Lessons Learned No. 45 - Viet Cong Tunnels, 12 February 1965

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    V OILMACV

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    UNCl SSIFIED

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    MODIFIED ; : ~ : G ,AUTHORIZED S FEDUNITED STATES MILITARY A S ~ I ~ ~ ~APO San Francisco 96243 Serilll #0178

    MACJ 323 12 February 10)6,:SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 45: Viet Cong Turmels

    TO: See Distribution

    1 . U) Attached ie the latest Lessons Learned from counterinsurgencyoperations in the Republic of Vietnam. The information contained therein isprimaril7 intended for use Py US Advisors in Vietnam. Lessons mBY be of valuefor direct application or they may simpl7 reinforce existing tactics techniques or doctrine.2. CMRA) Portions of the attached document are classified CONFIDENTIALto permit freedom of expression and careful analysis of operational methodsand tact ice of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces , to protect US advisorcounterpart relations and to e ~ anY possible use by insurgent forces.Special handling is required under the applicable prOVisions of DA-DCMl A) whenreleased to friendl7 nations. Release to personnel of the Republic of Vietnamwill be governed by the provisions of MACV Directive 380-4 11 Apr 64. Sanitized versions of this. information omitting d a ~ e s names of locations and participating personnel and units may be prepared for instructional purposes and/or official US A ~ Navy or Air Force publications.

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    MACJ 323SUBJECT: Lessons Learned Number 45: Viet Cong Tunnels

    1 U) IITOODITIOO. t ~ long LW:1CUSSJt lEDextensive use of tunnels to hide personnel and equipment. Often t h e ~ u n - .ndls are part of an elaborate underground system that took hundreds of man-hours to build and form the basis of the VC defense in an area. The purposeof this issue of Lessons Learned is to discuss:a. VC construction of tunnelsb A successful operation to destroy E tunnel system in Binh DuongProvince.

    2. (CMHA) BACKGROUND Tunnels haye been used as caches and secretrefuges for VC individuals and units since the beginning of the insurrection.Tunnels were used extensively by Viet M i ~ ~ forces which opposed the French asearly as 1945 and now almost al l VC controlled areas have elaborate undergroundsystems and i t is estimated that such systems exist in contested and GVN con-trolled areas as well. Not only do these tunnels afford a safe haven topursued forces but they can be a means of severely wounding ARVN pursuers whoare unfamiliar with the spike pits and booby traps installed inside theentrances.

    3. (CMHA) TUNNEL CHARACTERISTICS: Most underground tunnels are notconstructed for use as active defense installations but are normally used ashiding places. Others h c r ~ e v e r c o n t a L ~ concealed firing positions and pro-vide effective defense against unwary aggressors. The following characteris-t ics are common to al l VC tunnel systems:

    a. All entrances to the tunnels are camouflaged so as to merge with

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    e . Spoil earth r 'hoved f r w t he tunnel i s disposed of by spreadingi t evenly over the surrounding ar ,)u and cover ing - .t wi th leaves, grass andtwigs.

    f On . the 'peri llot er of area:; whe re t; ro'.md tunnels exist , VC unitsand guerri l las organize coLlbat s t ruct ur es and trenches to prevent or impedeARVN troop movement into the area.g. A typical t u r u ~ e l is s everal hundred meters long and consists ofa main shaft, connecting corridors, multiple entrances and several ai r vents.No lighting is instal led , (38e Ap pendix 1),

    4 . (CMHA) SUCCESS FUL TUNNEL DESTRUC l'ION OPERATION : The following i sreport of an operation conducted y el ements of the 5th Divisi on in BinhDuong ~ r o v ~ n e in la te December 196 4. Th e plan of operation was developedjointly by the regimental commander and his advisora. Task Organization :

    8th Regimental Headquarters1st Battalion. 8th Regiment5th Division Recon o m p ~. Engineer Compal'\Y1 C a m ~ 2d Battalion. 7th Regiment (He11borne Reserve)b. Supporting Forces :

    L-19 (Observation and radio relay)Armed HelicoptersArtiller.y (3 Platoons , lO5mm Howitzers)Fighter Aircraft

