Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence in the Philippines

Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence

in the Philippines1

Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER) July 2007

1 This is the case study commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and which is the

basis for the section on the Philippines of the UNDP paper entitled ―Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia‖

published in 2011.

2

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Problem of Violence ……………………. 6

Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines ……………………. 9

Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System ……………………. 12

Legal Framework for Elections ……………………. 12

The System of Elections ……………………. 13

Who can vote ……………………. 15

Who can contest elections ……………………. 16

Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections ……………………. 17

Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence ……………………. 20

Election Violence ……………………. 20

Election Contests and Disputes ……………………. 24

Focus Group Discussions ……………………. 20

Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence ……………………. 32

Candidates and Parties ……………………. 32

The Commission on Elections ……………………. 33

State Security Forces ……………………. 34

Insurgency groups ……………………. 34

Election Monitors and citizen arms ……………………. 35

Chapter 6 Case Study:

2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse

……………………. 36

The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy ……………………. 36

The Protagonists ……………………. 38

Election Results ……………………. 38

The Issue of Cheating ……………………. 40

Continuing Crisis ……………………. 44

Chapter 7 Issues and Recommendations/Good Practices ……………………. 45

Bibliography ……………………. 48

Research Team ……………………. 51

Annexes ……………………. 52

3

List of Annexes

Annex 1 Philippine Elections held after 1986

Annex 2 Proportion of Voters to Population

Annex 3 Total number of Contestants for the Elected House in the Last 3 Elections

Annex 4 Number of Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections)

Annex 5 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (2004 Elections)

Annex 6 Number of Elected Candidates by Party Affiliation (1998 Elections)

Annex 7 Election Contests

Annex 8 Procedure in Election Contestation

Annex 9 Election Protests for the year 2002 - 2004

Annex 10 Number of Deaths by Government Position (2004, Elections)

Annex 11 Comparative Statistics on Election-related Incidents (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004,

2007 Elections)

Annex 12 Discussion Sessions and Participants’ Affiliation

Annex 13 Philippine Election Laws

Annex 14 COMELEC Organizational Structure

List of Tables

Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 …………. 14

Table No. 2 – Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections …………. 15

Table No. 3 – Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections …………. 18

Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured (1992-2007) …………. 23

Table 5. – Judicial Body where election contests are filed

…………. 24

4

List of Acronyms

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

ARD Assistant Regional Director

ARMM Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

BEI Board of Election Inspectors

BOC Board of Canvassers

BP Batasang Pambansa (National Legislature)

CA Commission on Appointments

CBCP Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines

CER Consortium on Electoral Reforms

COMELEC Commission on Elections

COMPACT COMPACT for Peaceful Elections

CPP Communist Party of the Philippines

DepEd Department of Education

DILG Department of Interior and Local Governance

EA Election Assistant

EAC Election Areas of Concern

EDSA Epifanio de los Santos Avenue

EIAC Election Areas of Immediate Concern

EO Election Officer

ERAP Joseph Ejercito Estrada

ERVIs Election-related violent incidents

FGD Focus Group Discussion

FPJ Fernando Poe, Jr.

FPTP First-Past-The-Post

GARCI Former Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano

GMA Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

HRET House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

ICCPR International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

IFES International Foundation for Election Systems

IPER Institute for Political and Electoral Reform

IPER Indigenous Peoples

KBL Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (New Society Movement )

LAKAS-CMD LAKAS-Christian Muslim Democrats

LAKAS-NUCD LAKAS-National Union of Christian Democrats

LP Liberal Party

MILF Moro International Liberation Front

MNLF Moro National Liberation Front

MMDA Metropolitan Manila Development Authority

NAMFREL National Citizen's Movement for Free and Elections

5

NCR National Capital Region

NP Nacionalista Party

NPA New People's Army

OAV Overseas Absentee Voting

OEC Omnibus Election Code

PAGs Partisan Armed Groups

PES Provincial Election Supervisor

PET Presidential Electoral Tribunal

PNP Philippine National Police

PPCRV Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting

PTC Permit-to-Campaign

RA Republic Act

RED Regional Election Director

RPC Revised Penal Code

SC Supreme Court

SET Senate Electoral Tribunal

SK Sangguniang Kabataan (Youth Council)

SONA State of the Nation Address

SWS Social Weather Station

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

ULAP Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines

6

Chapter 1 Problem of Violence

The post-martial law period in the Philippines call for the need to re-establish democratic

processes and institutions. The EDSA People Power I2 escalated from the worsening social,

political, and economic order and widespread election manipulations and irregularities of the

Marcos government especially in the 1986 snap presidential elections. The uprising led to the

eventual ouster of Marcos and the installation of Corazon Aquino as the new democratic

president.

A new constitution was crafted to restore civil and political rights to the people, and to

provide for restricted powers of the president, multi-party system, promotion of the role of non-

government and sectoral organizations, and proportional representation in the legislature.

General elections have been held regularly and the Commission on Elections—the election

management body in the Philippines is given not only quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well.

Three major election exercises were immediately held after the drafting of the new

Constitution: a national plebiscite for the approval of the 1987 Constitution in February 1987;

election for members of the legislature in May 1987, and local elections in January 1988.

Since then elections have been a major component of Philippine democratic processes.

Unfortunately, Philippine politics is still challenged by instability. Violence and fraud continue

to mar democratic elections. The Philippines‘ transition to democracy is not exempt from the

transitions (―…either from or towards authoritarianism‖) which have a ―…high probability of

causing escalating levels of domestic political violence‖. [Croissant and Kneip, 2006 :12]

Several authors point to facets of Philippine politics: ―undeveloped party system, elite

dominance and the ideological sameness of candidates, exclusion of those who fail to muster the

considerable resources needed to mount a campaign, the subordination of issues to particularistic

concerns, elaborate forms of terrorism and fraud, and the cultural baggage of traditional values of

power and dependence‖. [Mojares(1991), Rocamora(2000)]3

Election is a major feature and mechanism for transfer of power in democracies.

Election-related violence can significantly influence the free and fair conduct of elections and

exercise of the right to vote. Election violence or election-related violence is included in the term

political violence which is defined by Croissant and Kneip (2006) as:

―‗Political violence‘ is a generic term demoting the efforts of individual or collective

actors to force public concerns by threatening to use or actually using physical or mental

violence against life and limb. This includes forms of action such as attacks on property;

rioting; violent confrontation between members of opposing parties; political groups;

fighting with one another or with the police/military; violent attacks directed against

persons, when one political group attacks another group, or members of the elite or the

2 In February 1986 Filipino people from various sectors of society including the religious and the military rose up in

a non-violent revolution against Marcos dictatorship. 3 Gutierrez, Eric. U, et.al. (1992). All in the Family A study of elites and power relation in the Philippines. Quezon

City: Institute for Popular Democracy. 189 pp.

7

public, causing injuries or death; random violent attacks, when organized violence is

directed against persons, regardless of their political or social identities and armed

seizures of place and people‖.

The International Foundation of Election Systems or IFES4 defines electoral conflict and

violence ―as any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay, or otherwise influence

an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, disinformation, physical

assault, forced ‗protection,‘ blackmail, destruction of property or assassination.‖5 Victims can be

people, places, things, or even data.

Election violence in the Philippines includes, among others, abductions, killings, physical

attacks, intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries, and damage to property.

Election-related violent incidents are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded

and reported by the Philippine National Police (PNP), COMELEC and other election monitors.

Meanwhile, the various forms of coercion, harassments, and intimidation are harder to quantify.

Violence during and in connection with the electoral process has been a feature of every

post-Marcos election in the Philippines. If at all, the picture is getting worse, with hundreds of

local areas regularly designated as election violence ―hot spots‖ during elections.

The election irregularities in the form of fraud and violence attending the conduct of

Philippine elections continue to cause growing cynicism of the general Filipino electorate. It has

led to many losers rejecting the election outcome and filing hundreds of cases of electoral

protests. It caused many voters to forego participation in the elections and, more alarming, to

peddle their votes for money. The electoral process as the democratic means of transfer of power

thus is constantly undermined.

Apart from regular electoral processes, transfer of power also happens through

mobilizations. This was the natural recourse in 1986 in the people power uprising that brought

down the Marcos dictatorship. However, in 2001, a second people power removed the Estrada

administration from power amidst a failed impeachment process. In the post-Marcos period

people‘s mobilizations played a major, if not a decisive role, in policy redirection and leadership

changes at various levels of the Philippine political structure.

The communist and Moro insurgencies are also a significant factor in the consideration of

the country‘s political and security situation. During the election period, these affect the local

electoral processes as the rebels maneuver to use these for their own causes. Especially in case of

the local communist insurgency, elections are an opportunity to raise funds, capture elective

positions, and make political statements. Generally, insurgencies position themselves as

alternatives to the failures of electoral democracy.

To a certain extent, mobilizations flows from the constitutional recognition of various

direct democracy mechanisms such as recall of elective officials, referenda, and people‘s

4 www.ifes.org

5 IFES, (2002), Electoral Conflict and Violence A Strategy for Study and Prevention.

8

initiative. These forms of direct democracy complement the electoral processes of representative

democracy.

However, they can also be a measure of the fragility and weak credibility of the formal

electoral process. When done in the context of the perceived failure of democratic constitutional

processes, they counterpose themselves as alternative processes. It is quite easy from here to

jump to extra-constitutional temptations such as military extremism, civil disobedience or even

rebellion. The electoral system is rendered useless in this scenario.

9

Chapter 2 History of Elections in the Philippines

During the pre-colonial Philippines, leaders were chosen based on his/her capacity to

ensure the survival of his/her tribe and clan. Wisdom, skills, and respect for people were the

important qualities for leadership. A system of election was first practiced in the Philippine

Republic under the Malolos Constitution6 during the colonial period. However, the process was

only limited to male voters who are members of the rich classes, and was more of a ceremonial

rather than a genuine democratic mechanism.

A leap in the sectoral struggle and political participation was realized in 1937. This was

when Act 4112, granting women the right of suffrage, was implemented; and when the peasant

movements gained meaningful participation in political parties and in the actual filling of

government positions.

The first democratic elections in the Philippines after the Second World War was the

1946 elections for President and Vice-President of the Republic, and members of the Senate and

of the House of Representatives. From then on, the country operated on a two-party system

where two major political parties, the Nacionalista (Nationalist) Party and the Liberal Party,

figure in succeeding elections.

By 1965, Philippine elections have settled to a predictable pattern of specific governance

issues against the incumbent party or leader. Campaign issues in these elections were not a

surprise: peace and order problem; rampant graft and corruption; continued rise in prices of

consumer goods; and continued smuggling of dutiable goods. The opposition Nacionalista Party

led by Ferdinand Marcos won over the Liberals. Marcos ran for re-election in the next election

and made history as the first president to be re-elected. The campaign can be characterized as an

exchange of accusations and attacks on issues concerning nationalism, land reform, foreign

policy, cronyism, and graft and corruption.

When Ferdinand Marcos declared Martial Law in 1972, the 1935 Constitution was

scrapped, an Interim Batasang Pambansa was created and a new (1973) Constitution was

adopted. Election for the Interim Batasang Pambansa was called for in 1978. The Kilusang

Bagong Lipunan (KBL) (New Society Movement) became the administration party. The election

was claimed to be towards restoration of old political order but Marcos‘ purpose was to gain

legitimacy for his unpopular administration and to create a rubber stamp legislature. The

electoral exercise defied democratic procedures, and was characterized by rampant electoral

manipulation done by the Marcos government to ensure victory.

