Labor Review Digests 1

LABOR REVIEW DIGESTS 25 June 2011

DE LA SALLE vs. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITYEMPLOYEE’S ASSOCIATION

FACTS- On December 1986, De la Salle University and De la Salle University

Employees Association National Federation of Teachers and Employees Union (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), which is composed of regular non-academic rank and file employees, entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a life span of three (3) years, that is, from December 23, 1986 to December 22, 1989.

- During the freedom period, or 60 days before the expiration of the said collective bargaining agreement, the Union initiated negotiations with the University for a new collective bargaining agreement which, however, turned out to be unsuccessful, hence, the Union filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board, National Capital Region.

- After several conciliation-mediation meetings, only five (5) out of the eleven (11) issues raised in the Notice of Strike were resolved by the parties, one of which is the issue discussed in this matrix. A partial collective bargaining agreement was thereafter executed by the parties.

ISSUEWhether or not the computer operators and discipline officers who

were previously recognized as confidential employees should be included in the bargaining unit composed of rank and file employees?

RULING- Yes. The Court held that the express exclusion of the computer

operators and discipline officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit. During the freedom period, the parties may not only

renew the existing collective bargaining agreement but may also propose and discuss modifications or amendments thereto.

- With regard to the alleged confidential nature of the said employees' functions, after a careful consideration of the pleadings filed before the Court, it ruled that the said computer operators and discipline officers are not confidential employees. The service record of a computer operator reveals that his duties are basically clerical and non-confidential in nature. As to the discipline officers, based on the nature of their duties, they are not confidential employees and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees.

- Moreover, the Court also held that the employees of the College of St. Benilde should be excluded from the bargaining unit of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University, because the two educational institutions have their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction.

REPUBLIC vs. KAWASHIMA TEXTILE

FACTSOn Jan 24, 2000, Kawashima Free Workers Union (KFWU) filed

with the DOLE Regional Office, a Petition for Certification Election to be conducted in a bargaining unit composed of 145 rank & file employees of Kawashima Phil. The Union attached to this petition a Certification of Creation of Local/Chapter issued on Jan 19 by the same DOLE Office, stating that KFWU submitted the Charter Certificate issued to it by the national federation PTGWO and a Report of Creation of Local/Chapter.

Kawashima Phil, respondent, filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that KFWU did not acquire any legal personality because its membership of mixed rank-and-file and supervisory employees, which violated Article 245 of the Labor Code, and because it failed to submit its books of accounts.

1 Aman. Reyes. Martin. Chan. Calalang. Manigbas. Fajardo. Diaz. Cruz. Hadlocon. Fabia. Morato. Machuca.


May 2000, Med-Arbiter found that KFWU’s legal personality was defective, hence it DISMISSED the petition for certification election. It was found out that 27 of the 145 employees were supervisory employees and because of this, the Med-Arbiter held that it has “not attained the status of a LLO.” It held that the Union must first exclude the supervisory employees from its membership before it can attain the status of a LLO.

The Union appealed the decision to DOLE, which reversed the said decision and ordered the conduct of a certification election. DOLE held that while Article 245 declares supervisory employees ineligible for membership in a labor organization for rank-and-file employees, the provision did not state the effect of such prohibited membership on the legitimacy of the labor organization and its right to file for certification election. Neither was such mixed membership a ground for cancellation of its registration. As to the failure of KFWU to file its books of account, the DOLE held that such omission was not a ground for revocation of union registration or dismissal of petition for certification election, for under Section 1, Rule VI of Department Order No. 9, a local or chapter like KFWU was no longer required to file its books of account.

Then CA reversed again, saying that the union, having both R&F members and supervisory members, cannot qualify as a LLO.

ISSUES1. W/N mixed membership of rank-and-file and supervisory

employees in a union is a ground for the dismissal of a petition for certification election.

2. W/N the legitimacy of a duly registered labor organization can be collaterally attacked in a petition for a certification election through a motion to dismiss filed by an employer.

RULING1. NO. RA 9481, enacted on June 14, 2007, made several

amendments to the LC. Such as in Article 245-A,which provides that “The inclusion as union members of employees outside the bargaining unit shall not be a ground for the cancellation

of the registration of the union. Said employees are automatically deemed removed from the list of membership of said union."

