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IAFF6101Interna-onalAffairsCornerstone
Lecture6NuclearProlifera0on
October18,2016
Today’sClass
• Nuclearweaponsandnucleararsenals
• Technologyofprolifera0on
• Causesofprolifera0on• Isprolifera0ondangerous?• Iran
NuclearFission
FissionWeapons:“Gun”Type• U-235
FissionWeapons:“Gun”Type
• LiGleBoy(Hiroshima)– 15kilotons
FissionWeapons:“Implosion”Type• U-235orPu-239
Nagasaki:August9,1945– FatMan(Nagasaki)• 22kilotons
FusionWeapons
• “Thermonuclear”or“Hydrogen”bomb
• Fissionexplosionignitesfusionofhydrogenisotopes
• Muchmorepowerfulthanfissionalone
• U.S.firsttestedin1952,Sovietsin1953
TheTriad:Bombers
• B-29,B-36,B-52,B-2
• Strengths– Youcanrecallthem!
• Weaknesses– Vulnerabilitytointercep0on
TheTriad:ICBMs • Land-basedintercon0nentalballis0cmissiles
• Mul0plewarheadspossible(MRVsorMIRVs)
• Strengths:reliability,command-andcontrol
• Weaknesses:vulnerability
TheTriad:SLBMs • Submarine-launchedballis0cmissiles
– Enteredservicein1961
• Strengths:nearlyinvulnerablebecausethey’rehardtofind
• Weaknesses:command-and-control
TheCurrentU.S.TriadWarheads Delivery
VehiclesType
Bombers 300 60 B-52,B-2ICBMs 450 450 MinutemanIIISLBMs 1,152 288 TridentIID-5Total 1,902 798
HansM.KristensenandRobertS.Norris,“U.S.NuclearForces,2015,”Bulle%noftheAtomicScien%sts71/2(March/April2015):107-19.
CurrentU.S.andRussianArsenalsU.S. Russia
Opera-onalWarheads 1,902* 1,600Reserve 2,680 2,700†Awai0ngDismantlement 2,340 3,500TotalInventory 7,100 7,800
*TheUnitedStatesalsohas180non-strategic(tac0cal)warheadsdeployedinEurope†700ofthewarheadsinRussia’sreservearestrategicwarheads;theremaining2,000arenon-strategic(tac0cal)warheadsUnderthetermsoftheNewSTARTTreaty,deployedwarheadsforbothU.S.andRussiawilldropto1,550
OtherNuclearArsenals
TotalInventory MethodofDeliveryFrance 300 SLBMs,aircraiChina 240 ICBMs,aircraiBritain 225 SLBMsPakistan 120 Aircrai,missilesIndia 110 Aircrai,missilesIsrael 80 Aircrai,missilesNorthKorea <10 NA
HansM.KristensenandRobertS.Norris,“GlobalNuclearInventories,1945-2013,”Bulle%noftheAtomicScien%sts69/5(Sept.-Oct.2013):75-81.
TwoTypesofBombFuelHighlyenricheduranium UraniumorPlutonium
TwoTypesofUranium
Plutonium:HeavyWaterReactor
• Usenaturaluraniumasfuel
• Reac0onproducesplutonium
• Boom!
Plutonium:LightWaterReactor
• Lightwaterreactor,usesLEUasfuel
• Plutonium=byproductofnuclearreac0on
• Mustbereprocessedfromspentnuclearfuelrodsinlargeplants
ElectricityortheBomb?Thesameprocesscanleadtoboth!
31StatesWiththeCapacitytoBuildNuclearWeapons,butonly10havedoneso
• Netherlands • North Korea • Norway • Pakistan • Romania • Russia • Serbia • Slovakia • South Africa • South Korea • Spain • Switzerland • Ukraine • United Kingdom • United States
• Argentina • Austria • Belgium • Brazil • Canada • China • Czech Republic • Denmark • Finland • France • Germany • Hungary • India • Israel • Japan • Latvia
Model KeyVariables ExamplesSecurity Externalthreat
Availabilityofnuclear-armedally
USSR,PRC,IsraelW.Germany,Japan,S.Korea,Saudi
Domes-c NuclearbureaucracyEconomicliberaliza0on
IndiaBrazil,Argen0na
Norms Globalnormsaboutnukes• Pres0ge• Pariah
France,IranUkraine
3ModelsinSearchofaBomb
ScoGD.Sagan,“WhyDoStatesBuildNuclearWeapons?ThreeModelsinSearchofaBomb,”Interna%onalSecurity21/3(Winter1996/97):54-87.
NPT• Enteredintoforcein1970• Dividestheworldintonuclear“haves”(U.S.,Russia,UK,
France,China)and“havenots”(everyoneelse)• Grandbargain:
– “Havenots”promisenottoacquirenuclearweapons(Art.II)– “Haves”promise
• Nottotransfernuclearweapons(Art.I)• Toworktowardnucleardisarmament(Art.VI)• Tohelpdisseminate“peaceful”nucleartechnology(Art.IV)
– Everyonepromisesnottoimport/exportnucleartechormaterialsunlesssubjecttosafeguards,andtoacceptIAEAinspec0ons(Art.III)
• Membershipisnearlyuniversal–190memberstates– India,Pakistan,Israel,NorthKorea,SouthSudan
IAEA• Twojobs
– Promoteciviliannucleartechnology– Monitornuclearmaterials
• Likeanygoodins0tu0on,theIAEAprovidesinforma0onandmonitoringtodeterchea0ng
• Safeguards
• Addi0onalProtocol– Collectmoreinforma0on– Accessmorefacili0es– Streamlinedaccessforinspectors– Environmentalsampling
SupplySideProlifera-onArguments
• Tradi0onalargumentsfocusonthedemandfornuclearweapons
• Recentscholarshipemphasizesthesupplyside– Sensi0venuclearassistance–ENRtechnology,fissilematerial,weaponsorweaponscomponents(Kroenig2010)
– Nuclearcoopera0onagreements–non-militarynuclearassistanceofvarioustypes(Fuhrmann2012)
• Combiningthedemandandsupplyside– Countriesthatreceivepeacefulnuclearassistanceandfaceathreateningsecurityenvironment(Fuhrmann2012)
TwoSchoolsofThought
• Nuclearop0mism– Nuclearweaponsareagreatdeterrent– Inducecau0on,reduceuncertaintyinwaroutcomes– WarmorecostlyàWarlesslikely– Basedinrealism,3rdimage
• Nuclearpessimism– Statesunlikelytodeployweaponssecurely– Riskofaccidents,unauthorizeduse– MorenukesàWarmorelikely– Basedinorganiza0ontheory,1stand2ndimage
3KeyQues-onsaboutProlifera-on
• Preven0veorpreemp0vewar?