Local election in 1980 was characterized by widespread terrorism, violence and

wholesale fraud. Intense opposition coming from the peasant and student sector in the

countryside supported peasant and labor unrest. In 1981, Marcos submitted himself to the

electoral process to regain legitimacy. This is mandated by the constitutional provision of a

parliamentary system.

6 The first Philippine Republic convened its Congress in Malolos, a town in Bulacan province just outside Manila.

The Malolos Congress passed the Malolos Constitution, the constitution of the first Republic.

10

The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 resulted in waves of protest forcing the

creation of wider democratic space. Batasang Pambansa elections happened in 1984 to replace

the Interim Batasang Pambansa. The exercise was intended to divert the people‘s attention away

from the Aquino assassination. Still, the period was marked by weakening popularity of Marcos

and the people‘s growing political will to guarantee that their sentiments are reflected in election

results.

Snap elections were held in 1986. The widespread election manipulations and

irregularities and the worsening social, political and economic order triggered the EDSA uprising

in the same year. The mass action known as the People Power Revolution of 1986 called and led

to the ouster of Marcos, the collapse of KBL, the installation of Corazon Aquino as the

President, and the replacement of the 1973 Constitution.

Aquino‘s program of restoring democracy, promoting stability, and establishing political

legitimacy involved three major electoral exercises: national plebiscite for the approval of the

constitution on February 1987; election for members of the Senate and House of Representatives

on May 1987; and local elections on January 1988. The 1987 Constitution was crafted to restore

civil and political rights to the people, and to provide for restricted powers of the president, and

proportional representation in the legislature. General elections have been held regularly and the

Commission on Elections---the election management body in the Philippines is given not only

quasi-judicial but judicial powers as well.

During the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the people voted for president

for the first time under the 1987 Constitution. The main campaign issue was doing away with

“trapo”7 or traditional politics. Other campaign issues were economic reform, political stability,

clean governance and social justice. An army general who also figured during the EDSA

uprising, Fidel V. Ramos of the LAKAS-NUCD Party was declared winner in that presidential

race. During that elections too, the first protest contesting the results of a Philippine presidential

election for charges of fraud was filed by another candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago against

Fidel V. Ramos, before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). In 1995, congressional and

local elections were held. A new form of fraud dubbed as ―dagdag-bawas‖ (vote-

padding/shaving) or the subtraction of votes from one candidate to be added to the contending

candidate was in practice during these two major elections.

In 1998, the first party-list election was held under the virtue of the Republic Act 7941 or

the Party-List Law. The constitutional mandate for proportional representation was realized only

after almost a decade. During the same elections, Joseph Ejercito Estrada8 was seated as

President of the Republic, topping a field of five candidates with 38 percent of the votes.

However in January 2001, EDSA 2, a repeat of the 1986 People Power in EDSA

removed Estrada from Malacañang on the heels of a failed impeachment process and based on

7 Trapo is the term used to refer to traditional politics or traditional politicians. In the Filipino language, trapo also

means dirt rug. 8 Estrada or popularly known by his screen name ―Erap‖ is a well-known actor who also had long been a

government official as a town mayor, as a senator, and as the vice-president.

11

charges of corruption and mismanagement. EDSA 2 also seated Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the

new president.

The Estrada opposition did not quite accept the legitimacy of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s

ascension to power via people power. A series of political protests, capped by another failed

people power in May 2001 and a military mutiny in 2003 ensued but failed to unseat her.

In 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo ran and was reelected as president in a

controversial electoral contest against Fernando Poe, Jr., Estrada‘s actor-friend. Right after

proclamation, the opposition launched protests against her presidency, accusing her of winning

through massive electoral cheating.

In June 2005, voice tapes surfaced, purportedly recording conversations between the

president and an election commissioner. This precipitated a political crisis that has not yet

abated, marked by the resignation of almost half her Cabinet, two impeachment attempts, an

attempted military withdrawal of support, and intense pressures on various political institutions,

including congress, constitutional bodies such as the Commission on Elections, Ombudsman,

and Sandiganbayan (ombudsman court), the courts, and the military and police.

With the electoral controversy of 2004 Philippine election-rigging allegations against no

less than the president and an election officer, the political and election system are in no way

lifted to higher ground. President Macapagal-Arroyo's satisfaction rating has been ―unfavorable

for nine consecutive survey rounds, ever since the Third Quarter of 2004‖.9 The credibility of the

election commission is also questioned. The electorate is in a situation where electoral choices

mean one member of political elite over another. Appreciation of the value of the vote is very

little. Even with the shift to a multi-party system, rivalries among elites10

and alliances are still

shaped by clan membership. ―The trend toward party-switching or political turncoatism a

significant feature of party politics during the pre-Martial law era continues to exist in the

present is determined by the movement and dynamics of political clans‖. (Gutierrez, et. al.

1992:6)

Various issues in the 2004 elections raised by the opposition, peoples‘ mobilizations, and

impeachment complaints posed a great challenge to the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration

and to the credibility of the COMELEC and even elections in general.

The challenge then is for the government, political parties and the civil society to pursue

reforms to counter public cynicism on the credibility of the election process and institution and

the legitimacy of the elected officials. Fundamental reforms in the system of ―can be critical for

areas as diverse as conflict management, gender representation and the development of political

party systems‖.11

The value of integrating responsibility of safeguarding the integrity of the

9 Social Weather Survey for the 3

rd quarter of 2006 finds ―37% Satisfied and 48% Dissatisfied with the performance

of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for an unfavorable Net Satisfaction Rating of -11‖. From sws.org.ph 10

Elites are mostly the same clans and families during the Marcos years which are able to re-align themselves and

dominate government positions in the post-Marcos politics. 11

Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005).pp.viii.

12

election process (and thus lessening the use of violence and fraud) of a strong party system is

lacking in the Philippines.

Chapter 3 The Philippine Electoral System

Legal Framework for Elections

Elections in the Philippines are mandated under the 1987 Constitution. Two other

international documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), govern the right of suffrage in the Philippines.

These three instruments similarly provide universality of the right of suffrage; equality in access

to public service; and secrecy of the vote.12

Recent addition to international human rights

instruments such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,

and Convention on the Political Rights of Women also provide for the right of suffrage.

The current Philippine Constitution provides for a bicameral presidential system of

government, multiparty system, partial proportional representation in the legislature, absentee

voting for overseas Filipinos, and equal propaganda opportunity. The Omnibus Election Code of

1985 through Batas Pambansa Bilang (or Republic Act No.) 881 is the basic law on elections.

The 1987 Constitution and succeeding laws13

served as amendments to the Omnibus Code.

Republic Act (RA) 6646 or the 1987 Electoral Reforms Law was passed to govern the

first elections under the 1987 Constitution and introduced reforms in canvassing, candidate

eligibility and disqualification, and election propaganda. Another law provided for synchronized

holding of national and local elections every three years. The Voters‘ Registration law adopts a

system of general and continuing voter registration. RA 9006 or The Fair Elections Act of 2001,

guarantees candidates and political parties ―equal opportunity for public service‖ particularly

access to media time and space, public information, fora, and campaigns, and protection from

harassment or discrimination in relation to the election process. The Overseas Absentee Voting

System14

implements the constitutional mandate to ensure the right of suffrage of Filipinos

abroad. The electoral modernization law of 1997 provided for the use of automated systems as

early as the 1998 elections. However, the full automation was not implemented. Ten years after,

another election law was passed mandating amendments to the previous modernization law and

the use of an automated election system in the succeeding elections. The most recent 2007

elections did not see to the implementation of this law even in pilot areas due to lack of time for

preparation.

12

Provisions on the right to vote are in: Article 21 (1-3) of the UDHR; Article 25 (a-c) of ICCPR; and Article 5,

Sec.1-2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 13

See Annex 13 for a list of Philippine Election Laws. 14

Republic Act 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 is lauded for granting method for registration

and voting in Philippine national elections foreign land-based and sea-based Filipinos.

13

The System of Elections

The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance classifies the

Philippines as having mixed and parallel voting system which combines elements of both the

plurality and the proportional representation electoral systems.15

The presidential, senate, and

local elections adopt a first-past-the-post (FPTP), where a candidate or party who wins the most

number of votes wins the seat. A mix of plurality-FPTP system and proportional representation

through the party-list system is used in election of the members of the lower house or the House

of Representatives.

The mixed system for congressional elections was intended to broaden representation by

hitherto marginalized and underrepresented sectors in the legislature. However, this intent is

itself undermined by the compromises in both the constitution and the election laws. The

constitutional limit of 20% for party-list seats means a permanent minority status for party-list

groups.

The law reserves this system to party-list groups and excludes the first 5 major parties. A

Supreme Court decision also interpreted the 20% constitutional limit as a target and not

mandatory. These effectively prevented the filling up of the reserved seats for party-list. In the

1998 elections, the first year of implementation, only 13 seats out of a possible 51 were filled up.

In the 2007 elections, a maximum of 20 seats will be filled up out of the possible 55 that are

reserved for the party-list system.

On the other hand, the FPTP system—which governs all other elections in the country—

has produced some undesirable effects. Electoral fraud and violence have become

institutionalized because of the winner-take-all nature of the system. Coupled with a weak party

system, incumbents are often tempted to build political dynasties composed of their families and

close allies. Term limits often have no meaning in a dynastic setting where wives, sons and

daughters often replace the incumbent in a play to maintain the power, sometimes despite the

negative vote of the electorate.

In the current manual system, balloting requires voters to write down the names of each

candidate for every position. Counting, canvassing of votes, and transmission of election results

are also done manually. An automated system of elections was already legislated but has yet to

see implementation.

Since the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, elections for President and Vice-President

are held every six years, while elections for Senators and members of the House of

Representatives and local government officials happen every three years. Regional elections

particularly in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), local executive and

legislative councils, barangay (village) elections and Sangguniang Kabataan (youth council)

elections are also held periodically.

15

Reynolds, Andrew, et.al., eds. (2005). Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook,

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, pp.171.

14

The Constitution provides that a President can only serve 1 term of 6 years. A second

term or reelection is prohibited. A Vice-President and a Senator have a term of 6 years and

cannot run for a third term after an uninterrupted service of 2 terms, although they may run again

after an interval of 1 term after the second term. Members of the House of Representatives and

elective local officials cannot run for a fourth term after uninterrupted service of 3 terms, but

may run again after a lapse of 1 term after the third term.

The bicameral national legislature is made up of the Philippine Senate and the House of

representatives. The 250-plus-membership in the House is completed through direct election of

single-member district representatives, of which 20% are party-list representatives elected on

proportional representation. Representatives have three-year term and are limited to three terms.

Twenty four senators are elected on a nationwide basis for a six-year term and are eligible for

one re-election. Half of the composition of the Senate is elected every three years.

Local Government officials are elected for a three-year term and are allowed re-election

up to three consecutive terms. Regional officials---governor and vice-governor are now given

three-years in office. Table No. 1 - Philippine elections held after 1986 (See Annex 1 for detailed list of elections)

Year Type of Elections

1987 Congressional Elections (Senate, House of Representatives)

1988 Local Elections

1989 Barangay (village) Elections

1992 Presidential, Congressional, and Local Elections

1992 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections

1994 Barangay Elections

1995 Congressional and Local Elections

1996 Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections

1996 Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections

1997 Barangay Elections



2002 Synchronized Barangay and SK Elections


2005 ARMM Elections


Elections are also highly competitive as shown by the seat-candidate ratio for elective

positions. During the most recent national and local elections in 2007, there were a total of

17,880 national and local positions that were vied upon by more than 87,000 candidates.