It also provided that "Art. 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. - A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election.” And in Art. 258-A, it states that the employer is a mere bystander and cannot oppose a pertition for certification election.

However, R.A. No. 9481 took effect only on June 14, 2007; hence, it applies only to labor representation cases filed on or after said date. As the petition for certification election subject matter of this case was filed by KFWU on January 24, 2000, R.A. No. 9481 cannot apply to it. Instead, the law and rules in force at the time of the filing by KFWU of the petition for certification election on January 24, 2000 is R.A. No. 6715.

Thus, the former law provides that when there is a comingling of supervisory and R&F employees in a single labor organization, it cannot possess any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. Unless they are separated.

HOWEVER, this provision was amended in 1997. The creation of a LOCAL or a CHAPTER was recognized if a charter certificate was issued by a federation or national union. To create a union or chapter however, there is no need to submit a list of its members.

This led the court to decide that after a labor organization has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its



registration, unless such mingling was brought about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of the Labor Code.

The Court explained that since the 1997 Amended Omnibus Rules does not require a local or chapter to provide a list of its members, it would be improper for the DOLE to deny recognition to said local or chapter on account of any question pertaining to its individual members.

2. NO. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.

ST. JAMES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAWGAWA SA ST. JAMES

FACTSThe Samahang Manggagawa sa St. James School of Quezon City

(Samahang Manggagawa) filed a petition for certification election to determine the collective bargaining representative of the motor pool, construction, and transportation employees of St. James School of Quezon

City. At the certification election held, 84 out of the 149 eligible voters cast their votes.

St. James filed a certification election protest alleging that it had 179 rank and file employees, none of whom voted in the certification elections and that those who voted are constructions workers of an independent contractor, Architect Conrado Bacoy.

ISSUES1. Whether or not St. James can attack the validity of the formation of

the labor union? 2. Whether or not there was a valid certification election?

RULING1. No. St. James can no longer argue that the members of Samahang

Manggagawa are not its employees and thereby question the validity of the formation of the labor union because prior to the holding of the certification election, it filed a petition for cancellation of the latter’s union registration. The case was brought all the way by St. James to the SC by virtue of a petition for certiorari which the Court denied for error in the choice or mode of appeal. Moreover, a resolution was issued by the SC closing any issue on the validity of the formation of the labor union.

2. Yes. It is immaterial that St. James has a total of 570 employees in its 5 campuses because Samahang Manggagawa sought to represent ONLY the motor pool, construction, and transportation employees of the Tandang Sora Campus. Thus, the computation of the quorum should be based on the rank-and-file employees of the previously mentioned campus ONLY. Hence, since the bargaining unit had 149 qualified voters at the time of the certification election, a majority of 84 qualified voters casting their votes would constitute a quorum. Also, the list submitted by St. James consist of teaching and office personnel who are not members of Samahang Manggagawa.



(FOR REFERENCE) Section 13, Rule XII, Book V: Proclamation and

certification of results by election officer; when proper. – Upon completion of the canvass there being a valid election, the election officer shall proclaim and certify as winner the union which obtained a majority of the valid votes cast under any of the following conditions:

1. No protest had been filed or, even if one was filed, the same was not perfected within the five-day period for perfection of the protest;

2. No challenge of eligibility issue was raised or even if one was raised, the resolution of the same will not materially change the result.

For this purpose, the election officer shall immediately issue the corresponding certification, copy furnished all parties, which shall form part of the records of the case. The winning union shall have the rights, privileges and obligations of a duly certified collective bargaining representative from the time the certification is issued. The proclamation and certification so issued shall not be appealable.

Section 2, Rule XII, Book V: Qualification of voters; inclusion-exclusion proceedings. – All employees who are members of the appropriate bargaining unit sought to be represented by the petitioner at the time of the certification or consent election shall be qualified to vote. A dismissed employee whose dismissal is being contested in a pending case shall be allowed to vote in the election.

In case of disagreement over the voters’ list or over the eligibility of voters, all contested voters shall be allowed to vote. However, their votes shall be segregated and sealed in individual envelopes in accordance with Section 9 of these Rules.

DHL PHILS. UNITED RANK AND FILE ASSOCIATION vs. BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA NG DHL PHILS.

