COUNTERINSURGENCY . ~----...= ..... ~ -"'''';LES:eONS,\£,.EARNED NO 68 ·

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7f~Major, USAAaet AG

20 July 1968

HEADQUAHTERSu~TED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

APO 96222

MACJJ4J

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Lessons Learned No. 68: Viet Cong BaseCamps a~d Supply Caches (U)

1. Attached for your information is a "Lessons Learned" from currentcounterinsurgency operations in South Vietnam.

2. The information contained in the "Lessons Learned" may be of valuefor direct application to training, or to reinforce existing Goctrine,based on combat experience in South Vietnam.

J. Comments or questions concerning the document, or requests for char.gesor additions in the distribution of Lessons Learned, should be addressedto this headquarters, Attention: MACJJ43.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J Incl1. Lessons Lea?hed No. 682. Distribution3. Index Current Lessons Learned

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SECTION I - VIET CONG BASE CAMPS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II. Source Material ••..••••••.•.•.•••••..•.••••.•............••• 2$

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SECTION II - VIET CONG SUPPLY CACHES

APPENDICES

Extraction and Destruction of Caches •.•.•••..•••••••.•• 3

General 1

sUlIlll1~ 4.

Methods of Destroying or Rendering Base CampsUntenable ••••.••..•..•..•••••••••••••••••.•••.••••••••• 3

SunnnaI'y 4.

I. Translatiion of Viet Cong Document •••••.•.•..•....••.•••••••• 22

Location and Detection of Base Camps ••••••••••••.••.••• 2

General

Location and Detection of Supply Caches •••••••••••••••• 2

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SECTION I

"RELEASABLE TOFWMAFV AND RVNAF"

LMODIfIED ~A!'lOIJNG AUTHORIZf:D

DOWl"GRADH'i AT J YC.i\R lN1H<VAl S"::.~.:'"'" A~~,rTf;~, "r:·T~.7 '2 YEARS

-..:.io.._ ':'-.',) D~Q ~?t1""~

Inclosure I

b. Years of labor.. and an immense amount of material have goneinto buildiPg a complex network of base camps throughout the country.It is this~etwork which sustains irregular operations. A semi­guerrilla army, such as that of the VC, cannot survive without itsbase camps any more than a conventional army can survive when cut offfrom its main bases. However remote and concealed, the base campscannot be easily moved or hidden indefinitely. To find and destroythese camps is a prime objective of the military effort.

c. Defended base camps present a formidable obstacle to the

VIET CONG BASE CAMPS

VIET CONG BASE CAMPS AND SUPPLY CACHES (U)

MACJ343

MODlf;"D r,ANDL,11C AU:-Ha[;.ZZD

COUNTERINSURGENCY LESSONS LEARNED NO. 68

1. (U) GENERAL:

a. Fortified base camps are the pivots of Viet Cong (VC) militaryoperations and if denied their use, the VC movement would wither.Local force units tend to place reliance on numerous small base campsdispersed throughout their area of operations and each attempts tomaintain at least one elaborately fortified refuge. The larger localforce units normally construct a tunnel complex which houses theirhospital and headquarters. The camps are usually extensively boobytrapped and protected by punji stakes, mines and spike traps. Mainforce base camps, on the other hand, are usually not so well guardedby mines; they are larger and frequently include training facilities,such as rifle ranges and classrooms. Main force units may be expect­ed to have pre-stocked base camps throughout their area of operations,and may shift their forces as the tactical situation dictates, eitherfor offensive or defensive reasons.

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attacker. They are normally somewhat circular in form with an outerrim of bunkers, auto~atic weapons firing positicns, alarm systems andfoxholes. Within the circle there is a rather complete system ofcommand bunkers, kitchens, and living quarters constructed above theground from a wide variety of materials. (Figs. 1, 2 arid 3 illustratethe various types of VC base camps which have been encountered bytactical units in South Vietnam). The exact shape of the camp willvary in order to take maximum advantage of natural terrain featuresfor protection and to restrict attack on the camp to one or two ave­nues. Some of the camps, particularly those used only for trainingor way stations, have minimum defensive works. However, in all cases,the en~ is prepared to defend his camp against a ground attack. Eventhough natural terrain features may cause a given camp to resemble acul-de-sac there will be at least one prepared exit or escape routeopposite the anticipated direction(s) of attack. Tunnels connect thebunkers and firing positions, enabling the defenders to move from onepoint to another. This technique enhances the effect of their fire­power and gives them a significant advantage over the attacker. Anunfordable river may parallel one flank of a typical camp while openpaddy land borders the other. The apparent lack of escape routesmakes the position appear like an ideal target for ground attack.However, until bombardment has removed most of the foliage, any ma­neuver into these areas on the ground is a complex problem. Onelocal force squad has been kilown to withstand the assault of two USArmy infantry companies, and a VC sniper or two, firing from withina mined camp, can inflict numerous casualties on the attacking force.

2. ((}!HA) LOCATION AND DETECTION OF BASE CAMPS:

a. The 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division (US), made a studyto determine if patterns existed for the establishment of en~ basecamps and defensive fortifications. It was found early in the opera­tion that .j;JJe _en~ll;Li.rJ:Yariably_.&"j;!3:bli~~<!. hi:LQaJ'3es_in_:t.h~Lupper__

..:-eaches of -draws wh§E..e_~ter was available and dense fo1i~g"'-Bre.;

cluded aerial 0 §..s.&r_vat;iPA. FOI];ITXc.atiillis_.wer.e-l'o1jJ;ld..on._the ...."fingers"coven.ng the base camBs and were mutuallx_s_uPpoJ:ting. A comparisonwItIlliU ormation obtained"from·other-sources such as agent reports,trail studies, etc., indicated that a pattern did exist and that po­tential base areas and bunkered positions could be predicted withreasonable accuracy. Based on this finding, information obtainedfrom the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV), photos, RedHaze, visual reconnaissance and special agent reports was placed onoverlays and the density of activity plotted. The plot was thentransferred to maps using the color red to represent probable basecamp locations. A careful study of surrounding terrain was then madeto determine likely defensive positions and these were entered in blue

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UNClASSIFIED

ENTRY TOBASE CAMP

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Figure 1

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EXIT

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BASE CAMP

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•Figure 2

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.... , ...,.,.. SLEEPING PLATFORMS© --0 DI\~ ~ e KITCHEN