Running in highly competitive elections entails very high electoral campaign costs and other

election –related expenses. In most instances therefore, election cheating and violence become

part of the over-all campaign strategy of candidates and political parties to ensure victory.

15

Table No. 2 – Number of seats and candidates in the 2004 and 2007 elections

2004 2007

Government Position Number of Seats Number of Candidates

Number of Seats

Number of Candidates

President 1 5 0 0

Vice-President 1 4 0 0

Senator 12 48 12 37

Party-List representatives 52 n/a 55 n/a

Congressman 212 650 219 --

Governor 79 284 81 --

Vice-Governor 79 227 81 --

Board Member 758 2,107 770 --

Mayor 1,615 4,264 1,628 --

Vice-Mayor 1,615 4,303 1,628 --

Councilor 13,292 38,312 13,406 --

Total 17,716 50,204 17,880 87,000+

Who can vote

Article V of the 1987 Constitution is devoted to Suffrage. Section 1 provides that suffrage

may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at

least 18 years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least 1 year and in the

place wherein they propose to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election. No

literacy, property, or other substantive requirement is imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Congress is also directed to provide for a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the

ballot, as well as a system for absentee-voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

All citizens of the Philippines, eighteen years of age or over, and a resident of the

Philippines for one year and in the city or municipality wherein he proposes to vote for at least

six months immediately preceding the election are qualified to vote.

The following are disqualified from voting:

a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less

than one year. However, he/ she may reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five

years after service of sentence.

b. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent court or tribunal of

having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government

such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any

crime against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in

accordance with law: Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon

expiration of five years after service of sentence.

c. Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority

In addition, RA 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Law entitles all Filipino citizens

overseas, not otherwise disqualified by law, and immigrants and permanent residents with

affidavit of intent to resume residence in the Philippines, to vote for elective positions in the

national level: President; Vice-President; Senators; and Party-List Representatives.

16

There is a conservative estimate of 3.5 million Filipinos who are qualified to vote under

the law. However, only around 500,000 registered in the 2007 elections which is already the

second elections where overseas absentee voting was implemented. Of this number, only 14%

voted. This dismal voting was traced partly to various restrictive provisions such as the

requirement for a pledge to return to the Philippines three years after the elections, personal

appearance at both registration and voting in Philippine embassy or consulate offices in many

countries, and lack of widespread public education among overseas Filipinos.

The overseas absentee voting system still needs to be improved. Relaxing the rules on

mail balloting, internet voting, and residency requirements are only some of remedial measures

being discussed. However, as a democratic measure, it is already accepted by the electorate.

Who can contest elections

Several requirements are enshrined in the 1987 constitution for the various elective

positions. There are corresponding requisites for citizenship, age, literacy, and residency. All

candidates should be registered voters, natural-born citizens, able to read and write. Presidential

and vice-presidential candidates should be forty years old or above and should have 10-year

residency in the country. Senatorial candidates should be at least 35 years old and 2-year

residency. Congressional candidates should be 25 years old or over and have at least resided in

his or her district for at least a year. These are minimum requirements provided by the

constitution. Other practical requirements for elections are machinery and the resources to run a

campaign.

Candidates except for party-list representatives can run independently or under a political

party or coalition. Party-list representatives can only vie for legislative seats through votes for

their parties. All candidates are also required to file candidacy with the Commission on

Elections.

The 1995 IPER psychographics study on the voting behavior of the Filipino electorate

shows that the voters choose their candidate primarily on their popularity. The next determinant

of vote is the endorsement of traditional network and organization. The third determinant of vote

is the characteristics that can be of benefit to the voter and the last determinant is the Party

Program.

An update of this study was made in 2003. This time the primary consideration of the

voters in choosing a candidate is the characteristics that can be of personal benefit to voters. The

second factor is political machinery. The third factor, which is the primary factor in the 1995

study, is popularity. The last factor that the voters consider is the endorsement of traditional

network and organizations.

These determinants in both studies attest to the relative immaturity of the Filipino

electorate in their choices. The 2003 study went further and identified a growing cynicism

towards the political process itself. In the 2007 elections, numerous popular media figures lost—

attesting to the continued weakening of sheer popularity as basis of voter choice.

17

In the current government set-up, the Philippine legislature generally constitutes the well-

off segment of society. A study on the post-1986 Philippine Congress describes it as composed

of ―richer, older, better educated and better connected…‖ or ―…are part of families who have

been in public office for two or more generations‖.16

Political machinery, connections, and

money still figure very prominently in elections and consequently the government.

With the passage and implementation of the party-list system law, the smaller political

and sectoral parties are now able to get seats in the legislature. The provision giving 20% of

Congress seats to representatives of national, regional, and sectoral parties17

is meant to

introduce proportional representation. This principle when adopted in an appropriate state of

party system is supposed to initially extend representation to more sectors and smaller parties

and to encourage more program-based campaign and legislative agenda. In effect the democratic

space for empowerment and participation of people in governance would have widened.

Various election contestations are available to citizens of the Philippines as provided for

in the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The OEC grants any voter the right to contest

the qualification of any person seeking to register, and any voter, election registrar or registered

political party the right to petition the annulment of permanent list of voters.

Election contests for the position of provincial, municipal, and barangay offices can be

filed by any candidate who has filed certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same

position. Pre-proclamation controversies can be raised by any candidate, registered political

party or coalition of parties.

A more detailed presentation of election contestation for local and national candidates is

done in Annexes 7 and 8.

Election Body: The Philippine Commission on Elections

In the Philippines, the Commission on Elections or COMELEC is the constitutional body

tasked to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,

plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall. It also has ―…exclusive charge of the enforcement

and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections‖. (Philippine Omnibus Election

Code)

The creation of the COMELEC was one of the constitutional mandates for the basic

principle that ―(s)overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from

them‖.18

Created by a 1940 amendment to the 1935 Constitution, the Commission was given

more members and more powers by the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Officials and personnel of

the Commission exercise not only administrative and quasi-judicial powers, but judicial power as

well.

16

In Coronel, et.al. (2004), THE RULEMAKERS How the Wealthy and Well-Born Dominate Congress, pp.viii. 17

As provided for in Article 6 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. 18

Article 2, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

18

Table No. 3 – Powers and Functions of the Commission on Elections

National COMELEC (which includes Chair, Commissioners, Department Heads)

Local COMELEC (which includes Regional Election Directors, Provincial Election Supervisors, Elections Officers, Election Assistants

Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs)

1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and rules

2. Promulgation of rules and regulations/ resolutions 3. Jurisdiction and resolution over all election contests 4. Decision over all questions affecting elections 5. Deputation of teachers, police and military for election duties 6. Registration of candidates political parties, organizations, or coalitions 7. Registration, inclusion or exclusion of voters 8. Prosecution for election offenses/violations 9. Recommend measures to minimize election spending 10. Removal or disciplinary action of deputized officer or employee, recommendation to the President; 11. Monitoring election expenses of parties an/candidates 12. Report to President and Congress on conduct of election (or plebiscite, initiative, referendum or recall) 13. Prescribe forms and appropriate technology for elections 14. Supervise of production and procurement of election materials 15. Distribution of election materials 16. Supervision of training of election officials and regional directors and provincial supervisors 17. Conduct of Information campaign and voter education 18. Tabulation and publication results

1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and

regulations 2. Registration of candidates

political parties, organizations, or coalitions 3. Supervision of registration of

voters/ correction of voter list 4. Prosecution for election

offenses/violations 5. Distribution of election

materials 6. Conduct of Information

campaign and voter education 7. Tabulation and declaration of

results 8. Collection and storage of

election materials

1. Ensure fair and impartial implementation of laws and

regulations 2. Receiving election

materials 3. Supervision of voting 4. Counting of votes in their

respective polling places 5. Return of results and

materials 6. Deputies of the

Commission in the supervision and control of the election in the polling places/precincts

The Commission is composed of a Chairman and six (6) Commissioners who are

appointed by the President and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (CA)19

. Of

those first appointed, three (3) members shall serve for seven years, two members for five years

and the last members for three years, without re-appointment. These COMELEC officials ―…can

be removed from office only by impeachment and are provided with salaries fixed by law which

shall not be decreased during their term of office‖.20

19

The Commission on Appointments is a congressional body composed of the Senate President as Chair, and 24

members, (12 from the Senate and 12 from the House of Representatives) constitutionally mandated to confirm all

government appointments by the President. 20

From COMELEC website, www.comelec.gov.ph

http://www.comelec.gov.ph/laws/consti_art9c.html#sec2



















http://www.comelec.gov.ph/

19

Appointees for the posts of COMELEC chair and commissioner should not have run for

any elective positions in the most recent elections and should have the following qualifications:

natural-born citizens of the Philippines;

at least thirty-five years of age (at the time of their appointment);

holders of college degree;

majority of members including the chair should be members of the Philippine Bar who

have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years

The Commission has a national central office and field offices, further divided into

regional and local offices. The Regional Election Office is headed by Regional Election Director

and assisted by the assisted by the Assistant Regional Director (ARD) and other officers or

employees appointed by the Commission.

The Provincial Election Office is headed by the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) and

assisted by officers or employees appointed by the Commission. The City/Municipal Election

Office is headed by the City/Municipal Registrar and assisted by an election clerk or other

officers or employees appointed by the Commission. During election period, the Commission

forms a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) for every precinct to be composed of a chairman and

a poll clerk who must be public school teachers. Those designated to be BEI should neither

engage in any partisan political activity nor take part in the election except to discharge his/her

duties and to vote.

The Commission may delegate its powers and functions or order the implementation or

enforcement of its orders, rulings, or decisions through the heads of its field offices. Too, the

Commission has the authority to deputize members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) during elections. For the recent 2007 elections,

the following are deputized by the COMELEC.

The Department of Education (DepEd) through the public school teachers are deputized

by the COMELEC to serve as BEI during election period. The Armed Forces of the Philippines

(AFP) is deputized only to provide security in areas with ―serious armed threats‖, manning

checkpoints, and enforcement of gunban but not in handling, counting, or transporting the ballots

nor in providing security to COMELEC officials, personnel, or deputies, or candidates. The

Philippine National Police (PNP) is deputized to provide security to polling places, members of

BEI, COMELEC personnel and representatives and protect voters from threats, intimidation,

coercion, harassments, reprisals. The PNP, National Police Commission, and the National

Bureau of Investigation are deputized to enforce prohibitons set in the Omnibus Election Cod

and other election laws and COMELEC resolutions. The Metro Manila Development Authority

(MMDA) and the barangay officials and tanods through the Department of Interior and Local

Government (DILG) are deputized for the 2007 elections to tear or remove illegal campaign

materials and campaign materials posted outside common poster areas, to make a report on these,

and to arrest persons distributing unlawful election materials.

Part of the quasi-judicial functions of the Commission also hears and resolves petitions

filed by political parties and other groups, and coalitions for accreditation to field candidates in

various national and local positions as well as for the party-list elections. The Commission is

20

also tasked to undertake voter education and accreditation of citizen arm, political parties, and

party-list groups.

The COMELEC has the duty to appoint or accredit citizens‘ arm which will serve to help

the Commission in some of its work like voter education, election monitoring, pollwatching, and

parallel count. The Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV) and the National

Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) had been the arm for pollwatching and parallel vote

count respectively.