• Securesecond-strikearsenals?
• Accidentalorunauthorizeduse?
NuclearOp-mists
• Preemp0on/Preven0on– Earlystage(Iran):canbedonesafely,butwillhavetobedonerepeatedly• IsraelistrikesonOsiraq(1981),al-Kibar(2007)
– Latestage(NorthKorea):toorisky
• Survivability– Stateshavebigincen0vestomakeforcesinvulnerable,andit’seasytodoso
• Accidental/UnauthorizedUse– Newnuclearstateswillbeverycareful;soldiersmaybemorecau0ousthancivilians
NuclearPessimists:Organiza-ons
• Preemp0on/Preven0on– Militaryofficersbiasedtowardoffensive,havefavorableviewofpreven0vewar
• Survivability– Makingweaponssurvivablenotahighlypriori0zedmilitarymission,conflictswithotherorganiza0onalgoals
• Accidental/UnauthorizedUse– Complex,0ghtlycoupledsystemsalmostinevitablyhaveaccidents
– Poorweaponsdesign,secrecy,proximity,predelega0on,unrest
NuclearPessimism:Leaders • Someleaderstooirresponsibletobetrustedwithhighlydestruc0veweaponry– Hardtodeter,couldusethemagainstus– Couldgivethemtoterrorists,whoareimpossibletodeter– Possessionofnuclearweaponscouldenableregionalaggression
DoNuclearWeaponsMakeStatesMoreAggressive?
• Commonargumentisthatacquiringnuclearweaponsprovidesstateswithashieldbehindwhichtheycanengageinregionalaggression– Iraq,Iran
• Notalotofsystema0cevidencehere– Oneproblemisthatconflictinvolvementisapredictorofprolifera0on,whichis
thenarguedtobegetfurtherconflict
• Lateststudyfindsthatnewnuclearstatesaremorelikelytoini0atemilitarizeddisputesvs.non-nucleartargets,butnotagainstnucleartargets
• Newnuclearstatesprimarilytargetstateswithwhichtheyhavenoconflicthistory–pickingnewtargetsratherthangoingaieroldfoes– Suggestsan“expansionofinterests”storyratherthana“nuclearshield”story
MarkS.BellandNicholasL.Miller,“Ques0oningtheEffectofNuclearWeaponsonConflict,”JournalofConflictResolu%on59/1(2015):74-92.
DoNuclearWeaponsHelpStatesPrevail?
• Scholars(mostly)agreethatnuclearweaponsareusefulfordeterrence
• Scholarsdisagreeaboutwhethernuclearweaponsareusefulforcompellenceorprevailingincrises
• Yes:Havingmorenuclearweaponsthanyouradversaryenablesyoutoprevailinthecompe00oninrisk-taking– Stateswithnuclearweaponsmorelikelytoprevailincrisesovernon-nuclearadversaries,but
notagainstnuclear-armedstates(BeardsleyandAsal2009)– Incrisesbetweennuclear-armedadversaries,stateswithnuclearsuperioritymorelikelyto
prevail(Kroenig2013)
• No:Threatstousenuclearweaponsforoffensivepurposesoienlackcredibility– Stateswithnuclearweaponsnotmorelikelytomakesuccessfulcompellentthreats,even
againsttargetsthatlacknuclearweapons(FuhrmannandSechser2013)• Notusefulfortakingterritory• Nuclearthreatsaredispropor0onate
UraniumEnrichment:NatanzandFordow
InNovember2013,Iranhad:• c.19,500centrifugesinstalled(almostallIR-1)
• Nearly8tonsofLEU(informofUF6gas)
• 432poundsenrichedto20%
LightWaterReactor:Bushehr
• StartedbytheGermansin1970s
• CompletedbyRussiain2010;Russianssupplyingfuel
• WentonlineinSept.2011
HeavyWaterReactor:Arak
• Heavywaterproduc0onplantrunning
• Heavywaterreactorunderconstruc0on(AR-40)
• Heavywaterplantsusenaturaluranium,producemoreplutonium
JointComprehensivePlanofAc-on• Reduc0onofinstalledcentrifuges
– 5,060atNatanz– 1,044atFordowforproduc0onofmedicalisotopes—nouraniumenrichment– AllIR-1
• ReducestockpileofLEUfrom10,000kgto300kg– Maintainthatlevelfor15years
• Noenrichmentabove3.67%
• RedesignofArakheavywaterreactortoproducelessplutonium– Spentfuelshippedoutofthecountry– Noaddi0onalheavywaterorH.W.reactorsfor15years
• Noreprocessingfor15years
• Intrusiveinspec0ons,includingimplemen0ngNPTAddi0onalProtocol