December 2007 - Issue 5

Dear Customers and Aviation Safety colleagues,

The 14th Airbus Flight Safety Conference, which took placeon October 15th to 18th, was an opportunity to remind thetrends and to show lessons learned. As we all know, CFITand runway excursions remain two of the highest riskareas.

It also emphasized the fact that we are learning muchmore than we ever have: with your flight data monitoringsystems we know of more near events than would haveever been possible before

As accident prevention is often a matter of repeatinglessons learned from the past and sharing them with newcomers, either new airlines or younger pilots, we havedecided to include in this 5th issue of Safety First magazine2 articles about lessons already known (near CFIT,managing unreliable airspeed).

Then, as soon as the investigations will be completed,we intend to share with you in a coming issue, the lessonslearned from the 2 major runway excursions, whichoccurred on the Airbus fleet since the last SafetyConference.

I hope you will enjoy reading this issue and share it widelywithin your airline.

The Airbus Flight Safety Team wishes you and your familya very good new year 2008.

Yours sincerely

Yannick MALINGEVice President Flight Safety

Yannick MALINGE

Vice President Flight Safety

Editorial# 05 December 2007

ContentThe Airbus Safety Magazine . . . . . . . . . 1NewsC. Courtenay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Near CFIT event during Non Precision ApproachP. Charalambides . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4A320 Tail strike at Take-Off?M. Baillion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Unreliable SpeedJ. Barthe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Compliance to operationalproceduresC. Pelegrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20The Future Air Navigation SystemFANS BS. de Cuendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24Airbus Flight SafetyContacts/Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

1

Safety First# 05 December 2007

Safety First is published by Airbus S.A.S1, rond point Maurice Bellonte31707 Blagnac Cedex / France

Editors:Yannick Malinge, Vice President Flight SafetyChristopher Courtenay, Director of Flight Safety

Concept Design byHCSGM 20071124Production by Quat’coul

Copyright: GSE

Photos copyright Airbus Photos by ExM: Hervé BerengerPhilippe MascletHervé Goussé

Computer rendering by ABAC

Printed in France

© Airbus S.A.S. 2007 – All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary documents.

By taking delivery of this Brochure (hereafter “Brochure”), you accept on behalf of your company to comply with the following guidelines:

> No other intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this Brochure than theright to read it, for the sole purpose of information.

> This Brochure and its content shall not be modified and its illustrations and photos shallnot be reproduced without prior written consent of Airbus.

> This Brochure and the materials it contains shall not, in whole or in part, be sold, rented, or licensed to any third party subject to payment.

This Brochure contains sensitive information that is correct at the time of going to press. This information involves a number of factors that could change over time, effecting thetrue public representation. Airbus assumes no obligation to update any information containedin this document or with respect to the information described herein.

Airbus SAS shall assume no liability for any damage in connection with the use of thisBrochure and of the materials it contains, even if Airbus SAS has been advised of the likelihood of such damages.

Safety FirstThe Airbus Safety MagazineFor the enhancement of safe flight through increased knowledge and communications.

Safety First is published by the Flight Safety Departmentof Airbus. It is a source of specialist safety informationfor the restricted use of flight and ground crew memberswho fly and maintain Airbus aircraft. It is also distributedto other selected organisations.

Material for publication is obtained from multiple sourcesand includes selected information from the Airbus FlightSafety Confidential Reporting System, incident andaccident investigation reports, system tests and flighttests. Material is also obtained from sources within theairline industry, studies and reports from governmentagencies and other aviation sources.

All articles in Safety First are presented for informationonly and are not intended to replace ICAO guidelines,standards or recommended practices, operator-mandated

requirements or technical orders. The contents do notsupersede any requirements mandated by the State ofRegistry of the Operator’s aircraft or supersede or amendany Airbus type-specific AFM, AMM, FCOM, MELdocumentation or any other approved documentation.

Articles may be reprinted without permission, except wherecopyright source is indicated, but with acknowledgementto Airbus. Where Airbus is not the author, the contents ofthe article do not necessarily reflect the views of Airbus,neither do they indicate Company policy.

Contributions, comment and feedback are welcome. Fortechnical reasons the editors may be required to make editorialchanges to manuscripts, however every effort will be madeto preserve the intended meaning of the original. Enquiriesrelated to this publication should be addressed to:

AirbusFlight Safety Department (GSE)1, rond point Maurice Bellonte31707 Blagnac Cedex - FranceE.mail: [email protected]: +33 (0)5 61 93 44 29

Safety FirstThe Airbus Safety Magazine

# 05 December 2007

2

New Head of AirbusProduct Safety

Claude Lelaie has replaced John Lauber as headof product safety following John’s retirement inSeptember.Claude joined airbus in 1988 as an experimentaltest pilot and since 1994 has led the Airbus flighttest team in the development, certification andacceptance of all Airbus aircraft including mostrecently the A380.He has accumulated over 15000 flight hours onmore than 200 aircraft types.

On taking this new appointment Claude said thathe was very much looking forward to his newresponsibilities. “ As a company we have anenormous obligation to ensure that we are providingthe safest possible aircraft for airlines andpassengers,” he said. “And it is an honour and agreat responsibility to take on such an importantrole for Airbus.

News

14th Flight SafetyConference

The 14th annual Airbus Flight Safety Conferencehas been very successfully completed in Barcelona,Spain and we hope you all benefited from theinformation sharing between us all.The numbers continue to grow each year with 141participants, representing 82 companies, includingmany new airlines operating Airbus aircraft. Asalways there were presentations made by someoperators, which encourages an open environmentto talk about the important safety issues.Note that even if you or your airline were unableto be there, the presentations are sent on CD toall the airline flight safety officers.

3Safety FirstThe Airbus Safety Magazine

# 05 December 2007

15th Airbus Flight SafetyConference

The planning for the next year’s conference isalready in progress and the dates and location arealready defined. So put in your calendars:

Date: 20th to 23rd October 2008Location: Paris, France.

Your articlesAs already said this magazine is a tool to help shareinformation. Therefore we rely on your inputs. Weare still looking for articles from operators that wecan help pass to other operators through themagazine.If you have any inputs then please contact us.

Contact: Chris Courtenay [email protected]: +33 (0) 562110284Mobile: +33 (0) 616036422

DistributionIf you have any questions about the distribution ofthe magazine either electronically or in hard copythen please contact us.

Contact: Mrs Nuria Solere-mail: [email protected]: +33 (0) 561934429

4

Near CFIT event duringNon PrecisionApproach

By: Panxika CharalambidesFlight Safety Manager

1 Introduction

Today most of major incidents and accidentsbelong to one of the following categories:• Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT)• Loss of control in flight• Landing short• Runway excursion

In particular CFIT events make up 45% of approach-and-landing accidents, that represent 55% of globalaccidents.This article details a near CFIT event encounteredon a single aisle aircraft as well as the associatedlessons learned.This event presents numerous classical componentsconducive to a CFIT and approach accident.

2 Reported event

The following was reported to Airbus: “This flight was uneventful until the approach phasethat was a non precision approach performed inVMC conditions. Weather report indicated a partlycloudy sky with 10 miles visibility at destination,but, during the descent, ATC informed the crewabout variable weather conditions due to banks

of fog closing and opening the station.On final approach, due to low visibility, the crewinitiated a go-around and hit electrical lines. Thecrew then diverted to the scheduled alternate airport.”

