Labor 2 Digests

III. Right to Self-Organization

NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., (NEECO I) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. NLRCFacts: NEECO I, herein private respondent, ordered all its regular employees, including petitioners to accomplish applications for retirement,

resignation or separation from service. What followed was promotion of certain union officers to supervisory rank. As a response to what they considered as harassment to union members and circumvention of their right to security of tenure, the

employees-union members held a snap election of their officers. Herein petitioners who were elected union officers then were compulosorily retired.

Petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal and damages before the NLRC, alleging that they were singled out for retirement because they were officers, past officers or active members of the labor union in the cooperative.

Labor Arbiter: finding of illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice; ordered reinstatement of complainants with award of full backwages, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation in their favor.

NLRC appeal by private respondent NEECO I: given due course (despite omnibus motion to dismiss by petitioners due to insufficient bond); deleted award of damages, attorney’s fees and cost of litigation; denied motion for reconsideration of both petitioners and private respondent

Issues/Held/Ratio:1. Appeal bond

o Petitioners contend that the supersedeas bond posted before the NLRC was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period (in LC Art.223) and hence appeal was not perfected.

o SC : There is substantial compliance on the part of private respondent. The LA decision was rendered 21

December 1992, respondents appealed 28 December 1992 and bond was issued 4 January 1993 (last day of filing appeal) and forwarded on 5 January 1993.

As to the amount posted, unreasonable and excessive bond may be reduced by the court so as not to effectively deprive respondent the right to appeal. Further, it already paid respondents their retirement benefits.

2. (topical) Moral and exemplary damageso SC :

There is a finding by the LA of unfair labor practice manifested in the singling out of petitioners for retirement because of their being union officers, past officers or active members. Their being selected for retirement was arbitrarily made by the employer and not in succession according to the list, violative of the employees’ constitutional right to self-organization, including right to bargain collectively.

The amount of moral damages were however reduced from Php30,000.00 (LA award) to Php10,000.00 while Php5,000.00 exemplary damages were awarded, both to each of the petitioners, taking into consideration the business, social and financial position of the cooperative.

REYES VS. TRAJANO

Facts:

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Employees of Tri-Union Industries Corp. had a certification election wherein Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA) and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) competed to be the employees’ exclusive representative in the bargaining unit.

Of the 348 workers qualified, 240 actually voted. Of the 240 who voted, 141 were members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), herein petitioners.

The choices in each ballot were: (a) TUPAS; (b) TUEU-OLALIA; and (c) No Union. The INK employees voted for No Union. Such votes were challenged by the two contending labor unions, who agreed to exclude

from the final count their (INK employees’) 141votes. Unions : INK employees have no right to vote as they are not members of any union and they refused to participate in previous

certification elections; INK employees have no personality to protest as they are not members of unions but of INK, which prohibits them from joining or forming labor unions.

INK employees : exclusion of their votes from the final count is not fair; election result (where TUEU-OLALIA won) is not the will of the majority.

Med Arbiter : INK’s petition has no merit; religious belief of INK employees render meaningless non-INK employees’ right to be represented by a labor organization as bargaining agent; petitioners have no legal personality to file the petition.

OIC of Bureau of Labor Relations : denied appeal; petitioners have no personality as they are not constituted into a duly-recognized union; they did not take part in previous certification elections due to religious belief.

NLRC : if INK members opted not to join a labor union, the right to do so must not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.

Issue/Held/Ratio:WON petitioners’ votes should be excluded from the certification election- No, their votes must be included.

The following 3 provisions of the Labor Code, and implementing rule, guaranteed to all workers:o Art.243 (and Omnibus Rules, Bk. V, Rule II, Sec.1)- right to self-organization, and to form, join, or assist labor

organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.o Art.248 (a)- to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization is an unfair

labor practice.o Art.249 (a)- to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization is unfair labor practice.

Right to self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union. Subsumed in it is the right not to join, affiliate with, or assist, and to disaffiliate and resign from a labor organization.

None should be denied the exercise of a right vested by law and none should be compelled to exercise such legally-conferred right.

Right not to join a union is acknowledged in the present implementing rule even if the choice (in a certification election) of No Union is not explicitly decreed. Said rule recognized the possibility of having no union at all in when a laborer is given the choice of whether or not to be represented by one union.

The minority employees’ will should not prevail over those of the majority. Rather they should wait for the proper opportunity to have a certification election that will result in their desire.

KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION v. FERRER-CALLEJAFacts

TUPAS seeks to review the resolution of the director of the Bureau of labor relations dismissing its appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter ordering a certification election to be conducted among the regular daily paid rank and file employees/workers of Universal Robina Corporation-Meat and Canning Division to determine which of the contending unions (TUPAS, NEW ULO, or no union) shall be the bargaining unit of the daily wage rank and file employees in the Meat and Canning Division of the company.



From 1984 - 1987 , TUPAS was the sole and exclusive collective baragainign representative of the workers of Meat and Canning Division of Universal Rubina Corporation with a 3-year CBA to expire on Nov. 15, 1987.

During the 60-day freedom period before the expiry, it filed a notice of strike as a means of pressuring the company to extend, renew or negotiate a new CBA and when such was staged(on Oct. 12) it resulted in the negotiation of a new CBA (which was finally signed Dec. 3)

4 days prior (Oct 8) NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers belonging to IGLESIA NI KRISTO sec, reegistered as a labor union and claiming to be composed of the majority of the daily wage rank and file employees (numbering 191), they filed for a certificate election at the BLR.

TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for being defective in form and contending that the NEW ULO members were part of the InC sect which 3 years previeous refuse to affiliate with any labor union.

Nov. 17 - The Med- Arbiter ordered the holding of a certificate election within 20 days TUPAS appealed to the BLR, which dismissed the same and denied the MR. Hence, the present appeal.

Issue/HeldWhether the Director of the BLR erred in dismissing TUPAS’ appeal from the Med-Arbiter’s order requiring the conduct of a certificate election? NO.Ratio

The SC’s decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Unionupholding the right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of self-organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation."

The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-day freedom period of the existing CBA, does not foreclose the right of the rival union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS' claim to majority status, by filing a timely petition for certification election on October 13, 1987 before TUPAS' old CBA expired on November 15, 1987 and before it signed a new CBA with the company on December 3, 1987.

As pointed out by the Med-Arbiter a "certification election is the best forum in ascertaining the majority status of the contending unions wherein the workers themselves can freely choose their bargaining representative thru secret ballot."