FACTS- Nov. 25, 1997 – a certification election was conducted among the rank

and file employees of DHL. The choices in the CE was petitioner and “no choice”

- Dec. 19, 1997 – a Petition for nullification of CE was filed with the DOLE. The officers of petitioner were being charged with misrepresenting to the employees that petitioner-union was an independent union; when, in fact, it was an affiliate of Federation of Free Workers. As a result of the misrepresentation, several employees pulled out of petitioner-union and started forming respondent-union.

- Jan. 19, 1998 – results of the CE was released. The election officer certified the petitioner as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of DHL.

- May 18, 1998 – the Med-Arbiter nullified the CE and ordered the holding of another one where the choices were: petitioner, respondent and no choice.

- On appeal, the DOLE undersecretary held that the issue of representation had already been settled in favor of the petitioner and that no CE would be entertained within one year from the issuance of the Certification Order.

- The CA reversed the decision of the DOLE saying that another CE should be done to give importance to the interest of the workers.

ISSUEWhether or not certificate election can be executed?

RULING



- Yes. Under Section 13 of the Rules Implementing Book V of the Labor Code, the election officer’s authority to certify the results of the election is limited to situations in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been any, it has not been perfected or formalized within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

- In this case, the protest was filed after five days from the close of the CE. However, the Court took note of the fact that the respondent-union, which filed the petition to nullify the CE, was only formed after petitioner’s misrepresentations. The SC said that the election officer should have deferred the certification of petitioner-union upon the filing of the petition.

- Also, the SC said that the rules of technicality should not be used to curtail the welfare of the workers. Notably, after respondent had applied for registration with the BLR, it filed its Petition to nullify the certification election. Petitioner insistently opposed the Petition, as respondent had not yet been issued a certificate of registration at the time. The certificate was issued in favor of the latter only four days after the filing of the Petition, on December 23, 1997. However, the fact that respondent was not yet a duly registered labor organization when the Petition was filed is of no moment, absent any fatal defect in its application for registration.

- The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did not sleep on their rights. Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest should not be taken against them. Mere technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the welfare of the workers. What is essential is that they be accorded an opportunity to determine freely and intelligently which labor organization shall act on their behalf. Having been denied this opportunity by the betrayal committed by petitioner’s officers in the present case, the employees were prevented from making an intelligent and independent choice.The SC also held that the misrepresentation made by the officers of petitioner is with regard to a material fact and thus, should be considered as sufficient ground to nullify the CE.

- Thus, the SC held that the CE was nullified and another CE is but proper.

- The election officer’s authority to certify the results of the election is limited to situations in which there has been no protest filed; or if there has been any, it has not been perfected or formalized within five days from the close of the election proceedings.

- The circumstances in the present case show that the employees did not sleep on their rights. Hence, their failure to follow strictly the procedural technicalities regarding the period for filing their protest should not be taken against them. Mere technicalities should not be allowed to prevail over the welfare of the workers.

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR

FACTS- Confederated Labor Union of the Philippines (CLUP), in behalf of its

chartered local, filed a petition for certification election among the rank-and-file employees of Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation and its affiliates (Sta. Lucia). This union is to be known as CLUP-SLECC.

- The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition because of inappropriateness of the bargaining unit. Thus, CLUP- SLECC reorganized itself and re-registered as CLUP-Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation Workers Association, limiting its membership to purely rank-and-file employees. This union is to be known as CLUP-SLECCWA.

- CLUP-SLECCWA filed a petition for certification election. - Sta. Lucia filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that it

already voluntarily recognized another union, SMSLEC, as the exclusive bargaining representative for rank-and-file employees. Moreover, a CBA between Sta. Lucia and SMSLEC was already registered with the DOLE.

- The Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of Sta. Lucia and dismissed CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election due to the “contract bar rule”, considering that Sta. Lucia already voluntarily recognized and alreadyhad a CBA with SMSLEC.



- On appeal, the DOLE Secretary reversed the decision of the med- arbiter and instead ruled in favor of conducting a certification election (as prayed for by CLUP-SLECCWA). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Both the Secretary and the Court of Appeals ruled that Sta. Lucia’s alleged voluntary recognition of SMSLEC is void because of the existence of another legitimate labor organization (CLUP-SLECCWA).

ISSUEWhether or not Sta. Lucia’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC as its

exclusive bargaining representative is void for having been done during a time when another legitimate labor organization is in existence among the rank-and-file employees?RULINGYES. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals in favor of CLUP-SLECCWA is affirmed.

