Fallout Shelter Program (1965)

8/3/2019 Fallout Shelter Program (1965)

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MARCH 1965(Supersedes June 1964 Issue)

~ B A S IS F O R T H EH~~~. ~ D E P A R T M E N T O F D E F E N S EB~ ,.~ ~

~ F A L L O U T S H E L T E R P R O G R A M~ . .

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2/23

"AN EFFECT IV E C IV IL DEFEN SE PROGRAMis an important element of our total defenseeffort.It aims at the achievement of a nationwidefallout shelter system."

President of the United States


3/23

BASIS FOR THE NATIONAL FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

The President in his message to the Congress on the state of our defenses which was deliveredon January 18, 1965, said:

"While confident that our present strength will continue to deter a thermonuclearwar, we must always be alert to the possibilities for limiting destruction whichmight be inflicted upon our people, cities and industry -- should such a war beforced upon us."It is already clear that without fallout shelter protection for our citizens,all defense weapons lose much of their effectiveness in saving lives. Thisalso appears to be the least expensive way of saving millions of lives, andthe one which has clear value even without other systems. We will continueour existing programs and start a program to increase the total inventory ofshelters through a survey of private homes and other small structures."

A nationwide fallout shelter system is an integral part of the over-all defense program of theDepartment of Defense. Secretary of Defense McNamara has underscored this concept on manyoccasions. On February 18, 1965 he made the following statement to the House Armed ServicesCommittee:

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"This year for the first time we are including in a single chapter the discussionof the three major programs which constitute our general nuclear war forces: TheStrategic Offensive Forces, the Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces, andC iv il D ef en se .


4/23

"I have made this change, not as a matter of style, but, rather to facilitate ouranalysis of the general nuclear war problem. It was clear last year that becauseof the close inter-relationship and, indeed, the inter-action of the three majorcomponents of our general nuclear war posture, the only practical way to dealwith this problem is to incorporate all three components in a single analyticalframework. Only then can the true character of the general nuclear war problemin all its dimensions be fully grasped and the relative merits of availablea lt er na ti ve s b e p ro pe rl y e va lu at ed ." In the event of general nuclear war, attacks might be directed againstmilitary targets only, against cities only, or against both types of targets,either simultaneously or with a delay. They might be selective in terms ofspecific targets or they might be general." A meaningful capability to limit the damage of a determined enemy attack.requires an integrated, balanced combination of strategic offensive forces, areadefense forces, terminal defense forces and passive defenses. Such a structurewould provide a 'defense in depth', with each type of force taking its toll ofthe incoming weapons, operating like a series of filters or sieves, progressivelyreducing the destructive potential of the attack "Since we have no way of knowing how the enemy would execute a nuclear attack uponthe United States, we must also intensively explore alternative 'defensive' systemsas means of limiting damage to ourselves. The problem here is to achieve an optimumbalance among all the elements of the general nuclear war forces, particularly intheir Damage Limiting role. This is what we mean by 'balanced' defense."Although a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States may seem a highlyunlikely contingency, it must receive our urgent attention because of theenormous consequences it would have 0 0

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5/23

"Several points are evident from our analysis of this problem. First, it is clearthat with limited fallout protection, an enemy attack on our urban areas would causegreat loss of life, chiefly because of the heavy concentration of population in ourlarge cities which I noted earlier. Second, the analysis clearly demonstrates thedistinct utility of a nationwide fallout shelter program in reducing fatalities, atall levels of attack~"~ ~ ~ a transfer of resources from fallout shelters to other defensive systemswould result in substantially less effective defense postures for any given budgetlevel. " any Damage Limiting program which excludes a complete fallout shelter systemwould cost at least twice as much as a program which includes such a system -- evenunder the favorable assumption that the enemy would not exploit our lack of falloutprotection by surface bursting hi~ weapons upwind of the fallout areas. In addition,fallout shelters should have the highest priority of any defensive system because theydecrease the vulnerability of the population to nuclear contamination under all typesof attack.

The following sequence of charts presents the basis for the national fallout shelter program.

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6/23

EFFECTS OF A 5-MT BLAST

Chart I shows the blast and thermal effects of a 5 megaton surface burst. People close tothe detonation, within 3 miles of ground zero, are not likely to survive the blast and thermaleffects. There is little that can be done for the population in this area as protectionagainst the close-in blast effects of nuclear weapons is beyond the present capabilities ofmilitary or civil defense.As you move out from the total destruction ring, however, chances for survival improve markedly.In terms of probabilities, the percentage of the population surviving blast and thermal effectsincreases rapidly as the distance from ground zero increases.While millions of people could survive these initial effects of nuclear detonations, a largeportion of the survivors would be exposed to the letbal effects of radioactive fallout.

