Democratization without a State: DemocraticRegime-building in Kosovo

OIS IN TANSEY

This article examines the relationship between democratization and the state with reference torecent political developments in the non-state entity of Kosovo. Existing analyses of the role ofthe state in democratic transitions provide critical insights into the politics of democratization,but have suffered from a lack of consensus regarding the concept of the state itself. This studydistinguishes three separate dimensions of statehood – recognition, capacity and cohesion –and argues that each has separate implications for transition politics. Analysis of democraticpolitical development in Kosovo suggests two conclusions: first, that international recognitionof statehood should not be viewed as a prerequisite for democratization, and second, that pro-blems of state capacity or state cohesion present far more fundamental challenges to successfuldemocratic regime change.

Key words: democratization; state; stateness; Kosovo

Introduction

After over six years of United Nations governance, Kosovo recently entered into a

new political era. In October 2005, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan

announced what had long been eagerly anticipated in Pristina: internationally

brokered talks on the entity’s final status. With independence one of the options on

the table, the initiation of status talks raised the possibility that Kosovo may soon

make claim to replace East Timor as the world’s youngest democratic state.

Yet Kosovo’s political development to date, along with its current status, raises

significant questions not only about the challenges facing democratization efforts in

Kosovo, but also about the very legitimacy of analysing a non-state entity from the

perspective of the existing transitions literature. Some of the firmest generalizations

that exist within the comparative democratization literature concern the relationship

between democracy and statehood, and Kosovo’s situation throws into sharp relief a

number of the core debates that revolve around this issue. As it currently stands,

Kosovo lacks official statehood, and is subject to extensive levels of international gov-

ernance that prevent the exercise of fully democratic politics by domestic actors.

Optimism about democratic potential in the entity is also undercut by the realities

of Kosovo’s troubled political existence, as its weak institutions, divided population

and contested status serve as obstacles to any easy political transition. Yet it is also the

Oisın Tansey is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Universityof Oxford, UK.

Democratization, Vol.14, No.1, February 2007, pp.129–150ISSN 1351-0347 print=1743-890X onlineDOI: 10.1080=13510340601024355 # 2007 Taylor & Francis

case that over recent years the entity has enjoyed increasing levels of democratic self-

governance, and that the foundations of a democratic political regime have been

established and have enabled the direct election of two successive domestic

governments.

Kosovo’s experience thus highlights a range of state-related issues that have

implications for democratic transition, including levels of state capacity and state

cohesion, and the role of international recognition of statehood. In doing so, it

brings to the fore debates within the transitions literature on the divisions between

the state and regime, and also highlights the connections that exist, and that should

be explored further, between separate approaches within comparative politics and

international relations to issues of the state and statehood. Insights from comparative

politics shed light on the domestic aspects of the state, while international relations

approaches often highlight how cross-border dynamics can determine political

status and shape and constrain the nature of domestic governance.

A central aim of this article is to highlight these different dynamics of the state,

both domestic and international, and explore their implications for democracy and

democratization. Analysis of Kosovo’s political development suggests two principal

conclusions: one, that the lack of official statehood does not, and should not, preclude

analysis of democratization in non-state entities, and two, that other state-related

issues, especially limitations on central capacity and a lack of state cohesion,

present far more fundamental challenges to successful democratic regime change.

The following sections explore these issues in more detail with reference to recent

events in Kosovo, and discuss the implications of both domestic and international

dimensions of the state for democracy and democratization.

Democracy and the Three Dimensions of Statehood

The concept of the state itself is both complex and contested. The classic definition of

a state is that provided by Max Weber, who holds that a state exists ‘insofar as its

administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate

use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’.1 Yet this is by no means the only

definition in the literature, and other contributions have identified a wider range of

attributes and characteristics of the state, including an identifiable territory, a body

of citizens, and internal and external sovereignty, meaning that there is a single

source of authority within the state, and none beyond it.2

Within the transitions literature to democracy literature, there is a small but rich

strand of writing that deals directly with the relationship between the state and demo-

cratization.3 Given the complexity of the concept of the state, this work covers a wide

range of issues concerning the role that the state plays in both facilitating and imped-

ing democratic transitions. While this has meant that a range of state-related impli-

cations have been discussed, at times it has led also to conceptual ambiguity, as

similar terms are used to refer to different aspects of the state and its relationship

with democracy.4 One strategy for overcoming this problem is to disaggregate the

concept of the state, and identify how separate elements of the state have separate

implications for democracy and democratization.5 In the existing range of writings

130 DEMOCRATIZATION

that deal with these questions, it is possible to identify three separate dimensions of

the state, each of which poses separate challenges to democratization and each of

which can be viewed in conceptually distinct terms.

The first dimension concerns the issue of state recognition, and relates to the per-

ceived requirement that a political entity be a recognized state in the international

community before it can be said to be a democracy. Linz and Stepan, for example,

clearly argue that a sovereign state is a ‘prerequisite to democracy’, and that the

challenges of achieving democracy cannot be overcome ‘unless the territorial

entity is recognized as a sovereign state’.6 Although rarely acknowledged

explicitly, to some extent this view is taken for granted in the literature and is

reinforced by the almost uniform scholarly attention to democratization processes

in recognized states only. This article seeks to question this restrictive approach,

however, and to argue that in certain circumstances analysis of democratization

can, and should, be carried out in relation to non-state entities. As Laurence

Whitehead has recently argued in a critical re-evaluation of the state-centred focus

of the field, ‘not all “states” are ready made prior to transition’ and ‘therefore a

major empirical theme for the comparative study of democratizations should be poss-

ible transition paths and the quality of democracy that is possible in the absence of full

state-ness’. 7

The second dimension in the relationship between statehood and democracy con-

cerns the issue of state capacity, and particularly the extent to which the existing state

apparatus has the resources and presence within a territory to maintain authority over,

and protect, the political community. In this context, the importance of statehood

relates to the ability, and willingness, of the state to uphold and enforce political

rights and the rule of law throughout a territory. According to O’Donnell, there are

three elements of the state that are required in order for democracy to be supported:

a legal system that supports the rights and freedoms entailed by a democratic regime,

a bureaucracy that can enforce such rights throughout the territory, and official state

ideological discourses and practices that ensure state capacity is used to reinforce

rather than undermine democratic values.8 Levels of jurisdiction, presence and auth-

ority of the state thus present particular political constraints and opportunities for

democratization that vary from context to context.9

The third dimension relates to the issue of state cohesion, and has been dealt with

most extensively in the work of Linz and Stepan and their discussion of what they

term ‘stateness’ problems. These emerge when a lack of congruence between the

polity and demos raises questions over the boundaries of the territory itself and the

appropriate membership of the political community. Specifically, Linz and Stepan

argue that the greater the percentage of people in a territory that do not wish to be

members of the state as it exists in its current form, the harder it will be to consolidate

democracy. If the population within a territory is divided along national, linguistic,

religious or cultural cleavages, the challenge of reaching agreement on the fundamen-

tals of democracy, especially citizenship rights, becomes more difficult.10 These

hypotheses echo those of Dankwart Rustow, who argued influentially that ‘national

unity’ regarding territorial and community boundaries is the sole background con-

dition necessary for successful transition to democracy.11

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 131

Each of these three dimensions of the state/democracy relationship is distinct

from the other, and each has particular implications for the nature and prospects of

democratization. In certain circumstances, where regime change takes place within

an established and homogenous state and where political authority is located firmly

with the central government, state-related issues may not play a significant role in

transition politics. In a case such as Kosovo, however, where central capacity is

limited and consensus over the boundaries of the political community is absent,

state-related factors clearly present some of the most fundamental obstacles to suc-

cessful transition and consolidation. Where state recognition is also absent, questions

are raised over the very eligibility of such non-state entities for consideration in terms

of democratization. The following sections explore these issues further in relation to

recent political development in Kosovo, and assess their implications for a political

entity that has been moving towards democratic self-government in the context of sig-

nificant domestic division and international intervention.

