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Lecture 4: Political Institutions
in Southeast Asia
Political Economy of Southeast AsiaEdmund J. Malesky, Ph.D., UCSD
Organization of Today’s Lecture
• Constraints on Executive Decision Making• Electoral Institutions• Federalism/Decentralization
Veto Points• It can be very complicated to remember all the
players, institutions, parties, and cultures of so many diverse countries.
• To deal with this political scientists have devised a short-cut
• They count up the number of potential veto players (i.e. political actors who have the ability to block legislation). This can include chief executives, legislatures (one or two houses), and coalition partners in parliamentary systems.
• A great deal of government activity can be explained through this lens.
MacIntyre Complicates Matters
Two Streams of Institutional Logic• Credible Commitment – Stable and dependable
policy environment, and the ability to make binding promises.
• Decisiveness - The importance of efficiency and flexibility in policy management, and the extent to which different institutions allow leaders to respond in a timely fashion.
• MacIntyre attempts to fold these two ideas into a single theory.
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pote
ntial fo
r G
ove
rna
nce P
rob
lem
s
1 2 3 4 5 6Dispersion of Decision Making Power
Veto Points in ASEAN 4 (1997)
Indonesia
MalaysiaPhilippines
Thailand
Pote
ntial
for G
over
nanc
e Pr
oble
ms
Dispersion of Decision-Making Power
How does this explain reactions to the Financial Crisis?
• How did countries with many veto-points respond?• Thailand was mired in gridlock and could not take a strong
position.
• How did countries with few veto-points respond?• Indonesia acted immediately and strongly, but soon
reversed course, acting quickly and strongly in another direction.
Malaysia and the Philiippines
• According to MacIntyre, these countries had more moderate responses, because there were not as constrained as Thailand, and not as centralized as Indonesia.
• Do you agree with that assessment?
What does MacIntyre say happened to the countries after
the crisis?
Veto Points in ASEAN 4 (2001)
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pote
ntial fo
r G
ove
rna
nce P
rob
lem
s
1 2 3 4 5 6Dispersion of Decision Making Power
Indonesia
Malaysia
ThailandIndonesia 2001 Thailand 2001
PhilippinesPhilippines 2001Malaysia 2001
Pote
ntial
for G
over
nanc
e Pr
oble
ms
Dispersion of Decision-Making Power
How would you rank the countries today?
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pote
ntia
l fo
r G
ove
rna
nce
Pro
ble
ms
1 2 3 4 5 6Dispersion of Decision Making Power
Indonesia 2001
Thailand 2001Philippines 2001
Malaysia 2001
Veto Points in ASEAN 4 (2008)
Indonesia 2008
Philippines 2008
Malaysia 2008
Thailand 200?
2005: TRT Victory in Snap Election
2006 : Military Coup
2008: Jan. Elections
Pote
ntial
for G
over
nanc
e Pr
oble
ms
Dispersion of Decision-Making Power
Now, let’s add the other SEA regimes
2
3
4
5
6
7
Pote
ntia
l fo
r G
ove
rna
nce
Pro
ble
ms
1 2 3 4 5 6Dispersion of Decision Making Power
Veto Points in Southeast Asia in 2008
Indonesia 2008
Philippines 2008
Malaysia 2008
Thailand 2008
Brunei, Burma,Cambodia, ChinaLaos, Vietnam
East Timor, Singapore
China (Malesky)
Vietnam (Malesky)
Pote
ntial
for G
over
nanc
e Pr
oble
ms
Dispersion of Decision-Making Power
Legislative Rules
1. Electoral Formula (F)2. Assembly Size (S)3. Number of Districts (#)4. District Magnitude (M)5. Entry Threshold (T)6. Term length (Le)7. Term limits (Lm)8. Appointed/Reserved Seats (A/R)
Lower/Single Chamber Elected Using the Plurality Formula
System Time M # S Le Lm A/R
Phil 1 1935-72 1 120 120 4 None None
Phil 2 1977-83 8-21 12 200 6 None 35
Phil 3 1983-87 1 186 220 6 None 34
Phil 4 1987-94 1 250 250 3 3 None
Malaysia 1957- 1 170 170 5 None None
Sing 1 1966-88 1 74 74 4 None None
Sing 2 1988 1,3+ 24 83 5 None 12-
Thailand 1978-97 1-3 155 393 4 None None
Vietnam 1992- 2-3 182 493 5 2 None
Lower/Single Chamber using Proportional Representation
System Time F M # S T Le Lm A/R
Camb 1993 CL 1-8 21 120 None 5 4 None
Indo 1 1950-59 FL 16 16 257 None 4 None 18(-)
Indo 2 1971-99 CL 4-62 27 500 11-13 5 None 75-100
Indo 3 1999 *Modified list PR with flexible list
Mixed-Member or Two-Tiered Systems
System Time F M # S T Le Lm A/R
Phil 1995 P 1 300 300 None
L 52 1 52 2% 3 3 None
Thailand 1997 L 100 1 100 5% 4 None None
P 1 400 400 None
Thailand 2007 L 10 8 80 5% 4 None None
(MNTV) P 2-3 400 None
Impact
• Which of these systems is most likely to lead to personalistic (patronage) based voting?
