Paolo Labor Case Digests

8/13/2019 Paolo Labor Case Digests

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University of San Carlos – College of Law Labor Standards Finals Case Digests

M a . C e c e l i a T i m b a l L l B – 2 R m 4 0 2 | 1

ContentsContents .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 1

Philippine Bank of Communications vs NLRC (1986) G.R. L-66598 ....................................................................................... 3

Neri vs NLRC (1993) 224 SCRA 717 ............................................................................................................................................ 5

Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp., vs NLRC (1996) 257 SCRA 336 .............................................................................................. 6

Maraquinot vs NLRC (1998) 284 SCRA 539 ............................................................................................................................... 7

San Miguel vs Maerc Integrated Services (2003) G.R. 144627 .................................................................................................. 9

Manila Water Co., vs Pena (2004) G.R. 158255 ........................................................................................................................... 9

NHA vs Maceda Security Agency (2005) G.R. 163448 ........................................................................................................... 11

Abella vs PLDT (2005) G.R. 159469 ........................................................................................................................................... 11

San Miguel vs Aballa (2005) G.R. 149011 .................................................................................................................................. 13

Manila Electric Co., vs Benamira (2005) G.R. 145271 .............................................................................................................. 14

DOLE Philppines vs Esteva (2006) G.R. 161115 ....................................................................................................................... 15

San Miguel vs NLRC (2006) G.R. 147566 .................................................................................................................................. 19

Eparwa vs Liceo (2006) G.R. 150402 .......................................................................................................................................... 22

Escario vs NLRC (2000) G.R. 124055 ......................................................................................................................................... 24

Aboitiz vs Dimapatoi (2006) G.R. 148619 .................................................................................................................................. 28

GSIS vs NLRC (2006) G.R. 157647 ............................................................................................................................................. 32

Republic vs Asiapro Cooperative (2007) G.R. 172101 ............................................................................................................. 33

Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency vs Sales (2008) G.R. 162420 ................................................................................ 38

Almeda et al., vs Asahi Glass (2008) G.R. 177785 .................................................................................................................... 39

Sasan, Sr et al, vs NLRC and EPCIB (2008) G.R. 176240 ......................................................................................................... 41

Purefoods Corp., vs NLRC et al., (2008) G.R. 172241 .............................................................................................................. 45

Maranaw Hotels and Resort vs CA (2009) G.R. 149660 .......................................................................................................... 48

Cola-Cola Bottler’s Phils., vs Agito et al., (2009) G.R. 179546 ................................................................................................ 49

South Davao Development Co. vs Gamo (2009) G.R. 171814 ................................................................................................ 53

Jethro Intelligence & Security Corp., vs Secretary of DOLE (2009) G.R. 172537.................................................................. 55

Traveno et al., vs Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Coop et al., (2009) G.R. 164205 ......................................... 56

Aliviado vs Procter and Gamble Phils. Inc., et al (2010) G.R. 160506 .................................................................................... 56

DBP vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 108031 .............................................................................................................................................. 59

Batong Buhay Gold Mines vs Dela Serna (1999) G.R. 86963 .................................................................................................. 62

Barayoga vs Asset Privatization Trust (2005) G.R. 160073 ..................................................................................................... 65





Philippine Airlines vs Zamora (2007) G.R. 166996 .................................................................................................................. 69

Philippine Airlines vs Philippine Airlines Employees Association (2007) G.R. 142399 ..................................................... 70

Castillo vs Uniwide Warehouse Club (2010) G.R. 169725 ...................................................................................................... 71

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs NLRC (1989) G.R. 69746-47 .............................................................................................. 72

Traders Royal Bank Employees Union vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 120592 ................................................................................... 74

Brahm Industries vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118853 ........................................................................................................................ 78

Heirs of Aniban vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 155034 .......................................................................................................................... 79

Sapio vs Undaloc Construcion et al., (2008) G.R. 155034 ........................................................................................................ 80

Atty. Ortiz vs San Miguel Corp., (2008) G.R. 151983-84 ......................................................................................................... 81

Masmud vs NLRC (2009) G.R. 183385 ...................................................................................................................................... 84

Bernardo vs. NLRC (1999) G.R. 122917 ..................................................................................................................................... 85

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978 .................................................................................... 89

Del Monte Phils vs Velasco (2007) G.R. 153447 ........................................................................................................................ 90

Ultra Villa Food Haus vs, Geniston (1999) G.R. 120473 .......................................................................................................... 91

Remington Industrial Sales Corp,. vs Castaneda (2007) G.R. 153477 .................................................................................... 93

Tolosa vs NLRC (2008) G.R. 149578 .......................................................................................................................................... 98

Phil Global Communications Inc vs de Vera (2005) G.R. 157214 ......................................................................................... 100

U-Bix Corp. vs Bandiola (2007) G.R. 157168 ........................................................................................................................... 101

Escasinas et al., vs Shangri-la Mactan Island Resort et al., (2009) G.R. 178827 .................................................................. 107

ISS Indochina Corp., vs Ferrer (2005) G.R. 156381................................................................................................................. 110

People vs Capt. Gasacao (2005) G.R. 168449 .......................................................................................................................... 111

Acuña vs CA (2006) G.R. 159832 .............................................................................................................................................. 114

Asian International Manpower Services vs CA (2006) G.R. 169652 .................................................................................... 116

Sim vs. NLRC (2007) G.R. 157376 ............................................................................................................................................ 119

Bahia Shipping Services Inc., vs Chua (2008) G.R. 162195 ................................................................................................... 122

Masangcay vs Trans-Global Maritime Agency Inc., (2008) G.R. 172800............................................................................. 123

Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et al., vs Velasquez, et al., (2008) G.R. 179802 ....................................................................... 124

Serrano vs Gallant Maritime Services et al., (2009) G.R. 167614 .......................................................................................... 125

People vs Domingo (2009) G.R. 181475 ................................................................................................................................... 127

Great Southern – Maritime Services Corp vs Surigao (2009) G.R. 183646 .......................................................................... 128





Philippine Bank of Communications vs NLRC (1986) G.R. L-66598

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc. (CESI) entered into a letter

agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook to provide "Temporary Services" to petitioner

Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven (11) messengers. The contract period is described as being "from January 1976." The petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service rate of P18, " on a per person basis.

Ricardo Orpiada was thus assigned to work with the petitioner bank. As such, he rendered services to the bank,

within the premises of the bank and alongside other people also rendering services to the bank. There was some

question as to when Ricardo Orpiada commenced rendering services to the bank. On or about October 1976, the

petitioner requested (CESI) to withdraw Orpiada's assignment because, in the allegation of the bank, Orpiada's

services "were no longer needed."

Orpiada instituted a complaint in the Department of Labor against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and failure to

pay the 13th month pay provided for in Presidential Decree No. 851. The Office of the Regional Director, Regional

Office No. IV of the Department of Labor, issued an order dismissing Orpiada's complaint for failure of Mr. Orpiada

to show the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the bank and himself.

The Labor Arbiter Dogelio rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of complainant to the same or equivalent

position with full back wages and to pay the latter's 13th month pay for the year 1976.

On 26 October 1977, the bank appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the respondent NLRC. NLRC

promulgated its decision affirming the award of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUES:

1. What is the appropriate characterization of the relationship between the bank and (CESI)

2. Whether or not that relationship is one of employer and job (independent) contractor or one of employer

and "labor-only" contractor;

HELD: Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended) provides

as follows:

ART. 106. Contractor or sub-contractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the

performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be

paid in accordance with the provisions in this Code.

In the event that the contractor or sub-contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this

Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or sub-contructor to such employees to the

extent of the work performed under the contract in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly

employed by him

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect the

rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions

between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and

determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent

any violation or circumvention of any provisions of this Code.

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial

capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers

recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of

such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who

shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.





ART. 107. Indirect employer. The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person,

part, nership association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor for

the performance of any work, task, job or project. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the general rule set out in the first and second paragraphs of Article 106, an employer who enters into a

contract with a contractor for the performance of work for the employer, does not thereby create an employer-

employes relationship between himself and the employees of the contractor. Thus, the employees of the contractor

remain the contractor's employees and his alone. Nonetheless when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his

employees in accordance with the Labor Code, the employer who contracted out the job to the contractor becomes

jointly and severally liable with his contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent of the work performed

under the contract" as such employer were the employer of the contractor's employees. The law itself, in other words,

establishes an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a

limited purpose, i.e., in order to ensure that the latter get paid the wages due to them.

A similar situation obtains where there is "labor only" contracting. The "labor-only" contractor-i.e "the person or

intermediary" is considered "merely as an agent of the employer. " The employer is made by the statute responsible

to the employees of the "labor only" contractor as if such employees had been directly employed by the employer.

Thus, where "labor only" contracting exists in a given case, the statute itself implies or establishes an employer-

employee relationship between the employer (the owner of the project) and the employees of the "labor only"

contractor, this time for a comprehensive purpose: "employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or

circumvention of any provision of this Code. " The law in effect holds both the employer and the "labor-only"

contractor responsible to the latter's employees for the more effective safeguarding of the employees' rights under the

Labor Code.

Both the petitioner bank and (CESI) have insisted that (CESI) was not a "labor only" contractor. Section 9 of Rule VIII

of Book III entitled "Conditions of Employment," of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides as

follows:

Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shag be deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person:

(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and

other materials; and

(2) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are to the principal business or

operations of the c workers are habitually employed,

(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be

considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same

manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him

(c) For cases not file under this Article, the Secretary of Labor shall determine through appropriate orders whether or

not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of each case and after considering the

operating needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In such case, he may prescribe conditions

and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of the workers. (Emphasis supplied)

In contrast, job contracting-contracting out a particular job to an independent contractor is defined by the

Implementing Rules as follows:





Sec. 8. Job contracting. There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met:

(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under

his own responsibility according to his own manner and method free from the control and direction of his employer

or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and

(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,

and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business. (Emphasis supplied)

The definition of "labor-only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules must be read in

conjunction with the definition of job contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules.

CESI is not a parcel delivery company: as its name indicates, it is a recruitment and placement corporation placing

bodies, as it were, in different client companies for longer or shorter periods of time. There is, of course, nothing

illegal about hiring persons to carry out "a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which

was determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service to be performed is

seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season"

We hold that, in the circumstances 'instances of this case, (CESI) was engaged in "labor-only" or attracting vis-a-vis

the petitioner and in respect Ricardo Orpiada, and that consequently, the petitioner bank is liable to Orpiada as if

Orpiada had been directly, employed not only by (CESI) but also by the bank. It may well be that the bank may in

turn proceed against (CESI) to obtain reimbursement of, or some contribution to, the amounts which the bank will

have to pay to Orpiada; but this it is not necessary to determine here.

Neri vs NLRC (1993) 224 SCRA 717

FACTS:

Petitioners instituted complaints against FEBTC and BCC to compel the bank to accept them as regular employees

and for it to pay the differential between the wages being paid them by BCC and those received by FEBTC employees

with similar length of service. They contended that BCC in engaged in labor-only contracting because it failed to

adduce evidence purporting to show that it invested in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises

and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of its business. Moreover, petitioners argue that they perform

duties which are directly related to the principal business or operation of FEBTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not BCC was engaged in labor-only contracting.

HELD: It is well-settled that there is labor-only contracting where: (a) the person supplying workers to an employerdoes not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among

others; and, (b) the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related

to the principal business of the employer.

BCC need not prove that it made investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among

others, because it has established that it has sufficient capitalization. This fact was both determined by the Labor

Arbiter and the NLRC as BCC had a capital stock of P1 million fully subscribed and paid for. BCC is therefore a

highly capitalized venture and cannot be deemed engaged in labor-only contracting.





While there may be no evidence that it has investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises,

among others, it is enough that it has substantial capital, as was established before the Labor Arbiter as well as the

NLRC. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools, equipment,

machineries, etc. This is clear from the use of the conjunction "or" instead of ‚and‛. Having established that it has

substantial capital, it was no longer necessary for BCC to further adduce evidence to prove that it does not fall within

the purview of "labor-only" contracting. There is even no need for it to refute petitioners' contention that the activitiesthey perform are directly related to the principal business of respondent bank.

On the other hand, the Court has already taken judicial notice of the general practice adopted in several government

and private institutions and industries of hiring independent contractors to perform special services. These services

range from janitorial, security and even technical or other specific services such as those performed by petitioners

Neri and Cabelin. While these services may be considered directly related to the principal business of the employer,

nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of the principal business of the employer.

Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp., vs NLRC (1996) 257 SCRA 336

FACTS:

Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corporation (FILSYN), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of polyester

fiber, contracted with De Lima Trading and General Services (DE LIMA) for the performance of specific janitorial

services at the former's plant in Pursuant to the agreement Felipe Loterte, was deployed at FILSYN to take care of the

plants and maintain general cleanliness around the premises.

Loterte sued FILSYN and DE LIMA for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages, non-payment of legal holiday pay,

service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay alleging that he was first assigned to perform janitorial work at

FILSYN in 1981 by the La Saga General Services; that the La Saga was changed to DE LIMA on August 1991; that

when a movement to demand increased wages and 13th month pay arose among the workers, he was accused of

having posted in the bulletin board at FILSYN an article attributing to management a secret understanding to block

the demand; and, for denying responsibility, his gate pass was unceremoniously cancelled was subsequently

dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Lima is an independent job contractor.

HELD: Private respondent DE LIMA is an independent job contractor. Under the Labor Code, two (2) elements must

exist for a finding of labor-only contracting: (a) the person supplying workers to an employer does not have

substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and (b)

the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities directly related to the principal business

of such employer.

These two (2) elements do not exist in the instant case. As pointed out by petitioner, private respondent DE LIMA is a

going concern duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission with substantial capitalization of

P1,600,000.00, P400,000.00 of which is actually subscribed. 13 Hence, it cannot be considered as engaged in labor-only

contracting being a highly capitalized venture. 14 Moreover, while the janitorial services performed by Felipe Loterte

pursuant to the agreement between FILSYN and DE LIMA may be considered directly related to the principal

business of FILSYN which is the manufacture of polyester fiber, nevertheless, they are not necessary in its operation.

On the contrary, they are merely incidental thereto, as opposed to being integral, without which production and





company sales will not suffer. Judicial notice has already been taken of the general practice in private as well as in

government institutions and industries of hiring janitorial services on an independent contractor basis. Consequently,

DE LIMA being an independent job contractor, no direct employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner

FILSYN and private respondent Felipe Loterte.

With respect to its liability, however, petitioner cannot totally exculpate itself from the fact that respondent DE LIMA

is an independent job contractor. Notwithstanding the lack of a direct employer-employee relationship between

FILSYN and Felipe Loterte, the former is still jointly and severally liable with respondent DE LIMA for Loterte's

monetary claims under Art. 109 of the Labor Code explicitly provides ‚every employer or indirect employer shall be

Decision responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any provision of this Code. For

purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be considered as direct

employers.‛

Maraquinot vs NLRC (1998) 284 SCRA 539

FACTS:

Petitioner Alejandro Maraguinot, Jr. maintains that private respondents employed him as part of the filming crew

with a salary of P375.00 per week. About four months later, he was designated Assistant Electrician with a weekly

salary of P400.00, which was increased to P450.00. He was promoted to the rank of Electrician with a weekly salary of

P475.00, which was increased to P539.00.

Petitioner Paulino Enero, on his part, claims that private respondents employed him in as a member of the shooting

crew with a weekly salary of P375.00, which was increased to P425.00 then to P475.00.

Petitioners' tasks consisted of loading, unloading and arranging movie equipment in the shooting area as instructed

by the cameraman, returning the equipment to Viva Films' warehouse, assisting in the "fixing" of the lighting system,

and performing other tasks that the cameraman and/or director may assign.

Petitioners sought the assistance of their supervisors, Mrs. Alejandria Cesario, to facilitate their request that private

respondents adjust their salary in accordance with the minimum wage law. In June 1992, Mrs. Cesario informed

petitioners that Mr. Vic del Rosario would agree to increase their salary only if they signed a blank employment

contract. As petitioners refused to sign, private respondents forced Enero to go on leave in then refused to take him

back when he reported for work. Meanwhile, Maraguinot was dropped from the company payroll from 8 to 21 June

1992, but was returned on 22 June 1992. He was again asked to sign a blank employment contract, and when he still

refused, private respondents terminated his services on 20 July 1992. Petitioners thus sued for illegal dismissal.

On the other hand, private respondents assert that they contract persons called "producers" also referred to as

"associate producers" 8 to "produce" or make movies for private respondents; and contend that petitioners are

project employees of the association producers who, in turn, act as independent contractors. As such, there is no

employer-employee relationship between petitioners and private respondents.

ISSUE: WON an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and private respondents or any one of

private respondents.

HELD: Assuming that the associate producers are job contractors, they must then be engaged in the business of

making motion pictures. As such, and to be a job contractor under the preceding description, associate producers





must have tools, equipment, machinery, work premises, and other materials necessary to make motion pictures.

However, the associate producers here have none of these. Private respondents' evidence reveals that the movie-

making equipment are supplied to the producers and owned by VIVA. These include generators, cables and wooden

platforms, cameras and "shooting equipment;" in fact, VIVA likewise owns the trucks used to transport the

equipment. It is thus clear that the associate producer merely leases the equipment from VIVA.

If private respondents insist that the associate producers are labor contractors, then these producers can only be

"labor-only" contractors. As labor-only contracting is prohibited, the law considers the person or entity engaged in

the same a mere agent or intermediary of the direct employer. But even by the preceding standards, the associate

producers of VIVA cannot be considered labor-only contractors as they did not supply, recruit nor hire the workers.

In the instant case, it was Juanita Cesario, Shooting Unit Supervisor and an employee of VIVA, who recruited crew

members from an "available group of free-lance workers which includes the complainants Maraguinot and Enero." 24

And in their Memorandum, private respondents declared that the associate producer "hires the services of . . . 6)

camera crew which includes (a) cameraman; (b) the utility crew; (c) the technical staff; (d) generator man and

electrician; (e) clapper; etc. . . . ." 25 This clearly showed that the associate producers did not supply the workers

required by the movie project.

The relationship between VIVA and its producers or associate producers seems to be that of agency, as the latter

make movies on behalf of VIVA, whose business is to "make" movies. As such, the employment relationship between

petitioners and producers is actually one between petitioners and VIVA, with the latter being the direct employer.

The employer-employee relationship between petitioners and VIVA can further be established by the "control test."

These four elements are present here.

VIVA's control is evident in its mandate that the end result must be a "quality film acceptable to the company." The

means and methods to accomplish the result are likewise controlled by VIVA, viz., the movie project must be

finished within schedule without exceeding the budget, and additional expenses must be justified; certain scenes are

subject to change to suit the taste of the company; and the Supervising Producer, the "eyes and ears" of VIVA and del

Rosario, intervenes in the movie-making process by assisting the associate producer in solving problems encounteredin making the film.

It may not be validly argued then that petitioners are actually subject to the movie director's control, and not VIVA's

direction. The director merely instructs petitioners on how to better comply with VIVA's requirements to ensure that

a quality film is completed within schedule and without exceeding the budget. At bottom, the director is akin to a

supervisor who merely oversees the activities of rank-and-file employees with control ultimately resting on the

employer.

Moreover, appointment slips 28 issued to all crew members state: During the term of this appointment you shall

comply with the duties and responsibilities of your position as well as observe the rules and regulations promulgated

by your superiors and by Top Management.

The words "supervisors" and "Top Management" can only refer to the "supervisors" and "Top Management" of VIVA.

By commanding crew members to observe the rules and regulations promulgated by VIVA, the appointment slips

only emphasize VIVA's control over petitioners.

Aside from control, the element of selection and engagement is likewise present in the instant case and exercised by

VIVA. Notably, nowhere in the appointment slip does it appear that it was the producer or associate producer who

hired the crew members; moreover, it is VIVA's corporate name which appears on the heading of the appointment





slip. What likewise tells against VIVA is that it paid petitioners' salaries as evidenced by vouchers, containing VIVA's

letterhead, for that purpose. All the circumstances indicate an employment relationship between petitioners and

VIVA alone, thus the inevitable conclusion is that petitioners are employees only of VIVA.

San Miguel vs Maerc Integrated Services (2003) G.R. 144627

FACTS:

In a decision by the court, it Decision petitioner jointly and severally liable with MAERC for the payment of

separation benefits and wage differential of 291 complainants. Petitioner reiterated that no employer- employee

relationship exists between it and the complainants. And that MAERC is an independent contractor hence petitioner

should not be Decision solidarily liable with it. It disputes this court’s finding that MAERC solely engaged the

services of complainants and exercised control over the complainants conduct; that no intervention or influence

could have been extended by it in the selection or hiring of complainants or the majority of them had worked to the

petitioner before it signed a contract with MAERC.

ISSUE: WON employer- employee relationship exists between the parties.

HELD: Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. While the continuity of service rendered by the workers to petitioner

by itself does not signify an employer- employee relationship, it was Decision to be so considering the other

circumstances present. More so, since the workers continued to work for petitioner without break from their former

employer and then as employees of MAERC even before the latter was incorporated. The record adequately supports

the fact that MAERC admitted recruiting workers for petitioner before its incorporation.

Most importantly, petitioner refutes this Court’s conclusion that petitioner exercised control over the workplace. It

stresses that checkers assigned to the workplace did not stay there continuously to merit the conclusion that they

maintained constant presence as Decision by the court.

We disagree. While petitioner’s checkers may not have stayed the full eight hours in the workplace because they had

to leave for their office to make their reports, their attendance need not be continuous to be considered constant and

therefore an indication of control. We find in fact that they maintained sufficient presence at the workplace to be able

to pinpoint the workers whose performance was not at par and to report who they are.

Manila Water Co., vs Pena (2004) G.R. 158255

FACTS:

Petitioner Manila Water Company, Inc. is one of the two private concessionaires contracted by the MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) to manage the water distribution system in the East Zone of Metro

Manila. Under the Concession Agreement, petitioner undertook to absorb former employees of the MWSS whose

names and positions were in the list furnished by the latter, while the employment of those not in the list was

terminated. Private respondents, being contractual collectors of the MWSS, were among the 121 employees not

included in the list; nevertheless, petitioner engaged their services without written contract for three months. Before

the end of the three-month contract, the 121 collectors incorporated the Association Collectors Group, Inc. (ACGI),

which was contracted by petitioner to collect charges for the Balara Branch. Subsequently, most of the 121 collectors





were asked by the petitioner to transfer to the First Classic Courier Services, a newly registered corporation. Only

private respondents remained with ACGI. Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money

claims against petitioner, contending that they were petitioner’s employees as all the methods and procedures of

their collections were controlled by the latter.

Petitioner on the other hand asserts that private respondents were employees of ACGI, an independent contractor. It

maintained that it had no control and supervision over private respondents’ manner of performing their work except

as to the results. Thus, petitioner did not have an employer-employee relationship with the private respondents, but

only a service contractor-client relationship with ACGI.

ISSUE: Whether or not ACGI is an independent contractor;

HELD: ACGI is an independent contractor but a labor- only contractor.

First, ACGI does not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work

premises, and other materials, to qualify as an independent contractor. While it has an authorized capital stock of

P1,000,000.00, only P62,500.00 is actually paid-in, which cannot be considered substantial capitalization. The 121

collectors subscribed to four shares each and paid only the amount of P625.00 in order to comply with the

incorporation requirements. Further, private respondents reported daily to the branch office of the petitioner because

ACGI has no office or work premises. In fact, the corporate address of ACGI was the residence of its president, Mr.

Herminio D. Peña. Moreover, in dealing with the consumers, private respondents used the receipts and identification

cards issued by petitioner.

Second, the work of the private respondents was directly related to the principal business or operation of the

petitioner. Being in the business of providing water to the consumers in the East Zone, the collection of the charges

therefore by private respondents for the petitioner can only be categorized as clearly related to, and in the pursuit of

the latter’s business. Lastly, ACGI did not carry on an independent bus iness or undertake the performance of its

service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal,

petitioner. Prior to private respondents’ alleged employment with ACGI, they were already working for petitioner,

subject to its rules and regulations in regard to the manner and method of performing their tasks. This form of

control and supervision never changed although they were already under the seeming employ of ACGI. Petitioner

issued memoranda regarding the billing methods and distribution of books to the collectors; it required private

respondents to report daily and to remit their collections on the same day to the branch office or to deposit them with

Bank of the Philippine Islands; it monitored strictly their attendance as when a collector cannot perform his daily

collection, he must notify petitioner or the branch office in the morning of the day that he will be absent; and

although it was ACGI which ultimately disciplined private respondents, the penalty to be imposed was dictated by

petitioner as shown in the letters it sent to ACGI specifying the penalties to be meted on the erring private

respondents. These are indications that ACGI was not left alone in the supervision and control of its alleged

employees. Consequently, it can be concluded that ACGI was not an independent contractor since it did not carry a

distinct business free from the control and supervision of petitioner.

Under this factual milieu, there is no doubt that ACGI was engaged in labor-only contracting, and as such, is

considered merely an agent of the petitioner. In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee

relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered

merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor

as if such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since ACGI is only a labor-only

contractor, the workers it supplied should be considered as employees of the petitioner.





NHA vs Maceda Security Agency (2005) G.R. 163448

FACTS:

On September 17, 1996, respondent MASADA Security Agency entered into a 1-year contract to provide security

services to the various offices and installations of NFA. Upon expiration of said contract, the parties extended the

effectivity thereof on a monthly basis under same terms. Subsequently, the RTWPB issued several wage orders

increasing the daily wage rate. Accordingly, respondent requested NFA for a corresponding upward adjustment in

the monthly contract rate consisting of the increases in the daily minimum wage of the security guards as well as

increases in their overtime pay, holiday pay and rest day pay. It also claimed SSS and Pag- ibig Premiums. NFA

however granted only with respect to the increase in the daily wage by multiplying the amount of the mandated

increase by 30 days and denied the others. Respondent now filed a case with the RTC for recovery of sum of money

against NFA, seeking reimbursement for the other wage- related benefits. NFA however denied that respondent paid

the security guards their wage related benefits and that respondent cannot demand an adjustment on said- related

benefits because it is bound by their contract expressly limiting NFA’s obligation to pay onlY the increment in their

daily wage.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not respondent is entitled to recover from NFA the wage related benefits of the security guards;

(2) Whether or not respondent the liability of the principals in service contracts under Section 6 of RA 6727 and

the wage orders issued by the RTWPB is limited only to the increment in the minimum wage;

HELD: Payment of the increases in the wage rate of workers is ordinarily shouldered by the employer. RA 6727

Section 6 however expressly lodged said obligation to the principals or indirect employers in construction projects

and estalblishments providing security, janitorial and similar services , the prescribed increases in the wage rates of

the workers shall be borne by the principals or clients of the service contractors and the contract shall be deemed

amended accordingly.

The term wage in RA 6727 pertained to no other than the statutory minimum which is defined as the lowest wage

rate fixed by law other than an employer can pay his worker. The presumption is that lawmakers are aware that ‚

wage‛ means the statutory minimum wage. If their intention was to extend the obligation of the principals in service

contracts to the payment of the increment in the other benefits and remuneration of workers, it would be expressly

specified.

At any rate, however, the interest of the employees will not be adversely affected if the obligation of the principals

under the subject provision will be limited to the increase in the statutory minimum wage. This is so because all

remuneration and benefits other than the increased statutory minimum wage should be shouldered and paid by the

employer or service contractor to the workers concerned. Having discharged its obligation to the respondent, NFA

no longer has the cause of action. The latter’s complaint for collection of remuneration and benefits other than the

increased minimum wage rate should therefore be dismissed.

Abella vs PLDT (2005) G.R. 159469

Facts:





Respondent People’s Security Incorporated entered into an agreement with the PLDT to provide the latter with such

number of qualified uniformed and properly armed security guards for the purpose of guarding and protecting

PLDT’s installations and properties from theft, pilferage, intentional damage, trespass or other unlawful acts. Under

the agreement, it was expressly provided that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the PLDT

and the security guards, which may be supplied to it by PSI, and that the latter shall have the entire charge, control

and supervision over the work and services of the supplied security guards. It was likewise stipulated therein thatPSI shall also have the exclusive authority to select, engage, and discharge its security guards, with full control over

their wages, salaries or compensation.

Consequently, respondent PSI deployed security guards to the PLDT. The sixty-five (65) security guards supplied by

respondent PSI filed a Complaint for regularization against the PLDT alleging that petitioner security guards have

been employed by the company through the years and that PSI acted as the middleman in the payment of the

minimum pay to the security guards, but no premium for work rendered beyond eight hours was paid to them nor

were they paid their 13th month pay. In sum, the Complaint states that inasmuch as the complainants are under the

direct control and supervision of PLDT. Hence they should be considered as regular employees by the latter.

Issue: WON an employer- employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent PLDT.

Held: We considered the following factors in considering the existence of an employer-employee relationship: (1) the

selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power to dismiss; and (4) the power to

control the employee’s conduct.

Testimonies during the trial reveal that interviews and evaluation were conducted by PLDT to ensure that the

standards it set are met by the security guards. In fact, PLDT rarely failed to accept security guards referred to by PSI

but on account of height deficiency. The referral is nothing but for possible assignment in a designated client which

has the inherent prerogative to accept and reject the assignee for justifiable grounds or even arbitrarily. We are thus

convinced that the employer-employee relationship is deemed perfected even before the posting of the complainants

with the PLDT, as assignment only comes after employment.

PSI is a legitimate job contractor pursuant to Section 8, Rule VII, Book II of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the

Labor Code. It is a registered corporation duly licensed by the Philippine National Police to engage in security

business. It has substantial capital and investment in the form of guns, ammunitions, communication equipments,

vehicles, office equipments like computer, typewriters, photocopying machines, etc., and above all, it is servicing

clients other than PLDT like PCIBank, Crown Triumph, and Philippine Cable, among others. Here, the security

guards which PSI had assigned to PLDT are already the former’s employees prior to assignment and if the assigned

guards to PLDT are rejected by PLDT for reasons germane to the security agreement, then the rejected or terminated

guard may still be assigned to other clients of PSI as in the case of Jonathan Daguno who was posted at PLDT on 21

February 1996 but was subsequently relieved therefrom and assigned at PCIBank Makati Square effective 10 May

1996. Therefore, the evidence as it stands is at odds with petitioners’ assertion that PSI is an ‚in-house‛ agency of

PLDT so as to call for a piercing of veil of corporate identity

It is PSI that determined and paid the petitioners’ wages, salaries, and compensation. As elucidated by the Labor

Arbiter, petitioners’ witness testified that his wages were collected and withdrawn at the office of PSI and PLDT pays

PSI for the security services on a lump-sum basis and that the wages of complainants are only a portion of the total

sum. The signature of the PLDT supervisor in the Daily Time Records does not ipso facto make PLDT the employer

of complainants inasmuch as the Labor Arbiter had found that the record is replete with evidence showing that some

of the Daily Time Records do not bear the signature of a PLDT supervisor yet no complaint was lodged for

nonpayment of the guard’s wages evidencing that the signature of the PLDT’s supervisor is not a condition





precedent for the payment of wages of the guards. Notably, it was not disputed that complainants enjoy the benefits

and incentives of employees of PSI and that they are reported as employees of PSI with the SSS.

Lastly, petitioners capitalize on the delinquency reports prepared by PLDT personnel against some of the security

guards as well as certificates of participation in civil disturbance course, certificates of attendance in first aid training,

certificate of completion in fire brigade training seminar and certificate of completion on restricted land mobile radio

telephone operation to show that the petitioners are under the direct control and supervision of PLDT and that the

latter has, in fact, the power to dismiss them.

The Labor Arbiter found from the evidence that the delinquency reports were nothing but reminders of the

infractions committed by the petitioners while on duty which serve as basis for PLDT to recommend the termination

of the concerned security guard from PLDT. As already adverted to earlier, termination of services from PLDT did

not ipso facto mean dismissal from PSI inasmuch as some of those pulled out from PLDT were merely detailed at the

other clients of PSI as in the case of Jonathan Daguno, who was merely transferred to PCIBank Makati.

San Miguel vs Aballa (2005) G.R. 149011

Facts:

Petitioner San Miguel Corporation entered into a one-year contract with the Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative.

Sunflower undertook and agreed to perform and provide the company on a non exclusive basis for a period of one

year the following: Messengerial, Janitorial, Shrimp harvesting and Sanitation. Pursuant to the contract, Sunflower

engaged private respondents to render services at SMC’s Bacolod Shrimp Processing Plant. The contract was

renewed and private respondentd continued to perform their tasks. Later, private respondents filed a complaint

praying to be declared as regular employees of SMC, with claims of recovery of all benefits and privileges.

Issue: Whether or not Sunflower is engaged in labor only contracting.

Held: The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an

independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the

control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work.

In legitimate labor contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship for a limited purpose, i.e., to

ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The principal employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the

job contractor, only for the payment of the employees’ wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other

than that, the principal employer is not responsible for any claim made by the employees.

In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to

prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and

the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been directly

employed by the principal employer.

The following would show that sunflower is engaged in labor only contracting: What appears is that Sunflower does

not have substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and

other materials to qualify it as an independent contractor. It is gathered that the lot, building, machineries and all

other working tools utilized by private respondents in carrying out their tasks were owned and provided by SMC.





Sunflower, during the existence of its service contract with respondent SMC, did not own a single machinery,

equipment, or working tool used in the processing plant. Everything was owned and provided by respondent SMC.

The lot, the building, and working facilities are owned by respondent SMC.

And from the job description provided by SMC itself, the work assigned to private respondents was directly related

to the aquaculture operations of SMC. Undoubtedly, the nature of the work performed by private respondents in

shrimp harvesting, receiving and packing formed an integral part of the shrimp processing operations of SMC. As

for janitorial and messengerial services, that they are considered directly related to the principal business of the

employer has been jurisprudentially recognized. Furthermore, Sunflower did not carry on an independent business

or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control

and supervision of its principal, SMC, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for SMC.

Therefore since Sunflower is labor only contracting, there is the existence of an employer- employee relationship

between SMC and private respondents.

Manila Electric Co., vs Benamira (2005) G.R. 145271

Facts:

The individual respondents are licensed security guards formerly employed by People’s Security, Inc. and deployed

as such at MERALCO’s head office. The security service agreement between PSI and MERALCO was terminated.

Thereafter, 56 of PSI’s security guards, including herein eight individual respondents, filed a complaint for unpaid

monetary benefits against PSI and MERALCO. Meanwhile, the security service agreement between respondent

Armed Security & Detective Agency, Inc., (ASDAI) and MERALCO took effect. Subsequently, the individual

respondents were absorbed by ASDAI and retained at MERALCO’s head office. Later, the security service agreement

between respondent Advance Forces Security & Investigation Services, Inc. (AFSISI) and MERALCO took effect,

terminating the previous security service agreement with ASDAI. The individual respondents amended their

complaint to implead AFSISI as party respondent.

Issue: Whether or not the individual respondents are employees of MERALCO.

Held: No. In this case, the terms and conditions embodied in the security service agreement between MERALCO and

ASDAI expressly recognized ASDAI as the employer of individual respondents. Under the security service

agreement, it was ASDAI which (a) selected, engaged or hired and discharged the security guards; (b) assigned them

to MERALCO according to the number agreed upon; (c) provided the uniform, firearms and ammunition,

nightsticks, flashlights, raincoats and other paraphernalia of the security guards; (d) paid them salaries or wages;

and, (e) disciplined and supervised them or principally controlled their conduct. The agreement even explicitly

provided that ‚*n+othing herein contained shall be understood to make the security guards under this Agreement,

employees of the COMPANY, it being clearly understood that such security guards shall be considered as they are,

employees of the AGENCY alone.‛ Clearly, the individual respondents are the employees of ASDAI.

Neither is the stipulation that the agency cannot pull out any security guard from MERALCO without its consent an

indication of control. It is simply a security clause designed to prevent the agency from unilaterally removing its

security guards from their assigned posts at MERALCO’s premises to the latter’s detriment.





The clause that MERALCO has the right at all times to inspect the guards of the agency detailed in its premises is

likewise not indicative of control as it is not a unilateral right. The agreement provides that the agency is principally

mandated to conduct inspections, without prejudice to MERALCO’s right to conduct its own inspections.

Moreover, ASDAI and AFSISI are not ‚labor-only‛ contractors. There is ‚labor only‛ contract when the person

acting as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the

workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him. On the other

hand, ‚job (independent) contracting‛ is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the contractor carr ies on an

independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under his own responsibility according

to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters

connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital

or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary

in the conduct of his business. Given the above distinction and the provisions of the security service agreements

entered into by petitioner with ASDAI and AFSISI, we are convinced that ASDAI and AFSISI were engaged in job

contracting.

The individual respondents can not be considered as regular employees of the MERALCO for, although security

services are necessary and desirable to the business of MERALCO, it is not directly related to its principal business

and may even be considered unnecessary in the conduct of MERALCO’s principal business, which is the distribution

of electricity.

Furthermore, the fact that the individual respondents filed their claim for unpaid monetary benefits against ASDAI is

a clear indication that the individual respondents acknowledge that ASDAI is their employer.

The fact that there is no actual and direct employer-employee relationship between MERALCO and the individual

respondents does not exonerate MERALCO from liability as to the monetary claims of the individual respondents.

