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CHALLENGES IN COMMUNICATING

COMPLEX TECHNICAL ISSUES TO THE PUBLIC Chernobyl and Fukushima

Elena Melikhova, IBRAE, Russia

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Fukushima 2011

100 µSv/ h ≈ 1000 x 0,1 µSv/h (natural background )

Radiologist as an emergency communicator

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Chernobyl 1991Radiation protection professional as an emergency communicator

Mr. Brakhudarov

Intervention conceptMove inhabitants out onlyif lifetime dose > 350 mSv

The concept was qualified as genocide

Avg. dose mSv/y No. of resettled ppl

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Challenges

typical complains of technical experts

External

• Exaggerated fears• No trust

• No knowledge

Internal

• No easy answers (stochasticeffects, uncertainties in riskcoefficients etc.)

• No simple guidance(contradictive and misleadingnorms and regulations)

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www.ibrae.ac.ru

5

Exaggerated fears

Event Effect Facts Opinions

A-bombImmediate death 210 ths 300 ths

Long-term effects in86572 exposed survivors

421 750 ths

Chernobyl

Death in first 100 days 28 40 ths

Long-term effects < 60 250 ths

Fukushima *

Death in first months 0 20 ths**

Expected long-termeffects

0 (not expected) 100 ths

 © 2012IBRAE

Victims of radiation

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Distrust of scientists

Russia: 2001

distrust43%

don'tknow42%

trust15%

Do you trust / distrust scientists when theystate limited radiological consequences ofChernobyl?

Respondents - 560 risk managers in allregions of Russia

 © 2001IBRAE

Fukushima 2011

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No knowledge & interest

www.russianatom.ru 

Gamma dose rates at 209 automatic posts around 16

nuclear installations all over Russia, in real time

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Radiation situation in Fukushima

18%

82%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Используются  Не используются 

   %   с  т  а  т  е   й

Russia N=103

 © 2012

SCK•CEN 

 © 2012

IBRAE

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Radiation risk - no easy answers

• A total of up to four thousand

people could eventually die ofradiation exposure from theChernobyl nuclear power plant(NPP) accident

By the mid of 2005 there were lessthan 50 deaths that can be directlyattributed to radiation exposure:28 in first 100 days +12 in next years +9 kids died of thyroid cancer

Prognosis for 95 years after theaccident: from 0 up to 4000

Chernobyl Forum 2005

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Stochastic effects

• Risk = Probability of death (injury)

Barnaul, Siberia

Q: What is probability to meet amammoth in Red Square?

A: Either 1 or 0

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No easy answers

SPIEGEL interviewed Mr. Yamashita

• SPIEGEL: And to help people relax, you also said that

doses of 100 millisievert per year would be fine? This isnormally the limit for nuclear power plant workers inemergency conditions.

• Yamashita: I did not say that 100 millisievert is fine and

no reason to worry. I just said that below that threshold wecannot prove a higher risk for cancer. That is the evidencefrom research in Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Chernobyl.

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Scientifically ungrounded norms

• Dangerous dose = TV tower

• Permissible dose limit = a brick

Any excess over permissible limits

inevitably provokes anxiety and self-

protection behavior

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Glossary

for development EPI massages regarding radiation risk• Accident• Accident Protection• ARSMS• Impact on Health• Dose• Containment

• Protection Measures• INES• Incident• Iodine Prophylaxis• Radiation Sickness• Non-Standard Situation• Violation of Normal Operation• Exposed/Affected• Objective Data 

• Reactor Shut Down• Limits of Safe Operation• Radiation Monitoring• Radioactive Contamination• Radionuclide• Sanitary Protection Zone• Shelter• Background• Emergency Situation

 © 2012IBRAE

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Objective data

In natural sciences objective data are based onobservation, measurement or test that might bereconfirmed / corroborated

“ASKRO data are objective as the system of radiation

control works in automatic mode” 

from Rosenergoatom press-release

In social sciences data are objective if the content presentsnot personal but conventional point of view

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Risk Communication in Emergency

V. Covello and P. Sandman

Risk = Hazard + Outrage

Mental noise Caring / Empathy

Communication Goals

Enhance knowledge andunderstanding

Build trust and credibility

Encourage appropriatebehaviors and levels ofconcern

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Big picture questions

• Do we need to communicate complicated risk issues to the public in

radiation emergency?

• Why?

• enhance knowledge/understanding?• deserve confidence?

• prevent improper behavior?

• How plain should be the “plain language”?

• Is it important / possible to explain risk uncertainties and methods

to win out over “low-dose alarmists”?

• Is it possible explain risk and its uncertainties to those who did

not like math in school?

• Is it possible to harmonize radiation risk regulation at national and

international levels and make it an easy guide for the public?