1. A legitimate labor organization according to Art. 212 (g) of the LC is “any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.” Upon compliance with documentary requirements, a certificate of registration will be issued in favor of the labor organization, which vests in it legal personality as well as all the rights and duties of a legitimate labor organization under the LC.

CLUP-SLECC’s initial problem was that they constituted a legitimate labor organization representing a non-appropriate bargaining unit. However, CLUP-SLECC subsequently re-registered as CLUP-SLECCWA, limiting its members to the rank-and-file of Sta Lucia. Sta. Lucia cannot ignore that CLUP-SLECC was a legitimate labor organization at the time of its voluntary recognition of SMSLEC.

The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code.[10] THUS, CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION, HAVING BEEN VALIDLY ISSUED A CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION, SHOULD BE

CONSIDERED AS HAVING ACQUIRED JURIDICAL PERSONALITY WHICH MAY NOT BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY. THE PROPER PROCEDURE FOR STA LUCIA IS TO FILE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION[11] OF CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION AND NOT TO IMMEDIATELY COMMENCE VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION PROCEEDINGS WITH SMSLEC.

2. On the matter of Sta. Lucia’s voluntary recognition of SMSLEC, the

Supreme Court said as follows: The employer may voluntarily recognize the

representation status of a union in unorganized establishments. STA.LUCIA WAS NOT AN UNORGANIZED ESTABLISHMENT WHEN IT VOLUNTARILY RECOGNIZED SMSLEC AS ITS EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVE ON 20 JULY 2001. CLUP-SLECC AND ITS AFFILIATES WORKERS UNION FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION ON 27 FEBRUARY 2001 AND THIS PETITION REMAINED PENDING AS OF 20 JULY 2001. THUS, STA LUCIA’S VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION OF SMSLEC ON 20 JULY 2001, THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTING REGISTRATION OF A CBA EXECUTED BY STA.LUCIA AND SMSLEC ARE VOID AND CANNOT BAR CLUP-SLECCWA’S PRESENT PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION.

3. The Supreme Court likewise said that Sta. Lucia had no standing to oppose CLUP-SLECCWA’s petition for certification election through a motion to dismiss because in such petitions, the employer is deemed to be a bystander. An exception to this rule is when the employer is requested to bargain collectively. However, this exception is not present in the case at bar.

SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA-LIKHA vs. SAMMA CORPORATION

FACTS



Petitioner Union (Samma-Likha) filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to establish its legal personality; (2) petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioners failed to attach a certificate of non-forum shopping. The Union filed a MR with the regional director of DOLE. The Acting DOLE Sec, treating it as an appeal, reversed the Med-Arbiter. Respondent filed MR, but DOLE Sec. denied.

Respondent elevated the case to the CA and it ultimately ruled in favor of respondent, saying that under Administrative Circular No. 04-94, a certificate of non-forum shopping was required in a petition for certification election.

ISSUEW/N a certificate for non-forum shopping (CNFS) is required in a

petition for certification election.

RULINGNO. Administrative Circular No. 04-94 states that: “The complaint

and other initiatory pleadings referred to and subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a party asserts his claim for relief.” The CA, in justifying its decision, held that a petition for certification election asserts a claim, i.e., the conduct of a certification election.

The SC ruled that the requirement for a CNFS refers to complaints, counter-claims, cross-claims, petitions or applications where contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A certification proceeding,

even though initiated by a "petition," is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.

Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The Board's functions are not judicial in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the decision of any alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. The determination of the proceedings does not entail the entry of remedial orders to redress rights, but culminates solely in an official designation of bargaining units and an affirmation of the employees' expressed choice of bargaining agent

Notably, under the Labor Code and the rules pertaining to the form of the petition for certification election, there is no requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping either in D.O. No. 9, series of 1997 or in D.O. No. 40-03, series of 2003 which replaced the former. Considering the nature of a petition for certification election and the rules governing it, we therefore hold that the requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping is inapplicable to such a petition

CHRIS GARMENTS CORPORATION vs. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS

FACTSChris Garment Corporation (CGC) is engaged in the manufacture

and export of quality garments and apparel.Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO, Local Chapter No. 832

filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter. The union sought to represent the rank-and-file employees not covered by its CBA with the Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Chris Garments Corporation-Solidarity of Union in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms



(SMCGC-SUPER) the certified bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees.