Kosovo’s Status Question

Kosovo’s current standing in the international political system is ambiguous, and its

political status has been a major source of tension in the region for many decades.

Under President Tito’s Yugoslavia, Kosovo became an autonomous province with

some generous powers of self-rule, but after the collapse of the state in the early

1990s the entity was stripped of much of its autonomy as it came under the authority

of the new regime of President Milosevic in Serbia. Serb repression in the region was

widespread, and the minority status of Serbs in Kosovo, which has a 90 per cent ethnic

Albanian population, was used extensively by Milosevic as a tool for mobilizing

nationalist support in Belgrade. During much of the 1990s, the prevailing strategy

among Kosovo Albanians was one of non-violent resistance, a policy that was pro-

moted in particular by the popular independence movement called the Democratic

League of Kosovo (LDK), and its leader Ibrahim Rugova, who was elected president

of Kosovo in unofficial elections in 1992. As Serb repression worsened, however, and

Kosovo came no closer to gaining independence, this strategy was increasingly ques-

tioned. A new armed Kosovo Albanian independence movement, the Kosovo Liber-

ation Army (KLA), emerged in 1996 and began targeting Serb forces, advocating a

violent struggle for independence. Serbia responded with force and in 1998 sustained

conflict broke out between the KLA and Serb forces. Initial attempts at a diplomati-

cally brokered ceasefire failed, and continued Serb aggression, which included

elements of ethnic cleansing, finally prompted a North Atlantic Treaty Organization

(NATO) military intervention in March 1999.

By the time Serbia had agreed to the international conditions for a halt to NATO

action, which included the withdrawal of Serb troops from Kosovo and the return of

refugees, it had been decided that the United Nations should be involved in a transi-

tional role before Kosovo’s final status would be determined. While the Kosovo Alba-

nian majority sought immediate independence from Serbia, international opposition

to boundary changes within the Balkans meant that independence was essentially

vetoed as a political option.12 Consequently, on 10 June 1999 the UN Security

132 DEMOCRATIZATION

Council passed Resolution 1244, which established the United Nations Interim

Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), mandated to ‘provide an interim

administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial

autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’.13 This presence was also com-

plemented by a NATO force, known as KFOR, that had a mandate to oversee the

withdrawal of Serb troops and provide a secure environment for the population and

the international presence.14

Since 1999 Kosovo has thus existed in a certain political limbo, officially a part of

the state of Serbia and Montenegro, but in reality largely independent of any direct

influence from Belgrade and administered primarily by the UN mission. Although

domestic political leaders have consistently sought independence, the international

community has been reluctant to grant it and governance in Kosovo has been

shared uneasily between domestic and international officials. Kosovo has conse-

quently existed without international recognition of statehood, and has thus faced

challenges related to the first dimension of statehood discussed above. In the

absence of political independence, and with an intrusive international presence at

the domestic level, political development in Kosovo has been marked by an

uncertainty over both future status and the possibility of independent democratic

self-government.

Yet despite this lack of international recognition, and its corresponding uncertain-

ties, it is argued here that Kosovo can nonetheless be examined from the point of view

of the transitions literature. Although it is not a sovereign state, and may not be recog-

nized as one for some time (if at all), a process has been underway within the entity to

establish the structures of a democratic political regime. Developments over recent

years in Kosovo reveal significant moves in the creation of a political regime for

democratic self-government, albeit in the context of significant levels of international

authority. New political parties have emerged, representative institutions have been

designed and established, and four sets of democratic elections have taken place

between 1999 and 2005, leading to the election of municipal assemblies and two suc-

cessive governments. Despite its lack of independence, Kosovo has thus undergone a

process of democratic development that in many ways mirrors processes of regime

change experienced in more conventional cases of the third wave of democratization.

While its attempt at democratization may ultimately be unsuccessful, waiting to

examine the case until Kosovo’s official statehood is secure risks holding analysis

of regime change hostage to the vagaries of the international politics of state recog-

nition, which in the Balkans in particular has a complex record.15

This argument not only has implications for the study of Kosovo, but also for the

many other ‘statelike entities’ or ‘de facto states’ that exist in the world, such as

Transnistria in Europe and Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh in the South Caucasus.16

While such territories do not enjoy official statehood, and possibly may never do so,

their efforts to gain independence often entail a process of political regime building,

and these efforts can in many cases be viewed from the perspective of the transitions

literature. Possibly the most well-established example of a democratic regime that

exists without a state is that of Taiwan, where a fully democratic political system

operates in the absence of international recognition of statehood. East Timor’s

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 133

experience can also be viewed through a similar lens, as its process of democratization

largely took place, like Kosovo’s, under UN administration and in the absence of offi-

cial statehood (although unlike Kosovo, the end goal in East Timor was not disputed

during the transition period, and independence was achieved there in May 2002).

The following section explores recent democratic development in Kosovo, and

highlights how the lack of official statehood has not prevented the entity from devel-

oping many of the institutions associated with democratic political regimes.

Democratic Regime-Building in Kosovo

The concept of regime remains distinct from that of the state, while maintaining a close

connection to it. While the state includes elements relating to security provision, the

economy, and legal and administrative institutions, the concept of regime refers par-

ticularly to the realm of the political system. As with the state, individual definitions

of the concept of regime vary, but common elements include a core ensemble of

rules, procedures and/or norms that together determine the ways in which elites can

access power, and the manner in which they can wield power once in office. From a

review of the literature on political regimes, Munck has identified three core procedural

attributes, those that determine: the number and type of actors who are allowed to gain

access to principal governmental positions; the methods of access to such positions; the

rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.17

In the case of Kosovo, developments over recent years, particularly in the arenas

of electoral politics and institution-building, reveal significant moves in the creation

of a political regime for democratic self-government. These developments cannot be

separated from the presence and actions of the United Nations administration mission

within Kosovo, and in many ways the story of the ongoing development of Kosovo’s

democratic regime is the story of a process of lengthy, and often fraught, interaction

between international and domestic actors.

On the international side, UNMIK has played an instrumental role in democratic

regime-building through a range of mechanisms, supported by a mandate that charged

it with holding elections and ‘organizing and overseeing the development of provi-

sional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-government’.18 The mission

itself was initially separated into four pillars, each to be led by a separate international

agency, but with a Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) to

hold overall authority and coordinate the different international agencies involved.

