14
Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar Iran and the Arab World ab Iti)rld acldresse ,, 111,- most ,Ii Nil and •,10.1 40,00 .1 dle-East politics, With .1 1,0011;100n tkk I , tiro ulf states combined, lit rill 0141 t,,i„ d leadership position in th,. , I4II lit on, Iran must be a part 01 ,110 hamt k oh k iddle East in general, `i , i lean, it ral refusal to disctiss its hoe num, through this barrier 01 so, it„ III1 .1,k,h, s with Syria, 1,ebankm, 11,al, 1 1.N ',midi A1,11.1. 1 . ,110 Gulf Cooperation Count 11 I he. 1 ,, 1111 , 111 ,- ng the New World ()Ilk' 11) ill. 111(1 is rd W. Runlet. Professor of Ilihtoly,, t'olti ^ 10,4 I 1 1 1%1 1 , elations arc crucial tor understanding the kJaileMpOtaty iddle East. To date, no monograph has nettled this iMptif pite the Iran--Iraq war, Iran's role in the Lehrunin, and or radical Islamic Retires in the Atah 0,111 ban anti the irably fills this lacuna. In a serot irn 1•,,1 essio Mat imp of ideology, United States poll, ‘. I.-Imams with on Iranian•Arab relations, dies ‘,,Inint. Iii 4 11111 at prospects for conflict and sulhons in OW / , ‘!.1, SO / 1 + 4 n 'ma s must reading 1 / a those seek nit,' .1 niil‘ 11) 1111 11 1 1/1:11' , 1 \ Middle East politics.' Davis, Professor of Political St is nc r, Rutyci.. i !ffivetsity .

Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar Iran and ...amirahmadi.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Iranian-Saudi-Arabi… · Edited by Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar

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    d by

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irahm

    adi

    and

    Nad

    er E

    ntes

    sar

    Iran

    and

    the

    Arab

    Wor

    ld

    e A

    rab

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    d ac

    ldre

    sse

    ,, 11

    1,-

    mos

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    rshi

    p po

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    on i

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    , I4

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    it

    sert

    ion,

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    n m

    ust b

    e a

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    01

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    ham

    t k

    oh

    k

    e M

    iddl

    e E

    ast i

    n ge

    nera

    l, `i

    ,i le

    an,

    it en

    eral

    ref

    usal

    to

    disc

    tiss

    its

    hoe

    nu

    m,

    taks

    thro

    ugh

    this

    bar

    rier

    01

    so, i

    t„

    III1

    .1,k

    ,h,

    tions

    with

    Syr

    ia, 1

    ,eba

    nkm

    , 11,

    al, 1

    1.N

    ',mid

    i A1,

    11.1

    .1. ,

    110

    the

    Gul

    f C

    oope

    rati

    on C

    ount

    11

    I he

    . 1 ,,

    11

    11

    ,111

    ,-

    )la

    tin

    g

    the

    New

    Worl

    d (

    )Ilk

    ' 11)

    ill.

    111(1

    is

    (cha

    rd W

    . Run

    let.

    Pro

    fess

    or o

    f Il

    ihto

    ly,, t

    'olt

    i ^10

    ,4 I

    111

    %1 1

    ,

    ,b r

    elat

    ions

    arc

    cru

    cial

    tor

    und

    erst

    andi

    ng

    the

    kJai

    leM

    pOta

    ty

    e M

    iddl

    e E

    ast.

    To

    date

    , no

    mon

    ogra

    ph h

    as n

    ettle

    d th

    is i

    Mpti

    f

    desp

    ite

    the

    Iran

    --Ir

    aq w

    ar, I

    ran'

    s ro

    le i

    n th

    e L

    ehru

    nin,

    and

    ar

    t for

    rad

    ical

    Isl

    amic

    Ret

    ires

    in t

    he A

    tah

    0,1

    11

    ba

    n an

    ti th

    e ad

    mir

    ably

    fill

    s th

    is la

    cuna

    . In

    a se

    rot i

    rn 1

    •,,1

    es

    sio

    Mat

    imp

    act o

    f id

    eolo

    gy, U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    po

    ll,

    ‘.

    I.-I

    mam

    s w

    ith

    ates

    on

    Iran

    ian•

    Ara

    b re

    lati

    ons,

    die

    s ‘,

    ,Ini

    nt.

    Iii

    4 11

    111

    at

    the

    pros

    pect

    s fo

    r co

    nfli

    ct a

    nd s

    ulho

    ns i

    n O

    W /

    ,‘!■.1

    ,S

    O /

    1+4n

    'ma

    rid is

    mus

    t rea

    ding

    1 /

    a th

    ose

    seek

    nit,

    ' .1

    niil‘

    11)

    1111

    1111

    /1:1

    1',1

    \

    g of

    Mid

    dle

    Eas

    t pol

    itic

    s.'

    ■ ,rie

    Dav

    is, P

    rofe

    ssor

    of

    Polit

    ical

    St i

    s nc

    r, R

    utyc

    i.. i

    !ffi

    vet

    sity

    .

    T

    r• e

    s •

    • t

    Plkerta

  • Also

    edi

    ted

    by H

    oosh

    ang

    Amir

    ahm

    adi a

    nd N

    ader

    Ent

    essa

    r

    REC

    ON

    STR

    UC

    TIO

    N A

    ND

    REG

    ION

    AL

    DIP

    LOM

    AC

    Y IN

    TH

    E PE

    RSI

    AN

    GU

    LF

    Also

    by

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irah

    mad

    i

    REV

    OLU

    TIO

    N A

    ND

    EC

    ON

    OM

    IC T

    RA

    NSI

    TIO

    N:

    The

    Irani

    an E

    xper

    ienc

    e PO

    ST-R

    EVO

    LUTI

    ON

    AR

    Y IR

    AN

    (co

    -ed

    itor)

    TH

    E U

    NIT

    ED S

    TATE

    S A

    ND

    TH

    E M

    IDD

    LE E

    AST

    (ed

    itor)

    U

    RB

    AN

    DEV

    ELO

    PMEN

    T IN

    TH

    E M

    USL

    IM W

    OR

    LD (

    co-ed

    itor)

    Also

    by

    Nad

    er E

    ntes

    sar

    KU

    RD

    ISH

    FR

    INO

    NA

    TIO

    NA

    LIS

    M

    MID

    DLE

    EA

    ST P

    OLI

    TIC

    S PO

    LITI

    CA

    L D

    EVEL

    OPM

    ENT

    IN C

    HIL

    E A

    STU

    DY

    ON

    CH

    INES

    E FO

    REI

    GN

    PO

    LIC

    Y

    Iran

    and

    the

    Ara

    b W

    orld

    Ed

    ited

    by

    Hoo

    shan

    g A

    mira

    hmad

    i A

    ssoc

    iate

    Pro

    fess

    or a

    nd D

    irect

    or, M

    iddl

    e E

    aste

    rn S

    tudi

    es P

    rogr

    am

    Rut

    gers

    Uni

    vers

    ity, N

    ew J

    erse

    y

    and

    Nad

    er E

    ntes

    sar

    Pro

    fess

    or o

    f Pol

    itica

    l Sci

    ence

    S

    prin

    g H

    ill C

    olle

    ge, A

    laba

    ma

    St. M

    artin

    's Pr

    ess

    New

    Yor

    k

  • 138

    Iran

    and

    the

    Arab

    Wor

    ld

    9.Ch

    eryl

    Ben

    ard

    and

    Zalm

    ay K

    halil

    zad,

    'Th

    e G

    over

    nmen

    t of G

    od'

    — Ir

    an's

    Isla

    mic

    Rep

    ublic

    (Ne

    w Yo

    rk: C

    olum

    bia U

    nive

    rsity

    Pre

    ss, 1

    984)

    . 10

    .R.

    K. R

    amaz

    ani,

    Revo

    lutio

    nary

    Iran

    : Cha

    lleng

    e and

    Res

    pons

    e in

    the M

    iddl

    e Ea

    st (B

    altim

    ore a

    nd L

    ondo

    n: Jo

    hns H

    opki

    ns U

    nive

    rsity

    Pre

    ss, 1

    986)

    . 11

    .Ro

    bin

    Wrig

    ht, I

    n th

    e N

    ame

    of G

    od: T

    he K

    hom

    eini

    Dec

    ade

    (New

    Yor

    k:

    Sim

    on an

    d Sc

    huste

    r, 19

    89),

    pp. 1

    08-

    29.

    12.

    Erik

    R. P

    eter

    son,

    The

    Gul

    f Coo

    pera

    tion

    Cou

    ncil:

    Sea

    rch

    for U

    nity

    in a

    D

    ynam

    ic R

    egio

    n (B

    ould

    er an

    d Lo

    ndon

    : Wes

    tvie

    w P

    ress

    , 198

    8), p

    p. x

    viii,

    13

    4-7.

    13.

    In 1

    983,

    the G

    CC S

    upre

    me C

    ounc

    il Co

    mm

    uniq

    ué ca

    lled

    'on Ir

    an to

    resp

    ond

    posit

    ively

    to [t

    he 3

    1 Oc

    tobe

    r 198

    3 UN

    Sec

    urity

    Cou

    ncil]

    reso

    lutio

    n an

    d no

    t to

    thre

    aten

    the f

    reed

    om o

    f nav

    igat

    ion

    in th

    e Gul

    f and

    its s

    traits

    '. In

    1985

    , ho

    wev

    er, G

    CC ru

    lers

    stat

    ed th

    at th

    e w

    ar sh

    ould

    end

    'in

    a m

    anne

    r tha

    t sa

    fegu

    ard[

    ed] t

    he le

    gitim

    ate ri

    ghts

    and i

    nter

    ests

    of th

    e two

    side

    s'. T

    his w

    as as

    lu

    cid

    a pro

    noun

    cem

    ent a

    s the

    GCC

    wou

    ld m

    ake i

    n ve

    ntin

    g its

    mem

    bers

    ' di

    sple

    asur

    e with

    Sad

    dam

    Hus

    sein

    but

    it w

    as en

    ough

    . See

    'Doh

    a Sup

    rem

    e Co

    uncil

    Sum

    mit:

    Fin

    al Co

    mm

    uniq

    ue',

    FBIS

    — M

    EA-V-

    83-21

    8, 9

    Nov

    embe

    r 19

    83, p

    p. C3

    —C4

    ; and

    'Mus

    cat S

    upre

    me C

    ounc

    il Su

    mm

    it: F

    inal

    Com

    mun

    i-qu

    e', F

    BIS

    — M

    EA-V-

    85 -2

    15 ,

    6 Nov

    embe

    r 198

    5, pp

    . C1—

    C2.

    14.

