May 2016 - Robert Musumeci

A Dissertation presented by Robert Musumeci in part-fulfilment of the requirements for the

obtaining of the degree of Doctor of Laws.

Faculty of Laws, University of Malta.

May 2016

THE DEVELOPMENT PLANNING ACT, 2016 –

A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

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ANNEXO

UNIVERSITYOF MALTA

FACULTYOF LAW

DECLARATIONOF AUTHENTICITY FORMASTER'S STUDENTS

Student's 1.0.: 29674(M)

Student's Name & Surname: Robert Musumeci

Course: LLD III

Title of Dissertation: The Development Planning Act, 2016 - A critical appraisal

I hereby declare that I am the legitimate author of this Dissertation and that it is my original work.

No portion of this work has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualificationof this or any other university or institution of higher education.

I hold the University of Malta harmless against any third party claims with regard to copyright violation,breach of confidentiality, defamation and any other third party right infringement.

As a Master's student, as per Regulation 58 of the General Regulations for University PostgraduateAwards, I accept that should my dissertation be awarded a Grade A, it will be made publicly available onthe University of Malta Institutional Repository.

Date

2

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Abstract

This thesis takes as its starting point the May 2014 document entitled ‘For an efficient Planning

System – A Consultation Document’,1 which document provided the foundations for the

prospective ‘demerger’ of the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA), proposing

that the ‘planning regime’ within the then current MEPA would be regulated by a new Planning

Authority which would handle both building2 and sanitary matters.3 In parallel, the

Environment Directorate within the MEPA was destined to be elevated to an autonomous

Authority, today known as the Environment and Resources Authority. The envisaged proposals

further provided for the setting up of an Environment and Planning Review Tribunal under

separate legislation, whose mandate was to hear and determine appeals from decisions taken

by both Authorities.

In July 2015, the Development Planning Bill (hereinafter also referred to as ‘2015 Planning Bill’

or ‘Planning Bill’), the Environment Protection Bill together with the Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal Bill (hereinafter also referred to as ‘2015 Tribunal Bill’ or ‘Tribunal Bill’) were

published and, after extensive parliamentary debating, became law. In this thesis the author

considers the legal ramifications consequential to the promulgation of the Development

Planning Act, 2016 and the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. In essence,

this study focuses on the administrative setup of the new Planning Authority, the permitting

process and the new Environment and Planning Review Tribunal.

Keywords: Planning, Development, Permits, Policies

1Parliamentary Secretary for Planning and Simplification of Administrative Process: For an efficient Planning System

– A Consultation Document (2014). 2The functions of the Building Regulations Board and the Building Regulations Office continue to be regulated by

the Building Regulations Act (Chapter 351 of the Laws of Malta) until the Minister so decides by virtue of Article

35(5) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 3Sanitary rules and regulations concerning buildings were previously found in Part V of the Code of Police Laws

(Chapter 10 of the Laws of Malta).

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Dedicated to my dear partner Consuelo for her continued support and dedication shown towards me in

the attainment of my Doctorate of Laws

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Table of Contents

Abstract........................................................................................................................................... 3

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................................... 5

Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. 8

Case Law ....................................................................................................................................... 10

Cases decided by the Planning Appeals Board .................................................................................. 10

Cases decided by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal ................................................... 11

Cases decided by the Court of Appeal (Inferior jurisdiction) ............................................................. 13

Cases decided by the First Hall, Civil Court ........................................................................................ 16

Table of Laws ................................................................................................................................ 17

Maltese Legislation - Acts ................................................................................................................. 17

Maltese Legislation - Bills .................................................................................................................. 18

European Union Legislation .............................................................................................................. 18

Parliamentary Debates ................................................................................................................ 19

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................................ 20

Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 21

1 General .............................................................................................................................. 21

2 Statement of research questions ....................................................................................... 22

3 Thesis Structure ................................................................................................................. 23

4 Method of research ........................................................................................................... 24

Chapter 1: Scope, Functions, Boards and Committees ............................................................... 25

1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 25

1.2 The Planning Authority ...................................................................................................... 26

1.3 The Executive Council ........................................................................................................ 29

6

1.3.1 The Executive Chairperson ................................................................................................. 34

1.4 The Planning Board ............................................................................................................ 36

1.5 Does separation of powers really exists? ........................................................................... 40

1.6 The Planning Commissions ................................................................................................. 42

1.7 Other Committees ............................................................................................................. 43

Chapter 2: Permitting and enforcement ..................................................................................... 46

2.1 What is development? ....................................................................................................... 46

2.2 Developments specifically exempted from the need to obtain a permit ........................... 47

2.2.1 Maintenance Operations ................................................................................................... 47

2.2.2 Use of land for agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry ............................................... 48

2.2.3 Change of use within the same use class order .................................................................. 49

2.2.4 Pre 1967 Developments ..................................................................................................... 50

2.2.5 Display of advertisements .................................................................................................. 51

2.2.6 Development Orders .......................................................................................................... 52

2.3 Types of permissions .......................................................................................................... 52

2.3.1 Outline Development Permissions ..................................................................................... 52

2.3.2 Full Development Permissions ........................................................................................... 55

2.3.3 Non Executable Permissions .............................................................................................. 56

2.3.4 Regularization Permits ....................................................................................................... 57

2.4 Owner consent ................................................................................................................... 58

2.5 Determination of planning permits .................................................................................... 60

2.6 Revocation of permits ........................................................................................................ 68

2.7 The removal of the Sixth Schedule ..................................................................................... 70

Chapter 3: The Environment and Planning Review Tribunal ...................................................... 75

3.1 General .............................................................................................................................. 75

3.2 An ad hoc Tribunal ............................................................................................................. 76

3.3 Functions of the Tribunal ................................................................................................... 78

3.4 Composition of the Tribunal .............................................................................................. 80

3.5.1 New powers enjoyed by the EPRT ...................................................................................... 86

3.6 Who and when one may appeal ........................................................................................ 88

7

3.6.1 Instances when applicants may appeal .............................................................................. 88

3.6.3 Special rights enjoyed by the Attorney General ................................................................. 95

3.6.4 Powers which were intended to be given exclusively to Environmental Non Government

Organizations (eNGOs) ....................................................................................................... 96

3.6.5 Special Powers enjoyed by the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage ................................. 97

3.6.6 Cumulative Appeal ............................................................................................................. 98

3.7 Principles of good administrative behavior ........................................................................ 99

3.7.1 The first principle of good administrative behaviour – fair hearing ................................. 100

3.7.2 The second principle of good administrative behaviour – timely decisions ..................... 103

3.7.3 The third principle of good administrative behaviour – procedural equality ................... 107

3.7.4 The fourth principle of good administrative behaviour – availability of information ....... 107

3.7.5 The fifth principle of good administrative behaviour – evidence admitted to be

available...... ..................................................................................................................... 108

3.7.6 The sixth principle of good administrative behaviour – Tribunal in a position to examine all

factual and legal issues .................................................................................................... 109

3.7.7 The seventh principle of good administrative behaviour – deliberations open to the

public.. ............................................................................................................................. 109

3.7.8 The eighth principle of good administrative behaviour – duty to give reasons ................ 110

3.8 Time to submit an appeal ................................................................................................ 110

3.9 Appointment of experts ................................................................................................... 112

3.10 Power to make corrections .............................................................................................. 112

3.11 The role of the Court of Appeal (Civil Jurisdiction) ........................................................... 113

Chapter 4: Conclusive remarks .................................................................................................. 118

4.1 Reconsideration of research questions ............................................................................ 118

4.2 Evaluation of thesis .......................................................................................................... 118

4.3 Areas for further analysis ................................................................................................ 123

Appendix A: Cases linked to Chapter 2 ..................................................................................... 126

Appendix B: Cases linked to Chapter 3 ...................................................................................... 137

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 144

8

Abbreviations

AAC – Agriculture Advisory Committee

AG- Attorney General

ART – Administrative Review Tribunal

COCP – Code of Organization and Civil Procedure

DAC – Design Advisory Committee

DC15- Planning and Design Guidance, 2015

ECF – Enforcement Notice

EIA – Environment Impact Assessment

eNGOs – Environmental Non Government Organisations

EPDA – Environment and Planning Development Act

EPRT – Environment and Planning Review Tribunal

ERA – Environment Resources Authority

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EU – European Union

GRTU – General Retailers and Traders Union

GSB – General Services Board

IPPC – Integration Pollution and Prevention Control

LN – Legal Notice

MEA – Malta Environment Authority (the Environment and Resources Authority was initially to be

known as Malta Environment Authority)

MEPA- Malta Environment and Planning Authority

MTA – Malta Tourism Authority

NGOs – Non Government Organisations

ODZ – Outside Development Zone

PA – Planning Authority

SCH – Superintendence of Cultural Heritage

SEO – Sanitary Engineering Officer

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Case Law

Cases decided by the Planning Appeals Board

Raymond Vella vs L-Awtorita’ Ta' L-Ippjanar, decided on 11th November 1994 by the Planning

Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 160/94 KA. ECF 339/94.28/2013]

Ray Bugeja vs L-Awtorita’ Ta' L-Ippjanar, decided on 30th January 1995 by the Planning Appeals

Board. [Ap. No. 131/94 RR. PA1048/94]

Anthony Borg et nomine vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp, decided on 18th April 1997 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 102/94 KA]

Charles Bugeja vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 19th July 2000 by

the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 627/98 SMS. PA 0656/98]

Biagio Muscat vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp decided on 2nd March 2001 by the

Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 224/00 KA. PA 952/00]

Pacifico Agius vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp decided on 23rd March 2001 by the

Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 468/99]

Dr. Gerard Spiteri Maempel vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza l-Avukat Dottor Joseph Zammit Maempel LL.D decided on 22nd October 2003 by the

Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 393/02 TSC. PA 0598/02]

Savio Spiteri vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 25th July 2008 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 222/04 ISB. PA 6293/01]

Kunsill Lokali Xewkija vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 24th July

2009 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 46/06 ISB. PA 6039/05]

11

Cases decided by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal

Jimmy Aquilina vs l- Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l- Ambjent u l- Ippjanar decided on 28th July 2011 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 232/10 CF. PA 5275/08]

Chris Vassallo et. vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza

Leonard Cassar decided on 13th October 2011 by the Environment and Planning Review

Tribunal. [Ap. No. 269/06 CF. PA 1176/00]

Grezzju Zahra vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 7th February 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 207/09 CF. PA 3907/06]

Angelo Abela kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar. Kristian Fenech Soler u

Pierre Nani vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th March 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 334/10 CF. PA 4939/08]

Godfrey Gialanze vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 21st June 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 171/09E CF. ECF 780/09]

Angelo Camilleri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st July 2012

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 647/11 CF.PA 0235/11]

Joseph Cuschieri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 2nd May 2013

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 165/12 CF. PC 0007/96]

Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided

on 2nd May 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 93/12E CF. ECF

472/11]

Annamaria Spiteri Debono f’ isimha propju u ghan-nom ta’ Caren Preziosi vs l-Awtorita’ ta’

Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Martin Testaferrata Moroni Viani f’ isem

il-familja Testaferrata Moroni Viani, decided on 13th June 2013 by the Environment and

Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 18/13 CF. DS 116/12]

Joseph Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 30th July 2013

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 347/12E CF. ECF342/12]

Stefan Vella vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 15th October 2013

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 214/12 CF. TR. No. 147273.

PA1996/08]

12

OSA Services Ltd vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 14th

November 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 177/13 MS. ECF

408/12]

Joe Cassar vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 13th March 2014 by

the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 49/12 CF. PA 3679/09]

Nicholas Cutajar vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 15th May 2014

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 200/13E. ECF 231/13]

John Micallef vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th June 2014.

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 94/09 CF. PA 5155/07]

Kenneth Bartolo, Frances Bartolo, James Camenzuli u Denise Camenzuli. vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 17th June 2014 by the Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 226/13 MS. PA 4917/06]

Annunziato Bonello Bianco vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 16th

September 2014 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 857/11E MS. ECF

539/11]

John Paul Grech vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29st January

2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 14/14E. MS ECF 329/13]

Godwin Abela u Lorraine Grech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta ghall-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in

kawza Edward Damato, decided on 30th April 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review

Tribunal. [Ap. No. 79/14 MS. PA3359/13]

Carmela Muscat vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 28th May 2015

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 23/15E MS. ECF2/15]

Charles Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 1st October 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 18/15 MS. DNO 1653/14]

Cristiano u Daniela konjugi Bagnaschi, Violet Mifsud, Ivan u Maria konjugi Micallef, Maria Stella

Callus, Katia Satariano, Ivan Mifsud Bons. kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar, u l-kjamat in kawza Frank Mifsud decided on 17th December 2015 by the Environment

and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 198/14 MS. PA 0712/14]

13

Cases decided by the Court of Appeal (Inferior jurisdiction)

Louise Anne Sultana vs Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta’ l-Izvilupp decided on 14th April 1997 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction).

Ġustu Debono vs Emanuel Buħaġiar, decided on 21st October 2002 by the Civil Court of Appeal Joseph Attard vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 28th October 2002

by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 13/01]

Max Zerafa vs Il-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta’ l-Izvilupp decided on 12th January 2004 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 20/2012]

Grace Borg vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th October 2009


Emmanuel Busuttil Dougall (bil-karta tal-identita` numru 848754M) vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 3/2010]

Joseph Tonna vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 24th February

2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 6/2010]

Godwin Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 14/2010]

Costa Brava Company Limited vs Dormax Promotional Printing Limited, decided on 28th March

2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 52/2004/2]

Carmel Pullicino vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 31st May 2012


Domenic vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 7/2011]

Emmanuel u Rita Muscat u Pauline Borg u b’digriet ta’ din il-Qorti datat 29 ta’ Novembru 2011 stante l-mewt ta’ Pauline Borg il-gudizzju gie trasfuz f’isem Rita mart Emmanuel Muscat, Joseph

Borg, Paul Borg u Raymond Borg bhala eredi tal-istess kif indikat b’nota taghhom datat 8 ta’

Novembru 2011. Vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza

Ghaqda Socjali Muzikali Kristu Sultan, decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 5/2011]

14

Eucharist Bajada ghan-nom tas-socjeta` Baystone Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u

l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap.

No.36/2011]

Michael Axisa ghan-nom ta’ Lay Lay Company Limited vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u

l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No.

22/2011]

Paul Polidano vs l-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by

the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 13/2011]

George Attard vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th June 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 51/2011]

Reverendu Joseph Tabone vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th

June 2012 by the by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. 58/2011]

Roger Vella vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th November 2012


Carmel Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 4th December


Frans Mamo vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 4th December 2013 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 193/2012]

Martin Baron vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Mario

Farrugia f’isem il-Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna decided on 22nd January 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 54/2013]

June Laferla vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2014 by

the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 36/2013]

Rebecca Darmanin Kissaun vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th

March 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 47/13]

Emanuel Formosa vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th June


Emmanuel u Rita Muscat u Pauline Borg u b’sentenza tal-Qorti tal-Appell tal-31 ta’ Mejju 2012 l-atti gew trasfuzi fl-eredi ta’ Pauline Borg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-

kjamat in kawza Ghaqda Socjali Muzikali Kristu Sultan, decided on 26th June 2014 by the Court

of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 72/2013]

15

Anne Marie Agius vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th

November 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 71/2013].

Marquis Dott. Anthony Cremona Barbaro u Chief Justice Emeritus Prof. John J. Cremona vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u kjamat in kawza Martin Camilleri decided on

27th November 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 41/2013].

Angiolina Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 11th

December 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 15/2014]

Michael Axisa ghas-socjeta Lay Lay Co. Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar

decided on 14th January 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 44/2013]

Mary Psaila vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2015 by

the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No.6/13]

Joseph Apap, Carmelo Zammit, John Attard, Rita Fenech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Maria Debattista ghan-nom ta’ Tourist Services

Limited Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent decided on 9th July 2015 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 16/15]

Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Carmelo

Borg decided on 5th November 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No.

42/15]

Pasquale Catuogno vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 10th

December 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 45/2015]

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Cases decided by the First Hall, Civil Court

Bunker Fuel Oil Company Ltd vs Paul Gauci et., decided on 6th May 1998 by the First Hall, Civil Court.

Decree given on 29th December 2016 by the First Hall, Civil Court in the Acts of the Warrant of

Prohibitory Injunction in the names of Jonathan Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar. [46/2016 AE]

17

Table of Laws

Maltese Legislation - Acts

Chapter 9 of the Laws of Malta – Criminal Code

Chapter 12 of the Laws of Malta – Code of Organization and Civil Procedure

Chapter 356 of the Laws of Malta - Development Planning Act

Chapter 413 of the Laws of Malta – Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act

Chapter 490 of the Laws of Malta – Administrative Justice Act

Chapter 504 of the Laws of Malta - Environment and Development Planning Act

Chapter 513 of the Laws of Malta – Building Regulation Act

Chapter 549 of the Laws of Malta – Environment Protection Act, 2016

Chapter 551 - Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016

Chapter 552 of the Laws of Malta – Development Planning Act, 2016

Legal Notice 171 of 1993 - Development Planning Act, 1992, (Act No. 1 of 1992) Advertisements

(Regulation) Order, 1993

Legal Notice 276 of 2012 - Environment and Development Planning Act (Cap. 504) - Daily

Penalty Regulations, 2012

Legal Notice 74 of 2014 - Environment and Development Planning Act (Cap. 504) - Development Planning (Use Classes) Order

18

Maltese Legislation - Bills

Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015

Bill entitled The Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2015 – Published July 2015

Bill entitled Development Planning (Health and Sanitary) Regulations, 2016 – Published April

2016

Bill entitled Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination) Regulations, 2016 – Published April 2016

European Union Legislation

Regulation No. 347/2013/EU on Guidelines for trans European energy infrastructure

19

Parliamentary Debates

Sitting No. 97 held on 27th April 1988. House of Representatives, Malta.

Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015. House of Representatives, Malta.

Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015. House of Representatives, Malta.

20

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Ivan Mifsud (LL.D.,Ph.D.) who was of great inspiration.

My heartfelt thanks also go to the Dean of the Faculty of Laws, Prof. Kevin Aquilina, for his

constant feedback during the course of this study.

21

Introduction

1 General

The Environment and Protection Act (Act V of 1991) was a first attempt to codify previous

fragmented environmental legislation under one umbrella. The said Act specified the duties of

the Minster responsible for the environment and inter alia dealt with legal provisions relating

to toxic substances, noise, energy control, environmental impact assessments and other

supplementary provisions. The following year, Parliament enacted what was considered to be

the first major step towards consolidating fragmented pieces of outdated planning legislation at

the time - the Development Planning Act (Act I of 1992) which was modelled to a large extent

on Sir Desmond Heap’s Town and Country Planning Act, 1969. Act I of 1992 repealed the

Building Development Areas Act (1983), then described as the ‘chief culprit legislation which

brought about the sporadic proliferation of buildings throughout Malta’.4 The Aesthetics

(Buildings) Ordinance, the Building Permits (Temporary Provisions) Act as well as parts of the

Code of Police Laws were concurrently repealed. Act I of 1992 also signified the shifting of the

Minister’s powers, who until then was responsible for the issuing of building permits, to an

‘independent’ Authority. Shortly after, the ‘independence’ of the Planning Authority started to

be questioned by commentators who considered the introduction of certain legal amendments

in subsequent years, particularly in 1997 and 2001, as a return of ‘ministerial intervention’.5

The year 2001 saw the consolidation of Act I of 1992 and Act V of 1991 into one piece of

legislation - Act VI of 2002. At this juncture, the Malta Environment and Planning Authority

(MEPA) was set up with the primary role to oversee both planning and environmental matters.

Subsequently, in 2008, the Nationalist administration resolved to undertake a ‘reform’ in the

MEPA directed towards more consistency and transparency in the development application

4Sitting No. 97 held on 27th April 1988 - House of Representatives, Malta. Parliament discussed a motion to revoke

a declaration of 18th June 1985 which declared various sites in Malta as building development area. 5Christopher Mizzi: MEPA Reform: A Critical Appraisal. A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of

Doctor of Laws - Faculty of Laws, University of Malta - June 2011.

22

process together with the strengthening of the enforcement arm within the same Authority.

The Environment and Development Planning Act (Act X of 2010 - Chapter 504 of the Laws of

Malta) was in fact enacted through Parliament in 2010, bringing about a number of

administrative changes within the MEPA. The salient changes included the setting up of four

independent Directorates (the Planning, Environment, Enforcement and Corporate Services

Directorates), the creation of a Chief Executive Officer, the introduction of full time

Environment and Planning Commissions including also the setting up of an Environment and

Planning Review Tribunal which succeeded the Planning Appeals Board.

In the run up to the 2013 general elections, the Labour opposition pledged that once it is

elected, the MEPA would be ‘demerged’ so that the planning and the environment regime

would then be migrated under the auspices of two separate Authorities. The publication of the

2015 Planning Bill, the Environment Protection Bill and the 2015 Tribunal Bill in July 2015 were

followed by an intense discussion and the relative laws were eventually enacted by Parliament

towards the end of that same year.

2 Statement of research questions

In this thesis, the following questions are addressed:

• What are the main changes brought about by the new legislation?

• How do the said changes reconcile with the aims of the legislator?

• How do these changes ‘interact’ with established case law?

• To what extent do these changes reflect the public’s criticism in furtherance to the

published Bills?

• Could the legislative product be better?

23

3 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into three chapters followed by conclusions. Chapter One explains the

administrative set up of the new Planning Authority. The Executive Council and the Planning

Board are discussed along with their respective mandate and composition. Particular attention

is given to the role of the Executive Chairperson who now heads the Executive Council. Further

on, the author delves into the role of the Planning Commission, which took over the role of the

previous Environment and Planning Commission. Finally, this chapter deals with the Agriculture

Advisory Committee and the Design Advisory Committee, both committees being novel to local

legislation.

In Chapter Two, the focus is shifted on the permitting process. Those developments which are

today exempted from the prior need of obtaining a planning development permission are first

highlighted. The discussion then shifts on the different types of planning development

permissions available under the new legal regime. The idea to remove the need for applicants

to obtain the owner’s consent at the outset of the application, eventually aborted by

Parliament, is also discussed. Emphasis is then shifted on the rules governing the development

permission decision process. Finally, this chapter deals with revocations along with the legal

effects following the removal of the Sixth Schedule previously found in earlier legislation.

Chapter Three concentrates on the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal, now found in

the Environment and Review Tribunal Act, 2016. The role and composition of the Tribunal are

discussed in detail whilst the author examines the jurisdiction enjoyed by the new Tribunal as

well as the instances when an appeal may be lodged thereto and from a decision therefrom.

Further on, this chapter focuses on the principles of good administrative behaviour, now clearly

identified in the said Act. The final part of this chapter is dedicated to the workings of the

Tribunal and the role of the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) in relation to Tribunal

decisions.

In each and every chapter, the research questions are constantly revisited and elaborated on.

24

The last chapter consists of a conclusion which outlines the envisaged impact resulting from an

analysis of the previous three chapters.

It should be noted that a number of equally relevant topics,6 also touched upon by the new

legislation, were not tacked in this thesis since the maximum word count was set to 35,000

words as per Faculty of Laws regulations.

4 Method of research

In conducting this research, the author made particular reference to the parliamentary debates

which preceded the Development Planning Act, 2016 and the Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal Act, 2016, established case law, authorative text books, academic articles and

the public’s criticism consequent to the publication of the Bills.

This thesis states the position on the 4th April 2016.7

6Topics which were not dealt with in this thesis include the following: New powers enjoyed by the Minister,

changes in enforcement procedures, changes in the procedures regulating approval of plans and policies and the

elimination of mediators and various committees previously found in the Environment and Development Planning

Act. 7The day on which the new Planning Authority was established.

25

Chapter 1: Scope, Functions, Boards and Committees

1.1 Introduction

The Development Planning Act, 2016 (also referred to as ‘new Planning Act’ or ‘2016 Planning

Act’), the Environment Protection Act, 2016 (also referred to as ‘new Environment Protection

Act’) together with the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 (also referred to as

‘Tribunal Act’) repealed the previous Environment and Development Planning Act.8

Article 3 of the new Planning Act puts the onus on government ‘to enhance the quality of life

for the benefit of the present and future generations, without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs, through a comprehensive sustainable land use planning

system.’ To achieve this aim, Part II of the said Act sets out six principles,9 described as

‘fundamental to the Government of Malta’. The following Article states that these principles are

‘not directly enforceable’ in a Court of Law but should nonetheless be ‘employed in the

interpretation’ of the Act.10

On the other hand, the Environment Protection Act, 2016 aims ‘to protect the environment and

to assist in the taking of preventive and remedial measures to protect the environment and

manage natural resources in a sustainable manner.’11

8Chapter 504 of the Laws of Malta - The Environment and Development Planning Act. 9The six principles, found under Article 3 of the Development Planning Act, 2016, are as follows:

‘(a) to preserve, use and develop land and sea for this and future generations, whilst having full regard to

environmental, social and economic needs;

(b) to ensure that national planning policies are unambiguous, accessible and clear to the general public;

(c) to deliver regular plans in accordance with the needs and exigencies from time to time;

(d) to identify regional planning shortcomings and address any problems found in relation thereto;

(e) to apply scientific and technical knowledge, resources and innovation for the effective promotion of

development planning;

(f) to consider public values, costs, benefits, risks and uncertainties involved when taking any decisions.’ 10Article 4 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 11Article 3 of the Environment Protection Act, 2016.

26

Consequently, the new Planning Act is concerned with the use of the land whereas the new

Environment Protection Act deals primarily with the management of our environment and

natural resources. Simply said, the responsibilities previously assumed by a single Authority –

the Malta and Environment Planning Authority (the MEPA) – will henceforth be handled by two

Authorities which shall work independently from each other, namely the Environment and

Resources Authority and the Planning Authority.

1.2 The Planning Authority

Article 5 of the Development Planning Act, 2016 provides that ‘the Planning Authority shall

consist of the Executive Council and the Planning Board’. The Executive Council and the Planning

Board are vested with different functions and their respective roles are highlighted in Articles

38 and 64 of the Act.

The new Planning Authority was designed ‘to perform and succeed to the functions which were

previously assigned to the Malta Environment and Planning Authority’12 in as far as planning

legislation is concerned. At the same time, the scope of the Authority was widened to embrace

new functions. Indeed, ‘the functions which were previously assigned to the Building Regulation

Board and the Building Regulation Office under the provisions of the Building Regulation Act’

have now been also assigned to the new Planning Authority13 though at Committee stage,

Parliament decided that such functions ‘shall only come into force from such dates as may be

established by notice in the Gazette, as prescribed by the Minister.’14 This signifies that building

regulations are still temporarily governed by the Building Regulations Act.15

12Article 7(2)(a) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 13Article 7(2)(d) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 14Article 35(5) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 states that ‘The provisions of Articles 33(2)(c), 38(1)(o), 62,

64 (1)(b), (c), (d) and (e), 77(4), 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91 and 92 shall come into force from such dates as may be

established by notice in the Gazette, as prescribed by the Minister.’ 15Chapter 513 of the Laws of Malta – Building Regulation Act.

27

On the other hand, the new Planning Authority immediately took over the role of the General

Services Board, in so far as sanitary regulations previously found in Part V of the Code of Police

Laws are concerned. This is possible now since the Development Planning Act, 2016 confers

upon the Minister or Parliamentary Secretary under whose portfolio the Planning Authority is

included with a power to make regulations, inter alia providing for any ‘sanitary’ matter16 and

concurrently he may also ‘amend, substitute or repeal any of the provisions of Part V of the

Code of Police Laws…. by order in the Gazette’ without the need to go to Parliament.17,18

Indeed, the Development Planning (Health and Sanitary) Regulations, 201619 shall eventually

replace the corresponding provisions in the Code of Police Laws. Certainly, the new sanitary

regulations are considered to mark a step forward in our planning system for different reasons.

First of all, sanitary regulations were long overdue, some of which dated back to the nineteenth

century. Moreover, the new regulations respond better to today’s socioeconomic realities,

making use of ‘recognized standards as established from time to time’20 while having regard to

technological advancements such as mechanically automated ventilation systems.21 Another

positive aspect to this change is that unlike what previously happened, the development

application process need no longer be stalled until a controversy on sanitary matters is settled

before the General Services Board because such sanitary issues are now dealt straightaway by

the Planning Authority with reservation to an eventual appeal before the Environment and

Planning Review Tribunal should the need arise.

16Article 85(2)(e) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 17Article 93(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 18Article 61(2)(o)(i) of the Environment and Development Act already provided the Minister with the power to

‘regulate buildings and the construction, demolition or alteration thereof, as well as any other matter relating

thereto, taking account of all relevant considerations, including safety, aesthetics, health, environment and

sanitation’. Therefore, the Minister could possibly enact sanitary regulations under previous legislation, even

though such power was never utilized. 19Bill entitled Development Planning (Health and Sanitary) Regulations, 2016 – Published April 2016. 20Article 10(1) of the Bill entitled Development Planning (Health and Sanitary) Regulations, 2016 – Published April

2016. 21Article 18 of the Bill entitled Development Planning (Health and Sanitary) Regulations, 2016 – Published April

2016.

