THE INTER-AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC REGIME: THE ROLE OF THE

ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DEMOCRACY

Rubén M. Perina∗

Introduction: New Context, New Role

The role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in the defense and promotion of

democracy in the inter-American system should be understood in the context of the new

international order that emerged at the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and is currently

characterized by the preeminence of democracy and free market economies.

This new international context is also characterized by a process of growing global

interdependence that extends to virtually every aspect of life: society, culture, economics,

politics, and so on. The falling prices in communications, information, and transportation

have facilitated and fueled this process. Thus most of the problems/challenges faced by our

democracies in the hemisphere can no longer be handled or resolved unilaterally or only

within the borders of a country. Challenges related to the environment, drug trafficking,

corruption, terrorism, security, democracy, trade, human rights, and health, among others,

are not only interdependent, but link governments and societies of the region in an

increasingly complex and extensive interdependent network. These challenges are

“intermestic”: part international and part domestic1; and, to address them, solidarity,

collaboration, and regional cooperation are necessary. It is in this context of interdependence

and globalization that international organizations such as the OAS are regaining their

relevance and importance. They were, after all, established to facilitate and promote

cooperation among their members, in the search for joint solutions to deal with common

problems and challenges.

The role of the OAS in the promotion and defense of democracy at the start of the

21st century should be analyzed and understood in that context. However, the development

∗ Is Coordinator, Strategic Programs, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), General Secretariat of the OAS. The views expressed in this paper are the exclusive responsibility of the author. They do not represent the position of the OAS General Secretariat or that of the Organization 1 The concept appeared a few years ago in academic works on interdependence.

2

of this new role has not been a linear, automatic, or easy one. It has required a lengthy,

tortuous, and in-depth debate around the tension existing between the principle of defense

and promotion of democracy, on one hand, and other principles enshrined long ago in the

inter-American system such as the legal equality of states, their absolute sovereignty, and

nonintervention, on the other. The fear that the exercise of the former may have a negative

effect on the latter, or that the former may be used to undermine and violate the latter, has

always been a formidable obstacle to the formal adoption of the former, at least up until the

mid-1980s. Nevertheless, the ideal of and the concern for democracy are long-standing in

hemispheric relations, dating back to the first inter-American conferences.2

2 Heraldo Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic Governance,” Journal of Democracy (July 1992). Muñoz traces

the historical evolution in the inter-American system to what he calls “the doctrine of democratic governance.”

See also his “A New OAS for the New Times,” in Viron Vaky and Heraldo Muñoz, The Future of the

Organization of American States (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1993). Jerome Slater, the chapter

on “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,” in his The OAS and United States Foreign Policy, Ohio State

University, 1967. As early as 1907, the Ecuadorian foreign minister, Carlos Tobar, was advocating the

nonrecognition of de facto governments, a provision that was included in Central American treaties of 1907

and 1923. In 1936, at the Inter-American Conference held in Buenos Aires, the American states declared that

democracy is common cause in the Americas, and in 1945, at the Inter-American Conference in Mexico, the

Guatemalan delegation proposed a resolution on the defense and promotion of democracy in the face of the

possible establishment of anti-democratic governments in the hemisphere,” which was rejected as

“interventionist.” See Eduardo Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System”

(CJI/SO/II/Doc. 37/94 rev. 1 corr., October 18, 1994), Annex VI, in La Democracia en el Sistema Inter-

Americano (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs of the OAS, 1998). Larman

Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes: Reactivation in the 1990s?” in Revista

Interamericana de Bibliografía no. 4 (1989); and F. V. García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano

(Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary for Legal Affairs, OAS, 1981). It should also be pointed out

that the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay,

recommended to member states the holding of elections as a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic

government. See also the discussion of whether electoral observation violated the principle of nonintervention

in Joao Clemente Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, 1984-1994 (Washington, DC: General Secretariat of

the OAS, 1994), pp. 142–145. Mention should also be made of the declaration of Mexico on the occasion of

the adoption of the “Washington Protocol,” in which Mexico expressed its disagreement with the amendments

to this protocol, stressing that democracy cannot be imposed from the outside and that “it is unacceptable for a

3

The development of this new role of the OAS is also closely associated to another

interdependent and noteworthy hemispheric phenomenon: the restoration of democracy (in

the early 1980s) as a system of government in almost all the states of the Americas. This new

political congruence among the political systems of the region has brought about a general

consensus and collective commitment on their part to defend and promote democracy in the

hemisphere.

This new hemispheric reality stands in stark contrast to the situation during the first

30-some years of the OAS. During those years (1948–early 1980s), dictatorial, military,

authoritarian, semidemocratic, and democratic governments coexisted in the hemisphere,

despite the fact that as early as 1948, Article 5 of the OAS Charter stipulated that the

solidarity of the countries of the Americas and the high aims sought through it (peace,

security, and development) required that these states be organized “on the basis of the

effective exercise of representative democracy.” This lack of congruence in political

systems, however, did not prevent member states, through the OAS or unilaterally, largely

for reasons related to the Cold War, from taking action to defend democracy against such

dictators as François Duvalier, Rafael Trujillo, Anastasio Somoza, or against the communist

regime of Fidel Castro, which was excluded from the OAS in 1962. But those efforts did not

lead to specific, practical, and permanent instruments for the defense and promotion of

democracy, precisely because of the difference between the systems that existed at that

time.3

Today, at the start of the 21st century, and in view of the congruence in democratic

systems and the joint commitment to democracy being shown by the governments of the

hemisphere, it seems that an inter-American democratic regime (Régimen Democrático

Inter-Americano, REDI, in Spanish) is emerging, as a concrete expression of a new

democratic paradigm, involving a community of nation-states that share a commitment to

democratic values and practices, a commitment that today guides and influences the conduct

regional organization to be given supranational authority and tools to intervene in the internal affairs of our

States,” La Democracia en el Sistema Interamericano, cited above. p. 87. 3 See Slater, Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes”; and Robert D. Tomasek,

“The OAS and Dispute Settlement,” Revista Interamericana de Bibliografía, no. 4 (1989). In fact, during the

1960s, not much attention was given within the OAS to the violation of human rights and of the principle of

democracy if they occurred in “big” and strongly anticommunist countries.

4

of their members in the defense and promotion of democracy.4

The thesis of this work is that the hemispheric community of nation-states is

building, in a more deliberate and effective form, an inter-American democratic regime

through the development of principles, norms, and juridical/diplomatic instruments and

through cooperative and collective actions for the defense and promotion of democracy. To

this end, member states would utilize the OAS as the central but not exclusive institution of

the inter-American system, in addition to subregional arrangements such as Mercosur or the

Río Group, or indeed would take unilateral action. Following Stephen D. Krasner's

definition, the word “regime” is understood to mean “an explicit or implicit set of principles,

norms, regulations, and procedures for decision-making, around which the expectations [and

actions] of the actors revolve in a given area [e.g., democracy] of international relations.”5

In this new context, all the nation-states of the hemisphere see regional peace and

their own security as depending on the security, stability, and continuity of each democracy

of the region. From this perspective, democracy is indivisible. A threat to one democracy

4 This notion of a paradigm is based on the sociological significance assigned to the term by Thomas S. Kuhn,

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), pp. 175–177. 5 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 2. This

definition is one of the most accepted in the specialized literature. Also, according to Krasner, Hedley Bull, in

Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Colombia University, 1977), argues that

“institutions contribute to the observance of rules, by formulating them, disseminating them, managing them,

applying them, interpreting them, and giving them legitimacy.” Krasner also states, as do Joseph Nye and

Robert Jervis, that international regimes are different from international agreements. The latter are ad hoc and

specific, while regimes facilitate agreements and not only incorporate norms and expectations that facilitate

cooperation but are a form of cooperation that goes beyond the pursuit of short-terms self interest. The

reference is to the works of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston: Little,

Brown, 1977); and Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, International Regimes, p. 173. Despite the

stinging criticism from Susan Strange of the concept in "A Critique of Regime Analysis," in ibid., the concept

is fairly valid and useful to visualize and give meaning to a series of occurrences or pattern that are observed

with increasing frequency in the conduct of the countries of the hemisphere in their inter-American relations,

particularly with respect to the defense and promotion of democracy. Viron Vaky, in Vaky and Muñoz, Future

of the Organization of American States, in 1994, wonders whether member states would convert the OAS into

an effective tool for regional governance and construction of the inter-American regime. This work argues that

at a minimum, an inter-American democratic regime is being created.

5

poses a threat to all the democracies of the hemisphere. The new norms and instruments are

designed to permit and facilitate the collective defense and strengthening of democracy in

each of the member states. This is essentially a commitment to regional security and peace

based on the concept of “democratic peace.” Democratic freedoms and institutional checks

and balances tend to favor peaceful solutions to international disputes and conflicts.

Democracy fosters mutual trust.

In contrast, dictatorships tend to be aggressive governments not restrained by

democratic institutions. They tend to generate instability and internal conflict, which, in

general, transcend national borders, creating mistrust and insecurity in international

relations. Both threaten peace and security, and hence the importance of defending,

promoting, and strengthening democracy in each member state. Regional peace and security

depend on the full exercise of democracy. Internal aggression or threats aimed at interrupting

or destroying democracy in a member state would be a potential threat to the democratic

community of the region.6

This notion of “democratic security/peace,” which assumes that the exercise of

democracy does not lead to war, seems to have been implicit already in the 1948 founding

charter when member states stipulated in Article 3 that “solidarity…and the high aims which

are sought through [e.g., cooperation and peace] require” that the member states be

organized “on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.” For the

writers of the charter, no doubt the continued existence of democracy was a prerequisite for

solidarity, security, and peace among states. This idea is more clearly expressed in the 1985

6 Recently the relationship between democracy, on one hand, and security and peace, on the other, has been

studied extensively in the field of political science and international relations, and is known in specialized

literature as "the democratic peace." In theory, the principle that democratic states do not declare war on one

another is sensible and persuasive. Empirically speaking, however, a small number of studies have found

exceptions and have maintained that the correlation is not always linear. See, for example, Paul Senese,

“Democracy and Maturity; Deciphering Conditional Effects on Levels of Dispute Intensity,” International

Studies Quarterly, no. 3 (September 1999); John R. Oneal and Bruce Russet, “The Classical Liberals Were

Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985,” International Studies Quarterly, no. 2 (June

1997); James Lee Ray, “The Democratic Path to Peace,” Journal of Democracy, no. 2 (April 1997); Kurt

Taylor Gaubatz, “Kant, Democracy and History,” Journal of Democracy, no. 4 (October 1996); and Edward

Mandsfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs (May/June 1995).

6

charter amendments, when the states indicate that they are “convinced that representative

democracy is an indispensable requirement for the stability, peace, and development of the

region.”7

The interest in defending democracy, given its implications for security and peace in

the hemisphere, is not new or something to which the OAS merely paid lip service. It was

specifically manifested in the actions and sanctions (diplomatic, economic, military) of

member states, collectively through the OAS, or unilaterally against the dictatorships of

Trujillo, Castro, Somoza, Manuel Noriega, and, recently, Raoul Cédras.8 And in the 1980s,

7 See also the Declaration of Santiago, Chile, 1959, of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of

Foreign Relations, which states that the existence of antidemocratic regimes violates the principles on which

the organization is based and is a threat to peaceful coexistence in the Hemisphere. See Garcia-Amador, El

Systema Inter-Americano, p. 532. Other significant references to the defense of democracy is the Santiago

Commitment of 1991, Resolution 1080 of Santiago, Chile, and the Washington Protocol on Amendments to the

Charter, the application of which will be discussed later. Some authors are already combining the topics of

security and democracy and are analyzing their relationship in the new inter-American context. See, for

example, Enrique Obando Arbulú, “Democracia y Seguridad Hemisférica,” Análisis Internacional (Lima, Peru:

Peruvian International Studies Center), nos. 6–7 (April–September 1994); Andrés Fontana, “La Seguridad

Hemisférica en los 1990s: Hacia una Comunidad Hemisférica Democrática,” Mimeo., Buenos Aires, 1999;

and “Seguridad Cooperativa: Tendencias Globales y Oportunidades para el Continente Americano,” Working

Document, no. 16, Instituto de Servicio Exterior de la Nacion, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1996. It is interesting

to note also that the Central American states recently signed a democratic security treaty. 8 As early as 1945, the Uruguayan foreign minister, Rodriguez Larreta, had proposed a system of collective

defense for restoring democracy when it had been overthrown, which was enthusiastically supported by the

United States. However, it did not receive the approval of the majority of Latin American countries. See Slater,

“The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,” pp. 240–241; Wilson, “The OAS and Promoting Democracy and

Resolving Disputes; Tomasek, “The OAS and Dispute Settlement”; and Muñoz, “The OAS and Democratic

Governance.” In Latin America, or rather in the wider Caribbean region, the opposite of the democracy-peace

relationship seems to confirm this theory: The dictatorships of the region were at the root of instability,

insecurity, and conflict in the region, at least since the creation of the OAS. Although the majority of the

conflicts and the antidictatorship actions occurred during the Cold War, when many argued that every conflict

was connected to it and to manipulation by the United States (a theory that ignored the democratic interests and

ideals of many Latin American leaders), and that efforts to secure democracy were only a smokescreen, today

one wonders, in light of the failure of the communist paradigm, with its violations of human rights and of the

most basic political and civil freedoms, whether these efforts to secure democracy, called interventionist by

7

democracy in Central America was sought as a central outcome of the peace negotiations,

because it was perceived as a condition and guarantee of firm and lasting peace within

countries and between the countries of the region.9

Despite the significance of these developments in the Americas and the growing and

unique role of the OAS in them—particularly in terms of important issues for the field of

international relations such as sovereignty, nonintervention, and peace and security— they

have been practically ignored as the focus of analysis or study in the most prominent

international relations academic circles, both in the United States and in Latin America.

Also, and despite the new interest in the role of international institutions awakened by end of

the Cold War, interdependence and globalization, virtually no serious studies have been

published on the OAS (at least in the past ten years). Some of the most respected journals in

this field, such as International Studies Quarterly, International Organization, and World

Politics, have failed to study the OAS. This paper seeks to place the analysis of the OAS in

the context of the academic discussions on international regimes and organizations that

appeared in these journals. An effort also is made to provide some empirical elements on its

structure and functioning, which could contribute to a more detailed and in-depth knowledge

of the organization and serve to enrich theoretical and practical discussion on the role of

international organizations.10

their left-wing detractors, were not valid and timely in the grand scheme of things, despite the abuses that may

have been committed in their name. 9 See the text of the Esquipulas II Agreement in OEA/Ser. G CP/doc. 1827/87, August 14, 1987. 10 Although these academic publications originate in the United States, they represent essentially the

“establishment” and the intellectual mind-set in the field of international relations and their content serves as

important indicators of trends and new paradigms in the study of international relations in the United States,

Latin America, and Europe. See Ole Waever, “The Sociology of Not So International Discipline: American and

European Developments in International Relations,” and Peter Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen

Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” International Organization, vol. 52

(Autumn 1998). In the United States these publications are influential not only in academic circles but also

have an impact on the training of specialists who frequently work in government circles formulating and

implementing international policy. The journal International Studies Quarterly is a publication of the

International Studies Association, which organizes an annual international convention of specialists

(academicians and officials) on international relations in several countries of the world. These conventions

offer more than 300 sessions on subjects that are topical and of academic and political relevance in the area of

8

The Defense of Democracy: New Legal/Diplomatic Instruments and Their Application

The collective effort of protecting and strengthening democracy has been taking place within

the OAS since the mid-1980s and can be seen largely in the development and application of

a number of legal and diplomatic instruments. 11

Charter Changes

The first instrument pertains to changes made to the OAS Charter in 1985. Here

representative democracy explicitly becomes one of the main purposes of the organization,

although it has to be carried out with due respect for the principle of nonintervention, a

fundamental and long-standing principle of the OAS. The changes to the charter also confer

new “powers” on the secretary-general, which authorize him, for the first time (Article 110),

to bring to the attention of the Permanent Council or the General Assembly of the OAS any

matter that in his view affects or threatens the peace, security, and/or development of a

member state.