When MERALCO contracted for security services with ASDAI as the security agency that hired individual

respondents to work as guards for it, MERALCO became an indirect employer of individual respondents pursuant to

Article 107 of the Labor Code.

DOLE Philppines vs Esteva (2006) G.R. 161115

Facts:

Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with Philippine laws, engaged principally in

the production and processing of pineapple for the export market. Its plantation is located in Polomolok, South

Cotabato.

Respondents are members of the Cannery Multi-Purpose Cooperative (CAMPCO). CAMPCO was organized in

accordance with Republic Act No. 6938, otherwise known as the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, and duly-

registered with the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) on 6 January 1993. Members of CAMPCO live in

communities surrounding petitioner's plantation and are relatives of petitioner's employees. On 17 August 1993,

petitioner and CAMPCO entered into a Service Contract. The Service Contract referred to petitioner as "the

Company," while CAMPCO was "the Contractor."

Pursuant to the foregoing Service Contract, CAMPCO members rendered services to petitioner. The number of

CAMPCO members that report for work and the type of service they performed depended on the needs of petitioner





at any given time. Although the Service Contract specifically stated that it shall only be for a period of six months,

i.e., from 1 July to 31 December 1993, the parties had apparently extended or renewed the same for the succeeding

years without executing another written contract. It was under these circumstances that respondents came to work

for petitioner.

The Task Force submitted a report on 3 June 1993 identifying six cooperatives that were engaged in labor-only

contracting, one of which was CAMPCO. The DOLE Regional Office No. XI held a conference on 18 August 1993

wherein the representatives of the cooperatives named by the Task Force were given the opportunity to explain the

nature of their activities in relation to petitioner. On 19 October 1993, Director Parel of DOLE Regional Office No. XI

issued an Order, directing the cooperatives to cease and desist from engaging in labor-only contracting.

On 15 September 1994, DOLE Undersecretary Cresencio B. Trajano, by the authority of the DOLE Secretary, issued an

Order dismissing the appeal of the Cooperatives.

Respondents started working for petitioner at various times in the years 1993 and 1994, by virtue of the Service

Contract executed between CAMPCO and petitioner. All of the respondents had already rendered more than one

year of service to petitioner. While some of the respondents were still working for petitioner, others were put on "stay

home status" on varying dates in the years 1994, 1995, and 1996 and were no longer furnished with work thereafter.Together, respondents filed a Complaint, on 19 December 1996, with the National Labor Relations Commission

(NLRC), for illegal dismissal, regularization, wage differentials, damages and attorney's fees.

Respondents thus argued that they should be considered regular employees of petitioner given that: (1) they were

performing jobs that were usually necessary and desirable in the usual business of petitioner; (2) petitioner exercised

control over respondents, not only as to the results, but also as to the manner by which they performed their assigned

tasks; and (3) CAMPCO, a labor-only contractor, was merely a conduit of petitioner. As regular employees of

petitioner, respondents asserted that they were entitled to security of tenure and those placed on "stay home status"

for more than six months had been constructively and illegally dismissed. Respondents further claimed entitlement

to wage differential, moral damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioner, in its Position Paper filed before the NLRC, denied that respondents were its employees.

Petitioner explained that it found the need to engage external services to augment its regular workforce, which was

affected by peaks in operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and excessive leaves. It used to engage the services of

individual workers for definite periods specified in their employment contracts and never exceeding one year.

However, such an arrangement became the subject of a labor case, in which petitioner was accused of preventing the

regularization of such workers. The Labor Arbiter who heard the case, rendered his Decision 18 on 24 June 1994

declaring that these workers fell squarely within the concept of seasonal workers as envisaged by Article 280 of the

Labor Code, as amended, who were hired by petitioner in good faith and in consonance with sound business

practice; and consequently, dismissing the complaint against petitioner.

The NLRC, in its Resolution, 19 dated 14 March 1995, affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's Decision and further foundthat the workers were validly and legally engaged by petitioner for "term employment," wherein the parties agreed

to a fixed period of employment, knowingly and voluntarily, without any force, duress or improper pressure being

brought to bear upon the employees and absent any other circumstance vitiating their consent. The said NLRC

Resolution became final and executory on 18 June 1996. Despite the favorable ruling of both the Labor Arbiter and

the NLRC, petitioner decided to discontinue such employment arrangement. Yet, the problem of petitioner as to

shortage of workforce due to the peaks in operation, work backlogs, absenteeism, and excessive leaves, persisted.





Petitioner then found a solution in the engagement of cooperatives such as CAMPCO to provide the necessary

additional services.

Petitioner contended that respondents were owners-members of CAMPCO; that CAMPCO was a duly-organized

and registered cooperative which had already grown into a multi-million enterprise; that CAMPCO was engaged in

legitimate job-contracting with its own owners-members rendering the contract work; that under the express terms

and conditions of the Service Contract executed between petitioner (the principal) and CAMPCO (the contractor), the

latter shall undertake the contract work on its own account, under its own responsibility, and according to its own

manner and method free from the control and direction of the petitioner in all matters connected with the

performance of the work, except as to the result thereof; and since CAMPCO held itself out to petitioner as a

legitimate job contractor, respondents, as owners-members of CAMPCO, were estopped from denying or refuting the

same.

Petitioner further averred that Department Order No. 10, amending the rules implementing Books III and VI of the

Labor Code, as amended, promulgated by the DOLE on 30 May 1997, explicitly recognized the arrangement between

petitioner and CAMPCO as permissible contracting and subcontracting.

The LA and the NLRC decided the case in favor of the Petitioner Company and against the complaint of the privaterespondents (employees). On appeal by certiorari, the CA reversed the rulings of the LA and NLRC. Thus, the

petitioner Company appealed to the SC for Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the revised Rules of

Civil Procedure, questioning the decision of the Court of Appeals concerning the herein assailed issues.

Issues:

1. Whether or not department order no. 10, series of 1997 is the applicable regulation in this case. Whether or

not there should be a retroactive application to department order no. 3, series of 2001.

2. Whether or not its retroactive application violated the constitutional provision against impairment of

contracts and deprived petitioner of the due process of the law.

Held: The second assignment of error delves into the significance and application to the case at bar of the two

department orders issued by DOLE. Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, amended the implementing rules of

Books III and VI of the Labor Code, as amended. Under this particular DOLE department order, the arrangement

between petitioner and CAMPCO would qualify as permissible contracting. Department Order No. 3, series of 2001,

revoked Department Order No. 10, series of 1997, and reiterated the prohibition on labor-only contracting.

Attention is called to the fact that the acts complained of by the respondents occurred well before the issuance of the

two DOLE department orders in 1997 and 2001. The Service Contract between DOLE and CAMPCO was executed on

17 August 1993. Respondents started working for petitioner sometime in 1993 and 1994. While some of them

continued to work for petitioner, at least until the filing of the Complaint, others were put on "stay home status" at

various times in 1994, 1995, and 1996. Respondents filed their Complaint with the NLRC on 19 December 1996.

A basic rule observed in this jurisdiction is that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given

retrospective effect unless explicitly stated. Since there is no provision at all in the DOLE department orders that

expressly allowed their retroactive application, then the general rule should be followed, and the said orders should

be applied only prospectively.





Which now brings this Court to the question as to what was the prevailing rule on labor-only contracting from 1993

to 1996, the period when the occurrences subject of the Complaint before the NLRC took place.

Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, permits legitimate job contracting, but prohibits labor-only contracting.

The said provision reads —

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person

for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any,

shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code,

the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent

of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly

employed by him.





any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.



recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of



To implement the foregoing provision of the Labor Code, as amended, Sections 8 and 9, Rule VIII, Book III of the

implementing rules, in force since 1976 and prior to their amendment by DOLE Department Order No. 10, series of

1997, provided as follows —

Sec. 8. Job contracting. — There is job contracting permissible under the Code if the following conditions are met;

(1) The contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account

under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his

employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof; and

(2) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work

premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

Sec. 9. Labor-only contracting. — (a) Any person who undertakes to supply workers to an employer shall be

deemed to be engaged in labor-only contracting where such person:

(1) Does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises

and other materials; and

(2) The workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the

principal business or operations of the employer in which workers are habitually employed.





(b) Labor-only contracting as defined herein is hereby prohibited and the person acting as contractor shall be

considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same

manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

(c) For cases not falling under this Article, the Secretary of Labor shall determine through appropriate orders

whether or not the contracting out of labor is permissible in the light of the circumstances of each case and after

considering the operating needs of the employer and the rights of the workers involved. In such case, he may

prescribe conditions and restrictions to insure the protection and welfare of the workers.

Since these statutory and regulatory provisions were the ones in force during the years in question, then it was in

consideration of the same that DOLE Regional Director Parel and DOLE Undersecretary Trajano issued their Orders

on 19 September 1993 and 15 September 1994, respectively, both finding that CAMPCO was engaged in labor-only

contracting. Petitioner, in its third assignment of error, questions the weight that the Court of Appeals gave these

orders in its Decision, dated 20 May 2002, and Amended Decision, dated 27 November 2003.

San Miguel vs NLRC (2006) G.R. 147566

Facts:

On 16 October 1990, Rafael M. Maliksi filed a complaint against the San Miguel Corporation-Magnolia Division,

herein referred to as SMC and Philippine Software Services and Education Center herein referred to as PHILSSEC to

compel the said respondents to recognize him as a regular employee. He amended the complaint on 12 November

1990 to include the charge of illegal dismissal because his services were terminated on 31 October 1990.

The complainant's employment record indicates that he rendered service with Lipercon Services from 1 April 1981 to

February 1982 as budget head assigned to SMC-Beer Division, then from July 1983 to April 1985 with Skillpower,

Inc., as accounting clerk assigned to SMC-Magnolia Division, then from October 1988 to 1989 also with Skillpower,

Inc. as acting clerk assigned to SMC-Magnolia Finance, and from October 1989 to 31 October 1990 with PHILSSEC

assigned to Magnolia Finance as accounting clerk. The complainant considered himself as an employee of SMC-

Magnolia. Lipercon Services, Skillpower, Inc. and PHILSSEC are labor-only contractors and any one of which had

never been his employer. His dismissal, according to him, was in retaliation for his filing of the complaint for

regularization in service. His dismissal was illegal there being no just cause for the action. He was not accorded due

process neither was his dismissal reported to the Department of Labor and Employment.

PHILSSEC disclaimed liability. As an entity catering (sic) computer systems and program for business enterprises, it

has contracted with SMC-Magnolia to computerize the latter's manual accounting reporting systems of its provincial

sales. PHILSSEC then conducted a three phase analysis of SMC-Magnolia set up: first the computer needs of the firm

was (sic) determined; then, the development of computer systems or program suitable; and, finally, set up the

systems and train the employees to operate the same. In all these phases, PHILSSEC uses its computer system andtechnology and provided the necessary manpower to compliment the transfer of the technology to SMC-Magnolia.

Complainant Maliksi was one of those employed by PHILSSEC whose principal function was the manual control of

data needed during the computerization. Like all assigned to the project, the complainant's work was controlled by

PHILSSEC supervisors, his salary paid by the agency and he reported directly to PHILSSEC. The computerization

project was completed on 31 October 1990, and so, the complainant was terminated on the said date.





SMC, on the other hand, submitted its position. In the contract SMC entered with PHILSSEC, the latter undertook to

set up the computerization of the provincial sales reporting system of Magnolia Division. To carry out the task,

PHILSSEC utilized 3 computer programmers and the rest were data encoders. The complainant being one of the

compliments (sic) performed the following functions.

SMC likewise contends that PHILSSEC exercised exclusive managerial prerogative over the complainant as to hiring,

payment of salary, dismissal and most importantly, the control over his work. SMC was interested only in the result

of the work specified in the contract but not as to the means and methods of accomplishing the same. Moreover,

PHILSSEC has substantial capital of its own. It has an IBM system, 3 computers, 17 IBM or IBM-compatible

computers; it has a building where the computer training center and main office are located. What it markets to

clients are computer programs and training systems on computer technology and not the usual labor or manpower

supply to establishment concerns. Moreover, what PHILSSEC set up employing the complainant, among others, has

no relation to the principal business of SMC, which is food and beverage. It was a single relationship between the

people utilized by PHILSSEC and SMC. . .

Issue: Whether or not private respondent Maliksi is an employee of SMC?

Held: Yes. SMC concedes that Maliksi, before his employment with PHILSSEC, worked in SMC from November 1988to April 1990, but as employee of Skillpower 7 and that he was previously assigned to SMC between 1981 up to

February 1985, "for periods spread apart." The Labor Arbiter found, as earlier stated, that Maliksi rendered service

with Lipercon from 1 April 1981 to February 1982 as budget head assigned to SMC-Beer Division; from July 1983 to

April 1985 with Skillpower as accounting clerk assigned to SMC-Magnolia Division, then from October 1988 to 1989

also with Skillpower as acting clerk assigned to SMC-Magnolia Finance, and from October 1989 to 31 October 1990

with PHILSSEC assigned to Magnolia Finance as accounting clerk. In all, it appears that, while under the employ of

either Lipercon or Skillpower, Maliksi has undisputedly rendered service with SMC for at least three years and seven

months.

The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Lipercon and Skillpower were declared to be labor-only contractors,

providing as they do manpower services to the public for a fee. The existence of an employer-employee relationshipis factual and we give due deference to the factual findings of both the NLRC and the CA that an employer-employee

relationship existed between SMC (or its subsidiaries) and Maliksi. Indeed, having served SMC for an aggregate

period of more than three (3) years through employment contracts with these two labor contractors, Maliksi should

be considered as SMC's regular employee. The hard fact is that he was hired and re-hired by SMC to perform

administrative and clerical work that was necessary to SMC's business on a daily basis.

It is worth noting that, except for the computerization project of PHILSSEC, petitioner did not make any insinuation

at all that the services of Maliksi with SMC was project-related such that an employment contract with Lipercon and

Skillpower was necessary.

We find respondent Maliksi to be similarly situated with those of the complainants in Madriaga. Indeed, Lipercon

and Skillpower have figured in not just a few of our decisions, so much so that we are inclined to believe that these

two were involved in labor-only contracting with respect to Maliksi. We hold that the finding of the NLRC and the

CA as to SMC's resorting to labor-only contracting is entitled to consideration in its full weight.

With respect to PHILSSEC, there was no need for Maliksi to be employed under the former's computerization

program to be considered a regular employee of SMC at the time. Moreover, SMC itself admits that Maliksi's work

under the computerization program did "not require the operation of a computer system, such as the software

program being developed by PHILSSEC." Given this admission, we are simply at a loss to understand why Maliksi





should be included in the computerization project as a project employee. Not being a computer expert, Maliksi's

inclusion in the project was uncalled for. To our mind, his placement in the project was for the purpose of

circumventing labor laws. The evidence shows that immediately before he entered the PHILSSEC project in October

1989, Maliksi was fresh out of his employment with SMC (through Skillpower) as acting clerk assigned to SMC-

Magnolia Finance (from October 1988 to 1989).

Maliksi's work under the PHILSSEC project was mainly administrative in nature and necessary to the development

of SMC's business. These were:

a. posting manually the daily account balances in the work set;

b. fitting the daily totals into the monthly totals;

c. comparing the manual totals with the computer generated totals;

d. locating the differences between the totals; and,

e. adjusting and correcting errors.

Simply put, the data gathered by SMC on a daily basis through Maliksi's work would be submitted for analysis and

evaluation, thereby allowing SMC to make the necessary business decisions that would enable it to market its

products better, or monitor its sales and collection with efficiency. Without the data gatherer or encoder, no analysis

could occur. SMC would then, for the most part, be kept in the dark.

As to the petitioner's second assigned error, we hold that there is no need to resolve the present case under the

principle that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the workingman. The perceived doubt does not obtain in the

first place.

We understand Maliksi's desperation in making his point clear to SMC, which unduly refuses to acknowledge his

status as a regular employee. Instead, he was juggled from one employment contract to another in a continuous bid

to circumvent labor laws. The act of hiring and re-hiring workers over a period of time without considering them as

regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of the employer. Where, from the circumstances, it is apparent that

periods have been imposed to preclude the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, the policy, agreement or

practice should be struck down as contrary to public policy, morals, good customs or public order. In point of law,

any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or

public policy shall be liable for the damage.

Ways and means contrived by employers to countermand labor laws granting regular employment status to their

workers are numerous and long. For instance, they toss the poor workers from one job contractor to another, make

them go through endless applications, lining up, paperwork, documentation, and physical examinations; make them

sign five- or ten-month-only job contracts, yet re-hire them after brief "rest periods," but not after requiring them to

go through the whole application and selection process once again; prepare and have them sign waivers, quitclaims,and the like; refuse to issue them identification cards, receipts or any other concrete proof of employment or

documentary proof of payment of their salaries; fail to enroll them for entitlement to social security and other

benefits; give them positions, titles or designations that connote short-term employment.

Others are more creative: they set up "distributors" or "dealers" which are, in reality, shell or dummy companies. In

this manner, the mother company avoids the employer-employee relations, and is thus shielded from liability from

employee claims in case of illegal dismissal, closure, unfair labor practices and the like. In those instances, the poor





employees, finding the shell or dummy company to be without assets, often end up confused and without recourse

as to whom to run after. They sue the mother company which conveniently sets up the defense of absence of

employer-employee relations. In San Miguel Corporation v. MAERC Integrated Services, Inc., we took note of the

practice of hiring employees through labor contractors that catered exclusively to the employment needs of SMC or

its divisions or other specific business interests, such that after the specific SMC business or division ceases to do

business, the labor contractor likewise ceases its operations.

The contrivances may be many and the schemes ingenious and imaginative. But this Court will not hesitate to put

pen to a line and defend the worker's right to be secure in his (or her) proprietary right to regular employment and

his right to a secure employment, viz, one that is free from fear and doubt, that anytime he could be removed,

retrenched, his contract not renewed or he might not be re-hired. The ramifications may seem trivial, but we cannot

allow the ordinary Filipino worker's right to tenurial security to be put in jeopardy by recurrent but abhorrent

practices that threaten the very lives of those that depend on him.

Considering, however, the supervening event that SMC's Magnolia Division has been acquired by another entity, it

appears that private respondent's reinstatement is no longer feasible. Instead, he should be awarded separation pay

as an alternative. Likewise, owing to petitioner's bad faith, it should be held liable to pay damages for causing undue

injury and inconvenience to the private respondent in its contractual hiring-firing-rehiring scheme.

Eparwa vs Liceo (2006) G.R. 150402

Facts:

On 1 December 1997, Eparwa and LDCU, through their representatives, entered into a Contract for Security Services.

On 21 December 1998, 11 security guards ("security guards") whom Eparwa assigned to LDCU from 1 December

1997 to 30 November 1998 filed a complaint before the National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC) Regional

Arbitration Branch No. 10 in Cagayan de Oro City. Docketed as NLRC-RABX Case No. 10-01-00102-99, the complaint

was filed against both Eparwa and LDCU for underpayment of salary, legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, rest day,

service incentive leave, night shift differential, overtime pay, and payment for attorney's fees.

LDCU made a cross-claim and prayed that Eparwa should reimburse LDCU for any payment to the security guards.

In its decision dated 18 August 1999, the Labor Arbiter found that the security guards are entitled to wage

differentials and premium for holiday and rest day work. The Labor Arbiter held Eparwa and LDCU solidarily liable

pursuant to Article 109 of the Labor Code.

LDCU filed an appeal before the NLRC. LDCU agreed with the Labor Arbiter's decision on the security guards'

entitlement to salary differential but challenged the propriety of the amount of the award. LDCU alleged that

security guards not similarly situated were granted uniform monetary awards and that the decision did not include

the basis of the computation of the amount of the award.

Eparwa also filed an appeal before the NLRC. For its part, Eparwa questioned its liability for the security guards'

claims and the awarded cross-claim amounts.

The Fifth Division of the NLRC resolved Eparwa and LDCU's separate appeals in its Resolution 7 dated 19 January

2000. The NLRC found that the security guards are entitled to wage differentials and premium for holiday and rest

day work. Although the NLRC held Eparwa and LDCU solidarily liable for the wage differentials and premium for

holiday and rest day work, the NLRC did not require Eparwa to reimburse LDCU for its payments to the security





guards. The NLRC also ordered the recomputation of the monetary awards according to the dates actually worked

by each security guard.

Eparwa and LDCU again filed separate motions for partial reconsideration of the 19 January 2000 NLRC Resolution.

LDCU questioned the NLRC's deletion of LDCU's entitlement to reimbursement by Eparwa. Eparwa, on the other

hand, prayed that LDCU be made to reimburse Eparwa for whatever amount it may pay to the security guards.

Issue: Is LDCU alone ultimately liable to the security guards for the wage differentials and premium for holiday and

rest day pay?

Held: For the security guards, the actual source of the payment of their wage differentials and premium for holiday

and rest day work does not matter as long as they are paid. This is the import of Eparwa and LDCU's solidary

liability. Creditors, such as the security guards, may collect from anyone of the solidary debtors. Solidary liability

does not mean that, as between themselves, two solidary debtors are liable for only half of the payment.

LDCU's ultimate liability comes into play because of the expiration of the Contract for Security Services. There is no

privity of contract between the security guards and LDCU, but LDCU's liability to the security guards remains

because of Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. Eparwa is already precluded from asking LDCU for an

adjustment in the contract price because of the expiration of the contract, but Eparwa's liability to the security guards

remains because of their employer-employee relationship. In lieu of an adjustment in the contract price, Eparwa may

claim reimbursement from LDCU for any payment it may make to the security guards. However, LDCU cannot

claim any reimbursement from Eparwa for any payment it may make to the security guards.

Eparwa and LDCU's Solidary Liability and LDCU's Ultimate Liability

Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code read:

Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the

performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be

paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.




employed by him.









the employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who






Article 107. Indirect employer. — The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to

any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent

contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

Article 109. Solidary liability. — The provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, every

employer or indirect employer shall be held responsible with his contractor or subcontractor for any violation of any

provision of this Code. For purposes of determining the extent of their civil liability under this Chapter, they shall be

considered as direct employers.

This Court's ruling in Eagle Security Agency, Inc. v. NLRC squarely applies to the present case. In Eagle, we ruled

that:

This joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to assure

compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage [Article 99, Labor Code]. The contractor

is made liable by virtue of his status as direct employer. The principal, on the other hand, is made the indirect

employer of the contractor's employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the contractor be

unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers' performance

of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution [SeeArticle II Sec. 18 and Article XIII Sec. 3].

In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that the security guards are the employees of EAGLE [See Article VII Sec. 2 of

the Contract for Security Services; G.R. No. 81447, Rollo, p. 34]. That they were assigned to guard the premises of

PTSI pursuant to the latter's contract with EAGLE and that neither of these two entities paid their wage and

allowance increases under the subject wage orders are also admitted [See Labor Arbiter's Decision, p. 2; G.R. No.

81447, Rollo, p. 75]. Thus, the application of the aforecited provisions of the Labor Code on joint and several liability

of the principal and contractor is appropriate [See Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No.

64204, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 669].

Escario vs NLRC (2000) G.R. 124055

Facts:

Petitioners allege that they were employed by CMC as merchandisers. Among the tasks assigned to them were the

withdrawing of stocks from the warehouse, the fixing of prices, price-tagging, displaying of merchandise, and the

inventory of stocks. These were done under the control, management and supervision of CMC. The materials and

equipment necessary in the performance of their job, such as price markers, gun taggers, toys, pentel pen, streamers

and posters were provided by CMC. 'Their salaries were being paid by CMC. According to petitioners, the hiring,

control and supervision of the workers and the payment of salaries, were all coursed by CMC through its agent D.L.

Admark in order for CMC to avoid its liability under the law.

CMC, on the other hand, denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner, and itself.

Rather, CMC contended that it is D.L. Admark who is the employer of the petitioners. While CMC is engaged in the

manufacturing of food products and distribution of such to wholesalers and retailers, it is not allowed by law to

engage in retail or direct sales to end consumers. It, however, hired independent job contractors such as D.L.

Admark, to provide the necessary promotional activities for its product lines.





For its part, D.L. Admark asserted that it is the employer of the petitioners. Its primary purpose is to carry on the

business of advertising, promotion and publicity, the sales and merchandising of goods and services and conduct

survey and opinion polls. As an independent contractor it serves several clients among which include Purefoods,

Corona Supply, Splash Cosmetics and herein respondent California Marketing.

On 7 February 1992, petitioners filed a case against CMC before the Labor Arbiter for the regularization of their

employment status. On 29 July 1994, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding that petitioners are the employees

of CMC as they were engaged in activities that are necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of CMC. In

justifying its ruling, the Labor Arbiter cited the case of Tabas vs. CMC which, likewise, involved private respondent

CMC. In the Tabas case, this Court ruled that therein petitioner merchandisers were employees of CMC, to wit:

There is no doubt that in the case at bar, Livi performs "manpower services," meaning to say, it contracts out labor in

favor of clients. We hold that it is one not withstanding its vehement claims to the contrary, and notwithstanding the

provision of the contract that it is "an independent contractor." The nature of one's business is not determined by self-

serving appellations one attaches thereto but by the tests provided by statute and prevailing case law. The bare fact

that Livi maintains a separate line of business does not extinguish the equal fact that it has provided California with

workers to pursue the latter's own business. In this connection, we do not agree that the petitioner has been made to

perform activities "which are not directly related to the general business of manufacturing," California's purported

"principal operation activity. The petitioners had been charged with merchandising promotion or sale of the products

of [California] in the different sales outlets in Metro Manila including task and occasional price tagging," an activity

that is doubtless, an integral part of the manufacturing business. It is not, then, as if Livi had served as its

(California's) promotions or sales arm or agent, or otherwise rendered a piece of work it (California) could not itself

have done; Livi as a placement agency, had simply supplied it with manpower necessary to carry out its

(California's) merchandising activities, using its (California's) premises and equipment.

On appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled that no employer-employee relationship

existed between the petitioners and CMC. It, likewise, held that D.L. Admark is a legitimate independent contractor,

hence, the employer of the petitioners. Finding no valid grounds existed for the dismissal of the petitioners by D.L.

Admark, it ordered their reinstatement.

Petitioners are of the position that D.L. Admark is a labor-only contractor and cites this Court's ruling in the case of

Tabas,

Issue: Whether petitioners are employees of CMC or D.L. Admark.

Held: We cannot sustain the contention of the petitioner. In resolving this, it is necessary to determine whether D.L.

Admark is a labor-only contractor or an independent contractor.Petitioners' reliance on the Tabas case is misplaced.

In said case, we ruled that therein contractor Livi Manpower Services was a mere placement agency and had simply

supplied herein petitioner with the manpower necessary to carry out the company's merchandising activity. We,

however, further stated that:

It would have been different, we believe, had Livi been discretely a promotions firm, and that California had hired it

to perform the latter's merchandising activities. For then, Livi would have been truly the employer of its employees

and California its client. In other words, CMC can validly farm out its merchandising activities to a legitimate

independent contractor.

There is labor-only contracting when the contractor or sub-contractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to

perform a job, work or service for a principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:





(a) The person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of

tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others; and

(b) The workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the

principal business of the employer.

In contrast, there is permissible job contracting when a principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor or a

subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined

period, regardless of whether such job or work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the

premises of the principal. In this arrangement, the following conditions must concur:

(a) The contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his

account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction

of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results

thereof; and

(b) The contractor has substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries (sic), work

premises, and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

In the recent case of Alexander Vinoya vs. NLRC, et al., this Court ruled that in order to be considered an

independent contractor it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or investment in the form of tools,

equipment, machinery and work premises. In addition, the following factors need be considered: (a) whether the

contractor is carrying on an independent business; (b) the nature and extent of the work; (c) the skill required; (d) the

term and duration of the relationship; (e) the right to assign the performance of specified pieces of work; (f) the

control and supervision of the workers; (g) the power of the employer with respect to the hiring, firing and payment

of workers of the contractor; (h) the control of the premises; (i) the duty to supply premises, tools, appliances,

materials, and labor; and (j) the mode, manner and terms of payment. Based on the foregoing criterion, we find that

D.L. Admark is a legitimate independent contractor.

Among the circumstances that tend to establish the status of D.L. Admark as a legitimate job contractor are:

1) The SEC registration certificate of D.L. Admark states that it is a firm engaged in promotional, advertising,

marketing and merchandising activities.

2) The service contract between CMC and D.L. Admark clearly provides that the agreement is for the supply of

sales promoting merchandising services rather than one of manpower placement.

3) D.L. Admark was actually engaged in several activities, such as advertising, publication, promotions,

marketing and merchandising. It had several merchandising contracts with companies like Purefoods, Corona

Supply, Nabisco Biscuits, and Licron. It was likewise engaged in the publication business as evidenced by its

magazine the "Phenomenon."

4) It had its own capital assets to carry out its promotion business. It then had current assets amounting to P6

million and is therefore a highly capitalized venture. It had an authorized capital stock of P500,000.00. It owned

several motor vehicles and other tools, materials and equipment to service its clients. It paid rentals of P30,020 for the

office space it occupied.

Moreover, by applying the four-fold test used in determining employer-employee relationship, the status of D.L.

Admark as the true employer of petitioners is further established. The elements of this test are (1) the selection and





engagement of employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the

employee's conduct.

As regards the first element, petitioners themselves admitted that they were selected and hired by D.L. Admark. As

to the second element, the NLRC noted that D.L. Admark was able to present in evidence the payroll of petitioners,

sample SSS contribution forms filed and submitted by DL Admark to the SSS, and the application for employment by

R. de los Reyes, all tending to show that D.L. Admark was paying for the petitioners' salaries. In contrast, petitioners

did not submit an iota of evidence that it was CMC who paid for their salaries. The fact that the agreement between

CMC and D.L. Admark contains the billing rate and cost breakdown of payment for core merchandisers and

coordinators does not in any way establish that it was CMC who was paying for their salaries. As correctly pointed

out by both CMC 16 and the Office of the Solicitor General, such cost breakdown is a standard content of service

contracts designed to insure that under the contract, employees of the job contractor will receive benefits mandated

by law.

Neither did the petitioners prove the existence of the third element. Again petitioners admitted that it was D.L.

Admark who terminated their employment. To prove the fourth and most important element of control, petitioners

presented the memoranda of CMC's sales and promotions manager. The Labor Arbiter found that these memos

"indubitably show that the complainants were under the supervision and control of the CMC people." However, as

correctly pointed out by the NLRC, a careful scrutiny of the documents adverted to, will reveal that nothing therein

would remotely suggest that CMC was supervising and controlling the work of the petitioners:

The memorandums were addressed to the store or grocery owners telling them about the forthcoming sales

promotions of CMC products. While in one of the memorandums a statement is made that "our merchandisers and

demonstrators will be assigned to pack the premium with your stocks in the shelves . . ., yet it does not necessarily

mean to refer to the complainants, as they claim, since CMC has also regular merchandisers and demonstrators. It

would be different if in the memorandums were sent or given to the complainants and their duties or roles in the said

sales campaign are therein defined. It is also noted that in one of the memorandums it was addressed to: "All regular

merchandisers/demonstrators." . . . we are not convinced that the documents sufficiently prove employer-employee

relationship between complainants and respondents CMC.

The Office of the Solicitor General, likewise notes that the documents fail to show anything that would remotely

suggest control and supervision exercised by CMC over petitioners on the matter on how they should perform their

work. The memoranda were addressed either to the store owners or "regular" merchandisers and demonstrators of

CMC. Thus, petitioners, who filed a complaint for regularization against respondent CMC, thereby, conceding that

they are not regular employees of the latter, cannot validly claim to be the ones referred to in said memos.

Having proven the existence of an employer-employee relationship between D.L. Admark and petitioners, it is no

longer relevant to determine whether the activities performed by the latter are necessary or desirable to the usual

business or trade of CMC.

On the issue of illegal dismissal, we agree with the findings of the NLRC that D.L. Admark "admits having dismissed

the petitioners for allegedly disowning and rejecting them as their employer." Undoubtedly, the reason given is not

just cause to terminate petitioners. D.L. Admark's belated claim that the petitioners were not terminated but simply

did not report to work is not supported by the evidence on record. Moreover, there is no showing that due process

was afforded the petitioners.





Aboitiz vs Dimapatoi (2006) G.R. 148619

Facts:

Petitioner Aboitiz Haulers, Inc. is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the nationwide and overseas

forwarding and distribution of cargoes. Private respondents Monaorai Dimapatoi, Cecilia Agawin, Raul Mamate,

Emmanuel Guerrero and Gemeniano Bigaw worked as checkers in the Mega Warehouse, which is owned by the

petitioner, located at the Tabacalera Compound, United Nations Avenue, Manila.

Respondents maintain that during their employment with the petitioner, they were not paid their regular holiday

pay, night shift differential, 5-day service incentive leave, and overtime premium. They also averred that illegal

deductions were being made on their wages, particularly the contributions for a Mutual Assistance Fund, a Cash

Bond, and claims for damaged and misrouted cargoes incurred by petitioner.

On 17 May 1996, respondent Raul Mamate filed a complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment

(DOLE) for nonpayment of wages and other benefits, as well as illegal deductions. The other respondents filed their

own complaints. Since the claims of the respondents exceeded Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), the case was referred

to the NLRC. Thereafter, respondents filed their complaint for illegal dismissal and other money claims before the

Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.

Petitioner claims that respondents are not its employees, rather they are the employees of Grigio Security Agency and

General Services (Grigio), a manpower agency that supplies security guards, checkers and stuffers. It allegedly

entered into a Written Contract of Service with Grigio on 1 March 1994. By virtue of the aforementioned Written

Contract of Service, Grigio supplied petitioner with security guards, checkers and stuffers for petitioner's Mega

Warehouse. The respondents were among the checkers that were assigned to the petitioner's warehouse.

Petitioner emphasizes that Grigio retained control over the respondents by providing their own supervisors to

oversee Grigio's personnel, as well as time cards to monitor the attendance of its personnel. Petitioner also alleges

that on 9 May 1996, the respondents left the warehouse and did not report to work thereafter. As a result of the

respondents' sudden abandonment of their work, there was no orderly and proper turnover of papers and other

company property in connection with the termination of the Written Contract for Services.

Respondents, on the other hand, claim that most of them worked as checkers in petitioner's warehouse even before 1

March 1994.

Issue: Whether or not Grigio is a "labor-only" contractor.

Held: Grigio is a "labor-only" contractor. The first issue that needs to be resolved is whether Grigio is a "labor-only"

contractor, which is tantamount to a finding that the petitioner is the employer of the respondents. Article 106 of the

Labor Code 24 explains the relations which may arise between an employer, a contractor and the contractor's

employees thus:

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person

for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any,

shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.



of the work performed under the contract in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly

employed by him.







between labor only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and





recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which directly related to the principal business of



The first two paragraphs of Art. 106 set the general rule that a principal is permitted by law to engage the services of

a contractor for the performance of a particular job, but the principal, nevertheless, becomes solidarily liable with the

contractor for the wages of the contractor's employees. The third paragraph of Art. 106, however, empowers the

Secretary of Labor to make distinctions between permissible job contracting and "labor-only" contracting, which is a

prohibited act further defined under the last paragraph. A finding that a contractor is a "labor-only" contractor is

equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of

the supposed contractor, and the "labor-only" contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real

employer. Section 7 of the Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as amended, reiterates the rules

in determining the existence of employer-employee relationship between employer, contractor or subcontractor, and

the contractor's or subcontractor's employee.

Section 7. Existence of an employer-employee relationship. — The contractor or subcontractor shall be

considered the employer of the contractual employee for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code and

other social legislation. The principal, however, shall be solidarily liable with the contractor in the event of any

violation of any provision of the Labor Code, including the failure to pay wages.

The principal shall be deemed the employer of the contractual employee in any of the following cases, as declared bya competent authority:

a. where there is a labor-only contracting; or

b. where the contracting arrangement falls within the prohibitions provided in Section 6 (Prohibitions) hereof.

In determining whether or not a "labor-only" contracting exists, Art. 106 of the Labor Code and Section 5 of the Rules

Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the following criteria: (1) where the

person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools,

equipment, machineries, work premises, among other things; (2) the workers recruited and placed by such persons

are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer; and (3) the contractor

does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of the contractual employee. In order that one isconsidered by law as a "labor-only" contractor, all three aforementioned criteria need not be present. If the contractor

enters into an arrangement characterized by any one of the criteria provided, this would be a clear case of "labor-only

contracting." The clear phrasing of Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Articles 106 to 109 of the Labor Code, as

amended, support this interpretation.

Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. — Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited.

For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely





recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following

elements are is present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job,

work or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor

are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) the contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual

employee.

The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (C) of the Labor Code, as

amended.

"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations,

tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or

subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.

The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers

are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching

that end.

The allegation of the petitioner that Grigio is an independent job contractor, and, therefore, this case is one of

permissible job contracting, is without basis. In this case, the respondents' work, as warehouse checkers, is directly

related to the principal business of the petitioner. Petitioner also exercises the right to control and determines not

only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. Lastly, petitioner failed

to sufficiently prove that Grigio had "substantial capital or investment."