The investigation performed on site revealed that25ft high electrical lines, located perpendicularlyto the runway axis, at about 1100m from the runwaythreshold, were found sheared.The aircraft was damaged subsequently to theimpact with the electrical power lines. Damagewas present all across the aircraft (fuselage, engine,wings) indicating that the aircraft impacted thelines head-on. Furthermore, some pieces ofelectrical lines were found in the area of the noselanding gear and it was concluded that the initialimpact occurred at nose landing gear level.

The aircraft diverted and landed at the scheduledalternate airport. There were no passenger or crewinjuries during this incident.

This article is mainly based on the analysis of theDFDR, which was provided to Airbus. Humanfactors aspects, in particular, will not be covered,due to lack of information.

3 DFDR analysis

Note: for de-identification reasons altitudes aregiven in heights with reference to QFE.

This was a step-down VOR-DME approachconduc ted in daylight, early in the morning, autopilotengaged.


# 05 December 2007

• While descending below MDA about 2.1 NMfrom runway threshold, go-around altitude wasselected on the FCU.

• At 325ft QFE/ 1.54NM from runway threshold,the crew selected a vertical speed of - 800ft/min.

• At 47ft RA at about 0.72NM from runwaythreshold the crew selected a vertical speed of0ft/min.

• At 35ft RA, at 0.70 NM from runway threshold,the Pilot Flying applied 2/3 of full back stick inputthat disconnected immediately the autopilot.

Notes:1/ As this approach was

performed in GPS primary (In this case onlyGPS and IRS data are used for the aircraftposition computation) the accuracy of therecorded aircraft position is very good.

2/ In managed guidance only (FINAL APP modeengaged) when the aircraft reaches MDA(MDH) –50ft or 400ft (if no MDA/MDH entered)the autopilot automatically disengages.

3/ As noticeable on the figure here above, fromMDA altitude this final descent was performedon a 3° slope.

As a consequence, the approach was a successionof descent and level flight phases so that autopilotlongitudinal modes were alternatively OP DES modeand ALT*/ALT modes, while the auto-thrust modeswere respectively idle mode and speed mode (withspeed managed by the FMS). The successiveconstraint altitudes were fully respected. Shortly before over-flying the last altitude constraint“P1” (859ft QFE situated at 3.7NM from the runwaythreshold) the aircraft was in level flight at 860ft QFE.The minimum descent height was 459ft.

The figure here below presents the descentprofile from “P1” This sequence can be detailed as follows: • Shortly before over-

flying “P1”, MDAaltitude was selectedon the FCU, and theOP DES longitudinalautopilot mode wasselected so that a thrust reduction was progressivelycommanded to targetidle thrust, while theautopilot pitch modemaintained the speedtarget.

• At that stage theaircraft was ins l a t s / f l a p sconfiguration 3, geardown, both flightdirectors engaged,autopilot N°2engaged.

• For the whole approach the autopilot lateral moderemained in NAV mode.

• At 800ft QFE, 3NM from runway threshold,shortly after over-flying the last altitude constraint“P1” full slats/flaps configuration was selected.

• At 680ft QFE, 2.6NM from runway threshold,whereas the rate of descent was 1000ft/min, analtitude 300ft below MDA was selected on the FCU.

• At 600ft QFE, 2.3NM from runway threshold,while the current rate of descent was -1400ft/min,the crew selected the autopilot V/S mode withinitially a selected V/S of -700ft/min. From thattime auto-thrust was therefore engaged in speedmode. Target speed was Vapp (VLS +5kts).

Distance toThreshold (m)

0

200

400

600

800

100

Runway

ALT mode OP DES mode V/S mode

Selected V/S:P1

700ft/min

-300ft

800ft/min

1250m

8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1000-200

2000

CONF FULL Selection OFF/min

MDH=459ft

QFE Altitude (ft) Ground profilePAPI 3°MDHA/C trajectorySelected ALT

GA altitude

At 35 ft RA/1280m from RWYThreshold/PF’s pitch-up stickinput initiated/AP disconnected

Descent profile

6

The figure here below presents a zoom on the pilot’s take-over phase:• The radio-altimeter parameters recorded in the

DFDR (here plotted in red ) indicate the distancebetween the lowest point of the main landinggear and the ground.

• The initial PF’s pitch-up stick input was followedby permanent pitch-up stick input (between 1/3and full back stick input) applied for 6 seconds,so that the aircraft stopped descending andstarted to climb.

• Minimum recorded altitude was 5ft RA reachedat about 1100m from the runway threshold.

• The estimation of the impact location indicatesthat, at that moment, the aircraft impacted theelectrical lines.

• At 10ft RA, 4.5 seconds after the initial PF’s pitch-up stick input, thrust levers were moved forwardto TOGA detent.

• 43 seconds after TOGA application, landinggears were selected up.

• 2 minutes after TOGA application, Slats/Flapsconfiguration 3 was selected.

• The aircraft diverted to the scheduled alternateairport.

40

Height (ft)

DistanceRWY Threshold (m)

Corrected Radio-altitude (Lowest Point of the Main landing gear)

30

20

10

0

Pilot’s pitch up stick input initiationAutopilot N°2 disconnection

Between 1/3 and Full backstick input was applied

for 6 seconds

Minimum reachedaltitude: 5 feet

A/P ONA/P ONY/S modeY/S mode(0ft/min)(0ft/min)

A/P ONV/S mode(0ft/min)

6s

4,5s

1300 1200 1100 1000 900 800 700

TOGA applicationImpact location(Electrical lines)

Zoom on pilot’s take-over phase

4.3 Step-down Non PrecisionApproach:

For non precision approaches, Airbus recommendsimplementing the Constant Angle Non PrecisionApproach (CANPA) rather than the classical step-down non precision approach. Flying a constant-angle approach profile will reduce the risk of CFIT.Indeed it will provide a more stabilized flight path,will reduce the workload during this critical flightphase and will minimize the risk of error in step-down distances/altitudes and the need for a leveloff at the MDA (MDH). This technique is detailedin the chapter 7.2 (Flying Constant-Angle NonPrecision Approaches) of the “Getting to Gripswith...” ALAR brochure (Approach And LandingAccident Reduction).

4.4 No EGPWS alert was triggeredduring the flight phase where theaircraft was getting very close tothe ground:

As the aircraft was in landing configuration (full slats/flaps, gear down…) no GPWS (Ground ProximityWarning System) basic modes could have beentriggered, but as the aircraft was fitted with anE(enhanced)GPWS, the EGPWS mode “TerrainClearance Floor (TCF) ” could have been triggered.Indeed, the TCF function uses a Terrain ClearanceFloor envelope (see drawing here below) stored inthe EGPWS database for each runway for whichterrain data exists, and warns in case of prematuredescent below this floor, regardless of the aircraftconfiguration.If the aircraft descends below this floor a “TOOLOW TERRAIN” aural warning sounds. In case ofsuch alert, it is recommended by the StandardOperating Procedures (SOPs) either to adjust theflight path (In daylight with terrain and obstaclesclearly in sight) or to initiate an immediate go-around (during night or IMC conditions).

4 Lessons learned

Following are the lessons to be learned from thisnear CFIT event:

4.1 Descent below MDA requestsadequate visual references:

When conducting a non precision approach, it isrecommended to apply the “Non PrecisionApproach” Standard Operating Procedures.In particular, when the aircraft is properly establishedat MDA, the runway in sight must be confirmedby both PF/PNF, before disconnecting the autopilotand descending for a visual approach.

Furthermore, if the required visual referencesare met at MDA but are lost at any time belowMDA, a go-around procedure must beimmediately applied.