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    SS F EbTP800 a l l o b j e c t ~ u . e . s " ' o c e ~ ~ . IUpon !!earch and d i 8 c l o s ~ . cltlllOU1 ; i ~ partie. d 1 I t o ~ t e c l T J I I l ' I . f ' , . . ' ~ 9 ' ~ l b l l j to seal tt tuMel entranceltb.t.t Qacl b .n t o ~ . (A t o t a l O " ~ : l;bS of TIlT was upended on th i l task) .n e expl_ime .l'1IIveeled othet"ltRtrailde'8by puff!! of slllOke and dust. Guards

    ~ J I \ l f C P " , O f t l " ' t l i l " > . " ~ e r . o f the da,Y,was devoted to searchingf f > ~ & d d i t ~ . tunpell. L a t 4 f ' . t a f i i ~ o n an aciditional-400 Ibs of TNTwa. c l e 1 i V l ~ to the objective area UH-lB helicopters.; L ~ 1 } 1611. . . . r l 9 6 ~ I 1 ) e s t I ' l f t i i M ...,0I":'*"'''1s'ashtinue8.Snattswere dUi to 1IrIQampged portions of tunnels whm::aetit.Vi,t 'S6ng"We&PMs wt!ref ~ S . c ~ i t 7 overlmown entrances was maintained.

    _ ~ . I f ; ., f J(3) 1.7 D e c . e r 19{?fj,: E a ' l Y l * ' t h c k i ~ r i I t i & ' { ) i . c l i r 1 f . y t u a i - d & ikUJ.e4. woUllllecl. or captured sewe11al Viet Cong attempting to escaPe from tun

    n e 1 . 8 ~ .Their cape attlllllPt c o ~ c i d . e c l w ~ h heav,y Viet COlli sma;u atml firetrcaoutlid1l the defensive p e r ~ e r . During the day destruction of tunnelsc C l R t ~ u e d . I t 1200 lMIu. . . . .U bulldozer arrived and begandemolishingVi fl0D8 fortifications in the area. Several more n e t Cong biee and

    . ' . 1 l i I I . " . ~ " " : ; . 1 I O I t . 1 t 1 l J U l f l s l < ' C1/: J >.,} . qu' ," ]; '" . ~ , , , O'J ' , ,- ; &;' i . . , - ~ ~ _ r _ ; f /'.': ';-1; < > : ,-'; , , , ; i:'(4) 1.s,.19 l)ecBlJlb8l'li;64tNlblltion"ot"tQiUi81stsmi:fdrti!!catj,Qnacontinued. Late on19 Declil lber a l l elementsmoved tlfo.kilometers south of tbe, . o b ~ l l U I 8 . 1 . 1 1 1 1 d . i _ ..' I Ip . ;___ P : ~ U . s 8 i : d : l f I 1 l e ' - " ~ o t ~ rlqO 52

    . ' v _ ( : _ >; ';' .' ,K>, ' \ : - ~ : ' > f ; ; : , ; , i - ' ' 1 ' r . r d : - , , _ : .:-1 ;; W:-( S ) 2 0 h c _ e r 1964: Several tunnels were d e m o l i 8 h e ( F a t f ~

    IlMI' l o ~ t i o n . UJlitsthen nturn/ild to theirhOlllll statiCCls., -! :..., 1

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    , ) 300 lbs plast l expl osive- - l _ ' 150 Hand grenaaes1 105 mine

    3 AP mines7 BAR magazines500 Kilo rice5. CMHA) lJi'SSONS LEARNED : The following lessons were learned as aruulJ; of the above operation:

    a . Most main tunnels n the area of operation had Bide tunnels about8 to 10 feet ,from the main entrance:g )The most effective method of destroying th e se tunnels is to place the explosivea t the :int.ersection of the tunnels (Jl\/irked by X in figure 1 above). This allows

    .. blaat, and . lhock waves to t ravel further .b. After the tunnels have been demolished, nlJW entrances s.hould bedug in the vicini ty of the blast in order to search the tunnels thoroughly for

    r U u 3 t s ~

    c. Security guards should be maintained over tunnel entrances 24hours a day while the unit remains in the area instead of only during blasting'operations. , This not only allows friendly units to capture or k i l l Viet Congattempting to escape. but also lessens sniping and grenad1ng incidents in the, &r.e& .of ,.operations., d. Pereerverence pays off . Units conducting thi,s type of operatioo. should remain in the area long enough to search ~ h o r o u g h l y ~ n d destroy &ll tun-

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    APPENDIX 1: oh. - ' ........"'".........rIAICut new) . . ONfiIiUNCLASSIFIED M\IIlIfIE lIAR MIflM

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