Upload
randall-kuhn
View
218
Download
0
Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
1/33
1
Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of
Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
(Manuscript)
Randall S. KuhnUniversity of ColoradoInstitute of Behavioral Science*
484 UCB
Boulder, CO 80309-0494
Jane A. Menken
University of ColoradoInstitute of Behavioral Science / Department of Sociology
Boulder, CO [email protected]
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
2/33
2
Abstract
This paper studies the role of migrant social capital on children s education in Matlab, an
area of rural Bangladesh with high rates of rural-urban and international out-migration,
and high dependence on urban-rural and international financial transfers. A primary point
of focus is the role of social capital, or origin-area connections to current destination-area
residents, as complements or substitutes for investments in childrens education. Past
research shows how investments in childrens human capital act as a substitute for
retirement insurance in developing societies. In areas of high out-migration, however,
high social costs and risks associated with migration may reduce the parents perceived
marginal returns to educational investment. The current analysis combines household
survey data with a series of demographic surveillance data, predicting education among
current children in terms of past migration experience at the village level. We find that a
history of male migration in the village increases the likelihood of parental investment in
girls education, yet has no effect on investment in the education of boys, who are the
group most likely to actually migrate. These effects persist in the presence of controls for
household assets, which are likely to rise with the increased practice of migration by
members of the household or village. Girls in high out-migration villages achieve parity
with boys in terms of completing primary school, but remain significantly less likely to
complete secondary school. Although migrant social capital encourages parents to
allocate more of their household educational budget to girls schooling, household
budgets, as determined by assets, still play a larger role in determining daughters
schooling investments.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
3/33
I. IntroductionPast research has demonstrated the role of investments in childrens human capital as a
form of retirement insurance in societies that have achieved rapid economic growth and
high returns to human capital, yet have few formal social insurance mechanisms (Becker
1991; Lillard and Willis 1997; Willis 1982). In rapid-growth settings such as Taiwan in
the post-War era, increasing human capital investment encouraged further economic
productivity growth, leading to a cycle of simultaneous growth in investment and
productivity (Lee et al. 1994). In the case of Taiwan, rapid growth also facilitated a
complete quality-quantity tradeoff in investment in children, with fertility declining to
replacement-level in a single generation, and a complete transition from a predominantly
rural society to an overwhelmingly urban one.
For societies with less rapid economic growth such as Bangladesh, these tradeoffs
are clearly not complete, and individuals must make difficult economic choices that allow
to simultaneously pursue economic innovation while also minimizing risk. In
Bangladesh in the last generation, fertility has declined rapidly from 6.5 children per
woman to 3.5. Education levels have risen rapidly for both men and women, with
women beginning to close the gap with men (Figure 1). Following the male education
deficit associated with the 1971 Liberation War, the school cohorts of study in this paper
(20-25 years olds) will likely represent some of the last cohorts to display prominent
gender differences in education. Urbanization has also continued apace, with the
proportion of population living in cities expanding from 5% in 1960 to 24% today. None
of these transitions is complete, however, and extensive research suggests that all are
linked to one another. A body of evidence suggests that economic growth must add fuel
to this process.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
4/33
2
This paper addresses Bangladeshs incomplete educational transition, attempting
to measure the impact of migration experience, knowledge and exposure in a village on
parental efforts to educate their children. The research is conducted in the context of
educations complex role education as a potential outlet for investments in old age
support, as an engine of urban economic development, and as a precious resource that is
subject to sometimes extreme budget constraints. It focuses on two basic questions that
lie at the heart of national efforts at both rural and urban development. One is a simple
question that is not asked often enough: does migration affect educational investment?
The other is a difficult question that has no easy answers: does migrant social capital
enhance or supersede the incentive to educate children?
A first set of analyses will model the overall impact of migration experience on
childrens educational investments. These models will first address the impact of
migration on parental budget constraints. Does the economic impact of migration simply
make it possible to provide more education for children? Further refinement of this
model will account for the impact of wealth, and attempt to understand the more general
impact of information about and exposure to migration on educational investments.
A second set of models looks at differential educational attainment between girls
and boys, addressing questions about the relationship between migrant social capital and
human capital. Two major hypotheses prevail in this regard. First, that social capital, by
offering an entrepot to the city, enhances the value of parents educational investments.
If this were the case, then past migration experience at the village level should have a
positive effect on childrens education, particularly for those most likely to migrate, in
this case boys. Second, social capital may offer a reasonable substitute for human
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
5/33
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
6/33
4
child. Educational budget constraints act to limit parental ability to incur educational
expenditure, as well as to raise opportunity costs of having children in school instead of
working in household economic activities.
Migration may raise constraints on household budgets in two primary ways. First,
those who have migrated themselves are likely to have accumulated more assets.
Research on transfers of wealth and skills from rural-urban and international migrants
show that a significant portion of all income in migrant-sending areas such as Matlab
derive from migrant transfers, which play an important role in both household expansion
of landholdings, and preventing entry into a vulnerable period of debt (Gardner 1995;
Kuhn 2001b). A significant body of research has documented the extensive use of
transfer income to pay for childrens education (Massey et al. 1998).
Migration may also loosen constraints on the household budgets of non-migrants
living in villages with high rates of out-migration. Migrant financial transfers are often
expended locally, creating income multipliers that can affect the entire village economy.
In the case of international migration in particular, successful migrants may endow a
local school, generating a permanent impact on educational attainment at the village
level.
Migrant social capital complements education
Controlling for migrations effect on educational budget constraints, past migration may
have an effect on parental incentives to educate children through the introduction of
migration-specific social capital. Information, contacts and specific connections to labor
and housing opportunities may increase the returns to migration by enhancing expected
income and reducing the likelihood of unemployment for potential migrants (Boyd 1989;
Taylor 1986). As a form of capital that can only be vested through migration, migration-
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
7/33
5
specific social capital should only directly influence the fortunes of those most likely to
migrate, in this case boys.
Migration-specific social capital is also likely to condition a migrants likely
returns to education, but the direction of this effect is likely to depend on the structure of
urban labor markets and likely pathway through which social capital operates (ie.
increasing income expectation, or reducing unemployment risks). If social capital
generates a rising income expectation conditional on employment, this may in turn
enhance the value of education and other skills that increase expected earnings. If the
expected marginal return to an additional year of schooling is higher in the presence of
migration-specific social capital, parental incentives to invest in migrants education
would rise, and parents may focus their investments on the education of those most likely
to migrate. In some cases, investments in likely migrants may rise at the expense of
necessary investments in the education of other children.