• Where do we see the highest degree of malapportionement?
• Which systems will yield high turnover, which are more stable?
Elected Second Chambers
• Philippines (35-72, 87-Present), Plurality• Thailand (1997-2006), SNTV• Malaysia (1957), SNTV
Elected Presidents (Executive Bodies)
System Time F M S a/r Le
Indo MPR 1 1971-1999 PR 4-62 425 575 5
Indo MPR 2 1999- 4-82 462 103 103 5
VN CCOM 1991- PL 1-12 160 none 5
Other Important Institutional Actors
• Monarchs• Political Parties• Regions
Logic of Delegation in Indonesia
Supreme Court
oMilitary CourtoReligious CourtoGeneral CourtoConstitutional Court
MPRPeople’s Consultative
Assembly(Plurality)
DPRHouse of People’s
Representatives
(550 Seats)
ExecutiveOffice of the
President(Plurality)
Currently SBY - JK
DPD(128
Provincial Reps)
Cabinet State Audit Board
Constitutional Council
2004 Election Results (Indonesia)
Party Votes %Seat
s
Golkar 24,480,757 21.6 128
Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) 21,025,991 18.5 109
National Awakening Party (PKB) 11,994,877 10.6 52
United Development Party (PPP) 9,248,265 8.1 58
Democratic Party (PD) 8,455,213 7.5 57
Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) 8,324,909 7.3 45
National Mandate Party (PAN) 7,302,787 6.4 52
2004 Presidential Candidates (Indonesia)
Candidates Parties First round Second round
Votes % Votes %
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Democratic Party (PD) 36,051,236 33.58 67,196,112 60.9
Megawati Sukarnoputri Indonesian Democratic Party-
Struggle (PDI-P) 28,171,063 26.24 43,198,851 39.1
Wiranto Golkar 23,811,028 22.18
Amien Rais National Mandate Party (PAN) 16,035,565 14.94
Hamzah Haz United Development Party (PPP) 3,275,011 3.06
Development State
• Organizational complexes in which expert and coherent bureaucratic agencies collaborate with organized private sectors to spur national economic transformation.
• Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan• Why not Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand?
Decentralization
• Deconcentration: Locality is agent of center• Delegation: Subnational governments are
responsible for service delivery.• Devolution: Independent/Elected subnational
bodies deliver services and impose fees.
Table 1: Types of Decentralization
Deconcentration Delegation Devolution
Cambodia (Provinces)
Indonesia (2000-2004, Provinces)
Vietnam (Provinces)
Singapore (?) Cambodia (Commune)
Indonesia (2004-, Districts)
Philippines (District)
Thailand (1997, all sub-provincial units()
Malaysia (??)
What is the motivation for decentralization?
• Historical Legacy• Efficiency• Accountability• Less Corruption (?)
BANG: Indonesian Decentralization
What affects investment and growth at the local level?
Endowments• Educated labor force• Better access to credit• Natural resources• Good infrastructure
Location• Near to a big city/market• Landlocked (or sealocked)• Topography
Policy• Education• Financial • Land and natural resource
management• Security• Infrastructure• Planning and licensing• Legal system
Elections
Poor economic performance can be punished by the people
Political parties respond by putting forward better candidates
There is a political market for good candidates
Fiscal Transfers
Central government’s key mechanism is through fiscal transfers
Trade-off between providing funds based on:
- Need- Fairness (revenue sharing)- Performance- Poverty
Checks and Balances
37
Why Do Single-Party Regimes Hold Elections? An Analysis of Candidate-Level Data in Vietnam’s 2007 National Assembly Contest
Edmund Malesky & Paul Schuler, University of California – San Diego
PUZZLE 1
• Vietnam spent roughly $22 million to administer the 2007 NA election.– More than it spent on targeted policies for poverty
alleviation– The same amount it transferred to Thai Binh province
last year.• Why spend any money at all?• What does an election provide that couldn’t be
achieved more cheaply and effectively by other means?