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+ COMMAND GROUP

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Figure 3

BASE CAMPo000 0o 0

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on the map. Thus, commanders were presented with a clear indicationof the most likelY',f,'eas which would be defended. This method ofidentifying probable base camps and defensive positions has provento be relatively accurate.

b. During OPERATION MAKALAPA, the 25th Infantry Division (US)found that VC base camps were normally located along streams andcanals and that extensive bunker complexes were built into the banks.Bunkers were usually constructed of a combination of mud, logs andcement. The bunkers presented a low silhouette and had extensivelanes of fire along the main avenue(s) of approach. Excellent cam­ouflage negated the effectiveness of our aerial and ground observa­tion.

c. In OPERATION WHEELER' the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Divi­sion (US) found that "People Sniffer" missions effectively producedintelligence in areas of heavy vegetation where visual reconnaissancewas ineffective. These missions were also invaluable in verifyingagent reports as well as specifically locating enemy units, hospitalsor storage areas as revealed by detainees or captured documents.

d. The After Action Report of the 25th Infantry Division (US)for OPERATION JUNCTION .CIIT,. reflects that of the sixteen base campsdiscovered, two were considered to be regimental size, ten battalionsize and four company size or smaller. All base camps were located200 meters or closer to a stream or other source of water. Each campwas encircled by a bunker system with interconnecting trench systems.The defensive positions showed evidence of careful planning of fieldsof fire and were well camouflaged and expertly organized. Enemyclaymore mine positions were marked on the enemy side of a tree, usu­ally with a single strip of white cloth or an "X" cut into the tree.

e. The 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (US) reported, afterthe completion of OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, that most base camps werelocated ne~treams or roads. It appeared that the plan was to lo­cate all installations close to transportation routes. This Brigademade the same comment in their After Action Report for OPERATIONBATTLE CREEK.

f. The 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infant~J, 4th Division (US) AfterAotion Report for OPERATION BREMERTON, which was conducted in theJ1ung Sat Special Zone, reflected that the most likely base camps inthat area existed on the high ground. Therefore, caution had to beexercised when entering dry ground from the swamps. Also, all basecamps encountered were within 150 meters of some type of waterway.Further, these camps, without exception, were well concealed and

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effectively bunkered. Similarity of Lhese ba1'i1' camps enabled unitsto plan their method of approach to minimize friendly casualties.

g. In the conduct of .?l'ERA');~ON BENE]. by the 196th Light Infan­try Brigade (US), it was noted thar-rn almost all cases the enemyinstallations were within 1000 meters of a valley or actually in thevalley. This indicated that in this area, the VC avoided the ruggedand more formidable higher elevations.

h. The 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Div~sion (US) found in OPER­ATION HOOD RIVER, that the VC contL,ued to utilize mutually supportingdraws, each-cfiaracterized by a water supply, dense foliage and forti­fied positions guarding accesses to base camp areas. This same unitnoted in their After Action Report for OPERATION BENTON that the VC~arded _hi_~ base cam-Es with local forces. who were well trained andvery capable of executing all aspects of guerrilla warfare.

i. Following OPEP.ATION YELLOWSTONE, the 3rd Squadron, 17th Cav­alry (-) (US) reported that sightings of previously unlocated basecamps were reported daily. As each sub-area was searched in detail,large bunker complexes were located along every large stream in thejungle area. Enemy lines of connnunication interlacing the fortifiedbase camps were found and plotted. Many of the base camps were va­cant but a large percentage proved to be occupied and well defended.

j. The After Action Report of the 1st Brigade, 25th InfantryDivision (US) for OfERATION LANIKAI reflected that during this oper­ation VC base camps were normally found along stream beds adjacentto built-up areas or in the midst of occupied villages. Bunkers werefound in most homes, astride or strung along roads and dikes and inthe corners of hedge rows. Pagodas are normally VC meeting placesand were often protect~d by bunker complexes.

k. ThF';'se of the "Open Arms" program to obtain intelligence ofspecific areas and for guides to areas can be very effective. DuringOPERATION DAN TAM 81, conducted by the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment,the exact locations of VC base camps were revealed by· a Hoi Chanh.

1. The 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division (US)reported upon completion of OPERATION BATON ROUGE that whenever aunit moved into an area where there are indications that much woodhad been cut, the unit could expect to find a base camp within 200to 500 meters of the cutting area. (Note: VC regulations prescribethat wood cutting must be done at least one hour's walking time fromsuch facilities.) Upon completion of OPERATION LEXINGTON III, thissame unit reported that base camps and facilities were generally

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p. Upon completion of OPERATION JUNCTION CITY, the 196th LightInfantry Brigade reported that defoliation flights cleared away brushand effectively revealed the enemy 1s base camps and supply routes.

q. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) reported that thequestions most frequently asked local VC PWs and ralliers, especial­ly Hoi Chanhs, pertained to the location of their base camps and AOs.The 5th SFG found that the two frequently used methods of map studyand aerial observation were unsuccessful. Most PWs ar;d Hoi Chanhsdo not know direction, cannot read a map and, when they are takenaloft for Visual Reconnaissance (VR), it is usually their first flightso they cannot associate what they see from the air with what they sawon the ground. However, most of these people will not admit that theycannot read a map, tell direction or do a terrain analysis from theair. As a consequence, they usually reply in the affirmative when •questions are asked. When detainees were re-interrogatect using thesame techniques, the information received in the second interrogationfrequently differed from the first interrogation. One method of

'0. It has long been thought that because of their superior knowl­edge of these areas, the Viet Cong habitually establish base areasdeep in the interior. Operations conducted by the 1st Brigade, lOlstAirborne Division have tended to disprove this belief. Apparentlythe Viet Cong do not regularly inhabit the interior of dense jungleareas unless they are accessible by trail. Instead, they operatefrom bases within two or three kilometers of the jungle periphery.

m. During OPERATIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UNIONTOWNI, the 199th Brigade's 503rd Chemical Detachment conducted twelve"People Sniffer" missions during the period 17 December 1967 to 13January 1968, identifying 94 hotspots of probable enemy activities.The "People Sniffers" enjoyed several successes by identifying VCbase camps and supplementing other intelligence means in locatingareas of enemy activity.

found near streams, indicating the need for easy accessibility in thetype of terrain encountered in the area.

n. The After Action Report of the 199th Light Infantry Brigade(US) for OPERATIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UNIONTOWN Icontains the comment that. the humane and considerate treatment of HoiChanhs reaps high dividends, saving countless manhours of operationaltime. Once the confidence of these returnees is gained and sincereconcern for their well being is established, they willingly provideinformation leading to identification and destruction of Viet Congforces or their base camps.