Dispositive : PETITION DENIED

PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS V. PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND CIR

Facts: Respondent Union (Pan American employees Association) filed a notice of strike on Aug. 28, 1965. On Sept. 17, 2965, the President of the Philippines certified the strike to the CIR as being an industrial dispute affecting national

interest and the parties were called to a conference on Sept. 20. Several conferences were held between petitioner airline and respondent union and it was the position of the union that its

members would not resume their duties unless its officers were also included in the return-to-work order.



Petitioner disagrees contending that it was agreeable to having the workers return to work but not the five officials of the respondent union.

It alleged that the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-strike clause of an existing collective bargaining agreement the result being that the officials could, as the responsible parties, be liable for dismissal. It offered, however, to deposit their salaries even if they would not be working, with the further promise that they would not even be required to refund any amount should the right to remain in their positions be considered as legally terminated by their calling the alleged illegal strike (payroll reinstatement I guess? The term wasn’t mentioned in the case but I think it’s the same… right?).

September 28, 1965 – However, Judge Bugayong issued an order requiring petitioner to accept the five union officers pending resolution on the merits of the dispute involved in the strike. Petitioner’s MR was likewise denied.

Hence, this petition, alleging a grave abuse of discretionIssue/Held: Did the CIR commit grave abuse of discretion in not granting the petitioner’s plea? NORatio:

The discretion the CIR possesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated that the mere failure to grant a plea to exclude from the return-to-work order the union officials could be considered as tantamount to a grave abuse.

As far back as 1957, the SC has held in the words of J. Labrador: “The evident intention of the law is to empower the CIR to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to find a solution in an industrial dispute and such solution consists in ordering of employees to return back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect.”

Recently, speaking through J. Sanchez: “the CIR is granted great breadth of discretion in its quest for a solution to a labor problem so certified”

Hence, there can be no legal objection to the mode of exercise of authority in such fashion by respondent Court of Industrial Relations. The allegation as to the grave abuse of discretion is clearly devoid of merit.

Further, the SC goes on to explain the novelty posed by the present situation and explained that the petitioner’s apprehension in making the officers of the union return to work was caused by the fact that the five officers of the union consist of three (3) Passenger Traffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who in the course of their duties could cause mix-ups in the reservation and accommodation of passengers which could result in very many suits for damages against petitioner (similar to the case of as the case of Nicolas Cuenca vs. Northwest Airlines).

Petitioner attempted to remove the sting from its objection to have the union officers return to work by offering to deposit the salaries of the five officers with respondent Court to be paid to them, coupled with what it considered to be a generous concession that if their right to return to work be not recognized, there would be no need for refund. However, due to this, it betrayed an inexcusable lack of confidence in the responsibility of union officials and ultimately in the validity of the collective bargaining process itself. For it is the basic premise under which a regime of collective bargaining was instituted by the Industrial Peace Act that through the process of industrial democracy, with both union and management equally deserving of public trust, labor problems could be susceptible of the just solution and industrial peace attained.

When management displays what appears to be grave but unwarranted distrust in the union officials discharging their functions just because a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the collective bargaining process itself is called into question. It would have been different if there were a rational basis for such fears, purely speculative in character for the records were bereft any indication of a clear and present danger to be expected from the union official’s return to work.

Further, this unwarranted demand has certain implications recognized by the SC, as it would effectively deprive the rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who should represent them and to that extent, impair their constitutional and statutory right to freedom of association

FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MED. FOUNDATION INC. V. TRAJANO

Facts: Petitioner has a work force of about 350 rank and file employees, majority of whom are members of private respondent AFW. Feb. 13, 1986 – AFW filed a Petition for Consent and/or Certification Election with Ministry of Labor and Employment. Petitioner

opposed on the ground that a similar petition involving the same issues and the same parties is pending resolution before SC. As early as May 10, 1976, private respondent filed a similar petition for certification election but the petition was denied by the MED

Arbiter and Secretary of Labor on appeal, on the ground that petitioner was a non-stock, non-profit medical institution; thus, its employees may not form, join or organize a union pursuant to LC Art. 244. Also, it filed a petition for certiorari with SC assailing the constitutionality of Art. 244. Pending resolution of the said petition (May 1, 1980), BP 70 was enacted amending Art. 244, thus granting



even employees of non-stock, non-profit institutions the right to form, join and organize labor unions of their choice; and that in the exercise of such right, AFW filed another petition for certification.

April 17, 1986 – Med Arbiter issued an Order granting the petition, declaring that a certification election be conducted to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of all rank and file employees of petitioner.

Respondent Director affirmed: rendered moot and academic by virtue of amendatory BP 70 which allows employees of non-profit medical institutions to unionize.

Issue: W/N respondent Director gravely abused his discretion in granting the petition for certification election, despite the pendency of a similar petition before SC

Held: NO.

Ratio: At the time private respondent filed its petition on Feb. 13, Art. 244 was already amended by BP 70: medical… institutions whether

operating for profit or not Rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for

purposes of collective bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law calling for certification election, it was incumbent upon

respondent Director to conduct such election. Any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before SC will not constitute res judicata in the present

petition for certification election, for in the former, private respondent questioned the constitutionality of Art. 244 before its amendment while in the latter, private respondent invokes the same article as already amended.

TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION LABOR UNION AND THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, R ESPONDENTS.

Facts: Nov. 26, 1992 – TMPCLU filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE NCR for all rank-and-file employees of the TMC. Feb. 23, 1993 – Petitioner filed a Position Paper seeking the denial of the issuance of an Order directing the holding of a certification election on two

grounds: first, that the respondent union, being "in the process of registration" had no legal personality to file the same as it was not a legitimate labor organization as of the date of the filing of the petition; and second, that the union was composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees in violation of law.

Attached to the position paper was a list of union members and their respective job classifications, indicating that many of the signatories to the petition for certification election occupied supervisory positions and were not in fact rank-and-file employees.

Mar. 8, 1993 – Med-Arbiter, Paterno D. Adap, dismissed respondent union's petition for certification election for lack of merit. He found that the labor organization's membership was composed of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in violation of LC Art. 245 and that at the time of the filing of its petition, respondent union had not even acquired legal personality yet.