CGC moved to dismiss the petition alleging that they already have an existing CBA (July 1, 1999-June 30, 2004 with SMGC-SUPER which bars any petition for certification election prior to the 60-day freedom period. They also argued that the union members are not their employees since they are the direct employees of qualified and independent contractors.

Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition since there was no EER between the parties – the union itself admitted that its members are agency employees. Assuming arguendo that they are CGC’s employees, the petition for certification election will still fail due to the contract bar rule under Article 232 of the Labor Code. A petition could only be filed during the 60-day freedom period of the CBA (May 1, 2004 – June 30, 2004)

Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed the decision of the Med-Arbiter. (However, SLE declared that there is an EER between CGC and members of Chirs Garments Workers Union-PTWGO.)

Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO filed for 2 more petitions (so all in all 3 petitions were filed) for certification of election. Both were dismissed by the Med-arbiter. However, the 3rd petition for election was granted by the Secretar of Labor and Employment, upon appeal.

CGC filed for petition for certiorari with the CA. However this was dismissed since CGC did not file for a motion for reconsideration before filing the petition for certiorari with the CA.(certification election was conducted where SMCGC-SUPER emerged as the winning union)

ISSUES1. Whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary before a party

can file a petition for certiorari from the decision of the 2. Whether the case is barred by res judicata or conclusiveness of

judgment 3. Whether or not there is an EER

RULING1. NO. DO No. 40-03 Series of 2003 states that the decision of the

SLE shall be final and executory after 10 days from receipt thereof by the parties and that it shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration

2. NO. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.

The elements of res judicata are: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new action

must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a

court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and

(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action

In the case at bar, the fourth elements (same cause of action) is missing.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed the first petition as it was filed outside the 60-day freedom period. At that time therefore, the union has no cause of action since they are not yet legally allowed to challenge openly and formally the status of SMCGC-SUPER as the exclusive bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. Such dismissal, however, has no bearing in the instant case since the third petition for



certification election was filed well within the 60-day freedom period.

In short, in their 3rd petition for certification of election, Chris Garments Workers Union-PTGWO already has a cause of action

3. Yes. The SLE already held that they have an EER and since CGC did not appeal this factual finding, it may be considered as the final resolution of such issue.

EAGLE RIDGE GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTSPetitioner1 had 112 rank-and-file employees. On 06 December

2005, at least 20%2 organized themselves into an independent labor union3. After being issued a registration certificate, it filed a petition for certification election (CE). Petitioner opposed it, followed by the filing of a petition for cancellation of the registration certificate. It claimed that EREU declared in its application for registration that it had 30 members when the minutes of its organizational meeting only showed 26. However, only 25 signed the certification that ratified the constitution and by-laws while 26 signed the document, thereby making one signature a forgery. Also, petitioner contended that 5 employees wanted to withdraw from the union, executing affidavits4 claiming that (1) the meeting was a drinking spree, (2) they didn’t know the documents they signed were for the organization of a union, and (3) they wish to withdraw from it. This withdrawal reduces the membership to 20 to 21 (below minimum). Conversely, the union presented duly

1 In the business of maintaining golf courses.2 20% of 112 is 22.43 Named Eagle Ridge Employees Union or EREU4 Dated 15 February 2006.

accomplished membership forms of 4 additional members dated 08 December 2005.5

ISSUEW/N EREU misrepresented, gave false statements and committed

fraud in the adoption of its constitution and by-laws, the numerical composition of the union and the election of officers for the application for registration.

RULING NO. It had 30 members when it applied for registration on 19

December 2005. It has sufficiently explained that the discrepancy6 was due to the 4 additional members. Admission of new members is neither prohibited by law nor was it concealed in its application. Art 234(b) required submission of the minutes and list of participants while par (c) merely required the list of all members. Any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of membership, especially in independent unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.7

The 26-25 difference is merely a typographical error and an insignificant mistake. The affidavits of retraction of 68 were not presented in the hearing and are, therefore, hearsay while those affidavits presented by the union were duly re-affirmed in the hearing by the affiants. The employees’ withdrawal from a labor union made before filing of the petition for CE is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after is considered involuntary. Hence, withdrawal from a union after filing the Petition for CE does not affect it. The retraction did not retroact to the time of the application for registration or even to the organizational meeting. Prior to

5 NOTE: It also presented two sama-samang sinumpaang salaysay and the union legal counsel’s sworn statement attesting to the orderly and properly proceedings of the organizational meeting.6 between those who attended the meeting and the total members7 It was alleged by petitioner that the applications for membership did not comply with (what petitioner called) “sine qua non requirements” in the constitution and by-laws.8 Facts stated 5 but the ruling stated 6 members.



their withdrawal, they were bona fide union members. They also never disputed affixing their signatures.