This is also highlighted in Chapter 7.3 (Acquisitionof visual references) of the “Getting to Grips with...”ALAR brochure (Approach And Landing AccidentReduction). This brochure can be downloaded from the FlightOperations Community at https://w3.airbus.com/.

4.2 Parameters monitoring

When conducting this particular approach,successive radio-altimeter callouts triggered below200ft RA, while the aircraft was getting closer andcloser to the ground, should have alerted the crew.

It is recommended as soon as the radio-altimeteris activated (at 2,500 feet AGL) to call out “radioaltimeter alive”. The radio altimeter reading shouldthen be included in the instrument scanning forthe remainder of the approach. See FlightOperations Briefing Note “ Altimeter Setting – Useof Radio Altimeter.”This FOBN can be downloaded from the FlightOperations Community at https://w3.airbus.com/.


# 05 December 2007

8

But as shown on the sketch here below there isa progressive desensitization of this function whenthe aircraft approaches the runway. In particular,in a circle centered on the runway, a fulldesensitization exists i.e. no warning when theaircraft is very close to the runway. With the EGPWS software version fitted on thisparticular aircraft, the Terrain Clearance Floorfunction had a higher desensitization zone thancurrent EGPWS, so that no alert was given whenthe aircraft descended very close to the ground. With the latest EGPWS software version (the aircraftwas equipped with a GPS), an alert would havebeen triggered about 20s before impacting theelectrical lines (at about 200ft QFE).

Note: The desensitization area depends on theFMS estimated position accuracy. In particular this software release allowsfor the GPS position data to be useddirectly, resulting in much smallerestimated error values that allow forsmaller desensitization areas.This latest software version was revised tooptimize the envelope profile and toreduce the minimum desensitization areato a circle with a radius of 0.25NM,whereas such radius was 1NM for thesoftware version installed on the aircraft atthe time of the event. This results in significantly improvedprotection for “landing short” accidents.

This last, free of charge, EGPWS softwareversion is available for any Airbus aircraft typesince May 2006.

Upgrade to last EGPWS software standard(P/N 965-1676-002) for any Airbus aircraft type:

Please refer to OIT ref.SE 999.0050/06/VHR dated 18 April 2006.Please refer to last ref. SIL 34-080 revision


# 05 December 2007

4.5 MDA and then an altitude lowerthan MDA were successivelyselected on the FCU during thefinal approach:

When performing non precision approaches, Airbusdoes not recommend MDA selection and even lessso an altitude below MDA. Indeed, this may causeunwanted ALT* mode engagement and consequentlyapproach destabilization at a critical stage of theapproach. Therefore FCU altitude should be set atgo-around altitude after over-flying the final approachfix (FAF).

5 Conclusion Five main recommendations should be particularlyhighlighted:

• To be go-around prepared and go-aroundmindedWhen performing an approach, even andbecause the go-around is not a frequentoccurrence, it is of prime importance to alwaysbe go-around-prepared and go-around-minded.This will help in performing the go-aroundappropriately, in the optimal conditions and asper procedures.In particular the flight crew should have a clearview of excessive deviation and should be readyto interrupt the approach if:• Ceiling and visibility are below the required

weather minimums• Criterias for stabilized approach are not achieved• Doubt exists about the aircraft position • There is confusion about the use of automation• The aircraft is destabilized below MDA• The visibility is lost below MDA

• To adhere strictly to SOPs for Non PrecisionApproachesIn particular altitude/distance checks and respectof MDA are crucial when performing NonPrecision Approaches.

• To retrofit a GPS on aircraft not alreadyequipped with this systemThe installation of a GPS improves the efficiencyof the EGPWS by providing a more accurateaircraft position to the system.

• To upgrade the EGPWS software standardThe EGPWS software should be upgraded withthe last version (free of charge for any Airbus aircrafttype), which reduces the desensitization area.

• Constant Angle Non Precision ApproachAirbus encourage the operators to work withtheir Authorities in order to translate step downNon Precision Approaches into Constant AngleNon precision Approaches.

A320 Tail strike at Take-Off?

By: Marc BaillionFlight Safety Manager

1 Introduction

This article describes an event that was first thoughtto be a tail strike. Further investigation allowed theoperator to dismiss this belief. The subsequentanalysis of this occurrence brought three interestingpoints to highlight, from which lessons can bedrawn. These experiences are particularlyaddressed to the cockpit, cabin crews as well asto the engineers in charge of analyzing flight data.

2 Descriptionof the event

At rotation, a member of the crew in the rear galleyfelt a thump and heard a bang at the rear of theaircraft. This information was forwarded to thecockpit crew when the aircraft had reached FL 160. At this time, the crew contacted the tower,which initiated a runway inspection, but found nosign of a tailstrike. They then consulted with theairline’s engineering department and decided todivert the aircraft. After landing, it appeared thatabout 20 bags had shifted in the rear hold.

The engineering department analysed the FlightData Monitoring and reported to Airbus as follows: “The FDM trace shows a maximum pitch angle of16.52 degrees nose up, with both main gearson the ground (presumably at least partiallycompressed), and the nose wheel is in the air. Even if the main gear was fully extended, a strikeshould have occurred at 13.5 degrees. Assuming that the runway undulations were nota factor, it would appear that either the FDMsoftware, or the data provided in the FCOM BulletinNo.22/4, is inaccurate.”

The airline reported no sign on the aircraft aft lowerfuselage indicative of a tail strike.The take-offweight and center-of-gravity location were insidethe normal envelope. The operator kindly pro-vided Airbus with a copy of the DAR data.

10

A subsequent calculation of the event lift-offconditions was conducted, using as inputs:longitudinal sidestick inputs, THS trim position,a/c weight and center-of-gravity, TO configuration,thrust lever position. The calculation results correlatewell with the 12-13 degrees at lift-off and confirmalso that a high pitch rate (5°/sec) was achieved,while the minimum distance between the tailand the runway was 2 feet.

A too high rotation rate is one of the main causesof tail strike at take-off and should therefore beavoided. Airbus recommends adhesion to the FlightOperation Briefing Note titled “Take-off anddeparture operations - Preventing tailstrike at take-off", which states:

“At VR, the flight crew should initiate the rotationwith a smooth positive backward sidestick inputto achieve a continuous rotation rate ofapproximately 3°/sec. Avoid aggressive andsharp inputs.”

See also FCOM bulletin 806/1 “Avoiding Tailstrike”.

3 Analysis of the eventand lessons learned

Take-off was performed in the following conditions:Configuration 3 Thrust levers position was set to TOGA TO weight: 73.690 T TO center-of-gravity: 31% Stabilizer position: 0.5° downV1 = 123 kts VR = 133 kts V2 = 138 kts

3.1 Stick inputs and rotation

Rotation was initiated at the expected VR. Analysisof the DAR data shows that about half forward stickwas applied until 80 kts, as per SOP. When thestick was released (at approx. 100 kts) the aircraftexperienced a pitch attitude increase of +1°.

The rotation was initiated through a square inputof about 1/2 full back stick deflection (-8° of stick)that was then slightly increased (up to -9° of stick)and maintained.

Under these conditions, the A/C initiated its rotationat about +1.4°/sec before stabilizing at a rotationrate of about +5°/sec, whereas the recom -mended value, as per SOP, is 3°/sec.