28

The new Planning Authority will assume another role which, pending the introduction of the

Development Planning Act, 2016, has been alien to our legal system. Today, the Authority has a

role to ‘facilitate and coordinate the permit granting process for projects of common interest’.22

These ‘projects of common interest’ are rooted in Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 which in April

2013 was included to form part of the so called Energy Infrastructure package previously

proposed by the European Commission in October 2011. The said Regulation is inter alia aimed

to promote accelerated licensing procedures regarding the provision of electricity

interconnections and gas pipelines that connect an EU Member State to an Energy Community

Contracting Party.23 In fact, Article 8 of the said Regulation committed all EU Member States,

including the Maltese Government, to ‘designate one national competent authority which shall

be responsible for facilitating and coordinating the permit granting process for projects of

common interest’ by not later than 16th November 2013.24 Consequently, as a result, the

Planning Authority was identified in the 2015 Planning Bill as the ‘competent authority’ to this

effect. During public consultation which was triggered following the publication of the 2015

Planning Bill, the Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent25 maintained that “facilitating and

granting permits at the same time points to a confusion of roles and functions which would lead

to abuse.” On the same subject, planning consultant Dr. John Ebejer26 stated that “the role of

the Planning Authority is to process applications for development and not to ‘facilitate’ any

‘permit granting’’. At Committee stage, the Hon. Marlene Farrugia eventually moved an

amendment to delete draft Article 7(2)(d) altogether and introduce the text ‘to safeguard the

common good and to ensure that permits issued for land development are so issued in the

22Article 7(2)(d) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 23‘Adoption and adaptation of the Regulation No. 347/2013/EU on Guidelines for trans European energy

infrastructure and repealing Decision No. 1364/2006/EC ECS Note for the PHLG discussion in December 2013.’

downloadable from https://www.energycommunity.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/2496182/ANNEX_3_31st_PHLG_Regula

tion_347-2013_18-11-2013.pdf. 24Article 8 of Regulation (EU) No. 347/2013 which relates to organization of the permit granting process. 25Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent downloadable from

http://environment.gov.mt/en/decc/Documents/environment/MEPA%20online%20submissions%202015%20-

%20final.pdf - August 2015. 26Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Dr. John Ebejer downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015.

29

interests for the whole community’. But still, the Hon. Farrugia lost sight of the principal

purpose behind the said Article and came up with no alternative as to who should instead

oversee such role. Naturally, the said amendment would have eliminated the possibility for

government to meet the obligations set out in Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 and this latter

amendment failed to make it through the final Act. The author is of the firm opinion that no

one else but the Planning Authority is equipped with the necessary resources to ‘organize the

permit granting process’. The alternative, which however would have made little sense in the

circumstances, was to set up another ‘competent authority’ in keeping with the obligations of

the said Regulation.

1.3 The Executive Council

Part V of the Development Planning Act, 2016 is dedicated entirely to the Executive Council.

The various functions of the Executive Council are listed in Article 38(1) of the current Act and

include inter alia the provision of a centralized office where all development applications are

duly processed by case officers and recommended for either approval or refusal. The Council is

also responsible for the carrying out of national mapping together with street

alignments/levels. The said roles were previously assumed by the Planning Directorate within

the MEPA. Moreover, the Council handles the coordination of enforcement complaints and

enforcement operations, which functions were previously handled by the Enforcement

Directorate.

Although the Executive Council is now directly responsible for the said functions, it is obvious

that such functions would still need to be delegated to a duly equipped technical set up. The

only difference is that under the previous legislation, the Directorates and their respective

functions were specified in the law whereas, under the new Planning Act, the relative

Directorates are set up by the Council.

30

Additionally, the Council has the power to issue discontinuance and removal orders27 as well as

to issue scheduling and conservation orders.28 Plans and policies29, minor modifications

including planning control applications30 and development orders31 are also formulated by the

Executive Council. In the past, it was the MEPA Board who was responsible for these functions.

Article 36 of the Development Planning Act, 2016 details the composition of the Executive

Council. The Council is headed by an Executive Chairperson appointed by the Minister ‘for a

period of three years which may be extended for further periods of three years each’ 32 as

envisaged earlier in the Planning Bill. Subsequently, a provision was added at Committee stage

so that ‘a member who has ceased to be a member of the Executive Council shall be eligible for

reappointment, but no person shall be a member of the Executive Council for more than six

years.’33 It follows that now the Executive Chairperson can have his initial three year

appointment extended only once.

The Executive Chairperson is joined by six other members – the chairperson and deputy

chairperson of the Planning Board ex officio , two independent members ‘who shall be

appointed by the Minister’ and two members appointed by the Environment and Resources

Authority. The latter shall only be present ‘whenever the Executive Council is considering

matters related to policies, scheduling and planning control applications’. The Superintendent

of Cultural Heritage shall be called in when the Council is considering ‘scheduling, conservation

orders and emergency conservation orders’.34 Moreover, the ‘Executive Council at the

discretion of the Executive Chairperson’ may call in any of the observatory members listed in the

Fourth Schedule of the Act to participate in any appointed Council meeting.

27Article 56 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 28Article 57 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 29Article 41 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 30Article 63(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 31Article 55 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 32Article 37(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 33Article 36(5) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 34Article 36(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016.

31

Initially, the 2015 Planning Bill proposed that the independent members would be ‘two

permanent members who shall be well versed in matters related to building construction or

health and safety or building services’. More so, Dr. John Ebejer35 had also suggested that these

two same members should be “appropriately qualified” and insisted further that the law should

establish “the minimum qualifications for such members”. Considering that the Executive

Council deals primarily with technical matters, the latter suggestion appears to have been well

founded. Having said that, the Act did away with the suggestion that these two members are

required ex lege to have any specific expertise and in the final Act, the said members are merely

described as ‘independent’. Clearly, this indicates that the legislator wanted to have a wider

option as to the eventual appointees.

It is to be noted that the presence of Environment and Resources Authority members on the

Executive Council was also the subject of a long debate. The Dean of the Faculty of Laws,

Professor Kevin Aquilina,36 termed the status of these two members as “second class

members”. The issue arose due to the fact that Article 36(2) of the 2015 Planning Bill provided

that only four of the six members would be ‘permanent members’. Ebejer37 also questioned

whether “the MEA representatives are permanent, supplementary or called in at the whim of

the Executive Chairperson” though the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon38 had already given an answer in

Parliament:

“Fuq dan il-kunsill qed nagħmluha ċara li se jkun hemm żewġ membri tal-

awtorità l-ġdida tal-ambjent. Mhux li se jiġu konsultati okkażjonalment jew at

whims and wishes tal-membri l-oħra tal-kunsill eżekuttiv kif hawn min qed jifhem

imma se jkun hemm żewġ membri permanenti li jirrappreżentaw lill-awtorità tal-

35Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Dr. John Ebejer downloadable from http://environment.gov.mt/en/decc/Documents/environment/MEPA%20online%20submissions%202015%20-

%20final.pdf - August 2015. 36Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s Demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. - 29th July

2015. 37Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Dr. John Ebejer downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 38Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta.

32

ambjent. Dan qiegħed hemm u minkejja dak kollu li jingħad, juri l-importanza li

din l-amministrazzjoni, dan il-Gvern qed jagħti lill-ambjent….. fuq il-leġiżlattiv tal-

awtorità l-ġdida tal-ippjanar se jkun hemm żewġ membri permanenti li

jirrappreżentaw l-awtorità tal-ambjent. Dan qed ngħidu biex mill-ewwel naqta’

ras il-misconceptions li hawn. Naħseb li nistgħu ma naqblux fuq ħafna affarijiet,

imma fuq din għandna naqblu.…..Il-kunsill eżekuttiv li jkun il-policy making body

tal-awtorità l-ġdida tal-ippjanar se jkollu żewġ membri permanenti li

jirrappreżentaw lill-awtorità tal-ambjent. Dan għandu jassigura li kull policy - u

din hija importanti – tal-ippjanar se jkollha mill-ewwel, mill-conception tagħha,

mill-bidu tagħha, fit-tfassil tagħha, is-say ta’ min iħares il-bżonnijiet ambjentali

ta’ pajjiżna. …. Dan huwa punt li qed nagħmluh ċar mill-bidu nett li dawn iż-żewġ

membri huma permanenti, mhumiex qegħdin hemm biss għall-konsultazzjoni

imma se jkunu involuti fit-tfassil ta’ kull policy tal-ippjanar. Kull policy tal-ippjanar

trid tgħaddi minn kunsill eżekuttiv li se jkollu l-preżenza ta’ żewġ membri mill-

awtorità tal-ambjent li se titwaqqaf.”

In order to dispel any doubts as to whether the ERA members would only be “called in at the

whim of the Executive Chairperson” as previously thought, Parliament eventually amended

Article 36(2)(d), so that it is now more evident that the two ERA members ‘will always be called

in and without fail, to attend meetings of the Executive Council by the Executive Chairperson

whenever the Executive Council is considering matters related to policies, scheduling and

planning control applications’. Clearly, government wanted to convey the message that all

planning policies would still be vetted from an environmental point of view during the actual

formulation. Nonetheless, it may be equally argued that such ‘assurance’ is open to abuse as it

lies in the absolute discretion of the Executive Chairman to decide whether the matters under

consideration are related to policies, scheduling or planning control applications.

Furthermore, the 2015 Planning Bill had envisaged the possibility for the Executive Chairperson

to call ‘any other supplementary member’ representing any one of the entities listed in the

Fourth Schedule of the Act ‘to attend meetings of the Executive Council’. Here, the idea was to

also involve other government stakeholders in the actual formulation of planning policies. The

Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon quoted the outside catering policy as a test example, which policy was

being revisited by an ad hoc committee involving the MEPA, the Lands Authority, the Malta

Tourism Authority and Transport Malta. This committee was incidentally set up a few weeks

33

prior to the current Planning Act was discussed in Parliament and the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon39

took the opportunity to explain that the Executive Council would now provide a permanent

framework where similar policies may be drawn up with the joint participation of various

government stakeholders:

“….fit-tfassil tal-policies l-istess kunsill se jkun jista’ jlaqqa’ rappreżentanti ta’

entitajiet u rappreżentanti ta’ aġenziji oħrajn tal-Gvern. Hija xi ħaġa li rridu

nibdew inħarsu lejha b’mod open ended, li naraw li jkun hemm l-involviment tal-

stakeholders li huma entitajiet u aġenziji oħrajn tal-Gvern. Jekk qed nitkellmu fuq

xi ħaġa li hija ta’ interess u ta’ relevanza għal oqsma oħra tal-Gvern, x’hemm

ħażin li ninvolvuhom? Anke fil-preżent, ħdimna u qed naħdmu fuq l-outside

catering policy fuq public spaces. X’hemm ħażin billi ddiskutejna u tkellimna ma’

Awtoritajiet oħrajn, ma’ aġenziji oħrajn bħalma pereżempju l-MTA u Transport

Malta? Dik hija xi ħaġa li għandha twassal għall-approċċ iktar ħolistiku, approċċ

iktar komprensiv. Preċiżament il-liġi se tagħti l-fakultà li l-kunsill eżekuttiv ikun

jista’ jlaqqa’ rappreżentanti tal-entitajiet, aġenziji oħrajn tal-Gvern. Aħjar

nagħmluha tajjeb mill-ewwel, aħjar ninvolvu lil min huwa interessat.”

During public consultation, Dr. John Ebejer40 had underlined that it was not clear “which of the

Council Members will have voting rights”, and asked whether the supplementary members

would also be given such voting rights. This position was later clarified in the final Article

36(2)(e), which confirmed that the supplementary members who ‘shall be amongst those listed

in ‘the Fourth Schedule’ enjoy merely an ‘observatory’ status and therefore are entrusted with

no voting powers.

On the same subject, Perit Simone Vella Lenecker41 positively pointed out that “even with the

best of intentions, it may be very easy for the Executive Chairperson to fail to call in members

who are affected by a decision or a policy”. Apart from the two ERA members, who ‘will always

be called in and without fail’ with a right to vote and the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage

39Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta. 40Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Dr. John Ebejer downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 41Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Perit Simone Vella Lenicker downloadable from



34

who, following an amendment at Committee stage, shall ‘always’ be called in as an observatory

member ‘when the Executive Council is considering scheduling and conservation orders and

emergency conservation orders’, it is correct to assert that the other members are only called in

“at the whim” of the Executive Chairperson.

It should be further highlighted that the Environment and Resources Authority, which was

initially listed in Schedule Four of the 2015 Planning Bill, was eventually removed from the list

since its status on the Council was already dealt with in Article 36 of the new Planning Act.

More so, Heritage Malta, which was previously identified as one of the supplementary

members (this term was eventually replaced by ‘observatory members’) is now substituted by

the ‘Superintendent of Cultural Heritage’. Indeed, it was Din L-Art Ħelwa42 who during public

consultation insisted that “the list of supplementary members of the Executive Council should

refer to the Heritage regulator, that is, the Superintendence for Cultural Heritage and not the

heritage agency (Heritage Malta).”

1.3.1 The Executive Chairperson

The role of the Executive Chairperson is specifically dealt with in Article 37 of the new Planning

Act. As discussed above, the Executive Chairperson’s appointment by the Minister may not

exceed an aggregate of six years in total. Initially, the Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent43

opposed the idea that the Executive Chairperson could be dismissed by the Minister,44 insisting

that such proposal “flushes down the drain all sense of organizational governance in the

Authority”. The Kummissjoni argued that “if the Executive Chairperson in his/her conscience

cannot accede to a request by the Minister, then he/she may be simply dismissed.” On the

42Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Din L-Art Helwa downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 43Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from the Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 44Article 37(3) of the Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015.

35

matter under examination, Din L-Art Helwa45 reiterated that “the appointment/dismissal of the

Executive Chairperson should rest with the Parliamentary Committee for the Environment and

Development.” To counter act this criticism, Article 37(3) of the Planning Act was eventually

amended by Parliament so that today the Executive Chairperson may be only be dismissed by a

Resolution of the House of Representatives ‘at any time for a just cause.’ This signifies that

the Minister would still be able to take action against the Executive Chairperson should the

latter fail to meet his expectations. The apparent difference is that the Minister would have to

get Parliament on board prior to the Chairperson’s dismissal. In reality, today, this could be

much easier since the Prime Minister has within his portfolio the responsibility of the Planning

Authority and it is unlikely that the Members of Parliament of his own party would cross swords

with him.

The responsibilities of the Executive Chairperson are delineated in Articles 38(2)(a)-(f) of the

Act. These same responsibilities are principally directed to ensure ‘the implementation of the

objectives of the Authority as set by the Executive Council’46 and include inter alia the

supervision and control of the Directorates and departments ‘for the proper functioning of the

Authority’.47 Directorates, along with the respective responsibilities, are established by the

Executive Council.48 On the other hand, departments may, unlike the Directorates, be set up

directly by the Executive Chairperson.49 At face value, it is possible to argue that all the

executive power of the Authority is now concentrated in one office – the Executive Council.

Certainly, this idea does not bode well with those who fear that ‘power corrupts and absolute

power corrupts absolutely’. The situation was very different under the Environment and

Development Planning Act since the Directorates were then specifically established by law.

45Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Din L-Art Helwa downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 46Article 37(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 47Article 37(2)(a) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 48Article 39(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 49Article 39(2)(a) of the Development Planning Act, 2016.

36

In addition, the Executive Chairman shall ‘establish and co-ordinate working groups that are set

up from time to time to formulate policies, plans or regulations’.50 This implies that the

Executive Chairperson may choose to handle such working groups without prior endorsement

from the Council, although failure to do so, in my opinion, would not be desirable. Incidentally,

the Opposition spokesman on the MEPA Board had in 2013 publicly objected to the setting up

of a number of working groups appointed by the then MEPA’s Chief Executive Officer to

formulate policy proposals without the Board’s prior endorsement. Today, such an issue is

unlikely to crop up particularly on two grounds. In the first place, members of the House of

Representatives are not represented on the Executive Council. In the second place, the

Executive Chairperson, as already indicated, is not bound to seek any direction prior to the

appointment of working groups.

1.4 The Planning Board

The functions of the Planning Board51 are set out in Article 64(a)–(e) of the new Planning Act.

Essentially, the Planning Board shall be responsible for the issuing of development permissions,

taking over the decision role of the MEPA Board. Similarly as in previous legislation, planning

decisions would still be subject to an appeal before the Environment and Planning Review

Tribunal, whose decision shall be final unless an appeal is made to the Civil Court (Inferior

Jurisdiction) ‘on a point of law decided by the Tribunal or on any matter relating to an alleged

breach of the right of a fair hearing before the Tribunal.’52 This goes to show that Front ODZ’s53

statements to the effect that “government's demerger of MEPA will also give too much power

to the respective Minister, who can override Planning Authority decisions” were ill founded.

50Article 37(2)(b) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 51Article 63(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 52Article 39 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 53Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Front Harsien ODZ downloadable from



37

Moreover, the Planning Board is now tasked with additional powers which previously fell

outside the parameters of the MEPA’s competence. These include the ability to dispense with

or allow the relaxation of a requirement of building regulations and the examination of

applications for the issuing of licenses of masons and consultants in the building industry.

Nevertheless, the Planning Board shall be empowered to decide on such matters once the

Minister so decides.54

The Planning Board will, on the other hand, no longer assume certain functions which the

MEPA Board previously enjoyed. As already stated in the previous section, plans and policies,55

minor modifications including planning control applications,56 development orders,57

discontinuance and removal orders58 as well as scheduling and conservation orders59 are now

decided by the Executive Council - the policy making organ within the new Authority.

The Planning Board consists of a chairperson chosen from amongst five independent members

‘of known integrity and with knowledge and experience’ in different areas of interest. The other

Board members are as follows: one member chosen from amongst the chairpersons of the

Planning Commissions,60 two members of the House of Representatives nominated by the

Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition respectively, a member representing the

Environment and Resources Authority, a member nominated by environmental NGOs (eNGOs),

three public officers and a member chosen by the Local Council who shall sit on the Board when

a major project application lies within its boundary.

The independent members and the eNGOs representative shall hold office for ‘a period of not

less than three years’61 and ‘may not be removed from office except by a resolution of the

54Article 35(5) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 55Article 41 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 56Article 63(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 57Article 55 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 58Article 56 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 59Article 57 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 60The Planning Commissions shall be dealt with later. 61Article 63(5) of the Development Planning Act, 2016.

38

House of Representatives on the ground of misconduct or inability to perform the duties of their

office.’62 Likewise, members representing the Local Council have their term of appointment

expired once the Board decides the relative application63 whereas the two Members of

Parliament do not remain Board members once they are no longer elected members of the

House.64 On the other hand, the three public officers may be removed by the Minister’s whim

at any time.65 Clearly, this undermines the perceived ‘autonomy’ of the Board. The legislator

should have therefore considered whether such appointees are guaranteed the same security

of tenure entrusted to the independent members. In all cases, however, no member may serve

on the Planning Board for an aggregate period exceeding six years.66

Although the composition of the Planning Board appears to be the equivalent of the MEPA

Board, there are remarkable differences which shall be identified. Namely, Mr. Alex Vella, a

member of the Malta Ramblers Association, sat on the MEPA Board as an independent member

despite the fact that government was not then legally obliged to appoint a member

representing the interests of eNGOs. Today, the situation is different since the Planning Board

shall specifically have ‘a member representing the interests of environmental NGOs’ and who

shall be also nominated by the eNGOs themselves, although the said nomination would still

need to be endorsed by government.

For the first time, Local Councils are also represented in the permitting process, even though in

limited circumstances, namely ‘when the Planning Board is deliberating and deciding a major

application between the boundaries of that particular local council’.67 The Act also envisages

situations where a major project lies within multiple boundaries in which case the respective

Local Councils shall choose between themselves one person to represent them. In that case,

the members shall be nominated by the different Local Councils but then subsequently chosen

62Article 63(6) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 63Article 63(7) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 64Article 63(8) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 65Article 63(8) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 66Article 63(9) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 67Article 63(2)(h) of the Development Planning Act, 2016.

39

by the Minister.68 It is pertinent to point out that the Act simply states that the member must

be ‘chosen’ by the Local Council and fails to mention whether such member must be an elected

local councilor.

The environment regulator, namely the ERA, is also represented on the Planning Board and has

a vote on planning decisions. By contrast, the role of the former environment Directorate

within the MEPA was limited to recommending planning applications for a decision without

having a say in the final permit. Of course, this was understandable since the Environment

Directorate, then MEPA’s technical arm on environmental matters, could not act as a judge and

jury within one and same Authority. Following the MEPA’s demerger, the environment

regulator gained its autonomy and thus now may have a direct say in planning decisions.

In this respect, Front Harsien ODZ69 was therefore incorrect to conclude that “the proposed

legislation weakens civil society participation in decision-making processes”. If anything, the

direct presence of Local Councils and environmental organizations on the Planning Board

reflects a wider representation of civil society. Nevertheless, it must be recalled that both Local

Councils and the Malta and Environment Authority are ‘external consultees’ in terms of

Schedule Three of the proposed application regulations70 and are thus formally consulted

during the processing of each development application. So what would be the position if the

Local Council would have already expressed its objection to the application during its

processing? Would the Local Council representative be still eligible to sit in judgment? There is

no clear reply in our law. Such hypothetical scenarios are catered for under section 25 (2) of

the UK Localism Act (2011) which provides that ‘a decision-maker is not to be taken to have

had, or to have appeared to have had, a closed mind when making the decision just because the

decision-maker had previously done anything that directly or indirectly indicated what view the

68Article 63 (2)(h) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 69Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Front Harsien ODZ downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 70Bill entitled Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination) Regulations, 2016 –

Published April 2016.

40

decision-maker took, or would or might take, in relation to a matter, and the matter was

relevant to the decision.’ Nevertheless, no equivalent provision finds solace in our current

legislation. Thus, the legal situation where members express themselves prior to a planning

decision remains nebulous.

1.5 Does separation of powers really exists?

During the second reading in Parliament, the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon71 justified the

establishment of the Executive Council and the Planning Board as follows:

“Fil-liġi l-ġdida, wieħed mill-prinċipji fundamentali huwa li qed inħarsu lejn li jkun

hemm iktar separazzjoni tal-poter. Qed jiġi propost li jkun hemm organu li jvara l-

policies, li jagħmel il-policies. Dak nistgħu nsejħulu l-organu leġiżlattiv, il-policy

making organ, il-kunsill eżekuttiv imbagħad ikollok l-organu l-ieħor li jiddeċiedi l-

permessi li huwa l-planning board. Nerġa’ ngħid, jekk nagħmlu anoloġija legali

f’pajjiżi fejn għandek id-demokrazija, għandek dak li jista’ jitqies bħala l-

leġiżlattiv u dak li jista’ jitqies bħala l-eżekuttiv. Hija xi ħaġa li qed inħarsu lejha

biex preċiżament ikollna mhux biss separazzjoni ta’ poter imma wkoll

delineament ta’ responsabilitajiet li fl-aħħar mill-aħħar hija xi ħaġa meqjusa

standard, kważi kważi sine qua non f’amministrazzjoni pubblika.”

The Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon asserted that shifting the policy/executive functions away from the

permit realm reflects the doctrine of separation of powers embraced in our administrative

laws, though, in effect, the ‘separation of power’ is not complete as contended. Indeed, the

chairperson and the deputy chairperson of the Planning Board both sit permanently on the

Executive Council where planning policies are formulated whereas the ERA is represented on

both the Executive Council and the Planning Board. Consequently, the Executive Council is more

akin to a subset of the Planning Board which answers to a chief executive officer, who in turn

has ‘no say’ in permit decisions.

71Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta.

41

In practice, having an Executive Council consisting of six members (at times, seven once the

Superintendent for Cultural Heritage is called in) focusing on policy formulation should augur

well in terms of a more efficient planning system. This should be seen in the light that the MEPA

Board used to dedicate most of its time debating controversial planning decisions and thus

giving minimal attention to policy making. This can be confirmed from the fact that the MEPA

Board used to meet only once a week and its agenda was mainly directed to decision taking on

pending applications. As already pointed out, the Executive Council has also the possibility to

bring other stakeholders to assist it in policy making - a situation which was previously alien to

our planning system. Also, since the chairpersons of the Planning Board and the Commission

are both well versed with the issue of permits, their experience can be of great benefit to all

and sundry.

As clearly anticipated, the current composition of the Council was met with substantial

disapproval from both eNGOs and the Nationalist Opposition. In their reaction to the Planning

Bill, the Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent72 asserted that “the Council’s composition is weak

and should have had a wider representation on the same line of the MEPA Board.” The NGO

Din L-Art Ħelwa73, described the Executive Council as “the Planning Authority’s main board”

and further argued that the Executive Chairperson who “will assume all the functions of the

current Chief Executive Officer together with all the duties of the current MEPA Board and some

duties of the current Director of Planning” will be subjected to “reduced accountability given the

absence of an independent Board”. Din l- Art Ħelwa further warned that the “proposed system

is manifestly less transparent, with far too much power vested in a smaller, politically appointed

executive body and executive chairman” and went on to suggest that “the membership should

be increased to include at least five independent members, at least one member representing

eNGOs”. As an alternative, Din L-Art Ħelwa had suggested a rather complicated structure

72Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from the Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 73Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Din L-Art Helwa downloadable from



42

where a chief executive officer would be answerable to the Executive Council headed by

another chairperson.

In my view, the above criticism is not entirely justified. To begin with, the idea that “the

Executive Council is the Planning Authority’s main board”74 is a complete misnomer once the

Planning Board has the ultimate say in planning decisions. It is to be emphasized that the

Executive Chairperson has only a ‘right to be present and participate at all its meetings’ (of the

Planning Board), without the right to vote.75 Likewise, the interests of the environment are

amply safeguarded since two out of the six members sitting on the Council actually represent

the Environment and Resources Authority.

1.6 The Planning Commissions

The Planning Commissions76 are the equivalent of the former Environment and Planning

Commissions. The Commissions may determine all planning applications delegated to it by the

Planning Board, except for those listed in Article 75 of the 2016 Planning Act.77 There may be as

many number of divisions dealing with different type of applications as the Minister may from

time to time prescribe. In contrast with the former Environment and Planning Commission, the

number of sitting members shall be reduced from five to three. The members are appointed for

a period of four years which may be further extended to another four years and may be

dismissed in the same manner as the independent members sitting on the Planning Board. The

quorum of the Commission shall be two, in which case the Chairperson has a second or casting

74Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Din L-Art Helwa downloadable from http://environment.gov.mt/en/decc/Documents/environment/MEPA%20online%20submissions%202015%20-

%20final.pdf - August 2015. 75Article 11(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 76Article 65 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 77Article 75 of the Development Planning Act, 2016 provides as follows: ‘(a) applications in respect of an activity or

development of a national or strategic significance or affecting matters of national security or other national

interests; (b) applications in respect of an activity or development which could affect the interests of other

governments; (c) applications in respect of development which is subject to an environmental impact statement;

(d) requests for reconsideration where the decision to be reconsidered was taken by the Planning Board itself.’

43

vote.78 To avoid situations wherein a casting vote would be necessary, the legislator included a

supplementary member concurrently with the other three permanent members but who shall

only take part in the deliberations when any of the permanent members ‘cannot for any

reasonable cause, properly fulfill his duties’.

1.7 Other Committees

The Development Planning Act, 2016 saw the introduction of two Committees – the Agricultural

Advisory Committee79 and the Design Advisory Committee.80 Indeed, an Agricultural Advisory

Committee had already been set up in August 2014 following the promulgation of the Rural

Policy and Design Guidance81 but was not included in the previous Environment and

Development Planning Act. The Committee’s mandate was in fact clearly spelt out for the first

time in the Development Planning Act, 201682 whereby, presently, the Committee is not only

expected to evaluate proposals and provide expert advice in terms of sustainable agriculture,

but also to ‘collate information regarding applications related to agriculture.’83 This Committee

is therefore expected to collect information from the relative Government Departments on

behalf of applicants, which information may be required throughout the application process.

The Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon84 made the following observation in respect of the Agriculture

Advisory Committee:

“Xi ħaġa ġdida li se titwaqqaf ukoll bis-saħħa tal-liġi l-ġdida hija l-AAC, l-

Agriculture Advisory Committee..... din il-liġi se tipprovdi għal kumitat ta’

konsulenza dwar l-agrikoltura. Ovvjament mhemmx dubju - u hekk għandu jkun -

li l-għan ewlieni tiegħu se jkun li jassisti applikanti bdiewa u raħħala fil-ġbir tal-

informazzjoni fejn ikun hemm bżonn, imma wkoll għandu - u naħseb li huwa

hawnhekk fejn irridu nagħmlu l-quantum leap ilkoll kemm aħna - jħares ukoll lejn

żvilupp agrikolu aktar sostenibbli u li jagħmel aktar sens.”

78Second Schedule Development Planning Act, 2016. 79Article 66 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 80Article 67 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 81The said policy stipulates that certain rural development applications are required to be referred to the said

committee. 82Article 66(4) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 83Article 66(4) of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 84Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta.