The respondents, as checkers, were employed to check and inspect these cargoes, a task which is clearly necessary for

the petitioner's business of forwarding and distributing of cargoes. The petitioner did not dispute the fact that the

respondents were hired as checkers as early as 1992. The fact that they were employed before the Written Contract ofServices took effect on 24 February 1994, and continued with their jobs until 1996, after the said contract had already

expired on 24 February 1995, 29 indicates that the respondents' work was indeed necessary for the petitioner's

business. In a similar case, Guarin v. National Labor Relations Commission, the workers' contracts were repeatedly

renewed to perform services necessary for the employer's business. Thus, the Court described the arrangement as

"labor-only" contracting:

The jobs assigned to the petitioners as mechanics, janitors, gardeners, firemen and grasscutters were directly related

to the business of Novelty as a garment manufacturer. In the case of Philippine Bank of Communications vs. NLRC,

146 SCRA 347, we ruled that the work of a messenger is directly related to a bank's operations. In its Comment,

Novelty contends that the services which are directly related to manufacturing garments are sewing, textile cutting,

designs, dying, quality control, personnel, administration, accounting, finance, customs, delivery and similar other

activities; and that allegedly, "it is only by stretching the imagination that one may conclude that the services of

janitors, janitresses, firemen, grasscutters, mechanics and helpers are directly related to the business of

manufacturing garments" (p. 78, Rollo). Not so, for the work of gardeners in maintaining clean and well-kept

grounds around the factory, mechanics to keep the machines functioning properly, and firemen to look out for fires,

are directly related to the daily operations of a garment factory. That fact is confirmed by Novelty's rehiring the

workers or renewing the contract with Lipercon every year from 1983 to 1986, a period of three (3) years.





As Lipercon was a "labor-only" contractor, the workers it supplied Novelty became regular employees of the

latter.Where the employees are tasked to undertake activities usually desirable or necessary in the usual business of

the employer, the contractor is considered as a "labor-only" contractor and such employees are considered as regular

employees of the employer.

In addition, Grigio did not undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and

method, free from the control and supervision of its principal. The work activities, work shifts, and schedules of the

respondents, including the time allowed for "recess" were set under the Written Contract of Services. This clearly

indicates that these matters, which consist of the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished, were

not within the absolute control of Grigio. By stipulating these matters in a contract, Grigio is constrained to follow

these provisions and would no longer be able to exercise the freedom to alter these work shifts and schedules at its

own convenience. Such being the case, Grigio cannot be considered as an independent job contractor.

Petitioner's allegation that Grigio retained control over the respondents by providing supervisors to monitor the

performance of the respondents cannot be given much weight. Instead of exercising their own discretion or referring

the matter to the officers of Grigio, Grigio's supervisors were obligated to refer to petitioner's supervisors any

discrepancy in the performance of the respondents with their specified duties. The Written Contract of Services

provided that:

5.c. That the GRIGIO personnel, particularly the supervisors, shall perform the following:

The Supervisor for the warehouse operation shall monitor the performance and productivity of all the checkers,

jacklifters, stuffers/strippers, forklift operators, drivers, and helpers. He shall coordinate with AHI's supervisors

regarding the operations at the Warehouse to ensure safety at the place of work. He shall see to it that the cargoes are

not overlanded, shortlanded, delivered at a wrong destination, or misdelivered to consignee's port of destination.

Any discrepancy shall be reported immediately to AHI's Logistic Manager, Mr. Andy Valeroso.

The control exercised by petitioner's supervisors over the performance of respondents was to such extent that

petitioner's Warehouse Supervisor, Roger Borromeo, confidently gave an evaluation of the performance of

respondent Monaorai Dimapatoi, who likewise felt obliged to obtain such Certification from Borromeo.

Petitioner's control over the respondents is evident. And it is this right to control the employee, not only as to the

result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished, that

constitutes the most important index of the existence of the employer-employee relationship.

Lastly, the law casts the burden on the contractor to prove that it has substantial capital, investment, tools, etc.

Employees, on the other hand, need not prove that the contractor does not have substantial capital, investment, and

tools to engage in job-contracting. In this case, neither Grigio nor the petitioner was able to present any proof that

Grigio had substantial capital. There was no evidence pertaining to its capitalization nor its investment in tools,

equipment or implements actually used in the performance or completion of the job, work, or service that it was

contracted to render. Grigio was merely expected to supply petitioner with manpower to carry out work necessaryfor its business, to be carried out in the manner which petitioner provided in the contract.

Thus, Grigio is obviously a "labor-only" contractor since it did not have substantial capital or investment which

relates to the service performed; the respondents performed activities which were directly related to the main

business of the petitioner; and Grigio did not exercise control over the performance of the work of the respondents.

Consequently, the petitioner is considered as the employer of the respondents.





In prohibiting "labor-only" contracting and creating an employer-employee relationship between the principal and

the supposed contractor's employees, the law intends to prevent employers from circumventing labor laws intended

to protect employees. In the case of Aurora Land Projects Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, this Court

pronounced:

The question as to whether an employer-employee relationship exists in a certain situation continues to bedevil the

courts. Some businessmen try to avoid the bringing about of an employer-employee relationship in their enterprises

because that judicial relation spawns obligations connected with workmen's compensation, social security, medicare,

minimum wage, termination pay, and unionism. In light of this observation, it behooves this Court to be ever vigilant

in checking the unscrupulous efforts of some of our entrepreneurs, primarily aimed at maximizing their return on

investments at the expense of the lowly workingman.

GSIS vs NLRC (2006) G.R. 157647

Facts:

Tomas Lanting, doing business under the name and style of Lanting Security and Watchman Agency (LSWA)

entered into a Security Service Contract to provide security guards to the properties of the Government Service

Insurance System (GSIS) at the contract rate of P3,000.00 per guard per month.

During the effectivity of the contract, LSWA requested the GSIS for an upward adjustment of the contract rate in

view of Section 7 of Wage Order No. 1 and Section 3 of Wage Order No. 2, which were issued by the Regional

Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board-NCR pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage

Rationalization Act.

Acting on the request of LSWA, the GSIS, through its Board of Trustees and under Board Resolution No. 207, dated

May 24, 1991, approved the upward adjustments of the contract price from P3,000.00 to P3,716.07 per guard, per

month effective November 1, 1990 to January 7, 1991, and P4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to May 31, 1991. LSWA

assigned security guards Daniel Fanila, Hector Moreno, Isauro Ferrer, Rubin Wilfredo, Jesus Delima Jr., Maria

Legaspi, Santiago Noto Jr., and Virgilio Soriano (hereafter complainants) to guard one of GSIS's properties.

On March 15, 1993, GSIS terminated the Security Service Contract with LSWA. All the complainants, except Virgilio

Soriano, were absorbed by the incoming security agency. On March 7, 1994, complainants filed separate complaints

against LSWA for underpayment of wages and non-payment of labor standard benefits from March 1991 to March

15, 1993. Virgilio Soriano also complained of illegal dismissal.

In its Position Paper, LSWA alleged that complainants were estopped from claiming that they were underpaid

because they were informed that the pay and benefits given to them were based on the contract rate of P103.00 per

eight hours of work or about P3,100.00 per month.

Issue: Whether GSIS is solidarily liable for payment of complainants-respondnents' salary differentials.

Held: Yes. Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code provide:

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. — Whenever an employer enters into contract with another person for

the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall

be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.





In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wage of his employees in accordance with this Code,



employed by him.

ART. 107 Indirect employer. — The provisions of the immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to

any person, partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer, contracts with an independent

contractor for the performance of any work, task, job or project.

In this case, the GSIS cannot evade liability by claiming that it had fully paid complainants' salaries by in corporating

in the Security Service Contract the salary rate increases mandated by Wage Order Nos. 1 and 2 by increasing the

contract price from P3,000.00 to P3,176.07 per guard per month effective November 1, 1990 to January 7, 1991, and

P4,200.00 effective January 8, 1991 to May 31, 1991.

In Rosewood Processing, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 25 the Court explained the rationale for the

joint and several liability of the employer, thus:

The joint and several liability of the employer or principal was enacted to ensure compliance with the provisions of

the Code, principally those on statutory minimum wage. The contractor or subcontractor is made liable by virtue of

his or her status as a direct employer, and the principal as the indirect employer of the contractor's employees. This

liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers' compensation, thus, giving the workers ample

protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution. This is not unduly burdensome to the employer. Should the

indirect employer be constrained to pay the workers, it can recover whatever amount it had paid in accordance with

the terms of the service contract between itself and the contractor.

Thus, the Court does not agree with the GSIS's claim that a double burden would be imposed upon the latter because

it would be paying twice for complainants' services. Such fears are unfounded. Under Article 1217 of the Civil Code,

if the GSIS should pay the money claims of complainants, it has the right to recover from LSWA whatever amount it

has paid in accordance with the terms of the service contract between the LSWA and the GSIS. Joint and solidary

liability is simply meant to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. This

is in line with the policy of the State to protect and alleviate the plight of the working class.

Republic vs Asiapro Cooperative (2007) G.R. 172101

Facts:

Respondent Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members.Under its by-laws, owners-members are of

two categories, to wit: (1) regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership; and (2)

associate member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights and privilegesprovided in its by-laws, Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities and to develop other

livelihood services for its owners-members.In the discharge of the aforesaid primary objectives, respondent

cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco - a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. and a

company based in Bukidnon.The owners-members do not receive compensation or wages from the respondent

cooperative.Instead, they receive a share in the service surplus which the respondent cooperative earns from different

areas of trade it engages in, such as the income derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. The owners-





members get their income from the service surplus generated by the quality and amount of services they rendered,

which is determined by the Board of Directors of the respondent cooperative.

In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of the respondent

cooperative, who were assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the latter to register them with petitioner SSS as

self-employed and to remit their contributions as such. Also, to comply with Section 19-A of Republic Act No. 1161,as amended by Republic Act No. 8282, the SSS contributions of the said owners-members were equal to the share of

both the employer and the employee.

On 26 September 2002, however, petitioner SSS through its Vice-President for Mindanao Division, Atty. Eddie A.

Jara, sent a letter to the respondent cooperative, addressed to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and General Manager

Leo G. Parma, informing the latter that based on the Service Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, respondent

cooperative is actually a manpower contractor supplying employees to Stanfilco and for that reason, it is an employer

of its owners-members working with Stanfilco.Thus, respondent cooperative should register itself with petitioner SSS

as an employer and make the corresponding report and remittance of premium contributions in accordance with the

Social Security Law of 1997.On 9 October 2002, respondent cooperative, through its counsel, sent a reply to petitioner

SSSs letter asserting that it is not an employer because its owners-members are the cooperative itself; hence, it cannot be its own employer.Again, on 21 October 2002 petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative ordering the

latter to register as an employer and report its owners-members as employees for compulsory coverage with the

petitioner SSS.Respondent cooperative continuously ignored the demand of petitioner SSS.

Accordingly, petitioner SSS, on 12 June 2003, filed a Petition before petitioner SSC against the respondent cooperative

and Stanfilco praying that the respondent cooperative or, in the alternative, Stanfilco be directed to register as an

employer and to report respondent cooperatives owners-members as covered employees under the compulsory

coverage of SSS and to remit the necessary contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.The same

was docketed as SSC Case No. 6-15507-03. Respondent cooperative filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss alleging

that no employer-employee relationship exists between it and its owners-members, thus, petitioner SSC has no

jurisdiction over the respondent cooperative.Stanfilco, on the other hand, filed an Answer with Cross-claim againstthe respondent cooperative.

Issue: Whether the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by petitioner SSS against

the respondent cooperative.

Held: Petitioner SSCs jurisdiction is clearly stated in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 as well as in Section 1, Rule

III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8282 provides:

SEC. 5. Settlement of Disputes. (a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage , benefits, contributionsand penalties thereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission , x x x.(Emphasis

supplied.)

Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states:

Section 1. Jurisdiction. Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to coverage , entitlement of

benefits, collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter related thereto, shall





be cognizable by the Commission after the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-in-charge of the

Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had first taken action thereon in writing.(Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS is

well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC.It is important to note, though, that the mandatory

coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship except incases of compulsory coverage of the self-employed.

It is axiomatic that the allegations in the complaint, not the defenses set up in the Answer or in the Motion to

Dismiss, determine which court has jurisdiction over an action; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would

depend almost entirely upon the defendant. Moreover, it is well-settled that once jurisdiction is acquired by the

court, it remains with it until the full termination of the case. The said principle may be applied even to quasi-judicial

bodies.

In this case, the petition-complaint filed by the petitioner SSS before the petitioner SSC against the respondent

cooperative and Stanfilco alleges that the owners-members of the respondent cooperative are subject to the

compulsory coverage of the SSS because they are employees of the respondent cooperative.Consequently, therespondent cooperative being the employer of its owners-members must register as employer and report its owners-

members as covered members of the SSS and remit the necessary premium contributions in accordance with the

Social Security Law of 1997. Accordingly, based on the aforesaid allegations in the petition-complaint filed before the

petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its jurisdiction.Although the Answer with Motion to Dismiss filed by the

respondent cooperative challenged the jurisdiction of the petitioner SSC on the alleged lack of employer-employee

relationship between itself and its owners-members, the same is not enough to deprive the petitioner SSC of its

jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it.Thus, the petitioner SSC cannot be faulted for initially

assuming jurisdiction over the petition-complaint of the petitioner SSS.

Nonetheless, since the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its

owners-members was put in issue and considering that the compulsory coverage of the SSS Law is predicated on theexistence of such relationship, it behooves the petitioner SSC to determine if there is really an employer-employee

relationship that exists between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.

The question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship is not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).Article 217 of the Labor Code enumerating the jurisdiction of the

Labor Arbiters and the NLRC provides that:

ART. 217. JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION . - (a) x x

6.Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security , Medicare and maternity

benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of

persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand

pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.

Although the aforesaid provision speaks merely of claims for Social Security, it would necessarily include

issues on the coverage thereof, because claims are undeniably rooted in the coverage by the system.Hence,

the question on the existence of an employer-employee relationship for the purpose of determining the

coverage of the Social Security System is explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC and falls





within the jurisdiction of the SSC which is primarily charged with the duty of settling disputes arising under

the Social Security Law of 1997.

On the basis thereof, considering that the petition-complaint of the petitioner SSS involved the issue of compulsory

coverage of the owners-members of the respondent cooperative, this Court agrees with the petitioner SSC when it

declared in its Order dated 17 February 2004 that as an incident to the issue of compulsory coverage, it may inquireinto the presence or absence of an employer-employee relationship without need of waiting for a prior

pronouncement or submitting the issue to the NLRC for prior determination.Since both the petitioner SSC and the

NLRC are independent bodies and their jurisdiction are well-defined by the separate statutes creating them,

petitioner SSC has the authority to inquire into the relationship existing between the worker and the person or entity

to whom he renders service to determine if the employment, indeed, is one that is excepted by the Social Security

Law of 1997 from compulsory coverage.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are considered: (1) the

selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever means; (3) the power of dismissal;

and (4) the power to control the workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The

most important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as to the result of the work tobe done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish. The power of control refers to the existence of the

power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof.It is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the

performance of duties of the employee; it is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power. All the

aforesaid elements are present in this case.

First.It is expressly provided in the Service Contracts that it is the respondent cooperative which has the exclusive

discretion in the selection and engagement of the owners-members as well as its team leaders who will be

assigned at Stanfilco. Second.Wages are defined as remuneration or earnings, however designated , capable of being

expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained, on a time, task, piece or commission basis, or other

method of calculating the same, which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten

contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for service rendered or to be rendered . In this case, theweekly stipends or the so-called shares in the service surplus given by the respondent cooperative to its owners-

members were in reality wages, as the same were equivalent to an amount not lower than that prescribed by existing

labor laws, rules and regulations, including the wage order applicable to the area and industry; or the same shall not

be lower than the prevailing rates of wages. It cannot be doubted then that those stipends or shares in the service

surplus are indeed wages, because these are given to the owners-members as compensation in rendering services to

respondent cooperatives client, Stanfilco.Third.It is also stated in the above-mentioned Service Contracts that it is the

respondent cooperative which has the power to investigate, discipline and remove the owners-members and its

team leaders who were rendering services at Stanfilco. Fourth.As earlier opined, of the four elements of the

employer-employee relationship, the control test is the most important.In the case at bar, it is the respondent

cooperative which has the sole control over the manner and means of performing the services under the Service

Contracts with Stanfilco as well as the means and methods of work . Also, the respondent cooperative is solely andentirely responsible for its owners-members, team leaders and other representatives at Stanfilco. All these clearly

prove that, indeed, there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-

members.

It is true that the Service Contracts executed between the respondent cooperative and Stanfilco expressly provide

that there shall be no employer-employee relationship between the respondent cooperative and its owners-members.

This Court, however, cannot give the said provision force and effect.





As previously pointed out by this Court, an employee-employer relationship actually exists between the respondent

cooperative and its owners-members.The four elements in the four-fold test for the existence of an employment

relationship have been complied with.The respondent cooperative must not be allowed to deny its employment

relationship with its owners-members by invoking the questionable Service Contracts provision, when in actuality, it

does exist.The existence of an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a

contract, when the terms and surrounding circumstances show otherwise.The employment status of a person isdefined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be.

It is settled that the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they want,

and their agreement would have the force of law between them.However, the agreed terms and conditions must not

be contrary to law, morals, customs, public policy or public order. The Service Contract provision in question must

be struck down for being contrary to law and public policy since it is apparently being used by the respondent

cooperative merely to circumvent the compulsory coverage of its employees, who are also its owners-members, by

the Social Security Law.

This Court is not unmindful of the pronouncement it made in Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Ferrer-

Calleja wherein it held that:

A cooperative, therefore, is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern, being run either by persons,

partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business while the

others are its employees x x x.

An employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right to

collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners. In the opinion of

August 14, 1981 of the Solicitor General he correctly opined that employees of cooperatives who are themselves

members of the cooperative have no right to form or join labor organizations for purposes of collective bargaining for

being themselves co-owners of the cooperative.

However, in so far as it involves cooperatives with employees who are not members or co-owners thereof,

certainly such employees are entitled to exercise the rights of all workers to organization, collective

bargaining, negotiations and others as are enshrined in the Constitution and existing laws of the country.

The situation in the aforesaid case is very much different from the present case.The declaration made by the

Court in the aforesaid case was made in the context of whether an employee who is also an owner-member

of a cooperative can exercise the right to bargain collectively with the employer who is the cooperative

wherein he is an owner-member. Obviously, an owner-member cannot bargain collectively with the

cooperative of which he is also the owner because an owner cannot bargain with himself.In the instant case,

there is no issue regarding an owner-members right to bargain collectively with the cooperative.The

question involved here is whether an employer-employee relationship can exist between the cooperative

and an owner-member.In fact, a closer look at Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. will show that it

actually recognized that an owner-member of a cooperative can be its own employee.

It bears stressing, too, that a cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its registration with the

Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board of Directors, which directs and supervises its business;

meaning, its Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and management of its affairs. With that,

a cooperative can be likened to a corporation with a personality separate and distinct from its owners-





members.Consequently, an owner-member of a cooperative can be an employee of the latter and an

employer-employee relationship can exist between them.

In the present case, it is not disputed that the respondent cooperative had registered itself with the

Cooperative Development Authority, as evidenced by its Certificate of Registration No. 0-623-2460. In its by-

laws, its Board of Directors directs, controls, and supervises the business and manages the property of the

respondent cooperative.Clearly then, the management of the affairs of the respondent cooperative is vested

in its Board of Directors and not in its owners-members as a whole.Therefore, it is completely logical that

the respondent cooperative, as a juridical person represented by its Board of Directors, can enter into an

employment with its owners-members.

In sum, having declared that there is an employer-employee relationship between the respondent

cooperative and its owners-member, we conclude that the petitioner SSC has jurisdiction over the petition-

complaint filed before it by the petitioner SSS

Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency vs Sales (2008) G.R. 162420

Facts:

Petitioner Jaguar Security and Investigation Agency ("Jaguar") is a private corporation engaged in the business of

providing security services to its clients, one of whom is Delta Milling Industries, Inc. ("Delta").

Private respondents Rodolfo Sales, Melvin Tamayo, Dionisio Caranyagan, Jesus Silva, Jr., Jaime Moron and Daneth

Fetalvero were hired as security guards by Jaguar. They were assigned at the premises of Delta in Libis, Quezon City.

Caranyagan and Tamayo were terminated by Jaguar on May 26, 1998 and August 21, 1998, respectively. Allegedly

their dismissals were arbitrary and illegal. Sales, Moron, Fetalvero and Silva remained with Jaguar. All the guard-

employees, claim for monetary benefits such as underpayment, overtime pay, rest day and holiday premium pay,

underpaid 13th month pay, night shift differential, five days service and incentive leave pay. In addition to these

money claims, Caranyagan and Tamayo argue that they were entitled to separation pay and back wages, for the timethey were illegally dismissed until finality of the decision. Furthermore, all respondents claim for moral and

exemplary damages.

On September 18, 1998, respondent security guards instituted the instant labor case before the labor arbiter.

On May 25, 1999, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of private respondents Sales, et al., the dispositive

portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the charges of illegal dismissal on the part of the

complainants MELVIN R. TAMAYO and DIONISIO C. CARANYAGAN for lack of merit but ordering respondents

JAGUAR SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY and DELTA MILLING INDUSTRIES, INC., to jointly and

severally pay all the six complainants, namely: RODOLFO A. SALES, MELVIN R. TAMAYO, JAIME MORON andDANETH FETALVERO the following money claims for their services rendered from April 24, 1995 to April 24, 1998:

a) wage differentials

b) overtime pay differentials (4 hours a day)

c) rest day pay

d) holiday pay

e) holiday premium pay

f) 13th month pay differentials





g) five days service incentive leave pay per year subject to the exception earlier cited.

The Research and Information Unit of this Commission is hereby directed to compute and quantify the above awards

and submit a report thereon within 15 days from receipt of this decision.

For purposes of any appeal, the appeal bond is tentatively set at P100,000.00.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.SO ORDERED."

On July 1, 1999, petitioner Jaguar filed a partial appeal questioning the failure of public respondent NLRC to resolve

its cross-claim against Delta as the party ultimately liable for payment of the monetary award to the security guards.

In its Resolution dated September 19, 2000, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, holding that it was not the proper forum

to raise the issue. It went on to say that Jaguar, being the direct employer of the security guards, is the one principally

liable to the employees. Thus, it directed petitioner to file a separate civil action for recovery of the amount before the

regular court having jurisdiction over the subject matter, for the purpose of proving the liability of Delta.

Jaguar sought reconsideration of the dismissal, but the Commission denied the same in its Resolution dated

November 9, 2001.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which, in the herein assailed Decision dated October 21, 2002 and

Resolution dated February 13, 2004, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner may claim reimbursement from Delta Milling through a cross-claim filed with the

labor court?

Held: The Court ruled in the negative.

The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an employer-employee relationship exists.

In the present case, there exists no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and Delta Milling. In its cross-

claim, petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of the monetary benefits

claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees. There is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim againstDelta Milling. Rather, the cross-claim involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's cross-

claim is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.

Moreover, the liability of Delta Milling to reimburse petitioner will only arise if and when petitioner actually pays its

employees the adjudged liabilities. Payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance,

in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either of the solidary debtors to seek

reimbursement for the share which corresponds to each of the debtors. In this case, it appears that petitioner has yet

to pay the guard employees.

The petition is DENIED.

Almeda et al., vs Asahi Glass (2008) G.R. 177785

Facts:

This a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees filed by

Almeda, et al against Asahi Glass and San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc. SSASI. Petitioners alleged that Asahi and

SSASI entered into a service contract whereby SSASI undertook to provide Asahi with the necessary manpower for

its operations. Pursuant to such a contract, SSASI employed petitioners Randy Almeda, Edwin Audencial, Nolie





Ramirez and Ernesto Calicagan as glass cutters, and petitioner Reynaldo Calicagan as Quality Controller, all assigned

to work for respondent. Asahi terminated its service contract with SSASI, which in turn, terminated the employment

of petitioners on the same date. Believing that SSASI was a labor-only contractor, and having continuously worked as

glass cutters and quality controllers for the respondent - functions which are directly related to its main line of

business as glass manufacturer - for three to 11 years, petitioners asserted that they should be considered regular

employees of the Asahi; and that their dismissal from employment without the benefit of due process of law wasunlawful.

Asahi claimed that petitioners were employees of SSASI and were merely assigned by SSASI to work for respondent

to perform intermittent services pursuant to an Accreditation Agreement. SSASI averred that it was the one who

hired petitioners and assigned them to work for respondent on occasions that the latter’s work force could not meet

the demands of its customers. Eventually, however, respondent ceased to give job orders to SSASI, constraining the

latter to terminate petitioners’ employment.

Issue: Are Almeda, et al employees of Asahi Glass even considering that they were originally hired by San Sebastian

Allied Services, Inc.?

Held: Yes. Almeda, et al are employees of Asahi Glass.

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or

farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a

definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed

within or outside the premises of the principal. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or

subcontracting if the following conditions concur:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to

perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own

manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with

the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees

entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-

organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.

On the other hand, labor-only contracting , a prohibited act, is an arrangement in which the contractor or

subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. In labor-

only contracting, the following elements are present:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility;

(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor is performing activities

which are directly related to the main business of the principal.

In labor-only contracting , the statutes create an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to

prevent circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered as merely the agent of the principal employer

and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees are directly





employed by the principal employer. Therefore, if SSASI was a labor-only contractor, then respondent shall be

considered as the employer of petitioners who must bear the liability for the dismissal of the latter, if any.

An important element of legitimate job contracting is that the contractor has substantial capital or investment ,

which respondent failed to prove. There is a dearth of evidence to prove that SSASI possessed substantial capital or

investment when respondent began contractual relations with it more than a decade before 2003. The Court did not

find a single financial statement or record to attest to the economic status and financial capacity of SSASI to ventureinto and sustain its own business independent from petitioner.

Furthermore, the Court is unconvinced by respondent’s argument that petitioners were performing jobs that were

not directly related to respondent’s main line of business. Respondent is engaged in glass manufacturing. One of the

petitioners served as a quality controller, while the rest were glass cutters. The only excuse offered by respondent -

that petitioners’ services were required only when there was an increase in the market’s demand with which

respondent could not cope - only prove even more that the services rendered by petitioners were indeed part of the

main business of respondent. It would mean that petitioners supplemented the regular workforce when the latter

could not comply with the market’s demand; necessarily, therefore, petitioners performed the same functions as the

regular workforce. The indispensa bility of petitioners’ services was fortified by the length and continuity of their

performance, lasting for periods ranging from three to 11 years.

More importantly, the Court finds that the crucial element of control over petitioners rested in respondent. The

power of control refers to the authority of the employer to control the employee not only with regard to the result of

work to be done, but also to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. It should be borne in

mind that the power of control refers merely to the existence of the power and not to the actual exercise thereof. It

is not essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee; it is enough that

the former has a right to wield the power.

Petitioners followed the work schedule prepared by respondent. They were required to observe all rules and

regulations of the respondent pertaining to, among other things, the quality of job performance, regularity of job

output, and the manner and method of accomplishing the jobs. Other than being the one who hired petitioners, there

was absolute lack of evidence that SSASI exercised control over them or their work.

The fact that it was SSASI which dismissed petitioners from employment is irrelevant. It is hardly proof of control,

since it was demonstrated only at the end of petitioners’ employment. What is more, the dismissal of petitioners by

SSASI was a mere result of the termination by respondent of its contractual relations with SSASI.

SSASI is a labor-only contractor; hence, it is considered as the agent of respondent. Respondent is deemed by law

as the employer of petitioners.

Equally unavailing is respondent’s stance that its relationship with petitioners should be governed by the

Accreditation Agreement stipulating that petitioners were to remain employees of SSASI and shall not become

regular employees of the respondent. A party cannot dictate, by the mere expedient of a unilateral declaration in a

contract, the character of its business, i.e., whether as labor-only contractor or as job contractor, it being crucial that its

character be measured in terms of and determined by the criteria set by statute

Sasan, Sr et al, vs NLRC and EPCIB (2008) G.R. 176240

Facts:





Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank), a banking entity entered into a Contract for Services with HI, a corporation

primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI

shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The

contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank

at its branch along Gorordo Avenue, Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.

On 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank

and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances, damages,

attorney’s fees and costs; later amended to include a claim for 13th month-pay.

Petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the activities for which

they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than

one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to

perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since

they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.

E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job contractor which hiredand assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services thereat. It was HI that paid

petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct contr ol and

supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank

could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its employees.

HI asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and related

services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners were its employees, part of its

pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on

15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI. HI designated petitioners to new work

assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually

or constructively, thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without basis.

The LA rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess

the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and

responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of

petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.

E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the NLRC. HI submitted before the NLRC several documents which it did

not present before the LA. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first

time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization,

which cannot be considered engaged in ‚labor-only contracting.‛

Issues:

1. W/N HI is a labor-only contactor

2. W/N E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal employer

3. W/N petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.





Held: HI is a legitimate job contractor.

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm

out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite

or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or

outside the premises of the principal. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontractingif the following conditions concur:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to

perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its

own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters

connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the

contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and healthstandards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and

welfare benefits.

In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor

merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. In labor-only

contracting, the following elements are present:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually

perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and

(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor areperforming activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.

In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting, we elucidated

in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission, that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or

investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following:

whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the

skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified

pieces of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer’s power with respect to the

hiring, firing and payment of the contractor’s workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply

premises, tools, appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of payment. Simply

put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered. Each casemust be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.

We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of

Registration Numbered VII-859-1297-048, stating among others that it had complied with the requirements as

provided for under the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules.





The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business from E-PCIBank. The

employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services, clearly distinguishable from

the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.

‚Substantial capital or investment‛ refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations,

tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor orsubcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out. An independent

contractor must have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work

premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment in the form of tools,

equipment, machineries, etc. It is enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI, it has proven both.

Once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial capital, it was no longer necessary to

adduce further evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of ‚labor -only‛ contracting. There is even

no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the activities they performed such as those of

messengerial services are directly related to the principal business of E- PCIBank.

In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners as janitors, messengersand drivers are considered directly related to the principal business of a bank, in this case E-PCIBank, nevertheless,

they are not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s) principal business.

Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employer-employee

relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of payment

of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the putative

employee’s conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the so-called ‚control test.‛

All the circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own responsibility, according

to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the control of the

principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial serviceagreement between E-PCIBank and HI is a case of permissible job contracting.

Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in government

institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special services, ranging from janitorial,

security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate

job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between HI and petitioners which renders HI

liable for the latter’s claims.

In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank regardless of

how long they were working for the latter.

Petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-

PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not

constitute illegal dismissal since, first , petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second , they were pulled out

from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they

filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were only ‚off-detail‛

pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And when they were actually given new assignments by HI

with other clients, petitioners even refused the same.





Purefoods Corp., vs NLRC et al., (2008) G.R. 172241

Facts:

Lolita Neri (Neri) originally filed a claim for nonpayment of additional wage increase, regularization, nonpayment of

service incentive leave, underpayment of 13th month pay, and nonpayment of premium pay for holiday and holiday

pay against Purefoods Corporation (Purefoods). By July 4, 1992, however, Neri was dismissed from her work as a

Deli-Attendant. Subsequently, or on 13 July 1992, eleven (11) other complainants joined forces with Neri and together

they filed an amended complaint, with Neri charging Purefoods with illegal dismissal. All the other complainants,

save for Neri, were still working for Purefoods at the time of the filing of the amended complaint. On August 31,

1993, Labor declared Neri and the complainants as Purefoods' regular employees; and Neri as having been illegally

dismissed and entitled to reinstatement with payment of backwages. Purefoods filed a partial appeal, praying that

the claims of complainants be dismissed for lack of merit, or in the alternative, the case be remanded for formal

hearing on the merits and to implead D.L. Admark as a party-respondent.The NLRC granted the appeal and

remanded the case for further hearings on the factual issues.

The case was remanded to Labor Arbiter, who, after finding that Neri is not an employee of petitioner, but rather of

D.L. Admark, an independent labor contractor , dismissed the complaint. A memorandum on appeal was nominally

filed by all the complainants; the NLRC ruled in complainants' favor and reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's

decision. According to the NLRC, the pieces of evidence on record established the employer-employee relationship

between Purefoods and Neri and the other complainants. Purefoods moved for the reconsideration of the decision

but its motion was denied for lack of merit. Hence, its recourse to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.

The Court of Appeals, relying on the case of Escario v. NLRC , held that D.L. Admark is a legitimate independent

contractor. However, it ruled that complainants are regular employees of Purefoods. Citing Art. 280 of the Labor

Code, the appellate court found that complainants were engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or

desirable in the usual business or trade of Purefoods, and that they were under the control and supervision of

Purefoods' supervisors, and not of D.L. Admark's. It noted that in the Promotions Agreements between D.L. Admarkand Purefoods, there was no mention of the list of D.L. Admark employees who will handle particular promotions

for petitioner, and that complainants' periods of employment are not fully covered by the Promotions Agreements.

Issue: Whether or not Neri and the other complainants are employees of PUREFOODS or A.D. ADMARK’S?

Held: The Court agrees with Purefoods' argument that Art. 280 of the Labor Code finds no application in a trilateral

relationship involving a principal, an independent job contractor, and the latter's employees. Indeed, the Court has

ruled that said provision is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an employment relationship because it

merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees, i.e., regular employees and casual employees, for purposes of

determining the right of an employee to certain benefits, to join or form a union, or to security of tenure; it does not

apply where the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute. It is therefore erroneous on the part of the

Court of Appeals to rely on Art. 280 in determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between

respondent Neri and Purefoods.

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or

farm out with the contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within

a definite or predetermined period regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed

within or outside the premises of the principal. In this arrangement, the following conditions must be met: (a) the

contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own

responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all





matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof; (b) the contractor has substantial capital or

investment; and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees'

entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of

tenure, and social welfare benefits.

To support its position that respondent is not its employee, Purefoods relies on the following: (i) the Promotions

Agreements it entered into with D.L. Admark; (ii) Department Order No. 10 (Series of 1997) which defines legitimatecontracting or subcontracting; and (iii) Escario v. NLRC wherein the Court declared D.L. Admark as a legitimate labor

contractor.

On the other hand, early on, Neri and the rest of the complainants admitted that they worked for petitioner through

D.L. Admark. However, they also averred that they were under the control and supervision of petitioner's

employees–salesmen, poultry sales managers, deli supervisors–who give them work orders and to whom they

submit weekly inventory reports and monthly competitive sales report. In support of these statements, Neri

appended several documents (various Identification Cards, Certification from Rustan's Supermarkets stating that

respondent Neri is from Purefoods, Memoranda to respondent Neri written by a supervisor from

Purefoods, letters from Purefoods area sales managers introducing complainants as Purefoods Merchandisers).

Purefoods, meanwhile, claims that these documents must be taken in the context of the performance of the servicecontracted out–promotion of its products.

In the first place, D.L. Admark's status as a legitimate independent contractor has already been established in Escario

v. NLRC. In the said case, complainants, through D.L. Admark, worked as merchandisers for California

Manufacturing Corporation (CMC). They filed a case before the labor arbiter for the regularization of their

employment status with CMC, and while the case was pending, D.L. Admark sent termination letters to

complainants. The complainants thereafter amended their complaint to include illegal dismissal. The Court

considered the following circumstances as tending to establish D.L. Admark's status as a legitimate job contractor:

1) The SEC registration certificate of D.L. Admark states that it is a firm engaged in promotional,

advertising, marketing and merchandising activities.

2) The service contract between CMC and D.L. Admark clearly provides that the agreement is for the supply

of sales promoting merchandising services rather than one of manpower placement.

3) D.L. Admark was actually engaged in several activities, such as advertising, publication, promotions,

marketing and merchandising. It had several merchandising contracts with companies like Purefoods,

Corona Supply, Nabisco Biscuits, and Licron. It was likewise engaged in the publication business as

evidenced by its magazine the "Phenomenon."

4) It had its own capital assets to carry out its promotion business. It then had current assets amounting to

P6 million and is therefore a highly capitalized venture. It had an authorized capital stock of P500,000.00. It

owned several motor vehicles and other tools, materials and equipment to service its clients. It paid rentals

of P30,020 for the office space it occupied.

Moreover, applying the four-fold test used in determining employer-employee relationship, the Court found that: the

employees therein were selected and hired by D.L. Admark; D.L. Admark paid their salaries, as evidenced by the

payroll prepared by D.L. Admark and sample contribution forms; D.L. Admark had the power of dismissal as it

admitted that it was the one who terminated the employment of the employees; and finally, it was D.L. Admark who

exercised control and supervision over the employees.





Furthermore, it is evident from the Promotions Agreements entered into by Purefoods that D.L. Admark is a

legitimate labor contractor. A sample agreement reads in part:

WHEREAS, The FIRST PARTY is engaged in the general promotion business;

WHEREAS, The SECOND PARTY will launch its "Handog sa Graduates" promotion project;

WHEREAS, The FIRST PARTY has offered its services to the SECOND PARTY, in connection with the said

promotion project, and the latter has accepted the said offer;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and of the mutual convenience between

them, the parties have agreed as follows:

1. The FIRST PARTY shall handle and implement the "Handog sa Graduates" promotion project of

the SECOND PARTY, said project to last from February 1, 1992 to July 31, 1992.

2. The FIRST PARTY shall indemnify the SECOND PARTY for any loss or damage to the latter's

properties, if such loss or damage is due to the fault or negligence of the FIRST PARTY or its agents

or employees.