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cnterrogation which proved successful is based on direct terrain ori­entation questions by the interrogator. First the detainee is askedthe direction of the sun when he last left the base camp. He is thenaskedhOw-Yong- H'-tOok him to walk to the point where he Chieu Hoi' dor was captured. Judging from the type terrain and health of the de­tainee the distance to the camp can generally be determined. The sub­ject is then asked to enumerate significant terrain features he saw oneach day of his journey, i. e., open areas, rubber lots, hills, ricepaddies, swamps, etc. As the subject speaks and his memory is jogged,the interrogator finds these terrain features on a current map andgradually plots the subject's route and finally identifies the areain which the base camp is located.

3. ( CMHA ) METHODS OF DESTROYING OR RENDERING BASE CAMPS UNTENABLE:~

a. The 1st Australian Task Force used tactical airstrikes, imme-diate and preplanned, against occupied enemy base camps during OPER­ATION INGHAM. Assessment of damage revealed that one strike was ontarget and destroyed two underground rooms, collapsed 60 yards oftunnel and blew in several weapons pits. One strike was not assessedas the camp was not revisited. The Task Force also reported thatairstrikes were directed against the camps to force the enemy out ofoccupied camps during OPERATION PADDINGTON.

b. The 1st Brigade, lOlst Airborne Division's method of renderingbase camps untenable, as reported in their After Action Report forOPERATION MAL1lliJ[!i, was to contaminate them from the air usin~The CS concentration remained effective for a period of from four to

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six weeks.

c. During QEf;,~TION DALLf,§., the 2/2 Infantry (Mech) conductedjungle clearing operations in the Vinh Loi Woods with tank dozers andRome Plows. During jungle clearing~iiheii'contactwas made which in­dicated the pr~ence of a VC base camp, the mechanized elements devel­oped the situation by deploying laterally while directing supportingair and artillery fires into the suspected base camp. The jungleclearing vehicles immediately began clearing a swath completely aroundthe base camp. When the circle was completed, additional swaths wereprogressively cleared into the center of the camp. The configurationof the cleared jungle took on the appearance of a spoked wheel super­imposed on the base camp. After occupation and security of the basecamp by mechanized elements, the camp would be systematically destroyedby dozers. The 2nd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division also reported theuse of both Rome Plows and demolitions to destroy enemy base campsduring this same operation.

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_"'...i.e' [(i :}tJMO.JJi'JED HI-If~[)'..Ii,C: ,,;U',li,::',dZGJ

d. The uth Infantry Division utilized tactical air to destroybunkers during OPERATION FRANCIS MARION. Battle damage assessment(BDA) indicated 'lwClll"uiikers-des-troye<a~and one or two bunker s damagedseverely, depending upon point of impact. Eight inch artillery didnot affect the bunkers unless there was a direct hit and then onlythe bunker receiving a direct hit was destroyed. The 3rd Brigade,uth Infantry Division reported after OPERATION NISQUALLY that enemybase camps were destroyed by burning but that during the dry seasoncaution must be exercised to prevent the fire from spreading to theadjacent jungle.

e. The 1st Infantry Division's tactic for destroying VC basecamps during OPERATION TUCSON was that of backing off, destroyingthem with air and artillery, and then sweeping through the base campwith troops. During OPERATION CEDAR FAIJ,S, this same division foundthat a dozer team of two tank dozers and six bulldozers was very ef­fective, particularly when working in a joint effort with infantry.The infantry provided the security and the dozers destroyed the basecamps and fortifications.

f. During OPERATION ATTLEBORO, elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1stInfantry Division discovered nine' base camps, all of which had thesame type fortifications. These ranged from open trenches and fox­holes to bunkers with overhead cover. The largest base camp hadfifty bunkers with overhead cover. The most elaborate was a circularbunker (See-.Eig.u). Overhead cover consisted of logs with a layer ofdirt. Destruction was difficult. At times units would physicallyremove the overhead cover and fill in the holes. When demolitionswere available they were used to destroy the bunkers. The primarymeans, however, of destroying the enemy installations was to call forair and artillery after evacuating the area.

u. (CMHA) SUMMARY OF SALIENT LESSONS LEARNED WITH RESPECT TO VCBASE CAMPS:.-

a. Fortified base camps are the pivots of VC milit9£Y_2pe~§1~9PR'

Denied their use, VC operations suffer significantly.

bo When a base camp is discovered, it must be thoroughly searchedand all facilities destroyed, even if it takes two or three days.

c. Offensive operations can be more successful if units knowwhere to search for different types of base camps in varying types ofterrain.

d. The VC normally re-enter a base camp area after US forces

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CIRCULAR BUNKER

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THE BUNKER WAS 50 METERS IN DIAMETER AND THE TRENCH WAS 5 FEErDEEP AND 2 FEET WIDE. 10 DUGOUT HOLES IN THE TRENCH WERE LARGEENOUGH FOR ONE NAN I S PROTECTION AGAINST ARTILLERY. 6 CLAYMORESWERE WIRED AND IN THE TRENCH READY FOR GROUND EMPLACEMENT.CONTROL TO FIRE THE CLAYMORES WAS LOCATED AT THE SOUTHERN EXIT.

Figure 1+

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Tactical air is an effective means of destroying enemy base~!?illea.-iS-less_(l.ifes1J.:v.e •

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k. The detailed and painstaking compilation of intelligence andits dissemination in concise graphic form, will permit the smallestelements to plan their operations in detail.

f. Base camps are normally guarded by well trained local forces.-----------.--_.. ----...._--~-"-----_. __._-_._~_._.-._-_ ..._._._,_.-

1. When a base camp is uncovered, units must be given time toconduct a thorough dismounted search.

MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED

j. Exploitation of hard intelligence can result in disruption ofthe VC logistical base and deny the enemy the use of supplies.

i. Prior to the initiation of an operation, a clear intelligencepicture should be obtained and presented to commanders to include, ifpossible, the exact location of VC base camps in the area of operations.

depart to remove items not located or destroyed.

g. The time-distance factor in planning operations should be suf­ficiently flexible to permit ground commanders to fully exploit andsearch any located base camp without having to conform to preplannedschedules.

h. A unit moving into a base camp must do so with a definite plan.The plan must include a minimum force to locate the base, a securityelement and a force to react to the enemy in the base camp.

e. The VC camps are seldom found high in the mountains or farfrom supporting populated areas.

o. A mechanized battalion can effectively destroy an enemy basecamp with armor and Rome Plows.

m. Special consideration must be given to Hoi Chanhs from the mo­ment of surrender to expeditiously capitalize on their knowledge andprevious experiences;' their ideas and impressions.'-

n. Plotting of known resupply routes can provide reliable intel­ligence for probable locations of base areas.

p.camps.

q. Caution should be exercised when burning huts in enemy campsduring the dry season so as to prevent fires from spreading to theadjacent jungle.