With the United Nations High Comissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initially in

charge of humanitarian issues and the European Union (EU) leading the economic

reconstruction effort, the UN itself has taken the lead on civil administration and

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has coordinated

the institution-building pillar.19 This mission structure has thus given both the UN

and the OSCE key roles in shaping Kosovo’s political development, and both have

been heavily involved in the intricacies of the entity’s transition politics. As the

highest civilian official within the UNMIK structure, the position of the SRSG is

also a particularly powerful one, entailing the authority to make or repeal laws, and

appoint or remove officials.20

134 DEMOCRATIZATION

Kosovo’s domestic political parties have also played a key role in political devel-

opment, not least through their own inter-party political competition. In the aftermath

of the conflict, significant levels of antagonism have continued to exist between the

Kosovo Albanian and Serb factions, and the Serb minority has frequently refused

to participate in politics in Pristina, relying instead on Belgrade-funded parallel insti-

tutions for the provision of public services. Since 1999, Serb participation in and

engagement with politics in Kosovo has been uneven, with moderate and hard-line

factions at times at odds over the most appropriate strategy to pursue to further

Serb goals.21

The Kosovo Albanian political landscape is also one marked by inter-party dis-

agreement and rivalry, as the near-monopoly status enjoyed by the LDK in the

1990s has been eroded with the emergence of two significant KLA-successor

parties. The first, and largest, is the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), which the

KLA leader Hashim Thaci formed in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. In

the political vacuum between the end of aerial bombing by the forces of NATO

and the arrival of UNMIK, the PDK quickly established a strong network of authority

at the local level in Kosovo and proclaimed a Provisional Government with Thaci as

unofficial Prime Minister. For some time it appeared that the PDK would be the

primary successor party to the KLA, but in May 2000 a second significant party

was created when a former KLA commander, Ramush Haradinaj, established the

Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). While these parties have had reason to

cooperate on many issues during the period of international administration, the

relationship between them has often been tense, and the LDK and PDK in particular

have experienced a tense rivalry that dates to their differing strategies of resistance to

Serb rule.22

The context within Kosovo since 1999 has thus been one marked by the presence

of a powerful international mission with an explicit mandate to involve itself in the

development of institutions of democratic self-government, along with a fragmented

and often antagonistic domestic political elite. The resulting interactions have often

been fraught, as international, Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian interests and priori-

ties have collided over the direction and pace of the entity’s political development.

Through a complex process that has featured elements of cooperation, conflict and

international imposition, the actions of these political factions have combined to

lead Kosovo on a path of democratic development that has included the establishment

of new institutions of self-rule and the democratic election of a domestic assembly

and government.

Institutional Design under International Administration

In the analysis of regime change, institutional design is primarily viewed as a process

determined by domestic actors and their interaction. In the case of Kosovo, however,

this aspect of democratic transition has seen as much international as domestic input,

and the international administration has played a major role in initiating and oversee-

ing the development of Kosovo’s institutions of self-government. In the early stages

of the mission, and to meet the requirements in Resolution 1244 for the provision of

local self-government, UNMIK initially set up a consultative forum, the Kosovo

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 135

Transitional Council (KTC), that was to bring the full range of Kosovo political and

civil leaders together. Yet the KTC held no real power and was increasingly criticized

by Kosovo members for its lack of political influence. The Council was also under-

mined by a boycott of Kosovo Serbs and the continued existence of both Kosovo

Serb and Albanian parallel institutions. More significant institutional developments

took place at the end of 1999, when an agreement was reached to disband the Alba-

nian parallel structures and create the Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS),

which entailed institutions that more resembled those of a conventional government.

The JIAS included 20 departments and a new executive body, the Interim Adminis-

trative Council (IAC) that was granted greater authority than the KTC by virtue of its

powers to make recommendations on new regulations and amendments to applicable

law. The JIAS institutions were further strengthened when international negotiations

finally led to some level of Serb participation in the KTC and IAC in early 2000, as a

moderate Serb grouping within Kosovo was persuaded to join the interim institutions.

Yet although these efforts led to a greater level of involvement of local actors in

the process of Kosovo’s governance, the balance of authority still lay clearly with

UNMIK and the SRSG retained final executive and legislative authority. Local dissa-

tisfaction with the pace of devolution remained, and helped prompt more substantial

progress on the development of institutions of self-government in early 2001, when

UNMIK initiated a process to develop a ‘legal framework’ for Kosovo that would

pave the way for a significant transfer of power to local authorities. During 2001,

Kosovo experienced its most critical period of political transition, as international

and domestic officials negotiated over this new legal framework, and laid the foun-

dations for Kosovo-wide elections and the establishment of a new legislature and

government.

To facilitate the process, in March 2001 UNMIK established the Joint Working

Group on the Legal Framework (JWG), a 14-member body with seven representatives

from the international administration and seven from local political parties and civil

society in Kosovo. Throughout the drafting process, the operations of the JWG were

based largely on an international/domestic divide. On the international side, UNMIK

officials sought to guide and direct the trajectory of the talks, and ensure the document

was consistent with international priorities. On the domestic side, and in contrast to

the conventional experience of constitutional negotiations, the disparate parties

largely worked together and sought to present a united front.23 The representatives

from the Kosovo Albanian political parties sought to coordinate their approaches

and any party divisions that emerged were put aside in an effort to have a coordinated

presence in the JWG and gain as many concessions from UNMIK as possible.24 To

some extent, this coordinated approach enabled the domestic members to wield a

strong influence over the process, and they took the negotiations in directions that

were originally unanticipated by UNMIK.

Agreement was reached between the international and domestic members on a

wide range of issues, and during the process of the negotiations the document

came to closely resemble a conventional constitution. It included a preamble and a

chapter on ‘basic provisions’, and set out in great detail Kosovo’s new ‘Provisional

Institutions of Self-government’ (PISG). These included a number of features that

136 DEMOCRATIZATION

the international administration had initially not envisaged, the most notable of which

was the provision for a president of Kosovo, which was resisted by some in the inter-

national community, and represented a significant gain for the local members of the

working group. The other principal political institutions agreed upon were a 120-

member directly elected assembly, with a seven-member presidency,25 and a govern-

ment to be headed by a prime minister. The institutional arrangements also contained

significant elements of the consociational model of democracy, with guaranteed min-

ority representation in the assembly (ten seats for Serbs, and ten seats for ‘other com-

munities’) and mandatory power sharing in the assembly presidency and the

government, both of which had clearly specified requirements to include members

of Serb and other communities.26

Yet while much of the document was agreed to among all parties during the nego-

tiations, a number of points of contention emerged to frustrate the process. UNMIK in

particular identified a series of issues that it was not willing to see included in the

document, and sought to veto measures that were regularly and repeatedly raised

by the domestic members. Critical points of dispute included the name of the docu-

ment itself, the extent of responsibilities that would be granted to the new self-

governance institutions, and whether the document should include provisions for a

referendum on Kosovo’s independence, a time limit for the international adminis-

tration, and a Constitutional Court.27

By the end of the negotiations stage many of these issues remained unresolved,

and with neither side willing to compromise, the JWG itself was unable to arrive at

an agreement over the final document. As a result of the impasse, the document

was ultimately completed by the SRSG and brought firmly into line with

UNMIK’s priorities. A compromise was found on the issue of the name, and it was

termed a ‘constitutional framework’ as opposed to a constitution as the Kosovo Alba-

nians had sought, or a ‘legal framework’ as UNMIK had originally envisaged. Yet on

many of the other issues, compromise was not an option and decisions went against

the local Kosovo Albanian wishes: the document contained no reference to a referen-

dum, or a time limit for the UN administration. There was also no provision for a Con-

stitutional Court in the document, as UNMIK was opposed to any body that would

have greater authority than itself.28 One of the most hotly disputed areas related to

the relative powers of the PISG and UNMIK. Chapter 5 of the Framework outlined

the responsibilities of the provisional institutions, while Chapter 8 listed the powers

of UNMIK, and debates over the list of competencies in each chapter were extensive.

Against Kosovo Albanian wishes, the final version of Chapter 8 gave the SRSG exten-

sive powers, including the authority to dismiss the Assembly, control the budget, and

appoint and remove judges and prosecutors. The final document also contained a short

chapter entitled ‘Authority of the SRSG’, which stated that the SRSG’s authority to

ensure full implementation of Resolution 1244 was unaffected by the introduction of

the PISG.