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7/23

E F F E C T S O F A 5 M T B L A S T C hart 1

PERCENT OF PEOPLE:DEAD_ HURT== SAFE,}}}},:

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . : : : : ; ; : ~ : : : : : : : : : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ : : : : ; : : : 1 1 1 ; 1 1 ; 1 ~ : : : ; .. . . . . . .

. . . .,: : . : ' ,

12-125 PSI98 2 0-1.5 PSI1002.5-5 PSI520 75l I ~g : :; : :: :: :: , : :: :: :: :: : :: :: :: :, . '" """

.... : : ; : ; : ; : : : : . : : : . : : : : : . : . : . : . : : : : : : : : : :

TOTALDESTRUCTION

. . . ....~ -:. .'.:: .: ; ~ L MODERATE!)". LIGHT.:: DAMAGE :";::. DAMAGE

.21 MI.CRATERRADIUS

3 MILES 7 MILES 9 MILESMILES

GROUNDZERO

If burst is elevated to altitude maximizing reach of blast damage:"Moderate Damage" from blast is extended from 7 to 11 miles"Ignition Radius" (ignites newspaper) is extended from 9 to 10 miles 5


8/23

EFFECTS OF A 20-MT BLAST

Chart 2 shows the effects of a 20 megaton surface burst. While this amounts to a fourfoldincrease in megatonnage over the five megaton weapon the same blast and thermal effects occurat less than twice the distance from ground zero. As in the case of the five megaton weapon,millions of people could survive these initial effects.

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9/23

E F F E C T S O F A 2 0 M T B L A S T Chart 2PERCENT OF PEOPLE:

DEAD_ HURT SAFE:}}}}::

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .: : : : ; : : ; : ; . . . . .. - : : : ; : : ; ~ ; ~ ~ : : : .O '.dl::;:;:: : : : g ; l l :.. . ::: .' ~. . . . .. . . .

12-125 PSI98 2 2.5-5 PSI'520 75 ....I :: : :: :: :: :: :: : :: :: :: ;; : :: :: :: = " : :' ~ " :. . .-"::}}/ :::",HEAVY : ; 1 1 : MODERATE ::\:DAMAGE : H l DAMAGE

TOTALDESTRUCTION

12 MILES

GROUNDZERO

If burst is elevated to altitude maximizing reach of blast damage:"Moderate Damage" from blast is extended from 11 to 17 miles"Ignition Radius" (ignites newspaper) is extended from 12 to 17 miles

0-1.5 PSI10 0: ~ : t ~ : ~ : ~ : ~ : : : : : : . : . : . : . ; . : : : : : : : : : : : : :

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10/23

UNSHIELDED MAX IMUM EQ UIV ALENT RADIATION DOSE CONTOURS

Chart 3 illustrates the extensive geographical coverage of fallout radiation from 5 and 20megaton surface blasts. Based on a 25 mph upper air wind, significant amounts of falloutfrom these weapons would be deposited over thousands of square miles of area down wind.A dose of over 200r could cause disabling illness.of death and over 600r death is almost certain.

At 450r there is a 50-50 probability

In an actual attack fallout from several weapons could overlap further increasing radiationlevels.

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11/23

UNSHIELDED MAXIMUM EQUIVALENT RADIATION DOSE CONTOURS5 ( 1 ) / 0 Fission - 5 ( 1 ) / 0 Fusion

Average Wind Speed ( 25 mph)

I I I I I Io 20 40 60 80 100 I150 I200 I300 I400

5 MEGATON

1 0, D O O r 5 , O OO r 100r 50r, OOOr 5 D O r 200r

20 MEGATON

o 20 40 60 80 100I I I I I I 400I150I 200I 300IScale: Statute Miles

771- 946 0 - 65 - 2

Chart 3

I500

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500I

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12/23

F ALL OU T R ADI AT ION E FFE CT S

Chart 4 illustrates the effects of fallout radiation upon occupants of a typical 10-story commercialbuilding.

1. The fallout particles are like salt or sand; they have weight and settle on theground; they are not likely to be indoors in harmful amounts.

A few facts about the physical nature of fallout:

2. Food is not contaminated unless outdoors and covered by fallout particles; theparticles can be removed by washing or peeling.

3. Only a small fraction of radioactive fallout is soluble in water. In addition,fallout particles sink rapidly to the bottom and potable water sources areprotected by passing through the ground and by water purifying systems.