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r. Hoi Chanhs and PWs, when properly interrogated, can be a pro­ductive source of information as to base camp locations •

s. Where there are indications that a lot of wood has been cut,units can expect to find_a ba.?e_c~pwithin200 to 500 meters •

t. "People Sniffer" missions can effectively supplement otherintelligence means in locating areas of enemy activity including basecamps.

u. Defoliation flights clear away brush and effectively revealenemy base camps and supply routes.

v. A supply of cratering charges, demolitions and blasting de­vices, held at battalion level, ready for delivery by helicopters,proved to be of great value in the destruction of installations inthe Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) •

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SECTION II

VIET CONG SUPPLY CACHES

1. (CMBA) GENERAL:

a. Combat experience has shown th3.t supply ctches are the life­blood of the enemy offensive. Without them, the Viet Cong's ,VC) ca­pability to sustain operations is seriously impail-ed. Cache c;estruc­tion has an adverse affect upon the morale of the enemy individuals and units, and has a significant military impact on his operational plans and logistical support. Loss of medical supplies further com­pounds the VCI S problem of maintaining unit effectiveness and con­ducting propaganda and recruitment operations.

b. Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) Study ST 63-09, Logistics Fact Book, dated 14 April 1968, states that the enemy uses an intricate system of caches and depots from which supplie" are dis­tributed to the units. In the past, the enemy used large central caches at locations which provided quick and easy access to ~~its in the field. As allied operations have uncovered and destroyed these large depots and caches, the enemy has found it necessary to disperse them. The VC now appear to be storing rice in homes of private citi­zens, but there are still instances when they maintain large central depots. Most caches serve as temporary consolidation points for out­of-country supplies coming into SVN for distribution to units. It also appears that highly accurate records are maintained of the sup­plies in the caches bu.t there is normally little reference to cache locations •

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c. Caches vary in size as to their content, and the unit or oper­ation they support. One example of a VC directive on construction of storehouses (caches) and the maintenance of supplies and facilities, as pUblished by Doan 84 (Group 84), Rear Service Unit, SVN Liberation Army Headquarters, is at Appendix 1. (The document was found in a hut by K/3/11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and translated by the Com­bined Document Exploitation Center, J2, MACV.) Caches are usually well concealed or camouflaged and search operations must be thorough and methodical. (See Fig. 5)~

• d. Emphasis must be placed on evacuation of rice and other food caches for use by the GVN since evacuation of captured food caches

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POTTERY WEAPONS CACHE

KITCHEN

Figure 5

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serves two important purposes. First, it denies the VC a much neededstaple and second, it increases the food available to the local popu­lace. However, evacuation is not always feasible due to the remote­ness of caches, lack of helicopter or ground transport, and opera­tional considerations which preclude units remaining in the area foran extended period of time. As stated by one commander, "Under somesituations, it would be less expensive and more feasible to ship ricefrom Louisiana than to extract the same amount from the jungle caches."Destruction or denial measures then become necessary to prevent enemyretrieval of this critical resource. The requirement exists for alightweight and effective system for contaminating or destroying largequantities of rice in a short period of time. The use of chemicalcontaminants is impractical for political/psychological reasons.

2. (CMHA) LOCATION AND DErECTION OF SUPPLY CACHES:

a. On two occasions during OPERATION MANHATTAN, 1st InfantryDivision interrogation of VC PWs led to the capture of two large VCweapons and munitions caches. One of these was the largest discoveryof its kind of the Vietnamese war. Two VC officer PWs provided infor­mation concerning caches in the division AO. The most significant waslocated inside a concrete lined warehouse, guarded by a double ringof claymore mines. The caches contained 220 - 7.92 Mauser rifles, 147Chicom type 53 rifles, 20 VC claymore mines, 500 rifle grenades, 7,500 ­l2.7mm AP rounds, 1 BAR (US), 1 VC type 7.62 SMG, 1500 - 60mm mortarrounds, 2,000 - 82mm mortar rounds, 250 radio tubes, 25 - 57mm RRrounds, 25 - 75mm RR rounds; 1600 mortar primers, 71,000 - 7.92 rounds,231,000 - 7.62mm rounds, 100 Ibs. TNT, 200 shoe box mines, 50 US APmines, 7,800 rounds of .50 caliber ammunition and a number of otheritems.

b. The 199th Light Infantry Brigade, upon completion of OPERA­TIONS MANCHESTER, UNIONTOWN/STRIKE and UNIONTOWN I, reported that theVC had ~~niously used "anthills" to provide caches for small arms,munitions! grenades and claymore mines. On numerous occasions, nat­ural anthills were found to be "hollowed out" in a manner not visiblefrom the exterior. Each "hill" housed a cache from which individualdefenders could replenish their ammunition stores as they either de­fended or withdrew. The 1st Infantry Division rendered a similarreport upon completion of OPERATION CEDAR FALLS. Their observationswere that weapons and munitions caches were generally located inbunkers resembling the anthills that are frequently found in thejungle. The bunkers had two entrances, were not booby trapped, andwere located within 75 meters'of a trail large enough to allowpassage of an ox cart.

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3. (CMHA) EXTRACTION AND DESTRlJCTION OF CACHES:

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MODIFIED HANDl.ING AUTHORIZE!}

a. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces,reported that during a three month period when the bulk of the riceharvest had taken place within a province, units conducting combatoperations have discovered large numbers of rice caches. Because ofdistances involved, agd the location of these caches, it was difficultto extract or destroy this rice.