Migrant social capital substitutes for education
In a context where the risks to returns on educational investments are higher, however,
evidence on the relationship between social capital and human capital is more
inconclusive. While social capital can enhance the value of education by converting
skills into better jobs, barriers to labor market entry may place a premium on social
connections at the expense of educational investment, particularly if the most readily
available jobs are not skilled professions. The risk of defection and a failure to remit
income, even by successful migrants, also places a premium on social contacts as a
means of ensuring migrant loyalty. Further, the risk of defection may create incentive to
provide locally-resident children with similar or greater years of schooling than migrant
children. In the context of migration from Western Mexico, human capital and social
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
8/33
6
capital are both useful for migration to urban areas in Mexico, while social capital had far
greater value than human capital for migration the United States (Massey et al. 1987). As
immigration reform laws increased barriers to entry and the risk of defection, migrant
human capital attainment continued to decline (Phillips and Massey 1999).
Research in Bangladesh finds a strong positive relationship between financial
transfers to the elderly and childrens education, but this relationship is subject to a great
deal of uncertainty (Kuhn 2001). While no political barriers separate urban and rural
areas, social barriers limit access to employment. Slow economic growth also leads to
persistently uncertain employment tenure and earnings growth. For these reasons,
qualitative respondents suggest that parental investments in childrens education are both
risky and best accompanied by strong social connections to current urban residents.
While urban social connections lower the risks of childrens employment and permit
greater parental control over children, older couples in areas of high migrant social
capital also tend to have a greater number and greater proportion of children participating
in urban labor markets, exposing them to greater risk of defection.
Taken in this context, social capitals role in reducing the risk of unemployment
and defection represent a reasonable substitute for educational investments. If migrant
social capital reduces the marginal impact of boys education on transfers by mitigating
the risks of unemployment, parents might prefer to emphasize the education of a group
less likely to migrate, such as girls. In a setting in which migration rates for boys are
high and rising and incentives to educate boys are diminishing, girls education
represents a powerful alternative for two reasons: 1) girls may be more likely to remain
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
9/33
7
near the parents household and remain in contact; and 2) the marginal value of girls
education may be higher as opportunities for womens migration emerge.
III. Data and Sample ConstructionStudies of childrens education in the developing world typically focus on attainment or
current school attendance for young cohorts that are likely to remain co-resident with
parents, thus avoiding any reporting bias for non-resident children. To study the impact
of migration intentions on education, however, it is important to capture achievement of
higher levels of education that are more likely to hold value in urban labor markets.
While qualitative research respondents in Bangladesh acknowledge that gaining a
primary education is important for migrants, secondary education is viewed as the most
significant threshold for gaining access to formal sector employment. Further, expansion
of educational infrastructure and incentives for daughters schooling have eliminated
male-female attendance differentials for current young school-going cohorts, with only
moderate attainment differentials remaining for the poorest households (Figure 2).
Gender differentials in current school-going cohorts are manifested primarily in the
tendency for girls to fall behind faster than boys, or to fail to move past secondary school.
The analysis thus focuses on the educational attainment of 20 to 25 year old children,
permitting an analysis of achievement of any, primary or secondary education for
members of this cohort.
The analysis includes data for all children, age 20 to 25, of adult respondents to
the individual adult questionnaire of the Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey
(MHSS). The MHSS, collected in 1996 by an interdisciplinary group from University of
Pennsylavnia, RAND and Harvard University, focuses on adult health and household
economic decision making. The primary sample of 4,632 includes two households from
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
10/33
8
a randomly selected 15% sample of all baris in the area served by ICDDR,Bs
Demographic Surevillance System (DSS).1 Within each sample household, the
individual adult questionnaire was administered to the household head, the spouse of
head, all members over age 50 and their spouses, and two additional members over age
15.
The MHSS data are unique, among other reasons, for asking respondents to
identify all non-householder children, both living and dead, providing childrens gender,
exact age (on June 1, 1996), educational attainment, location and information about
contact and financial exchange with the child. These data permit an analysis of
educational attainment for the significant proportion (24 for males, 19 for females) of
children in the sample who have moved away from home. While the females in this
group largely constitute marital migration episodes, the males are largely labor migrants,
among the most educated of the children covered in the sample (Table 1). Given the
focus on migration experience as the primary dependent variable, it is essential to capture
these children, but theyre presence raises concern over the precision and possible bias in
the parental reports.
The creation ofan analytic file employs both mother and fathers reports of non-
householder childrens education, as well as correction from demographic surveillance
records for the entire sample population. The initial file is constructed by combining data
for all children, of any age, from all parental reports of non-householder children and
household roster data for all householder children. These data are merged to individual
1 The within-bari sample consists of one randomly chosen household, and one based on a purposive selection processwhich gives preference to close kin. The analysis is weighted according to the likelihood of inclusion in the sample,
where households from large baris are under-represented.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
11/33
9
survey data for each available parent, and parental reportds are matched to one another.
If parental reports of non-household children generate a clear match (based on childs age
and gender), they are included in the file in an unduplicated form. If there is any doubt
about the quality of a match, both children are included in the file. This creates child-
level records for every child born to parents answering the individual survey, with
references to the parents household roster number or, if absent, their location. These
records are matched toparents age and educational attainment data from the individual
survey, as well as to parents household asset from the household economic survey.
While MHSS data are unique for collecting data on non-householder kin, their
added utility lies in matching the data to ICDDR,Bs Demographic Surveillance System
(DSS), which has recorded every birth, death, marriage and migration within the Matlab
Surveillance Area from 1966 to the present. DSS data provide village-level migration
data which constitute the primary set of predictors, and they address two major data
concerns inherent to the MHSS file. First, census data can be used to identify counts and
ages of children; second, census data can be used to update age and education data for
absent or deceased spouses in cases where only one spouse was available to answer the
individual survey.
While the model is designed to focus on the parental side of parental investments
in children, it is crucial to get the best possible estimates of the three categories of child
variable: own age, own gender, and counts of other childrens age and gender. One of
the greastest drawbacks to secondary report data, particularly in the LDC context, is
imprecision and frequent bias in age reporting data. For people born after 1966, DSS
census ages are based on records ofa childs date of birth, recorded within a month of the
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
12/33
10
event. While MHSS household heads were prompted with DSS roster data when
constructing the MHSS roster, non-householder children reports were not. As children of
respondents living the DSS area, however, a large majority of the non-household children
were born in the DSS area and have records that can be matched to their mothers
identification number. Using 1982 census data, supplemented with 1993 census data for
missing mothers or mothers with missing husbands, a roster of all living children is
generated for 1982, at which time the children in the study would range in age from 6 to
11.