44

The Design Advisory Committee (DAC) is another novelty in the new Planning Act. Nevertheless,

prior to 1992, planning permits were issued by the Planning Areas Permit Board (PAPB) subject

to the endorsement of an Aesthetics Board. The role of the DAC is to make recommendations in

relation to design in development applications related to urban conservation areas and major

projects and, unlike the aesthetics board, their recommendations may be overruled by the

Planning Board or Planning Commission as the case may be. The Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon85

explained that the idea behind the setting up of this Committee was to instill a culture in favour

of better aesthetic design. These were his observations in Parliament:

“Għall-ewwel darba wkoll qegħdin inħarsu lejn twaqqif ta’ kumitat ta’

konsulenza dwar id-disinn. Irridu naraw kif ma nibqgħux nitkellmu biss fuq il-

kwantità jew kemm hu l-għoli jew mhuwiex. Irridu nħarsu wkoll lejn il-kwalità.

Irridu nħarsu lejn kif se jiffittja l-element ta’ context driven kif għedt ftit ilu anke

fid-dawl tad-DC15 u rrid nitilqu minn kultura li għax il-perit issottometta hekk -

bir-rispett kollu lejn il-periti - allura jgħaddi.”

Although one should praise the legislator’s efforts, the role of the Design Advisory Committee

should have been extended to include sites within the development scheme and outside the

development zone, thus eliminating the possible impression that aesthetic quality is not of

major importance in such zones.

The Development Planning Act, 2016 concurrently saw the elimination of the Cultural Heritage

Committee which consisted of two panels – the Cultural Advisory Panel and the Nature

Advisory Panel.86 Din L- Art Ħelwa reacted to this by stating that “the removal of the Heritage

Advisory Committee reduces transparency in the processing of development applications.”87

Nevertheless, Din l- Art Ħelwa’s concerns are not necessarily factual since all development

applications will now be referred to the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage and the Malta

85Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015. House of Representatives, Malta. 86Article 37 of the Environment and Planning Development Act. 87Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Din L-Art Helwa downloadable from



45

Environment and Resources Authority for consultation at the outset of the application

process.88

88Regulation 8(1) of the Bill entitled Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination)

Regulations, 2016 – Published April 2016.

46

Chapter 2: Permitting and enforcement

2.1 What is development?

As a general rule, ‘any person, including a department of government or a body corporate

established by law’ wishing to carry out a ‘development’ is still required to obtain permission

from the Planning Authority, unless the Development Planning Act, 2016 provides otherwise.

The question that often arises amongst practitioners is the following: what constitutes

‘development’? The answer is found in Article 70 of the Development Planning Act, 2016 which

defines ‘development’ as follows:

‘Building, engineering, quarrying, mining or other operations for the

construction, demolition or alterations in, on, over, or under any land or the sea,

the placing of advertisements or the making of any material change in use of

land or building and sea’.

Essentially, the above definition is a reproduction of Article 67(2) of the Environment and

Development Planning Act. In Raymond Vella vs L-Awtorita’ Ta' L-Ippjanar89 the Planning

Appeals Board had held that the meaning of ‘development’ should, in any case, be given an

extensive interpretation. The Board observed inter alia:

“…..t-tifsira tal-espressjoni ‘zvilupp’ kif definita f'dan is-subartikolu ghandha

tifsira wiesgha hafna”

89Raymond Vella vs L-Awtorita’ Ta' L-Ippjanar, decided on 11th November 1994 by Planning Appeals Board - [Ap.

No. 160/94 KA. ECF 339/94.28/2013].

47

2.2 Developments specifically exempted from the need to obtain a permit

Under the previous planning laws, certain types of development were already exempted from

the need of obtaining planning permission. These are ‘maintenance operations’ subject to

certain parameters, ‘the use of land for agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry (including

afforestation)’ as well as the change of use of buildings or other land within the same class

specified in the use classes order. Additionally, developments orders which did not necessitate

a reply were equally exempted. In furtherance to the promulgation of the Development

Planning Act, 2016, the list has been widened to include emergency works carried out by

government, uses which subsisted continuously from a period when such use was not

considered illegal and did not require a permit, land reclamation carried out prior to 1994 as

well as pre 1967 development.

2.2.1 Maintenance Operations

As above indicated, maintenance operations ‘which affect only the interior of a building or which

do not materially affect the external appearance of the building…. and do not include demolition

and rebuilding works, irrespective of the location where such demolition and rebuilding works

are carried out’ were already considered exempted from permit requirements. Nevertheless,

experience has shown that it is not always an easy task to assess whether a particular

intervention falls within the said definition. Consequential to this, there are a number of

conflicting judgments. For example, in Annunziato Bonello Bianco kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar90, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal (EPRT) concluded

that the structural removal of a wall to pave way for a beam amounts to ‘demolition and

rebuilding works’ which go beyond simple ‘maintenance operations’ exempted from

development.

90Annunziato Bonello Bianco vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 16th September 2014

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal – [Ap. No. 857/11E MS. ECF 539/11].

48

In Godfrey Gialanze kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar91 the EPRT, on the

other hand, concluded that the ‘rebuilding’ of a concrete platform was exempted from the need

to obtain a permit after it held that the structure was in urgent need of repair. The Tribunal

found that the external appearance of the platform was to remain unchanged and the repair

works thus qualified as ‘maintenance works’ that do not necessitate a permit.

Although the approach taken by the Tribunal in Gialanze may appear sound on the face of it, it

is submitted that the Tribunal should have adhered to the letter of the law and dismissed

appellant’s claim on the premise that ‘rebuilding’ works require a permit despite any urgency.

Nevertheless, the legislator should explore the possibility of exempting applicants from the

need to obtain a permit for the reinstatement of dangerous structures in those cases where the

engaged perit ensures that a similar construction methodology would follow. This certainly

would be in line with the reasoning of the Tribunal in the Gialanze judgment.

2.2.2 Use of land for agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry

In the new Planning Act, ‘the use of land for agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry

(including afforestation), except where such use consists of the erection of buildings or amounts

to intensive raising or crops or animals’ shall equally remain exempted from the need to obtain

a permit. Since this part of the definition remained unchanged, there is still a quandary as to

whether animals can be kept in each and every niche on the island. It should be noted that the

terms ‘land’ and ‘buildings’ are used interchangeably as defined in the introductory definitions

of the Act. From the above definition, it follows – at least, in the author’s view - that the

management and care of animals should be exempted from planning permission, regardless of

location, provided that there is no ‘intense’ activity.

91Godfrey Gialanze vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 21st June 2012 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 171/09E CF. ECF 780/09].

49

However, in John Paul Grech kontra L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar92 the

Tribunal observed that the keeping of a horse in a residential garage still required a planning

permit since it constitutes a change of use in terms of law.

In this case, the Tribunal appears to have sought a practical solution to address the concerns of

the neighbourhood at the expense of disregarding the letter of the law. To avoid further

confusion, the law should identify those species which could be kept within a residential area

without the need to obtain a development permit.

Moreover, it is opportune to point out that ‘the reclamation of land for agriculture by the

deposit of material on such land which can be proven to have subsisted prior to 1994’ has now

been exempted from the need of obtaining a planning permit. It is however important to note

that the deposit of soil material should have ‘subsisted’ since a time prior to 1994. A new

permit is on the other hand required if the soil has been washed away over a period of time as

held in Angelo Abela kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar.93

2.2.3 Change of use within the same use class order

Uses carried out on ‘buildings or other land’ falling within the same ‘class specified in an order

made by the Minister’ remained exempt from the need of a development permit. The various

classes are now defined in Legal Notice 74 of 2014.94 That stated, certain uses, such as take away

outlets and auto dealers, are specifically excluded from any class category and thus require a

92John Paul Grech vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29st January 2015 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 14/14E. MS. ECF 329/13]. 93Angelo Abela kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar. Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani vs l-

Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th March 2012 by the Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 334/10 CF. PA 4939/08]. 94Regulation 3(2) of Legal Notice 74 of 2014 provides that a change of use within the same class category is

‘permitted development’ subject to prior development notification ‘ in the case when there is a change of use from

either: (i) Class 3B to Class 3A or Class 4B to Class 4A or Class 4C to Class 4A or Class 4C to Class 4B or Class 4D to

Class 4A or Class 4D to Class 4B or Class 4D to Class 4C or Class 5B to Class 5A or Class 5C to Class 5A or Class 5C to

Class 5B, or (ii) when activities identified under Class 1(c) or Class 1(d) are undertaken in addition to those activities

identified under Class 1(a) and/or Class 1(b)’.

50

permit despite the previous approved on site use being similar.95

Although the effects of the above definition appear quite straightforward, it has been the

subject of contrasting interpretations. For example, in Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani

kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar96, the Tribunal insisted that the

change of use from a store to a kitchen within a licensed catering establishment still required a

permit.

In the author’s opinion, the Tribunal gave a wrong judgment in search of a safe approach.

Although the respective room designations were indeed changed, the use of the building as a

whole remained the same, namely a catering establishment. Thus, I beg to differ with what the

Tribunal ruled in the aforementioned case, in particular that such intervention required a

permit on the basis that the approved plans showed different designations. For some reason,

decision makers always appeared hesitant to give an extensive interpretation of this provision

and the law as amended still fails to address this issue.

2.2.4 Pre 1967 Developments

‘Illegal works’ are defined as ‘any works on, in, over or under land, carried out after 1967 and not

covered by a development permission issued by an authority related to development’. A

contrario sensu, it ensures that works carried out prior to 1967 without a development

permission are construed as ‘legal’. Although there was no equivalent provision in previous

legislation, the MEPA had already on a number of occasions considered that buildings

constructed prior to 1967 were ‘legally established’. In Joe Cassar kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar97, the Authority submitted that the farmhouse forming the merits

95Regulation 4 of Legal Notice 74 of 2014 - Environment and Development Planning Act (Cap. 504) - Development

Planning (Use Classes) Order. 96Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 2nd May 2013

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 93/12E CF. ECF 472/11]. 97MEPA submission in Joe Cassar vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 13th March 2014

by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 49/12 CF. PA 3679/09].

51

of the appeal was ‘legally established’ on the basis that its construction dated prior to 1967.

Moreover, the MEPA used to issue compliance certificates with regards to pre 1967

development without the need for applicants to submit any permit documentation.

For a time, it was equally uncertain whether developments carried out prior to 1978 were

equally exempted from the need of a planning permit. This is because the Rural Policy and

Design Guidance 201498 introduced in 2014, provided that ‘any intervention, including land-use

change and land reclamation covered by development permission or that which is visible on the

1978 aerial photographs’ is considered to be ‘legally established’. This issue was eventually

clarified by the EPRT in Carmela Muscat kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar99 wherein it was concluded that such definition applies to pre-1978 development

forming part of a planning application which is assessed in terms of the Rural Policy. Hence, it

does not automatically follow that all pre-1978 buildings are ‘legal’.

Notwithstanding the aforesaid, one should note that all buildings that constitute an injury to

amenity by reason of their ‘appearance or structural condition’ are not immune from an

enforcement action in spite of their age. 100

2.2.5 Display of advertisements

As with previous Acts, advertisements still require a planning permit unless specifically

exempted by way of Legal Notice of 171 of 1993, which legal notice saw no amendments to it.

98MEPA: Rural Policy and Design Guidance Policy Document (2014). 99Carmela Muscat vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 28th May 2015 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 23/15E MS. ECF2/15]. 100Article 99(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016.

52

2.2.6 Development Orders

Development orders which do not require a reply remained exempt from the need to obtain a

planning permit. From the other side of the coin, those development orders which require

notification within 30 days may not be proceeded with prior to the issue of a notification.

Whatever the case, the Planning Authority should be very cautious to ensure that notifications

are issued in strict adherence with the law as these are otherwise deemed null and without

effect. This principle was clearly outlined by the EPRT in Charles Debono kontra L-Awtorita’ ta’

Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar.101

2.3 Types of permissions

The Development Planning Act, 2016 contemplates four types of permissions – namely, outline

development permissions, full development permissions, non-executable full development

permissions and regularization permissions.

2.3.1 Outline Development Permissions

Outline development applications were introduced by way of the 1992 Development Planning

Act and eventually abolished in 2010, only to be reintroduced six years later in the 2016

Planning Act. The current definition of an ‘outline development permission’, previously found in

the Structure Plan, is as follows: an ‘approval in principle to the proposed development’ subject

to ‘reserved matters which need to be included in a full development permit application or

applications.’ In an outline development permission, one is given a permit for a specified period

of time constituting a binding obligation on the Authority. This principle was evidenced

particularly in the judgment delivered by the Civil Court (Inferior Jurisdiction) in the names Dr.

Gerard Spiteri Maempel kontra l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar u l-kjamat

101Charles Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 1st October 2015 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 18/15 MS. DNO 1653/14].

53

in kawza l-Avukat Dottor Joseph Zammit Maempel LL.D.102

It is established case law that an outline permit is tantamount to a ‘vested right’ which

eventually overrules any emergent conflicting policy. Additionally, the reserved matters

highlighted in the outline permit should not be construed as a stumbling block for the issuance

of the full permit. These principles were highlighted in Eucharist Bajada ghan-nom tas-socjeta`

Baystone Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar103 and remain equally valid

under the current Planning Act.

Several eNGOs expressed dismay towards the reintroduction of outline development permits.

Front Harsien ODZ104 argued that ‘the Mistra experience has shown that commitments taken at

outline stage are difficult to revoke at a later stage’ adding that ‘it does not make sense to first

approve something in principle without providing the full details.’ The Kummissjoni

Interdjocesana Ambjent105 argued on the same lines, insisting that ‘when details are then

worked out and a full application is presented, the succeeding planning commissions express

dismay that their hands are bound because of a previous decision relating to an outline permit.’

By contrast, the GRTU106 took a totally different approach, expressing satisfaction at

government’s decision to reintroduce outline permits. The GRTU however insisted that once

the Authority issues an outline development permit, it should subsequently bind itself to issue

the corresponding Full Development Permit. Their views on this subject matter were as follows:

102Dr. Gerard Spiteri Maempel vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza l-Avukat

Dottor Joseph Zammit Maempel LL.D decided on 22nd October 2003 by the Planning Appeals Board - [Ap. No. PAB

393/02 TSC. PA 0598/02]. 103Eucharist Bajada ghan-nom tas-socjeta` Baystone Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar

decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No.36/2011]. 104Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Front Harsien ODZ downloadable from http://environment.gov.mt/en/decc/Documents/environment/MEPA%20online%20submissions%202015%20-

%20final.pdf - August 2015. 105Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Kummissjoni Interdjocesana Ambjent downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 106Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from General Retailers and Trading Union (GRTU) downloadable

from



54

“GRTU notes that the possibility to obtain an Outline Permit is being re-

introduced. Whilst GRTU views this as a positive move, it has reservations

regarding the weight being given to such permits. GRTU believes that once an

outline permit is issued, this should become binding. The difference between the

outline permit as proposed and a full development permit is just the fees paid to

the PA. Therefore once an outline permit is issued, a permit upon which

entrepreneurs might base important and costly decisions such as the acquisition

of property, it should become irrevocable and the applicant should only be asked

to pay the PA fees.”

In the author’s view, outline development applications must be viewed against the fact that

development briefs,107 previously introduced as an alternative to outline development

applications in 2010, proved to be largely unsuccessful. As a fact, the MEPA did not approve

one single development brief put forward by an individual applicant in the last six years.

Undoubtedly, however, as rightly pointed out by the GRTU, outline development applications

are considered to be an effective tool with which applicants may establish, with much a lesser

expense, whether the Authority would eventually issue the full development permit. Having

said that, the author tends to agree that outline permits should contain sufficient details and

reserved matters be clearly spelt out with a view to overcome potential ambiguities at a later

stage. In Parliament, the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon108 was of this same opinion. He argued as

follows:

“Xi ħaġa li tipprovdi l-liġi – u naħseb li fuq din jista’ jkollna diskussjoni fit-tul – hi li

se terġà tħares lejn l-introduzzjoni mill-ġdid tal-konċett ta’ outline development

permit, jiġifieri fejn inti, qabel ma tagħmel l-applikazzjoni sħiħa, qabel ma

tagħmel full blown application tkun tista’ tapplika għal permess outline. Kienet

teżisti fil-liġi mbagħad kien hemm diskussjoni u tneħħiet. Hawnhekk irridu

nagħmluha ċara li hemm differenza minn kif kien l-outline development permit

qabel u kif tħares lejh il-liġi l-ġdida. Fejn qabel forsi kellna esperjenza li għall-

outline develoment permit wieħed jissottometti site plan u erba’ Drawings fuq

fuq, illum qed nagħmluha ċara li jrid ikun hemm dettalji suffiċjenti li verament

wieħed ikun jista’ jevalwa fuqhom. Qegħdin inħarsu lejn dan għaliex jagħmel

sens ekonomikament imma fl-istess ħin irridu naraw li jkun hemm biżżejjed

107Article 65(1) of the Environment and Development Planning Act. 108Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta.

55

informazzjoni, kif għedt ftit ilu, li wieħed ikun jista’ jibbaża l-valutazzjoni fuqha.

Qegħdin inħarsu lejh f’każi ta’ proġetti ta’ ċertu daqs fejn l-iżviluppatur naħseb li

għandu jkun jaf jekk żvilupp huwiex se jkun aċċettabbli għallinqas in prinċipju

mingħajr ovvjament ma jkun daħal għall-piż li wieħed iħallas it-tariffi kollha mill-

bidu nett. Hija miżura li hija ntiża li wieħed jinkoraġġixxi l-investiment. Hija

miżura li kienet hemm imma tneħħiet u l-liġi ġdida qed tħares li terġa’ tidħol

b’mod differenti kif spjegajt li mhux sempliċement wieħed waddab site plan u

ħareġ imma jrid jagħti dettalji biżżejjed biex wieħed jista’ jieħu deċiżjoni. Naħseb

li iktar minn kollox, fil-fond ta’ qalbna lkoll nixtiequ li jkollna investiment

f’pajjiżna u li dejjem jinħoloq il-ġid.”

The legislator also deemed fit to limit the validity of outline permits to a period not exceeding

five years.109 In my view, such a period should have been restricted to two years since planning

policies are likely to change with time. As much as possible, one should avoid a situation where

decision makers are bound by an outline permit governed by a different policy regime.

2.3.2 Full Development Permissions

The Development Planning Act, 2016 deals with full development permissions in an identical

manner as seen in previous legislation. A full development permission is required before any

development can commence, whether or not preceded by an outline development permission.

Today, applicants may also obtain a full development permission through a ‘summary

Procedure Application’ which is in turn determined by the Chairperson of the Planning Board or

his delegate within six weeks from the publication of the application.

Summary procedures are only applicable to development included in Schedule Two of the

Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination) Regulations, 2016,

provided further that the proposal complies with all relevant applicable plans, polices and

regulations. It must also be pointed out that when representations are received within the

consultation period and the Chairperson of the Planning Board or his delegate deems that such

representations carry planning merits, the application would then undergo the entire planning

process and not be decided summarily. It should be noted that several developments, which

109Article 71(2)(a) of the Environment and Development Planning Act.

56

previously qualified under the Notification order regime, now need to be processed

‘summarily’.110 In turn, this implies that interested third parties may now appeal against such

developments, previously approved without the possibility of a third party appeal.

2.3.3 Non Executable Permissions

For the first time, the definition of ‘non executable permits’ was identified in a local piece of

legislation through the current Planning Act although the MEPA already had already issued these

type of permits. A non-executable full development permission is defined as a permit ‘which

approves the development but imposes conditions to be adhered to before a full development

permission is issued.’111 Typically, non executable permits are issued when the applicant is

required to effect a contribution towards the Urban Improvement Fund, an enforcement fine or

a bank guarantee within a set time frame and such payment is not made within the stated

period. On this particular matter, the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon112 made the following

observations:

“Punt ieħor innovattiv tal-liġi huwa li se jiġi formalizzat il-konċett ta’ dak li huwa

magħruf bħala non-executable permit. Dan huwa mezz kif ikun jista’ jinħareġ il-

permess imma x-xogħlijiet ma jkunux jistgħu jibdew sakemm l-applikant ikun

irregola ruħu mal-kondizzjonijiet li jkollu dak in-non executable permit. Dan

mhux qed nagħmluh b’kapriċċ imma għax ukoll fl-interess ta’ kulħadd għax hija xi

ħaġa li tista’ twassal għal aktar ċertezza legali.”

It should be noted that the validity of non executable permits runs from the publication of the

non executable decision and republication does not take place when the full development

permit is eventually issued.113 As a consequence, the time to lodge an appeal before the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal starts running from the date of publication in the

110Regulation 18 of the Bill entitled Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination)

Regulations, 2016 – Published April 2016. 111Article 71(2)(c) of the Environment and Planning Development Act. 112Sitting No. 287 held on 8th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta. 113Regulation 6(6) of the Bill entitled Development Planning (Procedure for Applications and their Determination)

Regulations, 2016 – Published April 2016.

57

Government Gazette.

2.3.4 Regularization Permits

Article 101(1) of the new Planning Act introduced the possibility for the Minister to make

regulations setting parameters by way of which an illegal development may be subsequently

regularized by the Authority subject to a fine. It should be noted that in drawing up such

parameters, the Minister is not bound by any other provisions found in the Act - the Minister

may for example decide that certain types of illegal development be regularized by way of a

regularization application regardless of the fact that such development does not conform to

sanitary regulations. Friends of the Earth114 described the said proposal as “a form of amnesty

for illegal development which is unacceptable.”

No similar provision was made in the Environment and Development Planning Act. Indeed, it

was only possible to obtain a ‘concession’ for certain types of illegal development which were

listed under Category B of Schedule Eight of the said Act and on the basis of which one was

then entitled to have a supply of water and electricity115 and further claim that an enforcement

notice should not be executed.116 That said, a concession was not tantamount to a sanctioning

permit as commonly misconceived.

Category A developments under the same Schedule Eight were also immune from enforcement

action if one were to claim such right. On the other hand, applicants having Category A

developments were still not eligible to be given water and electricity supply, unless such

development was first sanctioned. In fact, an application for ‘development permission

requesting amendments, alterations, additions or extensions’ relative to a site featuring a

Category A illegality had to have the illegality either sanctioned upon application or removed

114Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Friends of the Earth downloadable from


%20final.pdf - August 2015. 115Article 92(2) of the Environment and Planning Development Act. 116Article 91(1) of the Environment and Planning Development Act.

58

prior to the application.

Under the new legislation, there no longer is any reference to previous Schedule Eight

developments. Nonetheless, applicants will have an option to obtain a regularization permit

which carries the same legal standing of a full development permit once regularization policies

are in place. Eventually, a regularization permit would be immune from any possible

enforcement action and applicants holding such permits would be equally eligible to the

issuance of a compliance certificate.

Though this could be interpreted as a reward to past abuse, in reality it is my opinion that this

would give more positive results due to the explanation given above on account of the legal

uncertainties which shadow previous Schedule Eight developments.

2.4 Owner consent

The 2015 Planning Bill proposed that the owner’s consent at the onset of the application

process would no longer be required though applicant would still be obliged to inform the site

owner/s about his intentions to submit a planning application by way of a registered letter.117

Such proposal was deemed to be sensible particularly due to the fact that planning permits are,

in any event, issued ‘without prejudice to third party rights and shall not in any manner

constitute or be construed as a guarantee in favour of the applicant as to the title to the

property.’118 In Rebecca Darmanin Kissaun vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar119 had indeed held that a permit remains valid regardless of any real rights attached to

the property. In Joseph Apap et vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-

117Article 71(4) of the Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015. 118Article 72(1) of the Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015. 119Rebecca Darmanin Kissaun vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2014 by

the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 47/13 MC.].

59

kjamat in kawza Maria Debattista ghan-nom ta’ Tourist Services Limited120, the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) went a step further and reiterated that the Authority is not a Court

of Law and should thus distance itself from handling issues relating to legal title.

Regardless of the above, planning applications were still thrown out once it transpired that

applicants failed to obtain the relative consent from the relative site owner. In Savio Spiteri

kontra l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar121, the Court was presented with a

court judgment attesting that the owner of the property was not the one notified by applicant

at the outset of the application process. On the basis of such document, the Board concluded

that the application could not be processed further after finding that applicant notified a wrong

owner.

In Franco Debono kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in

kawza Carmelo Borg122 , the question relating to title was clearly not in dispute, so much so

that applicant himself notified appellant, the owner, with a ‘certificate B’. Yet, the applicant still

failed to obtain the relative consent from the owner. In turn, the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction) held that the Tribunal was obliged to assess whether applicant obtained the

relative owner’s consent so that applicant could proceed with his planning application.

The Debono and Spiteri judgments had established the principle that when a title is not in

dispute, the Authority (or the Tribunal as the case may be) are obliged to ensure that the owner

released his consent at the outset of the application. In the opinion of the author, such an

obligation should not be necessary once planning permits are issued ‘without prejudice to third

party rights and shall not in any manner constitute or be construed as a guarantee in favour of

120Joseph Apap, Carmelo Zammit, John Attard, Rita Fenech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-

kjamat in kawza Maria Debattista ghan-nom ta’ Tourist Services Limited Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent decided b on 9th July 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 16/15 MC.]. 121Savio Spiteri vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 25th July 2008 by the Planning

Appeals Board - [Ap. No. 222/04 ISB. PA 6293/01]. 122Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Carmelo Borg decided on

5th November 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 42/15 MC. PA 164/13].

60

the applicant as to the title to the property.’123 It was positive to see the 2015 Planning Bill

doing away with the need of such consent at the outset of the application. Nonetheless, Perit

Simone Vella Lenicker124 begged to differ, maintaining that “the system whereby the applicant

must declare that he has obtained the owner’s consent to submit an application for

development permission has cut out a significant amount of abuse.” It is not all that clear what

sort of abuse Vella Lenicker had in mind because, as held above, a planning permit does not

prejudice one’s title. However, government eventually decided to change track and reintroduce

the prior Article 68(1) of the Environment and Development Planning Act in its entirety as

Article 71 (4)(i) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 which inter alia provides that when the

applicant is not the owner of the site, he must notify the owner ‘of his intention to apply by

registered letter of which a copy has been received by the Authority and that the owner has

granted his consent to such a proposal’.

2.5 Determination of planning permits

Article 72(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 provides the mechanism of how planning

applications are to be determined. The corresponding section in the Environment and Planning

Development Act, namely Article 69, specifically provided that decision makers ‘shall apply

plans and policies’ and ‘shall have regard to material considerations and representations’. In

the new Planning Act, the previous text ‘shall apply plans and policies’ was substituted with the

words ‘shall have regard to plans and policies’. Also, decision makers shall likewise have regard

to ‘regulations made under the Act’, ‘any other material consideration, including surrounding

legal commitments, environmental, aesthetic and sanitary considerations, which the Planning

Board may deem relevant’, ‘representations made in response to the publication of the

development proposal’ and ‘representations and recommendations made by boards,

committees and consultees in response to notifications of applications.’

123Article 72(1) of the Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015. 124Comments on the proposed MEPA Demerger from Perit Simone Vella Lenicker downloadable from



61

Consequently, it follows that decision makers are now bound to take cognizance of plans and

policies on an equal footing as regulations, material considerations and external

representations or recommendations (including those promoted by the public).

Looking at decided Court judgments, it transpires that the effect of the text ‘shall apply plans

and policies’ in previous Acts was not always tantamount to laying primary importance on plans

and policies. For many years, certain decision makers, not least the Court, showed a tendency

to first assess whether there were any material considerations which could have a bearing on

planning matters, such as surrounding commitment, and were it to result in the affirmative, the

permit would be approved regardless of policy stipulations.125 For example, in Charles Bugeja

vs Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll tal-Izvilupp,126 the then Planning Appeals Board ordered the

Authority to issue a permit for additional floors over and above the policy height limitation

once it was established that the street was committed with similar development. Although the

policy was clearly being violated, the permit was justified on the premise that the design was in

keeping with the streetscape.

The same approach was adopted in Joseph Muscat kontra l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar.127 The Planning Appeals Board acknowledged that the proposal was not

in line with policy requirements and despite, still ordered the Authority to issue the permit on

the basis that similar permits were issued in the vicinity. In this case, the Board held that

appellants should receive equal treatment even though the site was located outside the

development zone and there was no specific policy at the time to justify infill development in

such locations. Consequently, the Board reasoned out that ‘equal treatment’ was tantamount

125It should be noted that on a number of occasions, the Planning Appeals Board has reasoned out differently,

giving preference to plans and policies over any other consideration - vide for instance Pacifico Agius vs l-

Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp decided by the Planning Appeals Board on 23rd March 2001 - [Ap. No.

468/99]. 126Charles Bugeja vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 19th July 2000 by the Planning

Appeals Board - [Ap. No. PAB 627/98 SMS PA 0656/98]. 127Joseph Muscat vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 18th May 2005 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction).

62

to a ‘material consideration’ which could not be omitted from the decision equation.

The same legal reasoning was adopted by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) in a number

of subsequent judgments. In Joseph Tonna vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar.128 The Court held that the Tribunal was bound to first and foremost assess whether

there was similar industrial commitment in the area, even more once the Authority had

admitted in a previous case that the area under consideration was ‘committed with industrial

use, including a concrete batching plant’. Consequently, the Court ordered the Tribunal to

assess the effect of commitment in the light of the Local Plan.