# 05 December 2007

12

Airbus’ “Getting to Grips with Cabin Safety”, chapter9 “Crew Resource Management” recommendsthat “any situation, feeling, word, behavior,observation that alerts cabin crewmembersto a possible threat to flight safety, mustimmediately be reported to the purser and theflight crew.”

For good crew coordination, training should includeinstructing flight crewmembers and flight atten-dants on each other's emergency procedures,codes, signals, and safety-related duties.

Conducting joint crew briefings will help in creatinga working environment that is more conducive toa safe operation:• Cabin crewmembers should be encouraged to

report to the purser, or the flight crew, anythingthat they feel may pose a threat to the safety ofthe flight

• Discuss the “Sterile Cockpit” rule with the pilots,and the circumstances that are acceptable forcontacting the flight crew during this time

See also CCOM chap 08.045 “SOP PreflightBriefing”.

3.2 Cabin-to-cockpit communications

According to the crew report, the purser informedthe cockpit at FL160, and not before, because ofthe application of a sterile cockpit concept by thisoperator.

In the event of a tailstrike, the abnormal andemergency procedures call for LAND ASAP andMAX FL100 (see hereafter), in order to avoid cabindepressurization:

The sterile cockpit concept comes from FAR121/542, which among others, prohibits nonessential communications between the cabin andcockpit crews below 10 000ft. This regulation mayexplain why cabin crews may hesitate to reportoccurrences which have no obvious safetyimplications. A concern addressed by AdvisoryCircular AC 120-48, which states: “hesitancy orreluctance on the part of a flight attendant tocontact the flight crewmembers with importantsafety information because of a misconceptionof the sterile cockpit rule is potentially even moreserious that the unnecessary distraction causedby needless violations of the sterile cockpit”.

ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY

MISCELLANEOUS

3.02.80 P 21

REV 39SEQ 001

TAILSTRIKEIn the event of a tailstrike, apply the following procedure :

LAND ASAP] MAX FL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 or MSA

500 feet/minute should be targeted for the climb, to minimize pressure changes, and forpassenger and crew comfort. Similarly, the rate of descent must be limited to about 1000feet/minute, except for the final approach that must be performed normally.Notify the ATC of the aircraft’s rate of climb.

] RAM AIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ON] PACK 1 and 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . OFF

4 ConclusionThis event did not jeopardize the safe continuationof the flight, but the conducted investigation allowedto highlight some shortcomings, which could haveled to a critical situation.

Lessons can be drawn from this occurrence forthe benefit of all operators in the following fields:- Rotation technique- Cabin to crew communication- Understanding DFDR data This illustrates the benefit of reporting events forthe advancement of safety.

Airbus safety and operational materials, includingthe Flight Operation Briefing Notes and Getting toGrips with... brochures, can be found in the FlightOperations section of the secure area ofwww.airbusworld.com.

Alternatively, the FOBNs can be consulted atwww.airbus.com/en/corporate/ethics/safety_lib/

3.3 Determination of the lift-off timewhen analyzing flight datamonitoring information

The flight data analysts of this particular airlinewondered how the aircraft could have reached anose up pitch angle of 16.5 degrees, “with bothmain gears on the ground (presumably at leastpartially extended)”, without striking the tail,considering that the FCOM calls for a pitch limitationof 11.7 degrees with the MLG fully compressedand 13.5 degrees with the MLG fully extended.

The explanation lies in the fact that the main gearswere in fact not on the ground any more when thepitch reached the 16,5 degrees. The reason forthe confusion lies in the time difference, dueto the gears’ damping function, between theactual lift-off time and the MLG full extension.

The actual lift-off can be reasonably welldetermined by the aircraft normal load factorvariation. Recorded data shows that when theload factor began to increase, the pitch angle wasin the range of 12 to 13 degrees i.e. within thepublished limitations for the A320 (as per FCOMbulletin 806/1).

A further analysis has been performed by Airbusto substantiate the time difference between theactual lift-off time and the MLG full extension. A flight test A320 was equipped with MLG loadmeasurements and the results fully confirm thegood correlation of the actual lift-off time with thenormal load factor variation. The full extension ofthe MLG may take place more than 2 secondslater, depending on the aircraft weight and center-of-gravity location. This confirmed that the use ofthe gear squat parameters1 is not accurate enoughto give precise lift-off times.


# 05 December 2007

1 RHSQUAT and LHSQUAT parameters shift to zero when,respectively RH and LH MLG are fully extended.

UnreliableSpeed

By: Joelle BartheFlight Operations Engineer

1 Introduction

Unreliable speed is one of the difficult situationsthat a pilot has to face. Once the failure has beenidentified, a procedure, based on pitch angles andthrust settings, will assist the pilot in safely flyingthe aircraft.

But the main difficulty is to rapidly detect anunreliable speed situation. Reaction time is crucial,since the aircraft may stall and overspeed conditionscould cause aircraft damage.

In issue #3 of the Safety First magazine (December2006), an article described the effects of pitotprobes obstruction on ground. It intended to makeground and flight crew more sensitive to theconsequences of obstructed probes, and to preventtake-off with unreliable speed.

But once airborne, how can the crew handle anunreliable speed situation?

This article therefore provides guidelines to recallhow an unreliable speed situation can be identified,but also how to deal with it.

Note: this article is based on A320/A330/A340design. Cockpit effects, identification andtroubleshooting, remains similar for widebody aircraft and A380, with somespecificities covered in the operationaldocumentation.

2 Effects and consequencesin the cockpit

Water, ice, dust, ashes, etc. may partially or totallyblock pitot probes and static ports. Equally, tubesmisconnected to the Air Data Modules (ADM),plastic covers not removed from the probes, insectnests, radome damage, may lead to erroneouspressure measurements.

The consequences of this erroneous pressureinformation, once used by the ADRs and/or thestandby instruments, are the computation and thedisplay of unreliable speed and/or altitude for allusers.

14

Depending on the affected probe, i.e. pitot probeor static port, different indications in the cockpitwill become unreliable. Therefore the crew shouldbe aware that some of the usual cues to fly couldbe unreliable as indicated:

Erroneous speed or altitude indications can besuspected, among others, in the following cases:• Speed discrepancy (between ADR 1, 2, 3 and

standby indication),• The fluctuation of the Indicated Air Speed or of

the Pressure Altitude,• Abnormal correlation between basic flight

parameters (IAS, attitude, pitch, thrust, climbrate),

• Abnormal AP/FD/ATHR behaviour,• STALL and OVERSPEED warnings or FLAP

RELIEF on ECAM that are in contradiction withat least one of the indicated airspeeds,

• Inconsistency between radio altitude and pressurealtitude,

• Impossibility of extending the landing gear bythe normal landing gear system.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized thatidentifying an unreliable speed indication is notalways obvious: no single rule can be given toconclusively identify all possible erroneousindications and the display of contradictoryinformation may confuse the flight crew. Pilotsshould therefore be aware of unreliable speedsymptoms and consequences.


# 05 December 2007

DataPitot probeobstructed

Static portobstructed

Indicated Speed/Mach Erroneous Erroneous

Altitude Ok Erroneous

Vertical Speed Ok Erroneous

FPV Ok Erroneous

AP/FD Erroneous Erroneous

ATC altitude report Ok Erroneous

CAPT PFD F/O PFD

Safetyaffected MEMORY ITEMS

LEVEL OFF

TROUBLESHOOTING

Safetynot

affected

Fly withoutspeed reference

Fly withremaining ADR

16

4 Procedures

As soon as a doubt about airspeed indicationarises, or a relevant ECAM alert is triggered (relativeto ADRs failure or discrepancy for instance), theUNRELIABLE SPEED INDICATION/ADR CHECKPROC procedure should be applied by the crew,following this sequence:

1) If the safe conduct of the flight is affected,APPLY THE MEMORY ITEMS, i.e. fly a pitchwith TOGA or CLB thrust,

2) If the safe conduct of the flight is notaffected, or once the memory items havebeen applied, LEVEL OFF, if necessary, andstart TROUBLESHOOTING,

3) If the affected ADR can be identified, fly withthe remaining ADR.