Well settled is that where the company seeks the cancellation of a union’s registration during the pendency of a petition for certification election, the same grounds invoked to cancel should not be used to bar the certification election. This is because a CE is the most appropriate procedure for the desired goal of ascertaining which of the competing organizations should represent the employees for the purpose of collective bargaining.

FACTSEagle Ridge is engaged in the business of maintaining golf

courses. It has about 112 rank-and-file employess. Sometime in 2005, at least 20% (the number required under the Labor Code) of the employees of Eagle Ridge decided to form a union – the Eagle Ridge Employees Union (EREU). They elected their officers and ratified their constitution and by-laws. EREU then applied for registration as a legitimate labor organization to which they were accepted. EREU then applied for certification election. This was opposed by Eagle Ridge and a petition for cancellation of registration was also filed by later. Eagle Ridge alleges misrepresentation, false statement and fraud committed by EREU in relation to their constitution and by-laws, the total membership in the union and the election of their officers.

ISSUE Was there fraud in the application for registration of EREU?

RULING No there was none. Before their amendment by RA 9481, the then

law provides the following requirements for registration as legitimate labor organization:

1. 50 pesos registration fee

2. Names of officers, their addresses, principal address of labor organization, minutes of organizational meetings and the list of members who participated in them

3. Names of all members comprising at least 20% of all the employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operatex x x x

5. Four copies of its constitution and by-laws, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of all members who participated in it.

The law further provides for the following grounds for cancellation of registration:

1. Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws, the minutes of the meetings and the list of members who participated in it.x x x x

3 Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in the elections of officers, in the minutes of the election, in the list of voters and the failure to submit the [necessary] documents … within 30 days from election.

The Court ruled that the petitioner failed to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. ERUE submitted all the necessary documents required for its registration.

The members of the EREU totalled 30 employees when it applied for registration. The Union thereby complied with the mandatory minimum 20% membership requirement under the law.

The Union has sufficiently explained the discrepancy between the number of those who attended the organizational meeting showing 26 employees and the list of union members showing 30. The difference is due to the additional four members admitted two days after the organizational meeting as attested to by their duly accomplished Union Membership forms.

The Court held that “any seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of independent



labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership. The right of employees to self-organization and membership in a union must not be trammelled by undue difficulties.”

Also, there was the issue of the six union members who expressed their intention to withdraw from the organization. The Court said that such would be immaterial as even if the six will be considered withdrawn, the minimum number of members (20% of all the employees in the bargaining unit) is still maintained by EREU. Besides, the withdrawal of the six union members does not retroact to the day of application of the union for registration.

Lastly, the Court mentioned that “precedent cases said that the employees’ withdrawal from a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then, if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of the union?”

PICOP RESOURCES vs. TANECA

FACTSRespondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PICOP and

members of Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Picop Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (NAMAPRI-SPFL), which is the collective bargaining agent for the rank-and-file employees of petitioner. PICOP has a CBA with NAMAPRI-SPFL. The CBA contained the following union security provisions:

Article II - Union Security and Check-OffSection 6. Maintenance of membership.

6.1 All employees within the appropriate bargaining unit who are members of the UNION at the time of the signing of this AGREEMENT shall, as a condition of continued employment by the COMPANY, maintain their membership in the UNION in good standing during the effectivity of this AGREEMENT.6.3 The COMPANY, upon the written request of the UNION and after compliance with the requirements of the New Labor Code, shall give notice of termination of services of any employee who shall fail to fulfill the condition provided in Section 6.1 and 6.2 of this Article…”

Atty. Fuentes sent a letter to the management of PICOP demanding the termination of employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of the Federation of Free Workers Union (FFW) during the effectivity of the CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid basis for termination.