In a string of judgments which were given prior to the enactment of section 69 of the

Environment and Development Planning Act, the Court maintained that decision makers had

the ‘setgha gurisdizzjonali’ to depart from established local plan height limitations on the basis

of surrounding commitment. For instance, in Grace Borg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar129, it was held that:

“Din il-Qorti jidhrilha li kemm l-Awtorita’ ta’ l-Ippjanar kif ukoll il-Bord ta’ l-

Appell dwar l-Ippjanar, it-tnejn ghandhom is-setgha, minghajr ma jbiddlu it-

Temporary Provision Schemes li jevalwaw kull kaz fuq il-mertu u fuq il-fattispecie

proprji tieghu. Inoltre, fejn ikun jirrizulta car li hemm cirkostanzi specjali ta’

commitment, kemm l-Awtorita’ u kif ukoll il-Bord ghandhom is-setgha

gurisdizzjonali li johorgu permess ta’ zvilupp li jkun jiddipartixxi, per ezempju mill-

maximum height limitation imposti fit-temporary provision schemes.”

Nonetheless, this “setgha guridizzjonali” was eventually curtailed after the enactment of the

Environment and Development Planning Act, once section 69 of the said Act established that

‘no such material consideration including commitment from other buildings in the surroundings

128Joseph Tonna vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 6/2010]. 129Grace Borg vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th October 2009 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 6/2009].

63

may be interpreted or used to increase the height limitation set out in a plan.’ 130 But, one would

naturally ask: were decision makers still bound by ‘other’ material considerations, not being

commitment above the set height limitation? The answer was given in Roger Vella vs l-

Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar.131 Here, the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction) maintained that commitment considerations were to be ignored only in as far as

height limitations are concerned, reiterating that decision makers were still required to have

full regard to ‘other’ material considerations. The Court observed as follows:

“Llum il-commitment gie eskluz (ghall-applikazzjonijiet li dahlu wara li gie in

vigore l-Kap. 504) ghal dak li huwa massimu ta’ gholi permessibbli, izda l-

legislatur ma’ estendiex dan ghal kull konsiderazzjoni ohra.”

In a number of subsequent judgments, the Court reiterated that decision makers could not

choose to ignore ‘commitment’ from the decision equation and instead limit their assessment

solely on what is provided in the Local Plans.132

The above decisions established an unequivocal principle – namely, that decision makers may

not rely on plans and/or policies and set aside ‘material considerations’. But in actual fact, the

Court’s raison d’etre gave rise to a great deal of uncertainty. For instance, how could one apply

the relative rural policy, which inter alia militates against further urban sprawl, and

concurrently have regard to the surrounding built commitment?

Indeed, the more recent case law which immediately preceded the Development Planning Act,

2016 discarded the above reasoning altogether. Particularly in the case Emanuel Formosa vs L-

130At this point in time, the height limitation could only be modified ‘by applying a policy which deals with the

maximum building height which may be permitted on a site, which policy may take into consideration the site

coverage, the building volume which may be permitted on a site or any other material consideration’, such as for

example Policy 16.5 of the Policy & Design Guidance 2007 which specifically dealt with developments abutting high

blank party walls. 131Roger Vella vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th November 2012 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 7/2012]. 132Domenic vs L-Awtorita` ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal

(Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 7/2011].

64

Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,133 the Court of Appeal highlighted that plans

and/or policies should take precedence over ‘material considerations’, adding that the said

‘material considerations’, particularly surrounding ‘commitment’, should be taken into account

only in circumstances where the policy was either silent with regard to the merits of the

proposal or where specific leeway was given to decision makers. The following was reached by

the Court:

“din il-Qorti taghmel distinzjoni bejn is-sahha ta’ pjan jew policy u kwistjonijiet

ta’ sustanza bhal ma hu ‘commitment’ fost affarijiet ohra. Il-Qorti taqbel

perfettament ma’ dak li qal it-Tribunal illi ebda kwistjoni ta’ commitment ma

tista’ tmur kontra dak esplicitament promulgat fi pjan jew policy u kwistjonijiet

ta’ sustanza ghandhom importanza fejn il-pjan jew il-policy hi siekta jew thalli

element ta’ diskrezzjoni.”

In a subsequent judgment delivered in the names of Anne Marie Agius vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar134 the Court concluded that ‘equal treatment’ is not tantamount to

a material consideration. Additionally, the Court highlighted that ‘commitment’ should be

relied upon only in those limited instances where the policy is silent on a particular issue.

The same principles were upheld by the Court of Appeal in Marquis Dott. Anthony Cremona

Barbaro u Chief Justice Emeritus Prof. John J. Cremona vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u kjamat in kawza Martin Camilleri.135 In this latter judgment, the Court

insisted that decision makers must, first and foremost, ‘apply’ the relative plans/ policies and

resort to ‘material considerations’ only where the relative policies are contradictory to each

other.

The above cited judgments highlight the problem that existed with interpreting Article 69 of the

133Emanuel Formosa vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th June 2014 by the Court

of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 82/2013 MC]. 134Anne Marie Agius vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th November 2014 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 71/2013]. 135Marquis Dott. Anthony Cremona Barbaro u Chief Justice Emeritus Prof. John J. Cremona vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u kjamat in kawza Martin Camilleri decided on 27th November 2014 by the Court of


65

Environment and Development Planning Act. It is perplexing to have a Court stating that

material considerations need to be given ‘regard’ only in qualified circumstances, namely when

the policies so dictate, and at the same time, the same Court is highlighting that ignoring

material considerations is tantamount to ‘bad law’. In the author’s view, ‘commitment’ should

have never been used as a basis for justification if it ran counter to a plan or policy since, under

previous legislation, ‘material considerations’ were subordinate to plans and policies.

The matter is now different under the new law since ‘material considerations’ can have the

upper hand over a plan or policy. Indeed, Article 72(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016

has codified what was previously being wrongly interpreted by the Courts. Decision makers

must now give ‘equal’ regard to plans, policies, regulations, material considerations and

external representations or recommendations. Ultimately, it is up to the decision makers to

decide whether any given material considerations are strong enough to prevail over policy

requirements. At face value, this may be seen as a practical approach in terms of urban

planning since very often, particular site circumstances are not always necessarily reflected in

print. On the other hand, one may counter argue that such an open ended approach would

open a gateway to arbitrary assessments since decision makers are now ‘free’ to give

consideration to extraneous matters at the expense of a plan or planning policy.

The same Article 72(1) provides that ‘a valid police or trading license issued prior to 1994’ now

constitutes a vested right which may not be affected adversely by emerging policy. In my

opinion, the introduction of this latter provision was long overdue since previously it was not

clear whether and, under which circumstances, a valid trading license would legitimize an

ongoing use. That said, the author is by no means implying that trading licenses were not taken

into account during the determination of a permit. In Biagio Muscat kontra l-Kummissjoni

ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp136, the Planning Appeals Board ordered the Commission to issue a

permit for the ‘change of use from garage into a vehicle registration testing (VRT) garage

136Biagio Muscat vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp decided on 2nd March 2001 by the Planning Appeals

Board - [Ap. No. 224/00 KA PA 952/00].

66

facilities’ after appellant submitted a copy of a Trading License which was issued by the Police

on 27th June 1987 showing that the premises could operate as an industrial venue.

Likewise, in the application number PA 991/06 submitted ‘to sanction change of use from

garage to Class IV shop’ the Development Control Commission upheld the request despite the

Directorate’s negative recommendation after it confirmed that applicant was in possession of a

trading license which was issued prior to 1992.

Similarly, in Jimmy Aquilina kontra l- Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l- Ambjent u l- Ippjanar Appell137

the Tribunal held that the Authority could not clamp down a commercial outlet after it was

established that such activity was covered by a trading license, which was issued prior to 1992.

Unexpectedly, in John Micallef kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent138, the Tribunal

took a different approach and held that a trading license must necessarily be preceded by a

planning permit. In this case, appellant produced a valid trading license for a car auto dealer

and notwithstanding this, the Tribunal still concluded that the valid license did not exempt

appellant from first obtaining a planning permit.

The amendments to Article 72(1) should therefore be enough to address the above conflicting

interpretations since it is now clear that any valid trading license which was issued prior to 1994

is equivalent to a planning permit covering such use. It should however be noted that the

trading license should be valid at the moment of the decision.

Moreover, a provision was made to the effect that ‘the Planning Board shall only refer to plans,

policies or regulations that have been finalized and approved by the Minister or the House of

Representatives, as the case may be, and published’. In other words, decision makers may not

137Jimmy Aquilina vs l- Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l- Ambjent u l- Ippjanar decided on 28th July 2011 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 232/10 CF. PA 5275/08]. 138John Micallef vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th June 2014 by the Environment

and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 94/09 CF. PA 5155/07].

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rely on plans and policies which, at the moment of decision, are either in draft form, deleted

from the statute books or pending formal Minster’s approval. Albeit no similar provision was

expressly made in previous legislations, our Courts and Tribunal consistently acknowledged the

aforementioned principle. In Godwin Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar

Appell139 the Court expressed itself in the following manner:

“Illi kwantu ghall-applikazzjoni tal-Pjan Lokali ma hemm l-ebda dubju li bhala

regola generali il-principju skond il-gurisprudenza nostrali hija li l-policies

applikabbli ghal kaz huma dawk ezistenti fil-mument li tkun ser jigi deciz il-kaz”.

In another judgment delivered in the names Angelo Camilleri kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar

l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,140 the Tribunal declared that the fine imposed by the Development

Control Commission found no basis at law since the decision to fine applicant was based on an

express provision contained in previous legislation, which legislation had since been replaced.

In the previous Article 69, decision makers were already bound to have regard to

‘representations made in response to the publication of the development proposal’. In the new

law, the text ‘representations and recommendations made by Boards, Committees and

Consultees in response to notifications of applications’ was also added. Although this may appear

as a minor detail, decision makers are subjected to even more pressure to ensure that all

incoming representations are included in the decision equation.

Furthermore, it is now certain when a planning permit takes effect. Notwithstanding that

applicants were previously bound to send the relative commencement notice at least five days

prior to commencement of works, failing to adhere to such a requirement was not tantamount

to the non utilization of the permit. Today, the legal situation is quite different since Article

139Godwin Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2011 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 14/2010]. 140Angelo Camilleri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st July 2012 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 647/11 CF.PA 0235/11].

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72(4) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 states in unequivocal terms that ‘ if the applicant

fails to submit the commencement notice relative to the permission, such development

permission shall be considered as never having been utilized.’ It follows that works covered by a

full development permit and subsequently undertaken without the prior lodging of the

commencement notice are now considered ‘illegal’. Matters could get all the more complicated

for applicants were they to choose to proceed with the ‘permitted’ works without submitting

the notice within the valid time period, particularly if the relative policies change in the interim.

2.6 Revocation of permits

Since the enactment of the Development Planning Act in 1992, there were five versions of the

law regulating permit revocations. As rightly pointed out by Professor Kevin Aquilina,141 ‘the

first two attempts verged in opposite extremes of the pendulum’, whereas the third version,

namely Article 39(a) of the 2001 Act tries ‘to achieve Aristotle’s golden mean’. Article 39(a) was

later substituted by way of Article 77 of the 2010 Environment and Development Planning Act,

though the practical ramifications remained unchanged.

Indeed, Article 77(1) of the Environment and Planning Development Act provided that both ‘the

Authority or the Tribunal’ could entertain a request to revoke a planning permit. A request for

revocation could thus be filed directly with the Tribunal, though such request could not be

made before the Tribunal concurrently with an appeal against the decision stemming from that

same permit. 142 In my opinion, this was not necessary since there was never a legal

impediment on the part of the Tribunal to treat both considerations concurrently.

141Kevin Aquilina: Rationalising administrative law on the revocation of development permissions. Bank of Valletta

Review, No. 34 - Autumn 2006. 142Cristiano u Daniela konjugi Bagnaschi, Violet Mifsud, Ivan u Maria konjugi Micallef, Maria Stella Callus, Katia

Satariano, Ivan Mifsud Bons. kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, u l-kjamat in kawza Frank

Mifsud decided by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal on 17th December 2015 - [Ap. No. 198/14 MS.

PA 0712/14].

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In the new Act, permit revocations are regulated by Article 80. As a rule, the basis on which a

permit or a clearance may be revoked or modified, remained the same – namely, ‘fraud’, ‘the

submission of any information, declaration or plan which is incorrect or does not reflect the

situation on site’, ‘where there is an error on the face of the record’ and also ‘where public

safety is concerned’. 143 Although the Act clearly states that the permission, clearance or order

must be ‘granted under this Act’ for it to be revoked, one must bear in mind that those permits

which were issued in consonance with the previous Act, whose five year validity period is still in

vigore, are likewise exposed to potential revocation.144

Like in previous legislation, revocation proceedings must ‘commence’ within ‘five years from

the date of issuing of the development permission, clearance or Order.’ Therefore, if the permit

is eventually renewed for a consequent five year term, such permit may not be then revoked on

the basis of this Article. This reasoning was held in Kenneth Bartolo et al. kontra l-Awtorita’

ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar.145

In contrast with previous legislation, it is now incumbent on the Executive Chairperson to

‘prepare his recommendations to the Planning Board as to whether the development permission

should be revoked or modified and invite both the applicant and the person making the request,

if any, to make written submissions.’ Prior to the enactment of the new Act, a public hearing

was not held if the Authority found that there was no prima facie case for revocation. Today, all

requests are heard by the Board and both applicant and the person filing the request are asked

to attend the hearing and make their submissions.

143Article 80 of the Development Planning Act, 2016. 144Article 35(3) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 expressly provides that ‘Any licence, permission, order,

notice or certificate, or any prosecution or charges, granted or made under or kept in force under any of the

provisions of the Environment and Development Planning Act, the Building Regulation Act and the relevant

provisions of the Code of Police Laws and still in force immediately before the date of coming into force of this Act,

shall as from such date continue in force as if it were a license, permission, order, notice or certificate, or

prosecution or charges, granted or made under a corresponding provision of this Act.’ 145Kenneth Bartolo, Frances Bartolo, James Camenzuli u Denise Camenzuli vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent

u l-Ippjanar decided on 17th June 2014 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 226/13MS. PA

4917/06].

70

The definition of ‘fraud’ and ‘incorrect information, declaration or plan’ remained essentially

the same. Interestingly, the definition of an ‘error on the face of the record’’, previously styled

‘an error on the face of a record which offends against the law’, amounts to ‘ an error made by

the Planning Board in reaching a decision and such error is apparent from the records of its

proceedings.’ Primarily, the amended definition provides that the error must be made by the

Planning Board. Secondly, the error must be attached to a specific time line, namely ‘in

reaching a decision’. Thirdly, the error must be visible in the records of the file.

Previously, the term ‘an error on the face of a record which offends against the law’ embraced a

much more extensive interpretation. Essentially, any error that offended the law resulting from

a simple examination of a document constituted such error. In Emmanuel Busuttil Dougall vs

L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar146 the Court confirmed that the site notice

was affixed in a wrong location as could be visibly attested from documented evidence. The

said evidence purported to show that the affixation of the site notice had not been done

according to law and the Court proceeded to confirm the Tribunal’s decision to revoke the

permit in terms of the then Article 39(a).

In most probability, today, the Court would have decided otherwise since an error should not

only result from the records of the file but such an error should be one taken by the Planning

Board at decision stage.

2.7 The removal of the Sixth Schedule

Article 73(1) of the Development Planning Act, 2016 provides that ‘the Planning Board may

grant permission for the retention on land of any buildings or works constructed or carried out

thereon, or for the continuance of any use of land, without permission under this Act or after

such permission has ceased to be valid or operative’. This means that the Authority is no longer

146Emmanuel Busuttil Dougall (bil-karta tal-identita` numru 848754M) vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar, decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 3/2010].

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bound by the limitations imposed in Article 70 of the Environment and Development Planning

Act, which inter alia provided that illegal interventions (specifically the ones listed under the

Sixth Schedule of the same Act147) could not be regularised solely through a sanctioning

application even though such illegalities could possibly be sanctioned in terms of the relative

plans and policies.

During the first months which followed the enactment of the Environment and Development

Planning Act, the MEPA was very adamant to scrupulously follow Article 70 of the said Act to

the letter. Initially, the Planning Directorate even refrained from processing requests asking for

sanctioning where it resulted at a prima facie level that Schedule Six illegalities were present.

The matter was eventually clarified by means of a judgment delivered by the Court of Appeal

(Inferior Jurisdiction) in the names Mary Psaila vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar.148 In this case, the Planning Directorate had issued a screening letter149 stating that

applicant’s request could not be processed since the proposal had included a number of

illegalities which fell under the Sixth Schedule. The Directorate’s decision was confirmed by the

Tribunal despite applicant’s insistence that he had every right to have his application processed

and formally decided by the Environment and Planning Commission. The Tribunal’s decision

was eventually appealed before the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) and the Court held

that the prima facie conclusions reached in a screening letter did not remove the applicant’s

right to have any type of sanctioning application duly processed.

147Schedule Six of The Environment and Development Planning Act of the Laws of Malta provided as follows: ‘ An

application to regularise a development which exceeds the approved footprint or, increases the approved volume of

the building and is not part of a registered livestock farm and is carried out after May 2008 in an area which falls

outside areas designated for development as defined in the Structure Plan or in any other plan; or

2. An application to regularise a development in a scheduled property; or

3. An application to regularise a development carried out after May 2008 in an area protected under the provisions

of this Act or any regulation made thereunder.’ 148Mary Psaila vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided by the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction) on 26th March 2015 - [Ap. No.6/13 ]. 149Under The Environment and Development Planning Act, a screening letter was issued prior to the submission of

a full development application. The letter would contain a preliminary opinion with respect to the proposed

development.

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With time, experience has shown a general tendency where the Environment and Planning

Commission started to overlook the importance of Article 70 and planning applications were

sanctioned notwithstanding the presence of illegalities listed under Schedule Six. For example,

in the application PA 8241/05, To sanction use of site as meeting place for prayers and worship

by Moviment Madonna tal-Konsagrazzjoni, to sanction alterations and additions and to erect

bronze statue of Jesus, decided on the 7th March 2012, the Environment and Planning

Commission gave a permit for structural interventions which had taken place illegally, despite

the location being a scheduled area. Evidently, the Commission went ahead with the decision

as it envisaged no planning or environmental benefit in having the construction removed and

reinstated in furtherance of a new application. If anything, the prospect itself of mobilizing

demolition equipment on such a sensitive site would have envisaged more environmental

harm. Having said that, in my opinion, the Commission’s decision was illegal regardless.

In a separate instance, the Tribunal went even a step further and held that Article 70 is

“counterproductive”. In the case Stefan Vella kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar,150 applicant made an attempt to sanction a canopy which was already fixed to an old

scheduled building. In his submissions, the appellant’s architect argued that the illegal

extension “improved the visual appearance of the building and provided a consistent neat/bold

outline to the building frontage avoiding a setback in the projecting slab which would have

otherwise looked too busy”. The Authority rightly rebutted ‘that the provisions of the Sixth

Schedule are quite specific and categorical”, adding that “if a proposal falls within these

provisions no sanctioning may be permitted – no ifs or buts” and thus requested the Tribunal to

dismiss the application on the basis of Article 70. Although the Authority was certainly correct

in its legal interpretation, the Tribunal reasoned that the old building would risk being damaged

should the illegal canopy be dismantled and consequently ordered the Authority to issue the

permit.

150Stefan Vella vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided by the Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal on 15th October 2013 - [Ap. No. 214/12 CF. TR. No. 147273. PA1996/08].

73

While the Tribunal may have been technically correct in its assertions, the legal reasoning is

quite baffling since no such a leeway was granted by law. At a particular point in time, MEPA

itself had even published a series of Frequently Asked Questions on its official website151,

providing inter alia that “Article 70 and the Sixth Schedule of the Environment and Development

Planning Act apply only to applications submitted after 1st January 2011” despite it being very

obvious that such statement ran counter to the legal provisions of Chapter 504. In Grezzju

Zahra kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar152 appellant relied on the said

website information in his defense, only to find strong opposition from the same MEPA who

published the information. In fact, MEPA’s legal counsel rebutted appellant’s defense and

observed the following in his reply to the appeal:

“Ghandu jinghad ukoll illi l-frequently asked questions bl-ebda mod m’huma xi

policies tal-Awtorita’ izda semplicement informazzjoni informali. Certament la

jbiddlu l-ligi u m’ghandhomx lanqas sahha ta’ ligi ….Oltre` dan, dan l-istess

Tribunal kif kompost diga` iddecieda kaz fit-28 ta’ Lulju, 2011 fl-ismijiet Victor

Portelli vs il-MEPA fejn dahal fil-fond fl-liema ligi applikabbli, w iddecieda li l-ligi

applikabbli, in toto hi l-Att X tal-2010 anki ghall-applikazzjonijiet li dahlu qabel

Jannar, 2011.”

It is therefore evident that the Schedule Six experience is laden with continuous contradictions

and all things considered, government’s decision to revisit Article 70 was duly warranted even

though Din L-Art Ħelwa held that the deletion of Article 70 was tantamount to “a retrograde

step”.153

Although it may still be argued that the removal of the Sixth Schedule may give rise to rampant

illegal development, it is to be noted that a daily fine is today imposed for every day after

sixteen days from the date of notification of the enforcement notice until the permit is

151www.mepa.org.mt. 152Grezzju Zahra vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 7th February 2012 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 207/09 CF. PA 3907/06]. 153Reactions to the proposed MEPA demerger from Din l- Art Helwa downloadable from



74

approved or until the illegality is removed.154 Indeed, daily fines are now inflicted for any illegal

development which took place after 24th November 2012 by virtue of Legal Notice 276 of 2012

and such legislation was not in force when the Sixth Schedule came into effect. Consequently,

it would thus be most daring to state that the elimination of the Sixth Schedule is tantamount

to uncontrollable abuse. It could be argued further that abuses which took place between May

2008 and November 2012 may today be regularised, and possibly against a hefty fine, whereas

under the previous law, such interventions were destined to remain illegal without the

imposition of a fine once sanctioning thereof was not possible.

On a practical note, the author sees no benefit in having a building demolished simply to have a

similar or identical building being reconstructed following a new application or, worse still,

having the Authority acting illegally in circumventing the Sixth Schedule by searching for

practical solutions to sanction illegalities against the law. The Stefan Vella case and the Girgenti

application are just two examples where decision makers embraced their good intentions at the

expense of breaking the law. Against this background, the author rebuts the idea that “the

removal of the Sixth Schedule implies that the ‘no tolerance’ policy previously adopted no longer

applies”.155

154Legal Notice 276 of 2012 - Environment and Development Planning Act (Cap. 504) - Daily Penalty Regulations,

2012. 155Reactions to the proposed MEPA Demerger from Perit Simone Vella Lenicker downloadable from



75

Chapter 3: The Environment and Planning Review Tribunal

3.1 General

Most decisions taken in virtue of the current Development and Planning Act may be subjected

to a ‘review’ before the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal (EPRT). The said Tribunal

was established for the first time under the Environment and Development Planning Act in

2010 when it took over the role of the Planning Appeals Board. 156 Following the demerger of

the MEPA into two separate Authorities, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal was

reconstituted, however under an independent piece of legislation entitled the Environment and

Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

As highlighted by the Hon. Dr. Owen Bonnici157 in Parliament, the newly established Tribunal

has jurisdiction to review decisions taken by both the Planning Authority and the Environment

and Resources Authority:

“Ta’ min jgħid li se jkollna liġi ad hoc li twaqqaf tribunal indipendenti – din fiha

nnifisha diġà hija xi ħaġa pożittiva – li se jisma’ appelli minn deċiżjonijiet ta’ żewġ

Awtoritajiet, sew ta’ dik li se tkun l-awtorità l-ġdida tal-ambjent, kif ukoll tal-

awtorità l-ġdida tal-ippjanar.”

Really and truly, we were already accustomed to this approach because the previous Tribunal

was competent to review both planning and environment related decisions taken by the MEPA.

156Article 41 of the Environment and Development Planning Act. 157Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta.

76

3.2 An ad hoc Tribunal

It is evident that both the Nationalist administration, under whose tenure the EPRT was

established, and the current Labour administration appear to be confident with having an ad

hoc Tribunal dealing with planning and environment related matters, rather than having such

matters decided by the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART). As a fact, the Minister of Justice,

Culture and Local Government argued in Parliament that planning and environment related

matters are better handled by a specialized Tribunal, citing the possibility of the EPRT to engage

experts as a key advantage.158 The Minister also remarked that the EPRT is better positioned to

deliver more timely decisions at a lesser cost:

“Bħala stat ta’ fatt, dan il-Parlament ilu unanimu fil-qbil li l-aħjar forum huwa t-

tribunal. Il-vantaġġ tat-tribunal hu li jkun iktar speċjalizzat, għandu l-possibilità li

jkollu esperti tekniċi miegħu, huwa iktar spedit u lill-pajjiż jiswih inqas.”

Indeed, the above assertions are not necessarily well founded. If one were to make a

comparison between the EPRT and the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART),159 it follows that

the Magistrate or Judge presiding over the ART is also accompanied by two assistants being

persons who have expertise within the specific field being dealt with. Moreover, the ART may

appoint additional experts ‘depending on the subject matter’. In so far as expenses are

concerned, the setting up of an ad hoc Tribunal would probably entail additional costs in its

constitution, considering that the ART already operates within an established organizational

setup.

Having said that, practicing periti would probably object to the idea of having to assist their

clients before the ART within a formalized Court setup. Moreover, in as far as decision time

frames are concerned, the EPRT is bound by stipulated, and rather strict, time frames within

which their decisions are to be delivered whereas the ART is only bound to deliver its decisions

158Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015 - House of Representatives, Malta. 159Chapter 490 of the Laws of Malta – Administrative Justice Act.

77

‘as soon as possible’.160 From the other end, it is correct to state that a specialized tribunal

whose jurisdiction is restricted, such as the EPRT, may be more proactive and focused for its

purpose.

The idea of having the EPRT set up under another piece of legislation was however met with

disapproval by the Dean of the Faculty of Laws, Professor Kevin Aquilina,161 who described the

new laws with doing ‘away completely with codification’. He saw ‘no added benefit of having

three distinct laws when they could have been easily integrated into one’. On the other hand, in

Parliament, the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon162 was of a totally different opinion:

“L-importanza li qed nagħtu lil dan it-tribunal hija riflessa fid-differenza għal dak

li jsir is-soltu, fejn it-tribunali jkunu mwaqqfin bħala parti mil-liġi. Is-soltu, meta

nagħmlu liġi, wara li nindikaw il-partijiet kollha tal-liġi ngħidu li se jitwaqqaf

tribunal. F’kull liġi li naf, l-ewwel titwaqqaf awtorità, imbagħad fl-istess liġi

nwaqqfu tribunal, però għalina tant huwa importanti dan it-tribunal li qegħdin

nagħmlu liġi speċifika li tistabbilixxih u tirregolah. B’daqshekk, mhux se taqa’d-

dinja, imma l-fatt li aħna ddeċidejna li nagħmlu liġi speċifika li twaqqaf dan it-

tribunal u mhux ikun parti minn liġijiet oħrajn, juri kemm għall-mod kif nagħmlu

l-liġijiet tagħna, it-tribunal huwa importanti u kruċjali. Hija opportunità li l-

proċeduri quddiem dan it-tribunal ikunu regolati b’mod iktar ċert u aċċessibbli

għal kulħadd.”

The author is more inclined to agree with Falzon’s belief in that it is more practical to have an

independent legislative Act which regulates appeal procedures that are common to different

pieces of legislation, such as in this case. Additionally, the establishment of the EPRT and the

Planning Authority under separate pieces of legislation should convey the message that these

organs are entirely distinct from each other.

160Article 3(2)(b) of the Administrative Justice Act. 161Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s Demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. - 29th July

2015. 162Parliamentary Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015 – Parliament of Malta.

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3.3 Functions of the Tribunal

Article 3(1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 states that the role of

the EPRT is ‘to review the decisions of the Planning Authority and the Malta Environment

Authority’, further providing that the EPRT is to ‘hear and determine …. appeals’.163 Clearly, the

role of the EPRT is to ‘review’ a planning decision in terms of law and fact within the

parameters set out in the appeal application. This principle was upheld in Frans Mamo vs L-

Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar:164

“Dan hu Tribunal ta’ Revizjoni ta’ decizjonijiet mehuda mill- Awtorita’. It-Tribunal

ma ghandux joltrepassa l-limitu li minn Tribunal revizur isir Awtorita’ li tezamina

applikazzjoni mill-gdid minn rajha jekk dak li tezamina u tiddeciedi dwaru ma

jkunx ingieb a konjizzjoni u attenzjoni taghha b’aggravju specifiku, kemm jekk

ikun kontra rifjut jew approvazzjoni ta’ permess.”