On 15 May 2001, in the face of disagreement from both within the Joint Working

Group and from political party leaders, the then SRSG Hans Haekkerup essentially

imposed the final document when he signed it into a law as an UNMIK regulation.29

The process highlighted both the authority of UNMIK and the tensions inherent in the

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 137

relationship between it and the local political parties. None of the members of the

JWG, nor the leaders of Kosovo’s political parties, were asked to sign the document,

and their declarations at the time suggested that many, particularly from the PDK,

would not have signed it.30 Yet the Constitutional Framework was introduced none-

theless, and despite their feelings, all parties agreed to abide by its terms. Once in

place, it laid the foundations for a new phase of politics in Kosovo, one in which

representatives would be elected on a Kosovo-wide basis to the new Assembly and

in which UNMIK would come to coexist with a democratically elected domestic

government.

Elections and Governments in Kosovo

Kosovo did have some previous experience of democratic electoral politics dating

from the 1990s, including a referendum on independence in 1991, which was

passed overwhelmingly, and two sets of elections in 1992 and 1998, both of which

the LDK won with significant majorities. Yet these were unofficial polls held in the

context of Serb rule, with restrictions on both the process and the outcome. In

1992, for example, voting had to be discreet and the government and parliament

that were elected were not able to establish themselves within Kosovo, leading to

the creation of a government in exile in Bonn.31

In contrast, the elections that have taken place since 1999 have been organized

under the auspices of the international administration, with heavy involvement

from the OSCE in ensuring international standards are met. As with other cases of

international administration, international authorities also attempted to use electoral

politics to promote political change within Kosovo.32 One of the first issues to be

dealt with in this arena was the design of the electoral system, a process which was

in many ways similar to that which led to the Constitutional Framework, as a con-

siderable degree of local consultation was combined with a strong international influ-

ence on the final outcome. A Central Election Commission was established in early

2000, largely consisting of local representatives, but chaired by the head of the

OSCE. After nearly two months of discussions, and with encouragement from

the OSCE, it recommended a proportional representation system. Yet both the

LDK and the PDK favoured alternative systems, with the LDK arguing for a

mixed electoral system, with both majoritarian and proportional aspects, and the

PDK in favour of a purely majoritarian system. It is probable that the PDK felt that

as the KLA’s main successor party it would translate the support of the military move-

ment into political support at the polls, and would thus gain more political influence in

a majoritarian system. Ultimately, however, the SRSG decided to introduce the

system favoured by the OSCE, in part for technical reasons and in part to favour

minority parties, and proportional representation has been used in each of

Kosovo’s elections since 1999.33

Municipal elections were held first, partly due to a fear that Kosovo-wide elec-

tions would be too controversial given the ambiguous status of the entity, and that

placing early emphasis on elections to entity-level institutions might promote

increased demands for statehood and possibly lead to an Albanian declaration of inde-

pendence.34 The elections, held in October 2000, were viewed as largely successful,

138 DEMOCRATIZATION

with only limited political violence and a large turn-out of 79 per cent. Political par-

ticipation was also strong, with 49 parties contesting the elections, although only three

parties, the LDK, PDK, and AAK, gained more than 2 per cent of the vote. The LDK

was the clear winner, with 58 per cent of the vote to the PDK’s 27.3 per cent. On the

urging of Belgrade, the Kosovo Serb parties boycotted the elections, and the SRSG

had to intervene after the election to appoint local officials in areas affected by the

boycott. In three cases in particular, UNMIK appointed entire municipal assemblies

where the Serb boycott had left a power vacuum, drawing members from a range of

Kosovo Serb political parties associated with opposition to the Milosevic regime.35

While the presence of the municipal assemblies provided an extra layer of politi-

cal authority that could be used by the domestic parties in Kosovo, the Joint Interim

Administrative Structures remained the primary institutions for political involvement

and interaction with UNMIK. Once the Constitutional Framework was introduced,

however, it paved the way for the holding of Kosovo-wide elections in November

2001 and the establishment of the PISG. Unlike the municipal vote of 2000, the

Serb parties participated in the 2001 elections through Coalition Povratak (Return),

an umbrella organization that submitted a single list for all the Serb parties.36 The

decision to participate was taken after prolonged negotiations between UNMIK

and Belgrade led to a ‘Common Document’ that dealt with many of the concerns

held by Serbia and the Kosovo Serb community, particularly regarding security

and rights protection issues.37 The results of the elections were thus in part distin-

guished by the showing of the Serb coalition, which polled 11.3 per cent of the

vote, winning 12 seats to supplement the 10 set aside seats reserved for them in the

Constitutional Framework. Of the Kosovo Albanian parties, the LDK suffered a

sharp loss in support, but with 45.7 per cent still polled more than the other two prin-

cipal parties. The PDK gained 25.7 of the vote, while the AAK received 7.8 per cent.

Once these Kosovo-wide elections took place, the PISG could finally be estab-

lished. The elections were not immediately followed by the formation of a new gov-

ernment, however, as a disagreement between LDK and the PDK on appointments to

the two key positions of government – the president of Kosovo and the prime min-

ister – led to a prolonged period of stalemate. Repeated votes on electing the presi-

dent failed when Rugova received insufficient support within the new assembly due to

PDK opposition.38 Both parties were also involved in a stand off over the prime min-

ister post, which the PDK felt it deserved on the basis of its second place showing in

the polls.

International mediation became a major part of the efforts to overcome the stand

off and form a government. Initial efforts were not successful, and the resolution of

the issue was also not helped by the resignation of the then SRSG, Hans Haekkerup,

at the end of December 2001, in part due to a lack of confidence in him among the

Kosovo Albanian politicians whom he was seeking to bring together. He was replaced

in January 2002 by Michael Steiner, who took a more direct and active role in trying

to broker a solution to the political stalemate. After a period of intense negotiations

with political leaders, and in the context of US pressure that Thaci not be the

prime minister,39 Steiner proposed a compromise candidate for this position, PDK

politician Bajram Rexhepi. The suggestion was accepted, the PDK agreed to

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 139

support Rugova for president, and a deal was reached after a lengthy negotiations

session at the SRSG’s private residence that ended in the early hours of 28 February

2002.40 Kosovo’s government was voted in by the Assembly on 4 March, and since

then UNMIK has coexisted with a democratically elected government and assembly.

In October 2004 a second Kosovo-wide election took place, leading to a two-party

coalition of the LDK and AAK, with the PDK in opposition.

Once the PISG were established, and the coalition government was finally formed

in early 2002, Kosovo had achieved what might be described as a qualified political

transition, and in many ways the resulting political system resembles that of a modern

democracy. There is an elected parliamentary chamber, comprised of representatives

that coalesce to form a fairly stable party political system.41 A coalition government is

in place, and a vigorous opposition regularly questions government policy and action.

The Constitutional Framework provides a legal foundation for the operation of gov-

ernment, and specifies the competencies of the various branches of the political struc-

ture. While Kosovo lacks official recognition of statehood, and has an uncertain

political future, it has nonetheless developed many of the core features of a demo-

cratic political regime.

Yet despite these developments, Kosovo has clearly not yet completed a process

of democratic transition and still lacks fundamental elements of democratic self-rule.

Primary among the features that qualify democratic governance in Kosovo is the

location of authority with the international presence and the role that UNMIK

plays in directing Kosovar political life. As one of the core features of democracy

is the ability of the elected government to wield sufficient authority to make

policy, UNMIK’s extensive powers clearly preclude the possibility of genuinely

democratic rule by the elected government. Under the Constitutional Framework,

UNMIK’s reserved powers provide the international administration with legislative

authority in a range of critical policy areas, including monetary policy, security

policy and external relations. It also enables the SRSG to dissolve the assembly

under conditions where the PISG are acting in a manner that violates the provisions

of Resolution 1244.