This instrument, plus the General Assembly Resolution of 1989, “Human Rights,

Democracy and Electoral Observations,” which instructs the secretary-general to organize

electoral observations at the request of a member state, opened the way for the OAS and the

secretary-general to get involved and to have a significant role in the peace and

democratization process in Central America in the late 1980s. The OAS, the United Nations

international relations. A rapid analysis of the programs of the most recent conventions of the decade also

shows the dearth of studies or sessions on the OAS. By way of exception, mention should be made of the work

of Javier Corrales and Richard Feinberg, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere: Power,

Interest, and Intellectual Traditions,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 43 (March 1999), which mentions

the role of the OAS in the promotion of democracy, but only as a positive example of the waning of an

antihemispheric intellectual tradition that was opposed to a regime of stronger inter-American cooperation. Of

course, some studies on the OAS have been done from time to time during the 1990s, most of which have been

cited in this work. This paper hopes to stimulate academic interest in teaching and research on the institution. 11 On the role played by international juridical norms in the building of international systems and political

change, see Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,”

International Organization, vol. 52, no.4 (1998).

9

(UN), the Contadora Group (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama), and the Support

Group (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay), monitored, encouraged, and facilitated

compliance with the negotiation process and the signing of the peace and democracy accords

of Esquipulas, Guatemala; Sapoa, Nicaragua; and Tela, Honduras.12

Concerned over the worsening conflict in Central America, the secretaries-general of

the OAS, Joao Clemente Baena Soares, and of the United Nations, Javier Pérez de Cuellar,

in an unprecedented effort at coordination between the two organizations, offered their

support to Central American countries and to the Contadora Group and the Support Group in

November 1986. The proposal was swiftly accepted by the foreign ministers of both groups,

and the two secretaries-general were invited to participate in a fact-finding mission and a

meeting to be held in Central America in early 1987 to revive the peace effort.13 In August

1987, through a proposal by the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias (San José, February

12 A few years before, the OAS had already played a significant role in withdrawing legitimacy from the

Somoza government, when the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations, acting as the

Organ of Consultation, recommended that the regime be replaced immediately and a democratic government

installed. That meeting sent a mission of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate

accusations of human rights violations, and it found that the Somoza government had committed repeated and

widespread violations of the human rights of Nicaraguan citizens. This report served as the basis for the

Meeting of Ministers to condemn the Somoza dictatorship for the situation in the country and to recommend its

removal. See 17th Meeting of Consultation OAS/Ser. F/II. 17 Doc. 40/79, rev. 2, June 23, 1979. See also

Wilson, "The OAS and Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes,” p. 480. This involvement of the OAS

in Nicaragua against the Somoza dictatorship represented perhaps the beginning of a new era of activism by the

organization on behalf of democracy, marked by a new consensus among member states on the need to defend

and promote democracy. This crystallizes later in the political and diplomatic instruments discussed here. On

that occasion, as on others before and after the conflicts in Central America and the Caribbean, a correlation

was established between threats to the peace and security of the region, on one hand, and the struggle against

dictatorship and in favor of democracy, on the other. See also Slater, “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance, ” in

his The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. 13 See Hugo Caminos and Roberto Lavalle, “New Departures in the Exercise of Inherent Powers by UN and

OAS Secretaries General: The Central American Situation,” American Journal of International Law (April

1989); and Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 183–203. The foreign ministers of the Contadora and

Support Groups, together with the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN, made a tour of Central America

and held a final meeting on January 21, 1987, in Mexico City, at which both officials were requested to

continue their support of the peace process.

10

1987) entitled "Procedures to Establish a Solid and Lasting Peace in Central America," the

presidents of Central America signed the Esquipulas II agreement, creating the International

Verification and Monitoring Commission (CIVS), made up of the foreign ministers of

Central America, the Contadora Group, the Support Group, and the two secretaries-

general.14

Subsequently, the secretary-general of the OAS participated as an observer and on

some occasions as an informal facilitator for the negotiation process between the Nicaraguan

government and the rebel army, the “Resistencia Nicaragüense,” known as the Contras,

which culminated in the Sapoa Accord of March 1988. That accord, based on Esquipulas II,

called for the cessation of military operations, the beginning of negotiations, a general

amnesty, guarantees of a free press and free elections, and the establishment of the

Verification Commission, composed of Cardinal Miguel Obando and the secretary-general

of the OAS—which was asked to help in implementing the commission. This agreement also

gave rise to a request by the Nicaraguan government for the OAS to send an observer

mission for the elections held in February 1990.

In August 1989 the presidents of Central America, at a summit meeting in Tela,

Honduras, made further progress toward peace and democracy in the region by ratifying the

Esquipulas II commitment. They created the International Support and Verification

Commission (CIAV) and requested the secretaries-general of the OAS and the UN to

establish it immediately with a humanitarian program for the demobilization, repatriation,

and voluntary relocation of former irregular combatants (Contras) and their families. The

OAS became the guarantor and facilitator for compliance with these agreements in

Nicaragua, especially with respect to the cease-fire and the disarming, demobilization, and

repatriation of the Nicaraguan Resistance, including their resettlement, and the provision of

social services, socioeconomic assistance, and guarantees of no reprisals. The UN was made

responsible for demobilizing the Contras in Honduras. All of this was ratified by the new

14 This agreement essentially called for setting up national reconciliation commissions to oversee amnesties,

cease-fire, democratization, elections, dialogue with the opposition in El Salvador and Nicaragua, repatriation

of refugees; to ensure that countries of the region were not used as bases by rebel forces with external support;

and to ensure that external support to irregular forces should cease (e.g., United States support to the Contras in

Honduras). See text of the accord, in OAS/Ser.G CP/doc. 1827/87, August 4, 1987.

11

Nicaraguan government of Violeta Chamorro (elected in February 1990) and in the Tocontin

Agreement with leaders of the resistance in March of 1990.15

Resolution 1080

The second instrument available to the OAS for the defense and promotion of democracy

was established at the 1991 General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, by means of Resolution

1080, entitled “Representative Democracy.” This resolution reiterates the commitment of

member states to take joint and immediate action to protect democracy in any member state

when it is threatened. It also vests the secretary-general with new powers, specifically the

authority to convene a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, when there is “a

sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or of the

legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government” in a member state.

This organ can, in turn, convene a special meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which

shall decide on the specific measures to be adopted by the OAS. This resolution has been

applied in four specific cases: Haiti, Peru, Guatemala, and Paraguay. In Ecuador and

15 By July 1990, the CIAV/OAS had already demobilized some 22,500 combatants and had relocated another

18,000 Nicaraguans returning from Costa Rica and Honduras. CIAV/OAS conducted a program to help

reintegrate former combatants and displaced persons, including the provision of food, medical assistance,

vocational training and support for projects in agriculture, livestock, and fishing. Some 120,000 individuals

were given clothing, tools, construction materials, and in cooperation with the Pan American Health

Organization, some 1,500 ex-combatants received medical and psychological attention. See Baena Soares,

Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 199–200. In addition to these demobilization and reintegration tasks, the

CIAV/OAS provided support for socioeconomic and institutional development in former conflict zones and

collaborated with the National Institute for Municipal Development in conducting training workshops for

mayors within the conflict zones dealing with aspects of legislation and municipal administration. It also

undertook surveillance and verification for the observance of human rights and served as a facilitator for

resolving conflicts. Together with the government and the Catholic church, it participated in the Tripartite

Commission responsible for examining the causes of violence and provided technical assistance for creating,

organizing, training, and setting up local networks of human rights activists and the peace commissions

composed of community leaders in places most prone to violence. The mandate of the CIAV came to an end

formally in December 1996. See International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV/OAS), The Peace

Process in Nicargua: Verification of Human Rights, Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts and Building the Peace

(OAS, August 1996).

12

Venezuela, the resolution was not invoked.

Haiti

In Haiti, after the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrande Aristide on September 29, 1991,

OAS secretary-general Baena Soares immediately invoked Resolution 1080 and convened a

meeting of the Permanent Council. This organ condemned the coup d’état and immediately

called an ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. This supreme organ of the OAS

met quickly and also condemned the coup; the ministers also decided, inter alia, not to

recognize the illegal government; to recommend the suspension of financial, commercial,

and diplomatic relations with the military government; to suspend cooperation and financial

and military assistance; and to send a mission chaired by the OAS secretary-general to

express to the new authorities the OAS’s condemnation of the action taken against the

constitutional government.16

From then on, and for three years, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs met five times

within the framework of the OAS to analyze the situation in Haiti, to ratify condemnation of

the coup d’état, and to increase gradually the pressure on the de facto government. At these

meetings, member states agreed, inter alia, to send a mission to observe respect for human

rights and to facilitate the restoration of democracy; to recommend new sanctions that

included the freezing of assets in international banks, the suspension of credit, international

assistance, and commercial flights; and to impose a trade embargo, with exceptions being

made on humanitarian grounds. They also agreed to seek the cooperation of the international

community, including the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank in

applying these sanctions.17

Following the Washington agreements of February 1992 and after much foot-

dragging by the de facto government, the OAS was able to send a reduced contingent (18

16 MRE/RES. 1/91, “Support for the Democratic Government of Haiti,” October 3, 1991. 17 During the three years of the crisis, periodic meetings were held and resolutions passed by the OAS

Permanent Council, monitoring closely and carefully, together with the Secretary General, the events that were

taking place. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 68–123; Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the

Inter-American System,” pp. 137–149; and Anthony Manigot, “Haiti’s Sovereign Consent vs. State-Centric

Sovereignty,” in Tom Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 189–212.

13

members) of the civilian mission known as OAS-DEMOC (democracy).18 The mission took

up position in Haiti in September 1992 and began its task of observing and promoting

respect for human rights, helping to reduce the level of violence, and verifying and

promoting compliance with the Washington agreements, in order to achieve a lasting

solution to the crisis. Moreover, the OAS requested UN assistance, and a contingent of

observers from the world organization was added to the OAS observers. Together, as of

February 1993, they formed the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (ICIVMIH), which at

one time had as many as 200 members. As a result, a close and fruitful cooperative

relationship began to develop with the United Nations through the secretaries-general of

both institutions. Also, the governing bodies of both organizations (Ad-hoc Meeting of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Council of the OAS and the General

Assembly and Security Council of the UN) explicitly provided mutual and complementary

support for the decisions taken to manage and end the crisis.19

The political crisis came to a dramatic and unsatisfactory end about one year of the

18 These agreements were facilitated and intermediated at OAS headquarters by the secretary- general and his

team. The protocol was signed by the presidents of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, by the prime

minister designate, Rene Theodore, and by President Aristide. A second instrument was signed by President

Aristide, the prime minister designate, and the secretary-general. In essence, these agreements recognized the

urgent need to find a negotiated solution to the crisis, to restore democratic institutions fully, and to reestablish

constitutional guarantees and freedoms. They included the return of President Aristide, a general amnesty,

separation between the armed forces and the police, and the presence of the Civilian Mission of the OAS to

guarantee compliance with the accords. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 95–97. 19 The ICIVMIH had offices in all regions of the country. Its major work of observing and promoting respect

for human rights was complemented in the first years through programs to strengthen and modernize the

offices of the president, the prime minister, and the minister of foreign relations; the legislative branch;

political parties: and the office of the public defender. Subsequently it undertook programs to strengthen the

Ministry of Justice, including advice on judicial reform, training for police forces and judges in the area of

human rights and dispute settlement, and also education in civics and in the promotion of human rights for

government authorities and civic and community leaders. The important contributions of ICIVMIH to the

defense and promotion human rights and democratic institutions have been widely recognized both by the

national authorities and by the international community. After seven years of operations, and at the request of

the government of Haiti, the mandate of ICIVMIH was ended in March 2000. See David Forsythe, “The

United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas,” in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, pp. 107–131; and Vaky and

Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, pp. 35–39.

14

signing of the Governors Island Agreement (July 1993), which had stipulated a number of

steps for the return of President Aristide prior to October 30 of that year.20 The de facto

government had failed to comply with the aforementioned agreement by blocking progress

in the dialogue between the presidential commission and representatives of the Haitian

Parliament. No progress had been made in normalizing the functioning of Parliament or in

the parliamentary approval of a prime minister appointed by Aristide. There also had been

no movement on reforming the judiciary system or the police force, in the appointment of

new military authorities, or in mandating the early retirement of the commander of the armed

forces. In October 1993, the de facto government prevented the landing of American and

Canadian troops sent to the country within the framework of Security Council Resolution

867 to facilitate the implementation of Article 5 of the Governors Island Agreement. And to

make things worse, the ICIVMIH was expelled and its members had to leave the country

temporarily, as the human rights situation deteriorated dramatically and the flow of refugees

to the United States increased greatly.

Against that backdrop, the United Nations Security Council, by means of Resolution

940 of July 31, 1994, within the framework of Chapter VII of its charter, authorized

“member States to join a multilateral force, … to use all means necessary to facilitate the

departure from Haiti of the military leaders in accordance with the Governors Island

Agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, and the reestablishment

of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti.” This decision of the highest

multilateral entity permitted the government of the United States to begin exerting

diplomatic and military pressure that culminated with the removal of the de facto

government and the return of Aristide as president of Haiti in October 1994.21

20 The agreement was the result of the initiatives and negotiations spearheaded by the joint envoy, Dante

Caputo, former foreign minister of Argentina. 21 The authorization by the Security Council of a comprehensive and mandatory commercial embargo, in

accordance with the OAS recommendation, was based on the argument that the humanitarian crisis in Haiti

posed a threat to security and peace in the region. SC/RES./841 (1993), June 16, 1993. The same argument was

used for Resolution 940. The U.S. government sent a mission composed of former President Jimmy Carter,

Senator Sam Nunn, and General Colin Powell mainly to warn the government of General Cédras of the

imminent arrival of U.S. troops to restore the government of President Aristide.