This reasoning was reiterated by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) in Emmanuel

Muscat et. al vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Ghaqda

Socjali Muzikali Kristu Sultan.165 In this case, a number of objectors appealed against the issue

of a permit for the change of use from a residence to a band club, basing their reasoning on

unacceptable noise levels. The Tribunal anulled the permit whilst giving an extensive definition

of a ‘modern band club’. Indeed, the Tribunal went to great lengths to make a distinction

beween a ‘traditional’ band club and a ‘modern band club’. It observed inter alia that

contemporary band clubs are more akin to bars and restuarants and hence went on to revoke

the permit. Subsequently, the applicant appealed the decision before the Court of Appeal

(Inferior Jurisdiction), claiming that the Tribunal delved into the definiton of a ‘band club’

though such definition was not in dispute. In turn, the Court held that the EPRT may not

163Article 11 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 164Frans Mamo vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 4th December 2013 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 193/2012]. 165Emmanuel u Rita Muscat u Pauline Borg u b’digriet ta’ din il-Qorti datat 29 ta’ Novembru 2011 stante l-mewt ta’

Pauline Borg il-gudizzju gie trasfuz f’isem Rita mart Emmanuel Muscat, Joseph Borg, Paul Borg u Raymond Borg

bhala eredi tal-istess kif indikat b’nota taghhom datat 8 ta’ Novembru 2011. vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Ghaqda Socjali Muzikali Kristu Sultan, decided on 31st May 2012 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 5/2011].

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express itself on a matter which was not being contested and ordered the Tribunal to reassess

its decision. When the case was referred back to the Tribunal, the latter simply concluded that

the proposed activity would be creating a nuisance to neighbors due to the envisaged noise.

The Tribunal went on to revoke the permit without making any attempt to enquire on matters

which were clearly not under contestation and this time round, its decision was confirmed by

the Court on appeal.166

Having said that, the Court recently observed that any matter in breach of planning laws or

policies qualifies as a matter of public order167 and the Tribunal is thus obliged to flag any such

concern ex officio regardless whether any reference thereto was made by the parties to the

appeal. This principle was confirmed in Angiolina Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,168 where the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) concluded:

“Il-Qorti hi tal-fehma illi t-Tribunal ghandu l-obbligu fi kwistjonijiet ta’ ippjanar li

jqajjem ex officio kwistjonijiet ta’ ippjanar li jmorru direttament kontra xi ligi pjan

jew policy anki jekk mhix mqajma mill-partijiet basta li dan jirrizulta mill-

parametri specifici proposti fl-applikazzjoni. Hu d-dmir tat-Tribunal li ma jhallix li

ssir approvazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni jekk ikun qed jigi vvjolat pjan, ligi jew policy

cari. B’danakollu t-Tribunal irid jirrispetta l-principju ta’ gustizzja naturali u jekk

jirrizulta xi punt li jekk ma jigix indirizzat jista’ jwassal ghal vjolazzjoni ta’ ligi,

pjan jew policy ghandu jew jirrimetti l-atti lura lil Awtorita’ biex terga’ tixtarr

mill-gdid l-applikazzjoni fid-dawl tal-kwezit li qam fl-istadju tal-appell jew jekk

iridu l-partijiet il-kwistjoni tigi ventilata direttament u l-kwistjoni tigi deciza mit-

Tribunal. Hi pero l-fehma tal-Qorti illi hi l-ewwel triq li t-Tribunal ghandu

jiffavorixxi biex ikun hemm il-possibilita tad-doppio esame.”

Although, the Court stressed that in such cases, the file must be reverted to the Authority for

reassessment in order for the appellant not to be deprived of his right to a ‘doppio esame’

(unless the parties jointly decide that the Tribunal proceeds with the judgment), there is still a

166Emmanuel u Rita Muscat u Pauline Borg u b’sentenza tal-Qorti tal-Appell tal-31 ta’ Mejju 2012 l-atti gew trasfuzi

fl-eredi ta’ Pauline Borg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Ghaqda Socjali

Muzikali Kristu Sultan, decided on 26th June 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 72/2013]. 167Like with previous legislation, the new Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 does not specify

which matters fall under the ambit of ‘public order’ and consequently it may be useful to look at case law. 168Angiolina Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 11th December 2014 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 55/2014

80

practical problem since the Tribunal would have already expressed its bias should an appeal be

eventually filed against the re assessed decision. All things being equal, it is my firm opinion

that the Tribunal should not raise and decide issues which would not have been indicated in the

refusal since this would amount to the Tribunal deciding in violation of the ‘audi alteram

partem’ rule.

As regards to the non adherence to the stipulated time frames within which an appeal must be

filed, these too are considered as a matter of public order.169

3.4 Composition of the Tribunal

The 2015 Tribunal Bill provided that the Prime Minister ‘may by order establish panels of the

Tribunal, and may designate the categories of cases to be assigned to each panel and may by

subsequent order amend, revoke or substitute such order.’ Each panel would consist of three

members, all of who are appointed by the Prime Minister - one such member is a Chairperson

and another member, the deputy Chairperson, assumes the functions of the Chairperson in the

former’s absence. Furthermore, the 2015 Tribunal Bill provided that for each panel, a member

shall be an advocate and the other two members shall be respectively ‘well versed in

development planning legislation and environmental legislation.’

In his reaction to the proposed 2015 Tribunal Bill, Professor Aquilina170 was quite critical of the

proposed composition, asserting that ‘the Tribunal will have three lawyers with no planners, nor

environmentalists as members’. Aquilina went on to suggest that ‘the new Tribunal should

instead be constituted with two chambers: a Development Planning Chamber and an

Environment Protection Chamber. The Development Planning Chamber should be presided by

169Pasquale Catuogno vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 10th December 2015 by the

Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 45/2015]. 170Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s Demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. - 29th July

2015.

81

three full-timers: an advocate versed in development planning as chairperson and two persons

versed in planning as members.’

Parliament did not take up these suggestions although the words ‘development planning

legislation’ and ‘environment planning legislation’ were eventually substituted with

‘development matters’ and ‘environment matters’, thus making it clear that now only one out of

these three members should be an advocate. Upon insistence from the Hon. Marthese Portelli,

Parliament unanimously decided that the advocate moreover ‘shall have practiced the

profession of advocate for at least four years’ to be eligible to sit on the Tribunal.171

At Committee stage, it was further decided to qualify the instances where the Deputy

Chairperson may preside over the Panel instead of the Chairperson, namely in cases where a

‘valid reason’ subsists. Nonetheless, the Act does not define what constitutes a ‘valid reason’,172

although it subsequently provides that a ‘a member of the Tribunal shall be disqualified from

hearing an appeal in terms of Article 734 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure and in

any such case, such member shall be substituted by another person either appointed for the

purpose by the Prime Minister, or chosen by the Secretary from the members of the other panel

or panels so appointed.’173 Bearing in mind the complexity of the legal issues raised before the

Tribunal, the author is however of the opinion that four years experience leave much to be

desired.

The words ‘shall be disqualified’ suggest that a panel member has no option but to abstain from

hearing a case should any of the circumstances listed in Article 734 of Chapter 12 of the Laws of

Malta subsist. This is not exactly the situation with the Courts since the decision to abstain or

otherwise ultimately rests with the individual judge or magistrate.

171Article 4(2) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 172Article 4(3) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 173Article 4(6) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

82

The effects of Article 4(6) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 are thus

wide ranging considering that the breach to the said Article would be tantamount to a ‘point of

law’ which in turn would be subject to an appeal before the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction). Possibly, this could lead to the summoning of Tribunal members before the Court

of Appeal and challenged as to whether they were ‘qualified’ to sit in judgment.

On the other hand, what if such a plea is raised for the first time by a party to the appeal before

the Court of Appeal? Will the court throw out the appeal given that “biex appell ikun

ammissibbli, il-kwistjoni trid tkun necessarjament dwar kwistjoni ta’ dritt, li tkun qamet

kontroversja dwarha, li tkun giet diskussa u elucidata fil-motivazzjoni u li tkun giet definita fid-

decizjoni appellata?”174

Initially, the Tribunal Bill also provided that EPRT members should be appointed directly by the

Prime Minister. On this point, Professor Aquilina175 argued that the Prime Minister, “entertains

a huge conflict of interest” once he is “responsible for the execution of all government related

projects”. Eventually, Parliament decided that Tribunal members shall now be appointed by the

‘President acting on the advice of the Prime Minister’.176 In practice, this amendment is only

‘cosmetic’ since the President would in practice assent to the directions given by the Executive.

Adopting the recommendations highlighted by the Bonello Commission,177 as suggested by the

Opposition at Committee Stage, would have certainly been akin to a more transparent selection

process once the EPRT members would be identified following an open expression of interest

and a thorough assessment. Although in such a situation the ultimate decision would still rest

174Max Zerafa vs Kummisjoni Kontroll Zvilupp, decided on 12th January 2004 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior

Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 20/2002]. 175Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. - 29th July

2015. 176Article 4(4) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 177Kummissjoni ghal Riforma Holistika fil-Qasam tal-Gustizzja: Ir-Rapport Finali tal-Kummissjoni ghal riforma

holistika fil- qasam tal- gustizzja. Report dated 30th November 2013. Paragraph 3.1.1. - Downloadable from

https://0d2d5d19eb0c0d8cc8c6a655c0f6dcd98e765a68760c407565ae.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/d1b90f63704c357de55

6e6eeb68302fa4065089817.pdf. Paragraph 3.1.1 of the said report recommends the setting up of an autonomous

Authority styled as Awtorità dwar l-Għażla għas-Servizzi Ġudizzjarji, would be set up to make recommendations to

the Minister with regard to the selection of Magistrates and Judges.

83

with the Minister, it would still be difficult on his part to act in defiance of the Committee’s

recommendations.

With regard to the removal of EPRT Members, the 2015 Tribunal Bill initially provided that

these ‘may only be removed from office by the President acting on the advice of the Prime

Minister for the reasons of proved inability to perform functions of his office (whether arising

from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause), proved misbehaviour, gross negligence or for

a just cause and it shall be a just cause if the member does not achieve the targets and

objectives set in relation to his duties.’ Essentially, Article 50 (4) of the Environment and

Development Planning Act provided a similar procedure, since EPRT members could be

removed from office ‘by the President acting on the advice of the Minister for the reasons

provided for in article 97(2) of the Constitution.’

Although the words ‘it shall be a just cause if the member does not achieve the targets and

objectives set in relation to his duties’ did not make it through the final Act, Tribunal members

today may still be removed at the Prime Minister’s discretion on the basis of whatever he

deems a ‘just cause’.178

When all is taken into consideration, it is disturbing to see that Tribunal members, who at the

end of the day may overrule Planning Board decisions, enjoy less security of tenure than the

members of the Executive Council and the Planning Board who may only be removed by a

Parliament Resolution.

178Article 4(8) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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3.5 Jurisdiction

From an examination of section 11 of the current EPRT Act, an appeal may now be lodged from

those decisions which are specifically listed in the law whereas under the previous Act, an

appeal was indeed possible ‘on any matter of development control’179 unless the law provided

otherwise.180

Under the present legislation, the EPRT has jurisdiction to hear and determine ‘all appeals

made by the applicant from a decision taken following an application’ for:

• A full development permission;

• A permission under a development notification order;

• A permission under a regularization process;

• A change in alignment under a planning control application;

• A permission for a project of common interest (PCI);

• Registration by the Registration Board;

• Screening letters, insofar as a request for additional submissions, studies, assessments

and documentation and/or fees and/or contributions required to be paid to the Authority

before submission of the application are concerned;

• A request for modification or revocation of permission.

An appeal before the EPRT can, in turn, be made by any person who feels ‘aggrieved’ in the

following instances:

• When a notice is issued under the provisions of Part IX of the Development Planning

Act, 2015;

• When a decision is given in relation to scheduling and conservation orders;

179Article 41(1)(a) of the Environment and Development Planning Act. 180For example, decisions from planning control applications and decisions on sanitary issues escaped the

jurisdiction of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal.

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• A decision on a request for modification or revocation of permission.

Any person or institution or any department or agency of Government having a direct interest

and aggrieved may file an appeal in the following instances:

• Any decision, ruling or direction in relation to Building Regulations and Building

Control Regulations, even where such a decision does not emanate from a development

application process.

An appeal may be made by an interested third party who had submitted written

representations within 30 days from the date on which the application is published in the local

Government Gazette181, when a decision relates to:

• Application for development permission;

• A planning control application relating to a change in alignment.

An appeal before the EPRT can be made by an interested third party from a decision

concerning:

• Scheduling and conservation orders.

An appeal before the EPRT can be made by a statutory external consultee who, during the

application process, lodges a recommendation within the consultation period, either indicating

that the application should be approved subject to conditions or that the application is

objectionable stating the reasons, in the following instances:

• A development permission;

181The period as established by the Planning Authority in terms of Article 71(6) of the Development Planning Act,

2016 is equivalent to 30 days.

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• A change in alignment following a planning control application;

• A permission for projects of common interest (PCI).

On the other hand, an appeal before the EPRT can be made by the Attorney General on behalf

of the Government and any department, agency, authority or other body corporate wholly

owned by the Government and who are not statutory consultees, notwithstanding that no

written representations have been submitted during the application process.

3.5.1 New powers enjoyed by the EPRT

It should be immediately observed that the jurisdiction of the EPRT has been widened to

include applications related to ‘a change in alignment under a planning control application’,

‘projects of common interest’ and ‘permissions under a regularization process’. Furthermore,

the EPRT has been granted the power to decide appeal with regard to ‘any decision, ruling or

direction in relation to Building Regulations and Building Control Regulations, even where such a

decision does not emanate from a development application process’.

It must be pointed out that the EPRT is now competent to determine appeals from planning

control decisions in so far as ‘changes in street alignments’ are concerned. On the other hand,

‘changes in zoning’ remain immune from appeal proceedings.182 The situation was altogether

different under previous legislation since all types of planning control applications could not be

appealed before the Tribunal. For example, in Joseph Cuschieri kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,183 delivered on the 2nd May 2013, the EPRT highlighted that it was

prevented from determining appeals involving planning control applications.

182Decisions on such applications are taken by the Executive Council as per Article 54 of the Development Planning

Act, 2016. 183Joseph Cuschieri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 2nd May 2013 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 165/12 CF.PC 0007/96].

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Prior to the enactment of the new laws, sanitary matters were also considered to be

extraneous to the planning fora and had to be reviewed by the General Services Board. This

principle was confirmed in Godwin Abela u Lorraine Grech kontra L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta ghall-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Edward Damato.184

The EPRT is now also competent to determine appeals from sanitary decisions. This is due to

the fact that the Planning Authority has simultaneous jurisdiction to decide sanitary matters

whereas under previous legislation, sanitary decisions were taken by a Sanitary Engineering

Officer who, in turn, was answerable to the Superintendent of Public Health. Essentially, this

means that the application process need no longer be suspended once a sanitary dispute arises.

The Authority may now pronounce itself on any sanitary matter without having to wait for the

outcome of the General Services Board (GSB) or the Court of Appeal, should an appeal be

subsequently presented against the GSB decision. With the introduction of the present law, an

appeal before the EPRT may hence incorporate aggravations on both sanitary and planning

merits subsequent to a decision of the Planning Board or the Planning Commission.

Although the EPRT is now also competent to determine an appeal from ‘any decision, ruling or

direction in relation to Building Regulations and Building Control Regulations, even where such a

decision does not emanate from a development application process’, it should be remarked that

the operative article in the Planning Act was held in abeyance. It follows that appeals

concerning building regulations shall, at least for the time being, continue to be regulated by

the Building Regulations Act.

184Godwin Abela u Lorraine Grech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta ghall-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Edward

Damato, decided on 30th April 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 79/14MS.

PA3359/13].

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3.6 Who and when one may appeal

3.6.1 Instances when applicants may appeal

The instances when an applicant may file an appeal have been listed in Article 11(1) of the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 and limited to ‘decisions taken following

an application’ for:

• A full development permission;

• A permission under a development notification order;

• A permission under a regularization process;

• A change in alignment under a planning control application;

• A permission for a project of common interest (PCI);

• Registration by the Registration Board;

• Screening letters, insofar as a request for additional submissions, studies, assessments

and documentation and/or fees and/or contributions required to be paid to the Authority

before submission of the application are concerned;

• A request for modification or revocation of permission.

But is ‘a decision taken following an application’ necessarily tantamount to the final ‘refusal’ or

‘approval’ subsequent to an application? Or does it refer to any decision which is taken once

the application process has been initiated? This matter was raised in Ray Bugeja kontra L-

Awtorita’ ta' L-Ippjanar.185 In this latter case, the Development and Control Commission

requested appellant to revise the submitted drawings to show one habitable unit instead of

two. Subsequently, applicant filed an appeal against the contents of the said letter but the

Authority argued that the Planning Appeals Board had no jurisdiction to decide since the

appealed document was not akin to a formal decision. Nonetheless, the Planning Appeals Board

decided that, according to the appealed letter, the proposal ‘as submitted’ was clearly being

185Ray Bugeja vs L-Awtorita’ Ta' L-Ippjanar, decided on 30th January 1995 by the Planning Appeals Board - [Ap. No.

131/94RR. PA1048/94].

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rejected. The Appeals Board rightly concluded that the contents of the letter amounted to a

decision, and thus applicant was certainly entitled to appeal. In fact, the Planning Appeals

Board held as follows:

“Ghalkemm hu accettat li l-ittra tat-13 ta' Mejju, 1994 m'ghandhiex l-format li

solitament jintuza biex jigi kkomunikat r-rifjut lill-applikant, m'hemmx dubbju li l-

istess ittra tinkorpora decizjoni li effettivament qed tichad l-applikazzjoni kif giet

proposta.”

From the said judgment, it ensues that a ‘decision’ takes effect once the following elements

concurrently subsist:

• An application which is specifically listed in Article 11 is made to the Authority;

• Application is either approved, rejected or applicant was constrained to act in a

manner, failure which his application would be rejected.

According to this line of thought, not each and every single controversy arising during the

application process is thus tantamount to ‘a decision taken following an application’. For

instance, a request by the Planning Directorate to amend the drawings ‘as submitted’ is not

tantamount to a decision in terms of Article 11(1) since the planning application would still

have not reached determining stage. On the other hand, a ‘request for additional submissions,

studies, assessments and documentation and/or fees and/or contributions required to be paid’

is construed to be a direction from the Authority to act in a manner, failure which the

application would be rejected. Using the above logic, an appeal may be lodged against such

direction regardless whether such request is accompanied with a screening letter as provided in

Article 11(1)(b) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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3.6.2 Instances when a third party may appeal

As already seen, there are a number of instances when a third party may also file an appeal. In

all these instances, a third party is not required to prove a personal interest in the appeal in

terms of the doctrine of juridical interest but it is enough to submit ‘reasoned grounds based on

environmental and, or planning considerations to justify the appeal’.186

Essentially, a third party has a right to appeal in the following circumstances:

• When a notice is issued under the provisions of Part IX of the Development Planning

Act, 2016;

• A decision on a request for modification or revocation of permission;

• Any decision, ruling or direction in relation to Building Regulations and Building

Control Regulations, even where such a decision does not emanate from a development

application process;

• A decision following an application for development permission;

• A decision following a planning control application relating to a change in alignment;

• When a decision is given in relation to scheduling and conservation orders.

With regards to non executable permits, these are equally considered as a ‘decision on an

application for a development permission’ and thus may be appealed before the Environment

and Planning Review Tribunal. Having said that, the EPRT Act is silent as to whether a third

party could lodge an appeal once the full permit is eventually issued following a non executable

permit. A third party could possibly have an interest to appeal against a full permit that was

allegedly issued despite the fact that applicant did not adhere to the conditions laid down in

the non executable permit.

186Article 22(1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 states: ‘When an appeal has been

lodged by an interested third party in terms of this Act, such a person need not prove that he has an interest in that

appeal in terms of the doctrine of juridical interest, which doctrine shall not apply to such proceedings, but such a

person shall submit reasoned grounds based on environmental and, or planning considerations to justify his

appeal.’

91

Furthermore, it should be noted that third party appellants are required to have submitted

‘written representations as established by the Planning Authority in terms of Article 71(6) of the

Development Planning Act, 2016’ at the onset of the application process in order to be entitled

to appeal the eventual decision. In fact, Article 11(e)(i)-(iii) provides that ‘an interested third

party who had submitted written representations as established by the Planning Authority in

terms of Article 71(6) of the Development Planning Act, 2016’ may appeal ‘(i) from a decision on

an application for development permission, (ii) from a decision on a planning control application

relating to a change in alignment and (iii) from a decision on scheduling and conservation

orders.’ It is also very important that the written representations reach the Authority within the

time frame stipulated by law. In Chris Vassallo et. Kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent

u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Leonard Cassar,187 the appeal from third party objectors was

immediately thrown out after the Tribunal found that the said objectors had failed to make

written representations within the stipulated sixteen day representation period at the onset of

the application process.

On the other hand, third parties may not appeal before the EPRT against decisions from

applications where the law does not provide for the possibility of written representations at the

onset of the application. For example, in Annamaria Spiteri Debono kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’

Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar et.188 the Tribunal dealt with a third party appeal against a

permit issued for the removal of danger in terms of Legal Notice 258 of 2002. The Tribunal held

that a third party has no right to appeal a permit decision unless the right to register one’s

interest at the onset of the application process is specifically provided in the law. Using the

same reasoning, third parties are not entitled to appeal before the EPRT from development

187Chris Vassallo et. vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Leonard Cassar,

decided on 13th October 2011 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 269/06 CF. PA

1176/00]. 188Annamaria Spiteri Debono f’isimha propju u ghan-nom ta’ Caren Preziosi vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent

u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Martin Testaferrata Moroni Viani f’ isem il-familja Testaferrata Moroni Viani,

decided on 13th June 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 18/13 CF. DS 116/12].

92

notification orders and regularization applications given that there is no possibility for objectors

to make written representations during the application process in such instances.

Nevertheless, an interested third party may inevitably institute an action before the Civil Court

to ‘enquire into the validity’ or declare such acts null in terms of Article 469A of Chapter 12 of

the Laws of Malta due to the fact there is no alternative mode of contestation or of obtaining

redress provided elsewhere. This principle was highlighted in the seminal judgment delivered in

the names Bunker Fuel Oil Company Ltd vs Paul Gauci et.:189

“L-eskluzjoni tal-gurisdizzjoni tal-Qrati li jistharrgu ghemil amministrattiv

ghandha tkun gustifikata biss jekk il-Qorti tkun soddisfatta li, fil-prattika, persuna

kellha rimedju effikaci u xieraq disponibbli ghaliha u hija naqset li tirrikorri lejh

bla raguni tajba.”

Nevertheless, in contrast to proceedings before the Tribunal, the person instituting an action in

terms of Article 469A must ab initio satisfy the threshold of judicial interest and prove to the

Court that he would suffer a prejudice in the enjoyment of his property as a direct result of the

Authority’s decision. Having said that, the interest of a third party does not have to be stricto

senso but a mere interest would suffice as elaborated upon in Ġustu Debono vs Emanuel

Buħaġiar:190

“Biex jissejjes l-interess ġuridiku, jeħtieġ li l-parti attriċi turi li bittitligħ tal-bini li

hija tqis li sar b’mod abbużiv, hija tkun ġarrbet ħsara fit-tgawdija tal-ġid tagħha,

kemm bil-ħolqien ta’ servitu’ jew b’kull mod ieħor.”

It is pertinent to note that ‘an interested third party who had submitted written representations

as established by the Planning Authority in terms of Article 71(6)’ include the external

consultees which are listed in the Third Schedule of the Development Planning (Procedure for

Applications and their Determination) Regulations, 2016. The list includes the Environment and

Resources Authority, which took over the role of the Environment Directorate within MEPA. As

rightly highlighted by the Hon Owen Bonnici in Parliament, this is the first time that planning

189Bunker Fuel Oil Company Ltd vs Paul Gauci et. decided on 6th May 1998 by the First Hall, Civil Court. 190Ġustu Debono vs Emanuel Buħaġiar, decided on 21st October 2002 by the Civil Court of Appeal.

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decisions may be appealed by a statutory environmental entity, since the Environment

Directorate within the previous MEPA was legally prohibited to file an appeal against MEPA’s

own decisions. In Parliament, the Hon. Bonnici191 had indicated the following:

“Infakkar ftit li għall-ewwel darba, quddiem dan it-tribunal se jkun possibbli li

meta jinħareġ permess ta’ żvilupp mill-awtorità tal-ippjanar, dak il-permess se

jkun jista’ jiġi appellat mill-awtorità ambjentali. Infakkar li minn meta jidħlu fis-

seħħ dawn il-liġijiet ‘il quddiem, se jkollna żewġ Awtoritajiet on the same footing

u m’aħniex se nibqgħu fis-sitwazzjoni li għandna llum, fejn l-ambjent huwa biss

direttorat fil-MEPA, imma se jagħti ħafna iktar aċċess għall-ġustizzja.”

Article 11c(i)–(iii) further provides that ‘any person aggrieved’ may appeal against a ‘a notice

issued under the provisions of Part IX of the Development Planning Act, 2016’, ‘a decision in

relation to scheduling and conservation orders’, as discussed above, and ‘a decision on a request

for modification or revocation of permission’. In this sub section, there is indeed no reference

for appellant to have registered a prior interest. Consequently, Article 11(e)(iii), which makes

reference to prior written representations in the case of scheduling and conservation orders,

appears to be superfluous.

On the matter under examination, the author thinks that ‘any person aggrieved’ could include

‘anyone’ with an aggrievance since Article 22(1) of the Environment and Planning Review

Tribunal Act, 2016 clearly states that an interested third party need not prove that he has an

interest in an appeal before the EPRT in terms of the doctrine of juridical interest.

In the case of ‘notices’ one would also need to refer to Articles 16 and 36(1) of the EPRT Act.

Article 36(1) expressly refers to ‘any person who feels aggrieved by any stop or enforcement

notice served on him in terms of Article 97, 98 and 99 of the Development Planning Act, 2015’

whereas Article 16 provides that ‘an appeal from an enforcement notice or other notice shall

also include a copy of the enforcement notice or other notice being appealed from’.192 When

taken together, these two sections prima facie suggest that, in order to appeal an enforcement

191Parliamentary Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015 – Parliament of Malta. 192Article 16 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal, 2016.

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or stop notice, the aggrieved must be formally ‘served’ with the said notice. By analogy, it

follows that persons who may feel equally ‘aggrieved’ because of their interest in the property,

such as a bare owner who was not equally served with the notice which was served, say, only

to the usufructuary, are not entitled to appeal.

The right of appeal in so far as decisions concerning revocation of permits, on the other hand,

appears to be unrestricted. Any person who simply feels aggrieved by such a decision may

therefore appeal, even if not having registered any prior interest during the application process.

In my view, such right could be abused and should have been limited to the person making the

request, the applicant whose application is being considered and any interested party who

formally registers his interest at the onset of the application process as identified above.

Moreover, it should be noted that any person or institution or any department or agency of

Government ‘having a direct interest’ and aggrieved by ‘any decision, ruling or direction in

relation to Building Regulations and Building Control Regulations’ has a right to appeal such

decision before the EPRT ‘even where such a decision does not emanate from a development

application process’. Although for the time being, appeals from these rulings shall not be

decided by the EPRT, the words ‘having a direct interest’ appear to be in conflict with the spirit

of Article 22(1) which provides that interested parties who lodge an appeal in terms of the Act

are not required to prove that they have an interest in that particular appeal in terms of the

doctrine of juridical Interest.

It is interesting to note that under previous legislation, no appeal was possible ‘by an interested

third party from any development control decision concerning a development which is

specifically authorized in a development plan’.193 This article, although rarely invoked, served to

dismiss a third party appeal against an approved development or use which was expressly

allowed in the relative Local Plan. For example, in Kunsill Lokali Xewkija kontra l-Awtorita’ ta'

193Article 15(1)(d)(ii) of the Development Planning Act (Chapter 356 of the Laws of Malta), which was eventually

replaced by Article (1)(c)(ii) of the Environment and Development Planning Act (The Environment and

Development Planning Act of the Laws of Malta).

95

Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,194 the Planning Appeals Board threw out an appeal by the

Xewkija Local Council who objected against a permit for the increase of industrial activity within

an established factory situated in close proximity to a residential area. The Planning Appeals

Board held that, in this case, no appeal should lie by an interested third party since the

approved industrial use was expressly authorized in the relative Local Plan.

Under the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, this provision has been done away

with. It follows that interested third parties are no longer restricted from appealing against

planning decisions pertaining to a development or use which is specifically authorized in the

planning policies. Undoubtedly, this is understandable since planning decisions are no longer

solely determined on the basis of planning policies. More so, the possibility for the EPRT to turn

down an application for a particular project which conforms to a ‘development plan’ having

gone through Parliamentary scrutiny is equally dangerous, since the EPRT would thus be

ignoring the will of the democratically elected representatives of the people.