Nov. 9, 1993 – On appeal, the Office of the Secretary of Labor directed the holding of a certification election among the regular rank.-and-file employees of TMC.



o Petitioner-appellant was already a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the petition. 2 days before the filing of the said petition, it was issued a certificate of registration.

o Med-Arbiter should have not dismissed the petition for certification election based on the ground that the proposed bargaining unit is a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees, hence, violative of Article 245 of the LC as amended.

o A perusal of the petition and the other documents submitted by petitioner-appellant will readily show that what the former really seeks to represent are the regular rank-and-file employees in the company numbering about 1,800 more or less, a unit which is obviously appropriate for bargaining purposes. This being the case, the mere allegation of respondent-appellee that there are about 42 supervisory employees in the proposed bargaining unit should have not caused the dismissal of the instant petition.

Petitioner filed MR, reiterating its claim that as of the date of filing of petition for certification election, TMPCLU had not yet acquired the status of a legitimate labor organization as required by the LC, and that the proposed bargaining unit was inappropriate.

Public respondent set aside its earlier resolution and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter concluding that the issues raised by petitioner both on appeal and in its MR were factual issues requiring further hearing and production of evidence.

Findings of Med-Arbiter Brigida C. Fodrigon: Petitioner could not have been issued its Certificate of Registration on November 24, 1992 when it applied for registration only on November 23, 1992 as shown by the official receipt of payment of filing fee. She concluded that respondent TMPCLU could not have acquired legal personality at the time of the filing of its petition."

April 20, 1996 – Public respondent issued a new Resolution, directing the conduct of a certification election among the regular rank-and-file employees of the TMC. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Issue: W/N the certification election should be conducted Held: NO.Ratio: The purpose of every certification election is to determine the exclusive representative of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for the

purpose of collective bargaining. A certification election for the collective bargaining process is one of the fairest and most effective ways of determining which labor organization can truly represent the working force.

In determining the labor organization which represents the interests of the workforce, those interests must be, as far as reasonably possible, homogeneous, so as to genuinely reach the concerns of the individual members of a labor organization.

Rothenberg: an appropriate bargaining unit is a group of employees of a given employer, composed of all or less than the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer indicate to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of law.

Belyca Corporation v. Ferrer Calleja: bargaining unit is "the legal collectivity for collective bargaining purposes whose members have substantially mutual bargaining interests in terms and conditions of employment as will assure to all employees their collective bargaining rights."

The LC has made it a clear statutory policy to prevent supervisory employees from joining labor organizations consisting of rank-and-file employees as the concerns which involve members of either group are normally disparate and contradictory.

Based on A.245 provision, a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no labor organization at all. Not being one, an organization which carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary, therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the LC.

The rationale behind the LC's exclusion of supervisors from unions of rank-and-file employees is that such employees, while in the performance of supervisory functions, become the alter ego of management in the making and the implementing of key decisions at the sub-managerial level. Certainly, it would be difficult to find unity or mutuality of interests in a bargaining unit consisting of a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees. And this is so because the fundamental test of a bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not such a unit will best advance to all employees within the unit the proper exercise of their collective bargaining rights. The LC itself has recognized this, in preventing supervisory employees from joining unions of rank-and-file employees.TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INCORPORATED V. TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION

Facts: The Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union (THEU)-Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization (PTGWO), Local Chapter 776, a

legitimate labor organization said to represent majority of the rank-and-file employees of THIGCI, filed a petition for certification election before the DOLE Mediation-Arbitration Unit.

The Tagaytay Highlands International Golf Club (THIGCI)opposed the Union’s petition for certification election on the ground that the list of union members submitted by it was defective and fatally flawed as it included names and signatures of supervisors, resigned, terminated and absent without leave (AWOL) employees, as well as employees of The Country Club, Inc., a corporation distinct and separate from THIGCI; and that out of the 192 signatories to the petition, only 71 were rank-and file employees of THIGCI.

THIGCI submitted a list of the names of its 71 actual rank-and-file employees which it annexed to its Comment to the petitioner for certification election. It then incorporated a tabulation of the number of signatories to the said petition whose membership in the union was being questioned as disqualified and the reasons for disqualification. THIGCI also alleged that some of the signatures were secured through fraudulent and deceitful means and submitted copies of the handwritten denials and withdrawal of some of its employees from participating in the petition.

DOLE Med-Arbiter: ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees if THIGCI. It held that the documents show that petitioner Union was a legitimate labor federation and its local/chapter was duly reported to this Office as one of its affiliate local/chapter. As for the allegation that some of the signatures were fraudulently obtained, Med-Arbiter held that it should be coursed through an independent petition for cancellation of union registration which is within the jurisdiction of the DOLE Regional Director. The Med-Arbiter held that THIGCI failed to submit the job descriptions of the questioned employees and other supporting documents to bolster its claim that they are disqualified from joining THEU.



THIGCI appealed at the Office of the DOLE Secretary. Decision: dismissal of the petition for certification election due to clear absence of mutuality of interests, i.e., THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units (supervisory employees and rank-and-file employees) as well as employees of two separate and distinct corporate entities.

Motion for Reconsideration by THEU before DOLE Undersecretary: In the DOLE Resolution, Undersecretary set aside the dismissal on the ground that THEU is a local chapter and thus, the 20% membership requirement is not necessary for it to acquire legitimate status. Hence, the retraction of some members cannot negate the legitimacy it had already acquired before the petition; that the names of the allegedly disqualified supervisory employees should be simply removed from THEU’s roster of membership. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, petition for certiorari to the SC which was referred to the CA

CA: denied THIGCI’s petition for certiorari and affirmed the DOLE Resolution in favour the Union.

ISSUES:/ HELD:1)Whether a certificate of registration of a union can be subject to collateral attack? NO2) MAIN: Is there a lack of mutuality of interest (in re claim that THEU sought to represent two separate bargaining units)? NO. FAILURE TO PRESENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

RATIO:1) While Art 245 of the Labor Code expressly prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank-and file union, it does not provide what would be the

effect if a rank-and-file union counts supervisory employees among its members or vice versa. The argument of THIGCI is that “the acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost depends on whether or not the labor organization has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization... An organization which carries a mixture of rank and file supervisory employees cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization xxx”SC said that the petition has no merit because after a certificate of registration is issued to a union, its legal personality cannot be subject to collateral attack. It may be questioned only in an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with Sec 5 Rule V, Book IV of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code. As regards the grounds for cancellation of a certificate of registration, the inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Art 239 Sections (a) and (c) (element of misrepresentation, false statement, fraud or deceit). THEU, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered to have already acquired juridical personality which may not be assailed collaterally. As to the allegation that some of the signatures were secured through fraud, the proper procedure is to file a petition for cancellation of the certificate of registration and not intervention in a petition for certification election.(Note: in re alleged withdrawal of union members from participating in the certification election, SC held that the best evidence is in the certification election itself wherein the workers can freely express themselves in a secret ballot)