    Mar

    tin K

    ram

    er, 'T

    rage

    dy in

    Mec

    ca',

    Orb

    is 32

    :2 (S

    prin

    g 19

    88),

    pp. 2

    32-7

    . 15

    .Is

    lam

    and

    Rev

    olut

    ion:

    Writ

    ings

    and

    Dec

    lara

    tions

    of I

    mam

    Kho

    mei

    ni,

    trans

    -lat

    ed b

    y Ha

    mid

    Alg

    ar (B

    erke

    ley, C

    A: M

    izan

    Pres

    s, 19

    81),

    p. 1

    96. T

    he an

    ti-Sh

    ia tra

    ct, A

    l-Khu

    tut a

    l-Ari

    da li

    -U

    sus A

    llati

    Qam

    a Al

    ayha

    Din

    as-

    Shia

    al-

    Ithna

    Ash

    ariy

    a (T

    he B

    road

    Lin

    es o

    f the

    Fou

    ndat

    ions

    on

    whi

    ch th

    e Sh

    ia

    Relig

    ion

    Aros

    e) is

    auth

    ored

    by

    Muh

    ib ad

    -Din

    al-K

    hatib

    . Firs

    t pub

    lishe

    d in

    19

    60, i

    t rem

    ains a

    wid

    ely d

    istrib

    uted

    anti-

    Shia

    polem

    ic.

    16.

    Ali S

    haria

    ti, H

    ail (

    Bedf

    ord,

    Ohi

    o: F

    ree I

    slam

    ic Li

    teratu

    re, 1

    978)

    , p. 1

    09.

    17.

    As q

    uoted

    in K

    ram

    er, o

    p. ci

    t., p

    . 243

    . 18

    .Di

    lip H

    iro, H

    oly

    War

    s: T

    he R

    ise o

    f Isla

    mic

    Fun

    dam

    enta

    lism

    (Ne

    w Yo

    rk:

    Rout

    ledge

    , 198

    9), p

    p. 2

    17-1

    9.

    19.

    As q

    uoted

    in K

    ram

    er, o

    p. ci

    t., p

    . 245

    . 20

    .Le

    Mon

    de, 2

    5 Au

    gust

    1987

    , p. 1

    . 21

    .W

    alter

    de B

    ock a

    nd Je

    an-C

    harle

    s Den

    iau, D

    es A

    rmes

    Pou

    r L' I

    ran:

    L' I

    rang

    ate

    Euro

    peen

    (Par

    is: G

    allim

    ard,

    198

    8), p

    p. 2

    14-1

    7.

    22.

    Shire

    en T

    . Hun

    ter, I

    ran

    and

    the W

    orld

    : Con

    tinui

    ty in

    a R

    evol

    utio

    nary

    Dec

    ade

    (Blo

    omin

    gton

    and

    Indi

    anap

    olis:

    Indi

    ana U

    nive

    rsity

    Pre

    ss, 1

    990)

    , pp.

    63-

    78.

    8 Ira

    nian

    —Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    an

    Rel

    atio

    ns si

    nce

    the

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irahm

    adi

    Until

    the e

    nd o

    f the

    US-

    led w

    ar ag

    ainst

    Iraq,

    the r

    elatio

    nshi

    p be

    twee

    n th

    e Isl

    amic

    Repu

    blic

    of Ir

    an an

    d the

    Kin

    gdom

    of S

    'a'ud

    i Ara

    bia r

    emain

    ed te

    nse

    and

    unfri

    endl

    y. W

    hile

    tensio

    n als

    o ex

    isted

    betw

    een

    the t

    wo n

    ation

    s dur

    ing

    the r

    eign

    of th

    e late

    Sha

    h M

    oham

    mad

    Rez

    a Pah

    lavi,

    it wa

    s now

    here

    clos

    e to

    the e

    ssen

    tially

    antag

    onist

    ic • r

    elatio

    ns th

    at de

    velo

    ped

    betw

    een

    the t

    wo

    coun

    tries

    in th

    e afte

    rmath

    of t

    he R

    evol

    utio

    n in

    197

    9.

    The I

    raqi

    inva

    sion

    of Ir

    an o

    n 22

    Sep

    tem

    ber 1

    980

    and

    the s

    ubse

    quen

    t eig

    ht-y

    ear w

    ar b

    etwee

    n th

    e two

    coun

    tries

    bec

    ame a

    noth

    er tu

    rnin

    g-po

    int i

    n th

    e wor

    seni

    ng re

    latio

    ns b

    etwee

    n th

    e Isla

    mic

    Repu

    blic

    and

    the S

    audi

    Kin

    g-do

    m. F

    rom

    that

    mom

    ent,

    the e

    ssen

    tially

    ideo

    logi

    cal c

    ontes

    t gra

    duall

    y de

    -ve

    lope

    d in

    to p

    oliti

    cal c

    onfro

    ntat

    ion

    on se

    vera

    l fro

    nts.

    The r

    elat

    ions

    hip

    beca

    me e

    ven

    mor

    e ten

    se w

    hen

    a Sau

    di-`e

    ngin

    eere

    d gl

    ut' in

    198

    5-6

    led to

    a sh

    arp

    drop

    in O

    PEC

    oil p

    rices

    , with

    extre

    mely

    neg

    ative

    cons

    eque

    nces

    for

    the I

    rani

    an w

    ar ec

    onom

    y.

    This

    deter

    iora

    ting

    relat

    ions

    hip

    reac

    hed

    its lo

    west

    poin

    t in

    1987

    whe

    n a

    polit

    ical

    dem

    onstr

    atio

    n by

    the

    Irani

    an p

    ilgrim

    s in

    Mec

    ca tu

    rned

    into

    a

    bloo

    dy co

    nfro

    ntat

    ion

    with

    the S

    audi

    pol

    ice.

    At t

    hat p

    oint

    ver

    bal a

    buse

    in

    tensif

    ied fr

    om b

    oth

    sides

    and

    dipl

    omati

    c rela

    tions

    wer

    e sev

    ered

    . The

    late

    Aya

    tolla

    h Ro

    uhol

    lah

    Kho

    mei

    ni ev

    en p

    rocl

    aim

    ed S

    audi

    Ara

    bia a

    s the

    Is-

    lamic

    Repu

    blic'

    s main

    enem

    y alth

    ough

    Iran

    was

    in th

    e mid

    st of

    its w

    ar w

    ith

    Iraq.

    The

    Islam

    ic lea

    ders

    in T

    ehra

    n als

    o be

    gan

    to ca

    ll th

    e Kin

    gdom

    by

    its

    old

    nam

    e, Hi

    jaz, q

    uesti

    onin

    g th

    e leg

    itim

    acy

    of th

    e Hou

    se o

    f Sau

    d's ru

    le in

    Isl

    am's

    birth

    plac

    e. Ira

    n—Sa

    udi r

    elatio

    ns im

    prov

    ed sl

    ight

    ly un

    der t

    he le

    ader

    ship

    of th

    e pra

    g-m

    atist

    Pres

    iden

    t Ali

    Akba

    r Has

    hem

    i Raf

    sanj

    ani b

    egin

    ning

    in 1

    989.

    Afte

    r th

    e cea

    sefir

    e with

    Iraq

    in A

    ugus

    t 198

    8 and

    the d

    eath

    of A

    yato

    llah K

    hom

    eini

    in 1

    989,

    the I

    slam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic be

    gin

    to re

    defin

    e its

    fore

    ign

    polic

    y fro

    m th

    e ea

    rlier

    conf

    ront

    ation

    al ap

    proa

    ch to

    ward

    a m

    ore m

    oder

    ate an

    d co

    oper

    ative

    on

    e with

    the s

    tates

    in th

    e reg

    ion.

    Th

    is ch

    ange

    notw

    ithsta

    ndin

    g, Ira

    n—Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a rela

    tions

    rem

    ained

    tens

    e an

    d un

    frien

    dly

    until

    the U

    S-le

    d w

    ar ag

    ains

    t Ira

    q w

    as su

    cces

    sful

    ly co

    n-

    139

  • 140

    Iran

    and

    the

    Ara

    b W

    orld

    elud

    ed. S

    ince

    then

    , som

    e of

    the

    mos

    t tro

    ublin

    g is

    sues

    bet

    wee

    n th

    e tw

    o re

    gim

    es h

    ave

    been

    reso

    lved

    . The

    se in

    clud

    e th

    e di

    sput

    es o

    ver t

    he M

    ecca

    de

    mon

    strat

    ion

    and

    OPE

    C le

    ader

    ship

    . Dip

    lom

    atic

    ties

    wer

    e re

    store

    d in

    Mar

    ch

    1991

    . Som

    e ve

    ry im

    porta

    nt is

    sues

    , how

    ever

    , rem

    ain

    unre

    solv

    ed fo

    r the

    tim

    e be

    ing.

    Am

    ong

    them

    are

    the

    futu

    re le

    ader

    ship

    and

    secu

    rity

    of th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf a

    nd th

    e tra

    ditio

    nal s

    ourc

    es o

    f ten

    sion

    bet

    wee

    n A

    rabs

    and

    Iran

    ians

    . Th

    is c

    hapt

    er p

    rese

    nts a

    n ov

    ervi

    ew o

    f Ira

    nian

    —Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    an re

    latio

    ns

    sinc

    e th

    e R

    evol

    utio

    n in

    197

    9 an

    d fo

    cuse

    s on

    the

    fact

    ors

    unde

    rlyin

    g th

    e te

    nsio

    n be

    twee

    n Te

    hran

    and

    Riy

    adh.

    I ar

    gue

    that

    thre

    e m

    ajor

    forc

    es w

    ere

    the

    mos

    t res

    pons

    ible

    for t

    he c

    onfro

    ntat

    ions

    bet

    wee

    n th

    e tw

    o re

    gim

    es: i

    deo-

    logi

    cal a

    nd c

    ultu

    ral d

    iffer

    ence

    s; str

    uggl

    e fo

    r OPE

    C le

    ader

    ship

    , and

    que

    st fo

    r su

    prem

    acy

    in th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf.

    A c

    ompl

    ex o

    f oth

    er fo

    rces

    will

    be

    show

    n to

    ha

    ve in

    fluen

    ced

    Iran—

    Saud

    i rel

    atio

    ns in

    the

    post-

    revo

    lutio

    nary

    per

    iod,

    mos

    t no

    tabl

    y th

    e U

    S pr

    esen

    ce in

    the

    regi

    on a

    nd th

    e Ira

    n—Ira

    q w

    ar.

    In th

    e fo

    llow

    ing

    page

    s, th

    e fir

    st se

    ctio

    n fo

    cuse

    s on

    the

    OPE

    C fa

    ctor

    . The

    ne

    xt s

    ectio

    n fo

    cuse

    s on

    the

    ideo

    logi

    cal a

    nd c

    ultu

    ral r

    oots

    of t

    he te

    nsio

    n be

    twee

    n th

    e tw

    o re

    gim

    es in

    Teh

    ran

    and

    Riy

    adh.