3.6.3 Special rights enjoyed by the Attorney General

It should be noted that, specifically in the case of appeals from a decision on an application for

development permission, a decision on a planning control application relating to a change in

alignment and on a decision on scheduling and conservation orders, the Attorney General may

appeal on behalf of the Government ‘notwithstanding that he has not submitted

representations in writing’.195 In the 2015 Tribunal Bill, it was proposed that the Attorney

General could only appeal when the ‘department, agency, authority or other body corporate

wholly owned by the Government’ was not ‘an external consultee’. This provision was

eventually done away with. Further on, the Act today provides that ‘any department, agency,

authority or other body corporate wholly owned by the Government, not being an external

consultee which had been consulted and had not objected shall always be deemed for all

194Kunsill Lokali Xewkija vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 24th July 2009 by the

Planning Appeals Board - [Ap. No. PAB 46/06 ISB. PA 6039/05]. 195Article 11(e) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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intents and purposes of law to be an interested third party notwithstanding that it shall not

have submitted representations in writing’.196

Against this background, external consultees are as a general rule, required to submit their

representations in writing in order to be eligible to submit an eventual appeal. Should an

external consultee, on the other hand, fail to submit the representations within the stipulated

time frames, an appeal may still be filed though through the office of the Attorney General. As

for the remaining ‘departments, agencies, authorities or other body corporates wholly owned

by the Government’ not being external consultees but who were consulted during the process

and failed to react, an appeal may be filed which, unlike in the case of external consultees, need

not be signed by the Attorney General.197 Really and truly, it may be argued that there might

be a discrimination in the law in that the Attorney General and third parties are not treated on

the same footing due to the fact that an ordinary citizen loses his right to appeal if he does not

file his written representations within the statutory 30 day period.

3.6.4 Powers which were intended to be given exclusively to Environmental Non Government Organizations (eNGOs)

The 2015 Tribunal Bill also provided that ‘an Environmental NGO shall always be deemed for all

intents and purposes of the law to be a registered interested person or party, provided that the

appeal is related to an Environmental Impact Assessment or an IPPC permit’. Essentially, this

meant that eNGOs were to be given the opportunity to file an appeal against an Environmental

Impact Assessment or an IPPC permit without the need to have formally registered any prior

objection. Eventually, this provision was substituted to the effect that ‘all persons having

sufficient interest shall have access to a review procedure before the Tribunal to challenge a

substantive or procedural legality of any decision, act or omission relating to a development or

196Article 11(e) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 197Article 11(e) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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an installation which is subject to an environmental impact assessment (EIA) or an integrated

pollution prevention and control permit (IPPC) permit’.198

The effects of the amended provision go to show that ‘anyone having sufficient interest’ -

therefore not only Environmental NGOs - has a right to appeal any decision consequential to a

decision relating to ‘development or an installation which is subject to an environmental impact

assessment (EIA) or an integrated pollution prevention and control permit (IPPC) permit’. Hence,

it should be observed that the appeal must relate to the decision relating to the development

which is subject to the EIA and not the contents of the EIA per se.

Moreover, the words ‘having sufficient interest’, once again, should not be taken to mean that

an appellant must satisfy a certain threshold of interest. It must be constantly recalled that all

appeals made in terms of the Act are admissible once appellant provides ‘reasoned grounds

based on environmental and, or planning considerations to justify the appeal’ without the need

to prove that he has an interest in that appeal in terms of the doctrine of juridical interest.199

Therefore, it is not clear why the legislator felt that he should adopt the ‘sufficient interest’

principle.

3.6.5 Special Powers enjoyed by the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage

A new provision was introduced by Parliament at Committee Stage to the following effect: ‘The

provisions of this Act shall be without prejudice to the provisions of the Cultural Heritage Act

and in particular they shall not affect the powers of the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage

under that Act and the exercise of the Special Powers of the State under Part VII of the said

198Article 11(e) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 199Article 22(1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 states: ‘When an appeal has been

lodged by an interested third party in terms of this Act, such a person need not prove that he has an interest in that

appeal in terms of the doctrine of juridical interest, which doctrine shall not apply to such proceedings, but such a

person shall submit reasoned grounds based on environmental and, or planning considerations to justify his

appeal.’

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Act.’200 This article must be read in conjunction with Article 38(1) of the Environment and

Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 which inter alia states that ‘The decisions of the Tribunal

shall be binding on the Planning Authority, external consultees, registered interested third

parties and any other person and, or entity affected by the decision.’ Essentially, this means that

a decision of the EPRT should bind all external consultees with the exception of the

Superintendent of Cultural Heritage whose special powers stemming from Part VII of the

Cultural Heritage Act are not compromised.

To illustrate this point by way of an example, the National Commission Persons with Disability

cannot invoke enforcement action in terms of Part VI of Chapter 413201 should it consider that a

development approved by the EPRT fails to satisfy the ‘justifiable hardship’ thresholds to enable

derogation from the relative ‘access for all standards’. On the other hand, where the

development relates to a scheduled property, the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage may still

impose restrictions in terms of Article 44(3) of Part VII of the Cultural Heritage Act.

3.6.6 Cumulative Appeal

The possibility of having a number of multiple appeals by external consultees is now greater in

view of the possibility of the various consultees which may file an appeal. Nonetheless, case law

suggests that a cumulative appeal is not possible and individual appellants are in any case

required to submit a separate appeal.202

200Article 2(2) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 201Chapter 413 of the Laws of Malta – Equal Opportunities (Persons with Disability) Act. 202Anthony Borg et nomine vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp, decided on 18th April 1997 by the Planning

Appeals Board - [Ap. No. 102/94 KA].

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3.7 Principles of good administrative behavior

The Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 introduced a set of rules styled as

principles of good administrative behaviour, which the Tribunal ‘shall adhere to and apply.’203

Although no express provision was ever made in any of the previous planning legislations, it is

acknowledged that these principles were long known to our justice system.204 In Parliament,

the Hon. Dr. Michael Falzon maintained that the incorporation of the principles of good

administrative behaviour in the new planning legislation reinforce such requirement:205

“Ħarisna ‘l bogħod fejn mhux biss qed naraw li jkollna entrenched u speċifikat fil-

liġi li jridu jiġu segwiti r-regoli legali ta’ ġustizzja naturali, talli qed naraw li rridu

mmorru lejn amminstrazzjoni tajba. Huwa obbigat ukoll bil-liġi li ż-żewġ partijiet

ikollhom l-istess mezzi proċedurali. Huwa veru li dawn huma prinċipji diġà

stabbiliti, imma għall-ewwel darba għandna liġi ad hoc li qed tagħmel obbligi

speċifiċi fuq l-istess tribunal u jien nemmen li dik hija xi ħaġa pożittiva immens.”

Professor Kevin Aquilina206 questioned whether “there is a need to list these principles in the

Tribunal’s law when these are already listed elsewhere”, referring of course to Article 2 of the

Administrative Justice Act (AJA).207 At face value, this assertion appears well founded since

Schedule One of the AJA already provides that these principles should be respected by the

Planning Appeals Board, now the EPRT. Nevertheless, decision makers with no legal background

are not necessarily familiar with such fundamental concepts. For example, a former chairman

of the EPRT, who is a perit by profession, argued recently that “the role of the EPRT is not to

deliver ‘justice’ to one side or the other (the courts do that) but to decide on the planning merits

of a case in the public interest based on a final technical interpretation of existing plans and

policies”.208 This assertion came when least expected, considering that the person concerned

203Article 9(1) and (2) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 204For example: Article 39(2) of our Constitution and Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights and

Freedoms. 205Parliamentary Sitting No. 292 held on 17th July 2015 – Parliament of Malta. 206Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. - 29th July

2015. 207Chapter 490 of the Laws of Malta – Administrative Justice Act. 208Chris Falzon: True Planning reform. Article published on the Times of Malta - 8th September 2015.

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was responsible himself for the conduct of quasi-judicial proceedings. This only goes to show

that the principles of natural justice warrant wider recognition. At the same time, one could

argue that such cases should be dealt with administrative courts presided by members of the

judiciary who after all benefit too from a security of tenure.

3.7.1 The first principle of good administrative behaviour – fair hearing

The first principle of good administrative behaviour refers to the long established notions that

‘a man may not be a judge in his own cause and that a man's defense must always be fairly

heard’209. Indeed, the first principle of good administrative behaviour reads as follows:

‘The Tribunal shall respect the parties’ right to a fair hearing, including the

principles of natural justice, namely: (i) nemo judex in causa sua, and (ii) audi et

alteram partem’.

In the past, the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’, or ‘right to be heard’, was raised time and

again before the Tribunal by appellants who alleged that this right was being infringed. In

Nicholas Cutajar kontra L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,210 the appellant

made specific reference to the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’ and requested the Tribunal to

summon the enforcement officer Brian Borg who had issued an enforcement notice in relation

to works which the latter himself had allegedly authorized during a site inspection. Appellant

made a written application to the following effect:

“Minghajr pregudizzju ghal dak li ntqal mill-Awtorita’, l-appellant jissottometti illi

dawn il-proceduri jridu l-ewwel jigu ezawriti u dan in omagg ghall-principju tal-

audi alteram partem u ghaldaqstant l-appellant qed jitlob illi huwa jipproduci

zewg xhieda kif del resto talab fir-rikors promotorju u cioe’ l-enforcement officer

Brain Borg li kien hu li hareg l-avviz u kif ukoll Denis Cutajar illi kien prezenti fuq

is-sit diversi drabi meta l-istess enforcement officer acceda fuq il-post, liema

xhieda qed jintalbu senjatament biex l-esponenti ikun jista’ jirribatti dak li inter

alia ntqal fir-risposta tal-istess Awtorita’ datata 19 ta’ Settembru 2013”.

209H.W.R. Wade: Administrative Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982, Fifth Edition) - page 414. 210Nicholas Cutajar vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 15th May 2014 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 200/13E. ECF 231/13.].

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The Tribunal nonetheless turned down appellant’s request, maintaining that there was no need

for the witness to be heard, notwithstanding the principle of ‘audi alteram partem’:

“Bir-rispett kollu dovut lill-Appellanti u r-riferenzi ghall-massimu legali audi

alteram partem, kliem il-ligi huma cari…..inutili li tigi milqugha t-talba tal-

Appellanti li tinstema x-xhieda ta' Brian Borg.”

Clearly, the appellant was in this case ‘denied what he regarded as an adequate opportunity to

put to the administration in the appropriate way facts, opinions, arguments, etc. which he

thought were necessary for the protection of his interest’.211 In my view, the Tribunal was under

a duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced

by the parties ‘without prejudice to its assessments of whether they are relevant to its

decision.’212

Unfortunately, this case was not pursued further since no appeal was lodged before the Court

of Appeal. Thus, it remains unclear whether the Court would have reasoned out that appellant

was in this particular case denied the opportunity of a fair hearing.

For certain, the current Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 specifically

provides that all parties may produce witnesses as evidence provided their details and the facts

they intend to establish through their evidence are stated in the appeal or in the reply to the

appeal.213 At least, the Tribunal is now fully aware that the legislator wanted to give any party

to the appeal ‘the opportunity he desires to influence the decision-maker’214 and such

opportunity may not be denied arbitrarily.

211Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, Leo Zwaak: Theory and Practice of the European Convention on

Human Rights (Intersentia, 2006, Second Edition). 212Pieter Van Dijk, Fried van Hoof, Arjen van Rijn, Leo Zwaak: Theory and Practice of the European Convention on

Human Rights (Intersentia, 2006, Second Edition). 213Article 7(1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 214David Foulkes: Administrative Law (London, Butterworths, 1990, Seventh Edition).

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In the meantime, there were other instances where the Court has ruled that the Tribunal acted

in breach of the ‘audi alteram principle’, although no express reference was made to such

principle in previous planning legislation. In George Attard vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,215 the Court held that appellant was denied the right of fair hearing since

he was not duly notified of the sitting and notwithstanding that both his architect and lawyer

were present during the sitting.

The principle of ‘nemo judex causa sua’ is, on the other hand, to ensure that Tribunal members

do not have any conflicting interest which might lead someone to suppose that there is bias

involved or that the Tribunal would have otherwise acted differently. Article 40(3) of the

Environment and Development Planning Act already provided that ‘a member of the Tribunal

shall be disqualified from hearing an appeal in such circumstances as would disqualify a judge in

a civil suit’. This principle has been reaffirmed in Article 4(6) of the EPRT Act, which expressly

provides that ‘a member of the Tribunal shall be disqualified from hearing an appeal in terms of

Article 734 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure’. The difference is that specific

reference to the relative Code of Organization and Civil Procedure article regulating

disqualification of judges in hearing a suit is now being made.

But who shall decide that a member of the Tribunal should be disqualified? The Environment

and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 is silent on this particular point and one would

therefore need to rely on the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure for guidance.

Consequently, it follows that it is the member himself who should ‘decide on the ground of

challenge’ and ‘where there is any reason to doubt as to whether an alleged ground of

abstention is a good ground or otherwise all the judges (in the case of the EPRT, members),

including the judge (the EPRT member) alleging such ground, shall decide on such ground.’

215George Attard vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th June 2012 by the Court of


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The Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 is also silent as to how a challenge is

made. Before a Court of Law, any objection raised by the parties must be made in ‘open court’

and supported with reasons, which need to be proved where necessary.

Furthermore, it is pertinent to ask: At which stage can a member be challenged by a party to

the appeal? Once again, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 is silent on

this matter. Article 739 of the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure however provides that

both the plaintiff and defendant may file a challenge only at preliminary stage ‘unless the

ground of challenge shall have arisen subsequently, or unless the party raising the objection, or

his advocate, shall declare upon oath that he was not aware of such ground, or that it did not

occur to him at the time.’ Having said that, a member of the Tribunal ‘shall be disqualified’ in

contrast with judges who, on the other hand, ‘may be challenged’. The words ‘shall be

disqualified’ are unequivocal and tantamount to a matter of public order. It follows that a plea

of challenge before the EPRT may thus be raised at any stage during proceedings as well as

before the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) in terms of Article 39 of the EPRT Act.

3.7.2 The second principle of good administrative behaviour – timely decisions

The second principle of good administrative behaviour reads as follows:

‘The time within which the Tribunal shall take its decisions shall be reasonable

depending on the circumstances of each case. The decision shall be delivered as

soon as possible and for this purpose the tribunal shall deliver a single decision

about all matters involved in an appeal before it whether they are of a

preliminary, substantive or procedural nature’.

Time considerations have been always an issue in so far as planning applications are concerned.

Apart from financial stakes, applicants often do encounter a situation where the pertinent

planning policies are changed by the time their application is determined. In Michael Axisa

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ghas-socjeta Lay Lay Co. Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar216 the Court

dismissed appellant’s arguments that the Tribunal was bound to apply the policies which were

applicable at the onset of the application process once the Authority and the Tribunal took a

long time long to process his application. In fact, the Court reiterated the principle that

planning decisions must be taken in line with the applicable polices at the time of the decision.

Consequently, processing time is of essence, all the more since policies can change to one’s

detriment during the course of an application process.

Indeed, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 has introduced various

provisions with a view to avoid delaying tactics together with strict time frames within which

the Tribunal is bound to decide. In fact, the Tribunal shall now hold its first hearing within two

months from the lodging of the appeal application whereas under the previous legislation, the

first hearing was held within three months from receipt of the appeal. As shall be seen

hereunder, if an appeal is accompanied by a request for suspension of the execution of a

permission, the primo appuntamento shall be held within a shorter time frame, namely a

month.

Moreover, the idea is that both the appellant and the Authority are required to have made

their respective preliminary submissions before the first sitting. In fact, the Authority is made

aware of the appeal application and the ancillary documentation within 5 working days from

when the date for the first sitting is set and the Authority is in turn obliged to formally reply

within 20 days. This will make sure that appellant is made aware of the Authority’s defence

prior to the first hearing. In previous years, the Authority’s submissions were rarely

communicated to appellant before the first sitting even though, strictly speaking, ‘a copy of the

appeal and the ancillary documentation was to be communicated to the Authority before the

appeal is heard’.217

216Michael Axisa ghas-socjeta’ Lay Lay Co. Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 14th

January 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 44/2013]. 217Article 20 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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What would happen if the Authority fails to make a reply within 20 days? The Act fails to

provide a definite answer. Nonetheless, in the absence of an an express provision in the EPRT

Act, the Tribunal may not pronounce a state of contumacia, in which case the Authority would

be unable to produce evidence in its favour, be unable to file pleas and be unable to cross-

examine evidence brought by appellant. On the other hand, the Tribunal may once again

choose to examine whether the defendant Authority had a justification not to file a statement

of defence, in which case, an extension of time could be granted.

In any case, appeals against decisions of the Planning Authority will now be decided within a

stipulated time frame, depending of the nature of appeal. Appeals against planning decisions

and enforcement notices shall in fact be determined within a year from the date of the first

hearing, which period may be extended by a further 6 months ‘in exceptional cases, in the

interests of justice’ but ‘no evidence or submissions shall be lodged during the extension

period’.218 There is no clear cut definition for the term ‘interests of justice’ in the law. It is my

opinion that this was purposely done so that the interpretation to be given should not be a

restrictive one but extensive in its applicability.

In the case of summary applications and DNOs, an appealed decision needs to be determined

within three months from the first hearing of the appeal and no provision is made whereby the

said three month period may be extended ‘in the interests of justice.’219

But what if the said time frames are not adhered to? The Act provides a practical solution ‘in

the event that a final decision is not granted within the time-frames above indicated’. In that

case, ‘the appeal shall be assigned by the Secretary to another panel’.220 In fact, a similar

provision already exists in the Code of Organization and Civil Procedure, notably Article

195(5)(a) which provides that any party to the case may present an application to the Chief

Justice, asking for the case to be assigned to another member of the judiciary ‘where a cause

218Article 35(a) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 219Article 35(c) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 220Article 35 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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has been pending before a particular court for three or more years or where a cause has been

pending for judgment before a particular court for eighteen months or more’. In the case of the

EPRT, the appeal would be however assigned ex lege to another panel, without the need of any

of the parties making the relative request. However it is to be noted that in such circumstances

there is no time frame within which the new panel shall then determine the case. Therefore, it

is not clear whether shifting the caseload before another panel would necessarily result in more

timely decisions.

When a request for suspension is made concurrently with the appeal application, the Tribunal

must now hold the first hearing within 30 days from the receipt of the application and state

whether the works should remain suspended depending whether ‘the prejudice that would be

caused would be disproportionate when compared with the prejudice caused by the staying of

the actual execution of the permit’ and ‘the development may not be easily removed or

reversed.’221 In any event, the time frame within which the Tribunal must then deliver its final

decision is equivalent to a maximum of three months, regardless of the type of application.

More so, ‘an application subjected to an Environmental Impact Assessment and, or to an IPPC

permit, which in the opinion of the Minister responsible for the Planning Authority is of strategic

significance or of national interest, related to any obligation ensuing from a European Union

Act, affects national security or affects the interests of the Government and, or of other

governments’ needs to be determined within one month.222

It is interesting to note that in the case of appeals accompanied by a request for suspension, no

such provision is made to allow for an extension ‘in the interest of justice’. Moreover, there is

neither a provision to suggest that the appeal shall be assigned ex lege to another panel in case

of non adherence with the above time frame, although a suspension order lapses ipso jure after

three months.

221Article 33(3) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 222Article 35(1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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Finally, witnesses who are duly notified and yet fail to appear before the Tribunal ‘without just

cause’ still risk being fined between two hundred euro (€200) and five thousand euro

(€5,000).223 Moreover, the Tribunal is now empowered to consider an appeal as abandoned if

the appellant shows no interest in the appeal by failing to appear before the Tribunal on two

consecutive sittings without good cause.224 Of course, both measures are aimed to do away

with deliberate delaying tactics. Furthermore, the Act now provides that the Tribunal must hold

its first hearing within shorter time frames while decisions shall, for the first time, be delivered

within stipulated frames.

3.7.3 The third principle of good administrative behaviour – procedural equality

The third principle of good administrative behaviour is the following:

‘Each party shall be given an opportunity to present its case, whether in writing,

or orally, or both, without being placed at a disadvantage.’

Essentially, one’s right to present his case without being placed at a disadvantage also reflects

the general principle of the ‘right to a fair hearing’.

3.7.4 The fourth principle of good administrative behaviour – availability of information

The fourth principle of good administrative behaviour is as follows:

‘The Tribunal shall ensure that the Planning Authority makes available to the

parties to the proceedings, the documents and information relevant to the

appeal.’

The ‘documents and information relevant to the appeal’ may include documents or information

contained in the file and which the public is otherwise not entitled to view if no appeal

procedures were initiated. Oddly enough, Article 33(2) of the Development Planning Act, 2016

223Previously, the same provision was found in Article 4 of Second Schedule of the Environment and Development

Planning Act. 224Article 42 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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limits public access to ‘that part of the file’ containing the application report, the decision and

reasons for such grant or refusal together with the relative plans and document, environmental

impact statements, environmental planning statements, traffic impact statements and all

alternative site assessments and cost-benefit analysis. In appeal proceedings, a party may, by

contrast, request the Tribunal to have access to any other recorded information that would

have been exchanged between officers of the Authority during the actual application process.

Nevertheless, a practical difficulty could arise if a party to the appeal proceedings insists on

seeing a professional legal advice given to the Planning Authority due to the fact that such

advice would have been given under professional secrecy unless the Authority decides to waive

same.

Once the entire file is accessible to the appellant after the first sitting held by the Tribunal,225

the scope of limiting access to the public of the same file at an earlier stage as provided in

Article 33 of the Development Planning Act, 2016 finds little solace.

3.7.5 The fifth principle of good administrative behaviour – evidence admitted to be available

The fifth principle of good administrative behaviour provides the following:

‘Proceedings before the Tribunal shall be adversarial in nature. All evidence

admitted to the tribunal shall, in principle, be made available to the parties with

a view to adversarial argument.’

Once again, the right of the parties to have full access to all evidence admitted during

proceedings is in keeping with the general principle of the ‘right to a fair hearing’.

225Article 19 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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3.7.6 The sixth principle of good administrative behaviour – Tribunal in a position to examine all factual and legal issues

The sixth principle of good administrative behaviour is the following:

‘The Tribunal shall be in a position to examine all of the factual and legal issues

relevant to the appeal presented by the parties in terms of the applicable law.’

This article makes express reference to ‘applicable law’. The term ‘applicable law’ may be

construed that the Tribunal is bound by the laws which are applicable at the time of the

decision in line with the general principle that ‘il-ligijiet procedurali ma ghandhomx jigu

applikati retroattivament.’226

3.7.7 The seventh principle of good administrative behaviour – deliberations open to the public

The seventh principle of good administrative behaviour reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided by law, the proceedings before the Tribunal shall be

open to the public’

Although giving an impression that there are circumstances where the Tribunal may conduct

proceedings behind closed doors, the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016

provides for no such situations. In fact, the said Act states further on that ‘all decisions of the

Tribunal’ shall be delivered also in public.227

226Carmel Pullicino vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 6/2011]. 227Article 38(2) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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3.7.8 The eighth principle of good administrative behaviour – duty to give reasons

The eigth principle of good administrative behaviour relates to the ‘duty to give reasons’ and

states the following:

‘ The Tribunal shall indicate, with sufficient clarity, the grounds on which it basis

its decisions. It shall not be necessary for the tribunal to deal with every plea

raised, provided that where a plea would, if accepted, be decisive for the

outcome of the appeal, such a plea shall require a specific and express

consideration.’

It is acknowledged that the majority of Tribunal decisions which have been annulled by the

Court were found to violate this same said principle. In June Laferla vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,228 the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) ruled that the

Tribunal, although dealing with each and every plea, failed to support its reasoning with

sufficient motivation.

In Reverendu Joseph Tabone vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,229 the

Court ruled on the same lines. Here, the Court found that the Tribunal cited a number of

planning policies in support of its conclusions and yet failed to state how such policies interact

with the aggravations of the appellant. For this reason, the Court concluded that the Tribunal’s

decision was not adequately ‘motivated’ as required by law.

3.8 Time to submit an appeal

Appeals to the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal are required to be filed within the

time periods stipulated by law. Indeed, the time periods within which appeals submissions are

required to reach the Tribunal have remained practically unchanged.230 In the case of decisions

228June Laferla vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2014 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 36/2013]. 229Reverendu Joseph Tabone vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 26th June 2012 by the

by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. 58/2011]. 230Article 30 of the the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016.

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which need to be published according to the Planning Act, the time period has remained 30

days from the date on which the decision is published on the Department of Information

website. Appeal submissions in relation to decisions which need not be published are required

to reach the Tribunal within thirty days from date of notification of the decision.231 On the

other hand, appeals against notices must still be lodged within ‘fifteen days from the service of

the notice or within fifteen days from the publication of the said notice on the Department of

Information website, should the Planning Authority deem fit to make such a publication.’232

When a reconsideration is submitted by applicant concurrently with a third party appeal, the

time period shall restart from the date of receipt by the Tribunal of the reconsidered decision

so that third party appellant may make further submissions to the Tribunal if he deems it

necessary. It is important to highlight that failing to adhere to the above time frames would

render the appeal ‘fuori termine’ and hence null and void.

In Joseph Debono kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,233 the Tribunal

found that the appellant did not file the appeal against the enforcement order within 15 days

from the serving of the enforcement notice. The Tribunal added that the period is extended

until the next working day when the last day is on a weekend or a public holiday. In this case,

the Tribunal found that the appeal was filed way beyond the 15 day period and held that the

appeal was submitted ‘fuori termine’.

It is equally important to ensure that the appeal reached the Tribunal’s registry (which now

replaces the Tribunal’s secratariat). In OSA Services Ltd kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-

Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,234 the Tribunal held that the appeal was fuori termine once it found that

the submissions were erroneously filed at the offices of the Authority. The Tribunal observed

231Article 13(1) of the the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 232Article 13(3) of the the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 233Joseph Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 30th July 2013 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 347/12E CF. ECF342/12]. 234OSA Services Ltd vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 14th November 2013 by the

Environment and Planning Review Tribunal - [Ap. No. 177/13 MS. ECF 408/12].

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that it was the responsibility of the appellant to ensure that the appeal submissions reach the

right location.

3.9 Appointment of experts

For the first time, ‘the Tribunal may appoint an expert or more than one expert to draw up a

report on any matter which the Tribunal deems relevant to the appeal’.235 Essentially, a similar

system already exists in our Courts. Nonetheless, the idea was rejected by Professor Aquilina236

who described it as ‘a wrong move as it will contribute only to increase expenses to parties who

appear before it and delay the decision making process.’ Although, the appointment of experts

during a process would definitely increase expenses, it is equally acknowledged that certain

technical aspects may require the input of specialised expertise, all more so since the

competence of the Tribunal has increased. Being a ‘planner’ sitting on a Board is not necessarily

tantamount to being an expert, for example, in aspects of fire safety and ventilation systems

which now fall under the competence of the Tribunal. Even more so, the envisaged expenses

related with experts would be probably minimal when compared to the huge investment which

is typically associated with construction projects. On the other hand, the appointment of

experts may be considered as an unnecessary added expense and consequently have an

adverse effect in disheartening third parties, including eNGOs, from filing an appeal.

3.10 Power to make corrections

Section 46 (1) of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016 introduced the

possibility for the Tribunal to correct mistakes arising from an oversight or omission. Indeed,

the Tribunal may, prior to the decision, allow the modification, adding or striking of names of

any parties as well as the correction of ‘any other mistake’ at the request of any of the parties.

235Article 30(2) of the the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 236Kevin Aquilina: Twenty reasons against MEPA’s demerger. Article published on maltatoday.com.mt. 29th July

2015.

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The Tribunal may also out of its own motion remedy ‘any administrative omission or mistake in

an act’ until it delivers the decision. Once a decision is delivered, the Tribunal has the power to

amend only ‘an error of calculation incurred in the decision’ or correct ‘an error in the wording

of the decision’ or ‘an expression which is equivocal, or which may be construed differently from

that evidently intended by the Tribunal’. In any event, the Tribunal must act within 20 days from

the date of the decision and the 20 day period within which one may appeal the ‘corrected’

decision before the Court will restart from the date of the notification of the decree given on

the demand for the amendment.

On the other hand, the parties may also request the Tribunal during proceedings to ‘make

further submission of fact or of law by separate note as long as such changes do not change the

substance of the action or of the defence on the merits of the case.’

These provisions are clearly intended to avoid situations where a Tribunal decision may not be

implemented in practice or even annulled by the Courts due to some simple omission in the

decision such as an error in the name of the parties.237

3.11 The role of the Court of Appeal (Civil Jurisdiction)

Under the previous legislation, it was already an established principle that ‘the decisions of the

Tribunal shall be final’ and an appeal from such decisions could be made by the appellant or

any of the appellate parties to the appeal before the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) ‘on a

point of law decided by the Tribunal or on any matter relating to an alleged breach of the right

of a fair hearing before the Tribunal.’238 Such an appeal had to be lodged within twenty days

from when the decision of the Tribunal was delivered in public and the Court was in turn bound

to conclude ‘in a timely manner’239 even though no provision was made to enforce a timeframe

237Louise Anne Sultana vs Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta’ l-Izvilupp, decided on 14th April 1997 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). 238Article 39 of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 239Article (41)(16) of the Environment and Development Planning Act.

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within which the Court was required to deliver judgment. In the previous law, it was also

established that ‘an appeal from a partial decision of the Tribunal may only be filed together

with an appeal from the final decision of the Tribunal.’240 Moreover, the Secretary of the

Tribunal was vested with all legal and judicial representation of the Tribunal in all judicial

proceedings instituted against the same Tribunal,241 including, of course, proceedings following

a Tribunal decision.

All the above features were in fact retained under the current Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal Act.242 Moreover, today Article 39 of the said Act further provides that, apart

from ‘points of law decided by the Tribunal’, decisions of the Tribunal may also be appealed on

‘any matter relating to an alleged breach of the right of a fair hearing before the Tribunal’.