2) MAIN: THIGCI failed to present substantial evidence that the assailed employees are actually occupying supervisory positions. While THIGCI submitted a list of its employees with their corresponding job titles and ranks, there is nothing mentioned about the supervisor’s respective duties, powers, and prerogatives that would show that they can effectively recommend managerial actions which require the use of independent judgment. Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor:The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union... What is essential is the nature of the employee’s function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which determines whether the employee has rank and file or managerial status or whether he is a supervisory employee.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO V. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENTDoctrine: Thus, the Implementing Rules of RA 6715 insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are null and void, for being not germane to the purposes of EO 111 and RA6715. The rule making power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Security guards may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank.Facts: The Staff and Technical Employees Association of MERALCO, a labor organization of staff and technical employees of MERALCO, filed a petition

for certification election, seeking to represent regular employees of MERALCO who are: (a) non-managerial employees with Pay Grades VII and above; (b) non-managerial employees in the Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services, Secretaries who are automatically removed from the bargaining unit; and (c) employees within the rank and file unit who are automatically disqualified from becoming union members of any organization within the same bargaining unit.

The petition alleged that “while there exists a duly-organized union for rank and file employees in Pay Grade I-VI, which is the MERALCO Employees and Worker’s Association (MEWA) which holds a valid CBA for the rank and file employees, there is no other labor organization except STEAM-PCWF claiming to represent the MERALCO employees. The petition was premised on the exclusion/disqualification of certain MERALCO employees from the appropriate bargaining unit and therefore outside the scope of the CBA namely: employees in patrol division, employees in treasury security services section, managerial employees and secretaries.

MERALCO moved for the dismissal of the petition on one ground among others that: The employees sought to be represented by STEAM-PCWF are either (1) managerial who are prohibited by law from forming or joining supervisory union; (2) security services personnel who are prohibited from joining or assisting the rank-and file union; (3) secretaries who do not consent to the petitioner’s representation and whom petitioner cannot represent; and (4) rank-and-file employees represented by the certified or duly recognized bargaining representative of the only rank-and-file bargaining unit in the company, the Meralco Employees Workers Association (MEWA) in accordance with the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement with the latter. As regards those in the Patrol Division and Treasury Security Service Section who are tasked with providing security to the company and thus not eligible to join the rank and file bargaining unit, MERALCO used as basis Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules



and Regulations of the Labor Code which provides that “the appropriate bargaining unit of the rank and file employees shall not include security guards.”

Ruling of Med-Arbiter: Having been excluded from the existing CBA for rank and file employees, these employees have the right to form a union of their own, except those employees performing managerial functions. With respect to those employees who had resented their alleged involuntary membership in the existing CBA, the Med-Arbiter stated that the holding of a certification election would allow them to fully translate their sentiment on the matter, and thus, directed the holding of a certification election.

MERALCO appealed contending that until such time that a judicial finding is made to the effect that they are not managerial employee, STEAM-PCWF cannot represent employees from Pay Grades VII and above. MEWA filed an appeal in intervention assailing the order of the med-arbiter as null and void for being in violation of Art. 245 of LC and Art 232 of LC. STEAM-PCWF opposed the appeal in intervention but with the enactment of RA 6715 and its IRR, STEAM-PCWF renounced its representation of employees in the Patrol Division, Treasury Security Services Section andrank and file employees in Pay Grades I-VI.

Secretary of Labor’s ruling: (1) Another rank-and file bargaining unit can be established independent, distinct and separate from the existing rank-and-file bargaining unit; (2) The employees from pay grades VII and above are rank and file employees; and (3) The security guards or personnel may be lumped together with the rank and file union and/or the supervisory union.

ISSUE:/ HELD: Whether it is legal to allow the security guards to join either the rank and file of the supervisory union? YES

RATIO:The Implementing Rules of RA 6715, par. 2, Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V provides that “Supervisory employees and security guards shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own.” This provision is similar to the above-cited Sec. 2 (c), Rule V, also of Book V, RA 6715. Both rules which barred security guards from doing rank and file organization were carried from the then Art. 245 of the Labor Code. However, President Aquino on December 24, 1986 issued E.O. No. 111 which eliminated Art. 245 in re disqualification of security guards. What was retained was the disqualification of managerial employees, renumbered as Art. 245. With the elimination, security guards were thus free to join a rank and file organization. On March 2, 1989, the present Congress passed RA 6715. Section 18 thereof amended Art 245 to provide that “Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist, or form separate labor organizations of their own.”

Note that the second sentence does not include security guards in the disqualification. Thus, the Implementing Rules of RA 6715 insofar as they disqualify security guards from joining a rank and file organization are null and void, for being not germane to the purposes of EO 111 and RA6715. The rule making power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Security guards may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory union, depending on their rank.

AD GOTHONG MANUFACTING CORP. EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU, petitioner, vs. HON. NIEVES CONFESOR, Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment and AD GOTHONG MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Subangdaku, Mandaue City, respondents.

Facts: May 12, 93 – petitioner Union filed a petition for certification election in its bid to represent the unorganized regular rank-and-file

employees of respondent Company excluding its office staff and personnel. Respondent company opposed the petition as it excluded office staff and personnel who are rank and file employees. The parties eventually included Romulo Plaza and Paul Yap in list of eligible voters on condition that their votes are considered challenged on ground that they were supervisory employees.

Plaza and Yap argued that they are rank and file employees. Plaza claimed that he was a mere salesman in Cebu while Yap claimed that he is a mere expediter whose job includes facilitation of processing of bills of lading of all company shipments.

Petitioner maintains that Plaza and Yap are supervisors who are disqualified to join the bargaining unit for rank and file employees. It based its assertion on the following: 1) joint affidavit of Ricardo Canete et al which alleges Yap is a supervisory employee; 2) affidavit of Pedro Diez which alleges that affiant is a supervisor in production department of respondent company; 3) photocopy of memorandum regarding attendance of department heads and supervisors to quarterly meeting which contains Plaza and Yap’s names; 4) photocopy of memo which states Romy Plaza as acting OIC of marketing in Davao; 5) photocopy of minutes of regular quarterly meeting wherein Yap was mentioned as shipping assistant and newly hired member of the staff.