15

Peru

In Peru, after the government of President Alberto Fujimori, on April 5, 1992, dissolved the

Legislature and intervened the judiciary, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, the National

Council of the Judiciary, and Court of Constitutional Guarantees, Secretary-General Baena

Soares, invoking Resolution 1080, convened the Permanent Council of the OAS. The council

had an emergency meeting and, in view of the “serious events that had occurred in Peru

[which] had led to an interruption of the democratic political institutional process in that

country,” decided to condemn the events, to urge the Peruvian authorities to facilitate,

immediately, the full functioning of democratic institutions, and to convene, in view of the

gravity of the events, an Ad-hoc Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers, pursuant to

Resolution 1080.22

The ad hoc meeting took place on April 13. During the meeting, the member states

reiterated their condemnation of the event and urged the Peruvian authorities to release the

legislators, political leaders, and trade union leaders who had been detained. They also call

on member states to reassess their relations with Peru and to ask the president of the ad hoc

meeting to put together a mission, along with the secretary-general and other foreign

ministers, to go to Peru to promote dialogue between the Peruvian authorities and the

political forces represented in the Legislature.23 The OAS mission, headed by the foreign

minister of Uruguay, Hector Gross Espiel, and the OAS secretary-general, Baena Soares,

visited Peru three times and met with government representatives and various opposition

groups. During these meetings, it was decided that elections for a constituent assembly

would be called.24

This agreement was ratified at the second ad hoc meeting of May 18, 1992, held in

the Bahamas, during which President Fujimori formally committed himself to hold those

elections, with OAS monitoring. The elections were held in November 1992.25

22 CP/RES. 579 (897/92), “The Situation in Peru,” April 6, 1992. 23 MRE/RES. 1/92, “Support for the Reestablishment of Democracy in Peru,” April 13, 1992. 24 Fujimori originally wanted to hold a plebiscite on the actions taken, while the opposition was seeking the

resignation and prosecution of Fujimori and the immediate calling of general elections. Baena Soares, Síntesis

de una Gestión, pp. 41–44. 25 MRE/RES. 2/92, May 18, 1992. Hugo de Zela, “The OAS and Electoral Observation,” International

Analysis (Lima: Peruvian Center for International Studies, December 1993).

16

The restoration of democracy was due not only to the automatic and immediate

application of the multilateral mechanisms of the OAS but also to the concerns expressed,

the suspension of assistance, and the bilateral pressure exerted by the international

community, including the United States, Japan, Spain, the European Union, the Río Group,

and the Inter-American Development Bank, among others. Within Peru, despite the

popularity of the actions taken by President Fujimori, the press, the traditional political

forces, and the intellectual community strenuously insisted on and pressed for the return to

the constitutional order.26

More recently, during the elections held in 2000, the OAS continued to play a

significant role in supporting the democratic process in Peru by not covalidating Fujimori’s

reelection, because of serious irregularities observed in the electoral process that undermined

the validity of the results, and by exercising diplomatic and political pressure through the

presence in Lima of a political observation mission, which acted as a facilitator of

negotiations between the government and opposition leaders.27

26 See Fabián Novak, “Defense of Democracy and Application of Resolution 1080 to the Case of Peru,” in

Arlene Tickner, ed., Sistema Interamericano y Democracia (Bogotá, Colombia: Centro de Estudios

Internacionales, Universidad de los Andes, UPD/OEA, 2000). 27 This mission was established and accepted by Fujimori at the General Assembly in June of 2000. The OAS

monitoring of those elections had extensive international visibility because of the irregularities that it found in

the electoral process. This compelled the member states, at the Windsor General Assembly, to send a high-level

mission, presided over by Secretary General Gaviria and Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian foreign minister, to

explore with all those concerned the options and recommendations that might contribute to the strengthening of

democracy in Peru. At the end of its visit in June of 2000, the mission proposed an agenda for negotiations that

was accepted by most of the political actors and included reforms for the strengthening of the administration of

justice, the rule of law, the separation and balance of powers, freedom of expression, transparency in the

electoral system; and civilian control of the intelligence apparatus and of the armed forces. The permanent

mission, headed by the former foreign minister of the Dominican Republic, Eduardo Latorre, monitored closely

in situ the negotiation and reform process as well as its implementation. Although, for some, this OAS response

was insufficient, one must understand it in context: The organization is not a monolithic and supranational

entity, autonomous of its member states. Its decisions are the result of long and arduous negotiations and

compromises, its traditional method of decision making. The OAS response at Windsor was consistent with

that tradition. It was a compromise between some foreign Mministers who wanted a more activist position in

favor of democracy and fair elections and those who preferred a less “interventionist” posture. See the

mission's report: Observación Electoral en Perú. Elecciones Generales del 9 de abril de 2000, OEA/Ser.D/XX,

17

Eventually the Fujimori regime collapsed, as revelations of widespread corruption

and bribery schemes within his inner circle became publicly known. In September 2000, he

fired his principal adviser, Vladimir Montesinos, announced that he would resign, and

proposed constitutional reforms that would allow for early elections. Fujimori resigned

abruptly in November 2000 and exiled himself in Japan. Fair elections were held in April

and June 2001.

Guatemala

In Guatemala, on May 25, 1993, President José Luis Serrano suspended the Constitution;

dissolved Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Court; removed the attorney

general; ordered the detention of the human rights ombudsman; and suspended the electoral

law and the political parties. In light of these events, the OAS secretary-general, in the

exercise of the powers conferred on him under Resolution 1080, immediately convened a

meeting of the Permanent Council. In its May 25, 1993, resolution, the council condemned

the events that had occurred and urged the Guatemalan authorities to reestablish

“immediately the complete functioning of democratic institutions”; convened an ad hoc

meeting; and called on the secretary-general to head a “fact-finding” mission to examine the

events and provide information on the situation in Guatemala at that meeting. The secretary-

general's mission met with officials of the institutions affected by the presidential decision;

with the leaders of political parties and the armed forces; and with representatives of

pertinent sectors of Guatemalan society.28

The ad hoc meeting took place on June 3, 1993, in Washington, D.C. It took note of

the secretary-general’s fact-finding mission, once again condemned the events that had

occurred, and urged the government to reestablish democratic institutions. In addition, it

resolved to call on member states to evaluate their relations and cooperation with Guatemala,

to ask the secretary-general to return to the country to continue providing support for “the

efforts of the Guatemalan people to reestablish constitutional order through dialogue and

SG/UPD/II.26, December 13, 2000. 28 CP/RES. 605, “The Situation in Guatemala,” May 25, 1993. Accompanying the secretary- general on his

mission were the foreign ministers of Barbados, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una

Gestión, pp. 53–68.

18

cooperation,” and to report on the results to the next session of the meeting. Also, member

states “approved” the Guatemalans' rejection of the events and their strong support for all

peaceful efforts “to find a democratic solution.”29

In the meantime, the international community and a number of member states

expressed their concern and rejection of the “presidential coup” and started to assess their

relationship with the government. Argentina withdrew its ambassador and canceled a

scheduled visit of President Jose Antonio Serrano to that country. Chile withdrew its military

cooperation. The U.S. ambassador to the OAS announced the suspension of trade

preferences for Guatemala. The presidents of Central America and Mexico also issued an

appeal to their Guatemalan counterpart.30

At the same time, the presidential coup was widely and forcefully resisted by the vast

majority of the Guatemalan media and people, which significantly contributed to the end of

the crisis. The Constitutional Court itself did not recognize the presidential coup and

declared unconstitutional the decree issued by Serrano. Also, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal

refused to accept Serrano’s call for a referendum.31

During the second visit of the secretary-general’s mission, the crisis came to an end.

Serrano resigned on June 1 and left the country, basically because of the resistance to his

actions by the people and institutions that had been targeted for dissolution and because of

the lack of support of the armed forces.32 Since Vice President Gustavo Espina Salguero was

considered to bear joint responsibility for the crisis, the Constitutional Court immediately

called on the Congress of the Republic to elect a new president for the remainder of the

29 MRE/RES. 1/93, “Reestablishment of Democracy in Guatemala,” June 3, 1993; and Francisco Villagrán, La

Crisis Constitucional en Guatemala, La Respuesta de la OEA y de la Sociedad Civil en la Defensa de la

Democracia (Washington, DC: Institute of Peace, October 1993); and Minutes of the Second Ad-hoc Meeting

of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, OEA/Serv. F/V.3, MRE/Acta 2/93, June 7, 1993, p. 17. 30 CP/ACTA 945/93, Situation in Guatemala, May 25, 1993; and Minutes of the Second Meeting. 31 See the report of Secretary-General Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 53–68; and the statement of

the Representative of Guatemala, Minutes of the Second Meeting, pp. 8–9. 32 The support of the Guatemalan armed forces for the court’s decision and demanding that the presidency

make public the court’s ruling played a decisive role in toppling Serrano. The minister of defense announced

that he had asked Serrano to comply with the ruling of the Constitutional Court but that the president had

refused to do so and had stepped down. See Minutes of the Second Meeting, p. 9.

19

constitutional term. On June 6 the Congress appointed the human rights ombudsman, Ramiro

de Léon Carpio, to this position.

Paraguay

In Paraguay, President Juan Carlos Wasmosy (constitutionally also the commander in chief

of the armed forces) sought the resignation of General Lino Oviedo, head of the army, on

April 22, 1996. The general's refusal to comply with the presidential order propelled the

country into an institutional crisis. His insubordination and failure to recognize the

presidential authority was an ill-disguised attempt to carry out a coup d’état, which also

included a call for the resignation of Wasmosy as well as military and political threats and

pressure against him.33 Strictly and formally speaking, these events cannot be classified as

institutional rupture, but they did create an ambiguous and murky situation that led to

uncertainty about institutional continuity. At least in the view of Paraguan citizens and the

international community, the situation posed an imminent threat to the interruption of the

“legitimate exercise of power by a democratically elected government,” as stipulated in

Resolution 1080. In that context and at the request of OAS secretary-general César Gaviria,

the chairman of the Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Panama,

Ambassador Lawrence Chewning Fábrega, called a special meeting of the Permanent

Council on April 23 to assess the situation.34

That organ met and condemned the attempted coup and expressed its decisive

support for the constitutional government of Juan Carlos Wasmosy, calling for the

Constitution and the legally established government to be respected. It also convened an Ad-

hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs without setting a date; this meeting did not take

33 In view of upcoming internal elections within the Colorado party, as well as presidential elections, Oviedo

had been distancing himself from the government and reducing his participation and political influence within

the government-backed party. Wasmosy not only considered this to be inappropriate and illegal conduct on the

part of a military officer but also a challenge to his authority and the presidency. 34 On that day Secretary-General Gaviria was on an official mission to Bolivia. In a 2 A.M. telephone call, he

asked the chairman of the council to convene the meeting. See the statement of Ambassador Lawrence

Chewing Fábrega, who was chairman of the Permanent Council during the crisis, in La Crisis Institucional de

1996 en el Paraguay, UPD/OAS Democratic Forum, 1996, p. 14.

20

place because the crisis ended quickly.35

On that same day, César Gaviria, together with the deputy foreign minister of

Bolivia, Jaime Aparicio (Bolivia was serving a secretary pro tempore of the Río Group),

went to Asunción to express the support of both organizations for President Wasmosy and

Paraguayan democracy. The Argentine foreign minister, the Uruguayan foreign minister, and

the Brazilian deputy foreign minister also went to Asunción for the same purpose. In the

meantime, the ambassadors of the United States, Argentina, and Brazil were engaged

intensely, publicly and privately, to support the president and to explicitly reject the actions

taken by General Oviedo.36 The crisis ended with the formal resignation of General Oviedo

from his position as army chief on April 24 in a public ceremony that was attended by

Secretary-General Gaviria and President Wasmosy. 37

35 CP/RES. 680 (1071/96), “Support for the Democratic Government of Paraguay,” April 23, 1996. See

Chewning Fábrega, in La Crisis Institucional de 1996 en el Paraguay, p. 14. 36 The Argentine, Uruguayan, and Brazilian ambassadors also expressed their support for Wasmosy on behalf

of Mercosur, whose “democratic clause” conditions membership in the group. In addition, the U.S. under

secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, announced at the meeting of the Permanent Council that “the days of

dictatorship are over” and that his government was suspending military aid to Paraguay. He added that the U.S.

government would probably participate in actions to impose diplomatic and economic sanctions if the

attempted coup proved successful. The representatives of those governments also warned Oviedo that, in such

an event, they would seek the international isolation of the new government. Oviedo had also received a call

from the head of the Brazilian army to stop his efforts to overthrow Wasmosy. On the night of April 22 and

during the early hours of the morning of April 23, the ambassadors of the United States, Robert Service, and

Brazil, Oliveira Días, and the assistant secretary of state for Latin America, Jeffrey Davidow, and Secretary-

General Gaviria managed to discourage President Wasmosy from resigning. Wasmosy was convinced that

Oviedo would carry out his military threats and that his resignation would avoid a bloodbath. On the morning

of April 23, Wasmosy received calls of encouragement from the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, the United

States, Spain, and others. Statements of support for democracy in Paraguay were also received from Chile,

Peru, Mexico, Russia, Portugal, Venezuela, and the European Community, among others. For further details,

see Arturo Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen,” Journal of Democracy, no. 1 (1997); José María Costa

and Oscar Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón: Los Secretos de un Golpe Frustrado (Asunción: Editorial Don

Bosco, 1996). 37 This resignation was apparently the result of an agreement between Wasmosy and Oviedo according to

which the latter would give up his position and insubordination in exchange for his appointment as minister of

defense. However, the president then decided not to do so, in the face of the outright and widespread popular

21

The immediate and widespread support of the international community for President

Wasmosy and Paraguayan democracy contributed significantly to the successful

management of the crisis. However, in the final analysis, and with international support, it

was the Paraguayan political, social, and military forces that found the most appropriate way

to preserve democracy in Paraguay. What sustained the democratic process and determined

the course of events were the political parties in Congress, the press, and the youth, through

popular demonstrations; and the Paraguayan air force and navy, through their public

expressions of support for the constitutional government and their resistance to Oviedo's

demands.38

Four years earlier, an attempted coup d’état in Venezuela on February 4, 1992—

although it was more traditional, open, and violent than the one in Paraguay—did not result

in the invoking of Resolution 1080. But a meeting of the Permanent Council took place

immediately, adopting a resolution entitled “Support for the Democratic Government of the

Republic of Venezuela.” At the meeting, the representatives of member states reiterated their

recent commitment to democracy and the principle of democratic solidarity, “forcefully

condemned the armed uprising against the democratic government of President Carlos

Andrés Pérez as well as the criminal attempt on his life,” and expressed their “condemnation

of all sectors that have attempted to use force to usurp popular sovereignty and the

democratic will of the Venezuelan people.” They also expressed their “resolve and

unconditional support for that Head of State” and reaffirmed “that there is no room in the

hemisphere for regimes established by force.” As an expression of inter-American

democratic solidarity and this rejection, the chairman of the Permanent Council and the

secretary-general traveled to Caracas and publicly delivered the resolution to the president of

rejection of this agreement, evidenced by thousands of demonstrators in front of the official government

headquarters. Most people view the agreement as a betrayal of democratic principles and of the support that

they had given to Wasmosy. The president announced the decision not to appoint Oviedo, acting “on a mandate

of the people,” in the speech made on April 25. See Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen”; and Costa

and Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón. Los Secretos de un Golpe Frustrado. 38 See La Crisis Institucional de 1996 en el Paraguay, UPD/OAS, Democratic Forum, 1996; as well as

Valenzuela, “The Coup that Didn’t Happen”; and Costa and Ayala Bogarín, Operación Godeón. Los Secretos

de un Golpe Frustrado.

