Danao Development Corporation vs. NLRCG.R. No. L-40706-07February 16, 1978

Facts:CIR found Danao Development Corp. guilty of unfair labor practice and said decision was

affirmed by the Supreme Court. The CIR issued a writ of execution for the reinstatement but the sheriffwas unable to effect any reinstatement. When the CIR was abolished, the implementation of the portionof that decision referring to backwages was transferred to the NLRC. The latter directed Aurelio Cruz,formerly of the Examining Division of the defunct Court of Industrial Relations, to proceed to thepremises of petitioner Danao Development Corporation and make the necessary computation of thebackwages ordered to be paid to the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC can issue the impugned alias writ of execution by the abolished CIR.

Ruling:No. It is readily evident from the very nature of the Industrial Court's judgment of February 20,

1974 that whereas, the Portion thereof regarding reinstatement was capable of immediately executionafter the Supreme Court's decision's the same had become final, hence the writ of execution of theindustrial Court of October 16, 1974 was in accordance with law, it is equally obvious that thebackwages aspect thereof could not be the object of execution until the respective amounts due to allthe complaints has been duly ascertained in a manner wherein both parties have been duly heard. By itsvery nature, a judgment ordering payment of backwages does not necessarily contemplate a simple andstraight computation of the corresponding wages of the prevailing claimants on the basis of the numberof days or months from the date of unlawful dismissal to the date of reinstatement or the date fixed bythe Court. There are other factors which must be indispensably looked into also, such as, for example,whether or not the workers ordered reinstated have worked elsewhere during the period of lay-off, inorder that there wages corresponding to the number of days they have so worked may be deducted fromthe award. Besides, some of in might have died already or have become retirable.

Therefore, the usual concept of finality which makes a judgment executory does not attach tojudgments of the nature herein concerned.

Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRCG.R. No. 88864 January 17, 1990

Facts:In the case of Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 79535, the Supreme Court dismissed the

petition questioning the decision of the NLRC on the ground that petitioner failed to sufficiently showthat the NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. The entry of judgment having been effected, theNLRC in the process of execution of the said decision of the labor arbiter made a computation of theaward to the private respondents. Thus, the NLRC issued a partial writ of execution. Petitioner filed amotion to stay execution/reconsideration citing supervening events that affect the computation of theaward.

Issue: Whether or not the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC may be stayed in view ofsupervening events that would affect the computation of the awards.

Ruling:Yes. Respondent alleges that in several conferences had with the petitioner, petitioner did not

raise these objections and that the petition is dilatory. Whatever it may be, the fact cannot be deniedthat such supervening events as the length of service of the private respondents, the wage exemptionsgranted, and payments already made on the award would certainly affect the computation of the totalaward under the decision. Thus, a prompt and immediate determination of these objections and arecomputation of the award should be made. A denial of this opportunity to right a clear error in theexecution of the judgment constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

Sampaguita Garments Corporation vs. NLRCG.R. No. 102406 June 17, 1994

Facts:The offense subject of the two cases is theft, claimed to have been committed by private

respondent Emilia B. Santos, an employee of petitioner Sampaguita Garments Corporation. Sampaguitadismissed her on this ground. She filed a complaint for illegal dismissal but the labor arbiter sustainedthe company. However, his decision was reversed by the NLRC, which ordered her reinstatement withback wages from the time of her illegal suspension until her actual reinstatement. Meantime, thepetitioner had also filed a criminal action against Santos for the same offense in the MTC and wasfound guilty. This was affirmed by the RTC. In the first case, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitionfor certiorari against the decision of the NLRC for lack of a showing that it was tainted with graveabuse of discretion. However, in the second case, said Court sustained the conviction.

Subsequently, Santos moved for the execution of the NLRC decision. The petitioner opposed,invoking her conviction in the criminal case. However, the NLRC sustained her on the ground that itsdecision had been affirmed by this Court and had long become final and executory.

It is asserted by the petitioner that, in view of the private respondent’s conviction, the decisionof the NLRC calling for her reinstatement and the payment to her backwages should not now beenforced. Otherwise, she would in effect be undeservedly rewarded when she should instead bepunished for her offense. On the other hand, the private respondent argues that the decision of theNLRC is independent of the criminal case and in any event can no longer be modified or reversed afterhaving become final and executory.

Issue: Whether or not a subsequent conviction in a criminal case for the same offense that an employeeis absolved of and led to the dismissal affect the administrative decision.