Med-Arbiter Achilles Manit declared that Yap and Plaza are rank and file employees. Petitioner appealed to Secretary of Labor insisting that Yap and Plaza are supervisor and manager of the company and are prohibited

from joining bargaining unit as rank and file employees. Respondent claimed that Pacita Gothong was the company’s secretary and not Baby Siador, who signed the minutes. Respondent also argued that Plaza could not qualify as manager as the Davao Branch never materialized.

Respondent Secretary of Labor affirmed the finding of Med-Arbiter Achilles. Motion for Recon denied.

Issue: Whether or not Plaza and Yap are managerial/supervisory employees and thus prohibited from joining the bargaining unit. (Corollary issue: did Confesor commit grave abuse of discretion?)



Held: No, they are not. Plaza and Yap are rank and file employees. Confesor did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.Ratio:The Labor Code Article 212(m) recognizes two principal groups of employees, namely, the managerial and rank and file groups. Under Rule I, Section 2(c), Book III of the IRR of the LC, to be a member of managerial staff, the following elements must concur:

1. His primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies2. He customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of his functions3. He regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment4. He does not devote more than 20% of his time to work other than those mentioned above

Franklin Baker Co of the Phil vs Trajano: test of supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a person possess authority to act in the interest of employer in the matter specified in Article 212(k) of LC and Section 1(m) of its IRR whether such authority is merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires use of independent judgment.

The SC also accords due respect and sustains findings of fact made by quasi-judicial agencies (Med-Arbiter and Sec of Labor) which are supported by substantial evidence considering their expertise in their respective fields. The Med-Arbiter ruled that the petitioner failed to present concrete and substantial evidence to establish the fact that challenged voters are either managerial or supervisory. Med-Arbiter’s evaluation: 1) the joint affidavit of Canete merely tagged voters as supervisors but nothing was said about their respective duties, powers and prerogatives; 2) the documents have not been properly identified which renders them inadmissible in evidence. Secretary of Labor’s evaluation: 1) Plaza and Yap are not managerial or supervisory EE because there is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by herein petitioner showing that they are exercising the managerial/supervisory attributes; 2) In re Plaza, there is nothing in minutes of staff meeting that said that he is exercising managerial prerogatives; 3) In re Yap, there is no evidence pointing Yap as a supervisory employee.

The SC finds no reason to disturb the finding of the Med-Arbiter and the Sec of Labor that copies of the minutes presented in evidence do not prove that Yap and Plaza were managerial or supervisory employees. Also, the issue raised herein is one of fact. The SC is not a trier of facts. It is not the Court’s function to examine and evaluate the probative value of evidence presented to it.

PAPER INDUSRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of Labor and Employment, HON. HENRY PABEL, Director of DOLE Regional Office No. XI, PCOP-BISLIG SUPERVISORY AND TECHNICAL STAFF EMPLOYEES UNION, ASSOCIATED LABOR UNION and FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERSFacts:

Petitioner PICOP is engaged in manufacture of paper and timber products with place of operations at Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. It has 9,000 employees, 944 of whom are supervisory and technical staff employees. 487 of these supervisory and technical staff employees are signatory members of private respondent PBSTSEU.

August 9, 1989 – PBSTSEU instituted Petition for Certification Election to determine the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the supervisory/technical staff EE of PICOP for CBA purposes.

August 10, 1989 – initial hearing of petition was set on August 18, then reset to August 25 at the instance of PICOP. PICOP failed to file any comment or position paper. Private respondents FFW and ALU then filed petitions for Intervention.

September 14, 1989 – Med- Arbiter Arturo Gamolo issued Order granting petitions for Intervention of FFW and ALU. Another order issued that PICOP’s supervisory and technical staff have four choices: 1) PBSTSEU; 2) FFW; 3) ALU; or 4) No union.

September 21, 1989 – PICOP appealed the order setting certification election contending that Med-Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in deciding the case without giving PICOP opportunity to file comments and answers and that PBSTSEU had no personality to file for certification election.

Secretary of Labor issued a Resolution which upheld the Med-Arbiter’s order with modification allowing employees in Cebu, Davao and Illigan to participate in election.

PICOP questioned and objected to inclusion of some section heads and supervisors in the list of voters whose positions it averred were reclassified as managerial employees in light of reorganization effected by it. Under the Revised Organizational Structure, company was divided into four main business groups: 1) Paper Products; 2) Timber Products; 3) Forest Resources; 4) Support Services. A Vice president heads each group. A division manager heads the divisions comprising each group. A department manager heads the departments comprising each division. Section heads and supervisors, now called section managers and unit managers head the sections and independent units comprising each department. PICOP advanced that considering the present authority of section managers and unit managers to hire and fire, they are classified as managerial employees, hence ineligible to form or join any labor organization.



March 27, 1990 – Med-Arbiter Phibun Pura issued order holding that supervisors and section heads of the petitioner are managerial employees and therefore excluded from the list of voters of certification election.

PBSTSEU appealed the order of Med-Arbiter and so did ALU. Laguesma then issued the assailed order setting aside the order of Med-Arbiter Pura and held that subject supervisors and section heads are supervisory employees eligible to vote in the election

PICOP sought reconsideration but was denied. Issue: Whether or not Section Heads and supervisors who have been designated as Section managers and unit managers were converted to managerial employees thus unable to join unions by virtue of Article 245 of the Labor Code. (Corollary: whether Laguesma is guilty of denying due process) Held: The petition is unmeritorious and thereby dismissed. Ratio:United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union vs Laguesma: Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line Managers. Top and Middle Managers have authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational policies while the task of First Line managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by rank and file employees. Under this distinction, managerial employees fall into 2 categories namely 1) managers per se composed of Top and Middle managers; and 2) Supervisors comprised of first line managers. The mere fact that employee is designated manager does not immediately make him one. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, for job description determines nature of employment.A thorough dissection of the job description indisputably show that they are not actually managerial but only supervisory employees since they do not lay down company policies. Their authority to hire and fire is merely advisory in character and not a final determination because it requires approval of a superior. Their power is subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other executives.With regard to denial of due process claimed by PICOP, no such thing can be ascribed to Laguesma for PICOP was allowed to submit voluminous documents. What the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be head. Also, the fact that PICOP voiced out its objection to holding of certification election, despite numerous opportunities to ventilate the same, only after Laguesma affirmed the holding thereof, bolstered public respondent’s conclusion that PICOP raised the issue merely to prevent and thwart the section heads and supervisory employees from exercising their right granted by law. No obstacle must be placed on the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented.