MHSS child rosters are matched to DSS rosters by mothers and fathers
ICDDR,B identification number, and matched to subsequent DSS death records to ensure
that they were alive in 1996 or when last recorded leaving DSS. All householder children
are easily matched to their DSS records, leaving all remaining MHSS non-householder
child reports to be reconciled to DSS child reports; mothers and fathers reports are used
when available, but DSS records are held up as the gold standard. An iterative matching
process attempts to find the best match between the two data sources based on age,
gender and migration data from the surveillance system. Exact age/gender matches are
marked as correct matches and eliminated from the process. If DSS and MHSS child
gender counts match, and specific child ages match within three years, then DSS ages are
applied and a match is recorded. Next, if DSS and MHSS child gender counts match but
ages are not within a three year range, MHSS ages are replaced by DSS ages by gender
and age rank. Next, DSS data are used to settle conflicts between fathers and mothers
child counts by gender, and the preceding three steps of reconciliation are repeated.
Extraneous MHSS children that cannot be attributed to births to deceased spouses or
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
13/33
11
births outside the surveillance area are dropped, and the three age reassignment steps are
again repeated for these children. Finally, the few remaining unmatched DSS children
are retained with their DSS ages. Using these thoroughly updated child age files, we
produce counts for children over age 25 from the corrected data, counts for children
under 15 from MHSS rosters, and restrict the sample to children whose adjusted
DSS/MHSS age is between 20 and 25.
DSS data are also used, when possible, to correct missing parental age and
educational attainment reports. If one parent is missing from the MHSS data or if either
respondent parent provided no data for age or education, these data are garnered from the
1982 census or, if necessary, from the 1993 census. Since the youngest possible parents
in the sample would have been 30 years old (or 35 for men), these provide
comprehensive educational attainment data. If any age data are missing after the DSS
match, missing husbands ages are set to seven years greater than their wives, and vice
versa. Missing values for education are imputed to the median by gender, age and
village. Measures of fathers current or past migration status are also supplemented with
data from DSS out- and in-migration records.
Finally, we use DSS out-migration records to construct yearly measures of
migration at the village level. The measures focus on mens migration, because most
labor migration episodes during the period were mens moves. Census population counts
from 1982 and 1993 are updated to reflect changes due to death and migration, creating a
measure of men age 24 to 60 who lived in the village in each year from 1982 to 1996.
Out- and in-migration files are each coded to identify all moves to an urban center or
district headquarters (rural-urban migration), and all moves to another country. All
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
14/33
12
moves in and out are recorded for men aged 24 to 60 in each year, disaggregating by
rural-urban and international destination/origin. Rates of in- and out-migration are
summed to produce measures of gross rural-urban and international migration for each
village-year.
Gross village-level migration rates (hence referred to as GVMRs) are
characterized by wide variation between villages, but extremely high yearly correlations
within villages. Figure 3 shows the yearly trend in out-migration rates for Matlab as a
whole (weighted by total males age 25-60 in the village in the year), and for three groups
assigned by the GVMR in 1982. Given the high correlation of GVMRs within village, it
is important to capture the impact of migration rates at multiple points in time without
over-specifying the model. We do this by generating period and cohort measures of
rural-urban and international migration.
We calculate average GVMRs for a three year period centered on the 13th
birthday of the average age respondent (1986-1988), as well as the GVMR for the year in
which the respondent turned 13 years old. The first measure captures the level of
migration information and exposure experienced during a general period in which all
sampled children were of school age, the second captures a level of migration
information particular to children of a specific age. Since GVMRs are correlated over
time, period measures capture the migration experience of a much broader period than
just three years, while the one-year snapshot of age-13 GVMRs captures the effects of
rising or falling rates throughout the observation period. Because the period and cohort
GVMRs are highly collinear, they are entered in terms of a mean or permanent effect (the
period GVMR), and a difference or transitory effect (the difference between the age-13
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
15/33
13
GVMR and the period GVMR). In preliminary analysis, we tested broader definitions of
period and cohort GVMR and models in which only period or cohort measures were
included, all of which remained qualitatively similar to the results presented below.
IV. MethodsThe model focuses on the role of parental decision-making on childrens education. The
assumptions of the model, which are difficult to test under any circumstances, are that the
impact of child aptitude and desire on relative educational attainment do not interact with
the measures of migration exposure included in the model. The analysis would thus not
distinguish between the impact of migration exposure on parental educational
investments and the interaction b/w migration exposure and child characteristics.
The analysis centers on multinomial logistic regression models of child
educational attainment, focusing on three levels of attainment that hold societal
importance and are easily recalled by parents. Any schooling is a good measure of
parental intentions to educate, and is easy for parental respondents to distinguish from no
education. Completion of primary schooling (5 years or more) often involves a shift in
school location, carries some state recognition in low-level job applications, and is widely
recognized by qualitative research respondents as the level of education required for
gaining low-skill service jobs. Completion of a Secondary School Certificate (measured
here by 10 years of schooling or more) offers a credential and is widely recognized as the
minimum requirement for most clerical or skilled service jobs.
The analysis focuses on a sample of children aged 20-25 in order to maximize the
number of possible educational attainment categories. Students in rural Bangladeshi
schools often fall behind due to work obligations, the primary source of differentiation
for current schoolgoing cohorts, but many of them complete a level of school several
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
16/33
14
years later than would be expected in MDC educational systems. Samples that included
children that were too young to have completed a level would have confounded cohort
effects towards higher attainment and age effects of merely being old enough to complete
a level. Very few MHSS respondents completed an SSC after their 20th birthday, so only
a multinomial model for the 20-25 year old group can include four categories of
attainment (0, 1-4, 5-9, 10+).
We test multinomial and ordered logistic regression models of educational
attainment under this four-category definition. The basic model includes parent
characteristics, sibling composition, child age/gender, and period and cohort GVMRs.
The tables present the effect of each variable on the log-odds of finishing school in a
particular range of educational attainment (those in the 10+ group may still be in school),
as well as standard error of these effects. Tables present likelihood chi-square tests
indicating whether each additional group of variables adds explanatory power to the
model (as well as a pseudo-R2 for each specification).