4) If the affected ADR cannot be identified or allairspeed indications remain unreliable, FLYWITH PITCH/THRUST REFERENCES.

3 Identification and Handling ofUnreliable Speedsituations

Airbus has developed procedures and guidelinesto help crews identify and handle an unreliablespeed situation.

The Volume 3 of the Flight Crew Operating Manual(FCOM) and the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH)provide the UNRELIABLE SPEED INDIC / ADRCHECK PROC procedure.

In addition, Airbus has developed training materialin the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM, availablefor A320/A330/A340/A380). The FCTM providesinformation about the causes and consequencesof unreliable ADR computations. It also providesinformation on how to apply the UNRELIABLESPEED INDIC / ADR CHECK PROC of the QRH.

An interactive training tool, the e-Briefing, is alsoavailable on https://w3.airbus.com/ in the FlightOperations community, under the heading “Safetyand Operational materials”.

In situations where most primary flight data areerroneous, some indications may still remain correctand should consequently be used to help the crewstabilize the flight path. This is the case for theFlight Path Vector (FPV), reliable if the static portsare not blocked, and for the GPS altitude displayedon the MCDU, when GPS is installed.

When the flight path is stabilized, the flight crewwill start the troubleshooting, keeping in mind thatsometimes two or even all three ADRs might provideidentical but erroneous data (e.g. due to icingconditions, flight in volcanic ashes, etc.). Therefor, do not instinctively reject an ADR thatis suspected to be affected.

If the troubleshooting procedure enables the crewto identify the affected ADR(s), then a normalsituation can be resumed.

But if the affected ADR cannot be identified, or allADRs are affected, then the flight crew will flywithout speed reference, using the pitch and thrusttables.

4.1 Memory Items

If the safe conduct of the flight is affected, the flightcrew applies the memory items: these allow “safeflight conditions” to be rapidly established in allflight phases (take-off, climb, cruise) and aircraftconfigurations (weight and slats/flaps). The memoryitems apply more particularly when a failure appearsjust after take-off.

Once the target pitch attitude and thrust valueshave been stabilized at or above minimum safealtitude, or when the safe conduct of the flight isnot affected, the flight crew will enter the 2nd partof the QRH procedure: level off the aircraft andperform troubleshooting.

4.2 Troubleshooting and isolation

The table provided in the QRH gives the pitch (°)and thrust (%N1) to be applied to level off theaircraft according to its weight, altitude andconfiguration, along with flying technique advices.


# 05 December 2007

18

5 Back Up SpeedScale (BUSS)

In order to decrease the crew workload in case ofunreliable speed, Airbus has developed the Back-Up Speed Scale (BUSS) that replaces the pitchand thrust tables. The BUSS is optional onA320/A330/A340. It is basic on A380, being partof the ADR Monitoring functions.

This indication is based on angle of attack (AOA)sensor information, and is therefore not affectedby erroneous pressure measurements.

The BUSS comes with a new ADIRU standard(among other new system standards), where theAOA information is provided through the IRs andnot through the ADRs. This enables selecting allADRs off without loosing the Stall WarningProtection.

The AOA information provides a guidance area inplace of the speed scale. When the crew selectsall ADRs OFF, then:• The Back-Up Speed Scale replaces the PFD

speed scale on both PFDs,• GPS Altitude replaces the Altitude Scale on both

PFDs.

The Back-Up Speed Scale then enables to fly ata safe speed, i.e. above stall speed and belowmaximum structural speeds, by adjusting thrustand pitch.

4.3 Flying using pitch/thrust tables

First, the crew has to switch OFF two ADRs andkeep one ADR ON, to keep the Stall WarningProtection.

Then, the crew will fly the aircraft without speedreferences, using pitch (°) and thrust (%N1)settings.

To fly the aircraft using pitch and thrust settings,the crew will find in the QRH the tables relative toeach phase of flight: Climb, Cruise, Descent andApproach, taking into account the aircraft weight,configuration and altitude. With these tables, thecrew will be able to safely land the aircraft.

6 Conclusion

An unreliable speed situation may be difficult toidentify, due to the multiple scenarios that can leadto it. Therefore, training is a key element: indeedthe flight crew’s ability to rapidly detect the abnormalsituation, and to correctly handle it, is crucial.

In case of any doubt, the pilot should apply thepitch/thrust memory items, and then refer to theQRH to safely fly the aircraft, and to positivelydetermine the faulty source(s) before eliminating it(them).

In addition, to further assist the pilot in detectingthe failure and safely fly the aircraft, Airbus hasdeveloped the BUSS, which provides a safe flyingrange indication.

Finally, to reduce the probability of experiencingunreliable speed situations, on-ground actions,such as comprehensive maintenance and thoroughpre-flight exterior inspection, should be stressed.

The BUSS will be displayed once all ADRs areswitched OFF. Therefore, on aircraft that have theBUSS, when the flight crew cannot identify thefaulty ADR(s) when performing the troubleshooting,or when all ADRs are affected, the flight crew willswitch OFF all ADRs, and will fly the green area ofthe BUSS.

However, if the safe conduct of the flight is affected,the memory items must still be applied beforetroubleshooting.

As the BUSS is associated to the ADR monitoringfunctions, some unreliable speed situations canbe automatically detected (e.g. new ECAM warning“NAV ADR 1+2+3 FAULT”), and some ECAMprocedures will lead to the BUSS activation byrequesting to switch OFF all ADRs.


# 05 December 2007

Buss: “Fly the green”

Compliance to OperationalProceduresWhy do well trained and experienced pilots not always follow procedures?

By: Claire PelegrinDirector Human Factors

1 Introduction

In the aviation domain, the purpose of introducingprocedures was to enhance safety in normal andabnormal conditions, by reducing uncertainty andthus risks. The rationale was obvious, and thebenefits so blatant that the aeronautical industryhas been using procedures for many years. It is now undisputed that pilots shall adhere to theprocedures designed for them. But real life is notalways that simple. The objective of this article is to understand thecomplete picture: good procedures design isimportant as well as appropriate explanations toensure pilots have sufficient confidence in theirskills and judgment to manage the situation.

Each procedure is designed as the best and safestway to do a given task. Flight deck proceduresare the skeleton of flight operations. They are thestructure and the organisation by which a pilotcan fly and interact with the aircraft and othercrewmembers.

When incidents or accidents occur, most of thetime a non-adherence to procedures is mentioned.But this is not sufficient to explain accidents,because every day pilots do not follow proceduresand this does not always lead to accidents!

20

For years, everybody has shared thatsame idea that safety will be guaranteedif pilots are selected and trained, so as

to strictly apply procedures.

The method was:

• tell them

• train them

• enforce them

to follow procedures.

3) Error managementa) Guideline prevents the likeliness of errors,b) Common reference allows error detection.

Built around an organised task-sharing, theprocedures allow each crewmember to standback from the actions performed by the otherone, which gives a kind of “fresh eye” on thetasks performed by the other crewmember.