38
PUZZLE 2
• A number of Vietnamese analysts and scholars have pointed out the increasing role that the NA has played in recent years.
• What is the source of this underlying power?– Little effort has yet to understand the reasons for the rise of a
particularly influential president, or did it in fact result from institutional changes that empowered it relative to actors.
– The most important factor for this empowerment would have to be an institutional means to hold leaders accountable.
– The election could play some role in delivering this accountability.
39
ORGANIZATION OF TALK
• What does the literature tells us about elections in authoritarian regimes?
• Specifics of the Vietnamese NA election.• Tests of the core theories in the literature.• Concluding remarks about the role of
elections in Vietnam and what it means for the role the NA plays in policy-making.
40
Emerging literature on Authoritarian Institutions
• Elections serve no purpose other than window dressing (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1961).
• Others have found robust correlations betweens having parliaments and regime stability (Magaloni 2007), longevity (Ghandi and Przeworski (2006) and economic growth (Wright 2008). They argue that this is because NAs either provide accountability or co-opt
opposition into the legislature. But they directly probe where accountability comes from. A key underlying assumption is elections.
• Third branch of literature that directly explores the role that elections play in authoritarian institutions.
– These are the hypotheses we look to explore in this paper.
41
Core Hypotheses in The FieldSignaling Regime Strength• H1: Elections in authoritarian regimes use high turnout to send a costly signal to
potential challengers (Geddes 2006).• H2: Authoritarian regimes use elections to produce supermajorities and ward off
potential challengers (Geddes 2006).Learning about Opposition• H3: Authoritarian regimes use elections to provide information on potential opposition
within the regime and punish venal subordinates (Geddes 2006).Rent-Seeking• H4: Preferred candidates should win with higher percentages and higher turnouts in
poorer, less educated provinces (Blaydes 2006).• H5: Incumbents should fare worse than new candidates because new candidates can
promise rents above and beyond whatever the incumbent managed to deliver (Lust-Okar 2006).
• H6 : Candidates who are holding or are likely to hold more powerful positions in the Party-State should have higher vote percentages (Lust-Okar 2004).
42
Core Hypotheses in The Field
Leadership Selection• H7: Delegates who take high-ranking positions in the NA should have
earned higher vote percentages than other officials (Boix and Svolik 2007).• H8: Delegates who become government ministers should have earned
higher vote percentages than other officials (Boix and Svolik 2007).
43
Structure of the National Assembly
• 30% percent are permanent, the rest meet twice a year• Divided into 10 Committees
– Two most powerful: Committee on Financial and Budgetary Affairs and Legal Committee
• 18-member Standing Committee selects committee assignments, future Central Election Board and distributes legislation to committees– Standing Committee includes NA chairman, four deputy
chairmen, and the chairmen of the committees• Each committee has chairmen and 2-4 deputy chairmen
– Deputy chairmen are technocrats – Chairmen typically represent party interests
44
NOMINATION SYSTEM
• 3 Types (Central, Local, Self)• All delegates must survive a complex vetting process
called the “Five Gates”, which included the “Three Negotiations.”
– Gate 1: National Assembly sets structure of future NA.– Gate 2: Institutions nominate at all levels, including self nomination.– Gate 3: Fatherland Front organizes preliminary list.– Gate 4: Local meeting with co-workers and neighbors.– Gate 5: Finalization of nomination list.
45
Self-nominees• All could enter, not all could run.
– The Vietnamese government heavily advertised the fact that there were 236 self-nominees (101 in HCMC alone)
– 30 made final ballot, one elected• Some self-nominees withdrew nominations
– Party self-nominees explained they did not have agreement from party cell. Võ Văn Sô in HCMC for example, withdrew because he said he had not cleared it with the party cell
• Some self-nominees did not have support from their neighbors– Many candidates had less then 50% support from their neighbors, which
disqualified them– Trần Anh Tuấn, for example, only had 7 of 34 support. According to the
newspaper account, he was unemployed, had not worked in his field for a long time, and his nomination bid was embarrassing to his family, so they did not even go to the meeting. According to the article, those were the reasons he did not have the voter support.