3. There shall be no employer-employee relationship between the FIRST PARTY or its agents or

employees and the SECOND PARTY.

4. In consideration for the services to be rendered by the FIRST PARTY to the SECOND PARTY,

the latter shall pay the former the amount of Two Million Six Hundred Fifty Two Thousand pesos

only (P2,652,000.00) payable as follows:

The agreements confirm that D.L. Admark is an independent contractor which Purefoods had engaged to supply

general promotion services, and not mere manpower services, to it. The provisions expressly permit D.L. Admark

to handle and implement Purefoods' project, and categorically state that there shall be no employer-employee

relationship between D.L. Admark's employees and Purefoods. While it may be true that complainants were requiredto submit regular reports and were introduced as Purefoods merchandisers, these are not enough to establish

Purefoods' control over them. Even if the report requirements are somehow considered as control measures, they

were imposed only to ensure the effectiveness of the promotion services rendered by D.L. Admark. It would be a rare

contract of service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any intervention whatsoever in

his performance of the engagement.Indeed, it would be foolhardy for any company to completely give the reins and

totally ignore the operations it has contracted out.

Significantly, the pieces of evidence submitted by Neri do not support her claim of having been a regular employee

of Purefoods. We note that two "Statement of Earnings and Deductions"were issued for the same period, December

1989, and in one "Statement," someone deliberately erased the notation "January 1997," thereby casting doubt on the

authenticity of the said documents. Even the identification cards presented by Neri are neither binding on Purefoods

nor even indicative of her claimed employee status of Purefoods, issued as they were by the supermarkets concernedand not by Purefoods itself. Moreover, the check voucher issued by Purefoods marked "IN PAYMENT OF DL

ADMARK DELI ATTENDANTS 12.00 PESOS ADJUSTMENT JAN 30, 1991 TO JUNE 22, 1992," signed and received

by Neri, is proof that Purefoods never considered Neri as its own employee, but rather as one of D.L. Admark's deli

attendants.

We also note that Neri herself admitted in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and in the hearings that she applied with D.L.

Admark and that she worked for Purefoods through D.L. Admark. Neri was aware from the start that D.L. Admark

was her employer and not Purefoods. She had kept her contract with D.L. Admark, and inquired about her





employment status with D.L. Admark. It was D.L. Admark, as her employer, which had the final say in, and which

actually effected, her termination.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that Neri is not an employee of Purefoods, but that of D.L. Admark. In the absence

of employer-employee relations between Neri and Purefoods, the complaint for illegal dismissal and other monetary

claims must fail.

Maranaw Hotels and Resort vs CA (2009) G.R. 149660

Facts:

Oabel was hired by petitioner as an extra beverage attendant. He worked in Century Park Hotel, an establishment

owned by the petitioner. Petitioner contracted with Manila Resource Development Corp or MANRED.

Oabel was transferred to MANRED with the latter deporting itself as her employer. Oabel worked as secretary,public relations, gift shop attendant, waitress and shop attendant. Oabel filed a petition for regularization of

employment. She was dismissed from employment.

Petitioner argues that it entered into a service agreement with MANRED. MANRED maintains that Oabel is its

employee and was willing to reinstate her.

Held: Notably, private respondent’s purported employment with MANRED commenced only in 1996, way after she

was hired by the petitioner as extra beverage attendant on April 24, 1995. There is thus much credence in the private

respondent’s claim that the service agreement executed between the petitioner and MANRED is a mere ploy to

circumvent the law on employment, in particular that which pertains on regularization.

In this regard, it has not escaped the notice of the Court that the operations of the hotel itself do not cease with theend of each event or function and that there is an ever present need for individuals to perform certain tasks necessary

in the petitioner’s business. Thus, although the tasks themselves may vary, the need for sufficient manpower to carry

them out does not. In any event, as borne out by the findings of the NLRC, the petitioner determines the nature of the

tasks to be performed by the private respondent, in the process exercising control.

This being so, the Court finds no difficulty in sustaining the finding of the NLRC that MANRED is a labor-only

contractor. Concordantly, the real employer of private respondent Oabel is the petitioner.

It appears further that private respondent has already rendered more than one year of service to the petitioner, for

the period 1995-1998, for which she must already be considered a regular employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the

Labor Code:

Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and

regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has

been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the

employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or

termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or

service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.





An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That any

employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be

considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall

continue while such activity exists. (Emphasis supplied)

Cola-Cola Bottler’s Phils., vs Agito et al., (2009) G.R. 179546

Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and

engaged in manufacturing, bottling and distributing soft drink beverages and other allied products.

Respondents filed before the NLRC two complaints against petitioner, Interserve, Peerless Integrated Services, Inc.,

Better Builders, Inc., and Excellent Partners, Inc. for reinstatement with backwages, regularization, nonpayment of

13th month pay, and damages.

Respondents alleged in their Position Paper that they were salesmen assigned at the Lagro Sales Office of petitioner.They had been in the employ of petitioner for years, but were not regularized. Their employment was terminated

without just cause and due process. However, they failed to state the reason/s for filing a complaint against

Interserve; Peerless Integrated Services, Inc.; Better Builders, Inc.; and Excellent Partners, Inc.

Petitioner filed its Position Paper (with Motion to Dismiss), where it averred that respondents were employees of

Interserve who were tasked to perform contracted services in accordance with the provisions of the Contract of

Services executed between petitioner and Interserve. Said Contract between petitioner and Interserve, covering the

period of 1 April 2002 to 30 September 2002, constituted legitimate job contracting, given that the latter was a bona fide

independent contractor with substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, and machinery

necessary in the conduct of its business.

To prove the status of Interserve as an independent contractor, petitioner presented the following pieces of evidence:

(1) the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve; (2) the Certificate of Registration of Interserve with the Bureau of

Internal Revenue; (3) the Income Tax Return, with Audited Financial Statements, of Interserve for 2001; and (4) the

Certificate of Registration of Interserve as an independent job contractor, issued by the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE).

As a result, petitioner asserted that respondents were employees of Interserve, since it was the latter which hired

them, paid their wages, and supervised their work, as proven by: (1) respondents’ Personal Data Files in the records

of Interserve; (2) respondents’ Contract of Temporary Employment with Interserve; and (3) the payroll records of

Interserve.

Petitioner, thus, sought the dismissal of respondents’ complaint against it on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did

not acquire jurisdiction over the same in the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and

the respondents.

Petitioner argues that there could not have been labor-only contracting, since respondents did not perform activities

that were indispensable to petitioner’s principal business. And, even assuming that they did, such fact alone does not

establish an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the respondents, since respondents were unable





to show that petitioner exercised the power to select and hire them, pay their wages, dismiss them, and control their

conduct.

Issue: WON Interserve is a legitimate job contractor.

Held: Interserve is not a legitimate job contractor.

Article 106. Contractor or subcontractor. - Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the

performance of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be





employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect therights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restriction, he may make appropriate distinctions




There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employee does not have substantial





The afore-quoted provision recognizes two possible relations among the parties: (1) the permitted legitimate job

contract, or (2) the prohibited labor-only contracting.

A legitimate job contract, wherein an employer enters into a contract with a job contractor for the performance of the

former’s work, is permitted by law. Thus, the employer-employee relationship between the job contractor and his

employees is maintained. In legitimate job contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between

the employer and the contractor’s employees only for a limited purpose, i.e. , to ensure that the employees are paid

their wages. The employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the

employees’ wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the employer is not responsible for

any claim made by the contractor’s employees.

On the other hand, labor-only contracting is an arrangement wherein the contractor merely acts as an agent in

recruiting and supplying the principal employer with workers for the purpose of circumventing labor law provisions

setting down the rights of employees. It is not condoned by law. A finding by the appropriate authorities that a

contractor is a "labor-only" contractor establishes an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer

and the contractor’s employees and the former becomes solidarily liable for all the rightful claims of the employees.

Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the guidelines in





determining whether labor-only contracting exists:

Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this

purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits,

supplies, or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are

present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work, or

service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are

performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of the contractual employee.

The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of the Labor Code, as

amended.

"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations,tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or

subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work, or service contracted out.

The "right to control" shall refer to the right reversed to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers


that end. (Emphasis supplied.)

When there is labor-only contracting, Section 7 of the same implementing rules, describes the consequences thereof:

Section 7. Existence of an employer-employee relationship.—The contractor or subcontractor shall be considered the

employer of the contractual employee for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code and other sociallegislation. The principal, however, shall be solidarily liable with the contractor in the event of any violation of any

provision of the Labor Code, including the failure to pay wages.

The principal shall be deemed the employer of the contractual employee in any of the following case, as declared by a

competent authority:

a. where there is labor-only contracting; or

b. where the contracting arrangement falls within the prohibitions provided in Section 6 (Prohibitions) hereof.

Labor-only contracting would give rise to: (1) the creation of an employer-employee relationship between theprincipal and the employees of the contractor or sub-contractor; and (2) the solidary liability of the principal and the

contractor to the employees in the event of any violation of the Labor Code.

The law clearly establishes an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the contr actor’s

employee upon a finding that the contractor is engaged in "labor-only" contracting. Article 106 of the Labor Code

categorically states: "There is ‘labor-only’ contracting where the person supplying workers to an employee does not

have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others,





and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the

principal business of such employer." Thus, performing activities directly related to the principal business of the

employer is only one of the two indicators that "labor-only" contracting exists; the other is lack of substantial capital

or investment. The Court finds that both indicators exist in the case at bar.

Interserve did not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, and workpremises; and respondents, its supposed employees, performed work which was directly related to the principal

business of petitioner. Interserve falls under the definition of a "labor-only" contractor, under Article 106 of the Labor

Code; as well as Section 5(i) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Interserve is a labor-only contractor under Section 5(ii) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code,

as amended, since it did not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of respondents.

Paragraph 3 of the Contract specified that the personnel of contractor Interserve, which included the respondents,

would comply with "CLIENT" as well as "CLIENT’s policies, rules and regulations." It even required Interserve

personnel to subject themselves to on-the-spot searches by petitioner or its duly authorized guards or security men

on duty every time the said personnel entered and left the premises of petitioner. Said paragraph explicitlyestablished the control of petitioner over the conduct of respondents. Although under paragraph 4 of the same

Contract, Interserve warranted that it would exercise the necessary and due supervision of the work of its personnel,

there is a dearth of evidence to demonstrate the extent or degree of supervision exercised by Interserve over

respondents or the manner in which it was actually exercised. There is even no showing that Interserve had

representatives who supervised respondents’ work while they were in the premises of petitioner.

Also significant was the right of petitioner under paragraph 2 of the Contract to "request the replacement of the

CONTRACTOR’S personnel." True, this right was conveniently qualified by the phrase "if from its judgment, the jobs

or the projects being done could not be completed within the time specified or that the quality of the desired result is

not being achieved," but such qualification was rendered meaningless by the fact that the Contract did not stipulate

what work or job the personnel needed to complete, the time for its completion, or the results desired. The saidprovision left a gap which could enable petitioner to demand the removal or replacement of any employee in the

guise of his or her inability to complete a project in time or to deliver the desired result. The power to recommend

penalties or dismiss workers is the strongest indication of a company’s right of control as direct

employer.1avvphil.zw+

Paragraph 4 of the same Contract, in which Interserve warranted to petitioner that the former would provide

relievers and replacements in case of absences of its personnel, raises another red flag. An independent job

contractor, who is answerable to the principal only for the results of a certain work, job, or service need not guarantee

to said principal the daily attendance of the workers assigned to the latter. An independent job contractor would

surely have the discretion over the pace at which the work is performed, the number of employees required to

complete the same, and the work schedule which its employees need to follow.

the Contract of Services between Interserve and petitioner did not identify the work needed to be performed and the

final result required to be accomplished. Instead, the Contract specified the type of workers Interserve must provide

petitioner ("Route Helpers, Salesmen, Drivers, Clericals, Encoders & PD") and their qualifications

(technical/vocational course graduates, physically fit, of good moral character, and have not been convicted of any

crime). The Contract also states that, "to carry out the undertakings specified in the immediately preceding

paragraph, the CONTRACTOR shall employ the necessary personnel," thus, acknowledging that Interserve did not





yet have in its employ the personnel needed by petitioner and would still pick out such personnel based on the

criteria provided by petitioner. In other words, Interserve did not obligate itself to perform an identifiable job, work,

or service for petitioner, but merely bound itself to provide the latter with specific types of employees. These

contractual provisions strongly indicated that Interserve was merely a recruiting and manpower agency providing

petitioner with workers performing tasks directly related to the latter’s principal business.

Interserve was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting, petitioner shall be deemed the true employer of

respondents. As regular employees of petitioner, respondents cannot be dismissed except for just or authorized

causes, none of which were alleged or proven to exist in this case, the only defense of petitioner against the charge of

illegal dismissal being that respondents were not its employees.

South Davao Development Co. vs Gamo (2009) G.R. 171814

Facts:

Petitioner South Davao Development Company is the operator of a coconut and mango farm in San Isidro, Davao

Oriental and Inawayan/Baracatan, Davao del Sur.

On 1963 petitioner hired respondent Sergio L. Gamo (Gamo) as a foreman. Sometime in 1987, petitioner appointed

Gamo as a copra maker contractor. Respondents Ernesto Belleza, Carlos Rojas, Maximo Malinao were all employees

in petitioner’s coconut farm, while respondents Felix Terona, Virgilio Cosep, Maximo Tolda, and Nelson Bagaan

were assigned to petitioner’s mango farm. All of the abovenamed respondents (copra workers) were later transferred

by petitioner to Gamo as the latter’s copraceros.

From 1987 to 1999, Gamo and petitioner entered into a profit-sharing agreement wherein 70% of the net proceeds of

the sale of copra went to petitioner and 30% to Gamo. The copra workers were paid by Gamo from his 30% share.

Petitioner wanted to standardize payments to its "contractors" in its coconut farms. Petitioner proposed a new

payment scheme to Gamo. The new scheme provided a specific price for each copra making activity. Gamo

submitted his counter proposal. Petitioner did not accept Gamo’s counter proposal since it was higher by at least fifty

percent (50%) from its original offer.

Without agreeing to the new payment scheme, Gamo and his copra workers started to do harvesting work. Petitioner

told them to stop. Eventually, petitioner and Gamo agreed that the latter may continue with the harvest provided

that it would be his last "contract" with petitioner. Gamo suggested to petitioner to look for a new "contractor" since

he was not amenable to the new payment scheme.

Gamo and petitioner failed to agree on a payment scheme, thus, petitioner did not renew the "contract" of Gamo.

Gamo and the copra workers alleged that they were illegally dismissed.

On the other hand, respondent Eleonor Cosep (Eleonor) was employed as a mango classifier in the packing house of

petitioner’s mango farm in San Isidro, Davao Oriental. Sometime in October 1999, she did not report for work as she

had wanted to raise and sell pigs instead. Petitioner, through Malone Pacquiao, tried to convince Eleonor to report

for work but to no avail.





Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. They alleged that sometime in December 1999,

petitioner verbally terminated them en masse.

Issues:

(1) whether there is a valid job contracting between petitioner and Gamo; and

(2) whether Eleonor had effectively abandoned her work.

Held: To establish the existence of an independent contractor, we apply the following conditions:

first, the contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account under

his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer

or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except to the result thereof; and

second, the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work

premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his business.

Gamo and the copra workers did not exercise independent judgment in the performance of their tasks. The toolsused by Gamo and his copra workers like the karit, bolo, pangbunot, panglugit and pangtapok are not sufficient to

enable them to complete the job. Reliance on these primitive tools is not enough. In fact, the accomplishment of their

task required more expensive machineries and equipment, like the trucks to haul the harvests and the drying facility,

which petitioner corporation owns.

SC also ruled that there exist employer- employee relationship applying the 4 fold test especially the control power

exercised by petitioner wherein petitioner corporation transferred the copra workers from their previous assignments

to work as copraceros. It was also in the exercise of the same power that petitioner corporation put Gamo in charge of

the copra workers although under a different payment scheme. Thus, it is clear that an employer-employee

relationship has existed between petitioner corporation and respondents since the beginning and such relationship

did not cease despite their reassignments and the change of payment scheme.

3.) It is well settled that abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate and unjustified

refusal of the employee to return for work. Two elements must be present, namely:

(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and

(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.

The second element is more determinative of the intent and must be evinced by overt acts. Mere absence, not being

sufficient, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the employee clearly and deliberately intended

to discontinue her employment without any intention of returning. In Samarca v. Arc-Men Industries, Inc, we held

that abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts.

An employee who takes steps to protest her layoff cannot be said to have abandoned her work because a charge

of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so when it

includes a prayer for reinstatement. When Eleonor filed the illegal dismissal complaint, it totally negated petitioner’s

theory of abandonment.

Also, to effectively dismiss an employee for abandonment, the employer must comply with the due process

requirement of sending notices to the employee. In Brahm Industries, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled that this requirement is

not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it





constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man’s innate sense of justice. Petitioner was not able to

send the necessary notice requirement to Eleonor. Based on the foregoing, Eleonor did not abandon her work.

Jethro Intelligence & Security Corp., vs Secretary of DOLE (2009) G.R. 172537

Facts:

Petitioner Jethro Intelligence and Security Corporation (Jethro) is a security service contractor with a security service

contract agreement with co-petitioner Yakult Phils., Inc. (Yakult). On the basis of a complaint filed by respondent

Frederick Garcia (Garcia), one of the security guards deployed by Jethro, for underpayment of wages, legal/special

holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, 13th month pay, and night shift differential, the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE)-Regional Office No. IV conducted an inspection at Yakult’s premises in Calamba, Laguna in the

course of which several labor standards violations were noted, including keeping of payrolls and daily time records

in the main office, underpayment of wages, overtime pay and other benefits, and non-registration with the DOLE as

required under Department Order No. 18-02.

Hearings on Garcia’s complaint and on the subsequent complaints of his co -respondents Gil Cordero et al. wereconducted during which Jethro submitted copies of payrolls covering June 16 to 30, 2003, February to May 16-31,

2004, June 16-30, 2003, and February 1-15, 2004. Jethro failed to submit daily time records of the claimants from 2002

to June 2004, however, despite the order for it to do so.

By Order of September 9, 2004, the DOLE Regional Director, noting petitioners’ failure to rectify the violations noted

during the above-stated inspection within the period given for the purpose, found them jointly and severally liable to

herein respondents for the aggregate amount of EIGHT HUNDRED NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TEN

AND 16/100 PESOS (P809,210.16) representing their wage differentials, regular holiday pay, special day premium

pay, 13th month pay, overtime pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differential premium and rest day

premium. Petitioners were also ordered to submit proof of payment to the claimants within ten calendar days,

failing which the entire award would be doubled, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8188, and the corresponding writs of

execution and garnishment would be issued.

Issues:

1. Whether the SOLE has no jurisdiction over the case because, following Article 129 of the Labor Code, the

aggregate money claim of each employee exceeded P5,000.00.

2. Whether petitioner Jethro, as the admitted employer of respondents, could not be expected to keep

payrolls and daily time records in Yakult’s premises as its office is in Quezon City, hence, the inspection

conducted in Yakult’s plant had no basis.

3. Whether or not the issuance of the questioned writs of execution and garnishment by the DOLE-Regional

Director was in order.

Held: While it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear

and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions do not

contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized

representatives. Rather, said powers are defined and set forth in Article 128 of the Labor Code (as amended by R.A.No. 7730).

Art. 128 explicitly excludes from its coverage Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code by the phrase

‚(N)otwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary xxx‛ thereby retaining and

further strengthening the power of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representative to issue compliance

orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of said Code and other labor legislation based on the findings

of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection





In the case at bar, the Secretary of Labor correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case as it does not come under the

exception clause in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code. While petitioner Jethro appealed the inspection results and there is

a need to examine evidentiary matters to resolve the issues raised, the payrolls presented by it were considered in the

ordinary course of inspection. While the employment records of the employees could not be expected to be found in

Yakult’s premises in Calamba, as Jethro’s offices are in Quezon City, the records show that Jethro was given ample

opportunity to present its payrolls and other pertinent documents during the hearings and to rectify the violations

noted during the ocular inspection. It, however, failed to do so, more particularly to submit competent proof that itwas giving its security guards the wages and benefits mandated by law.

Jethro’s failure to keep payrolls and daily time records in Yakult’s premises was not the only labor standard violation

found to have been committed by it; it likewise failed to register as a service contractor with the DOLE, pursuant to

Department Order No. 18-02 and, as earlier stated, to pay the wages and benefits in accordance with the rates

prescribed by law.

It bears emphasis that the SOLE, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercises quasi-judicial power, at

least to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor

legislation. He/she or the Regional Directors can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement

thereof. The significance of and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary is enunciated in

Article 128 of the Labor Code.

And Sec. 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices provides that

the filing of a petition for certiorari shall not stay the execution of the appealed order or decision, unless the

aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order (TRO) from the Court. In the case at bar, no TRO or injunction

was issued, hence, the issuance of the questioned writs of execution and garnishment by the DOLE-Regional Director

was in order.

Traveno et al., vs Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Coop et al., (2009) G.R. 164205

Facts:

Petitioners asseverated that while they worked under the direct control of supervisors assigned by TACOR and DFI,

these companies used different schemes to make it appear that petitioners were hired through independentcontractors, including individuals, unregistered associations, and cooperatives; that the successive changes in the

names of their employers notwithstanding, they continued to perform the same work under the direct control of

TACOR and DFI supervisors; and that under the last scheme adopted by these companies, the nominal individual

contractors were required to, as they did, join a cooperative and thus became members of respondent Bobongon

Banana Growers Multi-purpose Cooperative.

Issue: WON the relationship that exist between parties is job contracting.

Held: To the Court, the Contract between the Cooperative and DFI, far from being a job contracting arrangement, is

in essence a business partnership that partakes of the nature of a joint venture. The rules on job contracting are,

therefore, inapposite. The Court may not alter the intention of the contracting parties as gleaned from their

stipulations without violating the autonomy of contracts principle under Article 1306 of the Civil Code which gives

the contracting parties the utmost liberality and freedom to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditionsas they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or public

policy.

Aliviado vs Procter and Gamble Phils. Inc., et al (2010) G.R. 160506

Facts:





Petitioners worked as merchandisers of P&G from various dates, allegedly starting as early as 1982 or as late as June

1991, to either May 5, 1992 or March 11, 1993. They all individually signed employment contracts with either Promm-

Gem or SAPS for periods of more or less five months at a time. They were assigned at different outlets, supermarkets

and stores where they handled all the products of P&G. They received their wages from Promm-Gem or SAPS.

SAPS and Promm-Gem imposed disciplinary measures on erring merchandisers for reasons such as habitual

absenteeism, dishonesty or changing day-off without prior notice.

P&G is principally engaged in the manufacture and production of different consumer and health products, which it

sells on a wholesale basis to various supermarkets and distributors. To enhance consumer awareness and acceptance

of the products, P&G entered into contracts with Promm-Gem and SAPS for the promotion and merchandising of its

products.

In December 1991, petitioners filed a complaint against P&G for regularization, service incentive leave pay and other

benefits with damages. The complaint was later amended to include the matter of their subsequent dismissal.

On November 29, 1996, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and ruled that there was no

employer-employee relationship between petitioners and P&G. He found that the selection and engagement of the

petitioners, the payment of their wages, the power of dismissal and control with respect to the means and methods

by which their work was accomplished, were all done and exercised by Promm-Gem/SAPS. He further found that

Promm-Gem and SAPS were legitimate independent job contractors.

Appealing to the NLRC, petitioners disputed the Labor Arbiter’s findings. On July 27, 1998, the NLRC rendered a

Decision dismissing their appeal. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. However, said

petition was also denied by the CA.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not Promm-Gem and SAPS are labor-only contractors.

Held: Promm-Gem is an independent contractor however, SAPS is a labor-only contractor.

The pertinent Labor Code provision on the matter states:

ART. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. – Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the

performance of the former’s work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be




of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directlyemployed by him.



recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of







Rule VIII-A, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by Department Order No. 18-

02, distinguishes between legitimate and labor-only contracting:

Section 3. Trilateral Relationship in Contracting Arrangements. In legitimate contracting, there exists a trilateral

relationship under which there is a contract for a specific job, work or service between the principal and the

contractor or subcontractor, and a contract of employment between the contractor or subcontractor and its workers.

Hence, there are three parties involved in these arrangements, the principal which decides to farm out a job or service

to a contractor or subcontractor, the contractor or subcontractor which has the capacity to independently undertake

the performance of the job, work or service, and the contractual workers engaged by the contractor or subcontractor

to accomplish the job, work or service.

Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this

purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits,

supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are

present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work or

service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor areperforming activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) [T]he contractor does not exercise the right to control over the performance of the work of the contractual

employee.

The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248 (c) of the Labor Code, as

amended.

"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations,

tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or

subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.

The "right to control" shall refer to the right reserved to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers


that end.

Clearly, the law and its implementing rules allow contracting arrangements for the performance of specific jobs,

works or services. Indeed, it is management prerogative to farm out any of its activities, regardless of whether such

activity is peripheral or core in nature. However, in order for such outsourcing to be valid, it must be made to an

independent contractor because the current labor rules expressly prohibit labor-only contracting.

In the instant case, the financial statements of Promm-Gem show that it has authorized capital stock of P1 million and

a paid-in capital, or capital available for operations, of P500,000.00 as of 1990. It also has long term assets worth

P432,895.28 and current assets of P719,042.32. Promm-Gem has also proven that it maintained its own warehouse and

office space with a floor area of 870 square meters. It also had under its name three registered vehicles which were

used for its promotional/merchandising business. Promm-Gem also has other clients aside from P&G. Under the

circumstances, we find that Promm-Gem has substantial investment which relates to the work to be performed.

These factors negate the existence of the element specified in Section 5(i) of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02. The

records also show that Promm-Gem supplied its complainant-workers with the relevant materials, such as markers,

tapes, liners and cutters, necessary for them to perform their work. Promm-Gem also issued uniforms to them. It is

also relevant to mention that Promm-Gem already considered the complainants working under it as its regular, not





merely contractual or project, employees. This circumstance negates the existence of element (ii) as stated in Section 5

of DOLE Department Order No. 18-02, which speaks of contractual employees. This, furthermore, negates – on the

part of Promm-Gem – bad faith and intent to circumvent labor laws which factors have often been tipping points that

lead the Court to strike down the employment practice or agreement concerned as contrary to public policy, morals,

good customs or public order.

Under the circumstances, Promm-Gem cannot be considered as a labor-only contractor. We find that it is a legitimate

independent contractor.

On the other hand, the Articles of Incorporation of SAPS shows that it has a paid-in capital of only P31,250.00. There

is no other evidence presented to show how much its working capital and assets are. Furthermore, there is no

showing of substantial investment in tools, equipment or other assets.

In Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that "[w]ith the current economic atmosphere in

the country, the paid-in capitalization of PMCI amounting to P75,000.00 cannot be considered as substantial capital

and, as such, PMCI cannot qualify as an independent contractor."Applying the same rationale to the present case, it is

clear that SAPS – having a paid-in capital of only P31,250 - has no substantial capital. SAPS’ lack of substantial capital

is underlined by the records which show that its payroll for its merchandisers alone for one month would alreadytotal P44,561.00. It had 6-month contracts with P&G. Yet SAPS failed to show that it could complete the 6-month

contracts using its own capital and investment. Its capital is not even sufficient for one month’s payroll. SAPS failed

to show that its paid-in capital of P31,250.00 is sufficient for the period required for it to generate its needed revenue

to sustain its operations independently. Substantial capital refers to capitalization used in the performance or

completion of the job, work or service contracted out. In the present case, SAPS has failed to show substantial capital.

Furthermore, the petitioners have been charged with the merchandising and promotion of the products of P&G, an

activity that has already been considered by the Court as doubtlessly directly related to the manufacturing business,

which is the principal business of P&G. Considering that SAPS has no substantial capital or investment and the

workers it recruited are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of P&G, we find that

the former is engaged in "labor-only contracting".

"Where ‘labor-only’ contracting exists, the Labor Code itself establishes an employer-employee relationship between

the employer and the employees of the ‘labor-only’ contractor." The statute establishes this relationship for a

comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of

the principal employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees

had been directly employed by the principal employer.

Consequently, petitioners recruited and supplied by SAPS -- which engaged in labor-only contracting -- are

considered as the employees of P&G while those having worked under, and been dismissed by Promm-Gem, are

considered the employees of Promm-Gem, not of P&G.

DBP vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 108031

Facts:

In September 1983, petitioner Development Bank of the Philippines, as mortgagee of TPWII, foreclosed its plant

facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, TPWII continued its business operations interrupted only by brief shutdowns

for the purpose of servicing its plant facilities and equipment. In January 1986 petitioner took possession of the





foreclosed properties. From then on the company ceased its operations. As a consequence private respondent Leonor

A. Ang was on 15 April 1986 verbally terminated from the service.

After hearing on a complaint for separation pay, 13th month pay, vacation and sick leave pay, salaries and

allowances against TPWII, its General Manager, and petitioner, the Labor Arbiter found TPWII primarily liable to

private respondent but only for her separation pay and vacation and sick leave pay because her claims for unpaid

wages and 13th month pay were later paid after the complaint was filed. The General Manager was absolved of any

liability. But with respect to petitioner, it was held subsidiarily liable in the event the company failed to satisfy the

judgment. The Labor Arbiter rationalized that the right of an employee to be paid benefits due him from the

properties of his employer is superior to the right of the latter's mortgagee, citing this Court's resolution in PNB v.

Delta Motor Workers Union.

On 16 November 1992 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission affirmed the ruling of the Labor

Arbiter.Petitioner argues that the decision of public respondent runs counter to the consistent rulings of this Court in

a long line of cases emphasizing that the applicant of Art. 110 of the Labor Code is contingent upon the institution of

bankruptcy or judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, which refers to worker preference in case of

bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, is applicable to the present case notwithstanding the absence of

any formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of TPWII.

Held: Article 110 is applicable NOT applicable in the absence of any formal declaration of bankruptcy or judicial

liquidation of TPWII.We hold that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision of the

Labor Arbiter. Art. 110 should not be treated apart from other laws but applied in conjunction with the pertinent

provisions of the Civil Code and the Insolvency Law to the extent that piece-meal distribution of the assets of the

debtor is avoided. Art. 110, then prevailing, provides:

ARTICLE 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of

an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services

rendered during the period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation, any provision to the contrary

notwithstanding. Unpaid wages shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a

share in the assets of the employer.

Complementing Art. 110, Sec. 10, Rule VIII, Book III, of the Revised Rules and Regulations Implementing

the Labor Code provides:

SECTION 10. Payment of wages in case of bankruptcy. — Unpaid wages earned by the employees

before the declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of the employer's business shall be given first

preference and shall be paid in full before other creditors may establish any claim to a share in the assets of

the employer.

We interpreted this provision in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos to mean that —

. . . a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial liquidation must be present before the worker's preference may be

enforced. Thus, Article 110 of the Labor Code and its implementing rule cannot be invoked by the respondents in this

case absent a formal declaration of bankruptcy or a liquidation order . . .





The rationale is that to hold Art. 110 to be applicable also to extrajudicial proceedings would be putting the worker in

a better position than the State which could only assert its own prior preference in case of a judicial proceeding. Art.

110, which was amended by R.A. 6715 effective 21 March 1989, now reads:

ARTICLE 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of

an employer's business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other

monetary claims, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages and monetary

claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid.

Obviously, the amendment expanded the concept of "worker preference" to cover not only unpaid wages but also

other monetary claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate. The Rules and

Regulations Implementing R.A. 6715, approved 24 May 1989, also amended the corresponding implementing rule,

and now reads:

SECTION 10. Payment of wages and other monetary claims in case of bankruptcy. — In case of

bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's business, the unpaid wages and other monetary claims of the

employees shall be given first preference and shall be paid in full before the claims of government and other

creditors may be paid.

Although the terms "declaration" (of bankruptcy) or "judicial" (liquidation) have been notably eliminated, still in

Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC , this Court did not alter its original position that the right to

preference given to workers under Art. 110 cannot exist in any effective way prior to the time of its presentation in

distribution proceedings. In effect, we reiterated our previous interpretation in Development Bank of the Philippines

v. Santos where we said:

It (worker preference) will find application when, in proceedings such as insolvency, such unpaid wages shall be

paid in full before the 'claims of the Government and other creditors' may be paid. But, for an orderly settlement of a

debtor's assets, all creditors must be convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and thereafter the

preferences determined in the course of judicial proceedings which have for their object the subjection of the

property of the debtor to the payment of his debts or other lawful obligations. Thereby, an orderly determination of

preference of creditors' claims is assured (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, No. L-33929, September 2, 1983, 124

SCRA 476); the adjudication made will be binding on all parties-in-interest since those proceedings are proceedings

in rem; and the legal scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency

Law, and the Labor Code is preserved in harmony.

In ruling, as we did, in Development Bank of the Philippines v. Santos, we took into account the following

pronouncements:In the event of insolvency, a principal objective should be to effect an equitable distribution of the

insolvent's property among his creditors. To accomplish this there must first be some proceeding where notice to all

of the insolvent's creditors may be given and where the claims of preferred creditors may be bindingly adjudicated.

The rationale therefore has been expressed in the recent case of DBP v. Secretary of Labor (G.R. No. 79351, 28

November 1989), which we quote:

A preference of credit bestows upon the preferred creditor an advantage of having his credit satisfied first ahead of

other claims which may be established against the debtor. Logically, it becomes material only when the properties

and assets of the debtors are insufficient to pay his debts in full; for if the debtor is amply able to pay his various

creditors in full, how can the necessity exist to determine which of his creditors shall be paid first or whether they

shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale (of) the debtor's specific property. Indubitably, the preferential right of







On February 5, 1987, private respondents who are employees of petitioner Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc. (BBGMI),

filed a complaint against BBGMI for non-payment of basic pay and allowances pursuant to Wage Orders Nos. 2 and

5, 13th month pay for 1985, 1986 and 1987, non-payment of salaries, vacation and sick leave and salaries of employees

who were placed on forced leave since November 1985.

Upon motion of private respondents, an inspection was conducted on BBGMI. The Regional Director adopted the

recommendation of the Labor Standards and Welfare Officers and he issued an Order dated July 31, 1987 directing

BBGMI to pay to private respondent the sum of P4,818,746.40.

A writ of execution was issued and some of the properties of BBGMI were seized and sold at public auction. Finally,

BBGMI posted a supersedeas bond which restrained further enforcement of the writ of execution. BBGMI appealed

the Order dated July 31, 1987 of the Regional Director to public respondent Undersecretary Labor and Employment

Dionisio dela Serna claiming that the Regional Director had no jurisdiction over the case.

Acting thereon, the public respondent issued an Order dated September 16, 1988 upholding the jurisdiction of the

Regional Director and annulling all the auction sales for nsufficiency of price. Consequently, motions for intervention

were filed by MFT Corp. as the highest bidder in the auction sale conducted on October 29, 1987, and Salter Holdings

Pty. Ltd. claiming that MFT Corp. had already assigned its rights over the subject properties in its favor.

The said motions were granted by the public respondent and in his order dated December 14, 1988 it directed the

exclusion from annulment of the properties sold at the October 29, 1987 auction sale as claimed by the intervenors.

Hence, this petition which questioned the jurisdiction of the Regional Director over the complaint and whether or not

the auction sales conducted are valid.

The Court ruled that the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the BBGMI employees. The subject labor standards

case of the petition arose from the visitorial and enforcement powers by the Regional Director of the Department of

Labor and Employment (DOLE). Labor standards refers to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws,

rules and regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and welfare

benefits, including occupational, safety and health standards. Labor standards cases are governed by Article 128 (b)

of the Labor Code.

Issue: Whether or not the auction sales conducted by Special Sheriff Ramos valid to satisfy the judgment award.

Held: The auction sales in the first order were invalid but on different grounds. The auction sale in the second order.

It bears stressing that the writ of execution issued by the Regional Director led to the several auction sales conducted

on September 24, 1987, October 2, 1987, October 23, 1987, October 29, 1987 and October 30, 1987.

In the first Order of public respondent, the five (5) auction sales were declared null and void. As the public

respondent put it, "the scandalously low price for which the personal properties of the respondent were sold leads us

to no other recourse but to invalidate the auction sales conducted by the special sheriff."

In the September 16, 1988 Order of public respondent, the personal properties and corresponding prices for which

they were sold were to satisfy the judgment award in the amount of P4,818,746.00."

As a general rule, findings of fact and conclusion of law arrived at by quasi-judicial agencies are not to be disturbed

absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same. But in the case under scrutiny, there was grave

abuse of discretion when the public respondent, without any evidentiary support, adjudged such prices as

"scandalously low". He merely relied on the self-serving assertion by the petitioner that the value of the auctioned

properties was more than the price bid. Obviously, this ratiocination did not suffice to set aside the auction sales. The





presumption of regularity in the performance of official function is applicable here. Conformably, any party alleging

irregularity vitiating auction sales must come forward with clear and convincing proof.

Furthermore, it is a well-settled principle that: "Mere inadequacy of price is not, of itself sufficient ground to set

aside an execution sale where the sale is regular, proper and legal in other respects, the parties stand on an equal

footing, there are no confidential relation between them, there is no element of fraud, unfairness, or oppression, and

there is no misconduct, accident, mistake or surprise connected with, and tending to cause, the inadequacy."