4) Support risk management within complexand dynamic situations

3 Proceduresimplementation

Not everything is predictable, and there is no magicin procedures. Mismatches do exist betweenprocedures and actions. Implementing a procedureis not a simple automatic process. A procedure implementation is by nature differentfrom the procedure itself: the first one is an action,the second one is an instruction. The procedurespecifies the tasks, then the pilot will have his/herown way for implementing the task.

Human performance is not stable, and can beimpaired by a variety of factors such as fatigue,stress, workload or operational pressure. This canimpair procedure implementation. This is why it isimportant to understand the triggering factorsbehind procedure deviations in order to minimizethem.

2 Role of procedures

Everybody knows the obvious role of proceduresas a guide for action (individual and collectiveguide). It tells the pilot• What to do• When to do it

Sequence, order, synchronisation• How to do it• Who should do it

Organised task sharing• What to observe and what to check• What type of feed back is provided to the other

crewmember

But procedures also have additional safetyfunctions, which sometimes are not taught andexplained well enough:

They support:1) Situation awareness and anticipation

a) They support a shared plan of action andshared awareness. The organised task sharingcreates a shared action plan, that will be the“mental template” to act, synchronize actionsand manage time. Thus, this shared actionplan will be a support to build and managesituation awareness.

b) The call out which represents a collectivereading of the procedure is a basement forcoordination.

2) Decision making by providinga) Elements of diagnosis to prepare the action,b) Elements of execution,c) Elements of control: cautions, what to do

under different conditions and what to check.


# 05 December 2007

22

While developing procedures, airline managersmay use the 4Ps model. • Philosophy:

is the over-arching view of the top managementon how they conduct the business.

• Policies:are a broad specification of the way themanagement expects things to be done. Forexample, the commercial role of the Captain tostand at the cockpit door when passengersdisembark will influence the “Shut down”procedure, to be then performed by the Copilotalone.

• Procedures:shall be consistent with the policies and overallphilosophy.

• Practices: cover all flight deck activities.

If philosophies and policies are articulated, then itwill be easier to generate logical and consistentprocedures, and it will allow detecting thediscrepancies and inconsistencies betweenprocedures.

While the lack of procedures may generate riskand poor standards and standardisation, too manyof them will sometimes create complacency.Alike, pilots experiencing trouble with a specificprocedure may end up with lack of confidence inall other procedures. “I have already experiencedthis, I know a better way to do the task”.

The rationale for procedure changes should bedocumented and explained. Human beings oftenresist a change if they do not understand itsjustification and benefits (whether in terms ofeffectiveness or safety).

The level and type of explanations should beadapted to the context. When transitioning ontoa new type, the focus will be on the link with designprinciples. Recurrent training will rather focus onroutine situations, emergency situations and returnof experience.

Most of the time, crew action includes much morethan what is written. It requires sophisticated mentalfunctions such as:1) Understanding the situation

This requires an organized perception and goodsituation awareness, which means a clear andup-to-date understanding of what is going onaround the crew

2) Understanding the procedure and its meaning 3) Ensuring that all pre-conditions are checked4) Anticipating the expected results

This is possible because pilots do more thanjust follow procedures. A procedure is more thata mere instruction: it refers to the pilot’s ownskills and experience, his “good judgment”,“common sense” and “airmanship”. Confidencein oneself, in the aircraft and in the othercrewmember is paramount because it supportsdecision and action.

5) Ensuring that all actions requested by theprocedures are performed in the right order,with good judgment and with goodsynchronization between crewmembersThis requires dedicated skills. It is thus linkedto the pilot’s knowledge of his own skills, hisself-confidence, his confidence in the othercrewmember and in the airplane. It also impliesthe ability to manage time and priorities.

4 Role of managers

Once a procedure is designed and disseminated,the managers’ duties are not over. They also haveresponsibility for how the pilots use them. The pilots should be convinced that proceduresare useful and relevant to the situation. The probability for an instruction to be followed isbased on: • the perceived risk• the user’s knowledge• the situation• the presentation of information• the user’s attitude This means that procedures need to be explainedand taught at all phases of pilot activities.

5 Conclusion

To repeat: “Follow procedures” is not sufficient. Not even the best procedures can be consideredperfect. Extensively tested before implementation,SOPs are the outcome of a lot of expertise.However, the environment is dynamic, andprocedures can only provide baselines. No set ofprocedures can substitute for human intelligenceand flight experience.

In some circumstances, the role of airmanshipand good judgment should be clarified.

Example: Land ASAP

Even in this situation (red warning), procedures donot decide on behalf of the crew. The level ofemergency and the time available should beevaluated. Crew good judgment and decisionare based on the time available, the type of failure,the flight situation and the environment (weather,characteristics of surrounding terrain, etc…)

Sometimes, the main reasons behind theprocedures should be explained.

For example, in case of Tail pipe fireThe flight crew must perform the followingactions: Shut down the engine(MASTER switch set to OFF)Do NOT press ENG FIRE pushbutton

Why? Because (FCTM02.03):this would stop power to the FADECs andwould stop the motoring sequencethe fire extinguisher must no be used, as itwill not extinguish any internal engine fireas a first priority, the engine must beventilated


# 05 December 2007

SAFETY=

Safe aircraft

+ procedures

+ pilot’s competenceas an ability to manage

the expected and unexpected

The Future AirNavigation SystemFANS BAir traffic communications

enhancement for the A320 Family

By: Sophie de CuendasDesign Manager, Airbus Customer Services

A Preliminary Eurocontrol Trial (PETAL), theEurocontrol test of air/ground data link, a projectat Airbus and the Maastricht Upper Airspace Centre(UAC), and its follow-on PETAL II, also conducteduntil the end of 2001 at the Maastricht UAC,demonstrated that the transmission of digital datavia air/ground data link offers a reliable alternativeto voice communications in relieving spectrum andATC congestion and improving safety in airtransport. The Maastricht UAC controls the upperairspace of Belgium, the Nether-lands, Luxembourgand part of Germany, which carries a lot of Europe’sair traffic.

The experience gained from the PETAL projectswas used for a new project in Europe known as the Link 2000+ Programme, which provides airtraffic controllers and pilots with a secondcommunication channel: An air/ground datalink, over an Aeronautical TelecommunicationsNetwork/VHF Data Link (ATN/VDL) Mode 2infrastructure in the core area of Europe. VDL mode2 compared to VDL mode A improves the datarate exchanges between aircraft and the groundstation (data rate multiplied by ten, new modulationscheme, new communication protocol).

24

In today’s busy Air Traffic Control(ATC) environment, and especiallyin high-density continental airspace, congestion on the voicechannels used by air trafficcontrollers and pilots can be oneof the limiting factors in sectorcapacity and safety.

Most messages on the voicechannels are for routine activitiessuch as the transfer of voice communications, flight level requestsand clearances, route and headingclearances and requests, speedclearances and SecondarySurveillance Radar (SSR) codechanges. Pilots and controllers need to exchange informationin a flexible, reliable and securemanner.

This article first appeared inissue 40

Lufthansa City Line, Malev, Scandinavian Airlinesand SAS Braathens. Tarom-Romanian Air Transportis also considering joining. Currently, these airlinesoperate more than 600 Airbus aircraft and havecommitted more than 160 Airbus aircraft to theLink 2000+ Programme pioneer phase. Operatoracceptance for the pioneer phase is planned toend during 2007.

