Ecrea3a Lakel Amar Ppt

THE MYTH OF THE GLOBAL INTERNETECREA Symposium-VLB October 1Oth 2007

Internet Governance, between GlobalInfrastructure and Multistakeholderism

Françoise Massit-Folléa (University ofLyon, Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettreset Sciences humaines, scientificcoordinator of the Vox Internet Program)[email protected]

Amar Lakel (Assistant professor, ininformation and communication sciences,CEMIC –GRECO, University ofBordeaux, member of Scientific Co)[email protected]


Introduction

Our research aims at studying the communication practices of theforum Civil Society on Internet Gouvernance. We try to take intoconsideration its ambition of democratizing the internationalrelations

The WSIS, a UN initiative, announced and promoted a multi-stakeholder approachto the key question of internet governance, gathering governments, economicplayers, and civil society around the issue.

For the period spanning the presentation of the WGIG report on June 2005 to theactual summit in Tunis in December of that same year, we studied the e-mailmessages of one of the caucuses, “civil society – internet governance.”

In analyzing the modalities of these exchanges, we looked to see what kind oftactics and strategies would emerge and ascertain the role they may have played inthe public debate. Finally, we analyzed the limits to civil society’s actual role in adedicated international context.



The expected results of the theory of multistakeholderism, aswell at the global as at the local levels, would be a betterunderstanding of innovations, diversities and complexity ofthe contemporary phenomena.

A major social movement, led by ONG often related to the academic world, are engaging ina will of revitalizing the democratic instances by opening the deliberation and elarging theparticipation.

More and more NGO want to be recognized like sources of expertises by the inclusion oftheir participation in the public institutions. This is the “multistakeholder” theory, placed atthe heart of the post-modern institutional design. The benefits are expected to be a tighterfocus on innovation and the complexity of contemporary life.

Our case study on the civil society mobilized on internet governance in the WSIS processappeared emblematic of the hopes and limits to a reform of the gouvernementality andexecutives of the public action.

Introduction


Without question, the WSIS saw the officialrecognition of CS as an actor in the public decision-making processes.

“Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the privatesector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules,decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of theInternet”

An "Office of the Civil society" was established to ensure its optimum participation in all theaspects of the process of the WSIS.

The members of the civil society enriched the agenda summit, by insisting, more than theother actors, on « opening, transparency, the construction of consensus and engagementtowards universal principles such as the Human Rights ".

I – The CS participation in WSIS1 – From Geneva to Tunis


A group of strongly committed people became theintermediaries between institutions (GTGI), associations (IG-cs-caucus) and the civil society as a whole (cs-plenary List)

The Internet Governance caucus of the civil society (IG - Cs - caucus) was created inFebruary 2003, at a prepcom session of the Geneva phase of the WSIS, on the initiativeof some international actors from academic and associative areas.

Part of the participants in the caucus also took a significant physical involvement in theofficial process of the WSIS such as the Working Group on Internet Governance resultingfrom the first phase of the Summit.

An ad hoc mailing list was created, [email protected]. It became a “caisse ofrésonnance” of this group. Over the 3 months period we studied, the exchanges on the listwere marked by the development of two texts sent to the WSIS Secretariat.

I – The CS participation in WSIS2 – The Internet Governance Caucus


The attendance very quickly showed a very stereotypedprofile of the locutors in CS List which calls into question theprinciple of representativeness in the international bodies.

The speakers are mainly academics, militants or members of high level technicalprofessions - all people which have very high degrees of competence in technologies ofthe Internet.

The exchanges between contributors of more than 25 different nationalities proceed only inEnglish, and the non-english-speaking contributors yield with this implicit obligation: noclaim of linguistic opening is advanced for this period.

The list includes the people more "in-sight " (mainly North-American, but not exclusively).They often underline in debate that they have been invested for more than ten years in theissues of « internet governance » - asserting a statute of expert.

I – The CS participation in WSIS3 – Deliberation in CS-Governance Mailing List


The list counts approximately 31% of active transmitters (havingsent at least one mail), which confirms the classical variationbetween "being a subscriber to a list" and « being an actor in thedebate ".

The group of the “emergent leaders " and their “closer guards " developed a strategy of“hyperpresence” (45% of the messages/9% actors, average of 1 message per day,function of regulation of the speech, assignment of the tasks…)

The group of the "involved " are strongly implicated. They react and initiate the debatesbut do not lead the list (43% of the messages/22%des actors, 1 message by sem,deliberative function)

The group of the "concerned ". They contribute for 12 % of the messages and account for69% of the population (1 to 3 mails per month). They react sporadically to the debate orare satisfied to bring information punctually.

II – Pragmatics of deliberation1 – A strongly hierarchical speech


The political diary of the WSIS, with its key-moments ofinstituted and physical speeches, mainly explains the order ofdiscourses on the virtual word in time.

The leader group seems insensitive with the evenemential fluctuations. It continues anincreasing rise and consolidates its standpoint in the mailing list with, regularly, aprevalence of one leader or another one.

The group of the involved seems to be implied the days before the deadlines more andmore. After event, whereas the leaders maintain their presences, we note a clear ruptureof the interest post event.

The group of concerned seems to raise of weak temporal evolutions with moments whichput some members in engagement, even if if very quickly they return on their usual level ofemission.

II – Pragmatics of deliberation2 – A strategy of continuous hyperpresence


The strategy of dominating the debate by the permanentemission of mails seems largely successful. A hierarchy oflegitimacy is naturalized, with in the center, the leadersbecoming the ambassadors of the list.

The analysis of the eight "leaders" reveals a clear endogamy of the communication.Indeed, nearly 60 % of the messages are intended nominally to the leaders (by directinterpellation or express quotation).

The "major involved" are detached from the "minor involved", with a positioning of hyperlegitimation of the leaders (66 % of their mails are indeed sent to the group of the leaders).If we adds 15 % of communications intra-group, there remains only crumbs for the otherinterlocutors.

The "minor involved" and the "concerned ones ", as a whole do not call into question thehierarchical positions. One does not answer their questions, one does not take intoaccount their analyses, and yet very little choose to leave the play.

II – Pragmatics of deliberation3 – auto-legitimating endogamy.


The list went across a very strong tension between itsdemocratic principle of opening and the principle ofeffectiveness within the framework of the international diary.

Many internal criticisms raised the rigidity of the diary of the debates, the excessiveconcentration of the legitimate authors. Other opposed to it a legitimacy produced by thequality of the productions. The opening is thus, for the ones, a principle, for the others, ameans.

This tension is reinforced by the leaders’ tendency to qualify their involvement on thetheme of Internet governance as "historical ".This investment must thus justified the returnson strategic investment.

External legitimating by international organizations has a double perverse effect: theyimpose "results " within the framework of their needs, become sources of legitimacy, andsupports those which they accredit.

Conclusion :Towards a world democratization of governance ?


The base opening principle of the civil society rests on bettereffectiveness. Trapped by this managerial legitimacy, the"civil society" seems to have broken down its democratizationprinciple.

Invited to the table of the international negotiations, the civil society brings considerableingredients to it: reserve of expertise, pedagogical relay, participation in the public diary.

But we cannot speak here about experimentation of « online deliberative democracy » :Traditional power games dissolve the effort of reflexivity in the procedure, determiningparticipation of some, while being nourished by the activity on line of all.

This public space is not made up of citizens but of "stakeholders ", not of electedrepresentatives but of effective experts, not of States but of « bodies », the most powerfulrepresentatives of the various communities of interests.

Conclusion :…or a technocratisation of the politics

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