GLASS CEILING

Eva Ferreira Professor in Statistics UPV/EHU Maria Paz Espinosa Professor in Economics UPV/EHU

11-14-2013

2013, NOVEMBER

• First :The Wall Street Journal’s “Corporate Woman” column, 24 March 1986

• "The glass ceiling effect is an unseen, yet unbreachable barrier that keeps minorities and women from rising to the upper rungs of the corporate ladder, regardless of their qualifications or achievements." (U.S. Glass Ceiling Commission 1995)

2013, NOVEMBER

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

• Glass ceiling inequality = gender or racial difference – not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the

employee, – greater at higher levels of an outcome, – affects the chances of advancement into higher levels, and – increases over the course of a career.

Cotter et al (2001) (Macho et al. 2005) 30% of permanent position in mathematics (Spanish universitities in

2003), but only 8,4% among the full professors Research productivity around 20%, similar results in positive

research evaluations, BUT only 12% are directing research projects.

OUTLINE

2013, NOVEMBER

• Glass ceiling. Framework, previous works

• The model. Dynamics.

• Scenario 1. Participation may be costly • Scenario 2. On-the-job experience. Incumbency

advantage

• Scenario 3. The best person for the job

• Conclusions and directions for further research

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

• What Do We Know About Glass Ceiling Effects?

A Taxonomy and Critical Review to Inform Higher Education Research Jerlando F. L. Jackson & Elizabeth M. O’Callaghan, 2009 They review 66 works, • A large number of sources which cite, discuss, and generally acknowledge a glass ceiling

• Relatively little empirical research devoted specifically to identify and investigate the glass ceiling effects.

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

A Test of the Glass Ceiling and Glass Escalator, R Smith: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 2012 They talk about two schools of thought “Opponents argue that general inequality may exist between women and men (Baxter and Wright 2000; Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund 1995; Morgan 1998), .. but they claim the disparities do not necessarily increase with movement up the authority hierarchy as the glass ceiling hypothesis implies.” (Zeng 2011) calls it a myth.

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

“A larger body of literature has documented the presence of a

glass ceiling for women relative to men (Cotter et al. 2001;

Huffman 2004; Jacobs 1992; Maume 1999, 2004; Morrison and

Glinow 1990; Reskin and McBrier 2000; Reskin and Ross 1992),

and for racial minorities and white women relative to white men

(Elliott and Smith 2004; Maume 2004; Smith n.d.). These studies

show increasing inequality between groups from lower levels of

an outcome variable (e.g., authority, wages, managerial

transitions) to higher levels.”

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

So? The rate of female decreases when we go up What are the reasons behind this decreasing effect? Discrimination, bias? Glass ceiling effect Gender differences in preferences or in abilities? Not a

glass ceiling effect Women do not climb the ladder to higher positions

because they don’t want or because they cannot?

MOTIVATION

2013, NOVEMBER

An Economic Theory of Glass Ceilings Paul A. Grout, In-Uck Park, Silvia Sonderegger University of Bristol, U.K. May 27, 2011

One interpretation is that this is the result of real gender

differences.

Family responsibilities, women on average exhibit less job commitment than men,

as they are more likely to take career breaks or leave employment altogether.

This makes them less valuable as employees, and justifies the differential

treatment they receive by employers.

The other interpretation is that what is observed is only consistent with dis-

crimination by gender (see e.g., Bergmann 1989). Proponents of this view argue

that men and women do not differ in any relevant way. If treated identically to

men, women would exhibit the same work commitment.

THE MODEL

2013, NOVEMBER

• We model the selection process of a committee (corporate, academic, political,…context).

• The decision makers. A committee of fixed size z. They have to select a new committee.

• Assume among actual members there are zf women and zm men, each one with the same influence 1/z

• Dynamics. At each step n, the actual committee proposes the members of the committee at step n+1 • The process. In each step, the decision might be influenced by the proportion of female in the committee, either in a symmetric or asymmetric way (different perception among female and male) • Bias. When there is a bias, this goes against female candidates

THE MODEL

2013, NOVEMBER

Our main interest is to quantify the effect of the (fixed) bias in the expected female share • After each step: From n to n+1 • In the long run, when n infty (glass ceiling effect?)

• Considering different situations, motivated by previous empirical results

IMPORTANT AND NEW! Both groups of candidates, female and male, have the same characteristics (abilities, preferences, participation costs,..) The only difference between male and female along the whole work is the bias in the selection process

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SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

Goldin and Rouse (AER, 2000): The selection of musicians. The introduction of blind auditions in the 1970's and 1980's in US orchestras increased by 50% the probability that a woman would be advanced from the preliminary rounds in the selection process and increased by severalfold the likelihood that a woman would be selected in the final round. According to Goldin and Rouse's results, the switch to blind auditions could explain 30% of the increase of the proportion female among new hires and possibly 25% of the increase in the percentage female in the US symphony orchestras from 1970 to 1996. They observe that in the last years the female participation has also increased

SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

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SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

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candidates male ofnumber :

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n

n

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n

MFδµ

µDifferent bias perception

Matsa and Miller, AER 2011

SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

Under low participation costs, such that

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SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

)1(1

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=∞E

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The strategy of the proof. 1.- Write the process as a Markov chain 2.- Show that the transition matrix P is homogeneous and regular 3.- Use standard results for Markov chains

∞∞→ → ξξ Lnn

SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

10.750.50.250

0.5

0.375

0.25

0.125

0

delta

female share

delta

female share

SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

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mff

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δδµ

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+−= −− 11 1)|( F

SCENARIO 1

2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 1 High participation costs

For delta=0,5 Low participation costs, n=1, female share = 3/8; 37,5%, n large = 1/3; 33,3% High participation costs n=1, = 29% n large = 20%

2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 2

2013, NOVEMBER

Reuben, Sapienza and Zingales (WP, Stanford, 2010) find that individuals discriminate towards women in hiring decisions. • Discrimination is not based on a correct statistical inference regarding differences in performance; instead, it is rooted in biased beliefs about women's abilities. • When subjects receive accurate information on the performance of the applicants, the gender gap narrows but does not disappear.

• They conclude that unconscious stereotypes are partly responsible for the initial bias in beliefs and the subsequent lack of updating.

SCENARIO 2

2013, NOVEMBER

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2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 2

2013, NOVEMBER

2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 2

2013, NOVEMBER

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effect, ceiling glass a is There

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SCENARIO 2

1- a = inertia parameter a=0,1… 0,5 Expected average of female share in the long run

2013, NOVEMBER

0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5

d=1

d=0,9

d=0,8

d=0,7

Scenario 3

2013, NOVEMBER

Moss-Racusin et al. (PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES, 2012) John Vs. Jennifer: A Battle of the Sexes They show experimentally that science faculty exhibit a bias against female students in a job selection process. Science faculty from research-intensive universities rated the application materials of a student (randomly assigned either a male or a female name) for a lab manager position. Participants rated the male applicant as significantly more competent and hireable than the (identical) female applicant. (4000$ less for the female)

Scenario 3

2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 3

2013, NOVEMBER

Scenario 3

2013, NOVEMBER

SCENARIO 3

2013, NOVEMBER

Sesgo=0,8

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

2013, NOVEMBER

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

2013, NOVEMBER

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

2013, NOVEMBER

THANK YOU!

¡GRACIAS!

ESKERRIK ASKO!