A second specification for each group adds five-category measure of the value of
parents household assets, including agricultural land, livestock, homestead plot, rental
property and any non-productive assets such as jewelry. The asset controls account for
the wealth effect associated with a history of out-migration, as well as the tendency for
parents to educate sons first, while daughters education is more asset-dependent. Table
1 presents the mean value of assets (in taka=1/46 US dollar), period GVMR (1990-1992)
and mean sons and daughters education for each of the five asset quintiles.
Presentation of education models for all children will be followed by gender-
specific models that look at the differential impact of mens migration on boys and girls.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
17/33
15
Much of the difference between boys and girls will be captured in the intercept of these
models, and a positive effect on girls education at one of the intermediate levels could
indicate a number of explanations: that they are gaining more from migration than boys
and closing the education differential, or merely that their gains are occurring at a less
advanced transition (ie. from any to primary) than boys (who could be moving from
primary to SSC). The ordered logistic regression models will offer some direct
comparison between the overall effect of GVMR on educational attainment, but the rise
in levels cannot necessarily be interpreted as linear between the four levels of attainment.
The analysis concludes with a presentation of predicted education levels for boys and
girls under different village migration scenarios, employing a Multiple Classification
Analysis to account for the state-dependence between multinomial effects and their
predicted probabilities.
Regression models also attempt to account for the effects of endogenous selection
out of the sample ifboth parents were absent or deceased at the time of survey, the only
scenario in which non-householder children should be missed. We match 1982 census
data for all couples having a child between 6 and 11 years of age at the time (20-25 in
1996) to migration and mortality surveillance records for the intervening years to track
out-migration (and no subsequent return migration) or death for both parents. Two
logistic regression models predict the likelihood that both migrate or both die (ignoring
the rare cases in which one migrates and one dies) in the subsequent period. The
likelihood of both parents dying is predicted from a logistic regression model in terms of
parents age and education, as well as total household land holdings. The likelihood of
both having migrated and not returned is predicted from a logistic regression model in
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
18/33
16
terms of those variables, as well as a set of village-level controls. Predicted probabilities
for each event are matched to MHSS parent/child files, and entered as selection controls
in the model of childrens educational attainment. Since the selection criteria expects that
children cannot be in the sample if their parents are not available for survey, MHSS
respondents or roster entries age 20 to 25 are not included if neither parent was included
in the MHSS individual survey.
V. ResultsCombined Models
Table 3 begins with a four-category education model with no asset controls. Parental
education controls account for the strong relationship between parents and childrens
education. The relationship is significant and grows progressively larger for both
parents education, but the effect is stronger for mothers education, perhaps owing to the
greater differentiation in womens education for this generation. The effects of sibling
competition are limited when males and females are pooled, although having brothers
over age 25 reduces the likelihood of finishing 10
th
grade.
The gender effect for the ordered model shows that males are more likely to
achieve higher levels of education, while the multinomial model suggests a more
complex pattern. Males are more likely than females to have 1-4 or 10+ years of
education, but they are no more likely to have 5-9 years. This suggests that the pace of
educational differentiation among the 20-25 year old group differs for males and females,
as females move into the 5-9 group while boys move into 10+. The negative relationship
between age and 5-9 years of schooling also suggests that female advancement into this
group may be a cohort effect in progress; we test this directly in the gender-specific
models.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
19/33
17
GVMRs have strong positive effects on education, particularly at higher levels.
Children educated in villages with high period rural-urban and international migration
rates were significantly more likely to have completed 10th
grade. Cohort-specific rural-
urban migration rates have a further association with finishing 10th grade, suggesting that
incentives for educating children are greater still villages in which the migration process
is still growing. The likelihood of completing 5-9 years of schooling is also enhanced by
changes in the cohort GVMR.
These GVMR effects control for fathers own current and past migration
experience, both of which has no significant association with any level of educational
attainment. Fathers migration effects might be expected to capture a wealth effect, but
the measure of past migration may not be refined enough to indicate success. But the
result also suggests that the values and connections acquired while being a migrant do not
increase the incentive to invest in childrens education. It appears that it is not the
practice of migration itself that encourages educational investments in children, but the
possibility of migration. One explanation for this result is that the immediate connections
derived from a fathers own migrant experience may be sufficient to acquire employment
for a son, eliminating any need for enhanced educational investment. The children who
require education to get ahead in the city may be the ones who only hold the more
general association with past migrants capture by the GVMR. It is also likely that those
fathers who were successful in skilled professions requiring education may have found
permanent homes for their families in the city, and are thus not captured in the sample.
The second model specification introduces the asset measures to account for the
impact of migration on individual wealth and on the village economy in raising
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
20/33
18
educational budget constraints or promoting school development. The asset effects are
highly significant, but they also demonstrate the declining impact of assets when a level
of educational attainment becomes universal. Only one group has a higher likelihood of
achieving 1-4 years of schooling (4th quartile), and the asset variables have no joint effect
on achieving this educational category. For the top two categories, the lowest two
quintiles are statistically similar to one another, but the other three quintiles show a
progressively higher likelihood of completing either category, with a much stronger
relationship between wealth and achieving 10+ years of schooling. The ordered logistic
results bear out these findings, with progressively higher odds of moving up a category
for each of the top three quintiles.
The introduction of asset variables explains some though not all of the GVMR
effect. Their inclusion deflates the log-odds of international GVMR on the likelihood of
10+ years of schooling and on moving up a category in the ordered model, and all effects
for international GVMR are no longer statistically different from zero (at the p
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
21/33
19
male and female education. Educational opportunities appear to be constrained by the
presence of older same-sex siblings, with older sisters negatively affecting the likelihood
of girls achieving 1-4 and 5-9 years of education, and older brothers negatively affecting
the likelihood of all three levels of schooling for boys . Childs age does have a negative
and significant effect only on female education, supporting the claim that cohort changes
in female educational attainment were occurring during the period of analysis.
Asset effects differ for males and females, reflecting parents desire to give
educational priority to boys even in an environment of diminishing gender differentials.
Females in the second lowest asset quartile had an advantage over those in the lowest
quartile in achieving each higher level of education, and were the most likely to finish
with 1-4 years of education. The top three asset quartiles make up this deficit by showing
higher propensities for moving on to 5-9 or 10+ years of schooling, with large differences
between the 2nd
and 3rd
quartiles in particular. The top two quartiles appear to show little
difference between one another in female schooling.