46
Elections• Election districts are multi-member with 4-6 candidates
for 2-3 positions. Voter crosses out names of candidates they don’t want
• 876 candidates (165 centrally nominated) in 182 districts with 493 elected
• Candidates nominated locally and centrally.– Central nominees sent by central election board to provinces– Provincial election board places central nominees in districts
• No central nominee runs against another• Space also created for self-nominees (30 survived
vetting).
47
Vietnamese Ballot
48
H1: Turnout
49
H2: Generating Super-Majorities
50
*Some candidates may have had above fifty percent vote shares and still lost. However their percentages are not published, therefore they are included here as unelected.
H3: Super-Majority for Big 5
51
Two Electoral Mechanisms to Exploit.• Candidate to Seat Ratio
– 3 types of districts (5/3, 4/2, 6/3)– Clearly, those in 3/5 districts have a higher probability of
victory.• Difficulty of the Competition
– Central nominees can be placed in any district in the country.
– Local and self-nominees can be placed in district within the province.
– This allows for a lot of opportunity to manipulate the competition of favored candidates.
52
Was the Candidate-Seat Ratio Manipulated?
53
Measuring Electoral District Competitiveness• Competitiveness Index for each candidate,
measuring the strength of the district they face. +1 for every Central Nominee - candidate’s status+1 for every Politburo member - candidate’s status+1 for every Central Committee member – candidate’s status+1 for every NA incumbent – candidate’s status+1 for every Local Notable (Party Sec, People’s Council, People’s
Committee Member ) – candidate’s status+1 for every year candidate has been in party longer than the
electoral district average.
District Competitiveness Descriptive StatisticsMinimum (1) Maximum (11) 54
Was District Competitiveness Manipulated?
55
Central Party
Central Government
Local Party
Local GovernmentCentral SOE
Local SOE
Private Company/Cooperative/Farmer
University/High School
Medicine
Mass Organization
Military
Business Association/VICOOPSME
Journalist
Lawyer
Cultural Institution
Not Working/Student
Religious Organization
Research Institute
Central Nominated
Local Nominated
Self Nominated
050
100
Perc
enta
ge o
f C
andid
ate
s E
lect
ed t
o N
A
3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5Competitiveness of District
Confidence Interval 95 % Fitted Values
Candidate Careers - Actual Values Nomination Level - Actual Values
Determinants of Electoral Success• Manipulation mechanisms matter
– Being in a 5/3 district increased the chance of election by 11 % and the predicted vote percentage by 2.7%.
– Each additional point of district competitiveness ranking reduces a candidate’s probability of victory by about 6.5% and reduces vote percentage by 1%
Even controlling for these factors, just being a central nominee had a marginal impact of probability of 28% on the probability of election and increased vote shares by 5%.
Demographic factors had virtually no independent impact. Only education was statistically significant.
Notably businessmen candidates fared poorly. All else equal, they had 20% lower probability of election.
56
H2: Elections as Learning Mechanism• Data on Self-Nominees does not seem to bear out this hypothesis. Vetting
opposition candidates limits the ability of the election to provide reliable information.
57
H4-H6: Elections for Rent-Distribution
58
0.2
.4.6
.81
Pre
dic
ted P
rob
ablit
y o
f E
lection
0 200 400 600Transfers as a Percentage of Local Revenue
95% Cl Fitted Central Nominee
95% CI Fitted Other Nominees
Individual Central Nominees
H4-H6: Elections for Rent-Distribution
59
Yes No
No Committee 72.75 75.95 71.4Foreign Affairs Committee 73.29 72.89* 73.99Science, Tech and Environment Comm. 73.79 72.4* 74.39Economic Committee 72.13 75.35 70.17Legislative Committee 72.09 71.83* 72.4Law Committee 72.6 71.42 72.69Defense and Security Committee 77.34*** 74.12* 77.81***Budget and Finance Committee 75.35* 73.21 75.46**Culture, Education and Youth Comm. 72.04 75.31 70.73Social Affairs Committee 74.28 74.13 74.29Ethnic Affairs Committee 74.13 75.87 73.72
By Incumbent
Table 7: Predicted Vote Percentage By Committee Appointment (Percent)
Prospective Committee Assignment in Assembly
Note: Numbers for rows are the predicted values based on regression using Table 5: Model 3, controlling for South and GDP level. These are predicted values holding all constants to their means. Models for rows 2 and 3 are based on the same regression as row 1, except committee is interacted with a dichotomous incumbent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote the significance levels for regression coefficients.