    In th

    e th

    ird se

    ctio

    n, th

    e Pe

    rsia

    n G

    ulf f

    acto

    r and

    the

    US

    role

    in Ir

    ania

    n—Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    an re

    latio

    ns a

    re

    disc

    usse

    d. T

    he c

    hapt

    er is

    then

    con

    clud

    ed w

    ith a

    few

    rem

    arks

    abo

    ut re

    cent

    ch

    ange

    s in

    the

    rela

    tions

    bet

    wee

    n th

    e tw

    o na

    tions

    and

    the

    pros

    pect

    for t

    he

    futu

    re.

    THE

    OPE

    C F

    AC

    TOR

    To a

    ppre

    ciat

    e th

    e im

    porta

    nce

    of th

    e O

    PEC

    fact

    or in

    Iran

    —Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a re

    latio

    ns, o

    ne m

    ust t

    ake

    note

    of t

    he fa

    ct th

    at m

    ost m

    oder

    n se

    ctor

    s of t

    he

    Irani

    an e

    cono

    my

    depe

    nd o

    n th

    e w

    orld

    mar

    ket f

    or so

    me

    65 to

    75

    per c

    ent o

    f th

    eir v

    ario

    us in

    puts,

    from

    raw

    mat

    eria

    ls to

    tech

    nolo

    gy. T

    hese

    impo

    rts m

    ust

    be p

    aid

    for b

    y oi

    l rev

    enue

    whi

    ch c

    onst

    itute

    s ov

    er 9

    0 pe

    r cen

    t of t

    he

    coun

    try's

    fore

    ign

    exch

    ange

    ear

    ning

    s. O

    il is

    . in

    shor

    t, th

    e ec

    oncm

    y's r

    eal

    lifel

    ine.

    Yet

    Iran

    has

    onl

    y lim

    ited

    cont

    rol o

    ver t

    he p

    rodu

    ctio

    n, e

    xpor

    t and

    pr

    ice

    of it

    s oil,

    as t

    hey

    are

    larg

    ely

    dete

    rmin

    ed b

    y ch

    ange

    s in

    the

    wor

    ld o

    il m

    arke

    t and

    with

    in O

    PEC

    . The

    two

    fact

    ors

    are

    inte

    rrel

    ated

    and

    wor

    ked

    toge

    ther

    to c

    rippl

    e th

    e Is

    lam

    ic R

    epub

    lic's

    oil-e

    arni

    ng c

    apab

    ility

    . To

    beg

    in w

    ith, i

    n th

    e af

    term

    ath

    of th

    e 19

    73 A

    rab

    oil e

    mba

    rgo,

    the

    Wes

    t be

    cam

    e inc

    reas

    ingl

    y oi

    l-con

    scio

    us. T

    he U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    led

    the c

    rusa

    de ag

    ains

    t O

    PEC

    whi

    ch b

    egan

    with

    the

    crea

    tion

    of th

    e In

    tern

    atio

    nal E

    nerg

    y A

    genc

    y (IE

    A) i

    n 19

    74. E

    xcep

    t Fra

    nce,

    all

    maj

    or o

    il-co

    nsum

    ing

    natio

    ns in

    the

    Wes

    t pa

    rtici

    pate

    d in

    this

    new

    'car

    tel o

    f oil

    com

    pani

    es'.'

    The

    carte

    l's m

    ain

    task

    w

    as to

    cre

    ate

    a su

    rplu

    s of

    ene

    rgy

    by a

    com

    bina

    tion

    of s

    ever

    al m

    eans

    Hoo

    shan

    g A

    mira

    hmad

    i 14

    1

    incl

    udin

    g re

    duct

    ion

    in d

    eman

    d, d

    evel

    opm

    ent o

    f new

    ene

    rgy

    sour

    ces,

    and

    the

    engi

    neer

    ing

    of th

    e oc

    casio

    nal g

    lut.

    In re

    trosp

    ect,

    this

    polic

    y w

    as q

    uite

    succ

    essf

    ul. I

    n 19

    85, d

    eman

    d fo

    r oil

    in

    the

    non-

    Com

    mun

    ist w

    orld

    was

    5 p

    er c

    ent l

    ower

    than

    it w

    as in

    197

    3. F

    or

    OPE

    C, th

    e de

    clin

    e w

    as e

    ven

    mor

    e se

    vere

    . By

    1986

    , OPE

    C ha

    d lo

    st so

    me

    20

    mill

    ion

    barre

    ls a

    day

    of it

    s pot

    entia

    l pro

    duct

    ion,

    of w

    hich

    14

    to 1

    5 m

    b/d

    had

    been

    take

    n aw

    ay b

    y no

    n-O

    PEC

    prod

    ucer

    s inc

    ludi

    ng th

    ose

    in th

    e N

    orth

    Sea

    . 2 In the meantime, the world oil market was flooded by oil from Saudi Arabia

    and

    the

    new

    OPE

    C co

    mpe

    titor

    s, re

    sulti

    ng in

    a m

    ajor

    ove

    rsup

    ply

    or g

    lut b

    y 19

    85.3

    With

    in O

    PEC,

    Iran

    was

    the

    bigg

    est l

    oser

    . Its

    shar

    e of

    OPE

    C pr

    oduc

    -tio

    n an

    d ex

    ports

    of c

    rude

    oil

    decl

    ined

    from

    19.

    1 pe

    r cen

    t and

    18.

    2 pe

    r cen

    t in

    197

    6 to

    14.

    1 an

    d 13

    .4 in

    198

    5 re

    spec

    tivel

    y. P

    art o

    f thi

    s dec

    line,

    how

    ever

    , re

    sulte

    d fro

    m th

    e Ira

    n—Ira

    q w

    ar an

    d an

    earli

    er d

    elib

    erat

    e gov

    ernm

    ent p

    olic

    y to

    redu

    ce d

    epen

    denc

    y on

    the

    oil s

    ecto

    il Th

    e sh

    rinki

    ng d

    eman

    d an

    d ex

    pand

    ing

    com

    petit

    ion

    com

    bine

    d w

    ith m

    is-

    take

    n O

    PEC

    polic

    ies a

    nd w

    hat I

    hav

    e el

    sew

    here

    cal

    led

    'the

    Saud

    i fac

    tor'

    to

    caus

    e th

    e 19

    86 c

    rash

    in o

    il m

    arke

    ts; o

    il pr

    ices

    dec

    lined

    from

    abo

    ut $

    28 p

    er

    barre

    l in

    mid

    -Jan

    uary

    198

    6 to

    $10

    per

    bar

    rel b

    y th

    e firs

    t wee

    k of

    Apr

    il 19

    86.

    Inde

    ed, r

    eal,

    that

    is th

    e in

    flatio

    n-ad

    juste

    d, p

    rices

    wer

    e ev

    en lo

    wer

    , abo

    ut $

    4 to

    $5

    per b

    arre

    l. O

    PEC

    rem

    aine

    d in

    atte

    ntiv

    e to

    tran

    sfor

    mat

    ions

    occ

    urrin

    g in

    th

    e w

    orld

    oil

    mar

    ket a

    nd, a

    s a re

    sult,

    did

    not

    ado

    pt a

    long

    -term

    stra

    tegi

    c pe

    rspe

    ctiv

    e in

    the

    pric

    ing

    of it

    s oil.

    Inste

    ad o

    f int

    erve

    ning

    in th

    e m

    arke

    t to

    regu

    late

    its p

    rices

    at a

    stab

    le le

    vel a

    nd in

    rela

    tion

    to su

    pply

    —de

    man

    d fo

    rces

    , O

    PEC

    deci

    ded

    to ta

    ke a

    dvan

    tage

    of s

    hort-

    term

    gai

    ns in

    pric

    es.

    From

    the p

    ersp

    ectiv

    e of I

    ran—

    Saud

    i rel

    atio

    ns, h

    owev

    er, i

    t is t

    he im

    pact

    of

    the

    Saud

    i fac

    tor o

    n th

    e w

    orld

    oil

    mar

    ket t

    hat i

    s mos

    t sig

    nific

    ant.

    Follo

    win

    g th

    e 19

    73 o

    il pr

    ice-

    hike

    ; the

    intra

    -OPE

    C p

    ower

    stru

    ggle

    gre

    w, o

    ver O

    PEC

    le

    ader

    ship

    . As a

    con

    sequ

    ence

    , the

    org

    anisa

    tion

    beca

    me

    incr

    easin

    gly

    polit

    i-ci

    sed.

    Fro

    m th

    e ve

    ry b

    egin

    ning

    the

    two

    mai

    n co

    ntes

    tant

    s wer

    e Ir

    an a

    nd

    Saud

    i Ara

    bia.

    The

    'stru

    ggle

    for t

    he le

    ader

    ship

    of O

    PEC

    rem

    aine

    d a

    dorm

    ant

    issu

    e un

    der t

    he ti

    ght m

    arke

    t of 1

    979-

    1980

    . It w

    as o

    nly

    in s

    oft m

    arke

    t pe

    riods

    (for

    insta

    nce,

    197

    4-19

    78 a

    nd 1

    981-

    1985

    ) tha

    t thi

    s stru

    ggle

    cre

    ated

    co

    nsid

    erab

    le in

    tra-O

    PEC

    tens

    ions

    .' 5

    Afte

    r the

    Iran

    ian

    Revo

    lutio

    n, S

    audi

    Ara

    bia

    beca

    me

    the

    abso

    lute

    'sw

    ing.

    pr

    oduc

    er' o

    f OPE

    C, a

    pos

    ition

    that

    con

    tribu

    ted

    to it

    s gro

    win

    g po

    wer

    with

    in

    the

    orga

    nisa

    tion

    in th

    e su

    bseq

    uent

    yea

    rs. T

    he K

    ingd

    om u

    sed

    its n

    ew-fo

    und

    pow

    er to

    mak

    e ec

    onom

    ic a

    nd p

    oliti

    cal g

    ains

    and

    frie

    nds.

    In p

    artic

    ular

    , it

    used

    its p

    ower

    with

    in O

    PEC

    to re

    gula

    te o

    il pr

    ices

    acc

    ordi

    ng to

    the

    eco-

    nom

    ic n

    eeds

    and

    requ

    irem

    ents

    of it

    s Wes

    tern

    frie

    nds,

    the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es in

    pa

    rticu

    lar.

    The

    Saud

    is al

    so u

    sed

    thei

    r eco

    nom

    ic p

    ower

    to u

    nder

    min

    e po

    st-re

    volu

    tiona

    ry re

    gim

    es, i

    nclu

    ding

    Iran

    .