:i'.<;:

d. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment reported that during OPERA­TION CEDAR FALLS any time a flock of small birds had been frightenedaway by approaching friendly troops, a large rice cache was discoveredin the vicinity. Accordingly, any time a flock of birds was noticed,a search for a rice cache followed. It was also noted that intensebooby trapping of a particular area was a good indication that val­uable stores were hidden nearby.

b. During OPERATION ATTLEBORO, the 1st Brigade, 1st InfantryDivision found that rice located in crudely constructed bins can beeffectively scattered by placing 43 pound cratering charges insidethe bin and tamping them with loose or bagged rice. To preclude theuse of scattered rice by the VC, CS in 8 pound bags was wrapped withone loop of detonating cord, spread over the scattered rice, anddetonated. This unit further reported that a fast effective methodfor destroying bagged rice was to stack the bagged rice in a circularconfiguration, placing a 43 pound cratering charge in the center andtamping with bagged rice. TiUrty to forty 200 kg. bags of rice weredestroyed by one charge when using this method. All rice was so ef­fectively scattered that contamination with CS was unnecessary.

e. The 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep) reported, upon completion ofOPERATION SIOUX CITY and THE BATTLE FOR DAK TO, that the use of scoutdogs at company level aided in discovering enemy caches. However, itwas noted that dogs became fatigued and were limited to approximatelyten hours of work each day.

c. Upon completion of OPERATION MAKALAPA, the 1st Brigade, 25thInfantry Division reported that in the PINEAPPLE region (Northern LongAn Province) all weapons and ammunition caches were located near canalbanks and close to bunker complexes. The storage containers were usu­ally 55 gallon drums or other metal containers buried at ground levelwith straw or other types of mats for lids. The Brigade also reportedthat areas which produce large caches of arms, medicine and other im­portant supplies were heavily booby trapped. The booby traps wereusually in a circular pattern around the cache and were sometimesmarked with crude signs.

•

•

•

cMODIFIED HA1'J!)!..lNG 1',!iTIIORIZri:D

c. The 1st Brigade, 10lst A.irborne Division reported that VC ricecaches, particularly the larger ones of twenty to one hundred tons ormore, are often located in inaccessible areas and are extremely dif­ficult to extract. One possible solution is to arrange with the Dis­trict Chief or Province Chief before an operation begins to have twoh1L,dred to three hundred porters under the protection of militaryforces, available and ready. Evacuation by helicopters has sometimesbeen accomplished, but the SUitability of employing this method toremove large quantities of rice is questionable.

d. Upon completion of OP&~TION WHEELER, the 1st Brigade, lOlstAirborne Division reported that of the total rice tonnage (198.7 tons)captured by tactical elements of the brigade, 49.6 tons were locatedin areas that were inaccessible to helicopters or, due to the tacticalsituation, could not be extracted. This rice was destroyed by engi­neer and chemical personnel by seedir~ the caches with CS and thenscattering it throughout the area using cratering charges. A totalof eight hundred and ninety three pounds of bulk CS powder was uti­lized in these operations.

e. During OPERATION MALHEUR, an eighty ton rock salt cache wasdiscovered by A Co, 2nd Bn (Airborne), 502nd Infantry. It was nottactically feasible to eA~ract the salt and therefore, it was decidedto destroy the salt in place. Twenty, eight pound bags of CS weredispersed throughout the. cache ~,d blown simultaneously with a cra­tering charge, spreading the salt and CS throughout the area. Thenext day an additional fcur hundred and eighty pounds of CS wasdropped on the cache from the air. A low level flight was made overthe area seven days later and the CS concentration was still heavy;there were no signs of activity in the area or that any of the salthad been removed.

f • Duri~ ,OPERATION CEDAR FALLS, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regi­ment (ACR) captured a considerable quantity of rice from widely dis­persed caches in the IRON TRIANGLE. Since the 11th ACR could notextract or evacuate the rice, due to its combat mission, all possiblemeans of evacuation were considered. Consideration was given to theuse of surface tr~13portation ~~ch as trucking companieso However,at the time there was insufficient transportation available to movethe rice. Efforts were made to have the rice transported by thetrucks organic to an ARVN Division. Although the request was notdenied outright, the Division set a pickup date so far in the futureas to be unacceptable. The 11th ACR then appealed to Province. Afterconsiderable pressure had been applied through advisory channels, therice was partially extracted from the 11th ACR centralized collectionpoint.

18

MODIFIED HANDLING ,\lJTHOruZED

•

•

..

MODIFIED HA,NDLING AUTHORIZED

19

g. Operational planning must include methods of extracting riceor destroying it in place.

f. wben searching for caches, operations should be methodical,deliberate and thorough.

e. Analysis of the disposition of booby traps in an area can leadto the discovery of valuable VC stores and material.

d. Flocks of birds are a frequent indicator of the proximity ofrice caches.

c. Caches are more easily identified if units recognize the keyprotecti~~:measuresused by the VC.

4. (CERA) S!J1.il'lAKi OF SALlEiIT LESSONS LEARNED WITH RESPECT TC VCSUPPLI CAC}'.E3:

,A

:,lODlflED I-!ANnLt"J~ ,\')T!-!::),llLl.(O

b. The VC use natural and man made anthills as caches for weaponsand munitions.

a. The use of information provided by PWs and Hoi Chanhs canmaterially assist units in locating caches. Information provided bysuch people must always be considered and, whenever possible, ex­ploited to the u~~ost.

g. During OPERATION I'lASTIFF, theL3;, Infant:-y Division reportedthat an effective means of destroy;r;r; ri.ee by bur71ing had been found.Gasoline, diesel oil and unused a:-~,j_1~2T7 powder increments were mixedwith the ~ice to insure a hot fiTe. ':_11 this same operation, the 2ndBattalion, 2nd InfantrJ discovered a 50 ton :-ice cache which had beenbooby traDped. This rice was destroyed by pushing it into the SaigonRiver w~th a tank dozer. One other 75 ton rice cache was also de­stroyed by throwing it into the sErle r·I.vel~~ During this same opera­tion, a medical teclmical intelli§"ence team was attached to the .')rdB:-igade to examine and obtain sar"T'les cf VC medical supplies takenfrom one of the base carnps destrn;r2d ie:. the area. The team laterreported that the antibiotics wer, of ~ t}pe and b:-and that could bepurchased on the open market in the Republic of Vietnam. The vitaminK (Ampoule K) found at the base ca:;rp Has manufactured by laboratoriesTEVETE in Saigon. Large quantities of this item had been reportedsecretly captured by the VC in several places, The majority of theother drugs found were of the type nor:nally found in VC captured med­ical supplies. The lot numbers and othe:- information obtained fromthese medical supplies are of valuable assistance in determining andeliminating sources of supply to the VC.