Really and truly, this was already the case under previous legislations because the principles of

natural justice were always deemed to qualify under the ambit of ‘law’ by our Courts. In point

of fact, the implications resulting from the non observance of such rules should now seem very

obvious, since these rules are now listed as rules of good administrative behaviour, which the

Tribunal ‘shall apply’.

In Max Zerafa vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar243 the Court of Appeal

(Inferior Jurisdiction) maintained that it had no jurisdiction to reassess the evidence and

technical facts which led to the Planning Appeals Board’s conclusions. A decision which is based

on the ‘wrong’ interpretation of facts is not tantamount to a point of law and thus falls outside

the competence of the Court. Consequently, the Court was precluded from ascertaining

whether the Tribunal was correct in interpreting the facts leading to its conclusions. The Court

held:

240Article (41)(3) of the Environment and Development Planning Act. 241Article (41)(12) of the Environment and Development Planning Act. 242Part V of the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal Act, 2016. 243Max Zerafa vs Il-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta’ l-Izvilupp, decided on 12th January 2004 by the Court of Appeal

(Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 20/2012].

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“Din il-Qorti tista` tirrevedi biss kwistjonijiet dwar punt ta’ Dritt decizi mill-Bord.

Dan ifisser li m’hemmx appelli fuq kwistjonijiet ta’ fatt, fuq kwistjonijiet ta’

apprezzament ta’ provi. Biex appell ikun ammissibbli, il-kwistjoni trid tkun

necessarjament dwar kwistjoni ta’ Dritt, li tkun qamet kontroversja dwarha, li

tkun giet diskussa u elucidata fil-motivazzjoni u li tkun giet definita fid-decizjoni

appellata.”

On the other hand, in Joseph Tonna vs L-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,244

the Court found against the Planning Appeals Board because the latter failed to give regard to

the ‘surrounding commitment’ in determining whether the permit should have been issued as

required by the relevant section of the law. In its conclusions, the Court held:

“Illi fl-opinjoni ta’ din il-Qorti, din hija applikazzjoni hazina tal-Ligi, u dan peress li

dak li l-Bord kellu jaghmel kien fl-ewwel lok jara jekk kienx hemm commitment

ghal tali tip ta’ zvilupp, u dan fil-mument li kienet ser tittiehed id-decizjoni.”

Although, in recent judgments, the Court gave a different interpretation as to how this

particular section of the law should be applied by decision makers, it reiterated the idea that

the wrong application of any section of the law is subject to its scrutiny.

Similarly, the Court declared that it has jurisdiction ‘on a point of law’ after it found that the

Tribunal adduced extraneous requisites to a particular planning policy. In Carmel Gauci vs L-

Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar,245 the Tribunal found against appellant after

concluding that Policy PLP20 246 required applicants to furnish evidence which attests that the

building was occupied as a residence until the date of application. Nonetheless, the Court

observed that no such requirement was made in the said policy PLP20 and thus concluded that

that the Tribunal made a wrong application of the law.

244Joseph Tonna vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 6/2010]. 245Carmel Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 4th December 2013 by the Court

of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 28/2013]. 246Policy PLP 20 regulated structural extensions to residences situated outside development zones at the time.

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On the other hand, the Court consistently held that it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the

Tribunal made a wrong appreciation of the facts before it, in consequence of which, the wrong

policies were ‘applied’. In Joseph Tanti vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar

et247 the Court held:

“…. id-decizjoni bazikament tikkontjeni semplici applikazzjoni ta’ diversi policies

tal-Pjan ta’ Struttura ghall-fatti tal-kaz kif rahom u apprezzahom il-Bord.

Apprezzament tekniku dan li jisfuggi l-mansjoni revizjonali ta’ din il-Qorti. Jidher

car ghalhekk mal-ewwel illi l-appellant qieghed jappella fuq fatti. Dan … ma

huwiex possibbli legalment.”

Nevertheless, the Court has held in recent judgments, that it would also evaluate ‘points of

facts’ in exceptional circumstances where it results that the Tribunal’s conclusions are based on

a manifest injustice or a gross error of fact. This was the conclusion of the Court in Martin

Baron vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar et.:248

“Dan l-aggravju biex jinqara bhala appell fuq punt ta’ ligi deciz mit-Tribunal ma

jistax jttiehed fil-perspettiva ta’ apprezzament tal-provi da parti tat-Tribunal li

fuqhom din il-Qorti ma ghandhiex poter tissindaka hlief f’kazijiet eccezzjonali ta’

manifesta ingustizzja jew zball grossolan ta’ fatt liema fatt kien dak li ddetermina

d-decizjoni tat-Tribunal.”

Should the Court decide to annul the Tribunal’s decision, the case is sent to the Tribunal for

reassessment. As held in Costa Brava Company Limited vs Dormax Promotional Printing

Limited,249 the Tribunal has no option but to follow the Courts directions.

247Joseph Attard vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 28th October 2002 by the Court of

Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 13/01]. 248Martin Baron vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Mario Farrugia f’isem il-

Fondazzjoni Wirt Artna, decided on 22nd January 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No.

54/2013]. 249Costa Brava Company Limited vs Dormax Promotional Printing Limited, decided on 28th March 2012 by the Court

of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) - [Ap. No. 52/2004/2].

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The approach taken by the Court in Paul Polidano vs l-Awtorita’ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-

Ippjanar250 is perhaps more intriguing, although legally questionable. In this case, the Court

quoted from a previous judgment in the names of Martin Debrincat vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta

dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar et and warned the Tribunal that it would pronounce judgment on

the merits, should the Tribunal persist in ignoring the directions given by the Court.

All the above judgments go to show that questions of law may take various forms. It is

therefore not surprising that the legislator has once again steered away from defining ‘a point

of law’.

250Paul Polidano vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of


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Chapter 4: Conclusive remarks

4.1 Reconsideration of research questions

This thesis was presented in the following order – Chapter One dealt with the administrative

setup of the new Planning Authority, Chapter Two delved into the permitting process dictated

by the new provisions and Chapter Three focused on the new Environment and Planning

Review Tribunal.

At each and every stage of the study, the author made an attempt to address the following

research questions:

• What are the changes brought about by the new legislation?

• How do the said changes reconcile with the aims of the legislator?

• How do these changes ‘interact’ with established case law?


published Bills?

• Could the legislative product be better?

4.2 Evaluation of thesis

The answers to the above questions may be rounded up as follows:

• What are the main changes brought about by the new legislation? One of the major

changes envisaged in the new legislation and which drew up substantial criticism relates to the

setting up of the Executive Council. All things considered, better cooperation between the

planning regulator and other regulatory stakeholders, who in turn may give their input during

policy formulation, should however be envisaged. The situation was certainly different under

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previous legislation, since the MEPA Board was primarily focused on permit decisions rather

than creating new policies. In addition, it is expected that planning policies would hopefully be

revisited more often.

The envisaged changes, whereby the Planning Authority has now been entrusted to also decide

on sanitary matters instead of the General Services Board should translate to a swifter

application process. Similarly, having external statutory consultees being jointly consulted at

the onset of the application process should equally contribute to quicker processing. The

introduction of the Agriculture and Advisory Committee, whose role includes the collation of

information from the relative Government Departments on behalf of applicants, should

likewise save a lot of time for farmers who were previously obliged to obtain the required

information themselves prior to submitting an application.

On a similar note, the jurisdiction now enjoyed by the EPRT, covering planning control

applications and sanitary matters, should lead into a more effective remedy being given to

prospective applicants. Moreover, it should be observed that the Tribunal must now comply

with stricter procedures, including a timetable for action. Having said that, the author is of the

firm opinion that the notion of ‘fair hearing’, now codified in the Tribunal Act, should under no

circumstance be diluted at the expense of fleetness.

It was further argued that the new legislation seeks to enhance the ‘connection’ between

stakeholders/ citizens and the planning process. The presence of the ERA on both the Executive

Council and the Planning Board signifies prima facie a stronger voice for the environment in

both the policy and decision process. Likewise, the direct representation of Local Councils and

eNGOS on the Planning Board denotes a wider representation of civil society in the decision

making process. However, as expounded upon in this thesis, having Local Councils and the ERA

expressing their position with regard to an application in their capacity as a statutory consultee

and eventually participating in the decision process could form the basis of a legal dispute.

Furthermore, the environment regulator is amongst the list of external consultees and thus also

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enjoys a right of appeal before the EPRT for the first time since prior to MEPA’s demerger, the

environment Directorate had no legal standing before the Tribunal and/or the Courts.

Nevertheless, the success in the relationship between the Authority and consultees solely

depends on whether the latter are ultimately equipped to deal effectively with the thousands

of referred planning applications.

It was further stated that any person filing a request for the revocation of a planning permit is

now automatically entitled to a public hearing and the Planning Directorate may no longer

choose to block any such request on the basis of lack of prima facie evidence. Once again, this

goes to show that the rights given to third parties are being strengthened. Similarly, the

‘summary’ regime introduced in the latest legislation hosts a number of developments which

previously qualified under a simple DNO and thus could be carried out without third parties

being informed about the proposed works. It follows that those orders which have been

migrated to the summary framework are subject to external consultation for the first time. In

turn, the decision of a summary application can be appealed by interested third parties before

the EPRT. This novel move is once again directed to enhance third party rights.

From the above, it transpires that the rights of third parties have been ‘widened’, possibly even

excessively. On the down side, the result of these changes could lead to a myriad of requests

for revocation of planning permits together with frivolous and vexatious litigation before the

Tribunal.

It was also observed that the new law gives a lot of discretion to decision makers since they

need to achieve a balance in ‘trade offs’ between policy requirements and material

considerations. In the past, such latitude was exercised occasionally by decision organs,

including the Court, even though the law clearly provided otherwise. It appears that the new

Article 72(1) is the right answer to achieve optimal planning solutions, enabling decision makers

to take regard to circumstantial ‘context’ which is not necessarily reflected in the actual plans

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and policies without breaking the law. This is in line with the principle that ‘meta qed tiehu

decizjoni fuq applikazzjoni, trid tqis ic-cirkostanzi kollha’.251

The author also made reference to the removal of the Schedule Six, whose effectiveness was

hampered by a number of challenges. It was explained that the said Schedule was enacted

when illegal activities were still financially ‘viable’ because the daily fine regulations were still

not in force. More so, its removal was seen positively since decision makers need no longer

defy the law – as happened very often - by not requesting the removal of post-2007 illegalities

outside the development zone prior to their sanctioning.

It was clear from the onset that the legislator intended to give more legal certainty where it was

due. The replacement of Category B developments with the regularization framework is a prime

example. Likewise, the definition of ‘illegal development’ together with a clearer explanation as

to what constitutes a vested right in a planning decision as well as the revised definition of

‘error on the face of the record’ should lend a hand to address the various conflicting

interpretations given to date. Also, the instances when an appeal may be lodged before the

EPRT have been better defined, leaving little doubt as to when and who has a right to appeal.

Likewise, the principles of good administrative behaviour, the legal imposition of time frames

within which the Tribunal is bound to deliver its decisions together with the power of the

Tribunal to appoint experts should also contribute to a better ‘legal’ environment.

• How do the said changes reconcile with the aims of the legislator? From a reading of

the previous subsection it transpires that the legislator’s aims could be summed up as follows:

First, to cut red tape, promote a streamlined approach and speed up the planning application

process. Secondly, to give a stronger voice to the ordinary man in the street as well as other

statutory stakeholders, particularly the environmental regulator and the Superintendent of

251Concluding speech by the Hon. Deborah Schembri, Parliamentary Secretary for Planning and Simplification of

Administrative Processes. Conference organized by the MEPA for its employees about the MEPA Demerger.

Conference was held at the Dolmen Hotel, Qawra on 12th March 2016.

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Cultural Heritage. Thirdly, to provide concrete and enforceable ways in response to past legal

anomalies.

• How do these changes ‘interact’ with established case law? It is evident throughout

that case law wielded its effect on the legislator. A number of provisions which are now found

in the law mirror the directions given by the Court in past decisions. (For example, the

principles of good administrative behaviour are now found in the Tribunal Act, thus rendered

more evident). Equally so, certain amendments were carried out with a view to provide ‘neat’

legal solutions in response to past ‘illegal’ trends. (For example, the removal of the Sixth

Schedule which was very often overlooked by decision makers).


published Bills? It would be safe to state that the majority of the proposals put forward during

public consultation were not taken on board by Parliament. For example, Parliament proceeded

with the removal of the Sixth Schedule, the reintroduction of the outline permit and the setting

up of the Executive Council, amongst other new provisions which had been highly criticized by

the environmental lobby. However, Parliament embraced some of the suggestions put forward.

These include the veto given to the Superintendent of Cultural Heritage over planning

decisions. On the other hand, on a number of occasions, such as with ‘issues of ownership’, as

shall be seen in the next subsection, government succumbed to public pressure at the expense

of legal uncertainty. Finally, it was observed that certain suggestions, such as the proposal to

delete any reference to ‘projects of common interest’ from the law were ab initio frivolous.

• Could the legislative product be better? Although the legislator made an evident

attempt to address many of the past legal inconsistencies, the author still thinks that a number

of issues were overlooked. As observed earlier on, section 33 (2) of the Development Planning

Act, 2016, which restricts public access to only certain ‘parts’ of an application file, serves little

scope. This is particularly so since a party to an appeal may eventually request the Tribunal to

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gain access to all recorded information. Moreover, the Civil Court252 has recently decreed that

an objector should have the opportunity to view the minutes contained in the relative

application file prior to the planning decision. Thus, in light of what was just explained, such a

provision does not really hold water.

On other occasions, the legislator simply succumbed to media pressure. This was particularly so

with regard to ownership issues since government withdrew from what was previously

provided for in the 2015 Planning Bill. This could be easily done away with since the legislator

has introduced a concurrent safeguard stipulating that permits do not ‘in any manner constitute

or be construed as a guarantee in favour of the applicant as to the title to the property.’253

4.3 Areas for further analysis

In no time, the Planning Authority would be running in full force.254 Like any other law, planning

legislation cannot remain static. Before long, it could be time to revisit the current legislation

with a view to meet upcoming challenges arising from new situations. For sure, the more

planning legislation is discussed, the less the risk of one losing perspective.

One can safely foresee, even at such early stage, that there is room for further study in certain

key areas. As highlighted in the introduction of this thesis, a number of themes were given no

consideration by the author in view of the set word count. Having said that, it will soon be

important to revisit the topics focused upon in this study and assess their short term effect ‘on

the ground’ before long.

252A decree given on 29th December 2016 by the First Hall, Civil Court in the Acts of the Warrant of Prohibitory

Injunction in the names of Jonathan Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar - [46/2016 AE].

The said decree read as follows: ‘M’huwiex maghruf x’tghid minute 14. Fil-fehma tal-qorti r-rikorrent ghandu jkollu

access ghal din il-minuta biex ikun jaf il-motivazzjoni wara din l-opinjoni.’ 253Article 72(1) of the Bill entitled Development Planning Act, 2015 – Published July 2015. 254The new Planning Authority started to function on the 4th April 2016.

124

The following is a list of topics that one could possibly consider for further analysis, after the

law has been in operation for a few years:

• The interaction between the Executive Council and the Planning Board, particularly

whether a separation between the policy and decision regime was needed in the first instance

and whether planning policies and decisions are of now of a better ‘planning’ quality;

• The effect of demerging the environment from the planning regime and whether the

Planning Authority is living to the country’s environmental expectations;

• The interaction between the various organs – external and internal consultees, the

Executive Council, the Planning Board and the EPRT;

• The effect of incorporating sanitary legislation within the planning regime;

• The introduction of the Agricultural Advisory Committee and the Design Advisory

Committee and on the other hand, the elimination of the Heritage Advisory Panels as well as

planning mediators from the Planning Act;

• A comparative analysis between Article 72 of the new Planning Act and Article 69 of

the Environment and Planning Development Act. In particular, one should establish whether a

balance in ‘trade offs’ between policy requirements and material considerations is in effect

being achieved. At the same time, one could examine whether applicants and/or objectors are

now at the mercy of unfettered discretion of decision makers;

• The effect of the regularization permits and the removal of the Sixth Schedule on the

environment;

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• The performance of the EPRT, particularly whether the right of appeal has been

widened excessively and is now being abused;

• The rights of third parties in the planning process - one should analyze whether such

rights are being abused or whether there are any areas demanding a better access to justice;

• The role of the Court of Appeal, with particular emphasis on its interpretation of the

new legal provisions.

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Appendix A: Cases linked to Chapter 2

Annunziato Bonello Bianco vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 16th September 2014 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 857/11E MS. ECF 539/11]

‘Illi f’zona ta’ konservazzjoni urbana, xogholijiet ta’ twaqqieh ta’ hitan u t-

tnehhija ta’ pilastru biex jitpogga travu bil-konsegwenza li jitwessa l-access ghal

sala, ma jaqghux taht il-provizzjoni ta’ refurbishement jew maintenance, izda

jitqiesu bhala xogholijiet interni.’

Godfrey Gialanze vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 21st June 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 171/09E CF. ECF 780/09]

‘Fil-kas in ezami, id-divergenza bejn il-partijiet hi fis-sens li l-Awtorita’ tikkontendi

li sar xoghol gdid u ghalhekk jinhtieg il-permess, ghalkemm fl-Avviz jinghad biss

‘ghandek depositu ta’ konkos fuq il-blat’’ mentri l-appellant jinsisti li m’hemm l-

ebda depositu ta’ konkos, li ma sar l-ebda xoghol gdid, izda sar biss xoghol ta’

riparazzjoni ta’ dak ezistenti, hsarat ta’ natura urgenti li jirrikjedu attenzjoni

immedjata – u stante li s-sit imiss mal-bahar – xoghol li necessarjament jinhtieg li

jsir fis-Sajf. Irrizulta mill-pjanti, partikolarment ir-ritratti esebiti, li dak li sar kien

effettivament xoghol ta’ tiswija ta’ dak gia ezistenti, Skond l-Artiklu 62(2)(a) tal-

Kap. 504, precedentement Artiklu 30(2)(a) tal-Kap. 356, xogholijiet ta’

manutenzjoni ma jirrikjedux permess sakemm dawn ma jbiddlux l-apparenza

esterna tal-bini u sakemm ma jinkludux xogholijiet ta’ demolizzjoni u ta’

kostruzzjoni. Ix-xogholijiet li saru f’dan il-kaz huma certament xogholijiet ta’

manutenzjoni fit-termini tal-Artiklu hawn fuq citat. It-Tribunal ghalhekk qed

jiddisponi minn dan l-appell billi jilqa’ l-istess, jirrevoka l-Avviz biex Tieqaf u ta’

Twettieq kontra l-appellant tat-28 ta’ Lulju 2009, ECF 780/09.’

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John Paul Grech vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th January 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 14/14E. MS. ECF 329/13]

‘Illi l-Artikolu 67(2) tal-Kap. 504 jaghti definizzjoni ta’ f’hiex jikkonsisti zvilupp u hu

car li bdil ta’ uzu ta’ proprjeta’ huwa zvilupp. Ghaldaqstant biex wiehed jaghmel

bdil ta’ uzu minn garaxx ghal stalla jinhtieg permess tal-izvilupp.’

Angelo Abela kontra l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar. Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th March 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 334/10 CF. PA 4939/08]

‘Wiehed jifhem pero’, kif ritenut mill-Appellant, li l-art kienet xi darba tinhadem,

izda sfat abbandunata bil-konsegwenza li ntilfet il-hamrija u spiccat xaghri. Mill-

banda l-ohra, irid jigi sottolinjat li galadarba art agrikola ma tibqax tinhadem u

allura tispicca vittma ta’ degradazzjoni naturali - b’ dana li jinkixef il-blat u

tinbidel f’xaghri - tista’ tigi rigenerata biss wara li ssir applikazzjoni lill-Awtorita’

ghal-permess tal-izvilupp.’

Kristian Fenech Soler u Pierre Nani vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 2nd May 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 93/12E CF. ECF 472/11]

‘Ghalkemm bhala fatt, hu veru li bdil ta’ uzu fl-istess klassi ma jirrikjedix permess

ulterjuri, barra dak originali, il-kontravenzjoni allegata fl-Avviz m’hijiex bdil ta’

uzu fl-attivita’ gestita fil-fond mill-appellanti, izda li dak li hu ndikat fil-pjanti

approvati bhala store, gie konvertit u qed jintuza bhala kcina; u cioe’ li l-uzu

prezenti mhux konformi mal-pjanti approvati fl-imsemmi permess….. Billi l-uzu

prezenti, cioe’, l-kcina fil-basement, m’hijiex indikata fil-pjanti approvati, skond l-

Artikolu tal-ligi fuq citat, l-appell ma jistax jigi kkunsidrat favorevolment.’

128

Carmela Muscat vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 28th May 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 23/15E MS. ECF2/15]

‘Illi t-Tribunal huwa tal-fehma li l-Rural Policy and Design Guidance tal-2014

tistabilixxi dak li huwa accettabli fis-sens ta’ dicitura u nterpretazzjoni ta’ dak li

jista’ jkun legally-established u dak li m’huwhiex. Dan pero’ fl-ambitu ta’

applikazzjonijiet li jistghu jew ma jistghux isiru fiz-zoni kolpiti b’din il-Policy. Ma

jidhirx mid-dicitura tal-istess Policy li l-intenzjoni tal-legislatur kienet illi dak li

jidher fir-ritratti tal-1978 huwa munit bil-permess. Il-ligi hija tacita dwar dan il-

punt, anzi, taghmel uzu tal-kliem legally-established u mhux presumed to be with

a permit – haga li l-legislatur seta’ facilment jaghmel. L-uzu ta’ dawn il-kliem

saret bi skop li fi hdan dak kolpit b’din il-Policy, applikant ikun jista’ jargumenta li

ghandu l-izvilupp, jew parti minnu, li m’ghandux bzonn li jghaddi minn process

shih tal-MEPA billi huwa legally-established. Izda t-Tribunal huwa tal-fehma li tali

frazi m’hix intenzjonata sabiex tkopri dak li m’ghandux permess ai finijiet tal-

estremi li jistghu jwasslu ghall-hrug ta’ Avviz bhal dak mertu ta’ dan l-Appell.

Apparti l-fatt li, l-operat mertu tal-Avviz irid ikun tali li jkun munit bi permess.’

Charles Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 1st October 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 18/15 MS. DNO 1653/14]

‘Ikun ghalhekk inutli li l-Awtorita’ tohrog notifika ta’ zvilupp skont l-Ordni dwar in-

Notifikazzjoni ta’ Zvilupp jekk il-pjanti li jindikaw tali zvilupp ikunu qed jiksru l-istess

kundizzjonijiet li johorgu mill-Klassi ta’ Zvilupp fl-Ewwel (1) Skeda tal-Ordni. Din in-

notika tigi ghalhekk nulla u bla effett, f’kaz li ma tkunx mahruga skont id-dispost

tal-Artikolu 3(i) sucitat, ghaliex fil-kaz ta’ notifika ta’ zvilupp hija l-istess ligi li qed

tiddikjara zvilupp indikat fl-Ewwel Skeda tal-Ordni bhal permess u ma

jikkostitwixxix permess fuq decizjoni tal-Awtorita’.’

129

Dr. Gerard Spiteri Maempel vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza l-Avukat Dottor Joseph Zammit Maempel LL.D decided on 22nd October 2003 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 393/02 TSC. PA 0598/02]

‘Fil-fatt, il-hrug tal-permess ‘outline’ jorbot kemm l-Awtorita’ kif ukoll l-applikant

fis-sens illi l-’full development permission’ ghandu jigi approvat, dejjem sakemm l-

applikazzjoni tkun saret fl-isfond ta' dak illi jkun gie approvat fi stadju ‘outline’ u

sakemm dawk il-materji riservati jkunu accettabbli ghall-Awtorita’.’

Eucharist Bajada ghan-nom tas-Socjeta` Baystone Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) [Ap. No.36/2011]

‘……. kwistjoni ta’ reserved matters hija ntiza sabiex isiru decizjonijiet riservati

ghall-FDP li jalimentaw u jsostnu l-ODP u mhux li jannulawh jew irenduh

inesegwibbli ghaliex altrimenti l-kuncett ta’ ODP jigi rez ghal kollox inekwu u

rrelevanti…....la darba li bl-ODP l-appellant ghandu dritt akkwizit hekk rikonoxxut

mill-Ligi u mill-Awtorita’ li fuq kollox hargitu.....kull riferenza ghal dak li t-Tribunal

ghamel fid-decizjoni hawn appellata ghal dawk li huma l-policies tal-ippjanar

vigenti huma ghal kollox irrelevanti u dan proprju minhabba l-portata legali tal-

ODP.’

Rebecca Darmanin Kissaun vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 47/13 MC.]

‘Il-kwistjonijiet dwar titolu, nuqqasijiet jew ripensamenti bazati fuq kwistjonijiet

civili ma jbiddlu xejn mill-effett ta’ permess li hu validu sakemm m’hemmx lok ta’

revoka skond il-ligi, jew nuqqas ta’ zvilupp fit-terminu preskritt jew nuqqas ta’

proroga wara li jiskadi t-terminu ta’ validita’ tal-permess.’

130

Joseph Apap, Carmelo Zammit, John Attard, Rita Fenech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Maria Debattista ghan-nom ta’ Tourist Services Limited Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent decided on 9th July 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 16/15 MC.]

‘…. fejn hemm kontestazzjoni dwar it-titolu fuq il-proprjeta’ jew xi dritt reali jew

anki personali fuq l-istess proprjeta’ li fuqha tkun mibnija l-proposta, l-Awtorita’

m’hix fdata tiddetermina l-kwistjoni ta’ natura civili hi, izda ghandha tindirizza l-

applikazzjoni biss mill-lat ta’ ippjanar u kull permess li talvolta jista’ jigi approvat,

hu attwabbli biss fin-nuqqas ta’ oppozizzjoni minn min ikun qed jivvanta dritt fuq

il-proprjeta’ li fuqha jkun inhareg il-permess ta’ zvilupp. Altrimenti kull min irid

ifixkel lil Awtorita’ milli taqdi d-dover primarju li tikkonsidra proposti ta’ zvilupp

mill-lat tal-ligijiet ta’ ippjanar u jista’ facilment jistultifika l-process billi jivvanta

dritt fuq is-sit u jwaqqaf il-procedura ta’ ippjanar.’

Savio Spiteri vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 25th July 2008 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 222/04 ISB. PA 6293/01]

‘F'dan il-kas, jirrizulta mhux kontestat illi l-applikant mhux is-sid u jirrizulta

ulterjorament li gie notifikat persuna illi m’hix is-sid b'dana illi s-sidien propji,

ossia, John u Pauline konjugi Cefai baqghu qatt ma gew notifikati b' Certificate of

Ownership B. B'dawn ir-rizultanzi, il-Bord ta' l-Appell huwa propens illi jilqa' l-

eccezzjoni ulterjuri ta' nullita' sollevata mill-Awtorita’ bin-nota ta' l-14 ta' Marzu

2005.’

Franco Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Carmelo Borg decided on 5th November 2015. by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 42/15 MC. PA 164/13]

‘F’dan il-kaz irrizulta b’mod car illi l-applikant iddikjara f’korrezzjoni maghmula fl-

applikazzjoni illi fuq parti mill-izvilupp ma kienx proprjetarju assolut izda

koproprjetarju [….] Hi l-fehma tal-Qorti illi ladarba, nonostante l-kontestazzjoni li

semma t-Tribunal, l-istess applikant ghogbu jiddikjara kemm bi jew minghajr

pregudizzju, li m’hux l-uniku proprjetarju ta’ almenu parti mis-sit li fuqu qed

jintalab l-izvilupp, it-Tribunal kellu jsegwi l-precetti tal-Artikolu 68(3) ad litteram.

M’hemmx il-permess tal-koproprjetarju li l-istess applikant ex admissis jirrikonoxxi.

131

Din m’hix semplici kontestazzjoni fuq titolu jew aspett ta’ titolu izda ammissjoni

tal-applikant li hemm haddiehor li hu sid mieghu u illi jirrizulta mill-atti li dan il-

koproprjetarju fil-persuna tal-appellant qed joggezzjona ghall-izvilupp. It-Tribunal

ma setax f’dan il-kaz jelimina l-problema billi jiddikjara li l-permess hu soggett ghal

third party rights. Kellu invece jara jekk il-parti li fuqha hemm id-dikjarazzjoni ta’

koproprjeta’ hux qed tigi vjolata b’talba ghal zvilupp kontra r-rieda tal-

koproprjetarju ai termini tal-Artikolu 68(3). Dan ma sarx mit-Tribunal u ghal din ir-

raguni biss, l-appell jisthoqqlu jigi milqugh.’

Charles Bugeja vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 19th July 2000 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 627/98 SMS PA 0656/98]

‘Indipendentement minn kull regola jew gudikat kwotat mill-Awtorita’, l-Bord ma

jistax jahrab mill-istreetscape tal-lokalita` (liema streetscape ma jistax jigi injorat

billi huwa stat ta' fatt). Sabiex dan l-istreetscape jinzamm wiehed irid jezamina dak

li hemm fil-lokalita' – huwa hekk biss li l-istreetscape jista' jigi rispettat u mizmum

sewwa. Ir-ragunijiet tar-rifjut kienu l-gholi tal-izvilupp u l-problema ta' parking.