All Election Winners Yes No
No Committee 72.75 75.95 71.4Foreign Affairs Committee 73.29 72.89* 73.99Science, Tech and Environment Comm. 73.79 72.4* 74.39Economic Committee 72.13 75.35 70.17Legislative Committee 72.09 71.83* 72.4Law Committee 72.6 71.42 72.69Defense and Security Committee 77.34*** 74.12* 77.81***Budget and Finance Committee 75.35* 73.21 75.46**Culture, Education and Youth Comm. 72.04 75.31 70.73Social Affairs Committee 74.28 74.13 74.29Ethnic Affairs Committee 74.13 75.87 73.72
By Incumbent
Table 7: Predicted Vote Percentage By Committee Appointment (Percent)
Prospective Committee Assignment in Assembly
Note: Numbers for rows are the predicted values based on regression using Table 5: Model 3, controlling for South and GDP level. These are predicted values holding all constants to their means. Models for rows 2 and 3 are based on the same regression as row 1, except committee is interacted with a dichotomous incumbent variable. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 denote the significance levels for regression coefficients.
All Election Winners
H7&H8: Leadership Selection
• Controlling for other factors, it does not appear that performance in the election leads to appointments to National Assembly Leadership or position in Government Ministries.
• The only factor is central-nomination, which increases the probability of NA leadership by 35% and a position in the cabinet by 32%
60
Conclusions• The strongest hypotheses appear to be the creation of super-
majorities and rent-seeking.• Little evidence of leadership selection or learning.• Hard to tell how severe this problem is but it appears to indicate
that manipulation of the election may be inhibiting the ability of the NA to play its role of holding central officials accountable. Deputies owe their positions to top leaders.
• On the other hand, there does appear to be pocket-book voting in the election. Local government officials in wealthy provinces (and incidentally those with good governance) tend to better.
61
Location of Rejected Central Nominees
62
ProvinceNumber of
Losing Candidates
Nominating InstitutionsNational-Level
CityRegion
2006 GDP per capita (VND)
2006 Total Transfers/ Local
Revenue (%)
Percentage of Shared Revenue
Province Can Keep
HCMC 4 National Assembly & Fatherland Front Yes South 16,300,000 1.00 29Long An 2 National Assembly& Fatherland Front No South 5,843,591 31.34 99Binh Duong 1 National Assembly No South 9,607,095 0.91 44An Giang 1 National Assembly No South 5,109,826 31.89 100Can Tho 1 Fatherland Front Yes South 8,663,393 17.22 50Tay Ninh 1 National Assembly No South 7,535,378 28.62 99Ha Noi 1 National Assembly Yes North 11,800,000 1.39 32Hai Phong 1 Fatherland Front Yes North 8,754,038 4.76 95Province w/ central losers 9,201,665 14.64 68.50Province w/o central losers 5,249,892 229.23 100Median province 4,148,835 107.10 100
ProvinceNumber of
Losing Candidates
Nominating InstitutionsNational-Level
CityRegion
2006 GDP per capita (VND)
2006 Total Transfers/ Local
Revenue (%)
Percentage of Shared Revenue
Province Can Keep
HCMC 4 National Assembly & Fatherland Front Yes South 16,300,000 1.00 29Long An 2 National Assembly& Fatherland Front No South 5,843,591 31.34 99Binh Duong 1 National Assembly No South 9,607,095 0.91 44An Giang 1 National Assembly No South 5,109,826 31.89 100Can Tho 1 Fatherland Front Yes South 8,663,393 17.22 50Tay Ninh 1 National Assembly No South 7,535,378 28.62 99Ha Noi 1 National Assembly Yes North 11,800,000 1.39 32Hai Phong 1 Fatherland Front Yes North 8,754,038 4.76 95Province w/ central losers 9,201,665 14.64 68.50Province w/o central losers 5,249,892 229.23 100Median province 4,148,835 107.10 100