Consequently, in declaring the nullity of the subject auction sales on the ground of inadequacy of price, the public

respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

But, this is not to declare the questioned auction sales as valid. The same are null and void since on the properties of

petitioner involved was constituted a mortgage between petitioner and the Development Bank of the Philippines.

The aforementioned documents were executed between the petitioner and Development Bank of the Philippines

(DBP) even prior to the filing of the complaint of petitioner's employees. The properties having been mortgaged to

DBP, the applicable law is Section 14 of Executive Order No. 81, dated 3 December 1986, otherwise known as the

"The 1986 Revised Charter of the Development Bank of the Philippines," which exempts the properties of petitioner

mortgaged to DBP from attachment or execution sales. Section 14 of E.O. 81, reads:

"SECTION 14. Exemption from Attachment. — The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding,

securities on loans and/or other accommodations granted by the Bank or its predecessor-in-interest shall not be

subject to attachment, execution or any other court process, nor shall they be included in the property of insolvent

persons or institutions, unless all debts and obligations of the Bank or its predecessor-in-interest, penalties, collection

of expenses, and other charges, subject to the provisions of paragraph (e) of Sec. 9 of this Charter."

Private respondents contend that even if subject properties were mortgaged to DBP (now under Asset Privatization

Trust), Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, applies just the same. According to them, the said

provision of law grants preference to money claims of workers over and above all credits of the petitioner. This

contention is untenable. In the case of DBP vs. NLRC, the Supreme Court held that the workers preference regarding

wages and other monetary claims under Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended, contemplates bankruptcy or

liquidation proceedings of the employer's business. What is more, it does not disregard the preferential lien of

mortgagees considered as preferred credits under the provisions of the New Civil Code on the classification,

concurrence and preference of credits.

It is well to remember that the said properties were transferred to the intervenors, when Fidel Bermudez, the highest

bidder at the auction sale, sold the properties to MFT Corporation which, in turn, sold the same properties to Salter

Holdings Pty., Ltd. Public respondent opined that the contract of sale between the intervenors and the highest bidder

should be respected as these sales took place during the interregnum after the auction sale was conducted on October

29, 1987 and before the issuance of the first disputed Order declaring all the auction sales null and void.

On this issue, the Court rules otherwise.As regards personal properties, the general rule is that title, like a stream,

cannot rise higher than its source. Consequently, a seller without title cannot transfer a title better than what he

holds. MFT Corporation and Salter Holdings Pty., Ltd. trace their title from Fidel Bermudez, who was the highest

bidder of a void auction sale over properties exempt from execution. Such being the case, the subsequent sale made

by him (Fidel Bermudez) is incapable of vesting title or ownership in the vendee.

The Order dated December 14, 1988, declaring the October 29, 1987 auction sale as valid, was issued with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.





Barayoga vs Asset Privatization Trust (2005) G.R. 160073

Facts:

Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union is composed of workers of Bicolandia Sugar Development Corporation

(BISUDECO), a sugar plantation mill located in Himaao, Pili, Camarines Sur.On December 8, 1986, [Respondent]

Asset Privatization Trust (APT), a public trust was created under Proclamation No. 50, as amended, mandated to

take title to and possession of, conserve, provisionally manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the

Philippine government identified for privatization or disposition.

Pursuant to Section 23 of Proclamation No. 50, former President Corazon Aquino issued Administrative Order No. 14

identifying certain assets of government institutions that were to be transferred to the National Government. Among

the assets transferred was the financial claim of the Philippine National Bank against BISUDECO in the form of a

secured loan. Consequently, by virtue of a Trust Agreement executed between the National Government and APT on

February 27, 1987, APT was constituted as trustee over BISUDECO's account with the PNB.

Sometime later, on August 28, 1988, BISUDECO contracted the services of Philippine Sugar Corporation (Philsucor)

to take over the management of the sugar plantation and milling operations until August 31, 1992. Meanwhile,

because of the continued failure of BISUDECO to pay its outstanding loan with PNB, its mortgaged properties were

foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT, as the sole bidder. On April 2, 1991, APT was issued a

Sheriff's Certificate of Sale.

On July 23, 1991, the union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and

underpayment of wages and other labor standard benefits plus damages. In the meantime, on July 15, 1992, APT's

Board of Trustees issued a resolution accepting the offer of Bicol-Agro-Industrial Cooperative (BAPCI) to buy the

sugar plantation and mill. Again, on September 23, 1992, the board passed another resolution authorizing the

payment of separation benefits to BISUDECO's employees in the event of the company's privatization. Then, on

October 30, 1992, BAPCI purchased the foreclosed assets of BISUDECO from APT and took over its sugar milling

operations under the trade name Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (Pensumil).

On December 17, 1992, the union filed a similar complaint, later to be consolidated with its earlier complaint and

docketed as RAB V Case No. 07-00184-91. On March 2, 1993, it filed an amended complaint, impleading as additional

party respondents APT and Pensumil.

In their Position Paper, the union alleged that when Philsucor initially took over the operations of the company, it

retained BISUDECO's existing personnel under the same terms and conditions of employment. Nonetheless, at the

start of the season sometime in May 1991, Philsucor started recalling workers back to work, to the exception of the

union members. Management told them that they will be re-hired only if they resign from the union. Just the same,

thereafter, the company started to employ the services of outsiders under the 'pakyaw' system.

BISUDECO, Pensumil and APT all interposed the defense of lack of employer-employee relationship.After due

proceedings, on April 30, 1998, Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. Aurellano disposed as follows:

'WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent APT is hereby ordered to pay herein complainants of the mandated

employment benefits provided for under Section 27 of Proclamation No. 50 which benefits had been earlier extended

to other employees similarly situated.





The NLRC affirmed APT's liability for petitioners' money claims. While no employer-employee relationship existed

between members of the petitioner union and APT, at the time of the employees' illegal dismissal, the assets of

BISUDECO had been transferred to the national government through APT. Moreover, the NLRC held that APT

should have treated petitioners' claim as a lien on the assets of BISUDECO. The Commission opined that APT should

have done so, considering its awareness of the pending complaint of petitioners at the time BISUDECO sold its assets

to BAPCI, and APT started paying separation pay to the workers.

Finding their computation to be in order, the NLRC awarded to petitioners their money claims for underpayment,

labor-standard benefits, and ECOLA. It also awarded them their back wages, computed at the prevailing minimum

wage, for the period May 1, 1991 (the date of their illegal dismissal) until October 30, 1992 (the sale of BISUDECO

assets to the BAPCI). On the other hand, the NLRC ruled that petitioners were not entitled to separation pay because

of the huge business losses incurred by BISUDECO, which had resulted in its bankruptcy.

Respondent sought relief from the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA ruled

that APT should not be held liable for petitioners' claims for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, illegal deduction

and underpayment of wages, as well as other labor-standard benefits plus damages. As found by the NLRC, APT

was not the employer of petitioners, but was impleaded only for possessing BISUDECO's mortgaged properties as

trustee and, later, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of those assets.

Citing Batong Buhay Gold Mines v. Dela Serna, 8 the CA concluded that petitioners' claims could not be enforced

against APT as mortgagee of the foreclosed properties of BISUDECO.

Clarification of the facts according to the SC: It should be stressed at the outset that, pursuant to Administrative

Order No. 14, Series of 1987, PNB's assets, loans and receivables from its borrowers were transferred to APT as

trustee of the national government. Among the liabilities transferred to APT was PNB's financial claim against

BISUDECO, not the latter's assets and chattel. Contrary to petitioners' assertions, BISUDECO remained the owner of

the mortgaged properties in August 1988, when the Philippine Sugar Corporation (Philsucor) undertook the

operation and management of the sugar plantation until August 31, 1992, under a so-called Contract of Lease

between the two corporations. At the time, APT was merely a secured creditor of BISUDECO.

It was only in April 1991 that APT foreclosed the assets and chattels of BISUDECO because of the latter's continued

failure to pay outstanding loan obligations to PNB/APT. The properties were sold at public auction to APT, the

highest bidder, as indicated in the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale issued on April 2, 1991. It was only in September 1992

(after the expiration of the lease/management Contract with Philsucor in August 1992), however, when APT took

over BISUDECO assets, preparatory to the latter's privatization.

In the present case, petitioner-union's members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor in May 1991 seek to hold

APT liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal. Significantly, prior to the actual sale of

BISUDECO assets to BAPCI on October 30, 1992, the APT board of trustees had approved a Resolution on September

23, 1992. The Resolution authorized the payment of separation benefits to the employees of the corporation in the

event of its privatization. Not included in the Resolution, though, were petitioner-union's members who had not

been recalled to work in May 1991.

Issues and Rulings:

I. Whether or not APT is liable to pay petitioners' monetary claims, including back wages from May 1, 1991, to

October 30, 1992 (the date of the sale of BISUDECO assets to BAPCI).





We rule in the negative. The duties and liabilities of BISUDECO, including its monetary liabilities to its employees,

were not all automatically assumed by APT as purchaser of the foreclosed properties at the auction sale. Any

assumption of liability must be specifically and categorically agreed upon. In Sundowner Development Corp. v.

Drilon, the Court ruled that, unless expressly assumed, labor contracts like collective bargaining agreements are not

enforceable against the transferee of an enterprise. Labor contracts are in personam and thus binding only between

the parties.

No succession of employment rights and obligations can be said to have taken place between the two. Between the

employees of BISUDECO and APT, there is no privity of contract that would make the latter a substitute employer

that should be burdened with the obligations of the corporation. To rule otherwise would result in unduly imposing

upon APT an unwarranted assumption of accounts not contemplated in Proclamation No. 50 or in the Deed of

Transfer between the national government and PNB.

Furthermore, under the principle of absorption, a bona fide buyer or transferee of all, or substantially all, the

properties of the seller or transferor is not obliged to absorb the latter's employees. The most that the purchasing

company may do, for reasons of public policy and social justice, is to give preference of reemployment to the selling

company's qualified separated employees, who in its judgment are necessary to the continued operation of the

business establishment.

In any event, the national government (in whose trust APT previously held the mortgage credits of BISUDECO) is

not the employer of petitioner-union's members, who had been dismissed sometime in May 1991, even before APT

took over the assets of the corporation. Hence, under existing law and jurisprudence, there is no reason to expect any

kind of bailout by the national government. Even the NLRC found that no employer-employee relationship existed

between APT and petitioners. Thus, the Commission gravely abused its discretion in nevertheless holding that APT,

as the transferee of the assets of BISUDECO, was liable to petitioners.

A careful reading of the Court's Decision in that case plainly shows that it does not contain the words quoted by

counsel for petitioners. At this juncture, we admonish their counsel of his bounden duty as an officer of the Court to

refrain from misquoting or misrepresenting the text of its decisions. Ever present is the danger that, if not faithfullyand exactly quoted, they may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the

public who may thereby be misled.

In that case, contrary to the assertions of petitioners, the Court held as follows:

"There can be no controversy for it is a principle well-recognized, that it is within the employer's legitimate sphere of

management control of the business to adopt economic policies or make some changes or adjustments in their

organization or operations that would insure profit to itself or protect the investment of its stockholders. As in the

exercise of such management prerogative, the employer may merge or consolidate its business with another, or sell

or dispose all or substantially all of its assets and properties which may bring about the dismissal or termination of its

employees in the process. Such dismissal or termination should not however be interpreted in such a manner as to

permit the employer to escape payment of termination pay. . . . .

"In a number of cases on this point, the rule has been laid down that the sale or disposition must be motivated by

good faith as an element of exemption from liability. Indeed, an innocent transferee of a business establishment has

no liability to the employees of the transferor to continue employing them. Nor is the transferee liable for past unfair

labor practices of the previous owner, except, when the liability therefor is assumed by the new employer under the

contract of sale, or when liability arises because of the new owner's participation in thwarting or defeating the rights

of the employees."





In other words, the liabilities of the previous owner to its employees are not enforceable against the buyer or

transferee, unless (1) the latter unequivocally assumes them; or (2) the sale or transfer was made in bad faith. Thus,

APT cannot be held responsible for the monetary claims of petitioners who had been dismissed even before it

actually took over BISUDECO's assets.

II. Whether or not the claims of herein petitioners can be enforced against the foreclosed properties of

BISUDECO.

No. It should be remembered that APT merely became a transferee of BISUDECO's assets for purposes of

conservation because of its lien on those assets — a lien it assumed as assignee of the loan secured by the corporation

from PNB. Subsequently, APT, as the highest bidder in the auction sale, acquired ownership of the foreclosed

properties.

Relevant to this transfer of assets is Article 110 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6715, which

reads:

"Article 110. Worker's preference in case of bankruptcy. — In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer's

business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims shall be

paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid."

This Court has ruled in a long line of cases that under Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, a mortgage credit is a

special preferred credit that enjoys preference with respect to a specific/determinate property of the debtor. On the

other hand, the worker's preference under Article 110 of the Labor Code is an ordinary preferred credit. While this

provision raises the worker's money claim to first priority in the order of preference established under Article 2244 of

the Civil Code, the claim has no preference over special preferred credits.

Thus, the right of employees to be paid benefits due them from the properties of their employer cannot have any

preference over the latter's mortgage credit. In other words, being a mortgage credit, APT's lien on BISUDECO's

mortgaged assets is a special preferred lien that must be satisfied first before the claims of the workers.

Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC explained the rationale of this ruling as follows:

". . . . A preference applies only to claims which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a

particular property. The right of first preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not

constitute a lien on the property of the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their

favor, a preference in application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should

be paid in the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent's assets. It is a right to a first preference in the

discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor. . . ."

Furthermore, workers' claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or

judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. 26 It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the Labor

Code is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings, during which all creditors are convened, their claims

ascertained and inventoried, and their preferences determined. Assured thereby is an orderly determination of the

preference given to creditors' claims; and preserved in harmony is the legal scheme of classification, concurrence and

preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law, and the Labor Code.

The Court hastens to add that the present Petition was brought against APT alone. In holding that the latter, which

has never really been an employer of petitioners, is not liable for their claims, this Court is not reversing or ruling

upon their entitlement to back wages and other unpaid benefits from their previous employer.





Philippine Airlines vs Zamora (2007) G.R. 166996

Facts:

On 1 February 2005, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision modifying its 13 August 2004 Decision

but at the same time resolving petitioner PAL's Motion for Reconsideration in this wise: WHEREFORE, this Court's

August 13, 2004 decision is hereby AMENDED, the dispositive portion to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The NLRC resolution dated April 27,

2001 is MODIFIED. Considering that petitioner is a detention prisoner making reinstatement impossible,

PAL is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Zamora his separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, to be computed

at one month salary for every year of service from February 9, 1981 and backwages to be computed from

December 19, 1995, both up to October 1, 2000, the date of his incarceration.

Considering that PAL is still under receivership, the monetary claims of petitioner Zamora must be presented to the

PAL Rehabilitation Receiver, subject to the rules on preference of credits. The Court of Appeals took into account

respondent Zamora's incarceration when it recalled its order of reinstatement. Anent its earlier pronouncement

against the suspension of the proceedings of the case owing to the present rehabilitation of petitioner PAL, the

appellate court only had this to say:

However, since PAL is still under receivership, the provisions of PD 902-A, should apply. The enforcement of the

monetary claims of petitioner should be brought before the PAL Rehabilitation Receiver for proper disposition.

Issue: WON respondent Zamora’s monetary claim should be presented to the PAL rehabilitation receiver, subject to

the rules on preference of credits.

Held: No. The relevant law dealing with the suspension of actions for claims against corporations is Presidential

Decree No. 902-A, 52 as amended. The term "claim," as contemplated in Sec. 6 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A,refers "to debts or demands of a pecuniary nature. It means 'the assertion of a right to have money paid.

It is plain from the foregoing provisions of law that "upon the appointment [by the SEC] of a management committee

or a rehabilitation receiver," all actions for claims against the corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board

shall ipso jure be suspended

The law is clear: upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a rehabilitation receiver, all

claims for actions "shall be suspended accordingly." No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law.

Since the law makes no distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court.

Otherwise stated, no other action may be taken in, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension

— what are automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment ofclaims during the execution stage after the case had become final and executory.

The suspension of action for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation receiver or management committee

embraces all phases of the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. Furthermore, the

actions that are suspended cover all claims against a distressed corporation whether for damages founded on a

breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. As to the

appellate court's amended directive that "the monetary claims of petitioner Zamora must be presented to the PAL





Rehabilitation Receiver, subject to the rules on preference of credits," the same is erroneous for there has been no

declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation. Thus, the rules on preference of credits do not apply.

Philippine Airlines vs Philippine Airlines Employees Association (2007) G.R. 142399

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to set aside the 30

April 1999 Decision, and 10 March 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 50161 entitled,

"Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Airlines Employees Association

(PALEA)." In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition filed by herein petitioner Philippine

Airlines, Inc. (PAL); accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the 28 January 1998 Decision and 23 June 1998

Resolution, of the First Division of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), reversing and setting aside the

12 March 1990 Decision, of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR No. 00-03-01134-89, and ordering the herein PAL to "pay

the 13th month pay or mid-year bonus of the (concerned) members (of PALEA).

Issue: Can a court or quasi-judicial agency amend or alter a Collective Bargaining Agreement by expanding its

coverage to non-regular employees who are not covered by the bargaining unit?

Held: All told, this Court is constrained to suspend the progress, development and other proceedings in the present

petition.We take note, however, that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had mandated the rehabilitation

of PAL. On 17 May 1999, the SEC approved the "Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan" of PAL and appointed a

"permanent rehabilitation receiver for the latter." To date, PAL is still undergoing rehabilitation.

The pertinent law concerning the suspension of actions for claims against corporations is Presidential Decree No. 902-

A, as amended.The underlying principle behind the suspension of claims pending rehabilitation proceedings was

explained in the case of BF Homes, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals. This Court clarified that:In light of these

powers, the reason for suspending actions for claims against the corporation should not be difficult to discover. It is

not really to enable the management committee or the rehabilitation receiver to substitute the defendant in any

pending action against it before any court, tribunal, board or body. Obviously, the real justification is to enable the

management committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his powers free from any judicial or extra-

judicial interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the debtor company. To allow such other

action to continue would only add to the burden of the management committee or rehabilitation receiver, whose

time, effort and resources would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation instead of being directed

toward its restructuring and rehabilitation.

The Court holds that rendition of judgment while petitioner is under a state of receivership could render violence to

the rationale for suspension of payments in Section 6 (c) of P.D. 902-A, if the judgment would result in the granting of

private respondent's claim to separation pay, thus defeating the basic purpose behind Section 6 (c) of P.D. 902-Awhich is to prevent dissipation of the distressed company's resources.

In another PAL case, specifically, Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court again resolved to grant

PAL's Motion for Suspension of Proceedings by reason of the SEC Orders dated 23 June 1998 and 1 July 1998,

appointing an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver and enjoining the suspension of all claims for payment against PAL,

respectively. Therein it was declared that this Court is "not prepared to depart from the well-established doctrines"

essentially maintaining that all actions for claims against a corporation pending before any court, tribunal or board





shall ipso jure be suspended in whatever stage such actions may be found upon the appointment by the SEC of a

management committee or a rehabilitation receiver.

And, most recently, is the case of Philippine Airlines v. Zamora, we held in simple terms that:

Otherwise stated, no other action may be taken in, including the rendition of judgment during the state of suspension

— what are automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings of an action or suit and not just the payment of

claims during the execution stage after the case had become final and executory.

The suspension of action for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation receiver or management committee

embraces all phases of the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or before this Court. Furthermore, the

actions that are suspended cover all claims against a distressed corporation whether for damages founded on a

breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. In actual fact,

allowing such actions to proceed would only increase the work-load of the management committee or the

rehabilitation receiver, whose precious time and effort would be dissipated and wasted in defending suits against the

corporation, instead of being channeled toward restructuring and rehabilitation.

Castillo vs Uniwide Warehouse Club (2010) G.R. 169725

Facts:

This case stems from a complaint filed by Castillo against Uniwide and its President Jimmy Gow for payment of

Saturdays worked for the year 2001; holiday pay; separation pay; actual, moral and exemplary damages; and

attorney’s fees. Two months after the filing of the complaint however, the respondents moved to dismiss said

complaint on the ground that it petitioned the SEC for suspension of payments and approval of its rehabilitation

plan. It appears that on June 29, 1999, the SEC had ruled favorably on the petition and ordered that all claims, actions

and proceedings against herein respondents pending before any court, tribunal, board, office, body or commission be

suspended, and that following the appointment of an interim receiver, the suspension order had been extended to

until February 7, 2000. On April 11, 2000, the SEC declared the Uniwide Group of Companies to be in a state of

suspension of payments and approved its rehabilitation plan. Labor Arbiter and NLRC denied the motion of

respondent. Respondent then filed a petition under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals which found merit in the

petition and reversed the resolutions of the NLRC affirming the Labor Arbiter.

Held: Petioner argues that suspension of the proceedings is not in order, because his claim against respondent and

the latter’s corresponding liability are yet to be determined. Respondents countered by saying that the CA was

correct since it was among those actions for claims that are automatically suspended on the appointment of a

management committee or receiver according to Se. 6 of PD 902-A. Respondents advance the notion that while said

Section 6 expressly referred to suspension of pending claims, the clear and unmistakable intention of the law is to bar

the filing of any such claims in order to maintain parity of status among the different creditors of the distressedcorporation at least while the rehabilitation efforts are ongoing. To begin with, corporate rehabilitation connotes the

restoration of the debtor to a position of successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation

is economically feasible and its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the

rehabilitation plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. It

Whether or not the proceeding can be validly suspended. Contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities

in an effort to restore and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency, the

purpose being to enable the company to gain a new lease on life and allow its creditors to be paid their claims out of





its earnings. An essential function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism of suspension of all actions and claims

against the distressed corporation, which operates upon the due appointment of a management committee or

rehabilitation receiver. P.D. No. 902-A, as amended. Section 6(c) of the law mandates that, upon appointment of a

management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board, or body, all actions for claims against corporations,

partnerships or associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board, or body

shall be suspended. In a plethora of cases, the Court has upheld the suspension of proceedings regaring claimsagainst distressed coprations pursuant to PD902-A. The actions that were suspended cover all claims against a

distressed corporation whether for damages founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases, collection suits

or any other claims of a pecuniary nature. More importantly, the new rules on corporate rehabilitation, as well as the

interim rules, provide an all-encompassing definition of the term and, thus, include all claims or demands of

whatever nature or character against a debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. There is no doubt that

petitioner’s claim in this case, arising as it does from his alleged illegal dismissal, is a claim covered by the

suspension order issued by the SEC, as it is one for pecuniary consideration. Jurisprudence is settled that the

suspension of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly applies to ‚all actions for claims‛ filed against a

corporation, partnership or association under management or receivership, without distinction, except only those

expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business. In the oft-cited case of Rubberworld (Phils.) Inc. v. NLRC, the

Court noted that aside from the given exception, the law is clear and makes no distinction as to the claims that aresuspended once a management committee is created or a rehabilitation receiver is appointed. Since the law makes no

distinction or exemptions, neither should this Court. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Philippine

Airlines, Inc. v. Zamora declares that the automatic suspension of an action for claims against a corporation under a

rehabilitation receiver or management committee embraces all phases of the suit, that is, the entire proceedings of an

action or suit and not just the payment of claims. It must be conceded that the date when the claim arose, or when the

action was filed, has no bearing at all in deciding whether the given action or claim is covered by the stay or

suspension order. What matters is that as long as the corporation is under a management committee or a

rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims against it, whether for money or otherwise, must yield to the greater

imperative of corporate revival, excepting only, as already mentioned, claims for payment of obligations incurred by

the corporation in the ordinary course of business. In the instant case, a Certification issued by the SEC and signed by

its General Counsel states that as of August 17, 2006, the petition of Uniwide Sales, Inc. for declaration of suspensionof payments and rehabilitations was still pending with it, and that the company was still under its rehabilitation

proceedings. Hence, since petitioner’s claim was one for wages accruing from the time of dismissal, as well as for

benefits and damages, the same should have been suspended pending the rehabilitation proceedings. In other words,

the Labor Arbiter should have abstained from resolving the illegal dismissal case and, instead, directed petitioner to

present his claim to the rehabilitation receiver duly appointed by the SEC, inasmuch as the stay or suspension order

was effective and it subsisted from issuance until the dismissal of the petition for rehabilitation or the termination of

the rehabilitation proceedings. The Court of Appeals was thus correct in directing the suspension of the proceedings.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs NLRC (1989) G.R. 69746-47

Facts:

On March 22, 1983, the NLRC resolved the bargaining deadlock between BPI and its employees by fixing the wage

increases and other economic benefits and ordering them to be embodied in a new collective bargaining agreement to

be concluded by BPIEU-Metro Manila and ALU with BPI. It did not decide the intra-union dispute, however, holding

that this was under the original jurisdiction of the med-arbiter and the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Bureau

of Labor Relations.





Following the promulgation by the NLRC of its decision of March 23, 1983, in Certified Cases Nos. 0279 and 0281,

private respondent Ignacio Lacsina filed a motion for the entry of attorney's lien for legal services to be rendered by

him as counsel of BPIEU in the negotiation of the new collective bargaining agreement with BPI.The basis of this

motion was a resolution dated August 26, 1982, signed by members of the BPI Employees Union, providing for the

terms and conditions, including attorney’s fees and his authority to check -off with the company.

Accordingly, BPI deducted the amount of P200.00 from each of the employees who had signed the authorization.

Upon learning about this, the petitioners (ALU and BPIEU-ALU) challenged the said order, on the ground that it was

not authorized under the Labor Code.

On April 15, 1983, the NLRC issued a resolution setting aside the order and requiring BPI to safe-keep the amounts

sought to be deducted "until the rights thereto of the interested parties shall have been determined in appropriate

proceedings. Subsequently, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution dated September 27, 1983, ordering the release

to Lacsina of the amounts deducted "except with respect to any portion thereof as to which no individual signed

authorization has been given by the members concerned or where such authorization has been withdrawn.

The petitioners now impugn this order as contrary to the provisions and spirit of the Labor Code. While conceding

that Lacsina is entitled to payment for his legal services, they argue that this must be made not by the individualworkers directly, as this is prohibited by law, but by the union itself from its own funds. In support of this

contention, they invoke Article 222(b) of the Labor Code, providing as follows:

Art. 222. Appearances and Fees.

(b) No attorney's fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining

negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the contracting

union: Provided, however, that attorneys fees may be charged against union funds in an amount to be agreed upon

by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the contrary shall be null and void.

They also cite the case of Pacific Banking Corporation v. Clave, where the lawyer's fee was taken not from the total

economic benefits received by the workers but from the funds of their labor union.

Issue: Is the mentioned Resolution signed by the BPI employees granting attorney’s fees to Lacsina to be deducted

from the employees’ wages valid?

Held: Yes. The Court reads the afore-cited provision as prohibiting the payment of attorney's fees only when it is

effected through forced contributions from the workers from their own funds as distinguished from the union funds.

The purpose of the provision is to prevent imposition on the workers of the duty to individually contribute their

respective shares in the fee to be paid the attorney for his services on behalf of the union in its negotiations with the

management. The obligation to pay the attorney's fees belongs to the union and cannot be shunted to the workers as

their direct responsibility. Neither the lawyer nor the union itself may require the individual workers to assume the

obligation to pay the attorney's fees from their own pockets. So categorical is this intent that the law also makes it

clear that any agreement to the contrary shall be null and void ab initio.

We see no such imposition in the case at bar. A reading of the above-cited resolution will clearly show that the

signatories thereof have not been in any manner compelled to undertake the obligation they have there assumed. On

the contrary, it is plain that they were voluntarily authorizing the check-off of the attorney's fees from their payment

of benefits and the turnover to Lacsina of the amounts deducted, conformably to their agreement with him. There is

no compulsion here. And significantly, the authorized deductions affected only the workers who adopted and signed





the resolution and who were the only ones from whose benefits the deductions were made by BPI. No similar

deductions were taken from the other workers who did not sign the resolution and so were not bound by it.

That only those who signed the resolution could be subjected to the authorized deductions was recognized and made

clear by the order itself of the NLRC. It was there categorically declared that the check-off could not be made where

"no individual signed authorization has been given by the members concerned or where such authorization has been

withdrawn."

The Pacific Banking Corporation case is not applicable to the present case because there was there no similar

agreement as that entered into between Lacsina and the signatories of the resolution in question. Absent such an

agreement, there was no question that the basic proscription in Article 222 would have to operate. It is noteworthy,

though, that the Court there impliedly recognized arrangements such as the one at bar with the following significant

observation:

Moreover, the case is covered squarely by the mandatory and explicit prescription of Art. 222 which is another

guarantee intended to protect the employee against unwarranted practices that would diminish his compensation

without his knowledge and consent.

A similar recognition was made in Galvadores v. Trajano, where the payment of the attorney's fees from the wages of

the employees was not allowed because: "No check-offs from any amount due to employees may be effected without

individual written authorities duly signed by the employees specifically stating the amount, purpose and beneficiary

of the deduction. The required individual authorizations in this case are wanting."

Finally, we hold that the agreement in question is in every respect a valid contract as it satisfies all the elements

thereof and does not contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. On the contrary, it enables

the workers to avail themselves of the services of the lawyer of their choice and confidence under terms mutually

acceptable to the parties and, hopefully, also for their mutual benefit.

Traders Royal Bank Employees Union vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 120592

Facts:

Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the

E.N.A. Cruz and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement on February 26, 1987 whereby the former

obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000.00 in consideration of the law firm's undertaking to

render the services enumerated in their contract. During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to

private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer,

Traders Royal Bank (TRB). These employees obtained favorable decision from their complaint which went through

the SC.

The Supreme Court, in its decision promulgated on August 30, 1990, modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting

the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while affirming the award of holiday pay differential. The

bank voluntarily complied with such final judgment and determined the holiday pay differential to be in the amount

of P175,794.32. Petitioner never contested the amount thus found by TRB. The latter duly paid its concerned

employees their respective entitlement in said sum through their payroll. After private respondent received the

above decision of the Supreme Court on September 18, 1990, he notified the petitioner union, the TRB management





and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay differential

through a letter dated October 8, 1990.

Thereafter, on July 2, 1991, private respondent filed a motion before Labor Arbiter Lorenzo for the determination of

his attorney's fees, praying that ten percent (10%) of the total award for holiday pay differential computed by TRB at

P175,794.32, or the amount of P17,579.43, be declared as his attorney's fees, and that petitioner union be ordered to

pay and remit said amount to him. The LA and the NLRC affirmed A tty. Cruz’ motion.

Petitioner union filed a comment and opposition to said motion on July 15, 1991. Petitioner maintains that the NLRC

committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the award of attorney's fees in

the amount of P17,574.43, or ten percent (10%) of the P175,794.32 granted as holiday pay differential to its members,

in violation of the retainer agreement; and that the challenged resolution of the NLRC is null and void, for the

reasons hereunder stated.

Although petitioner union concedes that the NLRC has jurisdiction to decide claims for attorney's fees, it contends

that the award for attorney' s fees should have been incorporated in the main case and not after the Supreme Court

had already reviewed and passed upon the decision of the NLRC. Since the claim for attorney's fees by private

respondent was neither taken up nor approved by the Supreme Court, no attorney's fees should have been allowed by the NLRC. Thus, petitioner posits that the NLRC acted without jurisdiction in making the award of attorney's fees,

as said act constituted a modification of a final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court which did not award

attorney's fees. It then cited decisions of the Court declaring that a decision which has become final and executory

can no longer be altered or modified even by the court which rendered the same.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Cruz is entitled to 10 % of the judgment award as his attorney’s fees even if it was not

taken up in the main decision of the SC.

Held: Yes, not in the concept contemplatedin Article 111 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter erroneously set the

amount of attorney's fees on the basis of Art. 111 of the Labor Code; a hearing should have been conducted for the

proper determination of attorney's fees.

There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its

ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services

he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with

the client.

In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the

losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such

as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have

agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof.

It is the first type of attorney's fees which private respondent demanded before the labor arbiter. Also, the present

controversy stems from petitioner's apparent misperception that the NLRC has jurisdiction over claims for attorney's

fees only before its judgment is reviewed and ruled upon by the Supreme Court, and that thereafter the former may

no longer entertain claims for attorney's fees. It will be noted that no claim for attorney's fees was filed by private

respondent before the NLRC when it acted on the money claims of petitioner, nor before the Supreme Court when it

reviewed the decision of the NLRC. It was only after the High Tribunal modified the judgment of the NLRC

awarding the differentials that private respondent filed his claim before the NLRC for a percentage thereof as

attorney's fees.





It would obviously have been impossible, if not improper, for the NLRC in the first instance and for the Supreme

Court thereafter to make an award for attorney's fees when no claim therefor was pending before them. Courts

generally rule only on issues and claims presented to them for adjudication. Accordingly, when the labor arbiter

ordered the payment of attorney's fees, he did not in any way modify the judgment of the Supreme Court.

A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES MAY BE ASSERTED EITHER IN THE VERY ACTION IN WHICH THE

SERVICES OF A LAWYER HAD BEEN RENDERED OR IN A SEPARATE ACTION - It is well settled that a claim for

attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a

separate action. Attorney's fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject

of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over attorney's fees only arises when something has been

recovered from which the fee is to be paid. While a claim for attorney's fees may be filed before the judgment is

rendered, the determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to be held in

abeyance until the main case from which the lawyer's claim for attorney's fees may arise has become final. Otherwise,

the determination to be made by the courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorney's fees may be filed

before the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to the client. It is apparent

from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when to file his claim for professional fees. Hence,

private respondent was well within his rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for

holiday pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the award's complete resolution. To declare that a lawyer may

file a claim for fees in the same action only before the judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him

of his aforestated options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court.

The provisions of the contract entered into between petitioner and respondents are clear and need no further

interpretation; all that is required to be done in the instant controversy is its application. The P3,000.00 which

petitioner pays monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the

labor arbiter and the NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is

intended merely as a consideration for the law firm's commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A

(General Services) and Part B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement.

The difference between a compensation for a commitment to render legal services and a remuneration for legalservices actually rendered can better be appreciated with a discussion of the two kinds of retainer fees a client may

pay his lawyer. These are a general retainer, or a retaining fee, and a special retainer.

RETAINER FEES, GENERAL RETAINER AND A SPECIAL RETAINER— A general retainer, or retaining fee, is the

fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any ordinary legal problem that may arise in

the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The future services of the lawyer are secured

and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a fixed retainer fee which could be monthly

or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether or not there are cases referred to the

lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the opportunity of rendering services for a

fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost opportunities. A special retainer is a fee

for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client may have several casesdemanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent contract for

attorney's fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.

THE P3,000.00 MONTHLY FEE PROVIDED IN THE RETAINER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNION AND THE

LAW FIRM REFERS TO A GENERAL RETAINER OR A RETAINING FEE. — The P3,000.00 which petitioner pays

monthly to private respondent does not cover the services the latter actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the

NLRC in behalf of the former. As stipulated in Part C of the agreement, the monthly fee is intended merely as a





consideration for the law firm's commitment to render the services enumerated in Part A (General Services) and Part

B (Special Legal Services) of the retainer agreement. Evidently, the P3,000.00 monthly fee provided in the retainer

agreement between the union and the law firm refers to a general retainer, or a retaining fee, as said monthly fee

covers only the law firm's pledge, or as expressly stated therein, its "commitment to render the legal services

enumerated." The fee is not payment for private respondent's execution or performance of the services listed in the

contract, subject to some particular qualifications or permutations stated there. We have already shown that theP3,000.00 is independent and different from the compensation which private respondent should receive in payment

for his services. While petitioner and private respondent were able to fix a fee for the latter's promise to extend

services, they were not able to come into agreement as to the law firm's actual performance of services in favor of the

union. Hence, the retainer agreement cannot control the measure of remuneration for private respondent's services.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ENTITLEMENT TO AN ADDITIONAL REMUNERATION FOR SPECIAL SERVICES

RENDERED IN THE INTEREST OF PETITIONER IS BASED ON QUASI-CONTRACT. — The fact that petitioner and

private respondent failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of professional fees for special

services will not absolve the former of civil liability for the corresponding remuneration therefor in favor of the latter.

Obligations do not emanate only from contracts. One of the sources of extra-contractual obligations found in our

Civil Code is the quasi-contract premised on the Roman maxim that nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletari

protest. As embodied in our law, certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts give rise to the juridical relation of

quasi-contract to the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another. A quasi-

contract between the parties in the case at bar arose from private respondent's lawful, voluntary and unilateral

prosecution of petitioner's cause without awaiting the latter's consent and approval. Petitioner cannot deny that it did

benefit from private respondent's efforts as the law firm was able to obtain an award of holiday pay differential in

favor of the union. It cannot even hide behind the cloak of the monthly retainer of P3,000.00 paid to private

respondent because, as demonstrated earlier, private respondent's actual rendition of legal services is not

compensable merely by said amount.