After evaluation, Atty. Fuentes advised the management of PICOP that the Union found the member's explanations to be unsatisfactory. PICOP served notices of termination for causes to the 31 persons sought to be terminated on the ground of "acts of disloyalty" committed against it when respondents allegedly supported and signed the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the "freedom period" during the effectivity of the CBA.

Respondents filed a case for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioner PICOP. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Respondents, NLRC reversed. CA reversed NLRC, hence this petition.

ISSUE Whether there was just cause to terminate the employment of respondents.

RULINGNo. "Union security" is a generic term, which is applied to and

comprehends "closed shop," "union shop," "maintenance of membership," or



any other form of agreement which imposes upon employees the obligation to acquire or retain union membership as a condition affecting employment. There is union shop when all new regular employees are required to join the union within a certain period as a condition for their continued employment. There is maintenance of membership shop when employees, who are union members as of the effective date of the agreement, or who thereafter become members, must maintain union membership as a condition for continued employment until they are promoted or transferred out of the bargaining unit, or the agreement is terminated. A closed shop, on the other hand, may be defined as an enterprise in which, by agreement between the employer and his employees or their representatives, no person may be employed in any or certain agreed departments of the enterprise unless he or she is, becomes, and, for the duration of the agreement, remains a member in good standing of a union entirely comprised of or of which the employees in interest are a part.

However, in terminating the employment of an employee by enforcing the union security clause, the employer needs to determine and prove that: (1) the union security clause is applicable; (2) the union is requesting for the enforcement of the union security provision in the CBA; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to support the decision of the union to expel the employee from the union. These requisites constitute just cause for terminating an employee based on the union security provision of the CBA.

First requisite There is no question that the CBA between PICOP and

respondents included a union security clause. PICOP, upon written request from the Union, can indeed terminate the employment of the employee who failed to maintain its good standing as a union member. Second requisite

It is likewise undisputed that NAMAPRI-SPFL, in two (2) occasions demanded from PICOP to terminate the employment of respondents due to their acts of disloyalty to the Union.

Third requisite We find that there is no sufficient evidence to support the

decision of PICOP to terminate the employment of the respondents.

PICOP alleged that respondents were terminated from employment based on the alleged acts of disloyalty they committed when they signed an authorization for the Federation of Free Workers (FFW) to file a Petition for Certification Election. It contends that the acts of respondents are a violation of the Union Security Clause, as provided in their Collective Bargaining Agreement.

The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for Certification Election of FFW before the "freedom period" is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents. Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong. Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.

Petitioner's act of dismissing respondents stemmed from the latter's act of signing an authorization letter to file a petition for certification election as they signed it outside the freedom period. However, we are constrained to believe that an "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an actual "Petition for Certification Election. Strictly speaking, what is prohibited is the filing of a petition for certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents’ right to self-organization.

POSSIBLE SECOND ISSUE: PICOP anchored their decision to terminate respondents’

employment on Article 253 of the Labor Code which states that "it shall be



the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the parties." It claimed that they are still bound by the Union Security Clause of the CBA even after the expiration of the CBA; hence, the need to terminate the employment of respondents.

Petitioner's reliance on Article 253 is misplaced. It states: “…At the expiration of the freedom period, the employer shall continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent where no petition for certification election is filed.”

Applying the same provision, it can be said that while it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do so when no petition for certification election was filed. In the instant case, four (4) petitions were filed.

Moreover, the last sentence of Article 253 which provides for automatic renewal pertains only to the economic provisions of the CBA, and does not include representational aspect of the CBA. An existing CBA cannot constitute a bar to a filing of a petition for certification election. When there is a representational issue, the status quo provision in so far as the need to await the creation of a new agreement will not apply. Otherwise, it will create an absurd situation where the union members will be forced to maintain membership by virtue of the union security clause existing under the CBA and, thereafter, support another union when filing a petition for certification election. If we apply it, there will always be an issue of disloyalty whenever the employees exercise their right to self-organization. The holding of a certification election is a statutory policy that should not be circumvented, or compromised.

LEGEND INTERNATIONAL RESORTS vs. KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG LEGEND

FACTS KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, a Petition for

Certification Election alleging that it is a legitimate labor organization of the rank and file employees of Legend International Resorts Limited (LEGEND).LEGEND moved to dismiss the petition alleging that KML is not a legitimate labor organization because its membership is a mixture of rank and file and supervisory employees in violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code; That KML committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5, 2001 when in reality some of them were either at work; have already resigned; or were abroad.