Furthermore, Kosovo also faces a number of state-related challenges that suggest

that even if UNMIK were to depart and leave the way open for independent self-gov-

ernment, Kosovo would still face significant barriers in its effort to democratize.

While the lack of state recognition has not in itself proved a barrier to democratic

development in Kosovo, the two other state-related challenges discussed above,

those regarding both state capacity and cohesion, pose far more serious obstacles

to democratic regime change in Kosovo. Indeed, in 2002 UNMIK made both its

own withdrawal, and the initiation of negotiations on independence, conditional on

Kosovo meeting a set of clearly specified benchmarks in what has become known

as the ‘standards before status’ policy.42 This is an UNMIK strategy to ensure dom-

estic progress on key political priorities through a particular form of conditionality,

one that has linked the resolution of the status issue with progress on a series of speci-

fied benchmarks which touch on issues directly related to the strength and capacity of

state institutions and the levels of consensus and cooperation among Kosovo’s ethnic

communities.43

140 DEMOCRATIZATION

Governing Capacity in a Nascent State

State capacity is fundamental to the exercise of democracy. Unless central state insti-

tutions can exercise authority throughout the territory over which they have jurisdic-

tion, effective government will not be possible. In particular, liberal democratic rule

requires that political rights and the rule of law can be enjoyed evenly across a given

polity, and that state authorities both provide the legal foundations for this to take

place and the mechanisms through which it can be enforced.44 Democracy (and at

times peace) can thus be threatened when central state structures are weak, or

when local state institutions and actors operate according to local priorities and

refuse to work according to the rules or norms advocated by central government.45

In Kosovo, such problems are significant, and the new domestic political insti-

tutions that have been created since 1999 suffer from a range of weaknesses that

raise significant questions over their ability to implement policy and enforce rights

throughout the territory. In many areas, the institutional structures of government

and administration remain unable, and at times unwilling, to extend authority

throughout the territory and ensure that all members of the political community are

treated equally and have equal access to the legal and political system.

At the central level, the authority that government ministries enjoy independently

of UNMIK is undermined by a lack of resources and skilled staff. Many of the depart-

ments had no corresponding predecessors during Kosovo’s period of autonomy

within Yugoslavia, and are taking time to fully develop their roles and functions.

Staff levels are low and existing staff are often in need of further training, and as a

result, government departments lack the capacity to perform their key roles of devel-

oping policies and drafting legislation.46 Laws are often based closely on laws in other

countries, and there is often little regard for coherence or consistency among different

acts, raising problems for the legal framework as a whole.47 Implementation is a

further problem, as the lack of legal staff within ministries has frustrated the drafting

and publication of necessary subsidiary legislation.48

The assembly also faces similar weaknesses, with limited resources for law-

making and a reliance on outside assistance. The Assembly in Kosovo works on a

part-time basis, with Assembly members meeting once a month for a number of

days to work through the legislative agenda. As many of the representatives lack pol-

itical experience and only a small minority are lawyers, close scrutiny of government

legislation is often lacking, a problem that has been exacerbated by the pressures to

legislate quickly that stem from the standards before status process.49

A related problem concerns the local bureaucratic administration, which also

faces a number of capacity-related challenges. One of the principal problems that

exists in the bureaucracy is the role played by political parties and the politicization

of the civil service. Appointments and job security in the bureaucratic administration

are frequently dependent on party or clan ties, and an unofficial system of patronage

and nepotism undermines the standard requirement of an impartial and independent

civil service. Consequently, this gives rise to performance problems, as the prevailing

work ethic is marked in part by attitudes that link employment with party loyalty

rather than efficient job performance.50 The bureaucracy also faces problems in

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 141

enforcing political order due to its uneven reach throughout the territory, and the inde-

pendent centres of power that exist in many areas in Kosovo. A key challenge in this

regard is the presence of a series of parallel political structures in the predominantly

Serb-populated areas of Kosovo, most of which are controlled and funded by the

Serbian government. These structures include security provision from Serb police

in northern Kosovo, separate Serb-run courts and parallel health and education facili-

ties funded directly from the health and education ministries of the Serbian state.51

Aside from problems with central government and the bureaucracy, Kosovo’s

judicial system faces problems both of capacity and impartiality. Since 1999 there

has been much development in Kosovo’s judicial system, and the court system and

legal framework have been extensively developed under international guidance.

Yet in two significant respects the judicial system faces serious challenges in its

ability to carry out its core function of processing legal cases effectively and impar-

tially. First, the judiciary has found it difficult to cope with cases in one of the most

sensitive areas of Kosovo’s politics, that of property rights, and as a consequence has

a large backlog of cases relating to property disputes. Disagreements over property,

and particularly over illegal occupancy of former Serb homes by Kosovo Albanians,

remain one of the more significant sources of community tension in Kosovo, and the

inability to process cases and resolve disputes represents a serious barrier to demo-

cratic development in Kosovo. The backlog ultimately leads to an uneven enjoyment

of rights among Kosovo’s population, and seriously impedes the ability of some

sectors, especially the displaced Serb population, to realize their entitlement to

become stable members of the political community.52

Another problem relates to ability of the judicial system to ensure impartiality

when dealing with cases that have an ethnic dimension. The majority of domestic

judges within the judicial system in Kosovo come from the Kosovo Albanian commu-

nity, and in the early years of the international administration concerns over the lack

of impartiality in judges’ rulings led to the introduction of international judges and

prosecutors.53 Although the number of international judges and prosecutors has

been reduced in recent years due to improved performance, concerns remain about

the impartiality of the judiciary when it comes to sensitive cases. A recent report high-

lighted how the judiciary displayed serious deficiencies both in gathering evidence

and charging and sentencing suspects after anti-Serb riots broke out in Kosovo in

March 2004. Significant problems included the intimidation of witnesses, the

disappearance of important evidence (often from police files), a tendency to apply

charges for lesser offences than those committed, and lenient sentencing by

members of the judiciary. The report concluded that the weak response of the

courts to the March 2004 riots had contributed to an impression of impunity

among the population regarding such ethnically motivated crimes.54 A UN review

of standards progress in the summer of 2005 also highlighted similar problems, and

called on UNMIK to halt its reduction in the number of international judges and pro-

secutors on the grounds that continuation of the policy would lead to a reduction in the

credibility of and confidence in the judicial system.55

A final indicator of Kosovo’s lack of state capacity relates to the security arena,

and the continuation of low-level violence and intimidation against the minority

142 DEMOCRATIZATION

Serb community, as well as occasional incidences of larger-scale violence. The most

significant failure of the security structures within Kosovo, both domestic and inter-

national, was seen during in March 2004, when unsubstantiated reports that Serbs

were responsible for the drowning of three Kosovo Albanian children led to large-

scale riots throughout Kosovo. In the two days over which the riots took place both

the Kosovo Police Corps (KPC) and NATO’s KFOR troops were unable to control

the violence, in which 19 people were killed, nearly 1,000 injured, and over 4,000 dis-

placed.56 The events highlighted not only key failings in the international security

institutions, which held primary control over security affairs, but also revealed pro-

blems with the domestic security structures, and the political culture that exists

within them. While the domestic KPC performed well in many areas, there are

reports that many of its members stood by rather than prevent rioting by fellow

Kosovo Albanians, and that some members may even have joined in the riots.57 Simi-