SAN MIGUEL CORP. SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT EMPLOYEES UNION, PETITIONER VS. LAGUESMA, RESPONDENT

Facts: Petitoner Union filed before DOLE a petition for direct certification or certification election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis. Med- Arbiter Reynante ordered the conduct of certification election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando, and Otis as one bargaining unit. Respondent San Miguel filed a Notice of Appeal pointing out that Med Arbiter erred in grouping together all three (3) separate plants, into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3 and above whose positions are confidential in nature. Respondent Undersecretary Laguesma, granted the Appeal and remanded the case to the Med-Arbiter for the determination of the true classification of each of the employees sought to be included in the appropriate bargaining unit. Upon petitioner-JERRY E. ACEDERA, ANTONIO PARILLA, AND OTHERS LISTED IN ANNEX A, petitioners-appellants, vs. INTERNATIONAL CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC. (ICTSI), NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents-appellees.

Facts:

Petitioners-appellants Jerry Acedera, et al. are employees of herein private respondent International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI) and are officers/members of Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union-International Container Terminal Services, Inc. Local Chapter (APCWU-ICTSI), a labor organization duly registered as a local affiliate of the Associated Port Checkers & Workers Union (APCWU).

When ICTSI started its operation, it used 304-day factor in determining the wages of its employees. In accordance, however, with subsequent CBA1, the employees work week was reduced to five days or a total of 250 days a year. ICTSI, however, continued using the 304-day divisor in computing the wages of the employees.

Wage Order was issued increasing the minimum wage. Heeding the proposal and following the implementation of the new wage order, ICTSI stopped using 304 days as divisor and started using 365 days in determining the daily wage of its employees and other consequential compensation, even if the employees work week consisted of only five days as agreed upon in the CBA.

1 CBA- Section 1. The regular working days in a week shall be five (5) days on any day from Monday to Sunday, as may be scheduled by the COMPANY, upon seven (7) days prior notice unless any of this day is declared a special holiday.



ICTSI went on a retrenchment program and laid off its on-call employees. This prompted the APCWU-ICTSI to file a notice of strike which included as cause of action not only the retrenchment of the employees but also ICTSI’s use of 365 days as divisor in the computation of wages. The dispute respecting the retrenchment was resolved by a compromise settlement while that respecting the computation of wages was referred to the Labor Arbiter.

APCWU, on behalf of its members and other employees similarly situated, filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint against ICTSI. Petitioners-appellants filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion to Intervene.

LA: Correct divisor is 250 days; Motion to Intervene denied. NLRC: reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed APCWUs complaint for lack of merit. Denial of Motion to Intervene

was affirmed. CA on petition for certiorari.

Dismissed APCWUs petition on the following grounds: failure to allege when its motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed, failure to attach the necessary appendices to the petition, and failure to file its motion for extension to file its petition within the reglementary period.

Dismissed petitioner-appellants motion as they were already well-represented by APCWU.

Issue/Held: WON petitioner-appellant has right to intervene.-NOPetitioner-appellant’s argument: They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention (RULE 19 of 1997 ROC) because (1) they are the ones who stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue delay or prejudice would result from their intervention since their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was still hearing the case and before any decision thereon was rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to file a separate case as they would be guilty of forum shopping because the only forum available for them was the Labor Arbiter.SC: Petitioner failed to take into account rule on representation:Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. . . [27] (Emphasis supplied)A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of the Labor Code which provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That APCWU acted in a representative capacity for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly situated, the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiters Office so expressly states. union's motion, Usec Laguesma granted the reconsideration and directed the conduct of separate certification elections among the supervisors ranked as supervisory levels 1 to 4 (S1 to S4) and the exempt employees in each of the three plants at Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis. San Miguel filed an MFR. Sometime in 1993, Usec modified his earlier order and issued the assailed order excluding the employees under supervisory level 3 and 4 and the so-called exempt employees from the proposed bargaining unit and ruled out their participation in the certification election. Hence, this petition.

Issues: WON Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union. [No they are not. They can join the union.]2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate single bargaining unit. [Yes, they constitute a single bargaining unit.]Held/Ratio: 1. They are not vested with the powers and prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge or dismiss employees. They are, therefore, not qualified to be classified as managerial employees who, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. In the very same provision, they are not allowed membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate


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labor organizations of their own. The only question that need be addressed is whether these employees are properly classified as confidential employees or not.Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The broad rationale behind this “confidential employee rule” is that employees should not be placed in a position involving a potential conflict of interests. In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential employees merely because they handle "confidential data" as such must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for them to fall under said restrictions. The information they handle are properly classifiable as technical and internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of grievances wherein the interests of a union and the management are invariably adversarial.2. The fact that the 3 plants are located in 3 different places is immaterial. Geographical location can be completely disregarded if the communal or mutual interests of the employees are not sacrificed. The distance among the three plants is not productive of insurmountable difficulties in the administration of union affairs. Neither are there regional differences that are likely to impede the operations of a single bargaining representative.

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, MED-ARBITER NAPOLEON V. FERNANDO & PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-UOEF, respondents,

Facts: The Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors PEPSI. The Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (federation) together with two (2) rank and file unions, Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP). PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside, Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, on the grounds that (a) the members of the Union were managers and (b) a supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company. PEPSI filed a Notice of Appeal and Memorandum of Appeal with the Secretary of Labor, questioning the setting of the certification election on the said date and five (5) days after. It also presented an urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Suspend the Certification Election, which motion was granted. The Secretary of Labor denied the appeal and Motion for Reconsideration. Even as the Petition to Cancel, Revoke and Suspend Union Charter Certificate was pending before the BLR, PEPSI found its way to this Court via the present petition for certiorari. SC granted the prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction.Federation comments: Art 245 does not prohibit a local union composed of supervisory employees from being affiliated to a federation which has local unions with rank-and-file members as affiliates.Sec of Labor comments: Art. 245 does not preclude the supervisor's union and the rank-and-file union from being affiliated with the same federation. Affiliation did not make the supervisory employees members of the rank and file employee's union and vice versa.Pepsi comments: A supervisors' union cannot affiliate with a federation whose members include the rank and file union of the same company. Moreover, to allow the conduct of the certification election to proceed would make any decision arrived at by the Bureau of Labor Relations useless inasmuch as the same would necessarily be rendered moot and academic.