  • 142

    Iran

    and

    the A

    rab

    Wor

    ld

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irahm

    adi

    143

    This

    Saud

    i pol

    icy

    was

    par

    t of a

    larg

    er m

    utua

    l com

    mitm

    ent t

    hat

    had

    deve

    lope

    d be

    twee

    n th

    e Kin

    gdom

    and

    the U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    beg

    inni

    ng i

    n th

    e m

    id-1

    970s

    . In

    Terz

    ian'

    s wor

    ds:

    A ne

    w str

    ateg

    ic tr

    iang

    le ha

    d em

    erge

    d on

    the i

    nter

    natio

    nal s

    cene

    — O

    PEC

    at th

    e m

    ercy

    of S

    audi

    Ara

    bia;

    Sau

    di A

    rabi

    a al

    igne

    d w

    ith th

    e U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    ; the

    Uni

    ted

    Stat

    es co

    mm

    itted

    to th

    e pro

    tect

    ion

    of R

    iyad

    h —

    and

    O

    PEC

    was t

    o re

    mai

    n a

    priso

    ner o

    f thi

    s tria

    ngle

    thro

    ugho

    ut th

    e fol

    lowi

    ng

    year

    s, es

    capi

    ng o

    nly

    than

    ks to

    exce

    ptio

    nal —

    and

    ephe

    mer

    al ci

    rcum

    -sta

    nces

    .6

    Thus

    , fol

    lowi

    ng th

    e Ira

    nian

    Rev

    olut

    ion

    in 1

    979,

    acc

    ordi

    ng to

    Moh

    amm

    ad

    Faro

    uk A

    l Hus

    sein

    i:

    Saud

    i Ara

    bia

    was c

    alled

    upo

    n by

    the i

    nter

    natio

    nal c

    omm

    unity

    to in

    crea

    se

    its p

    rodu

    ctio

    n in

    orde

    r to a

    llevi

    ate t

    he ad

    vers

    e effe

    ct th

    at m

    ight

    hav

    e bee

    n en

    gend

    ered

    by

    a w

    orld

    ene

    rgy

    crisi

    s. Pr

    oduc

    tion

    was

    acc

    ordi

    ngly

    in-

    crea

    sed

    to 9

    .5 m

    b/d

    in 1

    979,

    9.9

    mb/

    d in

    198

    0 an

    d 9.

    8 m

    b/d

    in 1

    981.

    7

    Ara

    mco

    was

    alr

    eady

    , in

    late

    197

    8, p

    rodu

    cing

    som

    e 2.5

    to 3

    mb/

    d m

    ore

    than

    its p

    rodu

    ctio

    n ea

    rlier

    that

    yea

    r. As

    was

    late

    r rev

    ealed

    by

    a US

    Sen

    ate

    repo

    rt, A

    ram

    co's

    max

    imum

    pro

    duct

    ion

    capa

    city

    was

    abo

    ut 9

    .3 m

    b/d

    and

    the o

    verp

    rodu

    ctio

    n ha

    d 'c

    ause

    d ir

    repa

    rabl

    e dam

    age a

    nd re

    duce

    d th

    e ulti

    -m

    ate r

    ecov

    ery

    rate

    of o

    il in

    pla

    ces '

    .8 A

    lthou

    gh th

    e Sau

    dis'

    over

    prod

    uctio

    n po

    licy

    had

    begu

    n in

    the m

    id-1

    970s

    , it b

    ecam

    e a w

    ell-e

    stab

    lishe

    d pr

    actic

    e on

    ly a

    fter t

    he Ir

    ania

    n oi

    l wor

    kers

    wen

    t on

    strik

    e in

    1978

    , cau

    sing

    an a

    lmos

    t co

    mpl

    ete h

    alt i

    n th

    e cou

    ntry

    's oi

    l exp

    orts

    . Th

    e Sau

    di K

    ingd

    om a

    lso tr

    ied

    to k

    eep

    a lid

    on

    oil p

    rice

    s. H

    owev

    er, d

    ue

    to th

    e sof

    t mar

    ket c

    ondi

    tion

    prev

    ailin

    g in

    197

    9-80

    , the

    se S

    audi

    'mal

    icio

    us

    tact

    ics'

    prov

    ed la

    rgel

    y in

    effe

    ctiv

    e. A

    s was

    not

    ed b

    y Fe

    shar

    aki a

    nd Is

    aak:

    In 1

    979,

    the S

    audi

    s ini

    tially

    kep

    t the

    ir p

    rice

    s at $

    18/b

    arre

    l—$4

    /bar

    rel

    belo

    w si

    mila

    r-qu

    ality

    crud

    e — b

    ut sp

    ot p

    rice

    s ros

    e to

    $45/

    barr

    el. T

    he

    Saud

    is we

    re fo

    rced

    , ste

    p by

    step

    , to

    raise

    their

    pric

    es to

    $24

    /bar

    rel,

    then

    $2

    6, $

    28, a

    nd $

    30, a

    nd fi

    nally

    to $

    32/b

    arre

    l in

    Dece

    mbe

    r 198

    0. S

    till t

    heir

    pric

    es w

    ere $

    3-4/

    barr

    el b

    elow

    sim

    ilar-

    qual

    ity cr

    ude.

    9

    Acco

    rdin

    g to

    Ter

    zian,

    'thi

    s gap

    bet

    ween

    Sau

    di p

    rices

    and

    thos

    e of o

    ther

    pr

    oduc

    ers r

    epre

    sent

    ed a

    loss

    of o

    ver

    $23

    000

    mill

    ion

    over

    the

    peri

    od

    Febr

    uary

    197

    9 to

    Sep

    tem

    ber 1

    981.

    ..'.1

    9 The

    low

    er p

    rice

    s of S

    audi

    oil

    also

    le

    d to

    wid

    espr

    ead

    corr

    uptio

    n am

    ong

    top-

    rank

    ing

    Saud

    i per

    sona

    litie

    s, in

    -cl

    udin

    g so

    me m

    embe

    rs o

    f the

    roya

    l fam

    ily. T

    he tw

    o m

    ost i

    mpo

    rtan

    t cas

    es

    invo

    lved

    the n

    otor

    ious

    Pri

    nce M

    oham

    med

    bin

    Abd

    ul A

    ziz,

    Kin

    g K

    halid

    's el

    der

    brot

    her,

    and

    Pri

    nce

    Band

    ar b

    in F

    aisa

    l bin

    Sau

    d (p

    rese

    ntly

    Sau

    di

    Amba

    ssad

    or in

    the U

    S). B

    oth

    are r

    epor

    ted

    to h

    ave a

    ppro

    ache

    d oi

    l com

    pa-

    nies

    , offe

    ring

    them

    low

    er-p

    rice

    d oi

    l in

    exch

    ange

    for m

    ulti-

    billi

    on-d

    olla

    r co

    mm

    issio

    ns.1

    1 W

    hate

    ver t

    he co

    st, b

    y 19

    81, S

    audi

    Ara

    bia

    had

    'succ

    eede

    d in

    impo

    sing

    its

    will

    on

    the

    othe

    r O

    PEC

    mem

    bers

    , for

    cing

    them

    to r

    ealig

    n pr

    ices

    at t

    he

    low

    ered

    Sau

    di sc

    ale'

    .12 I

    n an

    inte

    rvie

    w w

    ith N

    BC te

    levi

    sion

    on 1

    9 A

    pril

    1981

    , Ahm

    ed Z

    aki Y

    aman

    i, th

    en S

    audi

    Oil

    Min

    ister

    , sai

    d th

    at th

    e cur

    rent

    oil

    glut

    was

    'eng

    inee

    red'

    by

    his G

    over

    nmen

    t to

    stab

    ilise

    the w

    orld

    oil

    pric

    e.13 Another source also q

    uoted the Minister for expressing a similar idea: 'we en

    gine

    ered

    the g

    lut a

    nd w

    ant t

    o se

    e it i

    n or

    der t

    o sta

    biliz

    e the

    pric

    e of o

    il'.1

    4 It was following this policy that the Saudis found themselves in opposition to

    the o

    ther

    12

    mem

    bers

    of O

    PEC

    durin

    g th

    e Org

    anisa

    tion'

    s six

    tieth

    mee

    t-in

    g in

    Gen

    eva

    on 2

    5-7

    May

    198

    1.

    Whi

    le th

    is Sa

    udi p

    olic

    y ha

    s bee

    n In

    flict

    ing

    real

    wou

    nds o

    n O

    PEC

    (for

    ex

    ampl

    e, pr

    ices c

    olla

    psed

    in F

    ebru

    ary`

    198

    2), t

    he K

    ingd

    om in

    trod

    uced

    an

    even

    mor

    e 'm

    alici

    ous'

    tact

    ic in

    198

    5. T

    his n

    ew p

    olicy

    is k

    nown

    as `

    netb

    ack'

    de

    als,

    or a

    s som

    e hav

    e rig

    htly

    calle

    d it,

    'a p

    rice

    war

    '.15

    Unde

    r the

    net

    back

    pr

    icin

    g ar

    rang

    emen

    ts, o

    il co

    mpa

    nies

    buy

    ing

    Saud

    i oil

    wer

    e gua

    rant

    eed

    prof

    its a

    t the

    refin

    ing

    stag

    e by

    inde

    xing

    the c

    rude

    oil

    pric

    e to

    the m

    arke

    t va

    lue o

    f the

    pro

    duct

    s mad

    e fro

    m it

    : The

    net

    back

    mec

    hani

    sm, t

    here

    fore

    , re

    duce

    d th

    e risk

    of t

    he v

    olat

    ile o

    il m

    arke

    t. Un

    der s

    uch

    a lu

    crat

    ive a

    rran

    ge-

    men

    t for

    the o

    il co

    mpa

    nies

    , Sau

    di A

    rabi

    a ha

    d no

    diff

    iculty

    in in

    crea

    sing

    its

    prod

    uctio

    n an

    d ex

    port

    s and

    floo

    ding

    the o

    il m

    arke

    t. In

    deed

    , by

    the e

    nd o

    f 198

    5 its

    pro

    duct

    ion

    had

    doub

    led

    and

    its ex

    port

    s m

    ore t

    han

    doub

    led. S

    pecif

    ically

    , Sau

    di o

    il ex

    port

    s ros

    e fro

    m 2

    .5 m

    b/d

    in th

    e fa

    ll of

    198

    5 to

    4.5

    mb/

    d in

    early

    198

    6 an

    d clo

    se to

    6 m

    b/d

    in th

    e sum

    mer

    of

    that

    year

    . As a

    resu

    lt, 't

    he p

    oten

    tial w

    orld

    over

    -supp

    ly of

    oil,

    as ea

    rlier

    in th

    e ye

    ar, b

    ecam

    e an

    actu

    al o

    ver-

    supp

    ly .

    . :.