larly, after the rioting KPC members were also reported to have been reluctant to

cooperate with judicial efforts to prosecute alleged rioters. Many were said to have

refused to give testimony, or gave testimony to the effect that they witnessed no

wrongdoing in events where others, including international security officers, stated

crimes were openly committed.58

Each of these problems, as diverse as they are, present problems for democratiza-

tion in Kosovo. With limited domestic capacity in many of its core political and secur-

ity institutions, as well as questionable commitment in some quarters to genuinely

impartial decision-making, Kosovo faces obstacles in both providing effective gov-

ernance and ensuring adequate citizen security and rights protection. While the inter-

national administration mission retains a role in providing capacity where it does not

exist domestically, the inevitable departure of UNMIK will place a greater burden on

institutions that remain weak in many critical areas. Indeed, the very presence of

international administrators in Kosovo, as in other cases of international governance,

has contributed to some of the capacity problems, with international staff assuming

control to achieve essential outcomes, but thereby reducing the potential for domestic

capacity building.59 This dilemma has yet to be overcome in Kosovo, and further

capacity building is needed before local institutions are in a position in Kosovo to

effectively, and fairly, govern the territory according to democratic standards.

Political Cohesion in a Post-conflict Society

Aside from issues of state capacity, Kosovo’s democratization process will also have

to overcome significant obstacles that exist with regard to state cohesion. As Linz and

Stepan highlight, disagreement over the membership of the political community, as

well as over the boundaries of the territorial unit, present fundamental challenges

to democratic development.60 In Kosovo, as in many other post-conflict contexts,

such disagreements are deep-rooted, and there is a long-running absence of consensus

concerning these core issues of state cohesion. Ultimately, the source of such dis-

agreement in Kosovo stems from the source of the underlying conflict itself,

namely the irreconcilable views of Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians over the

legitimate government of the territory. Both sides of the divide seek mutually

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 143

exclusive outcomes, as the Kosovo Serbs argue that Kosovo’s rightful place is as a

province within Serbia, with Belgrade as the capital, while Kosovo Albanians seek

independence for the entity, and argue that its current borders should be the future

borders of an independent state. These fundamentally irreconcilable viewpoints

have serious consequences for the operation of politics within Kosovo, and serious

implications for future democratic development.

In social terms in Kosovo, the two communities largely live separately from one

another and there is very little cross-community integration. Much of the Kosovo Serb

population lives in the north of the territory, with a large concentration in the city of

Mitrovica, while the rest are dispersed throughout rural Kosovo, often in isolated

enclaves. There is little cross-community contact, and tension between the commu-

nities is often high. As mentioned, low-level violence against Serbs is common,

and freedom of movement is thus restricted for much of the Serb population. Restric-

tions on such freedom have significant implications for the extent to which the Serb

population can access political and social services within Kosovo, and also hamper

efforts to promote the return of members of the Serb population, many of whom

were displaced by revenge violence in the wake of the Serbian troop withdrawal in

1999.61 The poor state of inter-ethnic relations also re-enforces the role of Serb-run

parallel structures in Kosovo, which, in a vicious cycle, in turn reduce the opportu-

nities for inter-ethnic interaction and communication.

Further indicators of the lack of cohesion can be seen in the divergence in public

opinion between each community concerning the most fundamental aspects of

Kosovo’s current and future status. Kosovo Serbs are overwhelmingly in favour of

Serbian sovereignty over the territory, view inter-ethnic relations and security as

the biggest problems facing Kosovo and place the blame for inter-ethnic tensions

on the shoulders of the Kosovo Albanian leadership and people. In contrast,

Kosovo Albanians are overwhelmingly in favour of independence, view unemploy-

ment rather than security as the biggest problem facing Kosovo and allocate the

blame for inter-ethnic tensions with the Kosovo Serb population and the Belgrade

government. Unlike the Serbs, the Albanian population also includes a significant

minority (25 per cent in March 2005) who are opposed to the return of displaced

people and refugees to Kosovo.62

In political terms, this divide is seen clearly in the consistent political confronta-

tion between Kosovo Serb and Albanian parties, as well as the frequent reluctance of

Kosovo Serbs to participate in Kosovo’s political institutions. The party system in

Kosovo reflects the ethnic divisions of the entity very clearly, as each community

is represented by separate, mono-ethnic parties and there are no multi-ethnic political

parties that cross the community divide. These parties also tend to see most political

developments in Kosovo as part of a zero-sum dynamic, in that each side interprets

developments either as furthering or undermining their mutually exclusive objectives

concerning political status. The result is resistance from at least one side to nearly all

political developments that take place.63

The lack of political cohesion in Kosovo is also highlighted by the frequent refusal

of Kosovo Serb parties to engage in the political institutions that have been estab-

lished during the period of international administration. In the early years of the

144 DEMOCRATIZATION

UNMIK administration, Serbs delayed involvement in the interim institutions that

were established, and joined only when guarantees regarding Serb interests were pro-

vided. Although the Serb community did participate in the 2001 Assembly elections,

there was very low turn-out in the 2002 municipal elections and full boycotts of both

the 2000 municipal elections and the 2004 Assembly elections. These boycotts have

been supported and encouraged by Belgrade, and both reflect the community divide

within Kosovo as well as contribute to it. Without Serb engagement with the new

institutions of self-government within Kosovo, democratic governance will be diffi-

cult to achieve.

This lack of cohesion clearly has implications for the prospects of democratic

transition in Kosovo. As Linz and Stepan state, ‘if a significant group of people

does not accept claims on its obedience as legitimate, because the people do not

want to be a part of the political unit, however democratically it is constituted, this

presents a serious problem for democratic transition and even more serious problems

for democratic consolidation’.64 In Kosovo, social segregation (both voluntary and

involuntary), parallel structures, political boycotts and a mono-ethnic political

party system all illustrate that a serious problem of legitimacy exists for a significant

sector of the population. Unless such problems are overcome, with both greater Serb

participation in Kosovo’s institutions and reduced efforts by Kosovo Albanians to

marginalize Serb interests, inclusive democratic government in Kosovo will be diffi-

cult, if not impossible, to achieve.

Conclusion: Conditional Independence, Conditional Transition

Since the end of the conflict in 1999, a process of democratic change has been under

way within Kosovo. Despite the lack of international recognition of statehood, dom-

estic democratic structures have developed over time, and have evolved into an

unconventional hybrid political system, part domestic democratic regime, part inter-

national authority. Kosovo’s recent political trajectory thus highlights the fact that

processes of democratic transition are not unique to established states, and can

occur outside the state system. As with all transitions, however, the success of

these efforts is far from guaranteed, and the lack of international recognition of state-

hood may be an indicator that other, more problematic, state-related problems also

exist. In Kosovo, significant challenges to successful transition remain, not least

due to problems with the capacity of its institutions and the lack of cohesion

among its population regarding the very boundaries of the political community and

territory of the entity. Yet in Kosovo, the nature of the international presence also

means that dealing with these challenges will not be a purely domestic affair, and

that international actors will continue to play a critical role. The prospects for demo-

cratization in the entity are thus inextricably linked to international considerations

regarding its status, its political development and stability within the wider region.