Following the pioneer phase, the Link 2000+Programme is currently investi gating introducingincentives for those aircraft that are Controller PilotData Link Communications/Aeronautical Telecom -munications Network (CPDLC/ ATN) equipped andoperate in Link 2000+ Programme airspace. Theintended follow-on from this incentive phase willbe a ‘mandate’ phase where all aircraft operatorsflying in Link 2000+ Programme airspace will berequired to equip with CPDLC/ATN avionics, subjectto certain conditions.

Incentive and mandate phases will require anupgrade of existing products to be compliant withthe Eurocae standard ED 110B to remove therequirement for voice readback.

1 Link 2000+ Programme phasedimplementation

Link 2000+ Programme will start with a pioneerphase whose objective is to gain operationalexperience on ATC data link use, with pioneerairlines and pioneer ATC centres, to prepare forfull deployment of ATC data link in Europe’s upperairspace. The product needed for the Link2000+ Programme pioneer phase requires a voicereadback in accordance with European Organi -zation for Civil Aviation Equipment (Eurocae)standard ED-110A, which provides an inter -operability requirements standard for the initialimplementation of the Aeronautical Tele-commu -nications network (ATN), which supports severalAir Traffic services. The pioneer airlines are presently: Finnair, Aero -flot-Russian Interna-tional Airlines, Air Berlin, AirEuropa, Airbus Transport International, Alitalia,American Airlines, Federal Express, Niki, Hapag-Lloyd, Lufttransport Unter-nehmen, Lufthansa,


# 05 December 2007

Current FANS 1/A data link services 2005-2011 Link 2000+ Programme data link services (FANS B)

2007 Worldwide air traffic data link services

26

• The ATC Clearance (ACL) Service • The ATC Microphone Check (AMC) ServiceAir Navigation Service Provider(ANSP) commitment

Maastricht centre (the pioneer ATC centre) hasbeen controlling flights using CPDLC since 2005.Most of the European ATC centres have committedthemselves to the Link 2000+ and theirdeployments are proceeding to schedule. OtherANSPs are split into two groups, those able to

achieve by 2008and the othersable to achieve by2011.

3 Future Air NavigationSystem B (FANS B)

The FANS B product is Airbus response to theEurocontrol Link 2000+ Programme for utilizationof ATC data link in continental areas (high densityairspaces with radar surveillance) in the en-routephase, using the ATN air-ground communicationnetwork. As ATN is operational only in Europe,FANS B is proposed only on A320 Family aircraftfor the time being.

The first FANS B package allows airline participationin early implementation phases of the Link 2000+Programme - the ‘pioneer phase’. Airbus pioneer

2 Link 2000+Programme applicationsand services

The Context ManagementApplication (CMA)

This application provides the Data Link InitiationCapability (DLIC) service that is mandatory prior to any CPDLC connection. This function will typicallybe initiated when an aircraft is either at the gate inthe pre-departure phase of flight, or before enteringa new Flight Information Region (FIR) supportingdata link communications. It provides the groundwith the necessary information to make data linkcommunications possible between the controllerand the aircraft:• Aircraft 24 bit address• Aircraft flight identification• Departure/destination airport• Facility designation• Information about available air applications

The Controller Pilot Data-linkCommunication (CPDLC) application

The CPDLC application provides directpilot/controller communication using data linkbetween an aircraft and the controlling ATC centre.A voice readback is required for any messagesrelated to any changes of the aircraft trajectory.

This application provides a set of data link messageelements corresponding to existing Inter-nationalCivil Aviation Organiza-tion (ICAO) phraseology.

Functions provided by the CPDLC application are:• The ATC Communication Management (ACM)

Service

ANSPs committed for 2008Country ANSPGermany DFSSwitzerland SkyguideItaly ENAVIreland IAA

ANSPs committed for 2011Country ANSPPortugal NAV PortugalFrance DSNAUK UK NATSSpain AENA

incentives and mandate conditions in the bestinterests of Airbus customers.

FANS B applications and services

The Airbus FANS B product offers, at aircraft level,over ATN air-ground communication network andthrough VDL Mode 2 sub-network, the data linkapplications and services (Context ManagementApplication, Controller Pilot Data-Link Commu -

customers are Aeroflot-Russian International Airlines,Alitalia, Finnair, Niki, Lufttransport Unternehmen,Royal Jordanian, and Tarom-Romanian AirTransport.For the following phases Airbus is aiming at a singleFANS B evolution enabling airlines to be eligibleand benefit from the incentive phase, and also becompliant with the Link 2000+ Programmemandate. Airbus is closely cooperating with Link2000+ Programme management to finalize


# 05 December 2007

2005 2008 2011

ANSP implementation plan

28

FANS B architecture

DCDU

EIS

MCDU

Printer

FMS

CMC

FWC

Clock

...User systems

CommunicationsMedia

Cockpitinterfaces

Hardware

PowerSupply

Processor

Input/Output

Software

HMIManagement

OperatingSystem

Comm.Applications

ATCmodule

AOCmodule

Comm.Ressources

Router

ATN

ACARS

VDR

SATCOM

HFDR

Mode S

Provisions

...

Air Traffic Services Unit - ATSU

• Two Multi Purpose Control and Display Units(MCDUs)

• Two Flight Warning Computers• The Central Fault Display Interface Unit (CFDIU)The FANS B Human MachineInterface (HMI)

The preceding product, FANS A+, has been in usefor oceanic and remote area operations for severalyears (see information). The main HMI principles,defined on the A330/A340 and A320 Family FANSA+ installation, are also used on FANS B.

The HMI equipment used in the cockpit for FANSB functions are:• Two DCDUs• The MCDU to access the ATC message MENU• Electronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor (ECAM)

pages and alerts for FWC information aboutabnormal situations

• Two push buttons with visual attention getters,and the two associated aural ATC alerts

• The printerA configuration with two DCDUs was chosen inaccordance with safety studies and human factorsstudies, because of a clear dissociation of the ATCcommunication from other communications;absence of interference with the previously existingcrew operational procedures; direct full timeavailability of ATC clearance messages; and itslocation in the forward field of view near the MCDUs.

The ATC alerts consist of:• An aural alert: A specific sound named ‘RING’

(double brief ringing-phone-like alert)• A visual alert: Two flashing lighted push-button

switches labelled ‘ATC MSG’ (one for CAPT, onefor F/O), located in the glare shield. The flashingperiod is one second.

nication application and ATC Communication Management, ATC Clearance, and ATC MicrophoneCheck services) in accordance with Link 2000+Programme specifications.FANS B architecture

The FANS B architecture is the following:• The airborne part with the ATSU (Air Traffic

Service Unit), which is a modular hosting platformthat centralizes all data communications (ATCand AOC/Airline Operations Communications)and manages the dedicated Human MachineInterface (HMI)

• The air/ground data link: - ACARS (Aircraft Communication Addressing

and Reporting System) over VDL mode A/2,Satcom or HFDL (HF Data Link) are used totransmit AOC data. Satcom and HFDL for AOCare optional in the ATSU architecture

- ATN over VDL mode 2 only, is used to transmitATC data to the ground for communicationpurposes

- The ground/ground data link: Two types ofnetwork have to be considered, the ACARS network for AOC messages and ATN networkfor ATC messages.

Data link communications between the aircraft andthe airline operations centre optimize aircraft andcrew management, improve data managementlike engine trend monitoring or maintenance reports,optimize spares management and speed up repairs.