Ruling:It is true that once a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be disturbed

except only for the correction of clerical errors or where supervening events render its executionimpossible or unjust. In the latter event, the interested party may ask the court to modify the judgmentto harmonize it with justice and the facts. There is no dispute in the case at bar that the decision of therespondent NLRC ordering the private respondent’s reinstatement with back wages had indeed becomefinal and executory. Even so, we find, in light of the subsequent developments, that the NLRC was notcorrect in sustaining the implementation of that decision.

The power of the NLRC to issue a writ of execution carries with it the right to look into thecorrectness of the execution of the decision and to consider supervening events that may affect suchexecution. The affirmance by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals of the privaterespondent’s conviction for theft is justification enough for the NLRC to exercise this authority andsuspend the execution of its decision.

Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. NLRCG.R. No. 113592 January 15, 1998

Facts:Respondent Leopoldo Medrano was employed as a mechanic by INTECO until he was granted

an indefinite leave of absence, during which period he was able to secure a temporary job. When hereported for work at INTECO, a supervisor confronted him for having worked in another firm.Consequently, he was asked to resign. Respondent was not allowed to enter the company’s premisesallegedly because his services had already been terminated.

In a complaint for illegal dismissal against INTECO, the Labor Arbiter ordered thereinstatement of Medrano without backwages. The decision became final and executory upon failure ofpetitioner to file an appeal within the reglementary period. Yet INTECO allegedly refused to complywith the reinstatement. Thus, respondent filed a motion to cite petitioner for indirect contempt and forpayment of backwages. Petitioner was found guilty of indirect contempt, and likewise directed thereinstatement of respondent with backwages. It was affirmed by the NLRC.

Issue: Whether or not the labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect contempt.

Ruling:Section 2, Rule X of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides that the Commission or

any labor arbiter may cite any person for indirect contempt upon grounds and in the manner prescribedunder Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 3(b),

Federico Robosa vs. NLRCG.R. No. 176085 February 8, 2012

Facts:Federico Robosa, along with other rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische

Manufacturing, Inc., were officers and members of CTMI Employees Union-DFA. They filed a petitionfor certification election at CTMI and was granted by the Med-Arbiter. A consent election wasconducted but the union failed to garner the votes required to be certified as the exclusive bargainingagent of the company. Later, CTMI made directives that the union asked for the withdrawal anddeterment of it, branding them as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI ignoredthe request and issued a notice of termination of employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition ofthe sales driver positions.

Thus, a complaint was filed by the union and its affected members for illegal dismissal andunfair labor practice, with a claim for damages. The labor arbiter handling the case denied the union’smotion for a stay order on the ground that the issues raised by the petitioners can best be ventilatedduring the trial on the merits of the case. This prompted the union to file with the NLRC a petition forthe issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction and/or TRO. When NLRC issued the TRO,respondent did not comply and instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union’s petition forpreliminary injunction. The NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondentsmoved for reconsideration. The union opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsibleCTMI officers in contempt of court. Contempt charge was dismissed.

Issues:1. Whether or not the NLRC has contempt powers.2. Whether or not the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable.

Ruling:1. Under Article 218 of the Labor Code, the NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold anyoffending party in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance withlaw. The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the degree or amountdepends on whether the contempt is against the Commission or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code,however, requires the labor arbiter or the Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the mannerprescribed under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.2. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order of a court in acase of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a criminal case. This is not thepoint at issue, however, in this petition. It is rather the question of whether the dismissal of a contemptcharge, as in the present case, is appealable. The CA held that the NLRC’s dismissal of the contemptcharges against the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to appeal.

In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, the Court declared that a distinction is made between a civil and acriminal contempt. Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for thebenefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of thecourt. The Court further explained that the real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to bedetermined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings are to be regarded ascriminal when the purpose is primarily punishment and civil when the purpose is primarilycompensatory or remedial.

But whether the first or the second, contempt is still a criminal proceeding in which acquittal,for instance, is a bar to a second prosecution. The distinction is for the purpose only of determining thecharacter of punishment to be administered.

LABOR RELATIONSCase Digests

1. Danao Development Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. L-40706-07, February 16, 19782. Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 88864, January 17, 19903. Sampaguita Garments Corporation vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 102406, June 17, 19944. Industrial and Transport Equipment, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 113592, January 15, 19985. Federico Robosa vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 176085, February 8, 2012

Submitted by: Celina May R. Tang, Block AProfessor: Atty Mila Raquid-Arroyo