THE LABOR ARBITER ERRONEOUSLY SET THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES ON THE BASIS OF ART. 111

OF THE LABOR CODE; A HEARING SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED FOR THE PROPER

DETERMINATION OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. - Here, then, is the flaw we find in the award for attorney's fees in favor

of private respondent. Instead of adopting the above guidelines, the labor arbiter forthwith but erroneously set the

amount of attorney's fees on the basis of Article 111 of the Labor Code. He completely relied on the operation of

Article 111 when he fixed the amount of attorney's fees at P17,574.43. As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code

regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the

prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer

by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the maximum allowable amount of attorney's fees,

it does not direct instantaneous and automatic award of attorney's fees in such maximum limit. It, therefore,

behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a conflict

between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles of

quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The

criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the

proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter

and for the resolution of private respondent's fees.

As already stated, Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of

damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in

fixing the exact amount payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also, while it limits the





maximum allowable amount of attorney's fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney's

fees in such maximum limit.

It, therefore, behooves the adjudicator in questions and circumstances similar to those in the case at bar, involving a

conflict between lawyer and client, to observe the above guidelines in cases calling for the operation of the principles

of quasi-contract and quantum meruit, and to conduct a hearing for the proper determination of attorney's fees. The

criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are to be considered, and not disregarded, in assessing the

proper amount. Here, the records do not reveal that the parties were duly heard by the labor arbiter on the matter

and for the resolution of private respondent's fees.

It is axiomatic that the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Ordinarily, therefore, we would have

remanded this case for further reception of evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by private

respondent to petitioner. However, so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a comparatively simple

controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present recourse a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in

favor of private respondent. For that purpose, we have duly taken into account the accepted guidelines therefor and

so much of the pertinent data as are extant in the records of this case which are assistive in that regard. On such

premises and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the amount of P10,000.00 is a reasonable and fair

compensation for the legal services rendered by private respondent to petitioner before the labor arbiter and the

NLRC.

Brahm Industries vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118853

Facts:

On 8 February 1994 Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco ruled that complainants Roberto M. Durian and Jone M.

Comendador were illegally dismissed by BRAHM and accordingly ordered the latter to: (a) reinstate complainants to

their former positions or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights, but if reinstatement was no longer

possible, to pay them separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of service; (b) pay Roberto M. Durian

the amount of Forty-Eight Thousand Thirty-Eight Pesos and Twenty-Five Centavos (P48,038.25) representing his

back wages; and, Jone M. Comendador the amount of Sixty Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-Four Pesos and

Ninety-Two Centavos (P60,474.92) representing his back wages, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay; and,

(c) pay complainants the amount equivalent to 10% of the total award as attorney's fees.

Upon appeal by BRAHM, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, subject to the modification that the

attorney's fees awarded be reduced to five percent (5%) of the total monetary award.BRAHM now argues that the

NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that: (a) private respondents Roberto M. Durian and Jone M.

Comendador were regular employees and not merely contractual employees hired on a per project basis; (b) they

were illegally dismissed; and, (c) they were entitled to attorney's fees despite the fact that the award lacks factual and

legal basis.

Issue: Whether or not private respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees.

Held: Yes. With regard to the propriety of the award of attorney's fees in favor of private respondents, petitioner

contends that it was erroneous for the NLRC to merely reduce the award of attorney's fees when it should have been

completely deleted. Petitioner claims that the award is baseless since the matter of attorney's fees was touched only

once in the dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision and no discussion or reason was stated therefor.





This argument is unfounded. A perusal of the decision shows that the reason for the award of attorney's fees is

clearly and unequivocally set forth in the body of the Labor Arbiter's decision, to witHaving been compelled to

litigate, complainants should be paid an amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total award as and for

attorney's fees." It used as basis Art. 2208 of the Civil Code which allows attorney's fees to be awarded by a court

when its claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of

an unjustified act or omission of the party from whom it is sought.

However, nothing precludes the appellate courts from reducing the award of attorney's fees when it is found to be

unconscionable or excessive under the circumstances. Thus, we agree with the NLRC's ruling that the award of

attorney's fees is proper on account of complainants' being compelled to litigate their claims against respondent. The

amount is however reduced to five percent (5%) of the adjudged relief, it appearing that the substantial portion of the

award refers to complainants' back wages and not to withheld salaries.

Finally, this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies

which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not

only respect but even finality and are binding upon this Court unless there is grave abuse of discretion or where it is

clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. Petitioner failed to

convince us that we should depart from this time-honored rule.

Heirs of Aniban vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 155034

Facts:

Reynaldo Aniban was employed by the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (TRANSMARINE) acting in behalf of

its foreign principal Norwegian Ship Management A/S (NORWEGIAN) as radio operator on board the vessel

"Kassel." Aniban died due to myocardial infarction during the period of his employment. A claim was made for

additional death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between Associated Marine Officers and

Seamen's Union of the Philippines and NORWEGIAN. The claim was rejected on the ground that myocardial

infarction was not an occupational disease. However, on 11 January 1994 the POEA ruled that myocardial infarction

was an occupational disease in the case of R/O Aniban and granted the prayer of his heirs for payment of death

benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract as well as under the Collective Bargaining Agreement plus

attorney's fees of US$6,700.00 equivalent to 10% of the total award.

On appeal, the NLRC reversed the POEA and denied the claim on the ground that it was the Employees'

Compensation Commission (ECC) which had original jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim for death benefits.

NLRC likewise deleted he award of attorney’s fees on the ground that there was no unlawful withholding of wages.

A motion to reconsider the decision of the NLRC was denied; hence, this petition by the heirs of Aniban. The

Supreme Court ruled that the Employees Compensation Commission may not be considered as having jurisdiction

over money claims, albeit death compensation benefits of overseas contract workers. Article 180 of the Labor Code

provides that the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction only over decisions rendered either by the GSIS or the

SSS in the exercise of their respective original and exclusive jurisdictions. On the issue of whether the death of

Aniban due to myocardial infarction is compensable, the Court ruled that it is compensable. Although the physical

exertion involved in carrying out the functions of a radio operator may have been quite minimal, the pressure and







Held: Yes. It is elementary in this jurisdiction that whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must

substantiate his allegation, since it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns and private

transactions have been fair and regular. Persons are presumed to have taken care of their business.

Absent any indication sufficient enough to support a conclusion, we cannot uphold the findings of the Labor Arbiter

and the NLRC. The conclusion of the Labor Arbiter that entries in the December 1995 payroll sheet could have been

altered is utterly baseless.

While we adhere to the position of the appellate court that the "tendency" to alter the entries in the payrolls was not

substantiated, we cannot however subscribe to the total deletion of the award of salary differential and attorney's

fees, as it so ruled.The Labor Arbiter granted a salary differential of P24,902.88.

The Labor Arbiter erred in his computation. He fixed the daily wage rate actually received by petitioner at P105.00

without taking into consideration the P141.00 rate indicated in the typewritten payroll sheets submitted by

respondents. Moreover, the Labor Arbiter misapplied the wage orders when he wrongly categorized respondent as

falling within the first category. Based on the stipulated number of employees and audited financial statements,

respondents should have been covered by the second category.

To avoid further delay in the disposition of this case which is not in consonance with the objective of speedy justice,

we have to adjudge the rightful computation of the salary differential based on the applicable wage orders. After all,

the supporting records are complete.

The total salary differential that petitioner is lawfully entitled to amounts to P6,578.00. However, pursuant to Section

12 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6727, as amended by R.A. No. 8188. Respondents are required to pay double the

amount owed to petitioner, bringing their total liability to P13,156.00.

The award of attorney's fees is warranted under the circumstances of this case. Under Article 2208 of the New Civil

Code, attorney's fees can be recovered in actions for the recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity

under employer's liability laws but shall not exceed 10% of the amount awarded. The fees may be deducted from the

total amount due the winning party.

Atty. Ortiz vs San Miguel Corp., (2008) G.R. 151983-84

Facts:

Petitioner is a member of the Philippine Bar who represented the complainants in NLRC Cases No. V0255-94 and No.

V-0068-95 instituted against herein private respondent San Miguel Corporation sometime in 1992 and 1993. Private

respondent, on the other hand, is a corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the

Republic of the Philippines. It is primarily engaged in the manufacture and sale of food and beverage particularly

beer products. In line with its business, it operates breweries and sales offices throughout the Philippines. The

complainants in NLRC Cases No. V-0255-94 and No. V-0068-95 was employees at private respondents Sales Offices

in the provinces. NLRC Case No. V-0255-94 (Aguirre Cases) In 1992, several employees from the Bacolod, Cadiz, and

Himamaylan Beer Sales Offices filed with the Labor Arbiter separate complaints against private respondent for

illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with backwages; elevation of employment status from casual-

temporary to regular- permanent reckoned after six months from the start of complainants employment;

underpayment of salaries; non-payment of holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, allowances and sick leaves;

nonpayment of benefits under the existing Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA); attorneys fees; moral,





exemplary and other damages; and interest. The foregoing complaints were consolidated and initially docketed as

RAB Cases No. 06-01-10031-92; 06-01-10048-92; 06-01-10049-92; 06-0210210-92; 06-02-10211-92; and 06-03-10255-92

(hereinafter collectively referred to as theAguirre Cases). After conducting a full-blown trial, the parties were given

the opportunity to submit their respective memoranda. Subsequently, the cases were submitted for resolution. On 30

June 1994, Labor Arbiter Reynaldo J. Gulmatico (Labor Arbiter Gulmatico) rendered a Decision in the Aguirre Cases

finding all the complainants to have been illegally dismissed. He ordered complainants reinstatement to theirprevious or equivalent positions without loss of seniority rights. He also ordered private respondent to pay the

complainants (1) full backwages and other CBA benefits in the total amount of P6,197,952.88; (2) rice subsidy or its

monetary equivalent; and (3) attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award or in the amount of

P619,795.28. Labor Arbiter Gulmatico, however, dismissed complainants claim for overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th

month pay differential, service incentive leave pay, moral damages and all other claims for lack of merit. Unsatisfied

with Labor Arbiter Gulmaticos monetary and economic awards, complainants appealed to the NLRC, where the

Aguirre Cases were collectively docketed as NLRC Case No. V-0255-94. The NLRC would later render a Decision

dated 21 July 1995 in the Aguirre Cases affirming the Decision of Labor Arbiter Gulmatico, with the following

modifications: (1) granting sales commission to the complainants and adopting their computation thereof in their

Appeal Memorandum[8] filed before the NLRC; (2) adjusting and/or reducing the amounts awarded to complainants

Alfredo Gadian, Jr., Renato Junsay, Agustines Llacuna, and Florencio de la Piedra depending on the dates they wereemployed; (3) determining that Modesto Jabaybay, who died on 28 December 1993, was to receive only the amount

of P356,128.02; (4) declaring that all the complainants except Romeo Magbanua, who withdrew his complaint, were

entitled to whatever benefits were given under the CBA; and (5) that complainants Romeo Magbanua and Modesto

Jabaybay shall no longer be reinstated. Private respondent moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid 21 July

1995 NLRC Decision, but its motion was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 27 February 1996. NLRC Case

No. V-0068-95 (Toquero Case) While the Aguirre Cases were still pending resolution by Labor Arbiter Gulmatico,

three other employees at the San Carlos Sales Office filed with the Labor Arbiter a similar complaint for illegal

dismissal against private respondent in 1993. Their complaint was docketed as RAB Case No. 06-0710404-93

(hereinafter referred to as the Toquero Case). On 26 December 1994, Labor Arbiter Ray Allan T. Drilon (Labor Arbiter

Drilon) rendered his Decision in the Toquero Case also ruling that the three complainants were illegally dismissed.

Thus, he ordered the complainants immediate reinstatement to their former positions without loss of seniority rights.He ordered private respondent to pay complainants (1) backwages and other benefits in the amount of P572,542.50;

(2) all benefits, privileges and rights enjoyed by the private respondents regular employees in the total amount of

P339,055.00; (3) a total of 159 sacks of rice ration; (4) sales commissions based on the monthly sales of beer sold by

their office for the last three years; and (5) attorneys fees in the amount of P91,159.75. Again, the complainants were

not contented with Labor Arbiter Drilons Decision, and they appealed their case to the NLRC which was then

docketed as NLRC Case No. V-0068-95. On 25 July 1995, the NLRC rendered a Decision modifying the 26 December

1994 Decision of Labor Arbiter Drilon by ordering the private respondent to pay the complainants the following: (1)

additional awards of sales commission; (2) tailoring allowance; (3) monetary equivalent of their uniform for two

years consisting of 24 sets of t-shirts and 6 pairs of pants; and (4) attorneys fees of 10% of the total monetary award or

P198,296.95. In its Resolution dated 9 October 1995, the NLRC partially granted private respondents motion for

reconsideration by allowing the deduction from the award of backwages any earnings of complainants elsewhereduring the pendency of their case. CA-G.R. SP No. 54576-77 Failing to get a favorable ruling from the NLRC in both

the Aguirre and Toquero Cases, private respondent elevated the NLRC Decisions to this Court via a Petition for

Certiorari, where they were docketed as G.R. No. 124426 and G.R. No. 122975, respectively. On 15 July 1996, this

Court issued a Resolution consolidating the two cases.In another Resolution dated 30 June 1999; this Court referred

the said cases to the Court of Appeals conforming to its ruling in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC and Bienvenido

Aricayos. The Court of Appeals accepted the consolidated cases in its Resolution dated 7 September 1999, and

docketed the same as CA-G.R. SP No. 54576-77. While the private respondents Petitions for Certiorari were pending





before the Court of Appeals, all but one of the remaining complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases appeared

on various dates before Labor Arbiters Gulmatico and Drilon, and in the presence of two witnesses, signed separate

Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of private respondent. Based on the Deeds they executed, the

complainants agreed to settle their claims against private respondent for amounts less than what the NLRC actually

awarded. Private respondent withheld 10% of the total amount agreed upon by the parties in the said Deeds as

attorneys fees and handed it over to petitioner. Private respondent then attached the Deeds of Release, Waiver andQuitclaim to its Manifestation and Motion filed before the appellate court. On 22 August 2001, the Court of Appeals

rendered a Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 54576-77 affirming the NLRC Decision dated 21 July 1995 and Resolution

dated 27 February 1996 in the Aguirre Cases, only insofar as it concerned complainant Alfredo Gadian, Jr.

(complainant Gadian), the only complainant who did not execute a Deed of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. With

respect to the other complainants in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases, their complaints were dismissed on account of

their duly executed Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Private respondent moved for the partial

reconsideration of the 22 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the

22 August 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 54576-77, which affirmed the 21 July 1995

Decision and 27 February 1996 Resolution of the NLRC in the Aguirre Cases, insofar as complainant Gadian was

concerned; and the dismissal of complainant Gadians complaint against private respondent for lack of merit.

Complainant Gadian and his counsel, herein petitioner, for their part, likewise moved for the partial reconsiderationof the same Decision of the appellate court praying that the award of attorneys fees of 10% should be based on the

monetary awards adjudged by the NLRC. In a Resolution dated9 January 2002, the appellate court denied both

motions. G.R. No. 151421 and No. 151427 Private respondent appealed before this Court by filing a Petition for

Review, docketed as G.R. No. 151421 and No. 151427. However, private respondents Petition was denied due course

by this Court in a Resolution dated 18 March 2002 for failure of the private respondent to show that a reversible error

had been committed by the appellate court.

Held: This Court has consistently ruled that a question of law exists when there is a doubt or controversy as to what

the law is on a certain state of facts. On the other hand, there is a question of fact when the Whether petitioner is

entitled to additional attorneys fees on top of what was already doubt or difference arises as to the alleged truth or

falsehood of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value

of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.[35] The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is

not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can

determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;

otherwise, it is a question of fact. In the case at bar, the core issue presented by the petitioner is with respect to the

amount of attorneys fees to which he should be entitled: whether he is entitled to the amount of attorneys fees as

adjudged by the NLRC in its Decisions in the Aguirre and Toquero Cases or only to the 10% of the amounts actually

paid to his clients, the complainants who signed the Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. The aforesaid issue

evidently involves a question of law. In determining whether the petitioner should be entitled to the attorneys fees

stated in the NLRC Decisions, this Court does not need to go over the pieces of evidence submitted by the parties in

the proceedings below to determine their probative value. What it needs to do is ascertain and apply the relevant law

and jurisprudence on the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing parties in labor cases. Article 111 of the Labor

Code, as amended, specifically provides: ART. 111. ATTORNEYS FEES. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of

wages the culpable party may be assessed attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the

recovery of the wages, attorneys fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered. (Emphasis

supplied.)





Masmud vs NLRC (2009) G.R. 183385

Facts:

On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a

complaint3 against First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent

disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel. In consideration of Atty. Go’s

legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total

monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise agreed that

any award of attorney’s fees shall pertain to respondent’s l aw firm as compensation. On November 21, 2003, the

Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive portion of the

decision, as quoted in the CA Decision, reads: WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the

*First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A.+ jointly and severally liable to pay *Alexander’s+ total

permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in

Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to pay further the amount of

P200,000.00 as moral damages,P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%)

of the total monetary award. [Alexander’s+ claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis. SO

ORDERED. Alexander’s employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). During

the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees to

Evangelina, Atty. Go caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Decision

dismissing the appeal of Alexander’s employer. The employer subsequently filed a motion for reconsi deration. The

NLRC denied the same in an Order dated October 26, 2004. On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was

affirmed with modification. The award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted.5 Alexander’s employers filed

a petition for certiorari6 before this Court. On February 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for

lack of merit. Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for the execution of

the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA. The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon

motion of Atty. Go, the surety company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check

amounting toP3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Evangelina. On January

10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said

amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the sum of P680,000.00. Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce

the attorney’s lien alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only the

amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney’s fees, thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the

award pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s fees. In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a

comment with motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. In her comment, Evangelina

manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total monetary award was null and void based on

Article 111 of the Labor Code. In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation of a

lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code. There are two concepts of attorney's

fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for

the legal services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fees may be

awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party, such that, in

any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil

Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain

to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees, or

the compensation that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her husband,

before the labor tribunals and before the court. Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law

that should govern Atty. Go’s compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed retainer contract.





Article 111 of the said Code provides: ART. 111. Attorney's fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the

culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of the wages recovered.

Held: Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the extraordinary concept of

attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by a nd

awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer by his

client for the legal services he rendered. In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed

in determining Atty. Go’s compensation. Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only

proper that he should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the

award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes

the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of

the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or imposition of fraud on the

part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure

that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital

consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure of time

and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to

escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice for

his client; he himself would not get his due. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31,

2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Bernardo vs. NLRC (1999) G.R. 122917

Facts:

Complainants numbering 43 are deaf-mutes who were hired on various periods from 1988 to 1993 by respondent Far

East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through a uniformly worded agreement called 'Employment

Contract for Handicapped Workers.'

Petitioners maintain that they should be considered regular employees, because their task as money sorters and

counters was necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank. They further allege that their contracts

served merely to preclude the application of Article 280 and to bar them from becoming regular employees.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that petitioners were hired only as "special workers and should not in

any way be considered as part of the regular complement of the Bank." Rather, they were "special" workers under

Article 80 of the Labor Code. Private respondent contends that it never solicited the services of petitioners, whose

employment was merely an "accommodation" in response to the requests of government officials and civic-minded

citizens. They were told from the start, "with the assistance of government representatives," that they could not

become regular employees because there were no plantilla positions for "money sorters," whose task used to be

performed by tellers. Their contracts were renewed several times, not because of need "but merely for humanitarian

reasons." Respondent submits that "as of the present, the 'special position' that was created for the petitioners no

longer exists in private respondent bank, after the latter had decided not to renew anymore their special employment

contracts."

In affirming the ruling of the labor arbiter that herein petitioners could not be deemed regular employees under

Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended, Respondent Commission ratiocinated as follows:





"We agree that Art. 280 is not controlling herein. We give due credence to the conclusion that complainants were

hired as an accommodation to [the] recommendation of civic oriented personalities whose employment[s] were

covered by . . . Employment Contract[s] with special provisions on duration of contract as specified under Art. 80.

Hence, as correctly held by the Labor Arbiter a quo, the terms of the contract shall be the law between the parties."

The NLRC also declared that the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons was not applicable, "considering the prevailing

circumstances/milieu of the case."

Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioners have become regular employees.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the Magna Carta for the Disabled (Republic Act No. 7277), on proscription

against discrimination against disabled persons is applicable in this case.

Held: Yes. The petition is meritorious. However, only the employees, who worked for more than six months and

whose contracts were renewed are deemed regular. Hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal.

The facts, viewed in light of the Labor Code and the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons, indubitably show that thepetitioners, except sixteen of them, should be deemed regular employees. As such, they have acquired legal rights

that this Court is duty-bound to protect and uphold, not as a matter of compassion but as a consequence of law and

justice.

The uniform employment contracts of the petitioners stipulated that they shall be trained for a period of one month,

after which the employer shall determine whether or not they should be allowed to finish the 6-month term of the

contract. Furthermore, the employer may terminate the contract at any time for a just and reasonable cause. Unless

renewed in writing by the employer, the contract shall automatically expire at the end of the term.

According to private respondent, the employment contracts were prepared in accordance with Article 80 of the Labor

Code, which provides:

"ARTICLE 80. Employment agreement. — Any employer who employs handicapped workers shall enter into an

employment agreement with them, which agreement shall include:

(a) The names and addresses of the handicapped workers to be employed;

(b) The rate to be paid the handicapped workers which shall be not less than seventy five (75%) per cent of the

applicable legal minimum wage;

(c) The duration of employment period; and

(d) The work to be performed by handicapped workers.

The employment agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized

representatives."The stipulations in the employment contracts indubitably conform with the aforecited provision.

Succeeding events and the enactment of RA No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons), however, justify the

application of Article 280 of the Labor Code.

Respondent bank entered into the aforesaid contract with a total of 56 handicapped workers and renewed the

contracts of 37 of them. In fact, two of them worked from 1988 to 1993. Verily, the renewal of the contracts of the





handicapped workers and the hiring of others lead to the conclusion that their tasks were beneficial and necessary to

the bank. More important, these facts show that they were qualified to perform the responsibilities of their positions.

In other words, their disability did not render them unqualified or unfit for the tasks assigned to them.

QUALIFIED DISABLED PERSONS REMOVE CONTRACT FROM AMBIT OF ARTICLE 80 OF LABOR

CODE. - In this light, the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons mandates that a qualified disabled employee

should be given the same terms and conditions of employment as a qualified able-bodied person. Section 5

of the Magna Carta provides:

"SECTION 5. Equal Opportunity for Employment. — No disabled person shall be denied access to opportunities

for suitable employment. A qualified disabled employee shall be subject to the same terms and conditions of

employment and the same compensation, privileges, benefits, fringe benefits, incentives or allowances as a qualified

able bodied person."

The fact that the employees were qualified disabled persons necessarily removes the employment contracts from the

ambit of Article 80. Since the Magna Carta accords them the rights of qualified able-bodied persons, they are thus

covered by Article 280 of the Labor Code, which provides:

"ARTICLE 280. Regular and Casual Employment. — The provisions of written agreement to the contrary

notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular

where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual

business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking

the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where

the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

"An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any

employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be

considered as regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall

continue while such activity exists."

TEST WHETHER EMPLOYEE IS REGULAR - The test of whether an employee is regular was laid down in De Leon

v. NLRC , in which this Court held:

"The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the

particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer. The test is

whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection

can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular

business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been performing the job for at least one year, even if the

performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and continuing need for its

performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the

employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity exists."

Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and desirable to the business of respondent bank.

With the exception of sixteen of them, petitioners performed these tasks for more than six months.

As held by the Court, "Articles 280 and 281 of the Labor Code put an end to the pernicious practice of making

permanent casuals of our lowly employees by the simple expedient of extending to them probationary appointments,

ad infinitum." The contract signed by petitioners is akin to a probationary employment, during which the bank

determined the employees' fitness for the job. When the bank renewed the contract after the lapse of the six-month





probationary period, the employees thereby became regular employees. No employer is allowed to determine

indefinitely the fitness of its employees.

As regular employees, the twenty-seven petitioners are entitled to security of tenure; that is, their services may be

terminated only for a just or authorized cause. Because respondent failed to show such cause, these twenty-seven

petitioners are deemed illegally dismissed and therefore entitled to back wages and reinstatement without loss of

seniority rights and other privileges. Considering the allegation of respondent that the job of money sorting is no

longer available because it has been assigned back to the tellers to whom it originally belonged, petitioners are

hereby awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Because the other sixteen worked only for six months, they are not deemed regular employees and hence not entitled

to the same benefits.

EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WITH FIXED TERM; RULING IN BRENT CASE NOT APPLICABLE IN

CASE AT BAR - Respondent bank, citing Brent School v. Zamora, in which the Court upheld the validity of

an employment contract with a fixed term, argues that the parties entered into the contract on equal footing.

It adds that the petitioners had in fact an advantage, because they were backed by then DSWD Secretary

Mita Pardo de Tavera and Representative Arturo Borjal.

We are not persuaded. The term limit in the contract was premised on the fact that the petitioners were disabled, and

that the bank had to determine their fitness for the position. Indeed, its validity is based on Article 80 of the Labor

Code. But as noted earlier, petitioners proved themselves to be qualified disabled persons who, under the Magna

Carta for Disabled Persons, are entitled to terms and conditions of employment enjoyed by qualified able-bodied

individuals; hence, Article 80 does not apply because petitioners are qualified for their positions. The validation of

the limit imposed on their contracts, imposed by reason of their disability, was a glaring instance of the very mischief

sought to be addressed by the new law.

·Employment contract; impressed with public interest; parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves. - Moreover, it

must be emphasized that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest. Provisions of applicable

statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the "parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their

relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other." Clearly, the

agreement of the parties regarding the period of employment cannot prevail over the provisions of the Magna Carta

for Disabled Persons, which mandate that petitioners must be treated as qualified able-bodied employees.

Respondent's reason for terminating the employment of petitioners is instructive. Because the Bangko Sentral ng

Pilipinas (BSP) required that cash in the bank be turned over to the BSP during business hours from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00

p.m., respondent resorted to nighttime sorting and counting of money. Thus, it reasons that this task "could not be

done by deaf mutes because of their physical limitations as it is very risky for them to travel at night." We find no

basis for this argument. Travelling at night involves risks to handicapped and able-bodied persons alike. This excuse

cannot justify the termination of their employment.

EMPLOYMENT; CHARACTER OF EMPLOYMENT; HOW DETERMINED - Respondent argues that

petitioners were merely "accommodated" employees. This fact does not change the nature of their

employment. As earlier noted, an employee is regular because of the nature of work and the length of

service, not because of the mode or even the reason for hiring them.

Equally unavailing are private respondent's arguments that it did not go out of its way to recruit petitioners, and that

its plantilla did not contain their positions. In L. T . Datu v. NLRC, the Court held that "the determination of whether





employment is casual or regular does not depend on the will or word of the employer, and the procedure of hiring . .

. but on the nature of the activities performed by the employee, and to some extent, the length of performance and its

continued existence."

Private respondent argues that the petitioners were informed from the start that they could not become

regular employees. In fact, the bank adds, they agreed with the stipulation in the contract regarding this point. Still,

we are not persuaded.

In this light, we iterate our ruling in Romares v. NLRC :

Article 280 was emplaced in our statute books to prevent the circumvention of the employee's right to be secure in his

tenure by indiscriminately and completely ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of

regular employment defined therein. Where an employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business of the employer, such employee is deemed a regular employee and is

entitled to security of tenure notwithstanding the contrary provisions of his contract of employment.

"At this juncture, the leading case of Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora proves instructive. As reaffirmed in subsequent

cases, this Court has upheld the legality of fixed-term employment. It ruled that the decisive determinant in 'term

employment' should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform but the day certain agreed upon

the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship. But this Court went on to say

that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of

tenurial security by the employee, they should be struck down or disregarded as contrary to public policy and

morals."

In rendering this Decision, the Court emphasizes not only the constitutional bias in favor of the working class, but

also the concern of the State for the plight of the disabled. The noble objectives of Magna Carta for Disabled Persons

are not based merely on charity or accommodation, but on justice and the equal treatment of qualified persons,

disabled or not. In the present case, the handicap of petitioners (deaf-mutes) is not a hindrance to their work. The

eloquent proof of this statement is the repeated renewal of their employment contracts. Why then should they be

dismissed, simply because they are physically impaired? The Court believes, that, after showing their fitness for the

work assigned to them, they should be treated and granted the same rights like any other regular employees.

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978

Facts:

Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari , petitioner Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company

(hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and defalcation of company funds as grounds to

terminate the services of an employee. That employee, herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarilyargues that what really motivated PT&T to terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her

employment, which is prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated

against in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the Labor

Code.

Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts

marriage is valid?





Held: Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts

marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor

laws and by no less than the Constitution.

The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases of social and

political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Acknowledged as paramount in the due process scheme is

the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a

condition sine qua non prior to severance of the employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly

establish, through substantial evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such

employee, one’s labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat, abhors any

stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code states, in no uncertain terms,

as follows:

‚ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of

employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or

tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually

dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage.‛

In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the branch supervisor of

the company, with the reminder, that ‚you’re fully aware that the company is not accepting married womenemployee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.‛ Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch

supervisor, private respondent was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason

of her concealment of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy

against marriage (‚and even told you that married women employees are not applicable *sic+ or accepted in our

company.‛

Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of a

woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but it likewise

assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to choose her status, a

privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable right. Hence, while it is true

that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions that they may deem convenient,

the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Carried to its logicalconsequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or

common-law relations and subvert the sacrament of marriage.

Del Monte Phils vs Velasco (2007) G.R. 153447

Facts:

Velasco started working with Del Monte Philippines (petitioner) on October 21, 1976 as a seasonal employee and was

regularized on May 1, 1977. Her latest assignment was as Field Laborer. On June 16, 1987, respondent was warned in

writing due to her absences. On May 4, 1991, respondent, thru a letter, was again warned in writing by petitionerabout her absences without permission and a forfeiture of her vacation leave entitlement for the year 1990-1991 was

imposed against her. On September 14, 1992, another warning letter was sent to respondent regarding her absences

without permission during the year 1991-1992. Her vacation entitlement for the said employment year affected was

consequently forfeited.

In view of the said alleged absences without permission, on September 17, 1994, a notice of hearing was sent to

respondent notifying her of the charges filed against her for violating the Absence Without Official Leave rule: that is





for excessive absence without permission on August 15-18, 29-31 and September 1-10, 1994. Respondent having failed

to appear on September 23, 1994 hearing, another notice of hearing was sent to her resetting the investigation on

September 30, 1994. It was again reset to October 5, 1994. After hearing, the petitioner terminated the services of

respondent effective January 16, 1994 due to excessive absences without permission.

Issue: WON the employment of respondent had been terminated on account of her pregnancy, and therefore violates

the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge an employee on account of the latter's pregnancy.

Held: Respondent's sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent's

services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to

discharge an employee on account of the latter's pregnancy. Article 137 of the Labor Code provides: that it shall be

unlawful for any employer: (1) To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to

discharge any woman employed by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits

provided under this Code; (2) To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, while on leave or in

confinement due to her pregnancy; or (3) To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her

work for fear that she may again be pregnant.

Respondent was able to subsequently justify her absences in accordance with company rules and policy; that therespondent was pregnant at the time she incurred the absences; that this fact of pregnancy and its related illnesses

had been duly proven through substantial evidence; that the respondent attempted to file leaves of absence but the

petitioner's supervisor refused to receive them; that she could not have filed prior leaves due to her continuing

condition; and that the petitioner, in the last analysis, dismissed the respondent on account of her pregnancy, a

prohibited act.

Petitioner terminated the services of respondent on account of her pregnancy which justified her absences and, thus,

committed a prohibited act rendering the dismissal illegal.

Ultra Villa Food Haus vs, Geniston (1999) G.R. 120473

Facts:

Private respondent Renato Geniston was employed by petitioner Ultra Villa Food House and/or its alleged owner

Rosie Tio. Private respondent alleged that he was employed as a "do it all guy" acting as waiter, driver and

maintenance man, in said restaurant. During the elections of May 11, 1992, private respondent acted as Poll Watcher.

The counting of votes lasted until 3:00 p.m. the next day, May 12. Private respondent did not report for work on both

days on account of his poll watching. As a result, his employment was terminated by petitioner Tio on the ground of

abandonment.

Private respondent filed a case of illegal dismissal against petitioners. Petitioner Tio maintained that private

respondent was her personal driver, not an employee of Ultra Villa Food Haus and denied dismissing private

respondent whom she claimed abandoned his job.

The Labor Arbiter found that private respondent was indeed petitioner's personal driver. The Labor Arbiter

concluded that private respondent, being a personal driver, was not entitled to overtime pay, premium pay, service

incentive leave and 13th month pay.On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter and ordered the

reinstatement of private respondent and payment of backwages, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest

days, etc. The NLRC also granted private respondent separation pay in lieu of reinstatement on account of the





establishment's closure but denied his prayer for moral, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.

Issues:

(1) Whether private respondent was an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus or the personal driver of

petitioner; and

(2) Whether private respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.

Held:

I. THE LABOR ARBITER CORRECTLY RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS PETITIONER'S PERSONAL

DRIVER AND NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE SUBJECT ESTABLISHMENT. — We find that private respondent was

indeed the personal driver of petitioner, and not an employee of the Ultra Villa Food Haus. There is substantial

evidence to support such conclusion, namely:

(1) Private respondent's admission during the mandatory conference that he was petitioner's personal driver.

(2) Copies of the Ultra Villa Food Haus payroll which do not contain private respondent's name.

(3) Affidavits of Ultra Villa Food Haus employees attesting that private respondent was never an employee of said

establishment.

(4) Petitioner Tio's undisputed allegation that she works as the branch manager of the CFC Corporation whose office

is located in Mandaue City. This would support the Labor Arbiter's observation that private respondents' position as

driver would be "incongruous" with his functions as a waiter of Ultra Villa Food Haus.

(5) The Joint Affidavit of the warehouseman and warehouse checker of the CFC Corporation stating that: Renato

Geniston usually drive[s] Mrs. Tio from her residence to the office. Thereafter, Mr. Geniston will wait for Mrs. Tio in

her car. Most of the time, Renato Geniston slept in the car of Mrs. Tio and will be awakened only when the latter willleave the office for lunch. Mr. Geniston will again drive Mrs. Tio to the office at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon

and thereafter the former will again wait for Mrs. Tio at the latter's car until Mrs. Tio will again leave the office to

make her rounds at our branch office at the downtown area. In contrast, private respondent has not presented any

evidence other than his self-serving allegation to show that he was employed in the Ultra Villa Food Haus.

On this issue, therefore, the evidence weighs heavily in petitioner's favor. The Labor Arbiter thus correctly ruled that

private respondent was petitioner's personal driver and not an employee of the subject establishment. Accordingly,

the terms and conditions of private respondent's employment are governed by Chapter III, Title III, Book III of the

Labor Code as well as by the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.

PETITIONER IS NOT OBLIGED UNDER THE LAW TO GRANT PRIVATE RESPONDENT OVERTIME PAY,

HOLIDAY PAY, PREMIUM PAY AND SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE.

Chapter III, Title III, Book III, however, is silent on the grant of overtime pay, holiday pay, premium pay and service

incentive leave to those engaged in the domestic or household service.

Moreover, the specific provisions mandating these benefits are found in Book III, Title I of the Labor Code, and

Article 82, which defines the scope of the application of these provisions, expressly excludes domestic helpers from

its coverage:





Art. 82. Coverage. — The provision of this title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings

whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members of the

family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of

another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate regulations.

The limitations set out in the above article are echoed in Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor

Code. Clearly then, petitioner is not obliged by law to grant private respondent any of these benefits.

II. PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BE INDEMNIFIED FOR HIS UNJUST DISMISSAL AND FOR

PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS IN EFFECTING HIS

DISMISSAL.

To constitute abandonment, two requisites must concur: (1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or

justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt

acts, with the second requisite as the more determinative factor.

The burden of proving abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is on the employer. Petitioner failed to discharge

this burden. The only evidence adduced by petitioner to prove abandonment is her affidavit. It is quite unbelievable

that private respondent would leave a stable and relatively well paying job as petitioner's family driver to work as an

election watcher.

Though the latter may pay more in a day, elections in this country are so far in between that it is unlikely that any

person would abandon his job to embark on a career as an election watcher, the functions of which are seasonal and

temporary in nature. Consequently, we do not find private respondent to have abandoned his job. His dismissal from

petitioner's employ being unjust, petitioner is entitled to an indemnity under Article 149 of the Labor Code.

Petitioner likewise concedes that she failed to comply with due process in dismissing private respondent since

private respondent had already abandoned his job. As we have shown earlier however, petitioner's theory of

abandonment has no leg to stand on, and with it, her attempts to justify her failure to accord due process must also

fall. Accordingly, private respondent is ordered to pay private respondent the sum of P1,000.00.

Remington Industrial Sales Corp,. vs Castaneda (2007) G.R. 153477

Facts:

Erlinda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as company cook with a salary of Php 4,000.00 for

Remington, a corporation engaged in the trading business; that she worked for six (6) days a week, starting as early

as 6:00 a.m. because she had to do the marketing and would end at around 5:30 p.m., or even later, after most of the

employees, if not all, had left the company premises; that she continuously worked with Remington until she was

unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when Remington transferred to a new site in Edsa, Caloocan

City.