Asset differentiation is far less for boys, with all quartiles equally likely to
achieve 1-4 years, and no difference between the bottom two quartiles in achieving any
level of education. The top three quartiles have incrementally higher likelihoods of
achieiving 5-9 or 10+ years of schooling. The 10+ effects are significantly smaller than
for girls, but 5-9 effects are of a similar scale, while the effects for the male ordered
model are significantly lower than for the female one. This again suggests that females
of this cohort in Matlab were making a universal transition towards completing primary
school, but were not yet catching up to males in terms of completing secondary school.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
22/33
20
The stratified models reveal distinct differences in the effects of GVMR measures
on male and female educational attainment. While GVMR effects for completion of 1-4
or 5-9 years are largely insignificant for both groups, we see that the positive effects of
village-level rural-urban and international migration experience on education, seen
above, are primarily focused on girls schooling. Period rural-urban and international
GVMRs have a strong positive association with girls reaching 10+ years of schooling,
and with girls moving up one level in the ordered models. No such effects are significant
for boys, and they are greatly reduced in size from the pooled models. Similarly, the
cohort-specific measure of rural-urban GVMR, while insignificant for boys, also has a
strong effect on girls reaching 10+ and on their moving up a level in the ordered model.
The results of ordered logistic regression models suggest that high and rising
GVMRs are likely to have a far greater impact on girls educational investment than on
boys. This supports the hypothesis that migration-specific social capital is a substitute
for investment in boys education, and does not appear to offer parents any increased
incentive to focus on boys education. It furthers suggests that security afforded by
migration-specific social capital allows parents to focus on educating girls, who may be
more likely to remain near the home.
Summary Predictions
The gender-stratified models suggest that the impact of village-level migration on the
education of a recent educational cohort unequivocally favors females, the group that has
been historically unlikely to migrate. Yet given the level of educational inequality that
had persisted in the cohorts preceding this one, most of these gains merely allow
daughters to gain ground on sons. Predicted probabilities of achieving a given level of
education are shown in Table 5, in terms of rural-urban VGMR, international VGMR and
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
23/33
21
asset values (for comparison). The composite indicator of rural-urban combines period
and cohort VGMR as if both were held at the selected quantile (eg. 25 th percentile
indicates a household in the 25th
percentile of period VGMR, and in 25th
percentile of the
cohort VGMR deviation; so migration rates in the village were lower than in most; and
that villages migration rates were lower in that year than in most).
These results show substantial gains for females, particularly in villages with a
high and growing practice of rural-urban migration. Yet most of these gains merely close
some of the gap with males. The proportion having 10+ years of schooling rises from
7.3% in low rural-urban migration villages to 12.3% in high migration ones, whereas
males, who show little change in the proportion achieving this level, complete 10+ years
27.7% of the time even if they live in low migration villages. Taken together, however,
female gains in the two top groups combined bring rates of primary school completion to
near equality with males. The proportion of girls completing primary school rises from
60.3 to 68.1% between low- and high-migration villages, putting them in range of the
proportion of males completing primary school (ranging from 67.6% to 70.5%). In
general, females in high out-migration villages are able to achieve parity in terms of
completing primary school, but can make only limited gains in terms of completing
secondary school. Similar but smaller effects hold for the impact of past international
migration on male and female education, for which there are even fewer incentives to
invest in male education, but also less relationship to female education.
Incentives such as migration-specific social capital play a significant role in
governing a childrearing couples child investment decisions, yet resources still play a
more immediate role. Table 5 predicts the powerful impact of parental assets on
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
24/33
22
educational attainment, particularly for girls. For boys, moving from the 2nd
to 4th
quartile of household assets increases the predicted probability of completing secondary
school from 33.9% to 43.4%; girls jump from 19.5% completing secondary to 36.2%.
Again with assets, girls never quite catch boys in terms of completing secondary school,
but their gains in completing primary school make them close to parity in this respect.
VI. ConclusionsThe preceding analysis has focused on two primary question regard ing migrations role in
parental decisions to invest in childrens education. First, does migration increase
parental incentives to invest in child schooling? The answer to the first question is a
definite yes. While basic controls for own past migration experience appear to have little
effect on educational investments, even net of wealth effects, measures of migration
experience during childrearing years have a significant appreciable effect on the level of
childrens educational attainment. Some of this can be explained by a wealth effect,
suggesting that migration, particularly of the international sort, does increase wealth and
loosen budget constraints. Much of the migration effect cannot be explained by wealth
alone, however. Changes appear to emerge in the structure of educational investment as
villages achieves high and growing migration rates.
The analysis of differences in boys and girls education attempts to pick up
where the first question leaves of, addressing the role of migrant social capital, or at least
migration history, as a complement to specific educational investments in migrant, or an
opportunity to focus investment elsewhere. In spite of a long and continuing history of
male temporary out-migration in the area of study, migration primarily impacted the
education of females, with positive effects for the level and growth of rural-urban
migration, as well as the level of international migration.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
25/33
23
In interpreting the meaning of these effects, it is useful to think separately about
the role of rural-urban and international migration on education. The effect of rural-
urban migration on girls education could suggest that parents were focusing on a shift
towards educating girls for future labor migrationwhile male migrant social capital
might be somewhat transferable to girls migration, there might be a premium placed on
enhancing girls human capital as the flow developed. This conclusion would be
tenuous, however, given that the 20-25 year cohort turned 13 between 1984 and 1989.
The ready-made garments industry, the first and primary source of urban employment for
young women, only emerged in 1990 and reached critical mass in the mid-1990s.
This suggests other possible explanations. It is quite possible that there is little to
be gained from further investment in sons education given the likely educational returns
to urban and overseas income. This is particularly true for international migration, which
as in many guest worker situations, appears to offer limited income returns to human
capital above a minimal level of education (Kuhn 2001). The strength of the
international migration effect for female education supports this. Another related
hypothesis suggests that daughters education may gain value as theirpost-marital role in
caring for parents expands. In an environment rapidly shifting towards two-child
families, evidence strongly suggests a move towards mobilizing all possible familial
resources in securing care in old age. With sons and increasingly daughters-in-law
leaving for the city or abroad, daughters are next in line. While parents may not find
education to be essential for this role, they may value it just the same, and exercise that
preference after at least one son has advanced in school. Finally, some of this result is
likely to stem from the mere emergence of a notion of daughters value and of womens
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
26/33
24
rights. While the government has made extensive efforts to finance the girls schooling,
it is clear that parents must always bear a burden of expenditure and opportunity cost. If
the average boy has achieved sufficient education to gain a job in an environment of
strong destination-area social connections, then the benefits of migration may be for this
increased focus on girls education.