•

•

•

•

CI~MODIfIED !-lANOLING AUTHORIZED

20

k. Sngineer ~ulldoz8r3 C~l b3 effectively utilized in the destruc­tion/e_~·::t:--cL::tio:J. of r:":-:~ caches by pustj.ng them into rivers or construc­ting sl~i~able LZ.s c10:>8 to the caches to allow evacuation by air.

Rice c8.ches arc i'requ8nt:L:.r bO.Jhy trapped.

The VC fnoquently place grenade tY,:Je booby traps inside bagsOJ. ...-:i.C9. Therefore; all rice bag;) should be sanitized by EOD and~Is;:i.;,cer persoDD81 prior to ha...'1diing. (388 Fig. 6).

:1~ce caches can lloma.Lly :Y; sffecti.vely scattered by the usec,."C ,'::'a,~JTi:~g ::-_:1arg~::; a,'id 9ffec"'.=.i~I81~y- ',-:O:;~~an.iild.tec: \-rith CS.

1. C~ches are usually well concealed, locatec in the proximity oftransportation routes, and are not placed in any discernible patterns.

Q. Extraction of rice caches are ideal missions for RVNAF's organictransportation units and Province/District Headquarters in carrying outCivic Action Progr~~s.

o. r1edical supplies should be evacuated through intelligence chan­nels rather than being destroyed in place.

:0. The use of probes and mine detectors in locating buried cacheshas proven to be effective.

... Nipa palQ trees have been used by the VC to store equipment.The foliage of these trees offers excellent concealment for caches.

2 Appendic&,p1. TYanslai~on of a Captured Enemy Document2. Source Material

21

THIN WIRE

M-2 GRENADE TYPEBODY

WIRE IS TIED TOSTRING IN THE SEAMON THE INSIDE OFTHE BAG

• TUBULAR NECK

RI CE

UNCLASSIFIED

RICE BAGBOOBY TRAP

UNCLA.SSIFIED

Figure 6

FUZE: (PULL FRICTION). QUICK JERK OR STRONG

PULL REQUIRED ...--...------..

•

BODY: STEEL FRAGAPPROX 1/4 1B OF

• EXPLOSIVE

•

22

-------- --- - - -- -- - -- - --. --fULL Tfi,'NSLATION--------- - _

•

•

AppendiX 1

copy of a full translation of a capturedtransl~tion was published by CDEC underMinor editorial changes have been made.

This is taken fro~ aeneJTI;l docuJ.'":1~nt. TheLog No •. 06-32.1,3::121.

NOTE:

Liberation ArmyDoan 84

2. You should use the requirements to calculate and estimate thematerials and instruments needed for building the storages. The GroupweU: study the estimate and approve the amount of money to be ex­vended. At the same tine, you must try by all means to purchase thenecess~i materials in advance in order to satisfy the immediate needsof holding the supplies. ~

1. Based on the criteria of your branch, you should draft a spe­cific plan for construction of various storage and issue sites.

MODIFIED HAI'lDLlNG AUTHORIZED

--------------------------------000---------------- _No 44/cv "DETERMINED TO FIGlIT AND DEFEAT US AGGRESSORS"

TO: Subordinates: K., ~2., K3., K7., C200. (!2.~~,.~ G.::oup.; K" Dis-!!:.':ct; S- _:"£':.!T'12"£\Y.' • RS I' ~

According to the agreement signed between Doan ~4 and the localforward supply council; Doan 84 was to secure and store all suppliesr:.~qu_i.r:"ci .for .)}66 before August .12~6. This agreement was sent to thevarious K (District). Now, ',e wish to remind you of building store­houses:

#06-3913-67

4. FollOwing the construction of the storages, their defense mustbe rapidly set up to include: making fences, camouflaging, diggingspike pits and laying minefields. Although temporary, the storagesshould be well camouflaged.

"-3. DU1'ing~ the rainy. season, the proVlslOns must be kept in highand dry p-lacesinorder"tC;' prevent damage by termites and rain. Storekeepers must kill termites, sweep the store, and repair leaks in theroof. The maintenance task must be looked after.

According to the criteria, eaeh K (District) must have many cacheswhich can accommodate assorted goods. The method of construction:3hould be carefully and scientifically studied. The caches must be

--_...========.:.......-:..:.-===-----------

•

•

•

CONFIOENTIALMODIFIED HANDLINu AUTIIORIZED

appropriate to tho gooda. I"or c;·::.IInp18:

-Salt caches must be built wlderr,round. The floor should be linedwith nylon sheets or straw.

Only a small amount of Galt should be stocked in the above groundstorages.

-Salt fish should 1'0 k"'pt In 'Ioode!! nirtieht barrels set on stilts.They should be shaded with n roof.

-Rice depots: Cache frames must be set on stilts.

-Clothing equipment storage: High, floored and with safe roof.This storage must be covered ~~th curtains to shield light. Next tothese curtains should be a layer of nylon or thatch used to preventrain damage. Equipment must be "ct en the stilts. The blind must betight so that mice cannot creep into the storage.

-Gasoline must be kept in cellars.

-Drug storages must be built as carefully as rice depots. Drugsshould be set on a high and dry place.

Due to the great number of stora~es, the maintenance of storagesmust be concentrated. Ks (Districts):

-Know the number of storages, and the goods held in each store.

-Make a clear register in order to control issues and receipts.

-Unit leaders mtlst control their storages and provide guidancefor the' ;[<'ell s.

Requisition and purchasing, transportation, and storage are threeimportant tasks. Especially, in the storage task, the maintenance ofgoods is most important.

In the past, transportation was carried out well, but maintenancewas still deficient •

You should try to step up this task because in the near future,provisions will be continuously sent to your unit in large quantity.

12 May 1966Commander oLD.oan...84lsi NGUYEN: VAN ,HUE;

23

CONFIDENTIALMODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED

MODIFIID HANDI.ING AUTHORIZED

•

•

•

ALUMINUM

GIRDER

24

-Bury the pillar in the soil (soil mixed with salt).

c

~ Floor of beatenearth. salt + soil

MODIFIED HANDLING AUTHORIZED

-Set a girder on the plate.

Method of preventing damage by termites:

In the maintenance task, some places applied an anti-termitemethod by using an aluminum plate. This method obtained favorableresults. Now, we disseminate it to you for study and use:

-Put the aluminum plate on the end of the pillar. The perimeterof the plate must be at least two times larger than the pillar.

Thus, when climbing up to the plate, the termites can not reach thegirder, and must climb down.