Chapter 4 Features of Election Violence

Election Violence

Election violence in the Philippines includes abductions, killings, physical attacks,

intimidation and other acts resulting in death, injuries and damage to property. While election

violence reports are measured in the number of deaths and injuries as recorded and reported by

the PNP, COMELEC and other election monitors, the various forms of coercion, harassments,

and intimidation are harder to quantify.

Incidence of violence related to elections can be grouped across various election phases:

pre-election or registration period; campaign period; election day; counting and canvassing

period; and proclamation phase. ―Victims and perpetrators of lection violence are not limited to

the candidates and their campaign operators‖ but extend to insurgent factions, military, police

and other security forces as well.21

Different election stakeholders also work together to at least

monitor and at most counter these incidents. COMELEC, PNP and the AFP, election watchdog

and civil society organizations such as National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL),

Parish Pastoral Council for responsible Voting (PPCRV), Compact for Peaceful Elections

(COMPACT) and the Consortium and Electoral Reforms (CER).

The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, albeit having undergone several

amendments, outlines the election-related prohibited acts or offenses in Article XXII Section

261. The following are considered ―violent‖ acts during the election period as they relate to

coercion, intimidation and harassments:

1. coercion of subordinates;

2. threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other forms of coercion;

3. coercion of election officials and employees;

4. transfer of officers and employees in the civil service;

5. intervention of public officers and employees;

6. the use of undue influence;

7. appointment or use of special policemen, special agents, confidential agents or the like

from campaign period to election day;

8. illegal release of prisoners 60 days before and 30 days after election;

9. carrying and use of deadly weapons, firearms and armored land, water, and air craft;

10. wearing of uniforms and bearing arms outside the vicinity of place of work of public and

private security and police organizations

21

Patiño and Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.223.

21

11. organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or other similar forces

12. suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer

The Commission on Elections through the PNP (and in some areas, members of armed

forces) monitors and keeps record of election-related violence incidents (ERVIs). The Philippine

National Police (PNP) lists the following as election-related incidence of violence:

Shooting

Explosion

Ambush

Harassment

Burning/ Arson

Ballot Snatching

Gun Ban Violation (refers to ―bearing, carrying or transporting firearms or other deadly

weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle or public

conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by

the Commission.‖22

The gun ban is intended to curb political violence during the election

period.)

The Commission also declares ―hotspots‖ or areas with observed or expected high degree of

violence. Additional security forces are deployed in these areas. Exemptions on gun ban are also

lifted in these areas. In the most recent 2007 elections, the COMELEC declared 10 provinces

(12% of the 81 Philippine provinces) as election areas of concern (EAC) and 46 provinces or

more than half of the total number of provinces as areas of immediate concern (EAIC). These

EAIC cover 201 municipalities and six cities.

EAIC are classified as critical hotspot and their administrative activities and deployment of

local police and other security units are placed ―under direct administrative control of

COMELEC‖ especially during election day and canvassing periods.23

Meanwhile, provinces

declared as EAC were generated based on ―several parameters broken down into two major

categories‖.24

Category I are areas with: a history of election-related violent incidents in past

elections; existence of intense political rivalry between contending parties; and possible

employment of partisan armed groups by candidates in the area. Category II are areas where

there are serious threats posed by the local communist movement particularly the CPP/NPA

southern Philippine secessionist groups such as the MILF and MNLF, and other similar

organizations. The degree of affectation and capability threat groups in these areas are the point

of consideration.

When IPER did a psychographics study in 1995 and 2003 it lists the following activities as

common election (mal)practices. These offenses are also those indicated in the Omnibus Election

Code.

22

Article 22 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code defines election offenses. 23

Ibid., pp.224 and COMELEC and PNP data. 24

PNP News Release. February 2007 and May 2007.

22

Vote Buying

Flying Voter

Threatening of Voters

Bribing Local COMELEC

Ballot Snatching

Cheating in Counting

Coercion and Terrorism

Election-Related Killing

Respondents to the survey were asked of their views of the following practices in

Philippine elections and majority of the respondents still view that election-related violent

practices should not be tolerated.

COMPACT for Peaceful Elections or COMPACT lists four incidence observed to be

predominant in the last 2004 elections.

Permit to Campaign (PTC) fees and other acts of violence by armed groups

Threat or declaration of an intention or determination to injure another by the

commission of some wrong

Coercion or the physical violence or moral pressure in a determined and constant manner

Coup d‘etat or the swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat, strategy or

stealth directed against the authorities

Moreover, Compact also lists the following usual violent incidents observed during election

period:

1. Political assassinations;

2. Threats or attacks on candidates and their supporters;

3. Attacks on rallies, headquarters or home of candidates and their supporters;

4. Clashes between supporters of opposing camps;

5. Destruction or seizure of campaign paraphernalia;

6. Kidnapping for ransom to raise funds;

7. Ballot box snatching;

8. Destruction of voters‘ list or other election materials;

9. Disruption of transportation of voters perceived to be voting for the rival candidate;

10. Threats on and harassment of voters to vote for a certain candidate or for them not to vote

at all;

11. Threats or attacks on election officials;

12. Instigating disorder in the polling precincts;

13. Threats of coup d’ etat; and

14. Demands for ―Permit to Campaign fees‖ (PTC) by the New Peoples‘ Army (NPA).

The NPA‘s practice of collecting PTC fees from candidates has been going on for years,

largely unnoticed by mass media. It became rampant when the NPA declared it as an official

policy, prompting many quarters to denounce it as plain and simple extortion. Since the NPA has

a nationwide infrastructure centered on remote rural areas, they can influence mostly the local

23

elections. However, they are able to project beyond the locales through a coordinated campaign

where organized approaches are made to provincial, congressional and even senatorial

candidates.

Permits-to-campaign are sometimes supplemented by permits-to-win in areas where the

rebel movement is confident enough that they can influence the outcome of the elections.

Influencing often ranges from letting candidates enter their own zones of influence to campaign,

actual campaigning for or against certain candidates, committing electoral fraud, and ultimately,

the use of electoral violence such as threats, harassments, ambush, assassination, or raids against

candidates or their constituencies.

Table No. 4 - Number of violent incidents, deaths, and injured in the last three national elections

(1992-2004)25

Year and Type of Election Incidents of election-related violence

Number of Deaths Number of Injured

1992 national and local 157 89 138

1995 congressional and local 121 79 111





As the table above shows, there were fewer incidents of election violence in the recent

2007 than in the past three elections (1998, 2001, 2004). Unfortunate however is the record of

growing number of deaths in the last four elections. Also more hotspots are being placed under

COMELEC control.

Election observers and monitors and even the police recognize that election-related

violence ―have become more targeted and less random‖. The more prevailing trend is that

election violence occur more in the local levels, thus making it a local phenomenon. 26

The pre-election period saw much more violence than during the day of the election and

the post election period. PNP and COMELEC considered election day in 2007 as generally

calmer and more peaceful. However, there were allegations that actual voting did not happen in

some precincts, but are done by community and other local leaders on behalf of their

constituents. The security situation can also prevent voters to cast votes or force them to vote in

favor of certain candidates or parties. Meanwhile it is also recognized that ―election-related

intimidation occurs in isolated barangays, where barangay captains exercise control over the

population‖.27

Given this political situation and phenomenon of violence, fraud, irregularity and

intimidation during election, disputes are inevitable. The same employment of violence and

intimidation figure in election disputes in the Philippines. In election disputes, violence and

intimidation become both means and causes.

25

Figures from 1995-204 are based on compiled from PNP and COMELEC Reports, while 1992 data are from

Patiño &Velasco in Croissant (2006), pp.225. 26

CEPPS report on the May 2004 Philippine Elections. 27

Ibid.

24

The main government bodies tasked to conduct election and process election disputes

have continued weak credibility because of allegations of partisanship and politicking. This fact

makes for a more problematic handling of election disputes.

Election Contests and Disputes28

Pre-proclamation controversy or question pertaining to the proceedings of the board of

canvassers (BOCs) or on preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the

election returns can be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of

political parties before the board or directly with the Commission. The OEC cites the following

as possible issues29

of such controversy:

Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

Incomplete, defective, tampered or falsified copies of canvassed election returns;

The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or

they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the

results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

The Commission has the exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies and

can motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or

total suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annual partially or totally any

proclamation.

On the other hand, in cases of post-proclamation election contests, the Commission on

Elections has the judicial function of hearing and resolution of election contests on matters of

relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the legislature as well as elective regional,

provincial and city officials. The lower courts have the counterpart judicial functions for

municipal and barangay level election contests.

Table 5. – Judicial Body where election contests are filed

Election Contests for: Can be filed with: Period of Filing

National legislative positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

Elective regional positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

Elective provincial positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

Elective City positions COMELEC Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

Elective Municipal positions Regional trial Court Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

Elective barangay (village) positions Municipal or Metropolitan trial court

Within 10 days after proclamation of election results

28

Annex 7 details the forms of election contests, and corresponding role and action of the Commission on Elections. 29

Sec 243, Article 20 of the Philippine Omnibus Election Code.

25

Focus Group Discussions

The research team held two ―dialogue sessions‖ in the form of focus group discussions

(FGDs). One session was conducted in Davao City in Mindanao, while another was held in

Quezon City.

Participants from the various sectors and organizations were invited. In each of the

dialogue sessions, two focus groups were formed based on the number of participants and the

sectors represented. In Mindanao, one group was composed of representatives from election

implementing body, monitoring groups, political parties, media, other civil society organizations,

and youth and women sectors. Another group consisted of local election actors, members of

Moro/ Moslem groups, indigenous peoples (IPs) representative, local election campaigners and

operators.

The session in Quezon City covered participants not only from Metro Manila but from

nearby Luzon provinces as well. One group included officers from government agencies

involved in elections and dispute resolutions, board members of monitoring bodies, officers of

political parties, and academe, media, and youth representatives. Another group was composed

of civil society groups working on election and electoral reform advocacy, and actors in local

elections of rural areas commonly tagged as ―election hotspots‖ in the Luzon region.

Representatives from Northern, Central, and Southern Luzon participated in the discussion. An

invitation was extended to members of the national police body. They were not able to send

representative as the schedule of discussion coincided with preparation of the police for the

President‘s State of the Nation Address (SONA). A separate interview with a police general was

however granted on August 8, 2006.

Common to all focus groups are three main issues: 1) perception and experience of the

participants on election-related violence; 2) perception on dispute resolution mechanisms; and 3)

recommendations for electoral systems reforms, election dispute laws and mechanisms, and

measures to address the problem of election violence in their respective areas and in the country

in general.

In the first issue, each participant shared with the group current and past capacities of

involvement in the electoral exercise and then proceeded to give their perception and various

experiences of election-related violence. Specific issues discussed vary depending on the

presence or applicability of such concerns in their respective areas. Some of the issues discussed

were:

Permit to campaign fees

Communist/NPA Insurgency

Moro rebellion/Insurgency

Clan dynamics in elections and politics in Mindanao

Warlordism

Guns, goons, gold

26

The portion on dispute resolution mechanisms covered not only perception on available

resolution mechanisms but also on the election body, election laws, and the topic covered in the

case study---in this case, the election-related controversy involving no less than the President of

the Philippines and an election official.

Insights of the FGD participants are reported here according to the three main topics

discussed:

Perception on and experience of election-related violence

There was a leveling-off among the group participants on their definition of violence or

more specifically election-related violence.

For most discussants, violence is very much a part of Philippine election and politics.

Election-related violence is deemed to occur not only during the actual election day but spans the

whole election period---one year before election up to the post-proclamation period.

