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Crisis Decisionmaking, Disaster Response, and Emergent Networks

PADM 523 & 524 Summer 2010

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Characteristics Defining a CrisisCrises are defined as situations involving:

Threats to major values—high organizational and personal stakes.Time urgency; time pressures.Ambiguity or uncertainty.Surprise or uniqueness.Insufficient information.

1. Jerrold M Post. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in Avoiding Inadvertent War, ed. A. George. Boulder: Westview Press.2. Alan Dowty. 1979. “U.S. Decision-Making Under Stress: 1973,” International Political Science Association. 3. Irving Janis and Leo Mann. 1977. Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment. New York: The Free Press.

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Crises and Crisis ManagementCrisis situations are by definition novel, unstructured, and well outside of an organization’s or individual’s customary operating framework.

Crises require nonprogrammed decisional responses.

Crises are highly uncertain and complex situations.

Crises are characterized by an overload of incomplete, conflicting information.

The process of perceiving, selecting, and processing this information is critical to effective crisis management

Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.” Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2. Page 118.

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CRISIS ATTRIBUTES

PROBLEMSENSING

PROBLEM/THREAT DIAGNOSIS

DECISIONRESPONSE

EXTERNALINFORMATION

FLOW

RESOURCEMOBILIZATION

RESPONSE ACTIONS

INTERNALINFORMATION

FLOW

CRISISOUTCOMES

DECISIONSAND ACTIONS

EVENTPERCEPTION

CRISIS MANAGEMENT

THE ROLE OF INFORMATIONIN CRISIS MANAGEMENT(Source: Reilly, A.H. 1993. “Preparing for the Worst: The Process of Effective Crisis Management.” Industrial and Environmental Quarterly. Vol. 7, No. 2.)

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Tasks of the Crisis Decisionmaker

Define the principal elements of the situationMaintain receptivity to new informationIdentify and adequately consider the major values, interests, and objectives to be fulfilledSearch for and evaluate alternative courses of actionEstimate probable costs and risks of alternativesSeek new information pertinent to assessment of optionsDiscern relevant/important from irrelevant/trivial informationConsider problems that arise in implementing optionsAssess the situation from the perspective of other partiesResist both defensive avoidance and premature closureMonitor the developing situation and make adjustments.

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Characteristics of Defective Decisionmakingin a Crisis—Decisional Dysfunctions

A truncated and compressed time span, with much more attention paid to the immediate consequences of action than to long-range consequences;

A perceived requirement for decisional closure—i.e., rushed decisions—which may in turn lead to premature action; or, conversely,

A tendency toward defensive avoidance, e.g., procrastination; Cognitive rigidity, a tendency to maintain a fixed mind-set and

not be open to new information; diminished creativity. A tendency to reduce cognitive complexity and uncertainty; A reduction of the range of options considered;

Jerrold M. Post. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers,” in Avoiding Inadvertent War, edited by A. George. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Page 475.

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Defective DecisionmakingIn considering options, a tendency to “bolster,” that is to overvalue and overcommit to factors favor the desired action prescription and devalue and set aside factors militating against that desired course of action.A tendency toward faulty historical analogies;A tendency toward the fundamental attribution bias: To see the other’s actions as being precipitated by internal (psychological) causes rather than external circumstances (example: my adversary’s actions show that s/he is malevolently out to destroy us, rather than that s/he responding to external threats; demonization, caricature. With sustained cognitive conflict and increasing value conflict, there is a tendency toward the emotional loading of chosen options: Choices are often rationalized by such statements as “We've run out of options,” when in fact good options remain to be considered.

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Source: Post, Jerrold M. 1993. “The Impact of Crisis-Induced Stress on Policy Makers.”

PERFORMANCE/STRESS CURVE

PERFORMANCE

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Decisionmaking PatternsVigilance – follows a methodical, high-quality process to objectively collect available information, thoroughly consider it, search for other possible options, and make a well reasoned decision.

Unconflicted adherence – continuing with the current situation.

Unconflicted change – following the last advice received.

Defensive avoidance – avoiding decision making.

Hypervigilance – The Inability to distinguish (or discern) the critical or crucial from the unimportant; equal attentiveness to all stimuli; undifferentiated scanning; leads to a vacillating approach.

Source: Fink, Steven. 1986. Crisis Management: Planning for the Inevitable. New York: Amacom. Pages 133–150.