4. Fallout radiation decays rapidly, especially soon after the burst. Much is givenoff harmlessly in the air before the fallout reaches the ground. Even after reachingground, decay continues to be rapid. For example, by the end of the third day thefallout radiation level would be less than a third of what it was at the end of thefirst.

In the chart, arrows represent the damaging gamma radiation from fallout particles. The arrows showradiation penetrating the outside walls, injuring persons in the outer rooms. Some radiation wouldpenetrate the protective core area of the building, but the density of building material would reducethe radiation to levels doing little or no harm.To the right of the building are pictured the initial effects of too much radiation on the humanbody; destruction of body cells is taking place, soon to result in intense illness. Depending onthe amount of the dose, death could follow days or weeks later. However, the same radiation isshown passing through food without contamination or damage.

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13/23

Chart 4

F A L L O U T, c " , , , , , , . ' : ' ' " " R A D IA T IO N , "E F F E C T S

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14/23

FALLOUT CONDITIONS FROM A LARGE NUCLEAR ATTACK(A Spring Day)

Chart 5 shows the geographic distribution of various levels of radioactivity resulting froman assumed attack. The targets attacked were a full range of military, industrial andpopulation centers. Targeting variables included such matters as how war starts, enemyabort rates from malfunctions, attrition of incoming weapons from U.S. military action,duration of attack, weapons accuracy, and upper wind direction and veloCity.The level of attack is in excess of 5,000 megatons detonated on target, about 65% surfacebursts which generate fallout.About 75% of the land would be covered with dangerous levels of radioactive fallout ifaverage winds prevailed. Areas shown to be free of serious fallout could virtually all becovered under different ~ind conditions.The darkest areas would require a week to two weeks stay in shelters. Less dark areas wouldrequire two days to one week. The light gray areas would require shelter only for the firstday or two.

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15/23

F A L L O U T C O N D , I T I O N S F R O M A R A N D O M A S S U M E D A T T A C K A G A I N S T AW I D E R A N G E O F T A R G E T S : M I L I T A R Y , I N D U S T R I A L A N D P O P U L A T I O N

A SPR ING DA Y

S UR V IV A L A C TIO N SoNo shelter required under this windcondition

t,/'J Up to 2 days shelter occupancy.2 days to 1week shelter occupancy

1week to 2 weeks shelter occupancyfollowed by decontamination in excep-tional areas

Chart 5

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16/23

FALLOUT CONDITIONS FROM A LARGE NUCLEAR ATTACK(A Fall Day)

Chart 6 shows the distribution of various levels of radioactivity resulting from the sameattack used for Chart 5 but with the wind conditions of a randomly selected fall day. Muchof the area which was free of fallout with the spring day winds is covered with seriousamounts of fallout under the fall day conditions.Even if targets, enemy intentions and offensive capabilities could be accurately predicted,the winds as of any day on which a potential attack might occur, could not be so predicted.Therefore, we must plan on providing fallout protection everywhere.

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17/23

F A L L O U T C O N D I T I O N S F R O M A R A N D O M A S S U M E D A T T A C K A G A I N S T AW I D E R A N G E O F T A R G E T S : M I L I T A R Y , I N D U S T R I A L A N D P O P U L A T I O N

A FALL DAY

SURVIVAL ACTIONSDo shelter required under this wind .condition

l i \ . . : ~ : lUp to 2 days shelter occupancy 2 days to I week shelter occupancy

I week to 2 weeks shelter occupancyfollowed by decontamination in excep-tional areas

Chart 6

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18/23

POPULATION AND AREA AFFECTED BY HYPOTHETICAL HEAV Y ATTACK

Chart 7 compares the effects of fallout and blast on the population and the land area ofthe country, using a series of attacks comparable to those shown in Charts 5 and 6.

Blast levels. Under these assumptions, 90% of the land area and 41% of the populationwould not be subjected to damage or injury. Another 20% of the population has an excellentprobability of surviving the attack. 18% has a better than a 50/50 chance for survival.21% of the population would be in the area of near total destruction.

Radiation levels. Although a large portion of the population would survive the blasteffects, 85% would be subject to lethal or dangerous radiation levels which cover about 75%of the land area. Only 15% of the population is in areas which are free of fallout or havea tolerable range of fallout.Even if we assume that all those killed by blast (approximately 30% of the population) werealso included in the lethal radiation area, there would still be 30% of the population whowould have survived blast and need fallout protection to survive the radiation hazard. Inaddition, 25% of the population would need such protection to avoid disabling radiationsickness.