From the discussions, election violence is defined as a systematic and premeditated act

aimed at monopolizing electoral victories through various coercive ways. It consists of

―infringement of liberty‖ or the freedom to choose (candidates and parties) during elections. The

absence of that freedom is equivalent to violence. Violence may be manifested not only by

―direct physical assault‖ but also in the fear and threat inflicted the individual. One participant

equated any deviations from the ―prescribed‖ processes as ―irregular‖ and ―violent‖.

From the Mindanao discussion sessions, it was inevitable to discuss violence alongside

with electoral fraud. Much of the discussion is devoted to irregularities and fraudulent activities

they are aware and have actually experienced.

Some of the usual violence and election irregularities that the participants experienced or

are aware of are:

Black-out or power failure during counting and canvassing

Missing names of voters, unequal tally of votes against the number of registered voters

Intimidation of Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) which is composed of three teachers

as chairs and members

Pressure on the election officer to delay the proclamation of winners

Threat on the watchers (verbal, physical, emotional)

Seizure of hand-held radio and other forms of communication of candidates

There are also areas where incidence of harassment and threats is so high that monitoring

bodies cannot deploy watchers, making the system very open for any form of irregularity.

Demand for payment of permit-to-campaign fees

Non-payment of PTC fees result in: removal of campaign posters and candidates and

supporters cannot enter NPA-controlled areas during campaign periods

Areas which are considered hotspots are under the control of political clan, landlord, or a

revolutionary group

Killings which involve mostly local candidates

27

There is a new trend in the strategy of candidates and some political parties in order to

ensure election victory. In one province, for instance, as one of the participants recall: To replace

buying and selling votes among voters or through community leaders, candidates and political

parties ―buy‖ votes or spend instead during the counting and canvassing phases. ―Vote-buying‖

now transpires between the candidates (through their operators or campaigners) and the people in

charge of the local COMELEC, and members of the board of canvassers.

Violence and fraud are used in elections as two different strategies. One is the direct use

of violence as a strategy to win the elections. Some political candidates or parties hire ―goons‖ or

―mercenaries‖ as ―stand-by mechanism‖ as observed by an election officer from Mindanao.

These ―mercenaries‖ pose as threats to the rival candidate or party. In this instance,

―representatives‖ of the candidates are careful not to violate the Revised Penal Code (the

Philippines‘ penal laws).

However, in extreme cases of political competition, ―goons‖ are employed to harass or

eliminate the political rival to ensure victory in the electoral exercise. In this case, electoral

violence parallels and even replaces the election itself as determinant of the outcome. Usually,

this happens in a very close fight or as a last resort of the losing candidate, particularly if the

candidate is an incumbent.

The second is the view of one local campaigner/operator from Luzon who shared his

experience where he and his political group employed violence and money to prevent or counter

the violence and fraud that their political rivals employed against them.

One local campaigner from Mindanao, who managed the campaign for a congressional

candidate in 2004, shared that there are two components of a campaign—the ―good campaign‖

and the ―bad campaign‖. The good campaign involves distribution of campaign materials, house-

to-house campaigns, participation in community dialogues and candidates‘ debates. The ―bad

campaign‖ makes use of ―dirty‖ tactics to ensure votes or to guard votes from fraud and

manipulation from the opposing candidates. Unfortunately, however the same participant and his

husband suffered the strongest form of political violence when they were shot to death two

weeks after.

Another participant affiliated with a party-list group which caters to multi-sectoral

interests, shares that before the elections, they prepare for the non-violent and violent arena. For

the violent arena, their response is to go public by holding press conferences—which for him is a

limited capacity to counter violence.

Marginalized sectors in the society such as indigenous peoples find it difficult to compete

in electoral exercises especially in the national level, such as in the party-list representation. The

primary limitation is machinery and resources to undertake campaign and eventually to win

seats. Illiteracy is also a problem among the indigenous peoples, thus making voters from this

sector vulnerable to manipulation during elections.

28

COMELEC officials, teachers who serve as board of election inspectors, some party

watchers are the persons who are susceptible to the commission of fraud and violence. Some

election officers can undertake delaying tactics for a price, or at most times, for the highest price.

But the discussion groups proved that there are still a substantial number of local election

officers and personnel who continue to be faithful and to make efforts of ensuring clean

elections.

Given this insight, local election actors in the group see the percentage of ―faithful‖

election officers and personnel as the opportunity for reform. Continuing education and

organizing among these personnel can be a significant force that can pressure the ―corrupt‖ ones

and can work towards repairing the credibility of the Commission. Consolidation of efforts albeit

a difficult task, is seen as vital in effecting reforms.

The role of the police and the armed forces are also seen as very crucial especially in

election hotspots. In the recent 2007 elections, there were efforts to insulate the armed forces of

election duties except to vote and in areas identified to have serious armed threat to the electoral

process only by: providing security through the deployment of sufficient AFP military personnel

to man and patrol the area; manning the checkpoints in locations jointly identified the

COMELEC and the AFP; enforcing the ban on carrying of firearms by persons without gun ban

exemptions.30

From the experience of participants who have long been actors in local elections,

members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) are the ―crucial‖ persons in the exercise. On

one hand, it is viewed that the school teachers who serve as BEIs are not only burdened with the

tedious election procedures but with the impending election-related threats on them as well. On

the other hand, there are BEIs who have been really corrupted to perform irregularities.

One group raised the impact of modernization or automation of the election system on

election fraud and violence. They view that automation can be a deterrent to electoral

manipulation and violence. Given the faster means of registration, voting, and counting and

canvassing of votes there is little room for politicians and parties or their representatives to

coerce election personnel, or manipulate the counting process. The burden of election personnel

in the manual counting and canvassing will of course be lessened. The only reservation is the

uncertainty of a foolproof automated system.

Perception on election dispute and dispute resolution mechanisms

Some FGD participants admit that they are not very much aware of all election laws and

dispute resolution mechanisms in the country. Much of their knowledge refers to the ones that

have practical applications according to their experiences. Local election actors who have filed

post-proclamation cases learn about available mechanisms, institutions, processes and rulings

which involve post-proclamation election conflicts. Protests on party accreditation will

encourage gathering of laws and procedures on accreditation.

30

COMELEC Resolution 7747 promulgated in November 2006.

29

Participants representing the civil society and monitoring bodies view that no election

protests succeed at the local level. Candidates find it difficult to make their cases proceed or even

prosper in the regional trial courts and in local COMELEC.

The problem of resources (especially financial) hinders candidates‘ or parties‘ attempt to

resolve election dispute. Organizations and sectors such as the indigenous peoples and ethnic

groups also stumble on this problem in their attempt to even file cases or protests.

Organizing component is important in tackling election disputes. But it is not enough to

be organized. The venue where people should fight and the mechanisms should be made

available. However the mechanisms and institutions for filing, processing and resolving election

disputes are also tainted. People then turn to violence and fraud as a strategy for dispute

resolution.

In the experience of some local campaigners, engagement in the mainstream political and

electoral arena means the use of violence and fraud as defense for the true results of elections.

What is frustrating for local leaders is the effort to keep their constituencies believe in the

system and the laws when the same system fails to provide the mechanisms for dispute

resolution.

The institutions which are constitutionally and legally mandated to handle election

disputes continue to have tainted image and credibility. Election protest cases filed in courts and

the COMELEC seem to stay longer in the dockets.

The COMELEC suffers its lowest point in terms of credibility after the Hello Garci-

GMA controversy. The alleged involvement of COMELEC Commissioner, the president, other

national and local candidates and members of the armed forces in election results manipulation

has reached the grassroots. Even the unorganized and least politically involved sectors of the

society became aware of the credibility question of the Commission. The tendency of the

electorate to accept the situation as normal is alarming.

There are civil society organizations which continue monitoring and engagement with

election management bodies. These organizations discuss venues for complementation of efforts

with the implementors.

Political parties and party-lists hold an important role in counterbalancing election

violence and election disputes. Democratic forces particularly in the local level can serve as the

base for dispute resolution because the local politics is where election violence and disputes

mostly happen. Most of the participants see the value of studying the phenomenon of election

violence in the country which is hoped to form basis for addressing the same phenomenon.

30

On civil society mobilizations

When asked if civil society mobilizations are still effective in response to election

disputes or political crises, the participants have varied responses. Some participants deem it

necessary to maintain the active role of civil society of expressing democratic rights in the

government. Without the civil society, the ills of the government and the system will be more

entrenched.

Although some still consider ―people power‖ as one response for political crises, most of

the participants expressed that after the two ―EDSAs‖ (or mobilizations in EDSA which led to

the change in leadership), several failed impeachments, there is decline in the people‘s

perception on effectiveness of such. People want to see changes as a result of mass actions.

The looming cynicism and apathy of the people stem from the lack of substantial change

(for the better, that is) in the quality of leaders, quality of election process, and quality of life.

People perceive that in the current political crisis, change in leadership will not ensure the

needed changes. They expect their present economic and political plights will remain.

People now feel the need for an ―alternative‖ that will address the fundamental problem

of poverty and of governance. And that alternative should come with the reforms.

There are existing organized groups but some are not organized and do not know where

to run or turn to. People again need a figure or an organization or coalition that can unify the

efforts at mobilizations.

The issue or program-based politics, encouraged in the party-list system of

representation, should have a corresponding personality that can compete with the traditional

elite leadership.

There are inevitable limitations of the civil society in that they can only have substantial

intervention in disputes at the municipal levels (or in other lower courts). After the cases are

brought to the national courts or the COMELEC, organizations, parties, and individuals are now

limited by resources to monitor the proceedings of the election cases.

The lengthy process of case proceedings is also a deterrent against resource-poor

candidates, particularly in cases where the electoral protest may stretch into the next campaign

period. In many cases, the protesting candidate either diverts his attention and resources to the

next election rather than continue with the protest. In other cases, the election protest is

continued but only within the context of the next election campaign. The protesting candidate

hopes thereby that a favorable decision can be handed down before the election and he can use

whatever resources of the public office for his or her campaign.

31

Summary of Concerns

Two general sentiments came up in both discussion sessions but have a different turnout.

In the Mindanao region, the group composed of the local election actors saw very little (or no)

hope at all at addressing the problem of election violence and fraud, while the group of

representatives from sectors, monitoring bodies, and local implementing body was more

enthusiastic in the thought that reforms can still be done in the current system particularly

through massive voter education campaigns.

During the session in the National Capital Region, the same hope and enthusiasm was felt

more by the local election actors from various election hotspot areas. However, this hope and

enthusiasm is coupled with the expressed need for a body or a civil society organization that will

lead the reforms.

Another major insight from all discussions is that ―money‖ figures very prominently in

most election processes. Most of the participants refer to the availability of ―money‖ or other

resources as a big advantage in electoral processes while the lack of these resources makes it

difficult for candidates or political parties to succeed in election contests. There is also a view

that the incumbent politicians particularly those aligned with the administration are most likely

to benefit from the available resources and machinery. Some also view that election violence

comes from the elite and powers that be.

The weakening view and trust of voters and candidates on the electoral process and

institutions result in the employment of election violence and fraud. Violence (as defined during

the discussion), as well as fraud are seen to be strategies used not only to win electoral seats but

as response or counter-strategy to election disputes and electoral fraud. The incidence of

election-related deaths happen more in the local electoral arena.

The tendency of the electorate to accept things as part of the situation can be addressed

by continuing voter education. The education campaign recommended one that will go beyond

the election period. Changes and reforms in the election system should be seen in the light of

giving more access and participation to the grassroots.