After several appeals and motion for reconsiderations of the earlier orders made by Med Arbiter and Sec of Labor, the BLR finally issued Registration Certificate No. 11492-LC in favor of the Union. Dissatisfied therewith, PEPSI brought the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not a supervisors' union can affiliate with the same Federation of which two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act 6715.Held/Ratio: At the outset, it must be stressed that on September 1, 1992, there was a Resolution of the Union withdrawing from the Federation. The issue in G.R. No. 96663, whether or not the supervisors union can be affiliated with a Federation with two (2) rank and file unions directly under the supervision of the former, has thus become moot and academic in view of the Union's withdrawal from the federation.

But the court stated that the prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union of rank and file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors' wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of which include local unions of rank and file employees.



Anent the issue of whether or not the Petition to cancel/revoke registration is a prejudicial question to the petition for certification election, an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing the cancellation.

As regards the issue of whether or not confidential employees can join the labor union of the rank and file, the Court finds merit in the submission of the OSG that Route Managers, Chief Checkers and Warehouse Operations Managers are supervisors while Credit & Collection Managers and Accounting Managers are highly confidential employees. Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees. A careful scrutiny of their job description indicates that they don't lay down company policies. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies since they have to report to their respective superior. The mere fact that an employee is designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU-NUBE) V. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND ANNE MARIE DURBIN (CEO-PHILIPPINES)

Facts: May 2000 - Petitioner (Union) and Standard Charterd

Bank (Bank) began negotiating for a new CBA. Due to a deadlock, Union filed a Notice of Strike. Secretary of Labor and Employment Particia Sto. TOmas (SOLE) assumed jurisdiction.

SOLE: Bank and Union are directed to execute their collective bargaining agreement effective 01 April 2001 until 30 March 2003

‐ charge of Unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith and the claim for damages are dismissed

‐ charge of ULP for gross violation of economic provisions of CBA are also dismissed for want of jurisdiction

CA: affirmed the SOLE's order Parties execute 2003-2005 CBA. While this would

render the case moot and academic, nevertheless, the likelihood that the same issues will come up in the parties' future CBA negotiations is not far-fetched, thus compelling its resolution.

Contention:Union: the following employees are the only ones to be excluded:1. all managers who are vested with the right to hire and fire employees2. confidential employees 3. those with access to labor relations materials4. Chief Cashiers5. Assistant Cashiers6. personnel of the Telex Department 7. one Human Resources (HR) staff(See case for the list of excluded employees in the 1998-2000 CBA)

SOLE: maintained the previous exclusions because petitioner failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list qualify for exclusionNote: The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence.

Issue: WON Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers, personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they should be excluded.

Held/Ratio:Bank cashiers

They are confidential employees as held in the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU) - Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres.

They have control,custody and/or access to confidential matters like the cash position, financial statements, vault combination, etc.

Telex Department They are confidential employees as held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja. They have access to confidential information which may become the source of undue advantage. They may act as spy or spies of

either party to a collective bargaining agreement.Personnel staff (HR)

They are also confidential employees.



They assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations.

HOWEVER Union failed to substantiate its claim. They failed to show that the employees sought to be removed from the list of exclusions are

actually rank and file employees who are not managerial or confidential in status and should, accordingly, be included in the appropriate bargaining unit.

They could not simply rely on jurisprudence without explaining how and why it should apply to this case. Allegations must be supported by evidence.

Dispositive: Petition is DENIED.CENTRAL NEGROS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC (CENECO) V. SECRETARY OF DOLE AND CENECO UNION OF RATIONAL

EMPLOYEES (CURE)Facts:

Aug. 15, 1987 - CENECO entered into a CBA with CURE, union representing rank-and-file employees, with 3 years term from April 1, 1987 to March 31, 1990.

Dec. 9, 1989 - CURE members had a general assembly wherein they agreed that union members shall withdraw, retract, or recall the union members' membership from CENECO in order to avail of the full benefits under the existing CBA entered into by and between CENECO and CURE, and the supposed benefits that union may avail of under the renewed CBA. This was ratified by 259 of the 362 union members.

Dec. 28, 1989 - CURE wrote CENECO proposing that negotiations be conducted for a new CBA. This was denied on the ground that under applicable decisions of the Supreme Court, employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join a union.

Feb. 27, 1990 - Withdrawal of membership was denied by CENECO as the basis was not among the ground covered by the Board Resolution No. 5023. CURE filed petition for direct recognition or for certification election. CENECO filed motion to dismiss. CENECO cited the case of Batangas I Electric Cooperative Labor Union vs. Romeo A. Young which held that employees who at the same time are members of an electric cooperative are not entitled to form or join unions for purposes of collective bargaining agreement, for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.

Med-Arbiter (Serapio): granted the petition for certification of election, denied motion to dismissDOLE: directly certified CURE as the exclusive bargaining representative Contention: CENECO: Secretary committed a grave abuse of discretion in not applying to the present case the doctrine enunciated in the BATANGAS case Issue: WON employees of CENECO who withdrew their membership from the cooperative are entitled to form or join CURE for purposes of the negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement proposed by the latter. Held: Yes

Ratio: Batangas case merely declared employees who are AT THE SAME TIME members of the cooperative cannot join labor unions for

purposes of collective bargaining. The case DID NOT state that member-employees are prohibited from withdrawing their membership in the cooperative in order to join a labor union.

Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By- Laws of CENECO:any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with such uniform terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe x x x upon withdrawal, the member is merely required to surrender his membership certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation that he has with the cooperative.

Thus, there is no other condition imposed on the withdrawing member and the denial of CENECO is unjustified. The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative must be allowed.

The policy of the State to afford full protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees' right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.

Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting is too trivial and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee to join a union of his choice.

The 390 employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of the cooperative, represent a very small percentage of the cooperative's total membership of 44,000. It is inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of members could adversely affect the business concerns and operations of CENECO.



ICMC V CALLEJA (1990)

ICMC Case: Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services

(TUPAS) filed with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment a Petition for Certification Election among the rank and file members employed by ICMC. The latter opposed.

Med Arbiter: sustained ICMC and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

BLR: REVERSED; ordered the immediate conduct of a certification election.

Philippine Gov’t subsequently granted ICMC the status of a specialized agency with corresponding diplomatic privileges and immunities

BLR Director: denied ICMC’s petition for dismissal of the TUPAS Petition for Certification Election invoking the immunity

IRRI case: 1979, PD 1920 – IRRI was granted the status, prerogatives,

privileges and immunities of an international organization Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and

Agriculture (OLALIA), is a legitimate labor organization with an existing local union, the Kapisanan ng Manggagawa at TAC sa IRRI (Kapisanan, for short) in respondent IRRI.