    16 It

    was

    in th

    e afte

    rmat

    h of

    this

    deve

    lopm

    ent t

    hat O

    PEC

    term

    inat

    ed it

    s pol

    icy

    of fi

    xing

    its o

    il pr

    ice a

    nd o

    f re

    stri

    ctin

    g pr

    oduc

    tion

    to th

    e lev

    el o

    f wor

    ld d

    eman

    d af

    ter a

    ccou

    ntin

    g fo

    r no

    n-O

    PEC

    oil.

    The

    se ch

    ange

    s the

    n se

    t the

    stag

    e for

    the b

    ig cr

    ash

    of 1

    986,

    w

    hich

    had

    , str

    ange

    ly en

    ough

    , occ

    urre

    d in

    less

    than

    two

    mon

    ths a

    fter I

    ran

    had

    take

    n th

    e Ira

    qi p

    ort o

    f Faw

    follo

    wing

    a su

    rpris

    e maj

    or o

    ffens

    ive.

    At th

    e tim

    e, th

    e Sau

    dis r

    emai

    ned

    very

    conc

    erne

    d ab

    out t

    he fa

    te o

    f Ira

    q, w

    hich

    in a

    se

    nse w

    as co

    nnec

    ted

    to th

    eir o

    wn

    fate

    . G

    ener

    ally

    spea

    king

    , whi

    le al

    l OPE

    C m

    embe

    rs su

    ffere

    d fr

    om th

    e dec

    lin-

    ing

    oil m

    arke

    t and

    of t

    he S

    audi

    pol

    icies

    , the

    Isla

    mic

    Repu

    blic

    was i

    mpa

    cted

    th

    e mos

    t. In

    the w

    ords

    of I

    ran'

    s Dep

    uty

    Fore

    ign

    Min

    ister

    , the

    Sau

    dis'

    polic

    y de

    alt a

    'sev

    ere b

    low

    to O

    PEC'

    and

    the K

    ingd

    om w

    as 'g

    uilty

    of t

    he g

    reat

    est

    trea

    son

    ever

    com

    mitt

    ed ag

    ains

    t the

    oppr

    esse

    d an

    d de

    priv

    ed co

    untr

    ies .

    ..'.

    17

    The

    Rep

    ublic

    was

    invo

    lved

    in a

    war

    for

    whi

    ch it

    had

    no

    inte

    rnat

    iona

    l

  • 144

    Iran

    and

    the

    Arab

    Wor

    ld

    supp

    ort a

    nd ha

    d inh

    erite

    d an e

    cono

    my t

    hat w

    as in

    deep

    crisi

    s and

    high

    ly

    depe

    nden

    t on

    oil r

    even

    ue. M

    oreo

    ver,

    the S

    audi

    pol

    icie

    s wer

    e not

    just

    desig

    ned t

    o 'cri

    pple

    the I

    slam

    ic reg

    ime e

    cono

    mica

    lly' b

    ut al

    so to

    stren

    gthe

    n its

    enem

    y, Ira

    q. Th

    e Sau

    dis w

    ere 'fi

    nanc

    ing I

    raq's

    war e

    ffort'

    from

    the s

    tart

    and i

    n a va

    riety

    of w

    ays,

    inclu

    ding

    unila

    teral

    trans

    fers

    in ca

    sh an

    d in k

    ind,

    cred

    it ar

    rang

    emen

    ts, an

    d loa

    ns. 1

    8 In

    a sin

    gle y

    ear i

    n 19

    81, f

    or in

    stanc

    e, Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a, alo

    ng w

    ith K

    uwait

    , Qata

    r, an

    d th

    e Uni

    ted A

    rab

    Emira

    tes,

    `pro

    vide

    d Iraq

    with

    fina

    ncial

    assis

    tance

    , in t

    he fo

    rm of

    an in

    teres

    t free

    loan

    of

    $30,0

    00 m

    illion

    ' . To

    achi

    eve m

    axim

    um de

    struc

    tive e

    ffect,

    the S

    audi

    polic

    y was

    also

    coor

    -di

    nated

    with

    the U

    nited

    Stat

    es' d

    estab

    ilisin

    g ca

    mpa

    igns

    and

    econ

    omic

    sanc

    tions

    again

    st th

    e Isla

    mic

    Gove

    rnm

    ent i

    n the

    after

    math

    of th

    e Am

    erica

    n ho

    stage

    dram

    a in T

    ehra

    n. Fo

    r exa

    mpl

    e, on

    5 Ju

    ne 19

    84, a

    Sau

    di F

    -15 s

    hot

    down

    an Ir

    anian

    F-4

    Pha

    ntom

    , an

    even

    t whi

    ch, a

    ccor

    ding

    to E

    lizab

    eth

    Gam

    len, h

    appe

    ned a

    s 'A

    dire

    ct co

    nseq

    uenc

    e' of

    the S

    audi

    air c

    over

    by 'th

    e US

    oper

    ated a

    nd co

    ntro

    lled A

    WAC

    S.' 2°

    Ira

    n was

    perh

    aps f

    ortu

    nate

    that

    the o

    il pr

    ice cr

    ash o

    f 198

    6 was

    equa

    lly

    harm

    ful t

    o the

    Ame

    rican

    oil i

    ndus

    try in

    Tex

    as. A

    s a re

    sult,

    and a

    ccor

    ding t

    o Ja

    mes

    Bill

    , 'Ira

    n's an

    d Am

    erica

    's in

    teres

    ts co

    nver

    ged o

    n thi

    s iss

    ue'. 2

    1 The

    US

    then

    pre

    ssur

    ed th

    e Sau

    dis t

    o sig

    n an

    agre

    emen

    t with

    Iran

    on

    lowe

    r pr

    oduc

    tion

    and

    stabi

    lise o

    il pr

    ices a

    t $18

    per

    bar

    rel i

    n Au

    gust

    1986

    . The

    Ne

    w Yo

    rk T

    imes

    wa

    s blu

    nt ab

    out t

    his U

    S ap

    proa

    ch to

    the S

    audi

    s: In

    the S

    prin

    g of

    198

    6, G

    eorg

    e Bus

    h tra

    veled

    to S

    audi

    Ara

    bia t

    o pl

    ead

    with

    the

    wor

    ld's

    bigg

    est o

    il ex

    porte

    r to

    stop

    flood

    ing

    the

    mar

    ket.

    Mr.

    Bush

    told

    the S

    audi

    s tha

    t the

    ir ov

    erpr

    oduc

    tion,

    by dr

    ivin

    g dow

    n the

    pr

    ice, w

    as je

    opar

    dizin

    g the

    Am

    erica

    n oil

    indu

    stry,

    in tu

    rn un

    derm

    inin

    g th

    e nati

    on's

    econ

    omic

    stren

    gth a

    nd se

    curit

    y.22

    The S

    audi

    s also

    cam

    e und

    er p

    ress

    ure f

    rom

    oth

    er O

    PEC

    and

    non-

    OPEC

    pr

    oduc

    ers,

    notab

    ly E

    gypt

    , whi

    ch w

    as al

    so su

    fferin

    g fro

    m lo

    wer o

    il pr

    ices

    and l

    oss o

    f oil

    reve

    nue.

    Saud

    i Arab

    ia co

    ntin

    ued t

    o und

    ermin

    e the

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic in

    the p

    eriod

    fo

    llowi

    ng th

    e Iran

    —Ira

    q war.

    As w

    as w

    idely

    repor

    ted in

    the

    New

    York

    Tim

    es,

    along

    with

    Kuw

    ait, th

    e Unit

    ed A

    rab E

    mirat

    es, Q

    atar a

    nd Ir

    aq, th

    e King

    dom

    stepp

    ed up

    its o

    il pr

    oduc

    tion a

    lmos

    t imm

    ediat

    ely af

    ter th

    e cea

    sefir

    e betw

    een

    Iran a

    nd Ir

    aq on

    20 A

    ugus

    t 198

    8.23

    By ea

    rly O

    ctobe

    r, Sa

    udi p

    rodu

    ction

    had

    reac

    hed

    5.7

    mb/

    d, w

    ell ab

    ove i

    ts OP

    EC q

    uota

    of 4

    .3 m

    b/d.

    The

    Sau

    dis

    claim

    ed th

    at th

    ey w

    ere p

    rotec

    ting t

    heir

    mar

    ket s

    hare

    from

    Iran

    's po

    ssib

    le in

    cursi

    on, a

    pre

    text t

    hat s

    oon

    beca

    me u

    nten

    able.

    The

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic co

    ntin

    ued t

    o pro

    duce

    at le

    ss th

    an it

    s OPE

    C qu

    ota o

    f 2.4

    mb/

    d thr

    ough

    out

    1988

    .

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irah

    mad

    i 14

    5

    Mea

    nwhil

    e, the

    Sau

    di Go

    vern

    ment

    and i

    ts all

    ies in

    Arab

    OPE

    C rai

    sed t

    he

    ques

    tion o

    f pro

    ducti

    on pa

    rity b

    etwee

    n Iran

    and I

    raq as

    a co

    nditi

    on fo

    r a ne

    w OP

    EC ac

    cord

    on pr

    ice an

    d pro

    ducti

    on. T

    his w

    as ra

    ther

    an un

    fair

    dem

    and,

    since

    Iraq

    's sh

    are h

    ad al

    way

    s bee

    n lo

    wer

    and

    Iran

    has a

    muc

    h bi

    gger

    ec

    onom

    y and

    a po

    pulat

    ion fo

    ur ti

    mes l

    arger

    than t

    hat o

    f Iraq

    . Nev

    erthe

    less,

    after

    an in

    itial

    perio

    d of r

    esist

    ance

    , Iran

    gave

    in, o

    nly to

    find

    that

    the S

    audis

    ha

    d ano

    ther

    plan

    in th

    eir ba

    g: al

    mos

    t im

    med

    iately

    the K

    ingd

    om at

    tempt

    ed

    to sa

    botag

    e the

    OPE

    C ag

    reem

    ent b

    y co

    nditi

    onin

    g its

    impl

    emen

    tatio

    n to

    se

    ttlin

    g cer

    tain p

    oliti

    cal d

    isput

    es be

    twee

    n itse

    lf an

    d the

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic.

    To ba

    ck up

    this

    new

    dema

    nd, th

    e Sau

    dis th

    reaten

    ed to

    lowe

    r the

    ir oil

    price

    s, a p

    ositi

    on th

    at on

    ly le

    d to

    wid

    espr

    ead

    prot

    est b

    y ot

    her m

    embe

    rs of

    the

    orga

    nisa

    tion.

    24 Th

    e Sau

    dis'

    anti-

    Isla

    mic

    Rep

    ublic

    pol

    icie

    s did

    not

    alw

    ays g

    o un

    an-

    swer

    ed. T

    o con

    front

    the S

    audi

    s in O

    PEC,

    Iran

    tried

    , som

    etim

    es su

    cces

    s-fu

    lly, t

    o crea

    te a u

    nited

    fron

    t with

    the '

    radica

    l stat

    es' w

    ithin

    OPE

    C (A

    lgeri

    a an

    d Lib

    ya).