32

Chapter 5 Role of Actors in Propagating or Mitigating Violence

As previously mentioned, actors in the election violence phenomenon are not limited to

the political candidates and campaign operators and supporters, although of course they figure as

the most obvious ones.

Patiño and Velasco identified six groups of actors in the election violence phenomenon:

―politician candidates, goons and private armies, partisan armed groups, police and military,

communist separatist rebels and election monitoring groups‖. (Croissant, et.al. eds. 2006)

Candidates and parties

While national politician candidates and their operators or supporters employ the use of

―media wars‖ in campaigns and elections, local candidates and operators resort to violence and

fraud as a strategy to secure victory. This victory refers not only for their candidacy but for the

candidacy of the national candidate/s they are supporting.

In areas particularly election hotspots, politicians employ personal bodyguards who may

also carry arms or may increase to become the politician‘s personal or private army. Goons and

private armies not only provide protection but can pose as threat or intimidation factors against

rival supporters and candidates. There are a recorded 114 private armies in the Philippines (2004

figure), 78 of which are in ARMM.

Private armed groups are usually bodyguards of specific politicians and sometimes

disguised as private security guards, local police or even military personnel. In a few cases,

rebels provide the armed personnel. They exist—and continued to thrive—in a political

environment dominated by political dynasties.

Apart from the personal army or goons, there are also partisan armed groups (PAGs)

which also work for politician candidates as ―guns for hire‖ or for ―specific missions or services‖

such as liquidation of politician‘s rival candidates or known critics. Private armies are regular

employees while PAGs are on a professional contractual or output/mission-based relation with

the politician. In the 2004 elections there are 115 existing partisan armed groups (PAGs) which

from the 2001 PNP figure decreased by 39. The PNP reports 21 to have been neutralized and 74

dismantled during the period of 2004 elections.

While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in

election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to

serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these

forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the

government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution.

It is of course a fact that the existence of partisan armed groups are a violation of existing

laws, including electoral laws, and that the Commission on Elections in every election outlaws

these groups and deputizes the military and the police to run after them. The COMELEC also

imposes a gun ban during the election period.

33

However, PAGs are also a reality in every election. They are in effect tolerated by the

state and even the COMELEC because of their political connections. It is only when electoral

violence by these armed groups reach unacceptable level and there is a popular outcry that these

are suppressed.

With a weak political party system, the local political dynasties controlling these armed

groups are usually allies or provide the political base of the national politicians. Thus the

persistence of these partisan armed groups directly depends on the political patronage system

that replaced the political parties.

Given this reality, the COMELEC—in itself heavily politicized—cannot provide the

political will to go after these personal armed groups. In fact, in the last 2007 elections, it issued

more than 23,000 gun ban exemptions—effectively negating the ban.

The Commission on Elections

As the election administration body mandated by the Constitution, the Commission on

Elections has the principal responsibility of maintaining peace and order in relation to elections.

To be able to do this, it deputizes the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National

Police and any other government agency it sees fit to mobilize. The only limiting constitutional

provision is the requirement for the acquiescence of the President to the deputization.

When they are deputized, the COMELEC has almost absolute power to transfer military

and police personnel, to deploy them to protect the electoral process, to order the arrest of

violators, order a gun ban, institute a liquor ban, to take over local government functions in areas

of probable electoral violence, and any other action in support of the peaceful conduct of the

electoral process.

However, in practice, there are many constraints on the COMELEC, both internally and

externally. It is subject to political pressure and may compromise as a result. In areas where

warlord political dynasties prevail, the COMELEC usually tiptoes and avoid direct

confrontations.

The institution is compromised politically in so many ways. The vast majority of its

personnel are political appointees, having been endorsed by politicians. Most of their offices are

located in local government premises by virtue of the ―generosity‖ of local incumbents. The

presence of partisan armed groups by local warlord-politicians also provides a threat to local

election officials. These politicians may also have influence over the local military and police

units and exerts pressure over their assignments.

The result is the weak or even the absence of political will on the part of the COMELEC

to prevent or even prosecute election violence cases. It is usually left to the police to follow-up

on cases of election violence.

34

However, the COMELEC has the potential to control election violence because of its

sweeping constitutional powers. If it so decides to exercise these powers, it has the ample

capability to do it. As it is, the level of election violence is inversely proportional to the level of

political will of the election administrator.

State security forces

The Philippine National Police (PNP) has the chief mission of maintaining peace and

order in the country. During election period, it is deputized by the COMELEC for election

duties. The Armed forces of the Philippines (AFP) is also usually deputized, particularly for

areas that have insurgencies or have armed groups that may potentially disrupt the elections. In

some elections in the past, the military reservist force, such as the Reserve Officers Training

corps (ROTC), are also deputized for election duties.

When deputized, these state security forces primarily provide for security of election

personnel, equipment, poll centers, and movement of candidates and voters. However, in some

cases, the military and police units substitute for the Board of Inspectors (BEIs) when civilians

are not available or there is imminent danger for civilians in this role.

The problem arises when these units are themselves politicized or become partisan to

specific candidates. Then, they become a liability, either by toleration or turning a blind eye to

threats or actual electoral violence acts of the politicians and their armed followers or by

participating in the acts of electoral violence themselves.

The assignment of military and police officers is a major arena among contending

candidates, particularly in areas where warlord-politicians prevail. They may well determine the

outcome of the elections in these places, by either preventing or tacitly supporting private or

partisan armed groups.

The COMELEC, with the consent of the President, may reshuffle these officers and

thus—in theory—prevent the influencing of these officers. However, this is easier said than done

when the careers of many of these officers—even those from the Philippine Military Academy

(PMA)—owe much to their politician-sponsors.31

Many officers are also members of political

clans as the latter, learning the lesson from Marcos, include influencing the military and police

in their political strategies.

Insurgency groups

Communist and separatist insurgents also make use of violence and attacks during

elections to send message to the government. In the Philippines, the long-standing communist

insurgency is waged by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed component

the New People‘s Army (NPA). In the 2004 elections, they went public with their permit-to

campaign (PTC) policy sowing more violence and intimidation through the NPA‘s demand for

31

The Philippine Military Academy as the premier military training institution of the country allows the practice of

honorary class membership of politicians. Thus PMA Class 1978 has for adopted member President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo while PMA Class 1974 has the Presidential Spouse Mike Arroyo as its adopted member.

35

money, contribution, and material and arms support in exchange for access to rebel areas during

campaign and election periods. The separatist rebels in the Southern Philippines are grouped as

the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The CPP-NPA and the MILF continue to have

conflicts with the military, thus threatening the security situation of various areas too.

While the police and military forces are deployed by COMELEC to provide security in

election areas, some elements of the state security forces are corrupted by politicians or parties to

serve in their favor based from previous experiences and allegations. In this instance, these

forces which become partisan are at an advantage because of their access and status in the

government. This contributes to decreasing public trust in the institution.

Election monitors and citizen arms

Existence of election monitoring organizations such as NAMFREL and PPCRV works in

two ways for a democracy like the Philippines. PPCRV, a nation-wide parish-based group of

volunteers accredited as COMELEC citizen‘s arm was established in 1992 and undertakes voter

education and pollwatching. NAMFREL conducts election quick count through precinct,

municipal, provincial and national volunteers.

The CER also works for citizen voter education and election monitoring. On one hand, it

promotes the mandate of civic participation in government processes by maintaining watchdogs

and as providers of voter education. In the 2007 elections, CER formed the Bantay-Eleksyon

2007 (Election Watch 2007) or the People‘s Coalition to Monitor the 2007 Elections to act as a

domestic monitoring mission. It also participated in a Pera at Pulitika (Money and Politics)

monitoring of campaign expenditures.

One major area of citizen election monitoring is electoral violence. International and

domestic monitors continually speak on this in their reports. These have noted, time and again,

the prevalence of election violence as a ―normal‖ part of Philippine election process. The only

differences are in the level of violence, number of incidence, and quality of targets.

It is only in the 2007 elections that so many of them have come out with a

recommendation for the serious campaign by government to eradicate warlordism. They noted,

as in the resolution of the influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP),

that warlordism in certain areas such as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

has reached a proportion that can affect the outcome of the national vote, including the

presidential election this coming 2010.

On the other hand, the growing number of local and international organizations which

conduct election monitoring and observation also manifest that Philippine politics and elections

suffer from democratic flaws not only in the available legal instruments and institutions but most

particularly in the actual conduct of democratic processes. All in all, more than 10 national and

international election monitoring initiatives were conducted during the 2007 elections.

Collectively, they were able to prevent the massive cheating that would have affected even the

national election results.

36

Of course, the big reason for this explosion of monitoring efforts was the realization that

Philippine democracy cannot take another beating with questionable elections such as the one

that dogged the 2004 presidential election. The latter precipitated a political crisis that still roils

the political landscape up to the present. Unfortunately, the Commission on Elections itself has

low credibility because of the alleged involvement of some of its personnel in the 2004 electoral

fraud issue. It was not in a position to guarantee the credibility of the 2007 elections.

Chapter 6 Case Study: 2004 Philippine Presidential Election Impasse

The Issue of Presidential Legitimacy

Philippine president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo came to power in 2001 through a reprise

of the people power of 1986. Under siege from a week-long demonstration of more than half a

million Filipinos and confronted by the withdrawal of support of the leadership of the armed

forces and members of his cabinet, then President Joseph Estrada left the Malacañang Palace in

the morning of January 20, 2001. Vice-President Arroyo took over when the latter

―constructively resigned.‖32

As president, she continually faced the issue of legitimacy. Cases were filed with the

Supreme Court to reverse its decision to recognize the legality of her presidency.33

In May 2001,

hundreds of thousands of Estrada‘s urban poor supporters besieged both the historical EDSA

people power shrine and Malacañang palace for several days. In August 2003, several hundred

officers and men of elite armed forces units occupied the plush Oakwood hotel in the country‘s

central business district and attempted to rally for a withdrawal of support. Every sector of the

people divided on the issue. The political opposition centered on Estrada never accepted

Macapagal-Arroyo‘s accession to presidency.

These events in 2001 and subsequent years provided the backdrop to the 2004

presidential election. By this time, the early euphoria of the largely middle class-based support

for Macapagal-Arroyo had evaporated and her popularity ratings were down.34

However, these

erstwhile supporters were not ready to embrace the political opposition, particularly those

identified with Estrada.

The 2004 presidential election offered itself as a possible political solution to the issue of

presidential legitimacy. Under the 1987 Constitution, the rare instance that a sitting president—

32

Sabrina M. Querubin, Ana Rhia T. Muhi, and Charisse F. Gonzales-Olalia, Legitimizing the Illegitimate:

Disregarding the Rule of Law in Estrada v. Disierto and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, Public Policy (January-

June 2003 Special Issue), pp. 108. The Supreme Court eventually decided that Estrada‘s acts during second People

Power can be termed as resignation even if there was no formal act of resignation. 33

The relevant cases are the Estrada v. Disierto (G.R. Nos. 146710-15) and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R.

No. 146738). 34

The Social Weather Station tracked President Macapagal-Arroyo‘s net satisfaction rating from a high of +24 in

March 2004 (just after she became president) to a lower -3 in November 2003 (before the start of the 2004 election

campaign). See Social Weather Station, Third Quarter 2006 Social Weather Survey, Press Release,

www.sws.org.ph.

37

who only is allowed one six-year term—can succeed oneself if he or she has served for less than

four years as a replacement president.