The decision in October 2005 to proceed with status talks reflects a new determi-

nation within the United Nations to move beyond the phase of transitional adminis-

tration and address the core issue that has been the source of Kosovo’s political

difficulties. At the time of writing, the outcome of these talks over Kosovo, which

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 145

are being led by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, are not yet clear. None-

theless, a set of parameters for the talks have been developed and suggest at least

some terms upon which the negotiations will be based. In preparation for the status

negotiations, the international Contact Group that has coordinated international

policy toward Kosovo provided a series of ‘guiding principles’ for the talks.65 In

addition to emphasizing the need for a settlement that conforms to democratic

values and meets international human rights standards, these principles clearly

exclude solutions that would involve the partition of Kosovo, unification of

Kosovo with Albania, or most important of all, a return to the situation that existed

before 1999.66 Kosovo is thus unlikely to be reincorporated into the Serbian state,

but the seemingly logical alternative, full independence, is also unlikely in the

short term.

Under international law, four criteria have traditionally been viewed as both

necessary and sufficient for an entity to be recognized as a sovereign state, those of

defined borders, a permanent population, effective government, and the capacity to

enter into international relations.67 These criteria alone pose difficulties for

Kosovo, which as discussed above, has a divided population and limited capacity

for effective government.68 Prospects for recognition of independence in Kosovo

(even if were to attain each of the four criteria) are also undercut by the fact that inter-

national practice in this arena has tended to define the right to self-determination in a

narrow fashion, limiting support for new states to cases of colonial independence, or

to the rare circumstances where there is full consent from the central government for

secession to take place.69 Given opposition by the government in Belgrade to

Kosovo’s independence, the international support that exists for unilateral secession

against the wishes of Serbia is thus tempered by considerations of the precedent it

could set for secessionist claims elsewhere. 70

In practice, states have often departed from the legal criteria and considerations,

and have recognized states (or withheld recognition) on the basis of purely political

considerations. The recognition of Yugoslavia’s other prospective states in the early

1990s is a prime example, as for security and strategic reasons the EU granted recog-

nition despite concerns that the necessary criteria had not been met.71 These cases

also displayed an unusual international willingness to accept the creation of new

states in the face of opposition from central government (again Belgrade), an

approach that was justified on the basis that the state of Yugoslavia was ‘in a

process of dissolution’.72 While these precedents raise the possibility that the inter-

national community might once again ignore the opposition of Belgrade and allow

a secession attempt to lead to statehood, the continued opposition of Belgrade and

the Serb minority in Kosovo means full recognition of Kosovo’s independence at

this stage remains politically difficult. As Marc Weller has observed, ‘. . . even if it

becomes clear that Kosovo cannot be forced back into Serbia, international mediators

remain insistent that any outcome of status negotiations must either disguise the fact

that independence has been obtained, or be based on express consent from Belgrade.73

One of the more frequently suggested solutions that might act as such a ‘disguise’

is the possibility of ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo. This concept was first

introduced by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo in 2000, and

146 DEMOCRATIZATION

was presented by the Commission as the best possible option for Kosovo’s future.74 As

envisaged by the Commission, conditional independence would entail ‘a self-govern-

ing Kosovo, outside the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), but within a specific

international framework in which the international community retains responsibility

for the security of borders and for overseeing the protection of minorities’. With

this status, Kosovo would have control over most of its internal affairs and the inter-

national presence would be limited to ensuring that minority rights are protected,

security is maintained and borders are secured and stable. Over time, Kosovo would

gradually gain full independence as it ‘demonstrates that its peoples can live in

peace with each other and with the neighboring states in the region’.75 The idea of con-

ditional independence has gained considerable support in some quarters since it was

introduced, and has become the favoured option of the Contact Group countries.76

If the recommendations of a recent UN report on Kosovo are to be followed, such con-

ditional independence would involve continued international presence through a

Bosnia-style High Representative, who would have powers to remove officials and

veto or enact legislation in areas relating to inter-ethnic issues.77

Such conditional independence, however, would still leave Kosovo as a non-state

entity, with final international recognition, and genuine independent government, still

pending further developments. Kosovo’s political transition is thus likely to continue

for some time, and retain at least some of the international involvement it has experi-

enced to date. While this may ensure there is continued political progress on the stan-

dards benchmarks, and may help reduce the capacity and cohesion problems Kosovo

faces, the fact remains that progress achieved under international auspices may not be

sustainable once international authorities depart. The real test for Kosovo’s political

transition will come when, and if, international authorities leave and the government

and assembly in Kosovo gain real political independence. On paper at least, international

statements suggest this will only happen when Kosovo has overcome many of its current

problems. But in reality, that moment will represent the first time Kosovo will have had

to govern itself without external oversight, and it is only then that its true progress can be

measured. Robert Jackson has shown clearly how recognition of independence alone

does not guarantee the kind of state capacity and cohesion discussed above, and that

judicial statehood without effective domestic authority can simply lead to ‘quasi-

states’.78 In an independent Kosovo, with the institutions of a democratic political

regime in place, the potential for genuinely democratic self-rule will be considerable.

However, domestic institutions and domestic actors will have to overcome the chal-

lenges that are currently presented by limited domestic capacity and lack of political

cohesion if Kosovo is not to become a troubled quasi-state of its own.

NOTES

1. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, edited by Guenther Roth andClaus Wittich (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), Vol. 1, p.54.

2. See Margaret Levi, ‘The State of the Study of the State’, in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds),Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002); Andrew Vincent, ‘Con-ceptions of the State’, in Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (eds), Encyclopedia of Governmentand Politics, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1992).

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 147

3. See, especially, Dankwart Rustow, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Compara-tive Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3. (1970), pp.337–63; Guillermo O’Donnell, ‘On the State, Democratization,and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American view with Glances at Some PostcommunistCountries’, in Guillermo O’Donnell, Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Demo-cratization (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), pp. 133–58. Juan J. Linz andAlfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, SouthAmerica and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996);Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King, ‘The State and Democratization: The United States inComparative Perspective’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2004), pp.193–210.

4. The term ‘stateness’, for example, has been used to refer to quite distinct aspects of the state. Comparethe use in Linz and Stepan (note 3), which emphasizes the boundaries of the territory and the member-ship of the political community, with the use in Gonzalez and King (note 3), where the term is definedin terms of the legal order, bureaucracy and ideology of the state.

5. This strategy is similar to that of Stephen Krasner, who has sought to clarify ambiguities concerning theconcept of sovereignty by disaggregating it into four constituent elements. See Stephen D. Krasner,Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

6. Linz and Stepan (note 3), p.18.7. See Laurence Whitehead, ‘Freezing the Flow: Theorizing about Democratization in a World in Flux’,

Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2005), pp.4, 6.8. O’Donnell (note 3), pp.135–7.9. Gonzalez and King (note 3), p.193.

10. Linz and Stepan (note 3), p.29.11. Rustow (note 3), p.350.12. For an analysis of the international dimensions to the conflict, see Richard Caplan ‘International Diplo-

macy and the Crisis in Kosovo’, International Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (1998), pp.745–61.13. United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1244, 10 June 1999.14. Military-Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments

of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.15. See Richard Caplan, Europe and the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 2005).16. See Charles King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States’, World

Politics, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2001), pp.524–52; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).

17. Gerardo L. Munck, ‘Disaggregating Political Regime: Conceptual Issues in the Study of Democratiz-ation’, Working Paper No. 228, The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University ofNotre Dame, 1996.

18. UN Security Council Resolution 1244, S/RES/1244, 10 June 1999.19. For more details on the structure of the mission, see United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary

General Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 1244’ (1999), S/1999/672,12 June 1999.

20. United Nations, ‘Report of The Secretary-General On The United Nations Interim AdministrationMission In Kosovo’, S/1999/779, 12 July 1999.