She averred that she reported for work at the new site in Caloocan City on January 15, 1998, only to be informed that

Remington no longer needed her services. Erlinda believed that her dismissal was illegal because she was not given

the notices required by law; hence, she filed her complaint for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, salary

differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and 10% attorney's fees.





Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular

employee; Erlinda worked as a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington's business of trading in

construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products. It also contended that contrary to Erlinda's

allegations that she worked for eight (8) hours a day, Erlinda's duty was merely to cook lunch and "merienda", after

which her time was hers to spend as she pleased. Remington also maintained that it did not exercise any degree of

control and/or supervision over Erlinda's work as her only concern was to ensure that the employees' lunch and"merienda" were available and served at the designated time. Remington likewise belied Erlinda's assertion that her

work extended beyond 5:00 p.m. as she could only leave after all the employees had gone.

The truth, according to Remington, is that Erlinda did not have to punch any time card in the way that other

employees of Remington did; she was free to roam around the company premises, read magazines, and to even nap

when not doing her assigned chores. Remington averred that the illegal dismissal complaint lacked factual and legal

bases. Allegedly, it was Erlinda who refused to report for work when Remington moved to a new location in

Caloocan City.

LA and NLRC decided the case in favor of the complainant. Petitioner appealed to the CA. While the petition was

pending with the Court of Appeals, the NLRC rendered another Decision in the same case on August 29, 2001, which

included the retirement pay not included in their first decision. Petitioner challenged the second decision of the

NLRC, including the resolution denying its motion for reconsideration, through a second

Issues and Rulings: The petition must fail.

I. Whether or not respondent is petitioner's regular employee or a domestic helper.

We affirm that respondent was a regular employee of the petitioner and that the latter was guilty of illegal dismissal.

Petitioner relies heavily on the affidavit of a certain Mr. Antonio Tan and contends that respondent is the latter's

domestic helper and not a regular employee of the company since Mr. Tan has a separate and distinct personality

from the petitioner. It maintains that it did not exercise control and supervision over her functions; and that it

operates as a trading company and does not engage in the restaurant business, and therefore respondent's work as a

cook, which was not usually necessary or desirable to its usual line of business or trade, could not make her its

regular employee.This contention fails to impress.

In Apex Mining Company, Inc. v. NLRC, this Court held that a househelper in the staff houses of an industrial

company was a regular employee of the said firm. We ratiocinated that:Under Rule XIII, Section 1(b), Book 3 of the

Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined as follows:

"The term 'househelper' as used herein is synonymous to the term 'domestic servant' and shall refer to any person,

whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually

necessary or desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort

and enjoyment of the employer's family."

The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the

employer's home to minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such

definition covers family drivers, domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and similar

househelps.

The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While

it may be true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a







We rule for the respondent. As a regular employee, respondent enjoys the right to security of tenure under Article

279 38 of the Labor Code and may only be dismissed for a just or authorized cause, otherwise the dismissal becomes

illegal and the employee becomes entitled to reinstatement and full backwages computed from the time

compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.

Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of

neglect of duty; hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer under Article 282 of the Labor

Code, which enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these

two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2)

a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor which is

manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work. The intent

to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. This, the

petitioner failed to do in the case at bar.

Alongside the petitioner's contention that it was the respondent who quit her employment and refused to return to

work, greater stock may be taken of the respondent's immediate filing of her complaint with the NLRC. Indeed, an

employee who loses no time in protesting her layoff cannot by any reasoning be said to have abandoned her work,

for it is well-settled that the filing of an employee of a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement

is proof enough of her desire to return to work, thus, negating the employer's charge of abandonment.

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid

cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The employer's case succeeds or fails on

the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee's defense. If doubt exists between the evidence

presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.

III. Whether the second NLRC decision promulgated during the pendency of the first petition for certiorari has basis

in law.

The petitioner contends that the respondent's motion for reconsideration, upon which the second NLRC decision was

based, was not under oath and did not contain a certification as to why it was not decided on time as required under

the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Furthermore, the former also raises for the first time the contention that

respondent's motion was filed beyond the ten (10)-calendar day period required under the same Rules, since the

latter received a copy of the first NLRC decision on December 6, 2000, and respondent filed her motion only on

December 18, 2000. Thus, according to petitioner, the respondent's motion for reconsideration was a mere scrap of

paper and the second NLRC decision has no basis in law. We do not agree.

It is well-settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of

substantial justice, particularly in labor cases. Labor cases must be decided according to justice and equity and the

substantial merits of the controversy. Rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of

justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.

This Court has consistently held that the requirement of verification is formal, and not jurisdictional. Such

requirement is merely a condition affecting the form of the pleading, non-compliance with which does not

necessarily render it fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the

pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading

is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the





pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may

be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

Anent the argument that respondent's motion for reconsideration, on which the NLRC's second decision was based,

was filed out of time, such issue was only brought up for the first time in the instant petition where no new issues

may be raised by a party in his pleadings without offending the right to due process of the opposing party.

Nonetheless, the petitioner asserts that the respondent received a copy of the NLRC's first decision on December 6,

2000, and the motion for reconsideration was filed only on December 18, 2000, or two (2) days beyond the ten (10)-

calendar day period requirement under the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC and should not be allowed. This

contention must fail.

Under Article 223 of the Labor Code, the decision of the NLRC shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar

days from the receipt thereof by the parties.

While it is an established rule that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law

is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment

final and executory, it is equally settled that the NLRC may disregard the procedural lapse where there is an

acceptable reason to excuse tardiness in the taking of the appeal. Among the acceptable reasons recognized by this

Court are (a) counsel's reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the Labor Arbiter that "the aggrieved

party may appeal . . . within ten (10) working days"; (b) fundamental consideration of substantial justice; (c)

prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy appeal is from a decision granting

separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and (d) special circumstances of the case

combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved.

We hold that the particular circumstances in the case at bar, in accordance with substantial justice, call for a

liberalization of the application of this rule. Notably, respondent's last day for filing her motion for reconsideration

fell on December 16, 2000, which was a Saturday. In a number of cases, we have ruled that if the tenth day for

perfecting an appeal fell on a Saturday, the appeal shall be made on the next working day. The reason for this ruling

is that on Saturdays, the office of the NLRC and certain post offices are closed. With all the more reason should this

doctrine apply to respondent's filing of the motion for reconsideration of her cause, which the NLRC itself found to

be impressed with merit. Indeed, technicality should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and

completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties for the ends of justice are reached not only through the

speedy disposal of cases but, more importantly, through a meticulous and comprehensive evaluation of the merits of

a case.

Finally, as to petitioner's argument that the NLRC had already lost its jurisdiction to decide the case when it filed its

petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, suffice it to state

that under Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition shall not interrupt the course of the

principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the

public respondent from further proceeding with the case. Thus, the mere pendency of a special civil action for

certiorari, in connection with a pending case in a lower court, does not interrupt the course of the latter if there is no

writ of injunction. Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in issuing its second

decision which modified the first, especially since it failed to consider the respondent's motion for reconsideration

when it issued its first decision.





Tolosa vs NLRC (2008) G.R. 149578

Facts:

Petitioner was the widow of Capt. Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia

Bulk, to be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. His contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as

supported by his contract of employment when he assumed command of the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel

departed for Long Beach California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of embarkation,

CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.

During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from Yokohama sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT.

TOLOSA was drenched with rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in the

succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in his death on November 18, 1992.

When petitioner filed a complaint with the POEA, transferred to the DOLE, NLRC, the Labor Arbiter ruled in her

favor. The NLRC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction

over the subject matter filed by petitioner. Hence, this appeal.

Summary of Ruling: The Court affirmed the appealed decision. Petitioner's action was recovery of damages based on

a quasi-delict or tort, not adjudication of a labor dispute to which jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited. Petitioner

is actually suing shipmates Garate and Asis for gross negligence, and the said shipmates have no employer-employee

relations with Capt. Tolosa. While labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only relief provided by

labor laws, but also damages under the Civil Code, these relief must still be based on an action that has reasonable

causal connection with matters

Issues and Rulings:

1. Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case (whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction

over petitioner's action).

Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort, but on the failure of privaterespondents — as employers of her husband (Captain Tolosa) — to provide him with timely, adequate and

competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code:

"ART 161. Assistance of employer. — It shall be the duty of any employer to provide all the necessary

assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick

employee in case of emergency."

Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) of the Labor Code vests labor arbiters and the NLRC with jurisdiction

to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from employer-employee relations.

Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule should be applied in her favor. Citing San Miguel

Corporation v. Etcuban, she insists that a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relation confers jurisdiction upon labor tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required conditions: 1)

the dispute arose from an employer-employee relation, considering that the claim was for damages based on the

failure of private respondents to comply with their obligation under Article 161 of the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute

can be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, because the material issue is whether private respondents complied

with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate and competent medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's

occupational safety. We disagree.





We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for

damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JURISDICTION; LABOR TRIBUNALS; ACTION BASED ON QUASI

DELICT THAT DOES NOT INVOLVE LABOR DISPUTE, NOT INCLUDED - Time and time again, we have held that

the allegations in the complaint determine the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.

After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the allegations therein

are in the nature of an action based on a quasi delict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis

for gross negligence.

Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and

Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The labor arbiter himself classified petitioner's

case as "a complaint for damages, blacklisting and watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in

the death of complainant's husband, Capt. Virgilio Tolosa."

We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a

quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations, as we

ruled in Georg Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani:

"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can

resolve in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC

under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can

only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining agreement."

The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought by petitioner. From her paper,

it is evident that the primary reliefs she seeks are as follows:

(a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or "lost income" and

(b) blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings of the deceased, but to his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years. This amount is recoverable if the action is based on a quasi delict as provided

for in Article 2206 of the Civil Code, 18 but not in the Labor Code.

DAMAGES PROVIDED BY THE CIVIL CODE; AWARD PROPER IF RELIEF SOUGHT HAS CAUSAL RELATIONS

WITH LABOR MATTERS - While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only

reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an

action that has a reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining

agreements.

The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the complaint. In San Miguel Corporation v.

NLRC, this Court held:"It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection.

Where such principal relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case

should fall within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be

asserted as an incident to such claim."

The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He ruled that Captain Tolosa, who died at age

58, could expect to live up to 65 years and to have an earning capacity of US$176,400.





LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; NOT TO BE EQUATED WITH LABOR BENEFITS COGNIZED IN LABOR

DISPUTES - It must be noted that a worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated with

wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor benefits that are generally cognized in labor

disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the

realm of civil law.

Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal connection with any of the

claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with

the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. In the present

case, petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or

collective bargaining agreements.

Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a

claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement

of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. Thus, claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond the

jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article

161 by suing for damages before the labor arbiter.

REGULAR COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY OVER ACTION FOR DAMAGES PREDICATED ON QUASI DELICT

AND HAS NO CONNECTION WITH LABOR-RELATED CLAIMS - It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that

have jurisdiction over actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in

which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for

damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims

provided for in Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action lies

with the regular courts — not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.

2. Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter (whether the monetary

award granted by the labor arbiter has already reached finality).

ISSUES NOT RAISED IN COURTS A QUO CANNOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL — Petitioner

contends that the labor arbiter's monetary award has already reached finality, since private respondents were not

able to file a timely appeal before the NLRC.

This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled is

the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and

arguments not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals need not — and ordinarily will not — be considered

by this Court. Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on its face; to do so would be tantamount to a

denial of respondents' right to due process.

Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a question of fact that cannot be entertained in a

petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a quo.

Phil Global Communications Inc vs de Vera (2005) G.R. 157214

Facts:





De Vera and petitioner company entered into a contract where respondent was to attend to the medical needs of

petitioner s employees while being paid a retainer fee of P4,000 per month. Later, De Vera was informed y petitioner

that the retainership will be discontinued. Respondent filed a case for illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not de Vera is an employee of PhilComm or an independent contractor.

Held: Applying the four fold test, de Vera is not an employee. There are several indicators apart from the fact that the

power to terminate the arrangement lay on both parties: from the time he started to work with petitioner, he never

was included in its payroll; was never deducted any contribution for remittance to the Social Security System (SSS);

he was subjected by petitioner to the ten (10%) percent withholding tax for his professional fee, in accordance with

the National Internal Revenue Code, matters which are simply inconsistent with an employer-employee relationship;

the records are replete with evidence showing that respondent had to bill petitioner for his monthly professional fees.

It simply runs against the grain of common experience to imagine that an ordinary employee has yet to bill his

employer to receive his salary. Finally, the element of control is absent. Petition granted.

U-Bix Corp. vs Bandiola (2007) G.R. 157168

Facts:

Sometime in April 1995, Bandiola was employed by U-BIX to install furniture for its customers. On 13 April 1997,

Bandiola and two other U-BIX employees were involved in a vehicular accident on their way to Baguio, where they

were assigned by U-BIX to install furniture for an exhibit. As a result of the accident, Bandiola sustained a fracture on

his left leg. Bandiola and his co-employees were initially brought to the Rosario District Hospital. The next day, 14

April 1997, they were transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital (Orthopedic). After his broken leg was

cemented, Bandiola was advised to go back for further medical treatment. U-BIX paid for the medical expenses

incurred in both mentioned hospitals.

When Bandiola asked for additional financial assistance for further expenses in the treatment of his leg which even

needed to be casted in fiberglass, U-BIX allegedly refused. On September 1998, Bandiola filed a Complaint before the

Labor Arbiter, where he alleged underpayment of salary; non-payment of overtime pay; premium pay for work

performed on holidays and rest days; separation pay; service incentive leave pay; 13th month pay; and the payment

of actual, moral and exemplary damages.

In its Decision, dated 16 September 1998, Labor Arbiter allowed Bandiola's claim for salary differential, service

incentive leave pay and 13th month pay due to U-BIX's failure to present payrolls or similar documents. Incidentally,

the award of these claims is no longer questioned in the present petition. The other claims, particularly those for

medical expenses that Bandiola allegedly incurred and for moral and exemplary damages, were dismissed. Bandiola

asserts that U-BIX failed to extend to him any financial assistance after he was injured in the performance of his

duties, and that as a result, he suffered physical pain, mental torture, fright, sleepless nights, and serious anxiety. Heclaims that this entitles him to moral and exemplary damages.

Bandiola filed an appeal before the NLRC. NLRC amended the Decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter ruling that U-

BIX should reimburse Bandiola the amount for the medical expenses he incurred in connection with his fractured leg;

and further ruled that U-BIX is liable to pay Bandiola P25,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00 in exemplary

damages for refusing to reimburse Bandiola for the medical expenses he incurred after it failed to report to the Social

Security System (SSS) the injuries sustained by Bandiola





It affirmed Bandiola's entitlement to reimbursement of his medical expenses, but reduced the amount to P7,742.50,

the amount of actual damages he was able to prove. It also affirmed without modification the award of moral and

exemplary damages, and the monetary award granted by the Labor Arbiter

Issue: WON petitioner U-BIX should reimburse respondent Bandiola for alleged medical expenses of P7,742.50 and

pay for moral damages of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 to said respondent Bandiola.

Held: Yes. Contrary to the arguments put forward by U-BIX, it is liable to reimburse Bandiola the amount of

P7,742.50 for medical expenses because its failure to comply with its duty to record and report Bandiola's injury to

the SSS precluded Bandiola from making any claims. Moreover, U-BIX, by its own admission, reimbursed its other

employees who were involved in the same accident for their medical expenses. Clearly, the reimbursement of

medical expenses for injuries incurred in the course of employment is part of the benefits enjoyed by U-BIX's

employees. The only justification for its refusal to reimburse Bandiola was that he intended to defraud the company

by presenting spurious receipts amounting to P7,742.50 that were allegedly issued four months before their

presentation.

EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION FOR WORK-RELATED INJURIES, DISABILITIES AND DEATHS - Articles 205 and

206 of the Labor Code set the reportorial requirements in cases when an employee falls sick or suffers an injuryarising in the course of employment. An injury is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place

within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is fulfilling his

duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 20 The aforecited provisions of the Labor Code provide

that:

ART 205. RECORD OF DEATH OR DISABILITY

(a) All employers shall keep a logbook to record chronologically the sickness, injury or death of their

employees, setting forth therein their names, dates and places of the contingency, nature of the contingency and

absences. Entries in the logbook shall be made within five days from notice or knowledge of the occurrence of

contingency. Within five days after entry in the logbook, the employer shall report to the System only those

contingencies he deems to be work-connected.

(b) All entries in the employers logbook shall be made by the employer or any of his authorized official after

verification of the contingencies or the employees absences for a period of a day or more. Upon request by the

System, the employer shall furnish the necessary certificate regarding information about any contingency appearing

in the logbook, citing the entry number, page number and date. Such logbook shall be made available for inspection

to the duly authorized representatives of the System.

ART 206. NOTICE OF SICKNESS, INJURY OR DEATH

Notice of sickness, injury or death shall be given to the employer by the employee or by his dependents or anybody

on his behalf within five days from the occurrence of the contingency. No notice to the employer shall be required if

the contingency is known to the employer or his agents or representatives.

GENERAL RULE AND EXCEPTION ON NOTIFICATION - As a general rule, the injured employee must notify his

employer, who is obligated to enter the notice in a logbook within five days after notification. Within five days after

making the entry, the employer of a private company reports the work-related sickness or injury to the SSS. The

claim is forwarded to the SSS, which decides on the validity of the claim. When the SSS denies the claim, the denial

may be appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) within 30 days.





However, the law provides an exception to the rule requiring an employee to notify his or her employer of his

injuries. Under Section B of ECC Board Resolution No. 2127, issued on 5 August 1982, notice of injury, sickness or

death of the employee need not be given to the employer in any of the following situations:

(1) When the employee suffers the contingency within the employer's premises;

(2) When the employee officially files an application for leave of absence by reason of the contingency from

which he suffers;

(3) When the employer provides medical services and/or medical supplies to the employee who suffers from

the contingency; and

(4) When the employer can be reasonably presumed to have had knowledge of the employee's contingency, in

view of the following circumstances:

(4.1) The employee was performing an official function for the employer when the contingency occurred;

(4.2) The employee's contingency has been publicized through mass media outlets; or

(4.3) The specific circumstances of the occurrence of the contingency have been such that the employer can be

reasonably presumed to have readily known it soon thereafter; or

(4.4) Any other circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable presumption that the employer has been aware

of the contingency.

In the present case, there is no dispute that Bandiola's leg injury was sustained in the course of his employment with

U-BIX. At the time of the accident, Bandiola was on the way to Baguio, where he was ordered by U-BIX to install

furniture for an exhibit. Moreover, U-BIX was aware that Bandiola, as well as his other co-employees, were injured

during the accident. U-BIX admitted to providing Bandiola and his co-employees with medical assistance and it even

sent its representative, Rey Reynes, to Rosario District Hospital, where they were confined, and had them transferred

to the Orthopedic. U-BIX was also aware that the Orthopedic instructed Bandiola to return for further medical

treatment. It is implicit that Bandiola needed further treatment for his broken leg and was, thus, incapacitated to

work.

Given the foregoing circumstances, U-BIX had the legal obligation to record pertinent information in connection with

the injuries sustained by Bandiola in its logbook within five days after it had known about the injuries; and to report

the same to the SSS within five days after it was recorded in the logbook, in accordance with Articles 205 and 206 of

the Labor Code. Had U-BIX performed its lawful duties, the SSS, or the ECC on appeal, could have properly

considered whether or not Bandiola was entitled to reimbursement for his medical expenses, as well as disability

benefits while he was unable to work. However, U-BIX did not present any evidence showing that it had complied

with these legal requirements. It had not even replied to Bandiola's allegations in his Position Paper, dated 13 April

1998, that its employees were not even members of the SSS.

HISTORY AND IMPORTANCE OF ‚EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION‛ - As early as 1938, this Court emphasized, in

the case of Murillo v. Mendoza, 22 that labor laws have demonstrated an impetus towards ensuring that employees

are compensated for work-related injuries. The law has since treated such compensation as a right, which the

employees can claim, instead of an act of charity to be given at the employer's discretion.





The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act was to secure workmen and their

dependents against becoming objects of charity, by making a reasonable compensation for such accidental calamities

as are incidental to the employment. Under such act injuries to workmen and employees are to be considered no

longer as results of fault or negligence, but as the products of the industry in which the employee is concerned.

Compensation for such injuries is, under the theory of such statute, like any other item in the cost of production or

transportation, and ultimately charged to the consumer. The law substitutes for liability for negligence an entirelynew conception; that is, that if the injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, under the doctrine of

man's humanity to man, the cost of compensation must be one of the elements to be liquidated and balanced in the

course of consumption. In other words, the theory of law is that, if the industry produces an injury, the cost of that

injury shall be included in the cost of the product of the industry.

In De Jesus v. Employee's Compensation Commission, this Court further noted that while the present law protects

employers from spurious and long overdue claims, it stresses at the same time that the claims for compensation are

to be promptly and properly addressed. More importantly, employers no longer need to determine the validity of a

claim or to defend themselves from spurious claims. Their duties are thus limited to paying the monthly premiums

and reporting the sickness, injury or death for which compensation is due.

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on the salaries of

their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his

claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new

neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting

papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt.

The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look

for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these

contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commissionadministers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the

compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. . . . .

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of

compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one

employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent.

By failing to report Bandiola's injury to the SSS, U-BIX disregarded the law and its purpose; that is, to provide a

proper and prompt settlement of his claims. Instead, U-BIX arrogated upon itself the duty of determining which

medical expenses are proper for reimbursement. In doing so, it could unnecessarily delay and unjustifiably refuse to

reimburse Bandiola for medical expenses even if they were adequately supported by receipts, as was done in this

instance. The expense and delay undergone by Bandiola since 1997 in obtaining reimbursement for his medical

expenses of P7,742.50 very clearly defeat the purpose of the law.

BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE DEFENDANT OF A CLAIM - U-BIX does not question its liability to pay for medical

expenses incurred in connection with the 13 April 1997 accident; it admits that it paid for all the medical expenses of

its other employees, who were involved in the accident. It refused, however, to reimburse Bandiola for further

medical expenses on the ground that the receipts were counterfeit and belatedly presented to U-BIX.





Bandiola presented eight receipts with a total amount of P7,742.50 issued by MCP and his attending physician, Dr.

Celestino Musngi. The amounts indicated therein range from P200.00 to P2,936.00. The receipts were issued on 24

April 1997 and 6 May 1997, or around the time the accident occurred on 13 April 1997. From the face of the receipts,

there is no showing that these documents are false or falsified. U-BIX could have easily confirmed with MCP or Dr.

Celestino Musngi, who issued said receipts, the authenticity of the documents. However, it failed to allege that it took

any steps to check the authenticity of the receipts. It also failed to present any evidence that these receipts are fake.Absent any proof, no weight can be attached to the allegation that the receipts are spurious.

The party who alleges the fact has the burden of proving it. The burden of proof is assigned to the defendant of a

claim when he or she alleges an affirmative defense, which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the

complainant's cause of action — the existence of the receipts, in the present case — but is one which, if established,

will be a good defense, i.e., an avoidance of the claim. One who alleges an affirmative defense that is denied by the

complainant — the falsity of the receipts, in this case — has the burden of proving it. Unless the party asserting the

affirmative of an issue sustains the burden of proof, his or her cause will not succeed. If he or she fails to establish the

facts of which the matter asserted is predicated, the complainant is entitled to a verdict or decision in his or her favor.

In this case, U-BIX's affirmative defense that the receipts are spurious is rejected due to utter lack of proof.

U-BIX asserts that no demand was made by the petitioner and that it only came to know of Bandiola's medical

expenses when it received the Summons to attend a preliminary conference before the Labor Arbiter. For his part,

Bandiola insists that before filing the case with the NLRC, he approached U-BIX three times for financial assistance in

connection with his medical expenses, but he was refused. Bandiola identified the persons he spoke to as Rey Reynes

and a certain Ms. Clarisse. U-BIX alleges that it sent Rey Reynes to look for Bandiola in the address recorded in their

office files, but that he no longer resided therein. Bandiola contested this allegation by stating that he had not

changed his residence. As of 20 September 2006, Bandiola still resided at the same address, Sampaloc Site II-B,

Barangay B.F. Homes, Parañaque City, as evidenced by the Certificate of Indigency issued by Barangay BF Homes

Chairperson Florencia N. Amurao.

U-BIX maintains that Bandiola kept the company in the dark regarding his medical expenses because he intended to

file a baseless suit aimed at extorting money from the company. This Court finds it implausible that a worker whoreceived less than minimum wage would choose to initiate legal proceedings before even seeking to collect from his

employer. To automatically presume that Bandiola intended to defraud the company despite the absence of

supporting evidence would constitute a hasty and unsubstantiated generalization, which displays a prejudice against

ordinary workers, such as Bandiola.

U-BIX's continued and stubborn refusal to reimburse Bandiola's medical expenses was made evident during the

mandatory conference before the Labor Arbiter when it refused to recognize the receipts shown to it. If U-BIX had

refused to take cognizance of the receipts presented during a quasi-judicial proceeding before a public officer, then it

would have been more likely that it ignored, if not flat-out refused, to consider the said receipts when the same were

presented by a lowly employee.

Under the facts of the case, Bandiola is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There is no question that moral

damages may be awarded in cases when a wrongful act or omission has caused the complainant mental anguish,

fright and serious anxiety.

Articles 2217 and 2219, in connection with Article 21 of the Civil Code, read:





Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,

wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation,

moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

U-BIX failed to perform its legal obligation to report to the SSS the injuries suffered by Bandiola, and, thereafter,

failed to extend the same "financial aid" it extended to other employees who were involved in the same accident.

After it was shown the receipts for the medical expenses Bandiola paid for in connection with the injuries, U-BIX

unreasonably refused to reimburse him for the expenses. It is not difficult to accept Bandiola's claim that he suffered

mental anguish, serious anxiety and fright when U-BIX left him without any options for financial support while he

was suffering from and rendered incapacitated by work-related injuries. He was severely distressed by his plight that

he felt that he could no longer continue to work for U-BIX. U-BIX's unjustified and continued refusal to reimburse

Bandiola after it failed to report his injury to the SSS, despite the receipts he presented, demonstrates bad faith. By

singling out Bandiola from its other employees, who were reimbursed for their medical expenses, and forcing him to

litigate for ten years in order to claim the unsubstantial amount of P7,742.50, U-BIX was clearly indulging in

malicious conduct.

AWARD ON MORAL DAMAGES - As regards the award of moral damages, this Court has ruled that there is no

hard and fast rule in determining the fair amount for moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own

peculiar circumstances. It should enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve

to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured party has undergone by reason of defendant's culpable action. In other

words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual and/or

psychological status quo ante; and therefore it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Therefore, in light of

the sufferings sustained by Bandiola, this Court sustains the award of P25,000.00 as moral damages.

Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for

public good. It reads:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the

public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences,

and their imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender.

The Labor Code provides for the medical expenses, as well as disability benefits of workers suffering from work-

related injuries and recognizes such compensation as their right. Indeed, a system has been put in place for the

prompt collection of the benefits, which are given by law to injured employees. All that U-BIX was required to do

was to report the injury; it need not have defended itself from what it perceived to be spurious claims. Instead, it took

upon itself the duty of determining the validity of Bandiola's claims and unjustifiably refused to reimburse his

properly receipted medical expenses. The prolonged litigation of his valid claims is not the only miserable situation

which the present labor laws sought to prevent, but the pathetic situation wherein a laborer is placed at the mercy of

his or her employer for recompense that is his or hers by right. Exemplary damages are, thus, rightfully imposed

against U-BIX.





Escasinas et al., vs Shangri-la Mactan Island Resort et al., (2009) G.R. 178827

Facts:

Registered nurses Jeromie D. Escasinas and Evan Rigor Singco (petitioners) were engaged in 1999 and 1996,

respectively, by Dr. Jessica Joyce R. Pepito (respondent doctor) to work in her clinic at respondent Shangri-la’s

Mactan Island Resort (Shangri-la) in Cebu of which she was a retained physician.

In late 2002, petitioners filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for regularization,

underpayment of wages, non-payment of holiday pay, night shift differential and 13th month pay differential against

respondents, claiming that they are regular employees of Shangri-la. Shangri-la claimed, however, that petitioners

were not its employees but of respondent doctor, that Article 157 of the Labor Code, as amended, does not make itmandatory for a covered establishment to employ health personnel, that the services of nurses is not germane nor

indispensable to its operations, and that respondent doctor is a legitimate individual contractor who has the power to

hire, fire and supervise the work of nurses under her.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared petitioners to be regular employees of Shangri-la, noting that the petitioners usually

perform work which is necessary and desirable to Shangri-la’s business, and thus ordered Shangri-la to grant them

the wages and benefits due them as regular employees from the time their services were engaged.

Upon appeal, the NLRC declared that no employer-employee relationship existed between Shangri-la and

petitioners. It ruled that contrary to the finding of the LA, even if Art. 280 of the Labor Code states that if a worker

performs work usually necessary or desirable in the business of an employer, he cannot be automatically deemed a

regular employee, and that the Memorandum of Agreement between the respondent and the respondent doctor

amply shows that respondent doctor was in fact engaged by Shangri-la on retainer basis, under which she could hire

her own nurses and other clinic personnel.

The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the NLRC decision, concluding that all aspects of employment of petitioners

being under the supervision and control of respondent doctor and since Shangri-la is not principally engaged in the

business of providing medical or healthcare services, petitioners could not be regarded as regular employees of

Shangri-la.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Article 157 of the Labor Code make it mandatory for covered establishment to employ health

personnel;

2. Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Shangri-la and petitioners.





Held: The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners’ postulation, Art. 157 does not require the engagement of full -time

nurses as regular employees of a company employing not less than 50 workers. Thus, the Article provides:

ART. 157. Emergency medical and dental services. – It shall be the duty of every employer to furnish his employeesin any locality with free medical and dental attendance and facilities consisting of:

(a) The services of a full-time registered nurse when the number of employees exceeds fifty (50) but not more

than two hundred (200) except when the employer does not maintain hazardous workplaces, in which case the

services of a graduate first-aider shall be provided for the protection of the workers, where no registered nurse is

available. The Secretary of Labor shall provide by appropriate regulations the services that shall be required

where the number of employees does not exceed fifty (50) and shall determine by appropriate order hazardous

workplaces for purposes of this Article;

(b) The services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency clinic, when

the number of employees exceeds two hundred (200) but not more than three hundred (300); and

(c) The services of a full-time physician, dentist and full-time registered nurse as well as a dental clinic, and an

infirmary or emergency hospital with one bed capacity for every one hundred (100) employees when the

number of employees exceeds three hundred (300).

In cases of hazardous workplaces, no employer shall engage the services of a physician or dentist who cannot

stay in the premises of the establishment for at least two (2) hours, in the case of those engaged on part-time

basis, and not less than eight [8] hours in the case of those employed on full-time basis. Where the undertaking is

nonhazardous in nature, the physician and dentist may be engaged on retained basis, subject to such regulations

as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe to

insure immediate availability of medical and dental treatment and attendance in case of emergency.

Under the foregoing provision, Shangri-la, which employs more than 200 workers, is mandated to ‚furnish‛ its

employees with the services of a full-time registered nurse, a part-time physician and dentist, and an emergency

clinic which means that it should provide or make available such medical and allied services to its employees, not

necessarily to hire or employ a service provider. As held in Philippine Global Communications vs. De Vera:

x x x while it is true that the provision requires employers to engage the services of medical practitioners in

certain establishments depending on the number of their employees, nothing is there in the law which says that

medical practitioners so engaged be actually hired as employees, adding that the law, as written, only requires

the employer ‚to retain‛, not employ, a part-time physician who needed to stay in the premises of the non-

hazardous workplace for two (2) hours.





The term ‚full-time‛ in Art. 157 cannot be construed as referring to the type of employment of the person

engaged to provide the services, for Article 157 must not be read alongside Art. 280 in order to vest employer-

employee relationship on the employer and the person so engaged. So De Vera teaches:

x x For, we take it that any agreement may provide that one party shall render services for and in behalf of

another, no matter how necessary for the latter’s business, even without being hired as an employee. This set-up

is precisely true in the case of an independent contractorship as well as in an agency agreement. Indeed, Article

280 of the Labor Code, quoted by the appellate court, is not the yardstick for determining the existence of an

employment relationship. As it is, the provision merely distinguishes between two (2) kinds of employees, i.e.,

regular and casual. x x x

The phrase ‚services of a full-time registered nurse‛ should thus be taken to refer to the kind o f services that the

nurse will render in the company’s premises and to its employees, not the manner of his engagement.

The existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship is generally established by considering the

following determinants: whether the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the

work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified

piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer's power with respect to the hiring,

firing and payment of the contractor's workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools,

appliances, materials and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.

On the other hand, existence of an employer- employee relationship is established by the presence of the following

determinants: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) power of dismissal; (3) the payment of wages by

whatever means; and (4) the power to control the worker's conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall

consideration.

Against the above-listed determinants, the Court holds that respondent doctor is a legitimate independent contractor.

That Shangri-la provides the clinic premises and medical supplies for use of its employees and guests does not

necessarily prove that respondent doctor lacks substantial capital and investment. Besides, the maintenance of a

clinic and provision of medical services to its employees is required under Art. 157, which are not directly related to

Shangri-la’s principal business – operation of hotels and restaurants.

As to payment of wages, respondent doctor is the one who underwrites the following: salaries, SSS contributions and

other benefits of the staff; group life, group personal accident insurance and life/death insurance for the staff with

minimum benefit payable at 12 times the employee’s last drawn salary, as well as value added taxes and withholding

taxes, sourced from her P60,000.00 monthly retainer fee and 70% share of the service charges from Shangri- la’s guests

who avail of the clinic services. It is unlikely that respondent doctor would report petitioners as workers, pay their





SSS premium as well as their wages if they were not indeed her employees.

With respect to the supervision and control of the nurses and clinic staff, it is not disputed that a document, ‚Clinic

Policies and Employee Manual‛ claimed to have been prepared by respondent doctor exists, to which petitioners

gave their conformity and in which they acknowledged their co-terminus employment status. It is thus presumedthat said document, and not the employee manual being followed by Shangri-la’s regular workers, governs how they

perform their respective tasks and responsibilities. In fine, as Shangri-la does not control how the work should be

performed by petitioners, it is not petitioners’ employer.

ISS Indochina Corp., vs Ferrer (2005) G.R. 156381

Facts:

Respondents, in their complaint, alleged that petitioner hired them as construction workers for its Taiwan-based

principal/employer Formosa Plastics Corporation. Pursuant to the parties' contracts of employment, each respondentwould receive a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Their employment covered a period of one (1) year or from May 1,

1997 to May 1, 1998.

On May 1, 1997, respondents, along with other Filipino contract workers, were deployed to Taiwan. But upon their

arrival, only 20 workers, excluding respondents, were employed as construction workers at Formosa Plastics

Corporation. Aggrieved, they sought assistance from Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) officials who

directed them to sign separate affidavits alleging that they were assigned, not as construction workers for Formosa

Plastics Corporation, but as cable tray/pipe tract workers at Shin Kwan Enterprise Co., Ltd.

On May 17, 1997, they were repatriated to the Philippines. They alleged that they were forced to resign since "they

were left out from among those workers who were considered for employment."Subsequetly, a complaint was filed

by private respondents for illegal dismissal, payment of salaries, refund of placement fee, damages and attorney's

fees filed with the Office of the Labor Arbiter against JSS Indochina Corporation, petitioner, docketed as NLRC NCR

OFW Case (L) 97-05-3715.

Petitioner denied the allegations in the complaint, claiming that, assisted by MECO officials, respondents pre-

terminated their respective contracts of employment as they refused to work after being assigned as cable tray/pipe

tract workers by Formosa Plastics Corporation to 33 KV Worksite being administered by Shin Kwan Construction

Company Limited.

Issue: Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed from employment by petitioner.

Held: We take this opportunity to stress the need for strict enforcement of the law and the rules and regulations

governing Filipino contract workers abroad. Many hapless citizens of this country who have sought foreign

employment to earn a few dollars to ensure for their families a life worthy of human dignity and provide proper

education and a decent future for their children have found themselves enslaved by foreign masters, harassed or

abused and deprived of their employment for the slightest cause. No one should be made to unjustly profit from

their suffering. Hence, recruiting agencies must not only faithfully comply with Government-prescribed

responsibilities; they must impose upon themselves the duty, borne out of a social conscience, to help citizens of this





country sent abroad to work for foreign principals. They must keep in mind that this country is not exporting slaves

but human beings, and above all, fellow Filipinos seeking merely to improve their lives.

There is no question that petitioner violated its contract with respondents. As found by the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC

and the Appellate Court, petitioner did not assign them as construction workers for Formosa Plastics Corporation.

Instead, they were directed to work as cable tray/pipe tract workers at Shin Kwan Enterprise Co., Ltd.

The Labor Arbiter found that respondents' "decision to resign from their employment were made by force of

circumstances not attributable to their own fault," and "it was not their fault that they were left out from among those

workers who were considered for employment by the foreign employer." Likewise, the NLRC held that respondents'

"decision to go home to the Philippines was justified in view of the evident breach of contract" by petitioner, as "it

clearly appeared that upon their arrival at the jobsite, there was no employer on hand." Clearly, both labor tribunals

correctly concluded, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that they were forced to resign and to pre-terminate their

employment contracts in view of petitioner's breach of their provisions. Undoubtedly, the termination of

respondents' services is without just or valid cause.