    The I

    slam

    ic Go

    vern

    men

    t was

    also

    succ

    essfu

    l in a

    pply

    ing,

    at tim

    es, a

    n agg

    ress

    ive p

    ricin

    g stra

    tegy i

    n spo

    t mar

    kets

    and i

    n mak

    ing e

    xten

    -siv

    e bart

    er de

    als w

    ith E

    aster

    n Eur

    opea

    n nati

    ons.

    In 19

    82, f

    or ex

    ample

    , Iran

    an

    noun

    ced t

    hree

    succ

    essiv

    e pric

    e-cu

    ts in

    less

    than

    thre

    e wee

    ks an

    d its

    oil

    price

    was

    betw

    een $

    4 and

    $5 lo

    wer t

    han t

    he pr

    ice fo

    r com

    parab

    le Sa

    udi o

    il.

    Even

    the U

    nited

    Stat

    es, w

    ho ha

    d onc

    e boy

    cotte

    d Iran

    ian oi

    l, too

    k adv

    antag

    e of

    the s

    ituati

    on an

    d pur

    chas

    ed th

    e che

    ap Ir

    anian

    oil t

    o buil

    d up i

    ts res

    erves

    . It

    seem

    ed as

    if th

    e Rep

    ublic

    had a

    desig

    n to p

    araly

    se th

    e 'Sa

    udi O

    PEC'

    . In

    resp

    onse

    to Ir

    an's

    price

    -cut

    s, th

    e Sau

    dis s

    urpr

    ised e

    very

    one i

    n the

    oil

    mar

    ket w

    hen t

    hey o

    ffere

    d to c

    ut th

    eir pr

    oduc

    tion i

    n ord

    er to

    boos

    t pric

    es.

    But I

    ran d

    id no

    t giv

    e in a

    nd th

    e cou

    ntry

    's oi

    l rev

    enue

    incr

    ease

    d in i

    ts po

    st-rev

    olutio

    nary

    peak

    s in 1

    982 a

    nd 19

    83 ($

    20 bi

    llion

    and $

    20.4

    billio

    n res

    pec-

    tivel

    y). I

    t mus

    t be n

    oted

    , how

    ever

    , tha

    t at t

    he ti

    me,

    Iran

    was

    mak

    ing

    prog

    ress

    in th

    e war

    , a de

    velo

    pmen

    t tha

    t was

    clos

    ely w

    atche

    d by t

    he S

    audi

    G

    over

    nmen

    t. It

    was

    not

    , how

    ever

    , unt

    il Ira

    n ha

    d re

    take

    n th

    e City

    of

    Khor

    ram

    shah

    r fro

    m th

    e occ

    upyi

    ng Ir

    aqis

    on 24

    May

    1982

    that

    the S

    audi

    s to

    ok th

    e Isla

    mic

    Repu

    blic

    serio

    usly

    . Su

    rpris

    ed by

    the s

    udde

    n Iran

    ian su

    cces

    s in t

    he w

    ar, th

    e Sau

    dis pa

    nicke

    d, of

    ferin

    g Ira

    n luc

    rativ

    e com

    pens

    ation

    for w

    ar da

    mag

    e and

    coop

    erati

    on in

    re

    gion

    al af

    fairs

    . The

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic wa

    s, ho

    weve

    r, in

    a to

    tally

    diffe

    rent

    m

    ood.

    Con

    fiden

    t of i

    ts ne

    wfou

    nd m

    ilitar

    y po

    wer a

    nd as

    sure

    d by

    its i

    n-cr

    ease

    d oi

    l rev

    enue

    , the

    Rep

    ublic

    had

    dec

    ided

    to co

    ntin

    ue th

    e war

    unt

    il Sa

    ddam

    Hus

    sein

    was

    ove

    rthro

    wn an

    d its

    allie

    s pun

    ished

    . In

    Ayato

    llah

    Khom

    eini's

    wor

    ds, `

    Jang

    , jan

    g to r

    at.' a

    Fitn

    ah' (W

    ar, w

    ar un

    til th

    e rem

    oval

    of th

    e plot

    ). Ira

    n reb

    uffed

    a se

    cond

    Sau

    di me

    diatio

    n to e

    nd th

    e war

    .whe

    n in

    May

    1985

    the S

    audi

    . Fore

    ign M

    inist

    er tr

    avell

    ed to

    Teh

    ran o

    n beh

    alf of

    the

  • 146

    Iran

    and

    the

    Ara

    b W

    orld

    Islam

    ic Co

    nfer

    ence

    Org

    anisa

    tion

    (ICO)

    and

    the G

    ulf C

    oope

    ratio

    n Co

    uncil

    (G

    CC).

    Mea

    nwhi

    le, t

    he R

    epub

    lic's

    polic

    y to

    war

    d Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a, as

    dec

    lare

    d by

    M

    oham

    mad

    Gha

    razi,

    then

    Iran

    ian O

    il M

    inist

    er, w

    ould

    cons

    ist o

    f 'iso

    latin

    g Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a, co

    mpe

    lling

    her

    to b

    ehav

    e as o

    ne m

    embe

    r am

    ongs

    t oth

    ers'.

    Bu

    t, he

    cont

    inue

    d, 'O

    ur st

    rugg

    le wi

    th R

    iyad

    h wi

    ll no

    t tak

    e plac

    e on

    the o

    il m

    arke

    t, it

    is a p

    oliti

    cal s

    trugg

    le. O

    nce S

    adda

    m H

    usse

    in h

    as fa

    llen,

    man

    y pr

    oblem

    s will

    be r

    esol

    ved.

    ' 25 In

    retro

    spec

    t, th

    is pr

    oved

    wish

    ful t

    hink

    ing

    on

    the p

    art o

    f the

    lead

    ersh

    ip in

    Teh

    ran,

    who

    coul

    d no

    t see

    the l

    arge

    r pol

    itica

    l ec

    onom

    y of t

    he M

    iddl

    e Eas

    t and

    its p

    lace w

    ithin

    the c

    apita

    list w

    orld

    syste

    m.

    As i

    s wel

    l-kno

    wn

    by n

    ow, t

    he•U

    nite

    d St

    ates

    inte

    rven

    ed in

    the w

    ar o

    n th

    e sid

    e of I

    raq,

    initi

    ally c

    reati

    ng a

    stalem

    ate, t

    hen f

    orcin

    g the

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic in

    to a

    situa

    tion

    wher

    e it h

    ad to

    acce

    pt a

    less t

    han

    optim

    al co

    nditi

    on to

    end

    the w

    ar. T

    he Is

    lamic

    leade

    rship

    had

    ende

    d th

    e hos

    tage d

    ram

    a in

    an ex

    actly

    sim

    ilar f

    ashi

    on.

    IDEO

    LOGI

    CAL

    AND

    CULT

    URAL

    FA

    CTO

    RS

    The f

    act t

    hat t

    he S

    audi

    s con

    tinue

    d to u

    nder

    min

    e the

    Islam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic in

    the

    perio

    d fo

    llowi

    ng th

    e cea

    sefir

    e betw

    een

    Iran

    and

    Iraq

    indi

    cated

    fund

    amen

    tal

    disa

    gree

    men

    ts be

    twee

    n th

    e two

    regi

    mes

    ove

    r the

    ir id

    eolo

    gica

    l and

    cultu

    ral

    orien

    tation

    s. In

    parti

    cular

    , Iran

    —Sa

    udi r

    ivalry

    over

    religi

    ous l

    egiti

    macy

    prov

    ed

    tenac

    ious

    and

    dam

    agin

    g to

    bot

    h sid

    es. W

    hile

    the I

    slam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic co

    nsid

    -er

    ed th

    e Sau

    dis'

    Vaha

    bism

    as an

    'Am

    erica

    n br

    and

    of Is

    lam', t

    he K

    ingd

    om

    was v

    ery

    hosti

    le to

    the r

    evol

    utio

    nary

    spiri

    t of A

    yato

    llah

    Khom

    eini's

    Islam

    . Th

    is id

    eolo

    gica

    l div

    ision

    had

    ove

    rsha

    dow

    ed th

    e tra

    ditio

    nal S

    hia—

    Sunn

    i di

    visio

    n be

    twee

    n th

    e two

    coun

    tries

    . The

    Islam

    ic re

    gim

    e in

    Tehr

    an w

    as al

    so

    inim

    ical t

    o th

    e Sau

    dis f

    or th

    eir cl

    ose f

    riend

    ship

    with

    the U

    S. T

    his r

    elatio

    n-sh

    ip w

    as co

    nsid

    ered

    una

    ccep

    table

    since

    the S

    audi

    s wer

    e de

    fact

    o gu

    ardi

    ans

    of Is

    lam's

    holie

    st pl

    aces

    , Mec

    ca in

    par

    ticul

    ar.

    Sign

    ifica

    nt cu

    ltura

    l and

    nat

    iona

    listic

    diff

    eren

    ces a

    lso d

    ivid

    e the

    two

    natio

    ns. S

    hi'is

    m in

    Iran

    is cl

    osely

    iden

    tified

    with

    Iran

    ian n

    ation

    alism

    whi

    le th

    e Vah

    abi S

    unni

    sm p

    rovi

    des l

    egiti

    mac

    y to

    the S

    audi

    s' ve

    rsio

    n of

    Ara

    b na

    tiona

    lism

    . The

    Ara

    b cu

    lture

    is p

    redo

    min

    antly

    Islam

    ic, w

    hile

    that

    of Ir

    an

    is a m

    ixtu

    re o

    f its

    pre-

    Isla

    mic

    Zor

    oastr

    ian

    and

    Isla

    mic

    cultu

    res.

    The t

    wo

    natio

    ns al

    so sp

    eak

    diffe

    rent

    lang

    uage

    s, ha

    ve d

    iffer

    ent c

    alend

    ar y

    ears,

    and

    celeb

    rate

    diffe

    rent

    holid

    ays.

    Their

    food

    , mus

    ic an

    d dre

    ss ar

    e also

    diss

    imila

    r. Th

    ese a

    nd ot

    her d

    iffer

    ence

    s hav

    e res

    ulted

    in di

    fferin

    g nati

    onal

    iden

    tities

    and

    natio

    nalis

    tic p

    urpo

    ses a

    nd ri

    valri

    es. T

    hus,

    it is

    no w

    onde

    r tha

    t the

    Iraq

    i

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irah

    mad

    i 14

    7

    lead

    ersh

    ip sh

    ould

    justi

    fy it

    s inv

    asio

    n of

    Iran

    in te

    rms o

    f 'Pe

    rsia

    n ra

    cism

    ', `P

    ersia

    n co

    loni

    alism

    ' and

    'Per

    sian

    expa

    nsio

    nism

    '. Th

    e Sau

    dis a

    lso ec

    hoed

    sim

    ilar v

    oice

    s and

    acted

    acco

    rdin

    gly.