The results of this analysis are encouraging from a policy standpoint, in that they
again assert that girls are catching up in Bangladeshi schools. They also address the oft-
held suspicion that most of migrations impact on the local economy comes in
consumption, asset expenditure or investing in future migrants -- not in supposedly
productive investments. The results suggest that not only does past migration have a
strong positive relationship with subsequent educational investment, but that this
relationship largely only applies for girls, the children who traditionally dont migrate.
The results do raise questions, however, about the effectiveness of parental educational
investments as a form of private transfer from the rural to the urban sector. If the limits
to economic growth have capped parents incentives to invest heavily in the education of
likely migrants, then urban productivity is unlikely to advance quickly, and the
development of a skilled service sector may be slowed. Stagnation of investment in
international migration further suggests a stationary role in manual jobs in overseas
destinations, generating only limited investment capital and insurance for rural areas like
Matlab that provide most of Bangladeshs guest workers. While this analysis does not
address change in education beyond the 10th grade level, it is suggestive of a leveling off
in the human capital pool. This again represents the difficulty in achieving complete
demographic and economic tradeoffs in the absence of economic growth.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
27/33
25
Finally, the results address some methodological and contextual concerns
frequently issues about research conducted in Matlab and other settings of high research
activity. Critics point to high overall levels of educational attainment and low gender
differentials in attainment as evidence of change induced by ICDDR,B, yet the results of
this paper suggest that while these changes occur more rapidly in Matlab than in some
regions of Bangladesh, they are certainly not merely the result of ICDDR,Bs presence.
Matlab, like most out-migrant sending regions of southeastern Bangladesh, benefits from
the transfer of capital and values associated with migration. Migration introduced the
capital necessary to invest equally in girls education. It also introduced new reasons to
invest in girls education, whether they remain at home or go to migrant destinations as
well. While ICDDR,B may have had a similar influence on values and labor markets as
migration opportunities, few parts of any country that have no such opportunities. Trends
such as gender equality and fertility decline are often manifest in Matlab before other
parts of Bangladesh, but other areas quickly follow suit because they are good ideas.
The methodology employed in this research would only have been possible in an
area like Matlab, where detailed origin-area survey data are supplemented by 36 years of
demographic surveillance data. These data provide precise ages not just for the current
resident population, but for anyone who can be linked to prior residence in the area.
Similarly, surveillance data allow the research to identify the extent of sample attrition
into a survey such as the MHSS, and model its causes accordingly. These and other uses
offer invaluable tools for social research when the quality of cross-sectional data is
limited. The opportunities afforded by 35 years of data collection justify any of the
changes that have occurred during the same period.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
28/33
26
References
Becker, Gary S. (1991). A Treatise on The Family, Enlarged Edition. Cambridge,MA:
Harvard Univerity Press.
Kuhn, Randall (2001). Never Far From Home: Parental Assets and Migrant Transfers in
Matlab, Bangladesh. Presented at Population Association of America Meetings,March 2001, Washington, DC.
Lee, Yean Ju, William Parish and Robert Willis (1994). Sons, Daughters, and Inter-
Generational Support in Taiwan. American Journal of Sociology 99(4):1010-1041.
Lillard, Lee A. and Robert J. Willis (1994). Intergenerational Educational Mobility:
Effects ofFamily and State in Malaysia. Journal of Human Resources 29:1126-1167.
Massey, Douglas S., Rafael Alarcon, Jorge Durand, and Humberto Gonzales (1987).Return to Aztlan: The Social Process of International Migration from Western
Mexico. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Phillips, Julie A. and Douglas S. Massey (1999). The New Labor Market: Immigrants
and Wages after IRCA. Demography 36(2):233-246.
Phillips, Julie A. and Douglas S. Massey (2000). "Engines of Immigration: Stocks ofHuman and Social Capital in Mexico" Social Science Quarterly 81(1): 33-48.
Willis, Robert (1982). The Direction of Intergenerational Transfers and DemographicTransition. Population and Development Review 8(3): 207-234.
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
29/33
27
Child's Location 0 Years 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Total
551 501 1154 455 2661