Section 10 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, provides:

"SECTION 10. Money Claims. —

In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,

the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per

annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year

of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Verily, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, respondents who were unjustly dismissed from work are actually

entitled to an amount representing their three (3) months salary considering that their employment contract has a

term of exactly one (1) year; plus a full refund of their placement fee, with no ceiling, with interest at 12% per annum.

In Olarte vs. Nayona, we ordered petitioner Olarte to pay respondent Nayona, an illegally dismissed overseascontract worker, an amount corresponding to her 3 months salary and to reimburse her placement fee of P23,000.00,

with legal interest of 12% per annum.

People vs Capt. Gasacao (2005) G.R. 168449

Facts:

Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while

his nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager, appellant's duties included

receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants and informing them of the agency's requirement of paymentof performance or cash bond prior to deployment.

On August 4, 2000, appellant and Jose Gasacao were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under

Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos

Act of 1995, and penalized under Section 7 (b) of the same law, before the RTC of Quezon City.





Only the appellant was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty

to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On March 5, 2001, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218,

rendered its Joint Decision convicting appellant of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94240 and

acquitting him of the charge in Crim. Case No. Q-00-94241.

Conformably with our pronouncement in People v. Mateo, 6 which modified pertinent provisions of the Rules of

Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty

imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as in this case, as well as this Court's Resolution dated

September 19, 1995, we resolved on February 2, 2005 to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate

action and disposition.

Issue: WON an error attended the trial court's findings, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that appellant was

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

Held:

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

Sec. 6. DEFINITIONS. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,

contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or

advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of

authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the

Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, that such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or

promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include

the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of

authority.

(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable

fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that

actually received by him as a loan or advance;

(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and

Employment; and

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and

processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the

worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense

involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons

conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or

more persons individually or as a group.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8042 (THE MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINO ACT OF 1995); LICENSE

DIFFERENTIATED FROM AUTHORITY - A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and

Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency, while an authority is a

document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities

as a private recruitment entity. However, it appears that even licensees or holders of authority can be held liable for

illegal recruitment should they commit any of the above-enumerated acts.





Thus, it is inconsequential that appellant committed large scale illegal recruitment while Great Eastern Shipping

Agency, Inc. was holding a valid authority. We thus find that the court below committed no reversible error in not

appreciating that the manning agency was a holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the private

complainants.

There is no merit in appellant's contention that he could not be held liable for illegal recruitment since he was a mere

employee of the manning agency, pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 8042 which provides:

The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of

juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE, CREWING MANAGER OF A SHIPPING AGENCY PROMISED THE

COMPLAINANTS THAT THEY WILL BE DEPLOYED ABROAD AFTER THEY HAVE PAID THE CASH BOND —

Contrary to appellant's claim, he is not a mere employee of the manning agency but the crewing manager. As such,

he receives job applications, interviews applicants and informs them of the agency's requirement of payment of

performance or cash bond prior to the applicant's deployment. As the crewing manager, he was at the forefront of the

company's recruitment activities.

The testimonies of the private complainants clearly established that appellant is not a mere employee of Great

Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. As the crewing manager, it was appellant who made representations with the private

complainants that he can secure overseas employment for them upon payment of the cash bond.

It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave complainants the distinct

impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the latter were

convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. 10 Appellant's act of promising the private

complainants that they will be deployed abroad within three months after they have paid the cash bond clearly

shows that he is engaged in illegal recruitment.

AN EMPLOYEE OF A COMPANY OR CORPORATION ENGAGED THEREIN MAY BE HELD LIABLE AS

PRINCIPAL TOGETHER WITH HIS EMPLOYER. — The trial court's appreciation of the complainants' testimonies

deserves the highest respect since it was in a better position to assess their credibility.

Even assuming that appellant was a mere employee, such fact is not a shield against his conviction for large scale

illegal recruitment. In the case of People vs. Cabais, we have held that an employee of a company or corporation

engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together with the employer, if it is shown that he

actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.

Clearly, the acts of appellant vis-à-vis the private complainants, either as the crewing manager of Great Eastern

Shipping Agency Inc. or as a mere employee of the same, constitute acts of large scale illegal recruitment which

should not be countenanced.

We find no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court that appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

large scale illegal recruitment. It was established that he promised overseas employment to five applicants, herein

private complainants. He interviewed and required them to complete and submit documents purportedly needed for

their employment. Although he informed them that it is optional, he collected cash bonds and promised their

deployment notwithstanding the proscription against its collection under Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and

Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042 13 which state that:





SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. — In no case shall an employment agency require any bond or cash

deposit from the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation.

Acuña vs CA (2006) G.R. 159832

Facts:

Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by private respondent Join International Corporation (JIC), a

licensed recruitment agency, to its principal, 3D Pre-Color Plastic, Inc., (3D) in Taiwan, Republic of China, under a

uniformly-worded employment contract for a period of two years. Herein private respondent Elizabeth Alañon is the

president of Join International Corporation.

Sometime in September 1999, petitioners filed with private respondents applications for employment abroad. After

their papers were processed, petitioners claimed they signed a uniformly-worded employment contract with private

respondents which stipulated that they were to work as machine operators with a monthly salary of NT$15,840.00,

exclusive of overtime, for a period of two years.

On December 9, 1999, with 18 other contract workers they left for Taiwan. Upon arriving at the job site, a factory

owned by 3D, they were made to sign another contract which stated that their salary was only NT$11,840.00. They

were likewise informed that the dormitory which would serve as their living quarters was still under construction.

They were requested to temporarily bear with the inconvenience but were assured that their dormitory would be

completed in a short time.

Petitioners alleged that they were brought to a "small room with a cement floor so dirty and smelling with foul odor".

Forty women were jampacked in the room and each person was given a pillow. Since the ladies' comfort room was

out of order, they had to ask permission to use the men's comfort room. Petitioners claim they were made to work

twelve hours a day, from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.

The petitioners averred that on December 16, 1999, due to unbearable working conditions, they were constrained to

inform management that they were leaving. They booked a flight home, at their own expense. Before they left, they

were made to sign a written waiver. In addition, petitioners were not paid any salary for work rendered on

December 11-15, 1999.

Immediately upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioners went to private respondents' office, narrated what happened,

and demanded the return of their placement fees and plane fare. Private respondents refused.

On December 28, 1999, private respondents offered a settlement. Petitioner Mendez received P15,080. The next day,

petitioners Acuña and Ramones went back and received P13,640 10 and P16,200, respectively. They claim they signed

a waiver, otherwise they would not be refunded.

On January 14, 2000, petitioners Acuña and Mendez invoking Republic Act No. 8042 filed a complaint for illegal

dismissal and non-payment/underpayment of salaries or wages, overtime pay, refund of transportation fare,

payment of salaries/wages for 3 months, moral and exemplary damages, and refund of placement fee before the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).







A perusal of the records reveals that petitioners were not in any way deceived, coerced or intimidated into signing a

quitclaim waiver in the amounts of P13,640, P15,080 and P16,200 respectively. Nor was there a disparity between the

amount of the quitclaim and the amount actually due the petitioners.

According to the Bangko Sentral Treasury Department, the prevailing exchange rates on December 1999 was NT$1 to

P1.268805. Hence, after conversion to Philippine pesos, the amount of the quitclaim paid to petitioners was actually

higher than the amount due them.

Asian International Manpower Services vs CA (2006) G.R. 169652

Facts:

Proxy Maid Services Centre (Proxy), a Hong Kong based recruitment agency hired her through AIMS, a recruitment

entity in the Philippines. On February 10, 2000, she signed an employment contract to work as a domestic helper of

Low See Ting who later cancelled the contract sometime in March 2000. Nevertheless, Lacerna heeded AIMS's advice

to proceed to Hong Kong on the assurance that she will be provided with an employment abroad. Upon arrival at

Proxy's office on April 1, 2000, Lacerna was fetched by her employer, Tan Kmin Shwe Lin Charmain (Charmain).

However, the latter dismissed her in a Notification dated May 2, 2000 citing as reason the "difficulty in

communication."

On May 20, 2000, Proxy transferred Lacerna to Tam Ching-yee, Donna. On June 30, 2000 she was dismissed by Donna

without stating the reason for her termination. Neither did Proxy explain why she was dismissed. On July 1, 2000,

Lacerna agreed to take a three-day trial period with another employer, Daisy Lee. However, before she could sign her

contract with the latter, the Hong Kong government denied her request for change of employer and advised her to

submit a fresh application with her country of origin.

Following the denial of her work permit, Lacerna returned to the Philippines on July 13, 2000 but was informed by

AIMS that Daisy Lee is no longer interested in hiring her. Lacerna demanded the return of her placement fee but was

denied, hence, she filed the instant illegal dismissal case.AIMS, on the other hand, alleged that Lacerna resigned after

working for five days as a domestic helper of Low See Ting from April 1, 2000 to April 5, 2000, as evidenced by her

resignation letter. Proxy paid her wages and fare for a return ticket to the Philippines but she refused to be

repatriated. Thereafter, with the assistance of Proxy, she was hired in the household of Charmain. Unfortunately, the

latter dismissed Lacerna on the ground of difficulty in communication. On May 8, 2000, the Hong Kong Immigration

Department granted her an extension of time to stay in Hong Kong with a warning that the same is her last chance to

stay in the country. When Lacerna requested another extension, the same was denied and she was directed to leave

Hong Kong.

In her Reply, Lacerna insisted that her first employer was Charmain because she never worked for Low See Ting,

who as early as March 2000, cancelled the contract before she flew to Hong Kong. She added that the signatureappearing in the resignation letter and receipt of payment for the period April 1 to 5, 2000 is not her handwriting.

Issue: Was Lacerna illegally dismissed? If yes, may AIMS be held liable for the monetary claims of Lacerna

Held: On both issues, the Court rules in the affirmative.





There is no dispute that the last employer of Lacerna was Donna and not Daisy Lee because the Hong Kong

government directed her repatriation before she could sign her contract with the latter. In dismissing her, Donna

gave no reason for her termination. Neither did Proxy explain the ground for her dismissal. And where there is no

showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination, the law considers the matter, a case of illegal dismissal.

In termination cases involving Filipino workers recruited for overseas employment, the burden of proving just or

authorized cause for termination rests with the foreign based employer/principal and the local based entity whichrecruited the worker both being solidarily liable for liabilities arising from the illegal d ismissal of the worker. In this

case, the Court of Appeals correctly declared Lacerna's termination illegal since no reason was given to justify her

termination.

AIMS argued that it cannot be held liable for the monetary claims of Lacerna because its contract was limited only to

Lacerna's employment with Low See Ting. When she resigned as domestic helper of the latter, the contract was

allegedly extinguished making AIMS no longer privy to the subsequent employment contract entered into by Proxy

and Lacerna.

However, the records of the Immigration Department of Hong Kong belie the contention of AIMS that Lacerna was

employed by Low See Ting. The Immigration Department noted that the application of Lacerna was her second

request for change of employer. She filed the first application after her contract was pre-terminated on May 4, 2000.

This refers to the pre-termination by Charmain in the Notification of Cancellation of Employment Contract dated

May 2, 2000. However, the prospective employer subject of said first application backed out, hence, Lacerna

submitted a second application for change of employer which was granted with a warning that the same will be her

last chance to stay in Hong Kong. Said second application landed her a job in the household of Donna on May 20,

2000. When the latter dismissed Lacerna on June 30, 2000, she applied for the third time to change employer but was

denied by the Immigration Department which directed her to leave Hong Kong.

The Hong Kong Immigration Department gave Lacerna only two chances to change employer. The subject of the first

was the prospective employer who backed out, and the second was Donna. If we follow the version of AIMS, then

the sequence of her employment would have been that with: (1) Low See Ting, (2) Charmain, (3) prospective

employer who backed out, and (4) Donna.

However Lacerna's employment with Low See Ting is not supported by the records of the Immigration Department.

If Low See Ting was the first employer, then Lacerna's two chances to change employer would have ended on her

prospective employer who backed out and would not have enabled her to work for Charmain and Donna.

Clearly, the version of AIMS does not jibe with the official records of the Hong Kong government. Hence, between

the alleged Lacerna's resignation letter to Low See Ting and the letters of the Hong Kong Immigration Department

showing that Lacerna could not have been employed by her, credence must be given to the said official records,

especially so that AIMS never assailed their authenticity.

Moreover, even granting that Lacerna truly resigned as domestic helper of Low See Ting, the liability of AIMS was

not extinguished. The contract of Lacerna as approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA) reveals that Proxy was her designated principal employer; the agreed salary was HK$3,670.00 a month; and

the contract duration was for two years. Since AIMS was the local agency which recruited Lacerna for Proxy, it is

solidarily liable with the latter for liabilities arising from her illegal dismissal. To detach itself from the liability of

Proxy, AIMS must show by clear and convincing evidence that its contract is limited to Lacerna's employment by

Low See Ting.







The award of attorney's fees is sustained.In actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was forced to litigate

and thus incurred expenses to protect his rights and interests, a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the total monetary

award by way of attorney's fees is justified under Article 111 of the Labor Code, Section 8, Rule VIII, Book III of its

Implementing Rules, and paragraph 7, Article 2208 of the Civil Code. There need not be any showing that the

employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful

wages were not paid accordingly and that the employee was forced to file a case, as in the instant case.

Sim vs. NLRC (2007) G.R. 157376

Facts:

Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that she was initially

employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing Consultant to the Frankfurt

Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to Manager position, until September 1999, when she received a

letter from Remegio David — the Senior Officer, European Head of PCIBank, and Managing Director of PCIB-Europe

— informing her that she was being dismissed due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagementand misappropriation of funds.

Respondent denied any employer-employee relationship between them, and sought the dismissal of the

complaint.On September 3, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered its Decision dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction

and/or lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's

Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of merit.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a

petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In a Resolution dated October 29, 2002, the CA dismissed

the petition due to petitioner's non-filing of a motion for reconsideration with the NLRC

Issues and Rulings:

I. Whether or not labor relations system in the Philippines has extra-territorial jurisdiction.

The Court notes, however, a palpable error in the Labor Arbiter's disposition of the case, which was affirmed by the

NLRC, with regard to the issue on jurisdiction. It was wrong for the Labor Arbiter to rule that "labor relations system

in the Philippines has no extra-territorial jurisdiction."

Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations

Commission, viz.:

ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. —

(a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to

hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without

extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural

or non-agricultural:

1. Unfair labor practice cases;

2. Termination disputes;





3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wage, rates of

pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee

relations;

5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of

strikes and lockouts; and

6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other

claims, arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,

involving an amount of exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim

for reinstatement.

(b) The commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.

Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,

provides:

SECTION 10. Money Claims. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,

within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee

relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims

for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 8042 provides that the Labor Arbiters

of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of employer-

employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment

including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the

NLRC.

Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from

employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among whom are overseas

Filipino workers. In Philippine National Bank v. Cabansag, the Court pronounced: . . Whether employed locally or

overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract

stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the

State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race

or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. For the State assures the basic rights of all

workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work

[Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987

Constitution]. This ruling is likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws

"which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or

judgments promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."

In any event, since the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the petition before it for failure to file a prior

motion for reconsideration with the NLRC, and considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC's factual findings

as regards the validity of petitioner's dismissal are accorded great weight and respect and even finality when the

same are supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds no compelling reason to relax the rule on the filing of a

motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari.





II. Whether or not a prior motion for reconsideration is indispensable for the filing of a petition for certiorari under

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the CA.

Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or

any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and "adequate remedy" is a motion

for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of

a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.

There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the

lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice

the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial

court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;

(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions. In fact, the Court notes that the petition

filed before the CA failed to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. It

was only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA's resolution of dismissal and in the petition filed in this case

that petitioner justified her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration.

It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never

issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in

the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to

himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the

requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for

doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.

Petitioner also contends that the issue at bench is purely a question of law, hence, an exception to the rule. A reading

of the petition filed with the CA shows otherwise. The issues raised in this case are mixed questions of fact and law.

There is a question of fact when doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts, and there is

a question of law where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts.

Petitioner, aside from questioning the ruling of the NLRC sustaining the Labor Arbiter's view that it does not have

any jurisdiction over the case, also questions the NLRC's ruling affirming the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that she was







Held: The inclusion of his "guaranteed overtime" pay into his monthly salary as basis in the computation of his

salaries for the entire unexpired period of his contract has no factual or legal basis and the same should have been

disallowed.

Petitioner contends that there is no factual or legal basis for the inclusion of said amount because, after respondent's

repatriation, he could not have rendered any overtime work. This time, petitioner's contention is well-taken.

The Court had occasion to rule on a similar issue in Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission , where the NLRC was questioned for awarding to an illegally dismissed overseas worker fixed overtime

pay equivalent to the unexpired portion of the latter's contract. In resolving the question, the Court, citing Cagampan

v. National Labor Relations Commission , held that although an overseas employment contract may guarantee the right

to overtime pay, entitlement to such benefit must first be established, otherwise the same cannot be allowed.

Masangcay vs Trans-Global Maritime Agency Inc., (2008) G.R. 172800

Facts:

Ventnor is a foreign company based in Liberia and engaged in maritime commerce. It is represented in the

Philippines by its manning agent, and co-respondent herein, Trans-Global, a corporation organized and existing

under Philippine laws. Petitioner Marciano Masangcay was hired by Ventnor, through its manning agent, Trans-

Global, as an oiler on M/T Eastern Jewel, an oil tanker. While on board M/T Eastern Jewel, Masangcay noticed a

‚reddish discoloration of his urine upon urination. This happened several times and later became associated with

bouts of left lower abdominal pain radiating to the loin area. Masangcay was brought to the Fujairah Hospital,

United Arab Emirates, because of lower abdominal pain and left loin pain with difficulty in urinating. Better removal

of the right pelvi-ureteric calculus was the recommended treatment but Masangcay refused surgical intervention and

insisted on being repatriated back to the Philippines instead. Upon his arrival in Manila, Masangcay was

immediately referred to Trans-Global’s designated physician. Masangcay was hospitalized at the Makati Medical

Center for treatment. The removal of the non-functioning right kidney was advised but Masangcay refused.

Masangcay was then referred to Dr. Reynaldo C. de la Cruz of the National Kidney and Transplant Institute (NKTI)

for a second opinion. An operation was made and proved successful. Dr. dela Cruz pronounced that Masangcay was

fit to resume work as all his laboratory examinations showed normal results. Accordingly, Trans-Global’s designated

physician, declared Masangcay fit to go back to work after a regular medical examination. Trans-Global, in behalf of

Ventnor, paid Masangcay his full 120 days Sick Leave Pay as well as all his medical and hospital expenses and

professional fees of his attending physicians. Masangcay was asked to report back to the office of Trans-Global for

deployment line-up. When Masangcay reported to the premises of Trans-Global, however, he was informed by the

Port Captain that he can no longer be deployed due to negative reports about him coming from its principal,

Ventnor. Masangcay instituted a complaint against Trans-Global and Ventnor, including Trans-Global’s President,

Michael Estaniel, before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for the payment of disability benefit,

damages and attorney’s fees. Masangcay alleged that his illness was contracted during the term of his Contract of

Employment. Labor Arbiter found Masangcay’s complaint meritorious and ordered Trans -Global, Ventnor, and

Estaniel to pay Masangcay for disability benefit. On appeal to the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of

the labor arbiter. The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of TransGlobal and Ventnor. It nullified and

set aside the challenged Resolutions of the NLRC for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to

lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Issue: WON Masangcay is entitled to disability benefits on account of his present condition.





Held: We rule in the negative. Under Sec. 20(b), paragraph 6, of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and

Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels: permanent total or

partial disability suffered by a seafarer during the term of his contract must be caused by work-related illness or

injury. To be entitled to compensation and benefits under said provision, it is not sufficient to establish that the

seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled, but it must also be shown that there is

a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted for.Accordingly, in order to hold Trans-Global and Ventnor liable for payment of his claims, Masangcay must prove that

he is suffering from permanent total or partial disability due to a work-related illness occurring during the term of

his contract. Proof that he not only acquired or contracted his illness during the term of his employment contract is

clearly not enough; Masangcay must also present evidence that such infirmity was work-related, or at the very least

aggravated by the conditions of the work for which he was contracted for. The burden is clearly upon Masangcay to

present substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a

conclusion, showing a reasonable connection that the nature of his employment or working conditions between the

conditions of his work and his illness; or that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working

conditions. This, he did not do. Masangcay does not even assert that his illness is work-related and/or was, at the

minimum, aggravated by his working conditions at the M/T Eastern Jewel. There is no substantiation that the

progression of his ailment was brought about largely by the conditions of his job as an oiler. His medical historyand/or records prior to his deployment as an oiler in M/T Eastern Jewel were neither presented nor alluded to in

order to demonstrate that the working conditions on board said vessel increased the risk of contracting renal failure,

chronic or otherwise. But even assuming that Masangcay is suffering from chronic renal failure, it still does not

entitle him to compensation and benefits for a permanent disability. Chronic renal failure, is neither listed as a

disability under Sec. 32 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of

Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels; nor an occupational disease under Sec. 32-A thereof. But other than

Masangcay’s bare avowal of entitlement just because an illness became manifest during his contract of employment,

there is nothing on record to substantiate the same and would have justified an award of compensation on top of the

aid or assistance already extended to him by Trans-Global and Ventnor. The dispute could have easily been resolved

had the parties stayed true to the provisions of Sec. 20(b), paragraph 3 of the 2000 POEA Amended Standard Terms

and Conditions: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.

Without the opinion of a third doctor, we are constrained to make a ruling based on the evidences submitted by the

parties and made part of the records of this case, which included the medical certifications of their respective

physicians. Masangcay makes no allegation, much less presents no proof, that the illness was caused or aggravated

by his employment. The evidence on record is totally bare of essential facts on how he contracted or developed such

disease and on how and why his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the same.

Magsaysay Maritime Corp., et al., vs Velasquez, et al., (2008) G.R. 179802

Facts:

Respondent Jaime M. Velasquez was hired by petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation as second cook for its

foreign principal, co-petitioner ODF Jell ASA. While on duty as second cook on board the vessel M/T Bow Favour,

respondent suffered high fever and was unable to work. He took fever relieving medicine but his condition

worsened. By the fourth day, his body temperature reached 40.9°C. Respondent was brought to a hospital in

Singapore where he was confined. Thereafter, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Respondent alleged that upon

his repatriation, he was not confined to St. Luke’s Medical Center as he expected. He claimed that he was compelled





to seek medical treatment from an independent doctor. He consulted a certain Dr. Efren Vicaldo who diagnosed him

to be suffering from staphylococcal bacteremia, multiple metastatic abcesses, pleural effusion and hypertension and

declared his disability as Impediment Grade 1 (120%). Dr. Vicaldo further concluded that respondent was ‚unfit to

resume work as seaman in any capacity.‛ Hence, respondent filed a claim for disability benefits, illness allowance/

reimbursement of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees but petitioners refused to pay. The Labor Arbiter

rendered a decision in favor of respondent. The NLRC rendered a decision reversing that of the Labor Arbiter anddismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. CA set aside the decision of the NLRC and reinstated that of the

Labor Arbiter.

Issue: WON the CA committed reversible error when it upheld the findings of respondent’s private physician rather

than the findings of the company-designated physician.

Held: CA committed reversible error in ignoring the medical assessment of the company-designated physician. The

POEA Contract is clear in its provisions when it provided who should determine the disability grading or fitness to

work of seafarers. The POEA contract recognizes only the disability grading provided by the company-designated

physicians. Section 20 B.3 of the POEA clearly illustrate that respondent’s disability can only be assessed by the

company-designated physician. If the companydesignated physician declares him fit to work, then the seaman is

bound by such declaration.

The parties are both bound by the provisions of the POEA Contract which declares that the degree of disability or

fitness to work of a seafarer should be assessed by the company-designated physician. Jurisprudence is replete with

pronouncements that it is the company-designated physician’s findings which should form the basis of any disability

claim of the seafarer. In this particular case, respondent refused to accept the assessment made by the company-

designated physician that he is fit to work. It is beyond cavil that it is the company-designated physician who is

entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability. However, when the seaman’s private physician disagrees

with the assessment of the company-designated physician, as here, a third doctor’s opinion may be availed of in

determining his disability. This however was not resorted to by the parties. As such, the credibility of the findings of

company-designated doctors was properly evaluated by the NLRC.

The company-designated physician cleared respondent for work resumption upon finding that his infection has

subsided after successful medication. We agree with the NLRC that the doctor more qualified to assess the disability

grade of the respondent seaman is the doctor who regularly monitored and treated him. The company-designated

physician possessed personal knowledge of the actual condition of respondent. Since the company-designated

physician in this case deemed the respondent as fit to work, then such declaration should be given credence,

considering the amount of time and effort the company doctor gave to monitoring and treating respondent’s

condition. It is undisputed that the recommendation of Dr. Vicaldo was based on a single medical report which

outlined the alleged findings and medical history of respondent despite the fact that Dr. Vicaldo treated or examined

respondent only once. As between the findings of the company-designated physician (Dr. Alegre) and the physician

appointed by respondent (Dr. Vicaldo), the former deserves to be given greater evidentiary weight.

Serrano vs Gallant Maritime Services et al., (2009) G.R. 167614

Facts:

Antonio M. Serrano was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. under a

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following





terms and conditions: Duration of contract Position Basic monthly salary Hours of work Overtime Vacation leave

with pay 12 months Chief Officer US$1,400.00 48.0 hours per week US$700.00 per month 7.00 days per month On

March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract

for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of

MSI that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. MSI did not deliver on their promise to make

petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, Soriano refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippineson May 26, 1998.

Soriano’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the

time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,

leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. He filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a

Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of

US$26,442.73 as well moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

He got a favourable decision with the Labor Arbiter in the amount of US$ 8,770.00. In awarding Soriano a lump-sum

salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his computation on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the

entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject

clause. However, the LA applied the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner's ‚*b+asic salary,

US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, + US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay =

US$2,590.00/compensation per month.‛ MSI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to

question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed. Soriano also appealed to the NLRC on the sole

issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor

Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of

their contracts. In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, ordering MSI to pay Soriano,

jointly and severally, in Philippine currency, at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment the following:

1. 2. 3. Three (3) months salary $1,400 x 3 Salary differential 45.00 10% Attorney’s fees424.50 US$4,200.00 US$4,245.00

TOTAL US$4,669.50 The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded to Soriano by

reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 ‚does not provide for the

award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.‛

Soriano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject

clause. The NLRC denied the motion.

Issue: WON Serrano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting

of nine months and 23 days.

Held: Yes, Soriano is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of

nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and

local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the

computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of

their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegallydismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been

differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on

local workers with fixed-term employment. The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect

classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally

discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their

contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause

singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.





People vs Domingo (2009) G.R. 181475

Facts:

In or about the month of November 1999 to January 20, 2000, in the Municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan,

Philippines, Domingo, being a non-licensee or non-holder of authority from the Department of Labor and

Employment to recruit and/or place workers under local or overseas employment, did then and there willfully and

feloniously, with false pretenses, undertake illegal recruitment, placement or deployment of Wilson A. Manzo, and

22 other individuals.

This offense involved economic sabotage, as it was committed in large scale. The Informations for 23 counts of Estafa,

all of which were similarly worded but varying with respect to the name of each complainant and the amount which

each purportedly gave to Domingo. That in or about the month of November, 1999 to January, 2000, in the

municipality of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and with intent of gain, did

then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one [Wilson A. Manzo] by then and there falselyrepresenting that he has the power and capacity to recruit and employ persons in Saipan and could facilitate the

necessary papers in connection therewith if given the necessary amount, and by means of deceit of similar import,

when in truth and in fact, as the accused knew fully well his representation was false and fraudulent and designed to

inveigle [Wilson A. Manzo] to give, as in fact the latter gave and delivered the amount of [P14,000.00] to him, which

the accused misappropriated to himself, to the damage and prejudice of Wilson A. Manzo in the said amount of

[P14,000.00]. Rogelio Cambay: Domingo recruited him for a painting job in Marianas Island for which he paid him

the amount of P15,000 in two installments – P2,500 during his medical examination at Newton Clinic in Makati City,

and the balance of P12,500 before the scheduled departure on January 25, 2000.

On his scheduled departure, appellant did not show up at their meeting place in Malolos, Bulacan, hence, the around

one hundred people who waited for him organized a search party to look for him in Zambales. Appellant wasarrested on February 25, 2000 at the Balintawak tollgate. Verification with the Department of Labor and Employment

showed that appellant was not a licensed recruiter. Florentino Ondra: He was recruited by Domingo for employment

as laborer in Saipan, for which he gave P14,700 representing expenses for passporting, NBI clearance, and medical

examination. Dionisio Aguilar: In September, 1999, he met Domingo thru a friend whereupon he was interviewed,

tested for a hotel job, and scheduled for medical examination. He gave P30,000 to Domingo inside the latter’s car on

November, 1999 after his medical examination. While he was twice scheduled for departure, it did not materialize.

Ma. Leah Vivas: After meeting Domingo thru Eddie Simbayan on October 19, 1999, she applied for a job as a

domestic helper in Saipan, for which she paid appellant P10,000, but like the other complainants, she was never

deployed. Simeon Cabigao: He was recruited by Domingo in September, 1999 for employment as carpenter in Saipan

with a guaranteed salary of $375 per month. For the promised employment, he paid Domingo P3,000 for medical fee,

and an additional P9,000, supposedly to bribe the examining physician because, per information of Domingo, he(Cabigao) was found to have an ailment. He was scheduled for departure on February 23, 2000, but the same never

took place. He was among those who looked for appellant in Zambales. Cabigao later recanted this testimony, per his

affidavit dated March 3, 2003. Testifying anew, this time for the defense, he averred that the one who actually

recruited him and his co-complainants and received their money was Danilo Gimeno (Gimeno), and that they only

agreed among themselves to file a case against appellant because Gimeno was nowhere to be found. Domingo’s

Argument: Domingo, denying all the accusations against him, claimed as follows: He was a driver hired by the real

recruiter, Gimeno, whom he met inside the Victory Liner Bus bound for Manila in September, 2000. It was Gimeno





who undertakes recruitment activities in Dakila, Malolos, Bulacan at the residence of Eddie Simbayan, and that the

other cases for illegal recruitment filed against him before other courts have all been dismissed. Domingo likewise

presented as witnesses Enrico Espiritu and Roberto Castillo who corroborated his claim that it was Gimeno who

actually recruited them, and that the filing of the complaint against appellant was a desperate attempt on their part to

get even because Gimeno could not be located.

Issue: Whether or not Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment despite that there is no evidence showing that he

actually received money from complainants.

Held: Y es, Domingo is guilty of Illegal Recruitment. The term ‚recruitment and placement‛ is defined under Article

13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippines as follows: (b) ‚Recruitment and placement‛ refers to any act of

canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals,

contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided,

That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons

shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor

Code, as amended, under which the accused stands charged, provides: Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any

recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken

by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.

The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article. (b)

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving

economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed

committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with

one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first

paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more

persons individually or as a group.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that any recruitment activities to be undertaken by nonlicensee or non-

holder of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually oras a group. To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution must prove three essential elements, to wit: (1)

the person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34

of the Labor Code; (2) he/she did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and

placement of workers; and (3) he/she committed the prohibited practice against three or more persons individually or

as a group. No receipt or document in which appellant acknowledged receipt of money for the promised jobs was

adduced in evidence does not free him of liability. For even if at the time appellant was promising employment no

cash was given to him, he is still considered as having been engaged in recruitment activities, since Article 13(b) of

the Labor Code states that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It suffices that appellant promised or

offered employment for a fee to the complaining witnesses to warrant his conviction for illegal recruitment.

Great Southern – Maritime Services Corp vs Surigao (2009) G.R. 183646

Facts:

On January 6, 1997, Jasmin Cuaresma (Jasmin) was deployed by Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.[2]

(Becmen) to serve as assistant nurse in Al-Birk Hospital in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), for a contract

duration of three years, with a corresponding salary of US$247.00 per month. Over a year later, she died allegedly of





poisoning. Jasmin’s body was repatriated to Manila on September 3, 1998. The following day, the City Health Officer

of Cabanatuan City conducted an autopsy and the resulting medical report indicated that Jasmin died under violent

circumstances, and not poisoning as originally found by the KSA examining physician. On March 11, 1999, Jasmin’s

remains were exhumed and examined by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The toxicology report of the

NBI, however, tested negative for non-volatile, metallic poison and insecticides On November 22, 1999, the

Cuaresmas filed a complaint against Becmen and its principal in the KSA, Rajab & Silsilah Company (Rajab),claiming death and insurance benefits, as well as moral and exemplary damages for Jasmin’s death.

In their complaint, the Cuaresmas claim that Jasmin’s death was work-related, having occurred at the employer’s

premises that under Jasmin’s contract with Becmen, she is entitled to ‚iqama insurance‛ coverage; that Jasmin is

entitled to compensatory damages in the amount of US$103,740.00, which is the sum total of her monthly salary of

US$247.00 per month under her employment contract, multiplied by 35 years (or the remaining years of her

productive life had death not supervened at age 25, assuming that she lived and would have retired at age 60). In

their position paper, Becmen and Rajab insist that Jasmin committed suicide, citing a prior unsuccessful suicide

attempt sometime in March or April 1998 and relying on the medical report of the examining physician of the Al-Birk

Hospital. They likewise deny liability because the Cuaresmas already recovered death and other benefits totaling

P130,000.00 from the OWWA. They insist that the Cuaresmas are not entitled to ‚iqama insurance‛ because this

refers to the ‚issuance‛ – not insurance – of iqama, or residency/work permit required in the KSA. On February 28,

2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National Labor

Relations Commission (Commission) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Relying on the findings of the City

Health Officer of Cabanatuan City and the NBI as contained in their autopsy and toxicology report, respectively, the

Commission, via its November 22, 2002 Resolution declared that, based on substantial evidence adduced, Jasmin was

the victim of compensable work-connected criminal aggression. The appellate court affirmed the NLRC’s findings

that Jasmin’s death was compensable, the same having occurred at the dormitory, which was contractually provided

by the employer. Thus her death should be considered to have occurred within the employer’s premises, arising out

of and in the course of her employment.

Issue: Whether the Cuaresmas are entitled to monetary claims, by way of benefits and damages, for the death of their

daughter Jasmin.

Held: Yes, they are. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion,

Inc., and their corporate directors and officers are found jointly and solidarily liable The Court cannot subscribe to

the idea that Jasmin committed suicide while halfway into her employment contract. It is beyond human

comprehension that a 25-year old Filipina, in the prime of her life and working abroad with a chance at making a

decent living with a high-paying job which she could not find in her own country, would simply commit suicide for

no compelling reason. Rajab & Silsilah Company, White Falcon Services, Inc., Becmen Service Exporter and

Promotion, Inc They have placed their own financial and corporate interests above their moral and social obligations,

and chose to secure and insulate themselves from the perceived responsibility of having to answer for and indemnify

Jasmin’s heirs for her death. Under Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), or the Migrant Workers and Overseas

Filipinos Act of 1995, [22] the State shall, at all times, uphold the dignity of its citizens whether in country oroverseas, in general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular. The State shall provide adequate and timely social,

economic and legal services to Filipino migrant workers. The rights and interest of distressed overseas Filipinos, in

general, and Filipino migrant workers, in particular, documented or undocumented, are adequately protected and

safeguarded. Becmen and White Falcon, as licensed local recruitment agencies, miserably failed to abide by the

provisions of R.A. 8042. Recruitment agencies are expected to extend assistance to their deployed OFWs, especially

those in distress. Instead, they abandoned Jasmin’s case and allowed it to remain unsolved to further their interests

and avoid anticipated liability which parents or relatives of Jasmin would certainly exact from them. They willfully




refused to protect and tend to the welfare of the deceased Jasmin, treating her case as just one of those unsolved

crimes that is not worth wasting their time and resources on. The evidence does not even show that Becmen and

Rajab lifted a finger to provide legal representation and seek an investigation of Jasmin’s case. Worst of all, they

unnecessarily trampled upon the person and dignity of Jasmin by standing pat on the argument that Jasmin

committed suicide, which is a grave accusation given its un-Christian nature.

Clearly, Rajab, Becmen and White Falcon’s acts and omissions are against public policy because they undermine and

subvert the interest and general welfare of our OFWs abroad, who are entitled to full protection under the law. They

set an awful example of how foreign employers and recruitment agencies should treat and act with respect to their

distressed employees and workers abroad. Their shabby and callous treatment of Jasmin’s case; their uncaring

attitude; their unjustified failure and refusal to assist in the determination of the true circumstances surrounding her

mysterious death, and instead finding satisfaction in the unreasonable insistence that she committed suicide just so

they can conveniently avoid pecuniary liability; placing their own corporate interests above of the welfare of their

employee’s – all these are contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, and constitute taking advantage of the

poor employee and her family’s ignorance, helplessness, indigence and lack of power and resources to seek the truth

and obtain justice for the death of a loved one. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers enjoy the

protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding.

This pronouncement is in keeping with the basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full

employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the relations between

workers and employers.

Documents

Paolo Labor Case Digests