    For

    exam

    -pl

    e, lik

    e the

    Iraq

    is, th

    ey ca

    ll th

    e Per

    sian G

    ulf t

    he 'A

    rab G

    ulf'

    and t

    he Ir

    anian

    K

    huzi

    stan

    prov

    ince

    , is k

    now

    n to

    them

    as A

    rabi

    stan'.

    The

    y al

    so ac

    cuse

    d Ira

    n fo

    r its

    'racis

    t' and

    'exp

    ansio

    nist'

    pol

    icy fo

    r the

    war

    with

    Iraq

    , ign

    orin

    g th

    e fac

    t tha

    t the

    Iraq

    i lea

    dersh

    ip w

    as ag

    gres

    sive a

    nd ex

    pans

    ioni

    st by

    desig

    n an

    d id

    eolo

    gy. W

    orst

    yet,

    they

    supp

    orted

    Iraq

    's ter

    ritor

    ial cl

    aim ag

    ainst

    Iran

    and h

    elped

    the I

    raqi

    regi

    me t

    o dism

    embe

    r the

    coun

    try du

    ring t

    he-w

    ar. T

    his

    Saud

    i pos

    ition

    rem

    ains u

    ncha

    nged

    des

    pite

    Iran's

    prin

    cipled

    stan

    d ag

    ainst

    Iraq's

    inva

    sion

    of K

    uwait

    and

    its su

    ppor

    t for

    the a

    nti-I

    raqi

    coali

    tion.

    Iron

    i-ca

    lly, K

    uwait

    also

    took

    a sim

    ilar p

    ositi

    on, a

    polic

    y tha

    t bac

    kfire

    d two

    year

    s lat

    er w

    hen

    Iraq

    inva

    ded

    Kuwa

    it.

    The i

    deol

    ogica

    l con

    front

    ation

    in th

    e con

    text o

    f cul

    tura

    l diff

    eren

    ces g

    radu

    -all

    y tu

    rned

    into

    pol

    itica

    l con

    front

    ation

    betw

    een

    the t

    wo re

    gim

    es o

    n m

    any

    front

    s. Th

    e Rep

    ublic

    attem

    pted

    to ex

    port

    its re

    volu

    tion

    to th

    e neig

    hbou

    ring

    state

    s and

    beg

    in su

    ppor

    ting

    anti-

    gove

    rnm

    ent a

    nd S

    hia m

    ovem

    ents

    in th

    e Ar

    ab w

    orld

    , inc

    ludi

    ng S

    audi

    Ara

    bia.

    The S

    audi

    s res

    pond

    ed by

    assis

    ting I

    raq

    in it

    s war

    again

    st Ira

    n and

    by im

    posin

    g res

    tricti

    ons o

    n Ira

    nian

    pilg

    rims.

    The

    two c

    ount

    ries a

    lso to

    ok th

    eir st

    rugg

    le to

    Afg

    hani

    stan,

    wher

    e the

    y sup

    porte

    d riv

    al m

    ujah

    edin

    gro

    ups f

    ight

    ing

    the c

    entra

    l gov

    ernm

    ent a

    nd th

    e Sov

    iet

    Unio

    n. Th

    e Sau

    dis a

    lso fi

    nanc

    ed ce

    rtain

    Iran

    ian op

    posit

    ion g

    roup

    s and

    back

    ed at

    lea

    st on

    e co

    up p

    lan to

    ove

    rthro

    w th

    e Isla

    mic

    Repu

    blic.

    Thu

    s, ac

    cord

    ing

    to

    Sam

    uel S

    egev

    (a fo

    rmer

    Isra

    eli in

    tellig

    ence

    offi

    cial),

    at le

    ast f

    our g

    over

    n-m

    ents

    were

    coop

    erati

    ng in

    the p

    lanni

    ng o

    f a c

    oup

    to ov

    erth

    row

    the I

    slam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic in

    198

    2. T

    he p

    lan,

    whi

    ch ai

    med

    at re

    storin

    g th

    e thr

    one f

    or th

    e Sh

    ah's

    son,

    was

    org

    anise

    d by

    Isra

    eli ar

    ms m

    erch

    ants

    and

    the t

    hen

    Defe

    nce

    Min

    ister

    Arie

    l Sha

    ron,

    fina

    nced

    by

    the

    Saud

    i Gov

    ernm

    ent (

    at so

    me

    $800

    mill

    ion)

    , bac

    ked b

    y the

    CIA

    (und

    er th

    e dire

    ctorsh

    ip of

    Will

    iam C

    asey

    ), an

    d bas

    ed in

    the S

    udan

    unde

    r the

    lead

    ersh

    ip of

    Ja`fa

    r Num

    eiri.

    The p

    lot w

    as

    canc

    elled

    beca

    use o

    f the

    chan

    ge in

    gove

    rnm

    ent i

    n Isra

    el af

    ter th

    e mas

    sacr

    e at

    the S

    abra

    and

    Shati

    la Pa

    lestin

    ian re

    fuge

    e cam

    ps.2

    6 Th

    e mos

    t im

    porta

    nt p

    oliti

    cal c

    onfro

    ntati

    on b

    etwee

    n th

    e two

    state

    s, ho

    w-ev

    er, t

    ook

    plac

    e on

    the

    stree

    ts of

    Mec

    ca. A

    yato

    llah

    Kho

    mei

    ni h

    ad o

    n va

    rious

    occ

    asio

    ns ca

    lled

    for t

    he S

    audi

    peo

    ple t

    o ris

    e up

    again

    st th

    eir le

    ad-

    ersh

    ip, b

    ut su

    ch c

    alls

    alm

    ost a

    lway

    s fel

    l on

    deaf

    ear

    s: th

    ere

    was

    one

    ex

    cept

    ion.

    In N

    ovem

    ber o

    f 197

    9, a

    grou

    p of

    seve

    ral h

    undr

    ed re

    ligio

    us

    peop

    le, m

    ost a

    llege

    dly

    Shia,

    seize

    d th

    e Gra

    nd M

    osqu

    e in

    Mec

    ca to

    forc

    e ch

    ange

    s on t

    he S

    audi

    king

    . The

    y wer

    e qui

    ckly

    and m

    ercil

    essly

    subd

    ued a

    nd

  • 148

    Iran

    and

    the A

    rab

    Wor

    ld

    destr

    oyed

    by th

    e Sau

    di po

    lice a

    nd tr

    oops

    . Ira

    n alle

    ged t

    hat A

    mer

    ican t

    roop

    s an

    d ad

    vise

    rs ha

    d he

    lped

    in th

    e ope

    ratio

    n.

    Iran

    then

    trie

    d to

    mak

    e ha

    jj (th

    e ann

    ual M

    uslim

    pilg

    rimag

    e to

    Mec

    ca)

    into

    a re

    ligio

    us—

    polit

    ical e

    vent

    and

    to p

    oliti

    cise p

    ilgrim

    age.

    Each

    yea

    r the

    ha

    jj br

    ings

    a lar

    ge n

    umbe

    r of M

    uslim

    s to

    Mec

    ca in

    ord

    er to

    show

    solid

    arity

    an

    d com

    mon

    purp

    ose.

    View

    ing t

    he ri

    tual

    as a

    polit

    ical—

    relig

    ious

    even

    t, th

    e la

    te A

    yato

    llah

    Kho

    mei

    ni u

    rged

    pilg

    rims t

    o ho

    ld an

    ti-A

    mer

    ican

    and

    anti-

    impe

    rialis

    t pol

    itica

    l dem

    onstr

    ation

    s in

    the n

    ame o

    f bar

    a'at

    az m

    oshr

    ekee

    n (li

    bera

    tion

    from

    infid

    els)

    . The

    Sau

    dis d

    isput

    ed th

    is in

    terp

    reta

    tion

    and

    re-

    spon

    ded b

    y add

    ing n

    ew re

    strict

    ions

    on Ir

    anian

    pilg

    rims,

    resu

    lting

    in cl

    ashe

    s in

    seve

    ral y

    ears

    that

    left a

    few

    Irani

    ans d

    ead.

    The

    hajj

    conf

    ront

    ation

    reac

    hed

    its cl

    imax

    on

    31 Ju

    ly 1

    987,

    whe

    n Sa

    udi t

    roop

    s kill

    ed so

    me 4

    50 Ir

    ania

    n pi

    lgrim

    s dur

    ing

    a pol

    itica

    l rall

    y.

    Shoc

    ked b

    y the

    even

    t, th

    e late

    Aya

    tolla

    h blam

    ed th

    e US

    and d

    eclar

    ed th

    at th

    e Sau

    dis w

    ere I

    ran's

    num

    ber o

    ne en

    emy,

    alth

    ough

    Iran

    at th

    e tim

    e was

    in

    the m

    idst

    of it

    s war

    with

    Iraq

    . Afte

    r som

    e pol

    itica

    l man

    oeuv

    ring,

    Iran

    ians

    were

    bann

    ed fr

    om pi

    lgrim

    age i

    n 198

    9 and

    the w

    ar of

    wor

    ds be

    twee

    n the

    two

    regi

    mes

    reac

    hed

    a new

    leve

    l of h

    ostil

    ity. T

    he S

    audi

    s had

    alre

    ady

    brok

    en

    dipl

    omati

    c rela

    tions

    with

    Iran

    in A

    pril

    1988

    . The

    lead

    ersh

    ip in

    Teh

    ran

    also

    bega

    n ca

    lling

    Sau

    di A

    rabi

    a by

    its o

    ld n

    ame,

    Hijaz

    , im

    plyi

    ng th

    at th

    e Hou

    se

    of S

    aud

    did

    not h

    ave t

    he le

    gitim

    acy

    to ru

    le in

    the b

    irthp

    lace o

    f Isla

    m.

    THE

    PERS

    IAN

    GULF

    FAC

    TOR

    The I

    rani

    an—

    Saud

    i Ara

    bian

    tens

    ion

    also

    refle

    cts th

    e two

    coun

    tries

    ' clai

    ms

    over

    the

    lead

    ersh

    ip o

    f the

    Per

    sian

    Gul

    f and

    its s

    ecur

    ity. I

    ran

    has l

    ong

    cons

    ider

    ed it

    self

    a lea

    der i

    n the

    Per

    sian G

    ulf,

    a clai

    m th

    at is

    large

    ly ju

    stifie

    d. It

    is th

    e lar

    gest

    coun

    try in

    the G

    ulf a

    rea w

    ith a

    popu

    latio

    n al

    mos

    t sev

    en

    times

    that

    of S

    audi

    Ara

    bia.