20.7% 18.8% 43.4% 17.1%
65 9 27 17 11855.1% 7.6% 22.9% 14.4%
108 78 149 98 433
24.9% 18.0% 34.4% 22.6%
14 23 51 44 132
10.6% 17.4% 38.6% 33.3%
(Code) 0 Years 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Total
227 259 753 217 1456
15.6% 17.8% 51.7% 14.9%
345 169 371 60 945
36.5% 17.9% 39.3% 6.3%121 65 164 52 402
30.1% 16.2% 40.8% 12.9%
3 4 10 4 21
14.3% 19.0% 47.6% 19.0%
In Household
Elsewhere in Rural
AreaUrban Area
Abroad
Table 1: Child's Level of Educational Attainment by Location
Males:
Females:
Elsewhere in RuralArea
In Household
Urban Area
Abroad
Asset Quintile N
Asset Value
(in taka)
Period Rural-
Urban GVMR
Period Int'l
GVMR
Girls' Mean
Education
Boys' Mean
EducationBottom Quintile 541 5861 2.21% 0.92% 2.22 3.64
2nd Quintile 558 31024 2.27% 0.73% 3.55 3.89
3rd Quintile 631 55217 2.24% 0.85% 4.52 5.37
4th Quintile 653 91173 2.28% 0.91% 5.74 6.81
Top Quintile 683 428507 2.22% 0.85% 7.82 8.63
Table 2: Selected Variable Means by Asset Quintile
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
30/33
28
Ordered Ordered
1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Logit 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Logit
-0.172 -0.35 -0.856* -0.487* -0.164 -0.209 -0.678 -0.343-0.335 -0.287 -0.388 -0.223 -0.33 -0.29 -0.392 -0.22
-0.415 -0.446 0.322 -0.003 -0.34 -0.396 0.344 -0.031
-0.628 -0.496 -0.565 -0.442 -0.619 -0.477 -0.575 -0.398
-0.109 0.218 0.075 0.092 -0.103 0.259 0.169 0.156-0.223 -0.199 -0.231 -0.128 -0.229 -0.214 -0.25 -0.135
1.591* 1.253* 1.064 0.122 1.518* 1.002 0.713 -0.062-0.715 -0.611 -0.69 -0.303 -0.721 -0.677 -0.773 -0.3810.03 0.009 0.034 0.015 0.028 0.004 0.025 0.012
-0.018 -0.015 -0.019 -0.011 -0.018 -0.016 -0.021 -0.012
-0.016 -0.001 0.007 0 -0.018 -0.011 -0.003 -0.004
-0.023 -0.019 -0.024 -0.015 -0.022 -0.019 -0.025 -0.015
0.172** 0.242** 0.351** 0.180** 0.160** 0.200** 0.293** 0.144**-0.049 -0.046 -0.049 -0.022 -0.05 -0.047 -0.049 -0.022
0.290** 0.441** 0.622** 0.287** 0.276** 0.413** 0.588** 0.261**
-0.084 -0.079 -0.083 -0.031 -0.085 -0.08 -0.084 -0.033
0.209 -0.182 -0.237 -0.195 0.154 -0.304 -0.363 -0.231
-0.307 -0.254 -0.315 -0.201 -0.312 -0.265 -0.329 -0.201-0.06 0.035 -0.238 -0.117 -0.03 0.061 -0.251 -0.136-0.216 -0.191 -0.232 -0.138 -0.216 -0.196 -0.24 -0.139
-0.275 -0.397 -0.915** -0.421* -0.306 -0.379 -0.848* -0.364
-0.303 -0.291 -0.338 -0.194 -0.303 -0.3 -0.345 -0.196
0.064 0.16 0.347 0.149 -0.009 -0.005 0.175 0.031
-0.257 -0.241 -0.282 -0.165 -0.258 -0.252 -0.286 -0.165
0.418* 0.196 1.166** 0.522** 0.448* 0.211 1.170** 0.499**
-0.183 -0.146 -0.185 -0.104 -0.184 -0.151 -0.189 -0.105
-0.017 -0.100* -0.043 -0.035 -0.014 -0.100* -0.045 -0.041-0.052 -0.045 -0.054 -0.031 -0.052 -0.047 -0.055 -0.031
10.261 12.153 20.572** 12.834** 10.155 9.88 16.407* 9.341*
-6.596 -6.551 -7.541 -4.607 -6.717 -6.972 -8.17 -4.7322.045 19.667 30.423* 17.836* 24.945 18.774 25.302 14.176
-12.99 -10.783 -12.965 -7.748 -13.18 -11.375 -13.831 -8.405
11.563 11.606* 17.546** 10.027** 11.158 10.069* 15.165* 8.264*
-6.129 -4.779 -5.734 -3.226 -6.193 -4.924 -5.93 -3.25
11.756 -8.667 -17.115 -8.323 14.297 -6.11 -17.234 -8.08
-8.701 -8.616 -9.822 -5.608 -8.802 -8.566 -10.723 -5.823
0.237 0.338 0.599 0.34
-0.247 -0.251 -0.35 -0.18
0.262 0.885** 1.536** 0.881**
-0.261 -0.241 -0.306 -0.173
0.569* 1.508** 2.241** 1.345**-0.287 -0.269 -0.342 -0.1860.496 1.875** 2.760** 1.582**
-0.363 -0.314 -0.362 -0.186
-2.527 -2.588* -3.578* -1.908* -2.103 -1.03 -1.415 -0.626-1.42 -1.234 -1.44 -0.796 -1.52 -1.309 -1.625 -0.906
-6.164 1.896 5.792 4.205 -4.451 2.568 5.475 2.772-10.57 -8.638 -10.095 -6.364 -10.525 -8.604 -10.304 -6.147
-1.876 1.258 -3.447 -1.924 1.411 -3.538
-1.656 -1.429 -1.836 -1.648 -1.489 -1.928
G1 301.6 (10) / 0.114**
G1+G2 341.8 (14) / 0.118**G1+G2+G3 381.4 (16) / 0.125**
G1+G2+G3+G4 392.3 (20) / 0.130**
G1+G2+G3+G4+G5 476.7 (24) / 0.159**Observations 3025
Table 3: Four-Category Models of Educational Attainment, Males and Females Combined
3026
221.0 (30) / 0.125**
272.7 (42) / 0.132**311.5 (48) / 0.144**
347.2 (60) / 0.151**
464.2 (72) / 0.181*
Father Lives Away from
Home
Father Migrated in Past
Mother Dead/Lives Away
Father's Age
Parental Individual Characteristics (G1):
Mother's Age
Father's Education
Mother's Education
Father Dead
Child's Age
Rural Urban, 1986-88
With Asset Controls
Any sisters >=25 Years
Any siblings
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
31/33
29
Ordered Ordered
1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Logit 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years Logit
-0.094 -0.058 -1.304* -0.407 -0.202 -0.368 -0.552 -0.343
-0.436 -0.392 -0.624 -0.292 -0.431 -0.365 -0.457 -0.269
1.094 -0.029 1.222 0.469 -1.581* -0.494 -0.124 -0.33
-0.791 -0.627 -0.795 -0.485 -0.703 -0.62 -0.726 -0.519
-0.291 0.201 0.097 0.151 -0.003 0.309 0.193 0.152
-0.37 -0.315 -0.399 -0.206 -0.293 -0.264 -0.284 -0.161
1.541 -0.11 1.622 0.488 2.413 2.804* 1.48 -0.22
-1.019 -0.998 -0.947 -0.488 -1.244 -1.126 -1.252 -0.491
0.03 0.006 0.018 0.009 0.024 -0.004 0.02 0.009
-0.024 -0.022 -0.029 -0.015 -0.025 -0.021 -0.026 -0.016