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A Definition of “Groupthink”

“a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group…members’ striving for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternate courses of action… a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results from in-group pressures.”

Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 9 in Groupthink.

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Antecedent Conditions for “Groupthink”Primary: A moderately or highly cohesive group.Structural or administrative faults in the organization in which the group exists, including: Insulation of the group. The group leader’s preference for a certain decision. A lack of norms requiring methodical decisionmaking

procedures for the group. Homogeneity of the group members’ social background and

ideology.High stress from external threats with low hope of a better solution than the leader’s solution—based in turn on over-reliance on the leader and his or her framing of situations.Relatively low levels of group self-esteem, often induced by the group’s perception of recent failures, excessive difficulty of current decisionmaking tasks, and moral dilemmas (for instance., apparent lack of feasible alternatives except ones that violate ethical standards).

Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Pages2 and 3.

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Symptoms of “Groupthink”Direct social pressure placed on a member who argues against the group’s shared beliefs.Members’ self-censorship of their own thoughts or concerns that deviate from the group consensus.An illusion of the group’s invulnerability to failure.A shared illusion of unanimity.The emergence of self-appointed mind guards that screen out information from outside the group.Collective efforts to rationalize.Stereotyped views of potential adversaries outside the group.Unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality.

Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.

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Correlative Symptoms of Defective DecisionmakingIncomplete survey of alternatives.Incomplete survey of objectives.Failure to examine risks of preferred choices.Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives.Poor information search.Selective bias in processing information at hand.Failure to work out contingency plans.

Source: Neck, C.P., and Manz, C.C. 1994. “From Group Think to Teamthink: Toward the Creation of Constructive Thought Patterns in Self-Managing Work Teams.” Human Relations. Vol. 47, No. 8. Derived from Victims of Groupthink, by I.L. Janis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1972). Page 3.

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Decisional Limits in Disaster Response

Research shows that while authority, leadership, and accountability are necessary in any event, collaboration functions better than over-centralized command and control approaches in major crises (Drabek & McEntire, 2002).

Complex disasters necessitate decentralized decision making structures and collaborative networks of exchange and support. A decentralized network will often emerge in the post-event environment of a large-scale disaster. The challenge is to maximize collaboration and communication across that network.

Disasters disrupt the patterns of what can be absorbed by routine procedures. As Tierney (2002) states, these types of events are largely defined by the need for improvised responses—but not entirely improvised. Rather, emergent organization shapes responses based on a combination of experience & improvisation.

– Drabek T. E. and D.A. McEntire. 2002. Emergent Phenomena and Multi-organizational Coordination in Disasters: Lessons from the Research Literature. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. August, 22(2), 197-224.

– Tierney, K.J. 2002. “Lessons Learned from Research on Group and Organizational Responses to Disasters.” Paper presented at Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters. Academy of Sciences, February 28 – March 1

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Incident Management Systems“A generic term for the design of ad hoc emergency management teams that coordinate the efforts of more than one agency under a unified command” (p.1)A functional management system that integrates personnel from different home organizationsInvolve identification of an incident manager or unified management team when jurisdictional areas or responsibilities overlapStandard terminology facilitates cooperation (although some minor regional variance remains)Rules for chain of command, unity of command, and span of controlProtocols for communications and flow of informationEmphasis on logistics planning and centralized resources allocationPlanning functions on an equal level with operations and logistics functions

Christen, H., P. Maniscalco, A. Vickery, and F. Winslow. 2001. “An Overview of Incident Management Systems.” Perspectives on Preparedness. Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness. No. 4 (September).

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Emergent Organization in Disaster ResponseEven with IMS in place, disasters evoke emergent responses. “Emergence is likely when members perceive a present threat, when the social

climate is supportive of emergence, when social ties are in place – at least to some degree – before the mobilization, when the social setting legitimizes the groups, and when resources are available (Quarantelli et al., 1983).”