The president initially announced in December 2002 that she will not run anymore in the

2004 elections. However, when the time came to make a decision, she decided to run, citing her

desire to protect the gains of her initial term. Predictably, the opposition and even some among

her supporters criticized her flip-flopping.

This action by the president set the stage for a very acrimonious presidential election. The

president‘s camp questioned the citizenship and educational qualifications of the second-running

presidential candidate, popular actor and Estrada‘s friend Fernando Poe, Jr. The latter expectedly

brought up the issue of the 2001 Macapagal-Arroyo‘s ―grab‖ for power and her poverty

eradication record.

The 2004 presidential election itself became controversial when the opposition

candidates, except for former senator Raul Roco, did not accept the results. Poe and his running-

mate for vice-president, former senator Loren Legarda, filed their respective election protests

before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.35

In December, 2004, barely seven months after the May elections, opposition candidate

Poe died. His electoral protest died with him.

The rest of the opposition maintained their rejection of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s electoral

victory. They initiated street demonstrations, congressional corruption investigations, and even

agitated for military intervention.

In June 2005, wiretap tapes36

of alleged conversations between President Macapagal-

Arroyo and an election commissioner, Virgilio Garcillano, became public. This fanned the

simmering political crisis into a firestorm that has not yet died down. It is still a major, if not the

number one issue, in the 2007 midterm national and local elections.

The 2004 presidential electoral dispute, as far as the legal process is concerned, is already

over when the Presidential Electoral Tribunal ended Poe‘s protest upon his death.37

It has since

then graduated into continuing attempts to force President Macapagal-Arroyo from office, both

constitutionally and extra-constitutionally.38

35

The Presidential Electoral Tribunal consists of the whole Supreme Court, convening as the former. 36

On June 6, 2005, alleged phone conversations between the president Macapagal-Arroyo and election

commissioner Virgilio Garcillano taken by the military‘s intelligence services became public, ironically through

presidential spokesperson Ignacio Bunye. 37

Under the rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the presidential and vice-presidential candidates with

the second and third highest votes, respectively, can lodge their respective protests within 30 days after the

proclamation of the winner. The spouse, who can do so in relation to lesser elective posts, is prohibited from

continuing with the protest. See 2005 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, p. 11. 38

Several options have already been done by the opposition. A significant number of Cabinet officials resigned in

July 2005, calling for the President‘s resignation. Two impeachment complaints were filed in 2005 and 2006. An

aborted withdrawal of military support sparked a declaration of national emergency last February 2006.

38

The Protagonists

The 2004 presidential election involved five major candidates: President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, actor Fernando Poe, Jr., former senator Raul Roco, former police chief and

senator Panfilo Lacson, and religious evangelist Eduardo Villanueva.

At the start of the election, it was already obvious that the main opponents were President

Macapagal-Arroyo and Estrada‘s friend, Fernando Poe, Jr. The contrast between the two main

presidential candidates is striking.

Macapagal-Arroyo, an economist by profession, campaigned on a platform of economic

performance, asserting that her policies led to the stabilizing of the Philippine economy. The

1997 Asian crisis and Estrada mismanagement, by 2001, led to major fiscal deficits and

economic downturn. She is the daughter of the late President Diosdado Macapagal.

She had consistently won national elections with convincing majorities, first as the top-

ranking senator in the 1992 elections and as vice-president in the 1998 elections. However, this

is attributed more to her political acumen and political network than her popularity. In the

campaign, she carefully skirted the political issues.

Poe, on the other hand, is a newcomer to politics, with no record of any previous

government position. However, as the Philippines‘ top actor, he is very popular—even more than

Estrada. He harped on the political legitimacy issue and her alleged power grab in 2001. He did

not do much campaigning, being short on funds and political savvy. Instead, he relied on his

movie popularity and clean image to bring him to power. 39

Election Results

Under the Philippine constitution, it is only Congress, with both the Senate and the House

of Representatives meeting in a joint session, which canvasses the election results and proclaims

the winner of the presidential and vice-presidential contest.

After one month of canvassing, it proclaimed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as

president and her running-mate, Senator Noli de Castro, as vice-president. President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo, by official Congressional canvass, got 12,905,808.40

His closest opponent,

Fernando Poe, Jr., got 11,782,232.

All the quick counts plus an exit poll by the Social Weather Station (SWS) showed the

president leading.41

Also, surveys two weeks before the elections predicted a close fight with the

president leading.42

The following chart shows both official and unofficial tallies (in percent):43

39

Fernando Poe, Jr. is popularly known as ―Da King‖ for his dominance in box office and movie world. He has a

vast following among Filipinos, especially the numerically important electorate from the lower classes. The

opposition expected him to win on sheer popularity, as Estrada did in 1998. 40

Figures are from the Congressional Joint Committee‘s Official Canvass Result for President. 41

The Social Weather Station (SWS) was the only one who conducted an exit poll showing: the following: GMA

45%, FPJ 34%, Lacson 10%, Roco 6%, Villanueva 5%. The relatively large margin of the president over Poe

became controversial when it was not supported by the official and unofficial counts.

39

As can be seen in the all the tallies, the fight between Macapagal-Arroyo and Poe was

tight. The president‘s three-percent margin in the official tally was not enough to convince the

opposition and many among the people of her victory. The opposition, including other

presidential candidates Lacson and Villanueva, claimed Poe won, albeit also by a small margin.

An election monitoring group, the Coalition of Hope (Honest, Orderly, Peaceful Elections)

branded the election a fraud. It even questioned the Catholic church leaders and the Catholic-

backed election monitoring groups NAMFREL and PPCRV for certifying that the results of the

election show the will of the people.44

An election analysis also concluded that, ―It was a very

close contest, with the most probable results ranging from a GMA win of around 156,000 votes

or less, to an FPJ win of around 84,000 votes or less.‖45

The US-led international election monitoring group, Consortium on Elections and

Political Party Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippine mission, was also not able to conclude on the

fairness of the election results, although it acknowledged the ―deeply rooted mistrust that

characterizes the relationships between and among virtually all participants in the processes.

42

SWS final pre-election survey for May 1-4, 2004 has the following results: Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 37%,

Fernando Poe Jr. 30%, Panfilo Lacson 11%, Raul Roco 6%, Eddie Villanueva 4%, Eddie Gil 0.3%, and 12%

undecided, with an error margin of ±3%. 43

Figures as compiled by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), as part of the report on

the 2004 elections by the Consortium on Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) Philippines

Election Observation Program. 44

The Daily Tribune, Church Leaders Prefer To Hide Truth By Absolving Cheats – Hope, June 2, 2004. 45

Roberto Verzola, The True Results of the 2004 Presidential Elections Based on the NAMFREL Tally: A Final

Report, p. 11. (PDF format). This article was also published in Kasarinlan, University of the Philippines Third

World Study Center journal.

40

There is little evidence of faith in the system or in the honest intent of any of its participants. All

parties in the process are assumed guilty of actual or planned malfeasance, and there are no

accepted or respected processes or evidentiary standards for demonstrating otherwise. The

basic integrity and the legitimacy of virtually every elective office is in question.‖

In the end, the presidential election was not able to decisively resolve President

Macapagal-Arroyo‘s claim to a legitimate presidency. Instead, on top of the 2001 legitimacy

crisis, a new crisis founded on charges of electoral cheating hounded her after the election.

The Issue of Cheating

The issue of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s cheating at the 2004 presidential election is essentially

a political one. It is being fought in the political arena, within the constitutional border as well as

outside in the extra-constitutional arena.

The constitutional venue of the legal electoral protest, allowed only for the second- and

third-ranked presidential candidate, was effectively closed when Fernando Poe, Jr. died in

December 2004. Panfilo Lacson, the third-ranked candidate, did not file any immediate protest

and he was barred by the 30-day rule for filing one. It is Loren Legarda, the second-ranked vice-

presidential candidate and running-mate of Poe, who still pursues her electoral protest before the

Presidential Electoral Tribunal.

The problem of an electoral protest in the Philippines, including the presidential electoral

protest, is that it is a very expensive proposition and takes a long time to have a final decision.

All fees related to the protest are borne by the protesting candidate, including legal fees,

attorney‘s fee, revision fee, and reproduction fees. In a national election protest, this runs into at

least tens of millions of pesos or millions of dollars. The painstaking opening of ballot boxes and

counting votes, accompanied by legal debate, also prevents any quick protest settlement.

An example is Senator and presidential candidate Miriam Defensor-Santiago‘s case

against President Fidel Ramos in 1992. Three years and millions of pesos later, she decided to

just run again as senator. It was a practical decision—with her protest going nowhere and the

next presidential election looming in 1998.

The impracticality and expenses of the electoral protest in the Philippines lend

themselves to electoral manipulation and corruption. In the case of Poe, it mercifully ended with

his death. His running-mate Legarda, in the meanwhile, tried to pursue her own protest but also

chose to run again in the 2007 senatorial elections, just like Defensor-Santiago in 1995.

Given the legal impediments and its historical background, the issue became politically

contentious from the start. The opposition, with a substantial presence in the Senate, started

various investigations into the use of government funds and illegal gambling contributions for

President Macapagal-Arroyo‘s campaign. These include the alleged use the funds from the road

users‘ tax to hire 100,000+ contractual streetsweepers for three months coinciding with the

election campaign, the distribution of 6-month temporary health cards to the poor from the

government health insurance, PhilHealth, the construction of highly-visible infrastructure

41

projects during the campaign period,46

the use of government transportation ostensibly for

project inspection but ending up in presidential campaign rallies, and the disappearance of

hundreds of millions of fertilizer subsidy funds and agrarian reform funds, including those

coming from the returned Marcos Swiss assets.

These investigations targeted the public opinion. By November 2004, barely six months

after her election, President Macapagal-Arroyo had a net satisfaction rating of -5%, a huge drop

from her June 2004 rating of +26%.47

As early as August 2004, an SWS survey found 23%

saying that Fernando Poe Jr. and Loren Legarda were definitely cheated, and another 32% saying

that they were probably cheated, or a total of 55% doubting the official result of the 2004

presidential election.48

Unrest also plagued the military, with rumors of military rebellion appearing in the media

intermittently. One reason for this is the politicization of the armed forces and police officer

corps—initiated by Marcos and not quite corrected up to the present—that led to divisiveness

among them. Former senator and coup leader Gregorio Honasan, who maintains strong links

with the younger officers, served as Poe‘s chief security during the presidential campaign. The

Oakwood mutiny in 2003 is being attributed to him by Malacañang despite his role in ending it.49

The Left, including the underground Communist Party of the Philippines, who had been

friendly with President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in her earlier term, now started aligning with

the opposition.

In June 6, 2005, pre-empting the opposition, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye announced

the existence of the so-called Garcillano tapes, which purportedly record wire-tapped

conversations between Commission on Elections (COMELEC) commissioner Virgilio

Garcillano and President Macapagal-Arroyo. He attempted to downplay these tapes as fakes and

presented ones that were supposedly correct.

It was a mistake. People got curious and demands for the public airing of the tapes

resounded. The opposition, sensing the public mood, released its own copy. The resulting

recording, heard or transcribed, supported the allegation of electoral cheating.50

The President hemmed and hawed. Her spokesperson first denied completely the tapes,

branding them as ―fakes.‖ Later, on June 27, 2005, in a national address, she admitted that her

voice was the one on the tape. Later, her people would again deny the admission.