22

Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez.39

Ecuador

When considering whether to invoke and apply Resolution 1080, mention should be made of

the irregular (or at least ambiguous and questionable from a constitutional standpoint),

although extremely popular, step to remove the president of Ecuador, Abdalá Bucarám, on

February 6, 1997. The resolution was not invoked on that occasion either, nor was there any

formal meeting of the Permanent Council on the matter.40 However, and in the spirit of the

new paradigm of defense and promotion of democracy, several member states expressed

their concern over the crisis and their interest in its prompt resolution through constitutional

and democratic channels. For that express purpose, OAS secretary-general César Gaviria, at

the request of the Ecuadorian head of state, visited Quito briefly on February 5.41

39 See CP/RES. 576 (887/92) and AG/RES. 1189 (XXII-0/92). 40 The president was removed by the National Congress, which, by a simple majority of members, declared him

mentally incapacitated and incompetent, without a political trial or proper analysis of the charges leveled

against him. The eccentric, emotional, and erratic conduct of the president (popularly known as “the

madman”), coupled with the implementation of a difficult economic adjustment program, led to a rejection of

his government by the population and even by the political forces that had originally elected and supported

him. His removal was preceded by a political/institutional crisis that placed the Congress on a collision course

with him. The crisis was accompanied by a national strike, violent street demonstrations calling for his

removal, and by the withdrawal of the armed forces’ support for his administration. See Andres Openheimer,

“Democracies Stay Out of Ecuador Controversy,” Miami Herald, February 8, 1997; Dianan J. Schemo,

“Ecuadorian Crisis Over Presidency Ends Peacefully,” New York Times, February 10, 1997; and Juan Jesús

Aznárez, “La Vicepresidenta Ecuatoriana Sustituye a Bucarám con el Apoyo del Ejército,” El Pais

Internacional, February 10, 1997. 41 Although some opposition leaders did not approve of the visit of the secretary-general and criticized his

alleged “interference” in the internal affairs of Ecuador, he made it clear in a press release that “the purpose of

his visit was simply to express the concern of the OAS over the complex situation existing in Ecuador” and that

he had “profound respect for the capacity of Ecuadorians to resolve their internal disputes on their own.” This

presence and concern on the part of the OAS was described as “understandable” by one of the most influential

newspapers of Quito in its editorial entitled: “Gaviria, Your Visit Is within Bounds,” El Comercio, February 6,

1997. Gaviria also stated that the OAS “has an unwavering commitment to defend democracy and will use the

tools available to it if the circumstances so warrant.” His visit to Quito was also openly supported by the U.S.

Department of State through its spokesman, Nicholas Burns. Despite the fact that the U.S. Ambassador to the

23

Another irregular change of government in Ecuador occurred with the overthrow of

President Jamil Mahuad on January 22, 2000, by the armed forces and indigenous groups.

The interruption of the constitutional process and the irregular manner in which the change

of government occurred was rapidly covered up, if not concealed, by the armed forces when

they appointed Vice President Gustavo Noboa as the successor. This appointment took place

after the dissolution of the civilian-military council that had been formed and in the face of

international pressure, in particular from the inter-American community through the OAS,

the United States, Mercosur countries, and Chile and Bolivia, among others.42

OAS, Harriet Babbit, informally sought consensus for a Permanent Council resolution supporting Ecuadorian

democracy, the topic was not discussed at that council meeting at which the Ecuadorian ambassador to the

OAS “provided assurances that all action would take place within constitutional channels and that there was no

possibility whatsoever of a coup d’etat in his country.” However, because the removal of Bucarán was

considered to be a violation of democratic and constitutional principles, it was condemned by the governments

of Argentina, Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. See news dispatches of the Spanish news

agency EFE, and AFP of February 5, 6, and 7 in OAS News Bulletin of February 6, 7, and 10. On February 6,

the Congress removed President Bucarán and appointed its president, Fabián Alarcón, as interim president of

the republic. However, in a brief and confusing period, Vice President Rosalía Arteaga also assumed the office

of president. (The Ecuadorian Constitution does not set forth any clear procedure for presidential succession.)

The crisis was finally resolved by another congressional decision confirming Fabián Alarcón as interim

president. 42 See “Civilian Rule Is Restored in Ecuador,” Washington Post, January 23, 2000. The OAS Permanent

Council approved a Resolution rejecting and condemning the “attack against the legitimately constituted

democratic order” at a special meeting on Friday, January 21, and supporting President Mahuad; CP/RES. 763

(1220/00), January 21, 2000. The U.S. government apparently played an important role in getting the military

leaders to recognize the danger of isolation that the country was facing with a civilian-military council or with

a clearly unconstitutional government. See the statements of Arturo Valenzuela, director of Hemispheric

Affairs of the National Security Council of the Office of the President of the United States, who points out that

during the crisis, several countries, including the United States, warned the leaders of the armed forces about

the danger of isolation Ecuador faced if the civilian-military council that had been formed took control. See the

interview in the Argentine newspaper El Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 22, 2000; CNN in Spanish,

“Governments of America and Europe Clamor for the Preservation of Democracy” in http://cnnenespañol.com,

January 22, 2000; and HOY (digital), “Cae el Triunvirato,” Quito, January 22, 2000. The Congress, which held

a special meeting in Guayaquil, approved the appointment of Noboa that same day.

24

The 1992 Washington Protocol

The third instrument now available to the OAS and its member states for the defense of

democracy is called the 1992 Washington Protocol, approved as an amendment to the OAS

Charter by the 16th regular session of the General Assembly in December 1992. With its

ratification by the majority of member states, the amendment took effect in September 1997

and is now part of the charter of the organization (Article 9). With this legal/diplomatic

instrument, member states have made further progress with their efforts to protect and

promote collectively the existence of democratic systems in the hemisphere. The spirit of

Article 9 of the charter, in essence, provides for the possibility of suspending or excluding

from the activities of the OAS any government of a member state that has not resulted from a

democratic process or that has been formed by military means.43 Since the entry into force of

Article 9, no situation has arisen in a member state that has warranted its invocation or

application.

The Inter-American Democratic Charter

A fourth instrument, known as the Inter-American Democratic Charter, was signed in Lima,

Peru, on September 11, 2001. This latest instrument is intended to strengthen Resolution

1080's “restoration function.” It stipulates that in the case of “an unconstitutional

alteration….that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member State,” it is possible

now for any member state—not just the secretary-general—to request a meeting of the

Permanent Council to assess the situation collectively and eventually, if necessary, to send a

diplomatic mission “to foster the restoration of democracy. If this fails, a special General

Assembly is to be convened to adopt decisions which “may include new diplomatic

initiatives and, if the alteration persists, the suspension of the member State from the

Organization” (Articles 20 and 21). The Democratic Charter also strengthens the preventive

function of the OAS. Article 17 now allows the government of a member state “to request

assistance from the Secretary General or the Permanent Council” for the “strengthening and

43 The article is somewhat elliptical and reads as follows: a “member of the Organization whose democratically

constituted government has been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to

participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, Meetings of Consultation, and the Councils of the

Organization.

25

preservation of its democratic system,” when it “considers that its democratic institutional

process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk.” Additionally, when the democratic

system and the legitimate exercise of power is threatened in a member state, “the Secretary

General or the Permanent Council, may, with the consent of the government concerned,

arrange visits or other actions in order to analyze the situation” and “adopt decisions for the

preservation and strengthening of the democratic system.” (Article 18).

On April 12, 2002, President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela was temporarily taken

prisoner and deposed (for approximately 48 hours) by a military faction of the armed forces

that installed Pedro Carmona, a business leader, as provisional president. The new president

tossed out the 1999 Constitution and dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court. As these

events unfolded, Latin American presidents and foreign ministers were meeting in San José,

Costa Rica, at the annual gathering of the Río Group. They condemned the coup and asked

for a meeting of the Permanent Council of the OAS, invoking Article 20 of the new charter,

to collectively assess the situation in Venezuela and adopt the appropriate decisions. On

April 13 the OAS council unanimously condemned the “alteration of the constitutional order

in Venezuela” and sent the secretary-general to Caracas “to investigate the facts and begin

the necessary diplomatic efforts, including good offices, to promote the immediate

normalization of the democratic institutions.” The council also convoked a special General

Assembly for April 18 to hear the secretary-general's report and decide on the most

appropriate actions to be taken.

The drastic measures of the interim president, plus his decision not to include in his

cabinet those labor, party, and civic leaders who had been active in opposing Chavez or the

moderate “institutionalist” military leaders, led to his immediate isolation and loss of critical

support. Under these internal circumstances, and in view of the condemnation of the coup by

the Río Group and the OAS, loyal and “institutionalist” military groups rescued Chavez from

his military prison and returned him by helicopter to the government palace at 3 A.M. on

April 14.

For three days the secretary-general examined the situation in Venezuela, and on

April 18 he presented his report to the special General Assembly. The General Assembly

unanimously approved the resolution, manifesting, inter alia, the member states'

determination to apply whenever necessary the Democratic Charter for the preservation and

26

defense of representative democracy.44 It also expressed the assembly’s satisfaction with the

reestablishment of the constitutional order in Venezuela and the return to power of the

democratically elected government of President Chavez. In addition, the member states

supported the Venezuelan government's initiative to convoke a national dialogue within the

constitutional and democratic framework, and encouraged the government to observe and

apply all the essential components of representative democracy, as stipulated in Articles 3

and 4 of the Democratic Charter (e.g., rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental

freedoms, separation and independence of powers, fair elections, pluralism). They also

offered any OAS assistance the Venezuelan government might require to consolidate its

democratic process.45

Lessons and Implications

The first lesson that can be drawn from the application fo the legal-diplomatic instruments is

clear and forceful: If there is an attempted coup d’état or irregular interruption of the

democratic process in any OAS member state, its members will take immediate and decisive

collective action through this organization, through other collective bodies, or will even act

unilaterally to stop or reverse such an attempt. Whatever action it takes, it will trigger a

process aimed at defending and restoring the democratic institutions of the country affected.

Resolution 1080 and the Democratic Charter now function as expected.46 And in the most

44 AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02). 45 Because of the uneasy relations existing between Venezuela and the United States, some have speculated that

the U.S. government supported the coup at least that it recognized the coup-makers too quickly, and only

belatedly condemned the coup, when it was reversed. But the fact is that both the Permanent Council and the

Special General Assembly resolutions, with theexplicit vote of the United States, strongly condemned the

unconstitutional rupture of the democratic process. See Arturo Valenzuela, “Bush's Betrayal of Democracy,”

and Karen De Young, “U.S. Seen as Weak Patron of Latin Democracy,” Washington Post, April 16, 2002. See

also Michael Shifter, “Democracy in Venezuela: Unsettling as Ever,” Washington Post, April 21, 2002, and

Peter Hakim, “Democracy and U.S. Credibility,” New York Times, April 21, 2002. 46 See Vaky in Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, p. 28. During the second

Ad-hoc Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs that was studying the crisis in Guatemala, the

Mexican secretary of foreign relations gave special recognition to the constructive work of the OAS and

described it as having acted in “a timely and effective manner,” thereby showing the “potential of our

27

extreme case, that of Haiti, it was possible for member states, pursuant to Resolution 1080,

not only to condemn the illegal regime but also to recommend sanctions, such as the freezing

of bank accounts/assets, the suspension of loans and assistance, the breaking of diplomatic

relations, and/or the imposition of embargoes. In Peru, the application of Resolution 1080

had consequences beyond the scope of the OAS and the hemisphere. The suspension of its

participation in the Río Group and the threats by pertinent actors of the international

community to suspend international cooperation, international investments, and

economic/trade relations probably played a significant role in the decision of the Peruvian

government to return to the more traditional democratic fold. Although these decisions took

the form of recommendations and their application is always voluntary and nonbinding

(unlike the decisions of the UN Security Council), these new OAS instruments signal a

collective stand in and a commitment to the defense of democracy, as well as a standard of

legitimacy that transcends the organization’s formal contours. If applied, these

recommendations would isolate internationally, on various fronts, a government that results

from an irregular or unconstitutional process. That isolation can now begin formally with the

application of the Democratic Charter and Article 9 of the constitutive charter. In other

words, multilateral political and economic pressure to defend and/or restore democracy may

have a widespread and significant impact on the country. If government leaders and military

officers perceive these instruments as having such an impact, as it appears they do, then the

instruments would have effectively served their preventive purpose.

The democratic paradigm (the collective defense and promotion of democracy) is

taking root in the inter-American political culture. It can even be argued today that it takes

precedence over other values and practices of the inter-American system, such as the

principle of nonintervention. Illegal or unconstitutional governments can no longer hide

behind the principle of nonintervention or absolute sovereignty of the state; nor can the

promotion of democracy be perceived any longer as a pretext of the United States in

Organization to provide assistance by means of the promotion of political dialogue to settle disputes.” The

assistant secretary for foreign affairs of Chile stated that the “rapid and firm action of the OAS should be

recognized,” adding that “the days of an OAS that is silent in the face of a coup d’etat are over,” as is an “OAS

that is indifferent to the violation of the will of the people. He also saw the emergence of an organization that is

“flexible and actively committed to the best values of representative democracy.” See Minutes of the Second

Meeting, pp. 11–14.

28

combating communism, as happened during the Cold War. Democracy, despite its

shortcomings, is what the peoples and governments of the Americas want and seek.

Democracy derives its validity, sustenance, and legitimacy from the sovereignty of a people

and the exercise by citizens of their political and human rights, not necessarily from state

sovereignty. It does not need pretexts. Thus, it is likely and to be expected that in the event

of the interruption of democratic processes, repression, violation of human and political

rights, and humanitarian crises, countries will proceed, either through the OAS or outside of

it, to take collective action through regional groups such as the Río Group or Mercosur

(under its democratic clause), or unilaterally, to reject and condemn such actions and to

apply political and economic pressure and sanctions to the governments responsible for

them.47

Furthermore, if the establishment of a nondemocratic government is perceived as an

immediate threat to national or regional security, countries with the political will and

military means will take action, unilaterally and militarily, if deemed necessary, to restore

democracy. For some experts, “the defense of democracy has no practical meaning if it is not

supported by a capacity for coercion, which, in the final analysis, is the threat or reality of

military intervention.” Similarly, Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman hold the view

that “there are cases where democracy can be restored only through the threat or actual use

of force.” The inability of a regional organization such as the OAS “to use all means

necessary to restore democracy” would undermine the commitment to democracy and its

role as a key institution in the defense and promotion of democracy, leaving the door open to

unilateral intervention or recourse to the United Nations Security Council.48 The case of

Haiti should be borne in mind. It is also useful to recall the unilateral military intervention of

47 Heraldo Muñoz, “El Derecho a la Democracia en las Américas,” Estudios Internacionales (Santiago, Chile)

(January–March 1995); and Domingo Acevedo and Claudio Grossman, “The Organization of American States

and the Protection of Democracy,” in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, p. 133. The topic has been convincingly

discussed by Thomas Franck in his influential article “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,”

American Journal of International Law (January 1992), and in “The Democratic Entitlement,” University of

Richmond Law Review, no. 29 (1994). 48 See Enrique Obando Arbulú, “Democracy and Hemispheric Security,” International Analysis (Lima: CEPEI,

April-September 1994), p. 46; and Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the

Protection of Democracy,” p. 145.