Hemm diversi binjiet faccata tas-sit u fl-istess blokk li huma tal-istess gholi bhal

dak mitlub mill-appellant. Dak li kien tajjeb ghal haddiehor ghandu jkun tajjeb anki

ghall-appellant.’

Joseph Muscat vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 18th May 2005 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction).

‘Kuntrarjament ghal dak sottomess mill-Awtorita’ u cioe' li l-bini f'din it-triq

ghandu biss ‘back gardens’ jaghtu ghal fuqha, irrizulta li hemm ringiela shiha ta'

zvilupp kollu bil-faccata fuq din it-triq. Mill-istess ritratti jirrizulta li s-sit hu 'infill

site' billi fuq iz-zewg nahat adjacenti diga sar zvilupp. Adjacenti s-sit in kwistjoni l-

Bord fl-access gie muri block ta' bini fl-gholi propost mill-appellant, li ukoll ghandu

l-faccata tieghu ghal Triq ix-Xaghra tal-Bandieri, - permess moghti b'decizjoni ta'

dan il-Bord diversament kostitwit - PA 5580/95. Din ic-cirkostanza partikolari, ma

tistax ma tinghatax l-importanza dovuta mill-Bord. Applikazzjonijiet simili jirrikjedu

trattament identiku. Id-decizjonijiet f'dan ir-rigward, u l-konsiderazzjonijiet li

jwasslu ghal dawn id-decizjonijiet necessarjament jinhtieg li jkunu konsistenti. L-

132

inkonsistenza ghandha bhala konsegwenza l-kontestazzjoni gustifikata, id-

diskriminazzjoni, l-inegwaljanza, u mill-aspett soggettiv tal-applikant, l-ingustizzja.

Illi peress li l-izvilupp fis-sit adjacenti gie approvat, hu difficli ghal dan il-Bord li

jasal ghal konkluzjoni differenti.

Joseph Tonna vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 6/2010]

‘Illi fl-opinjoni ta’ din il-Qorti, din hija applikazzjoni hazina tal-Ligi, u dan peress li

dak li l-Bord kellu jaghmel kien fl-ewwel lok jara jekk kienx hemm commitment

ghal tali tip ta’ zvilupp, u dan fil-mument li kienet ser tittiehed id-decizjoni, u dan

isir b’riferenza ghall-izvilupp attwali li hemm fl-istess zona, inkluz li jiehu konjizzjoni

ta’ l-izviluppi koperti bil-permessi stess tal-Awtorita’ appellata, u wara li jigi

kkonsidrat dan, anke fid-dawl ta’ decizjonijiet li l-istess Awtorita’ hadet, mhux l-

inqas l-istess Bord innifsu, jara x’effett ghandu l-istess commitment fid-dawl tal-

izvilupp propost u fid-dawl ta’ policies applikabbli, inkluz il-Pjan Lokali, dan bl-ebda

mod ma jfisser li l-Pjan Lokali elimina l-applikazzjoni tal-kuncett ta’

commitment……jekk il-Bord tal-Appell kien sostna li bl-izvilupp li kien hemm l-area

kienet gja kommessa ghal tali zvilupp. Mela allura jekk dan huwa l-kaz, l-Bord ma

setax hlief jasal ghal din il-konkluzjoni.’

Roger Vella vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 29th November 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 7/2012]

‘Kuntrarjament ghal dak sottomess mill-Awtorita’ appellata fir-risposta taghha

f’dan l-appell, dan il-Bord mhux biss m’ghamlux izda adirittura applika l-ligi hazin

billi elimina l-applikazzjoni tal-kuncett ta’ committment minhabba l-hrug tal-Pjan

Lokali u dan huwa legalment skorrett u jikkostitwixxi ‘bad law’.’

133

Anne Marie Agius vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th November 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 71/2013]

‘Fit-tieni lok kif gja qalet din il-Qorti ebda kwistjoni ta’ sustanza, kemm jekk hi

commitment jew trattament ugwali ma qatt jistghu jiehdu s-sopravent fuq l-

applikazzjoni rigoruza ta’ ligi, pjan jew policy jekk dan il-fattur ma jistax jigi dezunt

mill-istess ligi, pjan jew policy jew fejn l-istess ligi, pjan jew policy huma siekta fuq

xi kwistjoni partikolari u allura l-Awtorita’ u t- Tribunal ghandha certa diskrezzjoni

fl-operat taghha. F’dan il-kaz jekk hemm policy cara trid tigi applikata

rigorosament bla ebda eccezzjoni. Kwistjonijiet ohra li bihom l-appellant jista’

jhossu li gie pregudikat ghandhom jittiehdu quddiem il-forum opportun.’

Marquis Dott. Anthony Cremona Barbaro u Chief Justice Emeritus Prof. John J. Cremona vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u kjamat in kawza Martin Camilleri decided on 27th November 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 41/2013]

‘illi l-Awtorita’ u t-Tribunal huma marbutin l-ewwel u qabel kollox illi josservaw il-

ligijiet, pjanijiet u policies rilevanti ghall-izvilupp in kwistjoni. Ghandhom ukoll, jekk

l-istess pjanijiet, ligijiet jew policies jippermettu illi jikkonsidraw kwistjonijiet ta’

sustanza li jistghu jinfluixxu fuq l-izvilupp. Dan jaghti certu liberta ta’ diskrezzjoni lil

Awtorita’ u t-Tribunal li fejn hemm diversi pjanijiet jew policies rilevanti ghal kaz,

jisiltu dawk li huma l-aktar addattati ghal kaz in ezami. Pero tali diskrezzjoni trid

tintuza bi prudenza u cirkospezzjoni kbira u b’maturita’ u rispett lejn il-kelma tal-

ligi. Ebda diskrezzjoni m’hi mhollija meta hemm pjan, ligi jew policy li tirregola

esplicitament zvilupp rikjest ghaliex fil-fehma tal-legislatur tali pjan jew policy

ghandu jirregola zvilupp fiz-zona koncernata u dan fl-interess generali tal-izvilupp

edifikabbli tal-pajjiz b’rispett lejn l-ambjent naturali jew storiku tal-istess pajjiz.’

134

Biagio Muscat vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp decided on 2nd March 2001 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 224/00 KA PA 952/00]

‘Il-Bord huwa propens li jilqa' l-appell wara li acceda fis-sit mertu ta' dan l-appell u

seta' jikkonstata li l-garaxx in kwistjoni jifforma parti minn internal development,

mimli b'garaxxijiet, inkluz b'garaxxijiet ohra ta' l-istess appellant li huma koperti

bil-licenzji relattivi mahruga mill-Kummissarju tal-Pulizija.’

Jimmy Aquilina vs l- Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l- Ambjent u l- Ippjanar decided on 28th July 2011 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 232/10 CF. PA 5275/08]

‘Pero’ ghandha tinghata d-debita importanza ghac-cirkostanza partikolari li hawn

si tratta ta’ hanut – Class 4 li ilu s-snin validament licenzjat mid-Department of

Trade. Il-projbizzjoni ghal stabilimenti ta’ negozju fil-paragrafu 4.4.4 Residential

Priority Areas, in fatti tirreferi ghall-negozji godda u mhux dawk li kien ilhom s-snin

joperaw b’mod legittimu – f’dan il-kaz l-attivita’ kummercjali kienet debitament

awtorizzata mill-Licenzja tad-Dipartiment tal-Kummerc.’

John Micallef vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 12th June 2014 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 94/09 CF. PA 5155/07]

‘Oltre` dan minghajr pregudizzju ghas-suespost, kif wiehed jista’ jaccerta mit-

Trading Division, tali licenzja hija minghajr pregudizzju ghal li l-ewwel irid jinhareg

change of use fuq il-post. F’dan il-kaz partikolari, billi l-fond kien kopert b’permess

precedenti li awtorizza l-uzu ta’ ‘warehouse store’, l-proposta kellha tkun ta’

change of use minn store precedentement approvat ghall-autodealer; u mhux li l-

Awtorita’ hi obbligata taccetta dan l-istat ta’ fatt semplicement ghax tezisti

Trading Licence fuq il-fond. It-Trading Licence ‘per se’ ma teskludix n-necessita’ li

jintalab l-permess mill-Awtorita’, anzi hi kondizzjonata ghal tali permess.

135

Angelo Camilleri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st July 2012. by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 647/11 CF.PA 0235/11.]

‘Jigi rilevat li bl-Avviz Legali 512 tal-2010, l-imsemmi Artikolu kien gie abrogat bl-

Att X tal-2010, Kap. 504. Fic-cirkostanzi jirrizulta li gja dakinhar li l-Kummissjoni

iddecidiet fir-rigward tal-multa, il-Kap. 356 ma kienx ghadu fis-sehh, u di

konsegwenza dan l-appell jimmerita’ kunsiderazzjoni partikolari. Ghalhekk, in vista

tal-konsiderazzjonijiet kollha hawn fuq maghmula, dan il-Tribunal qed jiddisponi

minn dan l-appell billi jilqa’ l-istess, ihassar il-multa mposta mill-Kummissjoni ghall-

Kontroll tal-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar fis-27 ta’ Lulju 2011 u jordna li fi zmien tletin (30)

gurnata l-Appellant jinhariglu l-permess PA 235/11 kif minnu mitlub’

Kenneth Bartolo, Frances Bartolo, James Camenzuli u Denise Camenzuli. vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 17th June 2014 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 226/13MS. PA 4917/06.]

‘Kliem il-ligi in kwistjoni huma cari: fi żmien ħames snin mid-data tal-ħrug tal-

liċenza jew permess tal-iżvilupp. Dan l-artikolu ma jitkellimx dwar il-validita’ tat-tul

tal-permess. Titkellem b’mod strett dwar perjodu ta’ hames snin. Dawn il-hames

snin ghandhom l-effett, fl-opinjoni tat-Tribunal, ta’ dekadenza fil-konfront ta’ min

irid jaghmel xi forma ta’ lment taht dan l-Artikolu. L-Appell ossia talba in kwistjoni

dahlet wara l-hames snin in kwistjoni u ghalhekk hija talba tardiva.’

Emmanuel Busuttil Dougall (bil-karta tal-identita` numru 848754M). vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l- Ippjanar, decided on 24th February 2011 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 3/2010]

‘In-nuqqas ta’ twahhil tal-Avviz fis-sit in kwistjoni jikser il-ligi, u tali ksur ta’ ligi

johrog mir-ritratt esebit, li huwa dokument li mill-ezami tieghu jirrizulta ictu ocoli li

giet miksura l-ligi u allura jidher li dan jaqa’ fil-parametri tal-Artikolu 39A, li allura

gie invokat u applikat korrettement.’

136

Mary Psaila vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) on 26th March 2015. [Ap. No.6/13]

‘It-Tribunal qies, fil-fehma tal-Qorti, b’mod zbaljat, illi l-Artikolu 70 tal-Kap. 504

jaghti dritt ulterjuri lil Awtorita’ li jistronka applikazzjoni fil-fazi ta’ screening meta

dan ma jirrizultax mill-istess Artikolu u lanqas ma jista’ jigi dezunt mill-Avviz Legali

514/2010. Il-fatt illi r-regolament jaghti d-dritt ta’ appell lil applikant mill-

iscreening letter a bazi ta’ punti (b), (d) u (f) f’regolament 3(3) fosthom ghax l-

Awtorita’ tkun dikjarat li li-zvilupp jaqa’ fis-Sitt Skeda, ma jfissirx b’daqshekk li l-

Awtorita’ ghandha d-dritt li taghlaq il-bieb ghal applikant li jinsisti b’applikazzjoni

regolari. L-iscreening hu ndikazzjoni ta’ dak li ghandu jistenna applikant jekk

jippersisti b’applikazzjoni u appell fic-cirkostanzi specifikament imsemmija fil-ligi

qabel l-istadju tal-prezentata jew processar ta’ applikazzjoni hi xelta moghtija lill-

applikant li ghandu dritt jaghzel li l-kwistjoni jistronkaha f’dan l-istadju permezz ta’

appell specifiku fuq il-punt deciz, jew altrimenti jippersisti bl-applikazzjoni u

jipprocedi b’appell wara decizjoni finali fejn allura l-applikant ikun gia pprezenta l-

provi kollha in sostenn tal-applikazzjoni mehuda b’mod holistiku.’

Grezzju Zahra vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 7th February 2012 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 207/09 CF. PA 3907/06]

‘Jirrizulta ghalhekk li l-unika parti li tista’ tintlaqat direttament mill-Artiklu 70 tal-

Ligi hija dik il-parti tal-canopy li nbniet zejda. Irid jigi pprecizat li din il-parti tal-

canopy m’hix qed tokkupa xi art zejda u fl-opinjoni tat-Tribunal m’ghandhiex

impatt vizwali negattiv. Izjed minn dan huwa kkalkulat li biex titnehha din il-parti

tal-canopy jista’ jirrizulta ta’ impatt dirett negattiv aghar fuq is-sit milli kieku din

kellha tithalla. Peress li huwa ovvju li l-ispirtu tal-Artiklu 70 zgur li ma’ kienx biex

japplika ghal kazi bhal dawn, huwa kontro producente li tkun pozittivist iz-zejjed

f’dan il-kas ghax tispicca biex taghmel izjed hsara milli gid…’

137

Appendix B: Cases linked to Chapter 3

Emmanuel u Rita Muscat u Pauline Borg u b’digriet ta’ din il-Qorti datat 29 ta’ Novembru 2011 stante l-mewt ta’ Pauline Borg il-gudizzju gie trasfuz f’isem Rita mart Emmanuel Muscat, Joseph Borg, Paul Borg u Raymond Borg bhala eredi tal-istess kif indikat b’nota taghhom datat 8 ta’ Novembru 2011. Vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Ghaqda Socjali Muzikali Kristu Sultan, decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 5/2011]

‘..l-istess Tribunal ta u mmotiva d-decizjoni tieghu fuq punti li kienu jesorbitaw mill-

aggravji u punti li ssolevaw quddiemu l-partijiet u ghalhekk dan irendi l-istess

decizjoni nulla u bla effett, proprju ghaliex l-istess Tribunal kellu jiddeciedi biss fuq

l-aggravji mressqa quddiemu mill-appellanti quddiemu li kienu fid-dawl tal-policies

hemm vigenti, u huwa fuq dan li kellu jiddeciedi.’

Angiolina Buttigieg vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 11th December 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 15/2014]

‘In linea ta’ principju t-Tribunal hu marbut bl-aggravji mressqa u r-risposta li tkun

saret ghal tali aggravji sakemm il-kwistjoni gdida li titqajjem mill-partijiet jew it-

Tribunal ex officio m’hix wahda ta’ ordni pubbliku fost cirkostanzi eccezzjonali

ohra.’

Pasquale Catuogno vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 10th December 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 45/2015]

‘Ma hemm ebda eccezzjoni jew diskrezzjoni ghax it-termini legali huma ta’ ordni

pubbliku.’

138

Joseph Cuschieri vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 2nd May 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 165/12 CF.PC 0007/96]

‘Dan huwa appell minn PC application li saret biex jinbidel building alignment. In

vista tal-fatt li dan it-Tribunal m’ghandux gurisdizzjoni fejn jidhlu issues ta’

alignment, dan it-Tribunal ma’ jistax jiddeciedi finalment din l-applikazzjoni. Kif

jirrizulta mill-fatti li hargu fil-kors tas-smieh ta’ dan l-appell, billi l-proposta in

ezami tikkonsisti f’ appell minn Planning Control application li tirrikjedi tibdil fl-

alignment ezistenti li mhux fil-kompetenza ta’ dan it-Tribunal, dan l-appell ma

jistax jigi milquh.’

Godwin Abela u Lorraine Grech vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta ghall-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Edward D’Amato, decided on 30th April 2015 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 79/14MS. PA3359/13]

‘Illi a bazi ta’ skorta ta’ decizjonijiet ta’ dan it-Tribunal u l-Bord tal-Appell

precedenti, huwa gja stabbilit li dan it-Tribunal m’ghandux il-kompetenza li

jiddeciedi kwistjonijiet ta’ sanita’ jew b’xi mod jirrevedi decizjoni tal-Awtorita’

sanitarja. Dan gie konfermat b’decizjoni tal-Qorti tal-Appell fl-ismijiet 'Pater

Holding Co. Ltd vs Development Control Commission’ fejn gie konkluz li

kwistjonijiet ta' sanita’ ma jaqghux fil-kompetenza tal-Bord ta' l-Appell dwar l-

Ippjanar, illum sostitwit minn dan it-Tribunal, fejn tali kompetenza taqa’ fi hdan il-

GSB, bi dritt ta' appell fuq punt ta’ ligi quddiem il-Qorti ta' l-Appell. Illi f’dan il-kaz

dan it-Tribunal seta’ jinnota li l-proposta fl-applikazzjoni giet approvata mis-

Sanitary Engineering Officer, u ghaldaqstant mhux il-kompitu ta’ dan it-Tribunal li

jirrevedi tali decizjoni.’

Chris Vassallo et. vs l-Awtorita’ ta’’’

’Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Leonard

Cassar, decided on 13th October 2011 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 269/06 CF. PA 1176/00]

‘Billi irrizulta li l-oggezzjonijiet ta’ l-appellanti ma waslux ghand l-Awtorita’ entro t-

terminu stabbilit, l-eccezzjoni ta’ l-Awtorita’ li l-appell hu null billi l-oggezzjonijiet

maghmula mill-appellanti ibbazati fuq ragunijiet ta’ ippjanar ma sarux entro t-

139

terminu impost mill-ligi, tirrizulta fondata. It-Tribunal ghalhekk qed jiddisponi minn

dan l-Appell, billi jichad l-istess u jiddikjara l-appell null, billi l-appellant bhala third

party objector ma ssodisfax ir-rekwiziti legali billi naqas li jipprezenta l-

oggezzjonijiet tieghu fit-terminu perentorju stabbilit mill-ligi.’

Annamaria Spiteri Debono f’ isimha propju u ghan-nom ta’ Caren Preziosi vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar u l-kjamat in kawza Martin Testaferrata Moroni Viani f’ isem il-familja Testaferrata Moroni Viani, decided on 13th June 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal. [Ap. No. 18/13 CF. DS 116/12.]

‘In oltre, peress li l-koncessjoni kif regolata bl-imsemmi Avviz Legali ma’ tirrikjedix

pubblikazzjoni (bhalma normalment jigri f’ applikazzjoni ghall-permess ta’ l-

izvilupp), lanqas ma jezisti d-dritt ta’ terzi li jkunu per ezempju registered objectors

– jew li jappellaw minn tali koncessjoni bhalma fil-fatt qed jigri. Isegwi ghalhekk li

lanqas ma jezisti d-dritt t’appell minn terzi mill-hrug dan it-tip ta’ permess.’

Kunsill Lokali Xewkija vs l-Awtorita’ ta' Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 24th July 2009 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. PAB 46/06 ISB. PA 6039/05]

‘Dan il-Bord m’ghandux gurisdizzjoni jew poteri li tippermettilu jissindika l-

kontenut tal-pjanijiet lokali. Iz-zona inkwistjoni hija stabbilita fil-Pjan Lokali bhala

Industrial Zone, kif inhuma ukoll iz-zoni fl-inhawi ta’ madwar……Ghaldaqstant dan

il-Bord huwa tal-fehma li stante li l-Bord m’ghandux gurisdizzjoni u fuq

‘decizjonijiet dwar Kontroll ta’ Zvillupp, u dwar xi zvilupp li jkun specifikament

awtorizzat fi Pjan ta’ zvilupp’. Skond l-Artiklu 15(1)(D)(ii) tal-Att dwar l-Ippjanar

ghall-Izvilupp, dan l-appell huwa null.’

Anthony Borg et nomine vs l-Kummissjoni ghall-Kontroll ta' l-Izvilupp, decided on 18th April 1997 by the Planning Appeals Board. [Ap. No. 102/94 KA]

‘Fid-decizjoni ta' il-Bord kien laqa' l-eccezzjoni ta' l-Awtorita’ li ladarba appell

konguntiv mhux permess, kull appellant kellu jappella separatament u jhallas id-

dritt ta' l-appell rikjest mill-Avviz Legali 7 ta' l-1993.’

140

George Attard vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th June 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) [Ap. No. 51/2011]

‘ .. l-appellant u l-applikant ma jirrizultax mill-file li gew informati bis-seduta. Jidher

li d-difensur legali tal-appellant kienet prezenti u kien prezenti wkoll il-perit tal-

applikant, izda la darba l-istess persuni ma ndikaw bl-ebda mod li huma kienu qed

jidhru bhala mandatarji tal-appellant (jekk setghu) u allura bl-ebda mod ma taw

ruhhom notifikati ghall-istess appellant bl-istess appuntament, mela allura dan

ifisser li tali seduta u d-decizjoni li attwalment inhadet sar bi ksur tal-principju ta’

audi alteram partem tal-appellant, u kisru d-dritt tieghu ta’ smigh xieraq, ghaliex

bhala minimu tali dritt jimporta li huwa ghandu jkun jaf bis-seduti li kellhom

jikkoncernaw il-kaz tieghu u dan ma jidhirx li sar kif suppost, b’mod li d-drittijiet

tieghu gew certament ippregudikati.’

Michael Axisa ghas-socjeta Lay Lay Co. Ltd vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 14th January 2015 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) [Ap. No. 44/2013]

‘L-Awtorita’ u t-Tribunal huma obbligati li jiddeciedu fuq il-policies vigenti fil-

mument tad-decizjoni. L-isfond tal-applikazzjoni u d-dewmien tal-ezitu ma jistghux

jintuzaw bhala argument kontra dan il-principju bazilari ghal determinazzjoni ta’

applikazzjoni. Jekk sar xi nuqqas jew abbuz amministrattiv, l-appellant jista’

jivventilah fis-sede appozita izda ma jistax jintuza biex ixejjen principju regolatur

fid-determinazzjoni ta’ applikazzjoni ta’ ippjanar.’

June Laferla vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 26th March 2014 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 36/2013]

‘It-Tribunal kellu ghalhekk jidhol fil-mertu tal-aggravju u jispjega b’mod konkret

ghalfejn dan l-aggravju ma setax jintlaqa’. Il-fatt biss li jghidli l-Awtorita’ tat

spjegazzjoni konvincenti ghalfejn il-premessi mhux simili mhux bizzejjed

specjalment ikkonsidrat dak li ntqal specifikament rigward permess PA4493/07 li

kien jitlob mit-Tribunal li jiddeciedi ghaliex l-argument tal-appellant kien fallaci.’

141

Reverendu Joseph Tabone vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 26th June

2012 by the by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction) [Ap. 58/2011]

‘Dan jorbot ma’ dak li qed isostni lappellant ghaliex fid-decizjoni kull ma sar kienet

riferenza ghan-numru ta’ policies, izda minghajr dawn ma gew trattati fid-dawl ta’

l-aggravju mressaq mill-appellant quddiem it-Tribunal, aggravju li effettivament

iddelinea l-parametri tal-kwistjoni li giet sottomessa quddiem l-istess Tribunal,

aggravju li fid-decizjoni kollha bl-ebda mod ma gie ndirizzat, anzi din il-Qorti thoss

li gie skartat, anke mir-rappresentanti tal-MEPA li rrispondew ghall-istess appell, u

jidher u jirrizulta li t-Tribunal bl-ebda mod ma ta additu ghal dak sottomess mill-

appellanti b’dan li dan irendi l-istess decizjoni mhux motivata skond il-ligi.’

Joseph Debono vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 30th July 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal [Ap. No. 347/12E CF. ECF342/12]

‘Billi l-appell kellu jigi prezentat fi zmien 15 -il gurnata minn notifika, dan ifisser li

kellu jigi prezentat mhux aktar tard mill-Erbgha, 3 ta’ Ottubru 2012. Gie

konsistentement ritenut li dan it-terminu hu wiehed perentorju u ta’ decadenza;

ma jippermetti l-ebda estensjoni hlief eccezzjonalment u mhux f’dan il-kas, meta l-

ahhar gurnata tat-terminu tkun is-Sibt, il-Hadd jew festa pubblika. L-appell gie

prezentat fid-9 ta’ Ottubru 2012, kif konfermat mit-timbru ta’ dan it-Tribunal u

ghalhekk jirrizulta li gie prezentat ‘fuori termine’.’

OSA Services Ltd vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 14th November 2013 by the Environment and Planning Review Tribunal [Ap. No. 177/13 MS. ECF 408/12]

‘Fil-kaz odjern dan it-Tribunal ghandu fatti simili. It-Tribunal ma ghandu ebda

dubju li l-fatti graw kif spjegati mill-Appellanti. Jibqa l-fatti pero li fl-ahhar mill-

ahhar huwa obbligu tal-appellanti li jazgura ruhu li l-Appell jasal ghand it-Tribunal

fit-Termini stabbiliti mill-ligi. Ghalkemm fuq l-Appell relattiv hemm it-Timbru tal-

MEPA Front Office datat 27 ta’Dicembru 2013 (konferma tal-fatti dikjarati mill-

142

Appellanti), il-Front Office tal-MEPA mhux l-ufficju ta’ dan it-Tribunal u l-MEPA ma’

ghandha assolutament ebda obbligu legali li hi twassal ghand it-Tribunal Appelli

minnha ricevuti. Dan huwa obbligu assolut tal-Appellanti. Kien nuqqas serju tal-

Appellanti li ma segwewx ulterjorment x’gara mill-Appell taghhom, tenut kont tal-

fatt li l-Appell thalla mal-MEPA Front Office, u mhux mas-Segretarjat tat-Tribunal.

L-Appell huwa ghalhekk fuori termine.’

Carmel Gauci vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar, decided on 4th December 2013 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 28/2013]

‘Dan hu punt ta’ ligi li jisthoqq jigi kunsidrat ghal dak li qed jigi allegat hu

applikazzjoni hazina tal-provvedimenti tal-Policy PLP 20 u mhux semplicement

interpretazzjoni tal-istess. Il-Policy PLP 20 hi ntiza fost affarijiet ohra sabiex

tippermetti estensjoni limitata ghal bini li jinsab f’ODZ taht certi kundizzjonijiet. L-

eligibilita ghal tali permess irid jirrizulta jew minn prova li l-bini hu gia munit

b’permess jew li l-izvilupp jappartjeni ghal perjodu qabel il-bzonn ta’ permess (ara

para. 8.2(ii)). Dawn huma l-parametri li fuqhom trid tahdem l-Awtorita’. L-Artikolu

8.1(iii) sa (ix) li jridu jigu sodisfatti u fil-bqija tal-Artikolu 8.2, imkien ma wiehed isib

illi l-ligi tirrikjedi li l-uzu bhala residenza kien u baqa’ jezisti sad-data tal-

applikazzjoni. Hi l-fehma tal-Qorti li tghid li dak li l-ligi ma tghidx ma jistax jigi

attribwit ghaliha la mill-Awtorita’ u anqas mit-Tribunal. Hu car illi jekk applikant

qed jitlob estensjoni ta’ residenza u mhux bdil ta’ uzu jew konverzjoni irid igib

prova li s-sit kien jintuza bhala residenza jew ghax munita b’permess ta’ zvilupp

ezistenti jew ghax l-izvilupp kien ezistenti qabel id- dhul fis-sehh tal-ligijiet ta’

ppjanar cioe qabel l-1967. Pero mkien fil-PLP 20 ma jissemma l-bzonn li jigi ppruvat

li s-sit kien baqa’ jintuza bla interruzzjoni bhala residenza sad-data tal-

applikazzjoni. Dan ma jirrizultax mill-ligi u anqas jista’ jassumih it-Tribunal u tali

kundizzjoni ma tistax tigi applikata bhala parti mill-PLP 20 meta ma tezistix.’

Costa Brava Company Limited vs Dormax Promotional Printing Limited, decided on 28th March 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 52/2004/2]

‘……meta jigi deciz punt mill-Qorti tat-Tieni Istanza ma ghandux jerga jinfetah jew

ghar minn hekk jigi injorat minn Qorti tal-Ewwel Istanza jew f’dan il-kaz mill-Bord

jew Tribunal u dan ma jistax issir u ma ghandux jithalla jsir ghaliex b’hekk ikun

143

hemm nuqqas ta’ osservanza tar-Rule of Law u jigu mminati d-decizjonijiet u l-

Awtorita’ konferita mill-Kostituzzjoni ta’ Malta lil Qrati tal-Gustizzja.’

Paul Polidano vs l-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar decided on 31st May 2012 by the Court of Appeal (Inferior Jurisdiction). [Ap. No. 13/2011]

‘...s’issa din il-Qorti kif presjeduta dejjem uzat il-prassi li l-kaz jerga jigi rimandat

lill-Bord jew Tribunal u mhux jigi deciz mill-istess Qorti, kif jidher li jista’ jsir skond

kif deciz fis-sentenza ta’ din il-Qorti diversament presjeduta fl-ismijiet ‘Martin

Debrincat vs L-Awtorita’ ta’ Malta dwar l-Ambjent u l-Ippjanar et’ (A.I.C. (PS) – 23

ta’ Frar 2005) liema decizjoni hija llum res judicata u bl-ebda mod ma giet

kontestata fl-ebda fora mill-Awtorita’ appellata.’

144

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