On board equipment

The FANS B installation requires a minimumstandard of the following equipment/installation:• ATSU and Data link Control and Display Units

(DCDU) provision• Two DCDUs that allow the flight crew to read,

and answer, to CPDLC messages received fromthe ground

• Two pushbuttons with ‘attention getters’ on theglare shield controlled by both Flight WarningComputers (FWCs)

• One VHF Data Radio (VDR 3) capable of VDLmode 2


# 05 December 2007

30

InformationNorth Atlantic Region benefits from data link.• In 2004, traffic levels exceeded pre–2001 levels• NAV CANADA has reduced communication costs to users

by 50%• 55% of the fleet use either FMC (Flight Management

Computer), WPR (Waypoint Position Reporting) or FANS A+ADS–C for automatic position reporting

Pacific Sub–Region benefits from data link.• Reduced separations to 50/50nm and 30/30nm (trials)• User preferred routes and re-route (trials) for all city pairs

in South Pacific• Weather deviations• Automatic position reporting• 80% of the fleet in South Pacific use CPDLC

(Controller-Pilot Data-Link Communications) and ADS–C,based on FANS A+, 60% in the Central Pacific, and 30% onaverage in the entire Pacific

Two visual attention getters

Two aural ATC alerts

FWC informationabout abnormal situations

DCDUs

ATC menu on each MCDU

4

53

2

1

1

23

4

5

4

1

5

2

It is anticipated that other regions will deploy ATNdata link capabilities in their environment. A stronginternational standardization effort, in which Airbushas a key role, is being made to have interoperablestandards. In particular CPDLC is part of FederalAviation Administration (FAA) Next Generation AirTransportation System (NGATS).

Link 2000+ Programme and FANS B are keycomponents of the Single European Sky ATM (AirTraffic Management) Research (SESAR) conceptfor future European Air Traffic Management System. Any airlines interested in information about FANSB or in upgrading their aircraft to this standard areinvited to contact Airbus Customer ServicesUpgrade Services at [email protected] consult the ‘getting to grips with Fans B in high-density continental areas part III’ brochuredistributed by Airbus.

4 Conclusion

The FANS B product is the first Airbus answer toATN based data link operations. Highly inspiredby the FANS A/A+ package, FANS B integratesthe same interfaces and operational principles fordenser airspaces and for the characteristics of theATN environment (network architecture, technicalacknowledgement timestamp, timers).

FANS B enables aircrew to manage data linkcommunications between the aircraft and theground Air Traffic Services, as well as commu -nications between the aircraft and the AOC.

The availability of a second means of commu -nication reduces communication errors, aircrewand controller workload and fatigue and will thuscontribute to higher safety levels - radio voicecommunications have a number of drawbacks intoday’s busy traffic environment and pilots haveto listen to each controller-initiated communication.

Other benefits are expected with the entry intooperations of the data link technology in Europeanairspaces such as an increase of airspace capacityby:• 3.4% with a data link equipage rate of 25%*• 8% with a data link equipage rate of 50%*• 11% with a data link equipage rate of 75%*The above benefits are thanks to improvementssuch as better task sharing between controllers.

The Link 2000+ Programme can only be successfulwith the wide involvement of air navigation serviceproviders, communication service providers, airlinesand of course controllers and pilots. This is nowunder way – a contribution to safer, on-time aircraftoperations.


# 05 December 2007

To ensure proper operation of FANS B aircraft in high-density continental data link airspaces an operator needsto ensure the following:

a) A contract with a Data Service Provider, DSP(ARINC or SITA*) is signed

b) The aircraft is declared to the data link serviceprovider

c) The aircraft and its FANS capability is declaredto the ATC centres of the operated routes

d) The aircraft’s avionics are properly configurede) Operational approval is obtained

CONTACT DETAILS

Sophie de CuendiasDesign Manager

Upgrade ServicesAirbus Customer ServicesTel: +33 (0)5 62 11 05 60Fax: +33 (0)5 62 11 08 47

[email protected]

* Figures given in the Eurocontrol website

*ARINC: Aeronautical Radio INC SITA: Sté. Internationale de Telecommunications Aéronautiques

Yannick MALINGEVice-President Flight SafetyPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 43 60Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 29 80 86 52

The Airbus Flight Safety Team

Thierry THOREAUDeputy Vice President Flight SafetyHead of International CooperationPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 49 54Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 16 93 87 24

Christophe CAILTest PilotOperational Advisor to theVice-President Flight SafetyPhone : +33 (0)5 67 19 16 06Fax : +33 (0)5 61 93 29 34E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0) 6 72 05 91 94

Christopher COURTENAYDirector of Flight SafetyHead of Safety InformationDisseminationPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 02 84Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 16 03 64 22

Nuria SOLERAssistant to Flight Safety Dept.Phone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 45 19Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected]

Armand JACOBTest PilotOperational Advisor to theVice-President Flight SafetyPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 47 92Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 29 34E-mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 22 10 36 09

Jean DANEYDirector of Flight SafetyHead of In-Service Safety & Incident InvestigationPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 35 71Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 23 98 01 16

Albert URDIROZFlight Safety ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 01 20Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 23 98 01 13

Marc BAILLIONFlight Safety ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 67 19 14 75Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] Mobile : +33 (0)6 23 98 01 10

Frederic COMBESFlight Safety ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 97 42Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] Mobile : +33 (0)6 16 93 87 37

Panxika CHARALAMBIDESFlight Safety ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 80 99Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] : +33 (0)6 23 98 01 63

Nicolas BARDOUFlight Safety ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 67 19 02 60Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-mail : [email protected] Mobile : +33 (0)6 23 98 01 71

32


# 05 December 2007

Fligth Safety Advisors to Chief Engineers

Airbus Overseas safety Representatives

Ania BELLAGHCrisis Logistic Support ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 86 64 Fax : + 33 (0)5 67 19 12 26 E-mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 12 65 06 28

Jacques KUHLFlight Safety AdvisorTo Wide Body Chief EngineerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 03 90Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 48 28E-mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 20 61 35 21

André POUTRELSafety Operations DirectorFor ChinaPhone : + 86 10 80 48 61 61 (5072)Fax : + 86 10 80 48 61 62E-mail : [email protected] : + 86 13 70 13 15 413

Armand GASTELLUCrisis Logistic Support ManagerPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 41 79 Fax : + 33 (0)5 67 19 12 26 E-mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 23 98 00 86

Michel PALOMEQUEFlight Safety AdvisorTo Single Aisle Chief EngineerPhone : + 33 (0)5 62 11 02 85Fax : + 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29E-Mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 23 08 06 38

Per-Oliver GUENZELFlight Safety AdvisorTo Long Range Chief EngineerPhone : + 33 (0)5 61 93 22 56Fax : + 33 (0)5 67 19 15 21E-mail : [email protected] : +33(0)6 84 78 70 52

William G. BOZINVice-President Safetyand Technical AffairsAirbus North AmericaPhone : + 1 202 331 2239Fax : + 1 202 467 5492E-mail : [email protected] : +1 703 474 0892

Flight Safety Hotline:

+33 (0)6 29 80 86 66E-mail:[email protected]

Safety FirstSubscription form

# 04 June 2007

SAFETY FIRST - The Airbus Safety Magazine

Subscription Form To be sent back to

AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICEFax: 33 (0)5 61 93 44 29

Mailto:[email protected]

Name . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Surname . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Job title/Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Company/Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Post/Zip Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Telephone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Cell phone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Fax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

E-mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Please send me the digital copy*

Please send me the paper copy*

* Please tick the appropriate case

Documents

December 2007 - Issue 5