29

the United States in Panama in 1989, to overthrow a repressive military regime that had ties

to drug trafficking. Despite the fact that the intervention violated the principle of

nonintervention, involved the use of violence, and produced victims, it managed to restore

the democratic process that remains in effect to date.49

Perhaps it was this last vestige of unilateral interventionism in 1989 that provoked

and hastened the discussion of the possible mechanisms for the collective defense and

promotion of democracy that would prevent abusive or repressive conduct on the part of

some governments of the region but would also restrain or mitigate the inclination to

unilateral intervention on the part of others.50 The progress made in this regard began to be

49 This action took place after the military regime of General Noriega declared the general elections of May

1989 null and void and engaged in public and brutal repression of the opposition forces that had won the

elections. In addition, there was evidence of the continued violation of human rights. It happened four years

after the 1985 amendment to the Charter but two years before Resolution 1080. On the initiative of Venezuela,

an emergency Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held (OES/Ser.F/II, Doc. 8/89 rev.

2, May 17, 1989), at which Noriega was held responsible for the abuse perpetrated against the opposition

candidates and human rights violations, and it was decided that a transfer of power should take place (similar to

the recommendation made ten years earlier with respect to the government of Somoza). Also, a Mediation

Commission was established, comprised of the foreign ministers of Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and

Tobago, and chaired by Secretary-General Baena Soares, which went to Panama. However, the commission did

not manage to accomplish the transfer of power or the resignation of General Noriega. Eventually this led to

President Bush's decision to carry out a military intervention in December 1989 to remove Noriega. The

frustration and inability of the mission to achieve change was noted by Baena Soares (Síntesis de una Gestión,

p. 38). After the armed intervention, the Permanent Council condemned the intervention and called for the

withdrawal of the intervention forces. The U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, expressed his regret over the

OAS statement and the fact that this organization had failed to support political and economic sanctions against

Panama prior to the intervention, which could have avoided military action. See Wilson, “The OAS and

Promoting Democracy and Resolving Disputes.” In that context, it should also be remembered that, in a Cold

War setting, to restore peace and democracy in the Dominican Republic, the United States engaged in military

intervention in that country in 1965. See note 73. 50 Although as far as many critics of the organization are concerned, the resolutions of the General Assembly

are meaningless, superficial, or irrelevant, the process of final approval is complex. These resolutions are

usually the result or conclusion of a long process of debate, analysis, and negotiation, which begins with

informal and committee-level talks among foreign ministers and representatives of the countries at meetings of

the Permanent Council and General Assembly. Only after considerable drafting and efforts to achieve

30

reflected in the resolutions of the General Assemblies in Washington, D.C., in 1989, which

approved the resolution entitled “Human Rights, Democracy, and Electoral Observation”51;

in Asunción, in1990, establishing a Unit for the Promotion of Democracy52; and culminating

in the General Assembly in Santiago, Chile, with the Santiago Commitment and Resolution

1080.

The instruments, actions, and political/diplomatic measures just discussed are short-

term collective tools available to the OAS to respond automatically and immediately to

crises that threaten democracy in a member state. In that regard, they are protective

instruments or deterrents (a red light for possible transgressors). However, when they do not

manage or are insufficient to prevent or discourage interruptions of the democratic process,

they then serve as reactive/corrective instruments that permit collective action to restore the

democratic process of a member state. In both cases, they are “high politics” collective

mechanisms and are operative only because of the present congruence in political regimes

and because of the consensus and commitment of OAS member states to defend and

strengthen, collectively, democracy in the hemisphere. This collection of legal/political

instruments plus the actual actions of member states through the OAS to defend and promote

democracy are configuring and consolidating what has been called here the inter-American

democratic regime (REDI).53

This new role of the OAS represents a significant expansion of its competence and

responsibility since, initially and in conjunction with the Inter-American Treaty of

Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), the OAS was created to “strengthen peace and security in the

hemisphere” and to promote joint action in the event of external aggression.54 But today its

consensus are they finally forwarded to the plenary session of the General Assembly. At any rate, the point is

that the resulting regulations (Resolution 1080, e.g.) do end up influencing the external and internal conduct of

member states. 51 AG/RES. 991 (XIX-0/89. 52 AG/RES. 1063 (XX-0/90. 53 Heraldo Muñoz maintains that this new activism of the OAS to support democracy is consistent with what he

calls the long-standing doctrine of democratic governments within the inter-American system. See Muñoz, The

Future of the Organization of American States, p. 70, and “The OAS and Democratic Governance.” 54 The TIAR was not intended only to defend the hemisphere from an armed attack emanating from outside the

hemisphere, as some critics claim, but rather as a system of collective defense against the attack by any state on

31

commitment is also to defend the democratic system against internal aggression or threats.

These fundamental and unprecedented changes represent an area that has hardly been studied

and one that has profound implications for the traditional concepts of sovereignty and

nonintervention. These concepts and practices are clearly undergoing change. Careful and

in-depth analysis of their implications for the system of inter-American relations and the role

of the OAS is required.55

Perhaps the main lesson learned by these new developments and efforts to defend

democracy, which revolve around the OAS but are not exclusively limited to it, is that, as

stated in the Permanent Council Resolution of 1992 to support Venezuelan democracy,

“there is no room in the hemisphere for regimes established by force” or military

governments.56 The armed forces, which in times gone by did not hesitate to overthrow a

government at the first signs of political instability or threats related to its group interests,

seem to understand today that it is futile to use force to take over a government. In the crises

in Guatemala (1993), Paraguay (1996), and Ecuador (1997), the high command of the armed

forces kept their distance by supporting the constitutional process and did not yield to the

temptation to stage coups d’état. In Venezuela in 1992, the senior officers rejected the

attempted coup and then respected the trial of President Pérez. In 2002, the "institutionalist"

army high command at first appeared to accept Chavez’s “resignation” but then rejected the

unconstitutional measures taken by the provisional government and returned Chavez to

power. In Brazil, they also respected the trial and constitutional removal of President

Fernando Collor de Melo. In Chile, they accepted the detention of their leader, General

Augusto Pinochet, in England as well as accusations leveled against their members for

human rights violations during the military government. The same applies to Argentina,

where former military presidents have been prosecuted for and convicted of human rights

a member state. In fact, the TIAR has been invoked and applied only in the case of intrahemispheric conflicts

and particularly among states that comprise the wider Caribbean region. See “Aplicaciones del TIAR” in

García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, p. 852. 55 The beginnings of this analysis can be found in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty. 56 The reference is to the resolution “Support for Democratic Government in Venezuela,” CP/RES. 576

(887/92), February 4, 1992, and is in keeping with the statement of Strobe Talbott, the U.S. under secretary of

state, at the meeting of the Permanent Council on the crisis in Paraguay, in which he made it clear that “the

days of dictatorship are over.” See note 36.

32

violations.

However, the fact that the military is not seizing power and running the country does

not mean that it is no longer influential in the political process. It is still a significant actor,

although with diminishing power, in Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, and

Venezuela. The overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador on January 21, 2000, and

the failed Venezuelan coup of 2002 represent the last expression of that influence.57 This

behavior, this lingering antidemocratic action, underscores even more the importance of

strengthening the REDI.

The Promotion of Democracy

Complementing the "high politics" instruments for the defense of democracy, the member

states also have at their disposal the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). This unit

was created in 1990 at the General Assembly held in Asunción, Paraguay as an executive

instrument for the promotion and strengthening of democratic institutions on a medium- and

long-term basis.58 Its principal objective, as established by the Permanent Council, is “to

respond promptly and effectively to member States that request assistance, providing advice

or assistance related to the preservation and strengthening of their political institutions and

democratic procedures.”59

Like the other political/legal instruments of the OAS in the area of democracy, the

UPD is the product of a consensus reached among the member states of the organization. It

57 The decisive role played by the Ecuadorian armed forces in supporting or toppling of the government in

Ecuador was clear when President Mahuad stated on television that these forces had withdrawn their support

and had formed a civilian-military council, and when the vice president, Gustavo Noboa, announced on

television that he was assuming the position of president with the support of the armed forces. See note 42.

Perhaps one additional way of strengthening the mechanisms or sanctions for the protection of democracy is

for member states to consider, through the OAS, the exclusion or suspension of armed forces that have been

involved in an attempted coup d’état or have seized power by force from inter-American military cooperation

arrangements, such as the inter-American military conferences, the Inter-American Defense Board, and joint

military exercises. Ignoring major violations of the principles that defend democracy or applying them

selectively could weaken the REDI. 58 AG/RES. 1063 (XX-0/90). 59 CP/RES. 572 (882/91).

33

is an important complement to and support for the efforts of the governing bodies in their

activities to defend democracy. While legal/political instruments such as Resolution 1080 are

aimed at confronting the crises threatening democracy in the immediate term and have a

dissuasive and reactive function, the activities of the UPD contribute to strengthening

democratic institutions from a medium- and long-term perspective, which, in the final

analysis, constitutes preventive work. Its activities and actions are less dramatic and visible

than those resulting from the application of Resolution 1080.

The promotion of democracy is, by definition, a complex, multidimensional, slow,

and long-term task. It involves, in essence, the promotion and development of a democratic

culture. In other words, it essentially means the promotion, fostering, and teaching of values,

beliefs, attitudes, and practices that are usually recognized as essential for the existence of a

democratic culture. These are, inter alia, freedom, justice, equality, tolerance, pluralism,

separation and independence of powers, fair elections, ethics, participation, solidarity, fair

competition, cooperation, mutual trust, respect for the rights of others and for formal and

informal rules, the rule of law, negotiation and consensus-building, and the peaceful and

civil settlement of political disputes and conflict in a society. Democracy, then, is not just

elections (as important as these may be) but a way of life and a political culture. Its

promotion involves a process of socialization and internalization of democratic values and

practices carried out by the school system, the universities, the mass media, the organizations

of civil society, the church, the family, interest group organizations, and, of course, political

institutions.

The consolidation and viability of democracy depends in large measure on the extent

to which the political culture of democracy is firmly rooted, solid, and pervasive in a society.

The learning and practice of those democratic values and habits need to be supported and

strengthened on an ongoing and conscious basis, in individuals, in society, and in democratic

institutions themselves. A democratic political culture is the most significant and decisive

long-term variable in a democratic political system.60 Furthermore, a democratic political

60 With regard to the role of political culture in the strengthening of democracy, see Guillermo O'Donnel,

“Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies,” Journal of Democracy (July 1998), and his article “Do

Economists Know Best?”; Francis Fukuyama, “The Primacy of Culture”; and Robert Putnam “Bowling

Alone,” all in Journal of Democracy (January 1996). Marta Lagos, “Latin America's Smiling Mask,” Journal

34

culture conditions the international conduct of states and tends to encourage the development

of relations marked by cooperation, security, and peace. The predominance of a democratic

political culture in member states is a prerequisite for the development and consolidation of

the REDI.61

The main challenge in the promotion of democracy is in the world of politics itself, in

the political culture. This is where the most difficult and persistent challenges and threats to

institutions and to the consolidation of democratic practices and values are encountered. The

lack of credibility and legitimacy of political institutions are the major challenges and threats

to democracy in Latin America. And they are related to the lack of representativeness,

weakness, poor organization, technical lags, and inefficiency of political institutions. They

are also related to a weak democratic political culture that is characterized by lack of

transparency, ethics, and integrity in political practices; insecurity in the rules of the game; a

pervasiveness of paternalism, clientelism, mistrust, intransigence, and political intolerance;

and the inability of the political class to resolve conflicts peacefully and build consensus,

among others.

This view of democracy and its promotion provides a useful framework for

understanding the methodology and thematic areas of the UPD. But the UPD’s role is

conditioned by the limits imposed by member states on its autonomy (it may take action only

at the behest and/or instructions of member states) and by the dearth of human and financial

resources at its disposal to carry out its tasks. Thus the UPD's function should be construed

as one of regional cooperation that complements, assists, and supports the internal efforts of

member states. It is a catalyst, and its work is qualitative and regional in nature. The UPD is

not a funding or national technical assistance agency, although it can provide assistance with

“seed” funds and advise governments and academic institutions on start-up activities related

to the strengthening of democracy.

of Democracy (July 1997). Juan Liz and Alfred Stephan, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,

CT: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 12. See also Seymour Martin Lisped, “The Centrality of Culture,” Journal

of Democrac (Fall 1990); and the classic book on the topic: Richard E. Damson and Kenneth Precut, Political

Socialization (Chicago: Little, Brown and Co., 1969). 61 On the relationship between political culture and the conduct of states, see Katzenstein et al., “International

Organization and the Study of World Politics,” p. 674; and John S. Duffield, “Political Culture and State

Behavior,” International Organization, no. 4 (Autumn 1999).

35

The role of the UPD is to support at least four interdependent processes that are

considered basic and crucial in contributing to the institutional strengthening and

consolidation of a democratic political culture at both the national and regional levels. They

are:

1. The generation and dissemination of new knowledge and information on the

functioning of democratic institutions as well as on democratic values and

practices, particularly through empirical, rigorous, and comparative studies

and research62

2. The training of experts, advisers, young leaders, and officials who implement

policies related to institution building and the promotion of democratic values

and practices through regional courses and seminars

3. The promotion of interaction and dialogue among civil society, the academic

world, and the world of politics to foster a sharing of knowledge and

experience on problems and challenges that face the democratic governments

of member states through regional forums

4. The organization of special missions to provide assistance and support for the

strengthening of democratic institutions and processes in conflictive

situations, at the request of the member state

From that perspective, the UPD has focused its activities on a limited number of

thematic areas. These areas are considered to be priority areas because of their relevance to

the strengthening of democracy and are an integral part, inter alia, of the challenges faced

from within by the political systems of the region, including

• The modernization of legislatures and interparliamentary cooperation

• The process of decentralization and local government

• The strengthening of political parties

• The promotion of democratic values and practices

62 The Latin American experience demonstrates the absence of an adequate body of knowledge in the area,

generated endogenously in the region. An effort should therefore be made to build a Latin American empirical

theory of democracy, focusing on what it is and can realistically occur in the region, given its history and

peculiarities.