46

There is an election ban on government projects during the election period although an exception is made with

regards to projects started before the start of the election period. 47

SWS surveys of June 4-29, 2004 and November 25-December 2, 2004. SWS Press release of July 9, 2004 and

SWS Press Release of December 17, 2004. 48

SWS Press Release of August 25, 2004. 49

The Malacañang-created Feliciano Commission issued a report linking Honasan to the Oakwood incident. See

http://www.i-site.ph/Record/fffc-findings.html for the whole report. 50

All the versions of the Garcillano tapes can be downloaded from this site: http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-

files/tapes.php.

http://www.i-site.ph/Record/fffc-findings.html

http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-files/tapes.php

http://www.pcij.org/blog/wp-files/tapes.php

42

The damage was done. Ten members of her Cabinet resigned on July 8, 2005 and called

for her resignation. The Liberal Party under Senate President Franklin Drilon, a member of the

ruling coalition, seconded the call. The only other woman president, Corazon Aquino, also called

for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

However, the majority party Lakas-Christian-Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), rallied to

her under the leadership of former president Fidel Ramos and House Speaker Jose de Venecia.

The president, thus encouraged, refused the call.

Public opinion weighed in, giving the president the worst record in presidential

popularity. The Social Weather Survey of May 14-23, 2005 finds 26% of Filipinos satisfied, and

59% dissatisfied, with the performance of Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, giving her a Net

Satisfaction Rating of -33%, which is a new record low for Presidents since 1986. By February

2007, while rising again, it still remained negative at -4%. [See chart]

The nationwide 3rd Quarter 2005 SWS survey found 79% wanting President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo impeached, 64% favoring her resignation, and 51% saying she should be

removed by People Power if the House of Representatives would reject her impeachment.51

The key factor in the negative sentiment, according to SWS, is the belief of most

Filipinos that the president's admitted phone calls to "a COMELEC official" amounted to

instructing him to cheat in the 2004 election, and were not merely meant to protect her votes as

she claimed in her June 27 apology.

The president chose to fight it out. Sensing that the people were not keen on using extra-

constitutional means just yet and that both the Catholic church and the middle class called for

51

SWS Press Release of September 10, 2005.

43

constitutional means to settle the issue, she rejected the option to resign and maneuvered in the

House of Representatives where her allies hold the majority to prevent the initiation of

impeachment proceedings against her.52

She also rejected the convening of an independent

commission to investigate the charges.

Two impeachment charges, in 2005 and in 2006, were filed and defeated in the lower

House against President Macapagal-Arroyo. A nascent plot to withdraw military support in

February 2006 was also narrowly aborted when she declared a short-lived state of national

emergency.

The president‘s camp took advantage of the weaknesses of the opposition and

maneuvered to prevent the critical political mass from developing against her. They also tried to

preserve and consolidate their own bases among the congressmen and the local officials,

promising them extended terms without the constitutionally-mandated elections in 2007.

Their main strategy to achieve a ―no-election‖ scenario in 2007 was to undertake

constitutional change before the elections, thereby shifting to a unicameral parliamentary system,

and establishing an interim transition parliament composed of the current legislators. In order to

pursue constitutional change, they undertook parallel efforts to convene a constituent assembly

and a people‘s initiative.53

The pro-Arroyo majority coalition in the lower House of Representatives tried to call for

a constituent assembly on its own. Meanwhile, Arroyo allies among the local officials through

the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) and a newly-organized organization,

Sigaw ng Bayan (Shout of the People), tried to sponsor a people‘s initiative effort.

Both efforts failed. The Senate vigorously campaigned against the holding of a unilateral

―constituent assembly,‖ when the pro-Arroyo majority in the lower house unilaterally passed a

resolution convening it, the people—led by the Catholic Church and other religious groups—

threatened to hold a people power assembly against it. Both the Commission on Elections and

the Supreme Court rejected the ―people‘s initiative.‖

With the defeat of Arroyo constitutional change initiatives, the arena shifted to the 2007

midterm elections. Even if there is no election for presidency, the key issue in these elections still

remains the legitimacy of the presidential victory in the 2004 elections. Since one-half of the

Senate seats and the whole of the House of Representatives are up for elections, the possibility

exists for the opposition to get one-third of the House of Representatives and two-thirds of the

Senate—and thus mount a successful impeachment in the new 14th

Congress in July 2007.

52

Under the 1987 Constitution, only a ⅓ vote of all members of the House of Representatives can impeach

constitutional officers, including the president. The Senate act as the impeachment court. Only one impeachment

process can be done against a particular official in a year. 53

A constituent assembly is Congress convened in a joint session to propose a revision or amendments to the

constitution while a people‘s initiative is a direct democratic method to propose amendments by at least 12% of

registered voters nationwide (with at least 3% of registered voters in every legislative district).

44

Continuing Crisis

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, so far, successfully fought off all pressures,

maneuvering and using all the resources at her disposal. On the other hand, her government is

now a government of survival.

The political opposition is also fragmented, with sections coming from both pro-Estrada

and anti-Estrada camps, various shades of the Left, including the CPP rebels, and some Church

and middle class formations. There is no clear-cut leader, much more a unified platform and

alternative. They are still far from achieving the cohesiveness, unity and solidity needed to force

the hand of the Macapagal-Arroyo administration. The situation is one of a political impasse.

One political solution would have been negotiations on a possible political compromise

with the opposition. The logical way to resolve the impasse is to hold another presidential

election, one that is credible and acceptable to the opposition. However, this has not gone very

far because of the intractable nature of the issue and the stubbornness of the president‘s camp.

Presidential legitimacy rests on the body politic accepting the rule of the person holding

the presidency. Precisely, this is the issue. Any presidential election will almost certainly lead to

the loss of Macapagal-Arroyo‘s presidency because of the solid majority public opinion against

her. As long as this is the case, she will not agree to a new presidential election.

The 2007 elections loom as a threat because her low public approval may lead to the

defeat of enough loyal congressmen for the opposition to succeed in impeaching her. She may

also lose her political base as these congressmen and local officials jockey at the local levels in

the elections.

In the process of the crisis, almost all post-Marcos political institutions became victim.

They were attacked or put under tremendous pressure from both sides of the political divide.

The president and her allies maintain their dominance in the executive department, the

House of Representatives, the Lakas-CMD party and coalition. They also maintain considerable

influence in the military and police, the judiciary, the ombudsman, the commission on elections,

and other instrumentalities of government. They also have some influence in the various major

religious groups, including the powerful Catholic hierarchy, among big business groups, and

mass media. They have a certain level of grassroots support, coming from the base of its loyal

local government officials.

The opposition holds the Senate and also has considerable influence within and outside

the government.

Recently, distancing has been observed from the Catholic hierarchy, media and big

business. The Supreme Court and even the armed forces are taking a more neutral stance. The

Supreme Court decisions against the crisis policies of the president, including the recent decision

against the so-called ―people‘s initiative‖ to change the constitution does not augur well for the

president‘s camp.

45

The positioning of the Supreme Court and the neutral stance of the military has

guaranteed constitutional stability amidst the crisis. There is therefore the channeling of energies

towards the electoral solution.

The 2007 elections may well become the ―indirect referendum‖ on Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo‘s presidency. However, if this is not credible or is thwarted, the danger rises sharply

towards an extra-constitutional channel. The fate of Philippine democracy lies in balance.

Chapter 7 Issues and recommendations/Good Practices

Election violence and election dispute resolution in the Philippines take place within the

context of a fragile democracy struggling to consolidate itself. In the post-Marcos dictatorship

period, this democracy has to contend not only with the usual problems associated with the

democratic and electoral process of seeking power but also with institutions, practices, and

forces left behind by the Marcos regime.

The main issue in relation to election violence is the persistence of political dynasties and

its patronage politics. These dynasties or political clans see political power as the end-all and be-

all politics in the country. To this end, they are willing to do all that is necessary—including

undemocratic methods—in order to seek and maintain the power.

These dynasties and clans have built a power structure stretching from the national to the

community or village level that is unmatched by any political party, insurgency group or other

political forces.

A related issue is the inevitable corruption of democratic institutions in such a situation of

dominance of dynastic politics. This includes the election administration agency, the military and

police, the courts, and various electoral tribunals. Election disputes are often settled without

satisfying the losing side and often spill over to election violence.

The third issue is the politicization of the electoral process, including election

management and election dispute resolution. The practice of peer judges in the case of senate

and congressional election disputes lends itself to political meddling in election disputes. The

appointments of COMELEC commissioners and personnel via endorsement or confirmation by

political bodies or politicians lead to the political partisanship within the election administration.

The existence of political dynasties effectively excludes marginal groups from

participating fully in the elections and other political processes. Running for office requires huge

amounts of money, connections to government and electoral bodies, and even access to police

and military that marginal groups cannot hope to compete on an even playing field with the

political clans.

Exclusion of marginal groups from political participation provides the main political

rationale for local insurgencies and undermines the foundations of Philippine democracy. The

46

rise of extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances targeting members of open Left groups,

the media, and other critical sectors of society represents a setback to democracy is easily

understood if taken within the policy of political exclusion. Of course, insurgencies will persist

precisely because of the latter.

Gender participation in Philippine elections is also heavily skewed in favor of male

dominants who are usually dynastic leaders in a patronage feudal setting. Less than 20% of

elective officials are women. Many of the latter are wives or daughters of clan political leaders

who are elected within the rationale of maintaining clan political dominance.

Only comprehensive political and electoral reforms can effectively broaden participation

in Philippine democracy. Curbing election violence and credible electoral dispute resolution can

only be done if these reforms are in place and working. Among these are the following urgent

ones, as reiterated in the recommendations of election monitors in the 2007 elections:54

1. The Commission on Elections need to be revamped from top to bottom as the vital

first step in bringing back the credibility of the institution and reform the electoral

system. Among the first steps here is the appointment of four new, competent

commissioners with reputation for integrity, have management skills, and capability

for undertaking reforms. It is also necessary to weed out political appointees who do

not have the necessary impartiality or skill competency for the work of the

COMELEC. There is also the need to professionalize the COMELEC organization,

raise salaries, promote on merits, and conduct necessary trainings of COMELEC

personnel.

2. Election modernization should be implemented. This means the implementation of an

automated election system in time for the 2010 elections, modernization of

COMELEC infrastructure, and training of COMELEC personnel and public

education on the modernized system.

3. The political party reform bill should be passed by congress immediately so as to

strengthen the political party system.

4. The party-list law should be amended in the light of lessons learned not only in the

2007 elections but in earlier elections.

5. The overseas absentee voting law needs to be revisited to ensure its full

implementation in the next elections. Measures to educate overseas Filipinos should

also be devised and carried out.

6. The Omnibus Election code should be amended to reflect the requirements of election

modernization as well as to address the weaknesses and loopholes of the present

electoral laws.

54

This is the set of recommendations by Batay-Eleksyon 2007 (Election Watch), the domestic monitoring mission

organized by the consortium on electoral Reforms (CER).

47

7. The COMELEC should be given the necessary capability to enforce election laws and

prosecute election violators.

8. There should be a major initiative to address the problems of anomalous election

practices in ARMM and elsewhere and the phenomenon of massive and organized

cheating.

9. The problem of election violence needs to be addressed and effectively stopped in a

systematic manner.

10. Citizen participation in the electoral process should be heightened and made on a

continuing basis in order to make effective Philippine democracy.

48

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49

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50

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51

Research Team

Ramon C. Casiple

Maria Sonia B. Atienza Liñan

Rosa Bella M. Quindoza

Lalaine N. Marfil-Apugan

Jay Martin S. Ablola

Arturo Guerrero T. Liñan

Documents

Democracy, Electoral Systems, and Violence in the Philippines