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19/23

E X P O S U R E T O B L A S T A N D F A L L O U TH E A V Y H Y P O T H E T I C A L A T T A C K O NM IL IT A R Y , IN D U S T R IA L A N D P O P U L A T IO N T A R G E T S

PO PU L A T IO N R A D IA T IO N L EV EL S6(J/o_ L e th al R a di ati on

25%~ Dangerous15%" E x em pt o r T o le ra bl e

A R E A_37%=37%~26%

C hart 7

B L A ST L E V E L S ~!21%~ 00.5%ear T otal D e structio n{over 12p si * _ 2 ' > / 0 survival}18%~ H eav y D am ag e 01.5%{12o 5 psi _6(J/ourvival}2(J/o,. M oderate to L ight D am age ~8%(5to 1psi _ 95%urvival)

41%_ N o P hysical D am age ~_9(J/o

*P ounds per square inch of blast pressure 17


20/23

LIFESAV ING POTENTIAL OF IMPROV ED STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Chart 8 The facing chart depicts the effectiveness of various defensive postures in terms of livessaved. As in the preceding charts the data for this chart are taken from Department of Defense studies,but the assumptions used here are far more extreme. It was assumed that a very severe attack occursagainst population targets. All damage limiting defensive systems are measured against this veryp es si mi st ic a ss um pt io n.

No Sh el te ro In the absence of an effective shelter program for the protection of the population,about 144 million people would become fatalities.

Full Fallout Shelter (I). On the assumptions that 10% of the people would fail to use availableshelters and others would improperly use the shelters (e.g., late entrance and early exit), the fullfallout shelter program would save 48.5 million people. It was also assumed that there would be anincreasing population shift to urban areas - about an 18% shift by 1970. Certain offsetting factorswere not included for lack of adequate data; the blast protection afforded by fallout shelters, build-ings, terrain and other local characteristics; fatalities from fire spread beyond the impact area.To date at total program cost of about $600 million (FY 1962-1965) over 130 million fallout shelterspaces have been identified. Projecting the present program through FY 1970 would result in falloutshelter for 3/4 to 4/5 of the estimated 1970 population at a cost of less than $1.0 billion.

Blast Shelter (II). This posture includes 30 psi blast shelter in the central cities of the100 largest metropolitan areas, 10 psi blast shelter in the suburban areas surrounding these cities,and fallout shelter for the rest of the country. Approximately 25 million lives would be saved overthe full fallout shelter posture at an additional cost of approximately $19.0 billion.

Ballistic Missile Defense (III). Provides protection for 22 cities at a 5-year cost of $18.0billion. (Arbitrarily selected median of various studies of hypothetical systems ranging from 20 to25 cities defended and costs of $16 to $20 billion.) This posture would save 27.8 million people inaddition to those saved by the full fallout shelter posture.This system must be combined with the full fallout shelter system as an enemy could detonate a weaponupwind, outside of the defended areas, and kill those without fallout shelter in the ABM protected cities.

All Systems (IV). All of the preceding postures added together could save a total of almost 100mi ll io n l iv es.18


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L IF E S A V IN G P O T E N T IA L O F IM P R O V E D S T R A T E G IC D E F E N S E(Millions of People)

240 II III IV200

- - - - --


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ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM AND SHELTERS

First, the people in areas protected by ABMs can be exposed to lethal fallout radiation eventhough enemy weapons do not penetrate the protected areas. Surrounding groundbursts, as illustratedon the left of the chart, could be targeted to kill those without fallout shelters in a city.

Chart 9 This chart depicts the relationship between antiballistic missile systems and shelters.While shelters have value with or without an antiballistic missile system, an antiballistic missilesystem has little value for protection of population without shelters for two reasons:

Second, a series of industrial and population centers protected by effective antiballisticmissile systems (which are under development) may result in a shift in targeting to unprotected,industrial and population centers. Although lower priority, the unprotected target areas may befully justified by military, psychological and deterrent objectives.The relationship of shelters and antiballistic missile systems illustrates the necessity for inte-grating civil defense and other defense programs. Maximum protection of our people and values isthe purpose of all of our defense efforts. This objective requires a balanced and coordinated mixof civilian and military defense systems.

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Chart 9

A N T I - B A L L IS T IC M IS S IL E S Y S T E M A N D S H E L T E R S

S U R R O U N D I N G G R O U N D B U R S T S K I L L I N GT H O S E W I T H O U T F A L L O U T S H E L T E R S

i

M E T R O P O L I T A N A R E A P R O T E C T E D B Y A . B . M . S Y S T E M

21DISTRIBUTION:

O eD R eg io ns U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1965 0 - 771-946

Documents

Fallout Shelter Program (1965)