36

• Electoral modernization and election monitoring63

Electoral observation missions merit special mention because they constitute one of

the primary and most visible activities of the UPD and one with the greatest immediate

impact on the promotion of democracy. Although the OAS has performed election

monitoring since 1962, substantive systematic work in this area began with the 1989

mandate of the General Assembly and with the observation of the Nicarguan electoral

process in February 1990.64 All electoral observation activities are carried out at the request

of the member state in question. The main function of electoral observation activities is to

observe impartially the electoral process and to inform the secretary-general and the member

states on its developments. Another is to collaborate with all participants (electoral

authorities, parties, and government authorities) in their efforts to have an electoral process

characterized by transparency, fairness, and trust. Electoral observers are not electoral judges

or police; rather they serve as impartial facilitators in solving problems or difficulties that

may arise in the electoral process.

Although the mere holding of elections periodically does not guarantee the full

exercise of democracy, there is no question about the essential role of elections in the entire

democratic process. Representative democracy cannot exist without elections. All

democratic processes begin with and are renewed through elections. Periodic, transparent,

and competitive elections are critical and essential instruments to elect, assess, and make the

63 For a detailed description of the activities and products of the UPD, see its quarterly Reports of the General

Secretariat on the Activities of the UPD or its annual Work Plan. 64 Prior to 1989–1990, electoral observation activities of the organization were conducted in an ad hoc manner,

at the request of member states and through Permanent Council resolutions. In general, these missions, whose

members were appointed by the secretary- general, were small and were present basically on election day.

Notably, at the beginning there was a certain amount of opposition to sending these missions since they were

considered to violate the principle of nonintervention. See Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, pp. 137–180.

The legitimacy and nature of electoral observation missions changed after the 1989 General Assembly

resolution “Human Rights, Democracy, and Electoral Observations,” which recommends that the secretary-

general organize and send missions to observe all phases of the electoral process, provided that this is done at

the request of the state in question. It is important to point out again that the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of

Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in 1962 recommended to member states the

holding of elections as a prerequisite for the formation of a democratic government.

37

leaders of a society accountable, to settle differences, and to make collective decisions on

issues facing a society. They also provide an invaluable opportunity for the periodic exercise

of democratic values and practices. They permit and facilitate political participation, the free

expression of ideas, consensus building and respect for the rules of the game, fair

competition, and tolerance of differing positions and ideas, among others. The periodic

holding of elections strengthens a democratic culture. This fact explains the central role of

elections in democracy and the importance of electoral observation.

To date, the OAS has observed more than 70 electoral processes in Colombia,

Nicaragua, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,

Peru, the Dominican Republic, Suriname, and Venezuela, the nature and scope of which

have varied depending on the situation in the country. The most important electoral

observation missions are those that are known as comprehensive and deploy a large number

of specialized observers. They remain in the country throughout the different phases of the

electoral process, including the registration, campaigning, electoral preparation, voting

phases, and the postelectoral phase, which includes the proclamation of the winners.65

In addition to the UPD, other areas of the OAS contribute significantly to the

promotion of democratic values and practices. One example is the work carried out in the

promotion of human rights.66 The member states of the OAS frequently mention the close

and inseparable link between the respect for human rights and the rule of law. In other

words, democracy cannot exist without the exercise of human rights and vice versa. They

cannot be separated either in theory or principle. This link and the interest of member states

65 See Manual for the Organization of Electoral Observation Missions (Washington, DC: UPD, Organization

of American States, 1998). Examples of comprehensive electoral missions are the ones coordinated by the

author in Paraguay and Venezuela; see Electoral Observation in Paraguay, 1991–1993 (Washington, DC:

General Secretariat of the OAS, 1996); Election Observation in Venezuela. General Elections, 2000,

OEA/Ser.G.; CP/Doc. 3387/00, December 14, 2000. 66 Corruption is another area on which the OAS is increasingly focusing, particularly in terms of internalization

and application of the Inter-american Convention against Corruption. There are, of course, still other areas

thatthreaten democracy from “outside” the political system, such as drug trafficking and consumption,

antipersonnel mines, and terrorism, among others. The member states have increasingly used the OAS as an

instrument of regional cooperation to deal collectively with these threats. See the Annual Reports of the

Secretary-General.

38

in human rights is a long-standing one. One of the first initiatives in this direction is

Resolution XXXVI of the 1938 Eighth International Conference of American States held in

Lima, which states that “the democratic concept of a State guarantees all individuals the

essential conditions for carrying out their legitimate activities with dignity.” Similarly, in the

Caracas Declaration, the Tenth International Conference of American States in 1954

reiterated “the conviction of the American States that one of the most effective means of

strengthening their democratic institutions is to increase respect for the individual and social

rights of man”; and that the “full exercise of fundamental human rights and duties can only

be achieved through a system of representative democracy.”

In a formal sense, however, the inter-American system for the promotion and defense

of human rights begins with the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,

adopted at the Ninth International Conference of American States held in Bogotá in 1948.

The system was developed and strengthened with the establishment of the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign

Affairs held in Santiago in 1959 and with the adoption in 1969 of the American Convention

on Human Rights, also known as the Pact of San José (in effect since 1978), which also

establishes the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American

Court of Human Rights are the main institutions that oversee and sustain the inter-American

system of human rights. Both are autonomous, and their members are elected independently

and do not represent the states of which they are nationals. The main function of the IACHR

is the investigation and analysis of the petitions of individuals who claim that their human

rights have been violated by a state and the recommendation of measures to be adopted by

the government in question so that it can resolve the conflict. It also conducts on- site visits

to prepare reports on the human rights situation in member states and often analyzes cases

related to freedom of the press and the rights of women and children, indigenous

populations, and migrant workers.67 The court performs consultative and review functions.

At the request of a state party or the IACHR, it interprets the applicability of the convention

67 The work of the IACHR in these “new” areas of human rights is the result of the mandates of the First

Presidential Summit of the Americas, held in Miami in 1994.

39

to the cases submitted, and its decisions are binding with respect to states parties.68

In summary, the efforts and activities of the OAS, and of the UPD in particular, to

promote democracy must be seen as complementary to the actions of member states to

protect, defend, and restore representative democracy as the preferred system of government.

Generally speaking, its activities are less dramatic and less visible than those of "high

politics" in defense of democracy and in application of Resolution 1080 or the Democratic

Charter. But given its constraints, its efforts are, for the most part, of a regional and catalytic

nature. They are designed to stimulate and coordinate inter-American cooperation in support

of national efforts to strengthen the democratic political culture and its institutions. This

effort is based on the assumption that preventing the breakdown of democratic institutions

and consolidating democracy essentially requires a long-term process of instilling and

fostering a democratic political culture. At the inter-American level, these efforts are part of

the inter-American democratic regime and help to strengthen the democratic paradigm in the

hemisphere.

These activities also supplement the substantial financial efforts for reform of the

state in which multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and the Inter-American

Development Bank are engaged as well as the work of international assistance agencies of

developed countries including the United States, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Norway, and

others, which are making an important contribution to consolidating democracy.

Tensions and Limitations of the OAS

68 The extensive, substantive, and prestigious record of the OAS in this field cannot be analyzed adequately in

this paper. On the evolution and activities in this area, see the Annual Reports of the IACHR (Washington, DC:

OAS General Secretariat); Rafael Nieto Navia, ed., La Corte y el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos

Humanos (San José, Costa Rica: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, November 1994). Argentina,

Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua,

Dominican Republic, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela recognize the mandatory

jurisdiction of the court. See also The Inter-American Agenda and the Multilateral System of Government: the

Organization of American States (Washington, DC: April 1999. On ways of strengthening the system, see

ibid., and Canada and the Inter-American Human Rights System, statement by Ambassador Peter M. Boehm,

Permanent Representative of Canada to the OAS Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, Permanent

Council, December 2, 1999, Inter-American Dialogue.

40

The effectiveness of the REDI is conditioned by the inherent limitations and tensions of an

international organization such as the OAS. The limitations that the organization faces in

regulating effectively the behavior of its member states, and in executing or enforcing the

obligations arising from its charter or from the decisions of its governing bodies (resolutions,

Democratic Charter), reflect the limitations that have been generally identified in

international organizations and in international law. This issue has been the subject of much

controversy and debate in academic and diplomatic circles.69

Noncompliance with Obligations

There is no doubt, nor any presumption to the contrary, that the obligation of member states

is to comply with the resolutions of its senior bodies and to respect the charter of the

organization, which is, after all, an inter-American treaty, a binding instrument, with

principles, purposes, obligations, and rights.

Nevertheless, the question frequently arises as to what happens if member states fail

to respect the principles and obligations of the OAS (e.g., the principle of nonintervention or

the effective exercise of democracy) and/or its decisions as a collective body (e.g., sanctions

against a member state that has violated principles or obligations contained in the charter). In

other words, what are the consequences for a member state that does not respect the

principles of the OAS or comply with the decisions of its governing bodies?70 The

consequences depend on to what extent those neighbors in the democratic community that

69 This debate includes issues such as the distinction between domestic and international law, the lack of a

formal government or central formal authority in the international system, the autonomy of international

organizations, the prohibition on the arbitrary use of force, and the legitimacy of its use in self-defense. See

Keith R. Legg and James F. Morrison, Politics and the International System (New York: Harper & Row,

1971); Bull, The Anarchical Society; Stanley Hoffman, "International Systems and International Law," in The

International System, edited by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1961); and Wolfgang Friedmann, Oliver J. Lissitzyn, and Richard C. Pugh, International Law. Cases and

Materials (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Corporation, 1969). 70 Here we understand “respect” to mean not violating principles, while “comply” means not only nonviolation

of principles but also fulfilling the decisions of the governing bodies.

41

feel threatened by the violation are willing (and have the persuasive and coercive capacity)

to enforce, collectively or unilaterally, the provisions of the charter and the decisions of the

OAS governing bodies (the “realist” argument). This contingency points to an OAS

limitation: Its inability, in certain cases, to enforce respect for its principles; or, in particular,

to prevent, with the mere invocation of principles, member states from violating their

commitment to exercise democracy, for example, or from using force in unilateral

interventions, as was done by its most powerful member, the United States, in the Dominican

Republic in 1965, in Grenada in 1982, and in Panama in 1989.71

It should be noted that, despite the serious limitations on the enforcement of

collective sanctions against a member state that has violated the obligation to exercise

effective democracy, history has shown that when a majority of member states considers it

necessary, the OAS can take decisions and collective actions that will have a significant

impact on the violator. This is particularly the case if it is determined that such violation

represents a threat to the peace and security of the region. In the dictatorship cases of Trujillo

in 1960, Castro in 1962 to 1964, and Somoza in 1979, the member states of the OAS

concluded, in the context of the Río Treaty, that their regimes represented a concrete and

direct threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere, primarily because they were

supporting subversives or antidemocratic guerrillas, were engaging in armed aggression, and

were violating the principle of nonintervention. Decisions included such sanctions as

breaking diplomatic and trade relations, economic embargoes, and nonrecognition and

71 On the issue of whether decisions of the Organ of Consultation in application of the Río Treaty are

compulsory, see the enlightening discussion in García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 838–841. For

Thomas Franck, the obligation to govern democratically that states acquire upon associating themselves

voluntarily is the price they must pay for belonging to a democratic community (e.g., OAS, Mercosur). This is

an obligation to recognize the rights of its citizens to be governed democratically, or if it fails to do so, to face

sanctions by the international community. See Franck, “The Democratic Entitlement,” p. 3. Similarly, Dr. Vio

Grossi, a distinguished member of the Inter-American Juridical Committee, argues forcefully that member

States have the legal obligation to exercise effective democracy. See his “Report on Democracy in the

Interamerican System, op.cit p. 110. Farer also suggests that one way of binding member states would be

through national legislation that authorizes and obliges the executive branch to comply with sanctions imposed

against violators of democracy and human rights. To this end, Farer proposes that UPD design and promote

model legislation on the issue. See T. Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, p. 22.

42

suspensions that ended with the diplomatic and economic isolation of those regimes.72

Moreover, to facilitate the return to democracy and to ensure peace and security in the

region, the OAS in 1965 created and dispatched an Inter-American Peace Force to the

72 The coercive measures decided and applied in these cases by the Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of

Foreign Relations were taken in accordance with Article 23 of the Río Treaty, which stipulates that measures

may be adopted in the form of (a) “decisions of mandatory application” or (b) recommendations to states

parties. Once the intention of Rafael Trujillo to overthrow the government of Venezuela and assassinate its

president was demonstrated, the Sixth Meeting of Consultation, in Costa Rica in 1960, imposed mandatory

sanctions against the dictator. These had no precedent in the inter-American system, and consisted in

suspending diplomatic and economic relations as well as imposition of an arms embargo. See Federico Gil,

Latin American–United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 200–221and

García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 920–921. With respect to the sanctions against the regime of

Fidel Castro, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation in 1962 (Punta del Este, Uruguay) and the Ninth Meeting in

1964 (Washington, D.C.), under the Río Treaty, concluded that the communist regime was violating the human

rights of its citizens and promoting subversion in other countries of the region, constituting aggression against

those countries (e.g., Venezuela, Peru), and that it was violating the principle of nonintervention and was

incompatible with the fundamental principles of the OAS. On this basis, the member states, by a two-thirds

majority, condemned the actions of the Castro regime, suspended diplomatic and trade relations with the

government of Cuba as well as its participation in the inter-American system, called on that government to

dismantle and withdraw missiles from the islands, and recommended that member states adopt “such measures

as they deem necessary for their legitimate individual or collective defense in order to counter threats or acts of

aggression” of the Castro government. See García Amador, El Sistema Inter-Americano, pp. 832–834 and

Eighth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations Serving as the Organ of Consultation in Application of the

Río Treaty, Final Act, Doc. 38, January 31, 1962, Punta del Este, Uruguay, OAS/Ser. F/II.8, and Ninth

Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations Serving as the Organ of Consultation in Application of the Río

Treaty, Final Act, Doc. 48, July 26, 1964, OAS/Ser. F/II.9; and Slater, “The OAS as Antidictatorial Alliance,”

pp. 135–182. It is possible to argue, however, that the prevailing inter-American democratic regime will not

allow the Castro government to return to the OAS at least until there has been a significant democratic opening

in Cuba. In the case of Somoza in 1979, the decision of the 17th Meeting of Consultation in the framework of

the OAS Charter, to condemn the Somoza regime for its violations of human rights and to call for its

replacement by a democratic regime, was sufficient to destroy its legitimacy within the organization and to

isolate Somoza. See note 12 and Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the

Promotion of Democracy,” p. 138.

43

Dominican Republic, to replace U.S. forces.73

But when collective actions against violations have proven insufficient or ineffective,

successive governments in the United States have taken coercive measures against Castro in

Cuba (naval blockade, support to anti-Castro forces, and a continuing embargo) or against

pro-Castro revolutionaries to prevent them from seizing power in the Dominican Republic in

1965. Although these measures were taken in the hypersensitive context of strategic

confrontation during the Cold War, they nonetheless were related to a concern for

democracy, security, and peace in the hemisphere. Almost 30 years later, with the end of the

Cold War and the collapse of communism, when OAS efforts proved inadequate, the United

States intervened militarily in Panama (1989), on the grounds that human rights were being

violated, democracy was being thwarted, and a threat was posed to the peace and security of

the region by the dictatorship of General Noriega. For similar reasons, but with authorization

from the United Nations, the United States took coercive measures against Haiti to remove

the de facto government of General Cédras.

