11

HighHigh--Altitude Nuclear Explosion Altitude Nuclear Explosion

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

Yehoshua SocolYehoshua Socol

2009

22

ContentsContents

�� Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons –– basicsbasics

�� Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) Electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

and related effectsand related effects

�� EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

�� ConclusionsConclusions

33

Nuclear WarheadsNuclear Warheads

““AtomicAtomic”” 11--20 20 KtonKton

HiroshimaHiroshima ~15 ~15 KtonKton

Total destruction Total destruction ~0.5 km ~0.5 km

““HydrogenHydrogen”” 100100--1000 1000 KtonKton

much more complicated; much more complicated;

Total destruction Total destruction ~3~3--5 km5 km

Nuclear ProliferationNuclear Proliferation

USA 1945

Russia 1949

UK 1952

France 1960

China 1964

India 1974

Pakistan 1998

North Korea 2006

(South Africa)1982

…

Nuclear ProliferationNuclear Proliferation

“They’ll build, buy,

borrow, burgle it –

anyhow, they’ll have it”

Prof. Martin Van Creveld

author of “The Transformation of War “ and

“The Rise and Decline of the State“

"Nota bene" No. 7, 24.02.2005

66

ContentsContents

�� Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons –– basicsbasics

�� Electromagnetic pulse Electromagnetic pulse

(EMP) and related effects(EMP) and related effects

�� EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

�� ConclusionsConclusions

77

Nuclear explosion effectsNuclear explosion effects

�� Shock waveShock wave

�� Light emissionLight emission

�� Penetrating radiationPenetrating radiation

�� Radioactive contamination (Fallout)Radioactive contamination (Fallout)

�� EMP EMP –– ElectroElectro--Magnetic PulseMagnetic Pulse

HEMP HEMP –– HighHigh--altitude EMPaltitude EMP

ScenarioScenario

•• simultaneously over the simultaneously over the

entire continental USentire continental US

•• no immediate casualtiesno immediate casualties

Electronic systemsElectronic systems’’

shutdownshutdown

Electric grid destructionElectric grid destruction

Pilot strike ?!Pilot strike ?!

88

EMPEMP

H LoS

High-altitude EMP: above 30 km

0 50 100 150 200 250 3000

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

Height of Burst H, km

Dis

tance t

o H

orizon (

LoS

), k

mHigh-Altitude EMP coverage

99

EMPEMP

20 kt A-bomb

Air Force Air Force

Institute of TechnologyInstitute of Technology

WrightWright--Patterson AF Base, Patterson AF Base,

OhioOhio

50,00050,00015,00015,000EEmaxmax

V/mV/m

100010002020Weapon Weapon

Yield Yield

KtonKton

1000 kt H-bomb

1010

EMP waveEMP wave

6506501.61.613513550,00050,000

60600.50.5404015,00015,000

Energy Energy

flux S flux S

W/cmW/cm22

HH

OerstedOersted/ /

GaussGauss

HH

A/mA/m

E E

V/mV/m

1111

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 10000

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Time, ns

E(t

), a

.u.

High-Altitude EMP Wavefront

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

10-3

10-2

10-1

100

Frequency, Hz

Spectr

um

E(f

)EMP EMP wavefrontwavefront

1212

EMP vs. LightningEMP vs. Lightning

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 5000

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Time, µs

E(t

), a

.u.

EMP - offset for clarity Lightning (IEC 61312 standard)

101

102

103

104

105

106

107

108

109

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

Frequency, Hz

Spectr

um

E(f

)

EMP Lightning

1313

Radio & Radar EffectsRadio & Radar Effects

Opaque orOpaque or

aberrant aberrant

above 50kmabove 50km

“The Effects of Nuclear Weapons”, US DoD, 1962

1414

Effects on SatellitesEffects on Satellites

1.Direct γ-radiation => System-Generated EMP

2.Weapon debris => artificial

"trapped electron” (Van Allen) radiation belt

Satellite lifetime:

10 years => 2 months

Dr. George W. Dr. George W. UllrichUllrich, 1997Deputy Director, Deputy Director,

Defense Special Weapons AgencyDefense Special Weapons Agency

1515

EMP catastrophe?EMP catastrophe?“……“……. Few, if any people would die right away. But the loss of power. Few, if any people would die right away. But the loss of power

would have a cascading effect on all aspects of U.S. society. would have a cascading effect on all aspects of U.S. society.