Tree stripped of its _~ ..~-----bark and coated with <::i" I~ ________

anti-termite paint. ""'-

"'" .....---- PILLAR

------------------------END OF TRANSLATION----- _

•

•

•

SOURCE MATERIAL

1. 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep), Combat Operations After ActionReport, 3 March 1966.

2. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,12 April 1966.

3. 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, CombatOperations After Action Report, 20 June 1966.

4. USARV Battlefield Reports, A Summary of Lessons Learned, VolumeNo.2, 30 June 1966.

5. 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep), Combat Operations After ActionReport, 15 September 1966.

6. 1st Battalion, 18th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, CombatOperations After Action Report, 10 October 1966.

7. 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 4th Infantry Division, CombatOperations After Action Report, 9 December 1966.

8. 173rd Airborne Brigade (Sep), Combat Operations After ActionReport, 15 December 1966.

9. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 3 January 1967.

10. 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 31 January 1967.

~.

~

11. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Combat Operations After ActionReport, 19 February 1967.

12. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,13 March 1967.

13. 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Combat Operations After ActionReport, 13 March 1967.

14. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 19 March 1967.

25

Appendix 2

,

•.

UNCLASSIFIED

15. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Heport,26 March 1967.

16. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Heport,6 April 1967.

17. Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 525-2, Lessons Learned,Vietnam Primer, 21 April 1967.

18. 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Combat Operations After ActionReport, 4 MBy 1967.

19. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,8 May 1967.

20. USARV Battlefield Reports, A Summary of Lessons Learned, VolumeNo.3, 21 May 1967.

21. 25th Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,26 May 1967.

22. 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 6 June 1967.

23. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,12 June 1967.

24. 25th Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,19 June 1967.

25. 1st Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,28 June 1967.

'-26. 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 30 August 1967.

27. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 2 September 1967.

28. 196th Light Infantry Brigade, Combat Operations After ActionReport, 10 September 1967.

29. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 11 September 1967.

30. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 28 September 1967.

26

UNCLASSIFIED

•

-.

•

•

•

•

UNCLASSIFIED

31. 25th Infantry Division Operational Report for Quarterly PeriodEnding 31 October 1967.

32. 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep) Operational Report forQuarterly Period Ending 31 October 1967.

33. 4th Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,25 November 1967.

34. 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 11 December 1967.

35. 4th Infantry Division, Combat Operations After Action Report,16 December 1967.

36. 1st Australian Task Force, Vietnam, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 19 December 1967.

37. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 28 December 1967.

38. 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Operational Report forQuarterly Period Ending 31 January 1968.

39. 199th Light Infantry Brigade (Sep), Combat Operations AfterAction Report, 8 February 1968.

40. 3rd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (-), Combat Operations After ActionReport, 20 March 1968.

41. CICV Study, ST 68-09, Logistics Fact Book, 14 April 1968.

42. 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Lessons Learned, 20 April1968. .

27

UNCLASSIFIED

,

•

100 - Each SA, I, II, III & IVCorps (1 to·each Sr Advdown to and including Bnand sub-sector level)

10 - Each SA, CMR, Abn Div,RF/FF, Marine Adv Gp (1 toeach Sr Adv Down to andincluding Bn and Sub-sectorlevel)

1 - Each SA, I, II, III, IV, & V ALC5 - COMNAVFORV

15 - CO, 5th SFG (Abn)5 - JGS, J31 - JGS, J52 - JGS, Central Training Agency2 - Dir, CORDS/ICEY

10 - Chairman, JCS10 - CofSA5 - CSAF

10 - CNO10 - CMC10 - ACSI5 - DCSOPS

25 - SACSA1 - ACTIV Ln Off, ACSFOR5 - CINCPAC5 - CINCPACAF

14 - CINCAL5 - CINCLANT1 - CINCNJR2 - CINCSTRIKE2 - CINCSOUTH5 - CINCLANT FLT

10 - CINaJSARNJR5 - CINCUSARPAC2 - HQ USARSTRIKE

10 - US Army Forces Southern Command14 - CG, USARAL

2 - CG, 1st US Army2 - CG, 3rd US Army2 - CG, 4th US Army2 - CG, 5th US Army2 - CG, 6th US Army

UNCLASSIFIEDInclosure 2

UNCLASSIFIED

DISTRIBUTION:

S2 - SJS2 - Jl

14 - J21 - J311 - J321 - J33

150 - J342 - COC3 - coc (JOD) for JGS2 - COC-3 (EOD)2 - coc-52 - J42 - J52 - J61 - MACDC4 - Science Advisor

25 - MACT1 - 012 - MACSOO2 - FWMAO

12 - FWMAO (AFV)41 - FWMAO (ROK-V)

2 - FWMAO (NZV Force)2 - FWMAO (MACROC-V)2 - FWMAO (RMTAGOV)2 - FWMAO (PHILCAG)1 - Combined Studies4 - ACTIV

10 - OSD/AaPA1 - Mil History2 - AFTU2 - NRDU1 - DODSPECREP1 - USAHAC

100 - Cdr, 7thAF6 - MATTLO

150 - CG, III MAF360 - CG, USARV (150 each to

I FFORCEV and II FFORCEV)5 - Each Chief, AF Adv Gp;

Chief, US Naval Adv Gp;Railway Security Adv Det

•

•

._.._==--~-=-.----------------_---.:==

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIEDDISTRIBUTION:

2 - CG, 7th US Army2 - CG, 8th US Army5 - CG, XVIII Abn Corps5 - CG, III CORPS

45 - DIA (DIACO-3)5 - CG, 82d Abn Div5 - CG, 1st Armd Div5 - CG, 2d Armd Div5 - CG, 5th Mech Div3 - CG, USAMC

10 - CG, USACDC2 - CG, USACDEC1 - CO, USACDClA3 - COMPHIBPAC3 - COMPHIBTRAPAC3 - COMPHIBTRALANT5 - COMUSMACTHAI2 - COMUSJAPAN

20 - CIlMAAGCHlNA2 - CIlMAAGJAPAN2 - CHPROVMAAGKOREA2 - CHMILTAGINDONESlA2 - CHMEDTBURMA5 - Chief, R&D2 - Chief, ARPA RDFU (THAI)