As can be seen, a threat to peace and security is a necessary condition and could

trigger the application of sanctions and coercive measures, either unilateral or multilateral.

Currently, failure to exercise democracy effectively, including respect for human rights, can

be considered or perceived as a threat to the peace and security of the region, as was asserted

as early as 1959 in the Declaration of Santiago of the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of

Ministers of Foreign Relations.74 In this context, and as proponents of “realism” in

73 This intervention was endorsed by the Tenth Consultative Meeting, which decided to establish and dispatch

an Inter-American Peace Force, headed by a Brazilian general, for the purpose of overseeing the peace process

and the restoration of democracy. Democracy in the Dominican Republic, although imperfect, has been in

place for 30 years without interruption. See Jerome Slater, “The Limits of Legitimization in International

Organizations; The OAS and the Dominican Crisis,” in Yale Ferguson, ed., Contemporary Inter-American

Relations. A Reader in Theory and Practice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972). See also Neale

Ronning, ed., Intervention in Latin America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970); and Gil, Latin American–

United States Relations. 74 See Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System,” p. 113. See also note 7 on democratic

security. According to T. Franck, the decision of the UN Security Council established a precedent by

permitting the use of force, on the grounds that violations of human rights and the right to democracy

constituted a threat to the peace of the region. See his “The Democratic Entitlement,” p. 9.

44

international relations would argue, it is not impossible that countries of the inter-American

democratic community will resort to coercive measures, multilateral or unilateral, as they

have done historically—particularly in extreme situations that are deemed to pose a clear and

present threat to democracy and to the peace and security of the democratic community.

Notwithstanding these limitations in the OAS and their “realist” consequences, it is

perhaps a promising and significant sign that, in the context of the new democratic paradigm

within the hemisphere, the resolutions or decisions of its senior bodies, its condemnations,

pressures, and political and diplomatic negotiations, and the recommended sanctions arising

therefrom have, in the final analysis, shown themselves to be useful and effective. They have

contributed significantly to reversing institutional breakdowns, as in Peru, Guatemala and

Venezuela or to avoiding them, as in Paraguay. In Haiti, although these actions did not have

the desired effect immediately, pressure was maintained and served as a basis for decisions

by the United Nations Security Council. Moreover, such resolutions and actions in defense

and promotion of democracy have come to represent substantive components of what has

been called here the new inter-American democratic regime, in which the OAS is a central

institution. Its norms and efforts for the defense and promotion of democracy are today a

reference point and a framework that gives legitimacy to measures taken to those ends,

collectively or unilaterally, by members of the inter-American and international community.

The regime would be further strengthened, however, if the new Democratic Charter is also

invoked in cases in which there is a clear and constant violation and erosion of the

principles, values, and practices of a democratic process, as identified in its Articles 3 and 4.

This invocation would prevent the actual rupture of the constitutional framework. Up to

now, Resolution 1080 and recently the Democratic Charter have been invoked only after an

institutional breakdown, which in effect reduces their preventive value.

On the other hand, pursuant to the charter as reformed by the Washington Protocol in

1992, and the new Democratic Charter, the forceful and unconstitutional overthrow of the

democratic government of a member state is grounds for suspension from the OAS. Once

decided by a two-thirds majority of its members, the suspension or collective sanction will

invariably be mandatory and effective, and there will be no grounds for debate over its

compliance.

45

Between Institutional Dependency and Autonomy

To adequately understand this new role of the OAS, one must clearly understand and

recognize that the organization is not a supranational body, independent of its members; nor

is it monolithic. It is a political and diplomatic organization of 34 members, with various

collective decision-making bodies, such as the General Assembly, the Meeting of

Consultation or the Ad-hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Relations, the Permanent

Council, and the Inter-American Council for Integral Development, which are the senior

OAS organs. But in the final analysis, the behavior, decisions, and actions of these senior

collective bodies depend on the respective foreign policy decisions of each of the member

states. That is, the governing bodies do not act independently of the respective foreign

ministries of the member states.75

The General Secretariat, on the other hand, is a central and permanent organ of the

OAS, but with powers limited by the charter and by the mandates of the member states.

Among its principal functions are those of carrying out the duties entrusted to it by the

governing bodies, providing technical support to those bodies and to the administration of

the organization, and promoting cooperation between member states and the organization.76

The scope and effectiveness of its powers depends on the informal leadership ability of the

secretary-general, who is elected by the member states every five years, and on his ability to

build a consensus.77 The member states have always sought to limit the powers of the

General Secretariat and are very cautious about ceding their sovereignty to a supranational

body. Because of this, it is extremely important to recognize the reality and limitations of the

OAS. A superficial analysis of its activities often leads to the presumption that it is a

75 An excessive dependence on the ministries of foreign affairs of member states can have a paralyzing effect,

if those offices do not have adequate structures, procedures, and resources to follow closely the evolution of

issues in the OAS and to formulate policies on them—particularly during their treatment in the regular

proceedings of the Permanent Council. In times of crisis, however, those ministries obviously pay due attention

to OAS issues. 76 See Chapter XVI of the charter, as amended in 1993. See also Vio Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the

Inter-American System,” pp. 28–29. 77 The current secretary-general, César Gaviria, former president of Colombia, has succeeded in imbuing the

organization with a new vision and new dynamism that have contributed significantly to developing greater

confidence among member states in its renewed role in the defense and promotion of democracy.

46

monolithic and independent body, controlled or directed by the secretary-general, who may

then be unrealistically expected or required to take decisions or actions that are not within

his competence.

Since the 1985 reform of the charter and the adoption of Resolution 1080, the

secretary-general has significantly new and broader political and diplomatic responsibilities.

These responsibilities allow him to act with greater autonomy and to serve as a catalyst in

efforts to respond to a threat to the peace and security of the region and also in the defense

and promotion of democracy. Although prudence requires that he consult member states

closely before proceeding and that he keep them constantly informed, the secretary-general

is empowered, by Article 110 of the OAS Charter, to act on his own initiative and

independently “to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council

any matter which in his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere.” As

we have seen, the secretary-general also has the obligation to proceed almost automatically,

pursuant to Resolution 1080 and the new Democratic Charter, to convene the Permanent

Council in case of an interruption in the democratic process in any OAS member state.

Actions of secretaries- general in the cases analyzed above have contributed significantly to

activate immediate and effective collective responses in defense of democracy.78

Moreover, the standards and programs for the defense and promotion of democracy

adopted by the OAS have taken on a certain life of their own. They have a certain degree of

autonomy and have come to constitute an independent contribution to building the inter-

American democratic regime. This regime, although originally constructed by the countries

78 The role of the secretaries-general, ambassadors, and foreign ministries in constructing the regime deserves a

separate and much more profound analysis than can be offered in this paper. In this respect, it would be

worthwhile, for example, to analyze the role played by the ambassadors of Argentina (Hernán Patiño Mayer),

Brazil (Bernaddo Pericas Neto), Canada (Jean-Paul Hubert), Chile (Heraldo Muñoz), Colombia (Julio

Londoño), Saint Lucia (Joseph Edmunds), the United States (Luigi Einaudi), Venezuela (Guido Grooscors),

Uruguay (Didier Opertti), and others in designing and approving Resolution 1080 and the Washington

Protocol. With respect to the importance of individual leadership in the dynamics of international cooperation,

see Andrew Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurship and International Cooperation,”

in International Organization, vol. 53, no. 2 (1999); Oran R. Young, “Comment on Andrew Moravcsik…” and

his “Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society,”

International Organization, vol. 45, no. 93 (1991).

47

themselves, has over time developed its own dynamic. Its norms and rules have come to

condition and affect the behavior of the nation-states of the hemisphere, in particular with

respect to the exercise, defense, and promotion of democracy.79

The Principle of Nonintervention, Its Limits and Erosion

The principle of nonintervention is intimately linked with other traditional principles of

inter-American relations and international law, such as the absolute sovereignty and juridical

equality of states. Recognition and respect for these principles in the inter-American system

and in the charter of the OAS have been major concerns of Latin American countries. This

interest was originally expressed in the Calvo (1868) and Drago (1902) doctrines. Their

essential purpose was to restrain or contain, at least juridically, military interventions such as

those of some European powers (to recover former colonies, protect their citizens, or collect

private and public debts) and those of a series of U.S. governments during the first three

decades of the 20th century (in the context of the Monroe Doctrine and the Theodore

Roosevelt corollary).80

79 S. Krasner argues that there are regimes that acquire autonomy and that are converted into autonomous or

independent variables conditioning and influencing the internal and external behavior of states. See his

“Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables,” in International Regimes, (Ithaca,

NY: Cornell University Press, 1989). 80 These two Argentine international jurists argued, among other things, that states were juridically equal and

sovereign and that they could not be the object of prosecution in the courts of other countries; nor could they be

the object of military intervention to recover debts. European interventionism arose from the wars of

independence: by France in Argentina and Uruguay (1835–1850) and in Mexico, together with England and

Spain (1862–67); by Spain in Peru (1864–65) and in the Dominican Republic (1861–65); and by Germany,

England, and Italy in Venezuela (1902). U.S. interventionism concentrated in states of the Caribbean basin and

sought to instill stability in regimes of the region to forestall European intervention and control over regional

governments and to avoid the threat that this implied for its own security. At the beginning of the 20th century,

the region took on a certain economic, political, and military importance, and the security of the Panama Canal,

particularly after World War I, came to be a central focus of this concern in U.S. policy. In the first 30 years of

the 20th century, the United States intervened and occupied Cuba (1901–09), the Dominican Republic (1907

and 1916–24), Nicaragua (1909, 1912–25, 1927–32), Mexico (1914 and 1917), and Haiti (1914–34). See Gil,

Latin American–United States Relations, pp. 68–69 and 87–115; Samuel F. Bemis, chapter “The Doctrine of

Nonintervention and the Codification of International Law,” in his The Latin American Policy of the United

48

After decades of “negotiations” between Latin American countries and the United

States, the principle of nonintervention was definitively enshrined at the Ninth Conference of

American Republics held in Bogotá in 1948, with signature of the treaty (charter) founding

the OAS.81 During the first four decades of the organization, which coincided with the Cold

War, the principle of nonintervention was invoked on a number of occasions, and this led to

the convening of Meetings of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations. Both within

the framework of the Río Treaty and that of the OAS, as noted previously, member states

have taken concrete and coercive measures and sanctions against dictatorships in the

Caribbean that were threatening the security of other member states.82 The sanctions applied

by the Organ of Consultation (the Permanent Council provisionally, or the Meeting of

Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Relations), were imposed in the context of “decisions

of mandatory application” as contemplated by the Río Treaty (Article 23) in the case of

armed aggression.

States (New York: W. W. Norton, 1964), pp. 226–241; and C. Neale Ronning, ed., Intervention in Latin

America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970). 81 In 1933 President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced the “Good Neighbor Policy,” which rejected military

intervention, except in the case of collective and cooperative action in specific cases. To the satisfaction of

Latin American countries, this translated into the acceptance and signature, at the Seventh Conference of

American Republics held in 1933 in Montevideo, of the Inter-American Convention on the Rights and Duties

of States, which included moreover a stipulation that no state had the right to intervene in the internal or

external affairs of another In 1936, at the Eighth Conference of Republics of the Americans, held in Buenos

Aires, the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace was adopted. It

included a Consultation Pact for the peaceful settlement of disputes and a Declaration of Solidarity, which

stipulated the nonrecognition of the acquisition of territory by force, the principle of nonintervention, the

illegality of collecting debts by force, and the peaceful solution of disputes. This convention was the precursor

to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Río Treaty. Bemis, “The Doctrine of

Nonintervention and the Codification of International Law,” pp. 264–265; Gil, Latin American–United States

Relations, pp. 156–158. 82 It is interesting to note that when dictators like Trujillo or Somoza attempted to invoke the principle of

nonintervention, and its corollary, that of collective security through the Río Treaty, and to convene a Meeting

of Consultation, as a consequence of aggression by "democratic" forces of exiles supported by the governments

of Costa Rica and Venezuela, they could not achieve a quorum. In these cases, such principles did not apply

explicitly because the requesting states were nondemocratic. See Slater, The OAS and United Stares Foreign

Policy, pp. 86–91.

49

Nevertheless, in the most obvious cases of violation of the nonintervention principle

by unilateral and military action of the United States (e.g., Dominican Republic 1965;

Grenada, 1983; Panama, 1989; military support to the Contras during the 1980s), member

states of the Río Treaty and of the OAS could do no more than criticize or condemn,

collectively and individually, the behavior of the superpower. Essentially, this reveals the

practical limitations that “realism” imposes on the principle of nonintervention, for obvious

reasons: No country or alliance of member states has the military power to confront the

United States; and any economic sanctions against it would have no major effect but would

in fact be counterproductive for those imposing the sanctions. The crude reality is that

countries that have the necessary power, especially the superpowers, will do whatever they

deem necessary, including the imposition of sanctions and coercion, to eliminate what their

governments perceive as a threat to their vital national interests. From a “realist” perspective,

this is inevitable—even though analysts, international officials, or governments of other

countries consider it illegal, illegitimate, unfair, and contrary to the most elemental

principles of a peaceful and “democratic” international coexistence.