-0.025 -0.011 0.029 0.01 0 -0.009 -0.017 -0.012
-0.035 -0.026 -0.039 -0.019 -0.028 -0.025 -0.029 -0.019
0.222** 0.284** 0.340** 0.161** 0.104 0.113* 0.250** 0.142**
-0.059 -0.051 -0.061 -0.03 -0.059 -0.057 -0.055 -0.028
0.188 0.358** 0.570** 0.256** 0.330** 0.458** 0.605** 0.274**
-0.096 -0.085 -0.098 -0.045 -0.127 -0.125 -0.123 -0.043
0.388 -0.286 -0.2 -0.266 -0.03 -0.405 -0.344 -0.251
-0.449 -0.38 -0.572 -0.317 -0.41 -0.338 -0.372 -0.239
0.035 0.117 -0.285 -0.051 -0.027 0.051 -0.207 -0.126
-0.329 -0.287 -0.392 -0.209 -0.272 -0.246 -0.277 -0.17
0.422 0.263 -0.156 0.054 -0.939* -0.890* -1.369** -0.727**
-0.404 -0.373 -0.482 -0.239 -0.403 -0.389 -0.436 -0.276
-0.836* -0.700* -0.574 -0.403 0.577 0.517 0.669 0.391
-0.345 -0.32 -0.406 -0.209 -0.337 -0.314 -0.343 -0.223
0.009 -0.118 -0.123 -0.094 0.017 -0.047 0.038 0.006
-0.077 -0.069 -0.093 -0.048 -0.073 -0.068 -0.075 -0.042
13.324 17.545 31.430* 15.796* 12.168 9.199 11.701 6.211
-9.569 -10.026 -12.853 -6.655 -8.335 -7.758 -9.856 -6.042
12.992 22.268 43.750* 22.426* 35.824* 19.72 24.391 9.736
-17.685 -15.16 -19.08 -10.54 -18.192 -15.773 -17.576 -11.131
17.505 12.983 28.285** 12.011* 7.744 9.93 8.155 4.422
-9.017 -7.345 -9.385 -4.802 -7.924 -6.745 -7.805 -4.452
8.727 -3.794 -15.207 -4.426 19.689 -7.395 -16.539 -15.233
-9.62 -10.508 -14.797 -6.575 -15.985 -13.8 -14.428 -9.329
1.018** 0.991** 1.762** 0.861** -0.383 -0.227 0.084 -0.069
-0.361 -0.336 -0.62 -0.238 -0.311 -0.321 -0.387 -0.228
0.716 1.036** 2.373** 0.951** -0.196 0.725* 1.186** 0.748**
-0.376 -0.334 -0.538 -0.238 -0.357 -0.322 -0.349 -0.217
0.753 1.723** 3.430** 1.690** 0.387 1.358** 1.805** 1.050**
-0.404 -0.349 -0.555 -0.263 -0.376 -0.364 -0.42 -0.2270.438 1.764** 3.610** 1.792** 0.589 2.068** 2.686** 1.414**
-0.487 -0.427 -0.6 -0.279 -0.479 -0.414 -0.418 -0.217
-0.741 -1.33 -3.592 -1.47 -3.129 -0.766 -0.481 -0.028
-2.136 -1.822 -2.509 -1.186 -1.81 -1.727 -1.916 -1.153
0.415 -2.813 -12.531 -7.187 -12.636 7.33 17.301 13.075
-12.119 -9.966 -13.778 -6.782 -14.608 -12.225 -12.752 -8.437
-3.062 1.180 -4.328 -2.062 1.247 -2.871
-2.283 -2.006 -2.912 -2.281 -2.079 -2.467
G1 177.4 (10) / 0.129** 186.3 (10) / 0.116**
G1+G2 190.7 (14) / 0.131** 212.7 (14) / 0.123
G1+G2+G3 198.8 (15) / 0.135 212.8 (15) / 0.123
G1+G2+G3+G4 209.7 (19) / 0.143** 220.7 (19) / 0.127*
G1+G2+G3+G4+G5 270.3 / (23) / 0.177** 268.3 / (23) / 0.155**
Observations 1394 16321394
141.5 (30) / 0.151**
168.9 (42) / 0.157**
170.9 (45) / 0.161**
198.3 (57) / 0.173**
Father's Age
Multinomial Logit
Father Dead
271.5 (69) / 0.210**
Any siblings =25 Years
Rural-Urban, Age 13
International, Age 13
Child is Male
Child's Age
Asset 2nd Quintile
Asset 3rd Quintile
Asset 4th Quintile
Parental Assets (G5):
Asset Top Quintile
Predicted Probability, both
Parents out-Migrated
Predicted Probability, both
Parents are Dead
Selection Parameters:
Child Characteristics (G3):
Gross Village Migration Rates for Males (G4):
Rural Urban, 1986-88
International, 1986-88
Table 4: Gender-Stratified Models of Educational Attainment
Multinomial Logit
Parental Individual Characteristics (G1):
Sibling Characteristics (G2):
Mother's Age
Father's Education
Mother's Education
Father Lives Away from
Home
Father Migrated in Past
Mother Dead/Lives Away
212.3 (57) / 0.143
261.5 (69) / 0.177**
1632
Female Male
Log Likelihood Chi-Square / Pseudo-R^2 adding Variable Groups
163.5 (30) / 0.127**
196.9 (42) / 0.136
200.9 (45) / 0.137
Constant
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
32/33
30
Gender Level 0 Years 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years 5+ Years
Female 25th 25.2% 14.5% 53.0% 7.3% 60.3%
50th 19.9% 15.1% 55.1% 9.8% 65.0%75th 16.3% 15.5% 55.9% 12.3% 68.1%
Male 25th 15.5% 16.9% 39.9% 27.7% 67.6%
50th 13.3% 17.4% 40.8% 28.5% 69.3%
75th 11.8% 17.7% 41.5% 29.0% 70.5%
Gender Level 0 Years 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years
Female 25th 21.9% 15.7% 53.9% 8.5% 62.4%
50th 20.0% 15.3% 55.0% 9.7% 64.7%
75th 18.6% 14.9% 55.8% 10.7% 66.5%
Male 25th 15.1% 15.8% 41.2% 27.9% 69.1%50th 13.6% 17.0% 40.9% 28.4% 69.4%
75th 12.5% 18.0% 40.7% 28.8% 69.5%
Gender Level 0 Years 1-4 Years 5-9 Years 10+ Years
Female Bottom 19.3% 15.1% 55.4% 10.2% 65.6%
2nd 8.6% 15.7% 56.2% 19.5% 75.7%
3rd 8.0% 11.1% 52.7% 28.1% 80.8%
4th 4.8% 6.7% 52.3% 36.2% 88.5%
Top 4.5% 4.9% 50.9% 39.7% 90.6%
Male Bottom 13.1% 17.5% 40.8% 28.6% 69.4%
2nd 14.4% 14.2% 37.5% 33.9% 71.4%3rd 7.5% 8.6% 41.7% 42.1% 83.9%
4th 4.7% 8.6% 43.3% 43.4% 86.7%
Top 2.8% 5.9% 42.9% 48.5% 91.4%
Change in Period and Cohort Rural-Urban VGMR:
Change in Period International VGMR:
Change in Asset Ranking:
Table 5: Predicted Effect of Differences in VGMR and Assets on Education
8/8/2019 Migrant Social Capital and Education in Migrant-Sending Areas of Bangladesh: Complements or Substitutes?
33/33
Figure 1: Mean Years of Schooling: by age and sex, 1996/7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Age
Years
ofSchooling
Women
Men
Figure 2: Years of Schooling by Age and Sex, Matlab 1996/7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Age
Years
ofSchooling
Girls
Boys