11 - Chief, JUSMAG, PHIL2 - JFK Center SW5 - Defense Document Center2 - CO, NIOTC1 - CO, BOATSUPPU ONE1 - CO, UDT ELEVEN1 - CO, UDT;:TWELVE3 - CO, USA Lim War Lab3 - CO, Seal Tm 13 - CO, Seal Tm 21 - PAC Msl Range1 - NAV Ops Spt Gp LANT7 - COMRIVFLOT ONE6 - COMCOSRON ONE5 - COMRIVRON FIVE2 - COM NAV Ops Spt Gp PAC1 - COM NAV Const Bn LANT2 - COMDT, NWC5 - COMDT, AFSC2 - COMDT, lCAF5 - COMDT, USAWC2 - COMDT, Air War College2 - President, Naval War College5 - COMDT, USAINTS5 - COMDT, USAARMS

2

10 - OOMDT, USAIS5 - COMDT, USAAVNS2 - COMDT, USA Jungle Warfare Sch2 - COMDT, PMG Sch2 - OOMDT, USA Trans Sch2 - COMDT, USA Sig Sch2 - COMDT, USMC Sch2 - COMDT, USN Amph Sch

12 - COMDT, USA CA Sch2 - COMDT, USAPHS2 - COMDT, USAQMS6 - COMDT, USASWS2 - COMDT, USAAD Sch5 - OOMDT, USAAMS2 - COMDT, USACMLCS2 - COMDT, USAES5 - COMDT, USACGSC5 - COMDT, USARPAC Intel Sch2 - Supt, USNA2 - Supt, USNPGS3 - Supt, USMA2 - Supt, USAFA5 - USA Sch of Americas2 - CO, NAVPHIBSCOL CORa2 - CO, USA Cbt Surv Sch1 - CO, USNOTS5 - MAl1 - Hq, Foreign Tech Dir, AFSC2 - Hq, APGC (PGFS)5 - PACAF (IGSL)4 - USAF (AFlGSL-4)5 - Dept Air Police Tng1 - Dir, Air Univ Library1 - Dir, Special Air Warfare Sch1 - DIA (DIAAP-10A2)1 - ATC (ATOPT-S)1 - 3636 CCTG (CCT-OT)2 - CO, 1041 USAF Sec Pol Sqdn1 - General Research Corp

10 - Hq, USASA1 - Det 2, 39 Air Div2 - 39th Air Div

10 - DA, ACofS, FD1 - ASD (ASBEE-10)1 - ClNCPACREP PHIL1 - USN Mine Def Lab5 - CGUSARHAW1 - JCB Library, USMC1 - FTD (TID)1 - USA Combat Dev Com

•

,

MACV LESSONS LEARNED INDEX

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCtJSSIFIED

•

Operation JUNGLE JIM

Ranger Ta3k Force Operation in Vinh BinhSector

Multi-Battalion Operation in Northern TayNinh Province

Operations in Phuoc Thanh Sector toRelocate Civilians

SUBJECT

Operation DAN TIEN VIII

Operation CA CHEP

Operation in Kien Roa Sector

Heliborne Operation Cai Ngay, An XuyenProvince

Airmobile Operation in I Corps

VC Ambush-Trung Lap, Binh Duong Province

Operation TIGER HUNT

Operation NGUYEN HUE

Operation RAINDROP

Operation SON CA

Ambu3h Techniques

Review of Lessons Learned 1 - 15

Tips and Combat Experiences

Teclmiques Dealing with Airmobile. AS3aults

11 Apr 62

11 Apr 62

30 Mar 62

11 Apr 62

11 Apr 62

DATE

30 Mar 62

18 Apr 62

23 Apr 62

27 Apr 62

1 May 62

5~ 62

10 May 62

16 May 62

Unda-ced

24 Jul 62

15 Jun,62

19 Jun 62

25 Jun 62

6

9

5

3

4

7

8

2

1

10

11

NUMBER

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Inclosure 3

•

•

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

31 Jul 62

27 Aug 62

28 Aug 62

8 Sep 62

5 Oct 62

13 Nov 62

17 Dec 62

18 Jan 63

28 Feb 63

18 Apr 63

17 May 63

17 Aug 63

27 Sep 63

19 Oct 63

29 Oct 63

30 Nov 63

10 Jan 64

4 Feb 64

10 Feb 64

12 Mar 64

11 Mar 64

23 Mar 64

28 Jul 64

Operation SUNRISE

Indiscriminate Use of Firepower

Ambush Techniques

Operations of US Army Helicopters

Operation BINH TAY

Airmobile Raids Against Superior Forces

Search Techniques

Ml13 Operations

Ambushes

Guidelines for Advisors

Ambush in BINH CHANH

Ps,rwar and Civic Action Operations

Artillery Organization & Employment inCounterinsurgency

Eagle Flight Operations

Utilization of Military Dogs

Railway Security

Clear and Hold Operations

Fire and Maneuver

Vehicle Convoy Organization and Control

Area Saturation Operations

Ambush Operations

Corps Ps,rwar/CA Operations Center

Operations of Seabee Technical AssistanceTeams

2

•

UNCLASSIFIEn

•

•

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

7 Oct 64

22 Dec 64

23 Jan 65

12 Feb 65

3 Mar 65

30 Mar 65

7 Apr 65

13 Apr 65

13 Apr 65

24 Apr 65

22 Nov 65

29 Sep 66

27 Jan 66

15 Mar 66

18 Apr 66

25 May 66

20 JW1 66

13 Jul 66

5 Oct 66

27 Jan 67

11 Mar 67

VC Employment of Land Mines

Combat Tips I

Elimination of Viet Cong Infrastructure

Viet Cong TW1llels

Recent Operations

River Assault Group Operations

Combat Tips II

Operation HOAI AN

Naval Conduct of Amphibious Operations

Operational Employment of Riot ControlMW1i.tions

Operational Employment of the Mity MitePortable Blower

Viet Cong Improvised Explosive Mines andBooby Traps

The Battle of Ky Phu

The Battle of Annihilation

Operations Against Tunnel Complexes

Pursuit

Operation HAPPY VALLEY

Employment of Image IntensificationDevices

Defense Against Mortar/Recoilless RifleAttacks

Salient Lessons Learned

Salient Lessons Learned

3

UNCLASSIFIED

63 25 Apr 67 Search and Rescue Operations

64 15 Sep 67 Imitative Communications Deception

•65 20 Oct 67 Population and Resources Control

66 10 Nov 67 Countermeasures for 102mm, 122mm and14Qnm Rockets

67 4 Apr 68 Defense

68 Viet Cong Base Camps and Supply Caches

•

,

4

UNCLASSIFIED