Kapisanan, filed a Petition for Direct Certification Election with Region IV, Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). IRRI opposed.

Med Arbiter: upheld the opposition of IRRI; DISMISSED the petition for direct certification

BLR: REVERSED; authorized the calling of a certification election among the rank-and-file employees of IRRI.

Secretary of Labor: DISMISSED the Petition for Certification Election

Issue: W/N the claim of immunity by the ICMC and IRRI from the application of Philippine labor laws is validHeld: YES. The status of ICMC as a specialized agency and that of the IRRI as an international organization exempts it the application of labor laws.Ratio: Re: Concept of immunity granted to Ios and Specialized Agencies

3 propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations:1. For the effective discharge of their functions;2. No country should derive any national financial advantage by levying fiscal charges on common international funds; and3. The IOs should be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official businessPURPOSE OF IMMUNITY: to shield the affairs of IOS from political pressure or control by the host country to the prejudice of member States of the organization, and to ensure the unhampered performance of their functions.

Re: Contention that immunity from local jurisdiction allegedly deprives labor of its basic rightsThere is alternative recourse available, i.e. FOR ICMC: other z of settlement, and withdrawal of accorded privileges and immunites; FOR IRRI: formation of a Council of IRRI Employees and Management (CIEM)

Re: Contention that a certification of election is not a litigationA certification election cannot be viewed as an independent or isolated process. It could tugger off a series of events in the collective bargaining process together with related incidents and/or concerted activities i.e. penal, civil and administrative proceedings."



SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY V DRILON, ET AL (1991)

Facts Singer Sewing Machine Company-Singer Machine Collectors Union-Baguio (SIMACUB) filed a petition for direct certification as the

sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all collectors of the Singer Sewing Machine Company. The Company opposed. Med Arbiter: granted the petition Secretary of Labor: AFFIRMED. Denied MR.

Petitioner Company contends that commission agents are not employees but are independent contractors. It relies on several stipulations under the Collection Agency Agreement.

Respondents, on the other hand, contend that union members are employees,1. They "perform the most desirable and necessary activities for the continuous and effective operations of the business of the petitioner

Company" (citing Article 280 of the Labor Code).2. They cannot legally qualify as independent contractors who must be free from control (citing Section 8, Rule 8, Book No. III of the

Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code)3. Respondents also rely on certain stipulations in the Collection Agency Agreement,

An agent shall utilize only receipt forms authorized and issued by the Company. An agent has to submit and deliver at least once a week or as often as required a report of all collections made using report

forms furnished by the Company. The monthly collection quota required by the Company.

Issue: Whether the commission agents are employees OR are independent contractors.Held: The commission agents/collectors are INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. Thus, they cannot join or form a union.

Ratio:Re: Application of the four-fold testThere is no er-ee relationship between the petitioner company and the collectors.

Reports shall be submitted at least once a week is not necessarily an indication of control over the means. The collection agents are not required to observe office hours. The collection agents do not have to devote their time exclusively for SINGER. The manner and method of effecting collections are left solely to the discretion of the collection agents without any

interference on the part of Singer. The collection agents shoulder their transportation expenses. The collection agents are paid strictly on commission basis. The commissions earned by the collection agents are directly deducted by them from the amount of collections they are

able to effect.

Re: Application of Art. 280, LCArticle 280 is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship because it merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees.

Re: Application of Sec 8, Rule 8, Book III, Omnibus Rules (substantial capital requirement for independent contractors)It does not apply to this case. There is no showing that a collection agent needs tools and machineries.

Since private respondents are not employees of the Company, they are not entitled to the constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining.



MACTAN WORKERS UNION VS. ABOITIZ (1972)

Facts: Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Works (company) employs laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor unions. 72 of these employees are affiliated with the Mactan Workers Union (MWU) while the rest are members of the Associated Labor Union (ALU). In November 1964, the company and ALU (as the exclusive collective bargaining representative) entered into a CBA where the former agreed to give a profit-sharing bonus to its employees and laborers to be taken from 10% of its net profits or net income derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop and after deducting the income tax and the bonus annually given to its high-ranking officers. The said profit-sharing bonus was to be paid in 2 installments, the first being payable in March and the second in June, each year and was to be paid by the company to ALU to be delivered by the latter to the employees and laborers concerned. If a laborer or employee does not want to accept the profit-sharing bonus, it was the duty of ALU to return the money received to the company within a period of 60 days from receipt from the company of the said profit-sharing bonus.Members of the MWU failed to receive their shares in the second installment of the bonus because they did not like to go to the office of ALU to collect their shares. When ALU returned the uncollected shares to the company, it advised the latter not to deliver the said amount to the members of MWU unless ordered by the Court. As a result, the company deposited the amount with the Labor Administrator instead. MWU filed a money claim to collect the amount of P4, 035.82 due its members. City Court of Lapulapu and CFI of Cebu: both in favor of MWU. Issues:

1. W/N the exclusive collective bargaining representative (ALU) can disregard the rights of non-members2. W/N MWU’s action should be dismissed on the ground of procedural lapses (i.e. lack of a cause of action, of jurisdiction of the

City Court of Lapulapu and of personality of the MWU to represent its members)Held/Ratio:

1. NO. The benefits of a CBA extend to laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization. Any other view would be a discrimination on which the law frowns. The labor unit that gets the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. It represents ALL the employees in such a bargaining unit.

2. NO. The allegation of a lack of a cause of action cannot stand when there has already been a right violated on the part of the members of MWU (i.e. deprivation of their share of the second installment of the profit-sharing bonus). The claim that the City Court of Lapulapu was bereft of jurisdiction is likewise unpersuasive. The amount claimed by MWU on behalf of its members was P4, 035.82 and if the damages and attorney’s fees be added, the total sum was less than P10, 000. Where the issue involved seeks the enforcement of a provision of the CBA, jurisdiction pertains to the ordinary courts and not to the Industrial Court. The third assigned error, namely, that MWU could not file the suit on behalf of its members, also deserves scant consideration. In fact, ALU itself devoted only half a page in its brief to such an assertion. It seems that ALU is oblivious of how far a labor union can go, or is expected to, in the defense of the rights of its rank and file. More importantly, a labor organization such as ALU should be the last to lay itself open to a charge that it is not averse to denigrating the effectiveness of labor unions. While it is understandable that labor unions would do what lies in their power to put down competing groups, it should not be forgotten that what is entitled to constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and women, NOT labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities through which the working man’s welfare may be promoted and fostered.


Documents

Labor 2 Digests