This is so given that major disasters—catastrophes—involve situations where: Most or all of the community built structure is heavily impacted...[and] the

facilities and operational bases of most emergency organizations are themselves usually hit

Local officials are unable to undertake their usual work role, and this often extends into the recovery period

Help from nearby communities cannot be provided Most, if not all, of the everyday community functions are sharply and

concurrently interrupted The mass media system, especially in recent times, socially constructs

catastrophes even more than they do disasters Because of the previous five processes, the political arena becomes even

more important “…[Therefore] the level of emergence necessary to contend with these severe and

unanticipated conditions is likely to be greater than would occur in more typical disaster situations.”Quarantelli, E.L., with K.E. Green, E. Ireland, S. McCabe, and D.M. Neal. 1983. Emergent Citizen Groups in Disaster Preparedness and Recovery Activities: An Interim Report. Newark DE. University of Delaware, Disaster Research Center.

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Emergent Networks Emergent Multi-Organizational Networks (EMONs):

The “structure of relationships that form among organizations, or segments of organizations, that are focused on a specific [activities or response functions]” (Drabek, 1996: 21-11)

Form during the emergency period for a limited time in order to address emerging needs

In catastrophic events, EMONS are often simultaneously comprised of a range of established, expanding, extending, and emergent organizations.

Emergent organizational networks are defined as such not necessarily because they are comprised of emergent groups, but because of the newly formed relations between organizations

Drabek, T.E. 1996. The Social Dimensions of Disaster. Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency.

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Emergent Groups: Benefits and Challenges

May be able to act more quickly as they are outside of a formal bureaucracyMay have a better pulse of what emerging needs are as they connected to emergent systems and networksMay meet needs unidentified or not being met by formal systems

May not be governed by the same standards or systems of oversight as formal organizations May have less of a feel for emerging needs as they not necessarily part of the formal network where certain information is directed toMay generate overlap and compete with existing systemsMay be characterized by unclear leadershipMay have unstable definitions of tasks and roles

Drabek, T.E. and D.A. McEntire. 2003. Emergent Phenomena and the Sociology of Disaster: Lessons, Trends and Opportunities from the Research Literature. Disaster Prevention and Management, 12(2): 97-112.

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Role of Personal Convergence in Emergent Groups and Networks

Personal or people convergence involves the influx of people to areas associated with the disaster milieu (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003; Fritz & Mathewson, 1957).

- Fritz, C. and J. H. Mathewson. 1957. Convergent Behavior: A Disaster Control Problem. Special Report for the Committee on Disaster Studies. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D. C.- Kendra, James M., and Tricia Wachtendorf, 2003. Reconsidering Convergence and Converger Legitimacy in Response to the World Trade Center Disaster. Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas (ed. Lee Clarke). Research in Social Problems and Public Policy (11), 97-122.

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Network VisibilityAs existing groups take on new roles or other groups emerge, information about key organizations is often not known across the social network. In catastrophic events where convergence and emergence may play an even larger role than in typical disasters, network visibility, which allows for both open and coordinated systems, becomes paramount. Networks need to take visible form so that communications and role and task structuring can begin to take shape as well.

- Wachtendorf, T., B. Brown, J. Holguin-Veras, and S. Ukkusuri, and Perez. (In preparation). Network Visibility in Emergency Supply Chain Management.

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In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, emergent groups—previously existing groups undertaking new tasks or with new organizational arrangements—and established organizations all formed new organizational networks as they contended with the many response needs. Some groups played more dominant roles than others in different stages of the response and early recovery, with respect to different tasks, and in working with different communities. Some activities, such as Coast Guard search-and-rescue were so pre-programmed and at the same time apt for the situation at hand, that they were immediately deployable, and they also formed nuclei for the self-organization of emergent responses.

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Katrina Experience—Decisional failures Lack of adequate plans for things like evacuation Flawed local planning process Loss of local command and control facilities Lack of coordination among organizations of all types:

volunteers in boats and buses, Coast Guard, Red Cross, medication

Lack of initiative, as in the waste of city buses which could have been mobilized for evacuation and instead ended up under water.

Lack of creativity or resilience, as in the instance of refusal of Amtrak’s offer to fill its last train out of the city with evacuees

Lack of expertise Governor’s refusal to nationalize National Guard; political

pettiness.

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Strategic View of Disaster Response Defining, articulating:

What is the nature and scope of the

emergency? What are the values involved

(those threatened and those in prospect)?

What operational capabilities*

and resourcesare required? *Capability =

organizational capacity + individual skill &

experience

What authorizers & resources need be

involved, and aligned? White House, FEMA,

Governor, Mayor, Red Cross, etc.

Strategic managerial leadership:

individual and systemic