The inability of OAS member states to enforce respect for the principle of

nonintervention in such cases also reflects the reality of asymmetry in inter-American

relations. This fact inevitably conditions the development of a system of democratic peaceful

relations among the member states as well as the inter-American democratic regime. But this

asymmetry does not always, or inevitably, translate into diplomatic victories for U.S.

governments in achieving their objectives through the OAS.83 Yet it is not necessarily

negative or counterproductive to have the world's greatest power as a member of the inter-

American democratic regime, especially when a key element of that country's foreign policy

today, in the post–Cold War era, is to promote a community of democratic nations.84 In fact,

83 U.S. diplomats are not always able to achieve Latin American consensus for their objectives. For example, a

proposal to strengthen mechanisms for preventing constitutional breakdowns was widely and publicly rejected

during the General Assembly in Guatemala, 1999. See also Slater, The OAS and United Stares Foreign Policy,

pp. 242–241, and 274–275. 84 See, for example, speech by the secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, at the School of Advanced

International Studies, January 17, 2000. In fact, the United States has played a significant and decisive role,

both multilaterally and unilaterally, in protecting and restoring democracy during the crises examined here. See

Corrales and Feinberg, “Regimes of Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere”; Vaky, in Vaky and Muñoz, The

50

U.S. participation could contribute to strengthening the REDI and ensuring its

development.85

On the other hand, in recent years the principle of nonintervention (an illusion for

professor Stanley Kaufmann) has lost some of its absolute force and has gradually receded in

the face of the inexorable reality of globalization, independence, and the process of

integration itself. In fact, some observers are already claiming that the international system

has by now accepted a degree of “interventionism” as legitimate and even “legal” or

permitted by international norms. In its extreme expression, this belief manifests itself in

humanitarian military intervention, on a collective basis authorized by regional organizations

such as the OAS, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the UN. According to

this view, this new interventionism is motivated and justified, in principle, by serious

violations of human rights and by the collapse of the rule of law and constitutional

democracy—conditions that, in turn, are considered a threat to the peace and security of

neighboring countries or of the region in which the country is located. Yet paradoxically, the

success of such humanitarian intervention requires basic elements of realism—in other

words, one or more states with the military capability and willingness to carry it out

effectively. 86

Future of the Organization of American States; A. Valenzuela ”The Coup that din’t Happen,” on Paraguay and

his interview in Clarin on Ecuador; and F. Villagran, “La Crisis Constitucional en Guatemala.” 85 In this context, one might even return to the notion of Panamericanism or the “Western Hemisphere Idea”

espoused by some leaders during the second half of the nineteenth century in various American or continental

congresses (Panama, 1826; Lima, 1847, 1856, 1864), and then go on to imagine, in the setting of the 21st

century, an inter-American democratic regime centered on a superpower as its integrating and centripetal

nucleus and as the embryo for institutionalizing an inter-American democratic community with certain

democratic and politically integrating norms and democratic institutions that could actually include some

features of an inter-American confederation of democratic countries. See Corrales and Feinberg, “Regimes of

Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere,” pp. 4–6; Gil, Latin American–United States Relations, pp. 144–183;

and on the conditions and processes for forming or integrating pluralistic political communities, see the classic

work of Karl Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in

the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968).

86 See the excellent analysis of this issue by Fernando R. Tesón, who proposes that collective and humanitarian

military intervention, authorized by the United Nations for the purpose of remedying serious violations of

51

At the same time, standards and actions for the collective defense and promotion of

democracy, which for some imply a kind of interventionism in the internal affairs of member

states, also represent a significant challenge to the traditional principle of nonintervention.

Concepts such as the right to democracy, the principle of democratic legitimacy, and the

rights and sovereignty of peoples (rather than states) have been gaining legitimacy and

international force and have achieved preeminence in the scale of values of the inter-

American system. The effective exercise of representative democracy is no longer a question

of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of any member state, nor can violation of that principle or

obligation be excused under the traditional principle of the absolute sovereignty of states—

particularly when member states have formally accepted the commitment and obligation to

defend, promote, and exercise representative democracy effectively. 87

Conclusion and Comments

The thesis of this paper has been that an inter-American democratic regime is now emerging

for the defense and promotion of democracy in the hemisphere, one that has as its central,

but not exclusive, institution the Organization of American States. The OAS is the key inter-

human rights, is legitimate in current circumstances. He argues moreover that the acceptance of interventionism

of this type, together with the erosion of traditional principles of sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction, is

essential to maintaining peace in the new international order. See his "Changing Perceptions of Domestic

Jurisdiction and Intervention," in Farer, ed., Beyond Sovereignty, pp. 29–51. For Slater, collective action in

defense of democracy should not be regarded as interventionism: see his “The OAS as Antidictorial Alliance.”

On the other hand, it is important to remember the warning of Joseph Nye on the perils of this kind of

interventionism, in “The New National Interest,” Foreign Affairs (July–August 1999). 87 See Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governments”; and his “The Democratic Entitlement,” pp.

1–5, in which he argues that the self-determination of peoples or popular sovereignty is a right that

governments must accord the people who live under their authority and that to the extent that this right to

democracy advances, the traditional sovereignty of states will diminish, since states will gradually cede

sovereignty in exchange for legitimacy and membership in the community of democratic nations. See also Vio

Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System”; Acevedo and Grossman, “The Organization of

American States and the Protection of Democracy”; Heraldo Múñoz, “El Derecho a la Democracia en las

Américas [The right to democracy in the Americas],” Estudios Internacionales (Instituto de Estudios

Internacionales, Universidad de Chile), (January–March 1995).

52

American institution of mandatory and automatic reference for the defense and promotion of

democracy in the hemisphere. It is the regional organization that legitimizes and

immediately triggers inter-American and international cooperation in reaction to a threatened

or actual institutional breakdown. It is the focal point for collective and systematic efforts to

restore democratic institutions and to dissuade attempts to disrupt the institutional integrity

of member states. It is the single institution around which the new inter-American

democratic regime is gradually evolving.88 This regime is emerging at a historic moment of

democratic political congruence and commitment in the hemisphere. It combines a moral

imperative and a degree of idealism for democracy and human rights as the basis for peace

and security with a new political realism that accepts the use, collective or unilateral, of

diplomatic, economic, and coercive sanctions if it is determined that regional or domestic

peace and security are threatened by violations of democracy and human rights.

The inter-American community of democracies that makes up this regime contains,

naturally, some democratic political systems that are weak, fragile, imperfect, or not

sufficiently liberal to be considered full and consolidated democracies. Some of them still

betray an authoritarian political culture with antidemocratic values in which democratic

practices of liberty, justice, equality, and transparency are not fully observed. There is also a

shortage of leaders with the democratic vision and capacity to negotiate and build consensus

and to mobilize the citizenry around it. And it would appear that in some cases the armed

forces still have a decisive role in determining whether a government will survive (as in

Ecuador and Venezuela), while the independence and balance between the branches of

government is still precarious. Given this reality, some pessimistic observers have concluded

that democracy in Latin America is merely an illusion.89

88 It is worth repeating here the words of H. Bull, in Anarchical Society, that it is “institutions that help ensure

adherence to rules, formulating them, communicating them, administering them, enforcing them, interpreting

them, and legitimizing them.” On the other hand, this statement about the importance and significance of the

OAS in the REDI is based on the conventional wisdom, shared by the “neo-realists,” that international

institutions constitute a valuable instrument for promoting the interests of states through cooperation. See

Katzenstein et al., “International Organization and the Study of World Politics,” p. 684; and Robert Keohane,

“International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998). 89 See Larry Diamond, “Degrees, Illusions and Directions for Consolidation,” in Farer, ed., Beyond

Sovereignty; and Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” Foreign Affairs (November–

53

It is maintained here, however, that these shortcomings of democracies do not

necessarily mean that they are failures, but rather that greater effort is still required,

domestically and regionally, to consolidate them. They also point to the need to strengthen,

with constancy, patience and prudence, the inter-American democratic regime as a system of

cooperation for supporting members of the community that need help in their efforts to

cultivate and strengthen democracy, and for defending it when it is threatened, using all the

means necessary and possible. The fact that there are weak democracies that lack some of

the required liberal traits also indicates that the values, rules, and norms of the regime will

inevitably be violated from time to time, just as happens with juridical standards in the

domestic context. What is important here is that there must be, within the inter-American

democratic regime, and particularly among those established democracies that coexist with

the weaker democracies within it, the willingness and the leadership to maintain momentum

toward democracy and to defend it when it is threatened.

As we have seen, the inter-American system for defending and promoting democracy

is centered formally on the OAS, but it is supplemented and supported by the bilateral and

multilateral activities of the inter-American and the international community. In this respect,

the construction of this regime owes much to the summits of Miami (1994) and Santiago

(1998), which have been important sources of mandates and of decisive support for the role

of the OAS in defending and promoting democracy. OAS member states such as Argentina,

Brazil and Uruguay, acting unilaterally and collectively through Mercosur, have together

with the United States played a key role in preventing the breakdown of the democratic

process in Paraguay. Mexico and the countries of Central America did not remain aloof from

the crisis in Guatemala but brought pressure, individually and collectively, to prevent the

attempted coup d'état from succeeding. The Río Group has consistently repudiated and

condemned attempts to disrupt the democratic process in Panama, Venezuela, Haiti, Peru,

Guatemala, Paraguay, and Ecuador. The European Community and countries like Japan have

taken a similar stance. The United States, thanks to its multilateral and unilateral political,

economic, and military clout, has wielded considerable influence in resolving most of the

December1997). See also the collection of articles under the title “High Anxiety in the Andes,” Journal of

Democracy (April 2001).

54

crises identified here.90 Canada has also played an important role in building the new regime

within the OAS and in efforts to defend and promote democracy.91

Of course, the involvement of the United Nations and its collaboration with the OAS

in Nicaragua and Haiti represented a significant and decisive contribution to restoring

democracy in those countries. The same is true of its efforts for the pacification of El

Salvador and for the protection of human rights in Guatemala.92 Nor must we overlook the

importance for promoting democracy of the financial aid packages for state reform provided

(at last) by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. These packages

include projects for modernizing the judicial and legislative branches and for decentralizing

local government to promote transparency, juridical security, and good governance in

general, as indispensable conditions for encouraging investment, privatization, trade, and

external financing.93

Construction of the regime has also been facilitated by the new interest and

increasing involvement of civil society in promoting and defending democracy, both at the

national and at the inter-American level.94 It should be noted also that the 1999 General

Assembly approved the holding of a meeting of representatives from the legislatures of the

member states, which eventually became the Interparlamentary Forum of the Americas

(FIPA), as created in March 2001 in Canada. The creation of this forum in the inter-

American system adds a parliamentary dimension that has been lacking to date. Greater

participation by the legislative branch in pursuit of the hemispheric agenda, and in particular

on issues relating to the defense and promotion of democracy, would not only strengthen the

90 A. Valenzuela, interview in Clarín. 91 See Múñoz, “A New OAS for the New Times,” p. 91. 92 See Vaky in Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, pp. 35–39 and 81; Baena

Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión; Grossi, “Report on Democracy in the Inter-American System,” pp. 140–149;

and Forsythe, “The United Nations, Democracy, and the Americas,” pp. 107–131. 93 See reports of the IDB and World Bank. The banks, at the insistence of their major democratic members,

have in fact warned of possible suspension of projects and financing in cases where democratic processes were

interrupted. 94 Kathrynn A. Sikkink, “Nongovernmental Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights in Latin America,”

in Farer, Beyond Sovereignty. The General Assembly, at its June 1999 meeting, decided to establish a

Committee of the Permanent Council on the Participation of Civil Society in OAS activities.

55

role of those institutions within their own political systems but would help to strengthen the

REDI.95

Still other measures could strengthen the role of the OAS in supporting the efforts of

member states to prevent institutional ruptures and to protect the democratic process. The

creation of an “early warning” capacity has been suggested as a way of analyzing situations

of potential democratic breakdown and of designing strategies for responding to threats or

for restoring democracy.96 While the suggestion is valid and could be useful both to the

General Secretariat and to the governing bodies, such a capacity by itself is not sufficient to

prevent institutional collapse. Today information and analysis about threats and political

crises are available almost instantaneously through newspapers, radio, and the Internet. The

signals and patterns of crisis are clear, and there is no need to be taken by surprise. In

Ecuador and Venezuela, the last crises were public and easy enough to see as they gradually

became more serious. This “early warning” capacity of the OAS, however, if it is to be really

relevant and useful, must be supplemented by the competence and capacity of the secretary-

general, duly authorized by the governing bodies and at the request of the government

affected, to send a mission of political observation and facilitation to countries in crisis and

facing political instability. Article 18 of the new Democratic Charter makes an important

step forward in this direction.97

95 Resolution AG/RES. 1673 (XXIX-O/99), “Parliamentary Network of the Americas.” This Canadian

initiative received strong support from the great majority of members. The consequences of inserting the

parliamentary dimension in the inter-American system and connecting it to the OAS somewhat are

unpredictable but could be significant since to date the OAS has been an organization in which its members are

represented by delegates from the executive branch of the states. In a context of growing democratization and

the increasing importance of legislative branches in formulating national policies (including foreign policy), it

is not difficult to imagine that their systematic participation in dealing with the hemispheric agenda will have a

significant impact on the formulation and execution of that agenda at the inter-American level and in turn on

the treatment of that agenda at the domestic level. 96 Vaky, Vaky and Muñoz, The Future of the Organization of American States, p. 47. 97 In consonance with the spirit of the new charter, and in view of the continuous political instability in Haiti

(e.g., the attack on the Presidential Palace in December 2001), the Permanent Council has recently instructed

the secretary-general to establish in Haiti an OAS Mission to strengthen democracy, with the purpose, inter

alia, of “monitoring events, including respect for the essential elements of representative democracy” and to

“help the government in the development and strengthening of its democratic processes and institutions.” See

56

In a certain respect, the functions of such a political observation mission would be

similar to those of the electoral observation missions that ostensibly observe the electoral

process but, in situations of political tension, frequently act as facilitators in bringing

together opposing factions and helping them arrive at negotiated solutions. In situations of

crisis, polarization, and political instability, the function of such a mission would be to

maintain a public presence in the country, which would immediately put the opposing

factions on notice that the international community is watching their behavior (if it were

antidemocratic or subversive of the constitutional order). The mission would make contact

with contending political forces, receive complaints from and accusations about each other,

and transmit them to the appropriate authorities. If necessary, the mission could organize

venues where competing political forces could meet in private and in an atmosphere of trust,

in the presence of the observer mission. It could even serve as a facilitator in negotiations

and as a guarantor for any agreements the parties might arrive at. The mission would be

composed of experts in political conflict analysis, management, and negotiation, and would

be led by a special envoy of the secretary-general.98

The actions of the OAS to promote democracy could also be reinforced by endowing

it with a greater capacity for analysis, debate, and exchange of ideas on common endogenous

and exogenous threats to democracy the hemisphere. Such a capacity would help to generate

and disseminate new theoretical and practical knowledge about these threats and could serve

as basis for formulating policies in response to such circumstances as well as for training

CP/RES. 806(1303/02), January 16, 2002, entitled “The Situation in Haiti, ” and Primer Informe Provisional

sobre el Cumplimiento de la Resolucion CP/RES. 1003/02) del Consejo Permanente sobre la Situacion en

Haiti, OAS/Ser.G, CP/doc. 3567/02, April 3, 2002. 98 The parallel between a mission of this nature and election observation missions (which have already been

accepted by member states as a valid and legitimate instrument for promoting democracy) is clear when we

consider that, informally and by the very fact of their presence in the country, they perform various additional

functions, beyond simply observing events: They open a window in the country for the international

community; they awaken expectations that conflicts will be resolved; they inspire politicians to act in ways that

will demonstrate their democratic credentials; they reduce the aggressiveness of those who might be

contemplating a coup; they stimulate debate and open discussion of disputed issues; they guarantee freedom of

expression for the public and the press; they open channels of communication, direct and indirect, among

contending parties; and they help to clear up mistrust and misunderstanding between opposing forces. See

Baena Soares, Síntesis de una Gestión, p. 59.

57

new generations of politicians, officials, legislators, experts, media people, and diplomats.

Finally, it is possible to argue that because democracies tend to be more open and

cooperative societies, the REDI has contributed to the emergence and development of a

greater interest in the creation of a free trade zone in the Americas, which would tend to

favor and facilitate the process of inter-American commercial and economic integration. The

creation of such a zone probably would help strengthen and consolidate the REDI.