KML argued that even if 41 of its members are indeed supervisory employees and therefore excluded from its membership, the certification election could still proceed because the required number of the total rank and file employees necessary for certification purposes is still sustained; that its legitimacy as a labor union could not be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings but only through a separate and independent action for cancellation of union registration.

BLR: KML NOT A LEGIT LABOR ORGNIZATION.

ISSUES 1. Whether or not the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration

should retroact to the time of its issuance 2. Whether or not the the legal personality of KML can be collaterally

attacked in a petition for certification election

RULING1. NO. We cannot subscribe to LEGEND’s proposition that the

cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance. LEGEND claims that KML’s petition for certification election filed during the pendency of the petition for cancellation and its demand to enter into collective bargaining



agreement with LEGEND should be dismissed due to KML’s lack of legal personality.

Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, a certification election may be conducted during the pendency of the cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for certification was filed, the petitioning union is presumed to possess the legal personality to file the same. There is therefore no basis for LEGEND’s assertion that the cancellation of KML’s certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KML’s activities, including its filing of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.

2. NO. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding. Section 5, Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, which states as follows:

SEC. 5.[51] Effect of registration. – The labor organization or worker’s association shall be deemed registered and vested with legal personality on the date of issuance of its certificate of registration. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack but may be questioned only in a an independent petition for cancellation in accordance with these Rules.

COASTAL SUBIC BAY TERMINAL vs. DOLE

FACTSThere are two private respondents. First is the CBTSI – Rank and

File Union [RFU]. Second is the CBSTI – Supervisory Union [SU]. Both the RFU and the SU filed separate petitions for certification election before the Med-Arbiter of the Regional Office. RFU alleges that it is a legitimate labor

organization since it was chartered by the Associated Labor Union. On the other hand, SU alleges that it is also a legitimate labor organization since it was chartered by the Associated Prof, Supervisory, Office and Technical Employees Union.

Petitioner, the Employer of members of the RFU and SU, opposed the petitions for certification election contending that both are not legitimate labor organizations. The med-arbiter dismissed the petitions, without prejudice to their refilling. The med-arbiter ruled that the RFU and SU were in effect affiliated with only one federation because their mother federations are one and same because they had the same set of officers.

On appeal, the Sec. of Labor reversed and ruled that the RFU and SU have separate legal personalities and are legitimate labor organizations. The Sec. of Labor ruled that the mother federations are separate and distinct labor organizations having separate certificates of registration from the Dept. of Labor. The Sec of Labor thus ordered the conduct of certification elections for both the rank-and-file and the supervisory bargaining unit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Sec of Labor finding that there was no grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUEDo the unions have legal personality to file the petitions for

certification election? If so, is commingling of the officers of their federations relevant?

RULINGThe Supreme Court granted the Petition for certiorari and affirmed the

decision of the Med-Arbiter, whereby the RFU and SU may re-file the petitions for certification election once the prohibition on the RFU and SU joining one Federation is removed.

1. Once a labor union acquires attains the status of a legitimate labor organization, it continues as such until its certification is cancelled or revoked in an independent action for cancellation. The legal personality of a labor organization cannot be collaterally attacked.



Hence, the lack of legal personality of the labor organization cannot be alleged as a ground to oppose a petition for certification election since it partakes of a collateral attack.

2. However, the [old] Artilce 245 of the Labor Code prohibits supervisory employees from joining a rank and file union. This prohibition applies as well to a rank-and-file union and a supervisory union of the same company joining a federation. Here, the common set of officers of both federations to which the RFU and SU are affilitated is also a violation of the prohibition. Hence, as long as the RFU and SU are affiliated with their mother federations that have common officers, they do not meet the criteria to attain the status of a legitimate labor organization and thus cannot file petitions for certification election.

Note The case is decided prior to RA 9481 and under the amended Article 258-

A of the Labor Code, the employer is considered a bystander in a petition for certification election and is not entitled to oppose the petition. This is perhaps why this case is under “Reference” because it shows how the old rule worked, where the employer can oppose a petition for certification election and allege certain violations of the labor code, as in this case where the employer alleges commingling between the supervisory and the rank and file union in one federation.


Documents

Labor Review Digests 1