21. International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo: Toward Final Status’, Europe Report No. 161, 24 January 2004.22. International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo After Haradinaj’, Europe Report No. 163, 26 May 2004.23. The exception to this was the non-participation of the Serb member, who initially left the JWG and was

replaced only at the final stages.24. Author interviews with former Kosovo Albanian JWG members, Pristina, April 2005.25. The presidency was later increased to eight members when the results of the 2001 elections gave the

Serbs a larger presence in the assembly than expected. The strength of the support for the Serb coalitionmeant the AAK were pushed into fourth place and lost out on automatic representation in the Assemblypresidency. The Constitutional Framework was amended to enable the AAK leader Ramush Haradinajto join the Presidency. See UNMIK Regulation 2002/9, ‘On an Amendment to the ConstitutionalFramework for Provisional Self-Government’, 3 May 2002.

26. The ‘other communities’ in Kosovo as outlined in the Constitutional Framework include the Roma,Ashkali and Egyptian (RAE) communities, the Bosniak community, the Turkish community and theGorani community.

27. See Blerim Reka, UNMIK as an International Governance with Post-War Kosova; Nato’sIntervention; UN Administration And Kosovar Aspirations (Shkup, Prishtine, Tirane: Logosa, 2003),p.244.

148 DEMOCRATIZATION

28. Author interview with senior UNMIK official, April 2005.29. UNMIK Regulation 2001/9, ‘On A Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-government in

Kosovo’, 15 May 2001.30. See ‘Haekkerup Signs Constitutional Framework’, UNMIK Local Media Monitoring, 16 May 2001,

available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/mon/lmm160501.html31. See Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), pp.68, 146.32. Carrie Manning, ‘Elections and Political Change in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Democratiz-

ation, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2004), pp.60–86.33. Andrew Taylor, ‘Electoral Systems and the Promotion of Consociationalism in a Multi-ethnic Society:

The Kosovo Assembly Elections of November 2001’, Electoral Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2005),pp.435–63.

34. Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press,2005), p.122.

35. United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo’, S/2000/1196, 15 December 2000, p.2.

36. International Crisis Group, ‘Kosovo: Landmark Election’, Balkans Report No. 120, 21 November2001.

37. UNMIK-FRY Common Document, 5 November 2001, available at http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Policy/Priorities/KIM/unmik_e.html (accessed on 19 October 2006).

38. ‘Constitution Watch: Yugoslavia’, East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 11, Nos. 1/2 (2002),p.57.

39. Author interview with former UNMIK official, Oxford, February 2005.40. Michael Steiner Press Conference, 28 February 2002, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/

press/2002/trans/tr280202.htm; ‘Agreement on the President and Government of Kosovo’, Pristina,28 February 2002, available at http://www.intstudies.cam.ac.uk/centre/cps/documents_Kosovo_PandG.html (accessed 19 October 2006).

41. In the Assembly elections of 2004, a fourth significant party emerged, ORA (meaning ‘hour’). Theparty was led by newspaper publisher Veton Surroi and gained 6.2 per cent of the vote.

42. These standards have become increasingly well specified over time. See, in particular, UNMIK,‘Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan’, 31 March 2004, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/misc/ksip_eng.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).

43. For more on this approach in Kosovo, and on similar efforts in other statebuilding missions to applynew ‘standards of civilization’, see Dominik Zaum, The Sovereignty Paradox: The Norms and Politicsof International Statebuilding (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, forthcoming).

44. Gonzalez and King (note 3), p.196.45. See Carrie Manning ‘Local Level Challenges to Post-conflict Peacebuilding’, International Peace-

keeping, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2003), pp.25–43.46. United Nations Development Programme, ‘Assessment of Administrative Capacity in Kosovo’, April

2005, available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/KCAP/KCAP_report_final_20050525_english.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).

47. Author interview with National Democratic Institute (NDI) official, Pristina, April 2005.48. OSCE, ‘Implementation of Kosovo Assembly Laws by the Executive Branch of the Provisional

Institutions of Self-government: Laws Promulgated in 2002-2003’, January 2005, available athttp://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/01/4099_en.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).

49. Author interview with NDI and OSCE officials, Pristina, April 2005.50. OSCE, ‘JIAS Employment Survey: Results Report’, 12 November 2001, available at http://osce.org/

documents/mik/2001/11/1240_en.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).51. OSCE, ‘Parallel Structures in Kosovo’, October 2003, available at http://www.osce.org/documents/

mik/2003/10/698_en.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).52. See the findings of the UN progress report, ‘A Comprehensive Review of the Situation in Kosovo’,

S/2005/635, 7 October 2005.53. Michael E. Hartmann, ‘International Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo: A New Model for Post-

Conflict Peacekeeping’, USIP Special Report No. 112, October 2003.54. OSCE, ‘’The Response of the Justice System to the March 2004 Riots’, December 2005, available at

http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2005/12/17177_en.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).55. UN (note 52).56. International Crisis Group, ‘Collapse in Kosovo’, ICG Europe Report No. 155, 22 April 2004.57. Ibid.58. OSCE (note 54).

DEMOCRATIC REGIME-BUILDING IN KOSOVO 149

59. Caplan (note 34), Ch.4.60. Linz and Stepan (note 3), Ch.2.61. See OSCE, ‘Tenth Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo’, March 2003, available

at http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2003/03/903_en.pdf (accessed on 19 October 2006).62. For public opinion survey results, see UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), ‘Early

Warning Report: Kosovo’, No. 9, January–March 2005 (and earlier reports).63. Alexandros Yannis, ‘The UN as Government in Kosovo’, Global Governance, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2004),

pp.67–81.64. Linz and Stepan (note 3), p.27.65. The Contact Group comprises of the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and

Italy.66. Contact Group, ‘Guiding principles of the Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo’,

available as annex to UN document S/2005/709, 10 November 2005.67. For further discussion of these, and other criteria that have been suggested, see James Crawford, The

Creation of States in International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), especially Ch.2.68. For further discussions of Kosovo with reference to the international legal criteria for statehood, see

Michael Redman, ‘Should Kosovo be Entitled to Statehood?’, Political Quarterly, Vol. 73, No. 3(2002), pp.338–43.

69. Marc Weller, ‘The Self-determination Trap’, Ethnopolitics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), pp.3–28.70. Tim Judah, ‘Kosovo’s Moment of Truth’, Survival, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter 2005–06), pp.73–84.71. See Caplan (note 15), Ch.1. Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia were each recognized as states during 1992

and Macedonia was widely recognized in 1993.72. This quote is taken from an opinion of the Badinter Commision, which was established in 1991 by the

then European Community (EC) to resolve legal questions arising from the crisis in Yugoslavia. Theopinion was used by EC leaders to argue that they were not supporting secession, but rather acknowl-edging the breakdown of a state. Kosovo was not recognized at this time as the Badinter Commissionrecommended that only the six republics of Yugoslavia had the right to self-determination. See ibid,Ch.2.

73. Weller (note 69), p.23.74. The Independent International Commission on Kosovo was established in 1999 at the initiative of the

government of Sweden, and was tasked with analysing the Kosovo conflict, the international response,and Kosovo’s future status. It was comprised largely of jurists and academics.

75. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, InternationalResponse, Lessons Learned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 274.

76. See Judah (note 70).77. UN (note 52). See also Nicholas Wood, ‘Kosovo May Soon Be Free of Serbia, but Not of Supervision’,

New York Times, 2 November 2006.78. See Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World

(Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Manuscript accepted for publication May 2006.

Address for correspondence: Oisın Tansey, Department of Politics and International Relations, Universityof Oxford, Oxford, UK. E-mail: oisin.tansey@nuffield.ox.ac.uk

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