Communication would be largely impossible. Lack of refrigerationCommunication would be largely impossible. Lack of refrigeration

would leave food rotting in warehouses, exacerbated by a lack ofwould leave food rotting in warehouses, exacerbated by a lack of

transportation as those vehicles still working simply ran out oftransportation as those vehicles still working simply ran out of gas gas

(which is pumped with electricity). The inability to sanitize an(which is pumped with electricity). The inability to sanitize and d

distribute water would quickly threaten public health, not to distribute water would quickly threaten public health, not to

mention the safety of anyone in the path of the inevitable firesmention the safety of anyone in the path of the inevitable fires, ,

which would rage unchecked. And as we have seen in areas of which would rage unchecked. And as we have seen in areas of

natural and other disasters, such circumstances often result in natural and other disasters, such circumstances often result in a a

fairly rapid breakdown of social order.fairly rapid breakdown of social order. ““

Senator Jon Kyl, Chairman;US Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology & Homeland

Security. Washington Post April 15 2009

““…… whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was whatever the target system, no indispensable industry was

permanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistentpermanently put out of commission by a single attack. Persistent

rere--attack was necessary.attack was necessary.””US Strategic Bombing Survey (European war)

Washington DC September 15 1945

1616

ContentsContents

�� Nuclear weapons Nuclear weapons –– basicsbasics

�� Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) Electromagnetic pulse (EMP)

and related effectsand related effects

�� EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

�� ConclusionsConclusions

1717

ScreeningScreening

BondingBonding

GroundingGrounding

FiltersFilters

Surge ArrestersSurge Arresters

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

∫ ~ ∫ ~SA

F

1818

Keep It Simple !Keep It Simple !

Cited by the US Congress

EMP Commission Report, 2008

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

1919

Holistic (synergeticHolistic (synergetic--integratedintegrated--system) system)

approachapproach

Cited by the US Congress

EMP Commission Report, 2008

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

2020

ScreeningScreening

BondingBonding

GroundingGrounding

FiltersFilters

Surge ArrestersSurge Arresters

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

Hardening costs: 1%Hardening costs: 1%--3%3%

at the development stageat the development stage

�� ””New units can be EMP-hardened for a very small fraction of

the cost of the non-hardened item, e.g., 1% to 3% of cost, if hardening is done at the time the unit is designed and manufactured. In contrast, retrofitting existing functional components is potentially an order of magnitude more

expensive..““

The The US CongressUS Congress EMP CommissionEMP Commission

Executive Report, 2004Executive Report, 2004

2121

Shared BenefitsShared Benefits

The EMP CommissionThe EMP Commission

Executive Report, 2004Executive Report, 2004

EMP ProtectionEMP Protection

Most of the … actions … militate against more than an EMP attack. The protection and/or rapid restoration of critical infrastructures in the civilian sector from an EMP attack also will be effective against other types of infrastructure disruptions, such as attacks aimed at directly damaging or destroying key components of the electrical system, and natural or accidental large-scale disruptions ... Some of these steps also enhance reliability and quality of critical infrastructures, which is a major direct benefit to the US economy and to our way of life.

2222

ConclusionsConclusions

�� EMP protection isEMP protection is feasiblefeasible

�� EMP protection isEMP protection is affordableaffordable::

11--3% of electronics3% of electronics’’ costcost

�� Holistic approach is crucialHolistic approach is crucial

�� Time to actTime to act!!

2323

Further ReadingFurther Reading

The EMP Commission http://www.empcommission.org

Samuel Glasstone and Philip J. Dolan. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons. United States Department of Defense, 3rd edition (1977).

Philip J. Dolan. The Capabilities of Nuclear Weapons. Defense Nuclear Agency (1972; declassified 1989)

Other aspects of nuclear weapons

Academic Forum for Nuclear Awareness

http://www.afna-forum.org

and references thereof.