    Iran

    also

    has

    the l

    onge

    st co

    astli

    ne w

    ith th

    e Pe

    rsian

    Gul

    f com

    pare

    d to a

    ny G

    ulf s

    tate i

    nclu

    ding

    Sau

    di A

    rabi

    a. M

    oreo

    ver,

    Iran

    owns

    man

    y isl

    ands

    in th

    e Gul

    f, in

    cludi

    ng Q

    eshm

    , the

    larg

    est o

    ne, a

    nd

    cont

    rols

    the S

    trait

    of H

    orm

    uz, t

    he P

    ersia

    n G

    ulf's

    mos

    t stra

    tegi

    c poi

    nt an

    d th

    e Sau

    dis'

    maj

    or o

    il ex

    ports

    out

    let.

    It is

    corre

    ct, t

    here

    fore

    , tha

    t the

    Gul

    f sh

    ould

    be c

    alled

    (and

    reco

    gnize

    d in

    terna

    tiona

    lly as

    ) the

    Per

    sian

    Gulf.

    His-

    toric

    ally,

    too,

    Iran h

    as of

    ten be

    en th

    e stro

    nges

    t stat

    e and

    a lea

    der i

    n the

    area

    . In

    deed

    , eve

    n du

    ring

    its g

    olde

    n da

    ys, t

    he O

    ttom

    an E

    mpi

    re w

    as u

    nabl

    e to

    subo

    rdin

    ate Ir

    an, w

    hich

    rem

    ained

    stro

    ng an

    d in

    depe

    nden

    t. Th

    e Sau

    dis a

    lso co

    nsid

    er th

    emse

    lves

    a lea

    der i

    n th

    e Ara

    b Gu

    lf sta

    tes, a

    cla

    im th

    at wa

    s leg

    itim

    ated i

    n the

    after

    math

    of th

    eir in

    volv

    emen

    t in t

    he 19

    62

    civil

    war i

    n Ye

    men

    and

    its n

    egot

    iated

    conc

    lusio

    n in

    196

    8. S

    audi

    Ara

    bia i

    s

    Hoo

    shan

    g Am

    irahm

    adi

    149

    also t

    he la

    rges

    t am

    ong t

    he st

    ates i

    n the

    Ara

    bian

    Pen

    insu

    la an

    d has

    by fa

    r the

    gr

    eates

    t eco

    nom

    ic po

    wer t

    here

    . It s

    its o

    n so

    me 6

    6 bi

    llion

    bar

    rels

    of p

    rove

    n oi

    l res

    erve

    s, a s

    ourc

    e tha

    t the

    Sau

    dis h

    ave t

    ried

    to u

    se si

    nce t

    he se

    llers

    ' m

    arke

    t in

    the 1

    970s

    to d

    omin

    ate re

    gion

    al po

    litics

    . Yet,

    com

    pare

    d to

    Iran

    , Ira

    q, S

    yria

    and

    Egyp

    t, Sa

    udi A

    rabi

    a see

    ms s

    till t

    o re

    main

    a m

    inor

    forc

    e in

    the r

    egio

    n, th

    eir va

    st oi

    l wea

    lth no

    twith

    stand

    ing.

    The S

    audi

    s are

    parti

    cular

    ly

    weak

    mili

    tarily

    and

    polit

    ically

    , a fa

    ct wh

    ich w

    as w

    ell-d

    emon

    strate

    d by

    the

    Kuwa

    it cr

    isis.

    They

    had t

    o call

    upon

    the U

    S to

    com

    e to t

    heir

    defe

    nce w

    hen

    Sadd

    am H

    usse

    in's

    arm

    y to

    ok o

    ver K

    uwai

    t. Th

    e pol

    itica

    l pow

    er o

    f its

    oil

    wealt

    h ha

    s also

    pro

    ven

    weak

    in th

    e 198

    0s b

    uyer

    s' m

    arke

    t. Ho

    weve

    r, wh

    at ha

    s em

    bold

    ened

    the S

    audi

    s in

    rece

    nt y

    ears

    is th

    e spe

    cial

    relat

    ion

    that

    they

    hav

    e dev

    elope

    d wi

    th th

    e Uni

    ted S

    tates

    , par

    ticul

    arly

    sinc

    e th

    e Rev

    olut

    ion

    in Ir

    an. T

    he A

    mer

    ican

    inte

    rest

    in S

    audi

    Ara

    bia o

    rigin

    ally

    gr

    ew w

    hen

    the

    coun

    try e

    mer

    ged

    as a

    forc

    e fo

    r mod

    erat

    ion

    durin

    g th

    e pa

    rticip

    ation

    neg

    otiat

    ions

    (whi

    ch in

    crea

    sed

    owne

    rship

    of t

    he o

    il sta

    tes in

    up

    strea

    m p

    rodu

    ction

    to a

    majo

    rity

    shar

    e) an

    d du

    ring

    the T

    ehra

    n ne

    gotia

    -tio

    ns (f

    ollo

    wing

    whi

    ch oi

    l pric

    es qu

    adru

    pled

    in 19

    74).

    In su

    bseq

    uent

    year

    s, th

    e Sau

    dis b

    ecam

    e a m

    oder

    ating

    forc

    e with

    in O

    PEC

    and a

    trus

    ted fr

    iend o

    f th

    e Wes

    t. Sa

    udi m

    oder

    ation

    and o

    il we

    alth a

    lso as

    sisted

    the s

    tate i

    n gain

    ing

    cred

    ibili

    ty as

    an in

    term

    ediar

    y in

    a re

    gion

    torn

    by

    extre

    mist

    s, co

    nflic

    ts an

    d po

    verty

    . The

    Am

    erica

    n—Sa

    udi s

    pecia

    l rela

    tion

    reac

    hed

    a tur

    ning

    -poi

    nt in

    th

    e afte

    rmath

    of t

    he Ir

    anian

    Rev

    olut

    ion.

    The

    anti-

    Amer

    ican

    and

    anti-

    Saud

    i sta

    nd of

    the I

    slam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic be

    cam

    e a un

    ifyin

    g fac

    tor b

    etwee

    n the

    US

    and

    Saud

    i Ara

    bia.

    Mea

    nwhi

    le, d

    irect

    US in

    volv

    emen

    t in

    the P

    ersia

    n Gu

    lf in

    crea

    sed

    in th

    e af

    term

    ath of

    the S

    hah's

    depa

    rture

    , whi

    ch co

    incid

    ed w

    ith th

    e Sov

    iet U

    nion

    's in

    terv

    entio

    n in

    Afg

    hani

    stan.

    The

    Sha

    h's d

    epar

    ture

    had

    mad

    e the

    'Nix

    on

    Doc

    trine

    ' larg

    ely

    obso

    lete

    and

    crea

    ted

    new

    secu

    rity

    conc

    ern

    for t

    he U

    S.

    Thes

    e dev

    elop

    men

    ts al

    so p

    rom

    pted

    the C

    arte

    r adm

    inist

    ratio

    n in

    198

    0 to

    de

    clare

    the M

    iddl

    e Eas

    t an

    area

    'vita

    l' to

    Amer

    ican

    inter

    ests,

    a de

    clara

    tion

    that

    beca

    me k

    nown

    as th

    e Car

    ter D

    octri

    ne.

    Acc

    ordi

    ngly

    , the

    US

    expr

    esse

    d its

    will

    ingn

    ess t

    o ta

    ke m

    ilita

    ry ac

    tion

    again

    st 'an

    y ou

    tside

    forc

    e to

    gain

    cont

    rol' o

    f the

    Per

    sian

    Gulf.

    " Alre

    ady

    in

    1979

    and

    follo

    wing

    the t

    akeo

    ver o

    f the

    Am

    erica

    n Em

    bass

    y in

    Teh

    ran

    by

    radi

    cal M

    uslim

    stud

    ents,

    the P

    entag

    on h

    ad an

    noun

    ced

    the f

    orm

    ation

    of t

    he

    Rapi

    d De

    ploy

    men

    t Joi

    nt T

    ask

    Forc

    e (of

    som

    e 100

    000

    mar

    ines

    ). Th

    is wa

    s lat

    er ex

    pand

    ed in

    to th

    e US

    Cent

    ral C

    omm

    and,

    whi

    ch ai

    med

    at o

    rgan

    ising

    th

    e Per

    sian

    Gulf

    Arab

    state

    s int

    o a U

    S-led

    mili

    tary

    allian

    ce.

    The A

    mer

    ican

    adm

    inist

    ratio

    n ha

    d als

    o be

    gun

    a sea

    rch

    for n

    ew al

    lianc

    es

    that

    coul

    d res

    ist po

    ssib

    le So

    viet

    or Ir

    anian

    expa

    nsio

    n in t

    he ar

    ea. A

    s par

    t of

    this

    new

    strate

    gy, t

    he U

    S als

    o be

    gan

    to st

    reng

    then

    frien

    dly

    states

    such

    as

  • 150

    Iran

    and

    the A

    rab

    Wor

    ld

    Saud

    i Arab

    ia. T

    hus,

    in hi

    s Stat

    e of t

    he U

    nion

    Add

    ress o

    n 23

    Janu

    ary 19

    80,

    Pres

    iden

    t Car

    ter no

    ted th

    at th

    e Uni

    ted S

    tates

    was

    read

    y to c

    oope

    rate

    with

    th

    e stat

    es in

    the M

    iddl

    e Eas

    t to m

    eet t

    he 'n

    ew th

    reat' (

    prim

    arily

    Iran

    ) to t

    he

    secu

    rity o

    f the

    Per

    sian G

    ulf.2

    8 Sub

    sequ

    ently

    , in N

    ovem

    ber 1

    981,

    and o

    nly

    two m

    onths

    after

    the o

    utbrea

    k of t

    he Ir

    an—

    Iraq w

    ar, S

    audi

    Arab

    ia alo

    ng w

    ith

    Kuw

    ait,

    Bahr

    ain,

    Qat

    ar, t

    he U

    AE

    and

    Om

    an ag

    reed

    to si

    gn a

    mut

    ual

    secu

    rity

    pact

    . Thi

    s was

    real

    ised

    in M

    ay 1

    981

    in th

    e for

    m o

    f the

    Gul

    f Co

    oper

    ation

    Cou

    ncil

    (GCC

    ), an

    orga

    nisa

    tion t

    hat l

    ater b

    ecam

    e kno

    wn fo

    r its

    uneq

    uivo

    cal s

    uppo

    rt of

    Iraq

    in it

    s war

    again

    st Ira

    n. Th

    e GCC

    's em

    phas

    is on

    Islam

    as th

    e bas

    is of

    its u

    nity

    was

    an in

    dica

    tion

    that

    the o

    rgan

    isatio

    n ha

    d be

    en fo

    rmed

    to co

    unter

    the I

    slam

    ic Re

    publ

    ic's

    thre

    at to

    the G