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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and
MANUEL OPULENCIA
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
Nature: Petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek to set aside the
orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in Criminal Case No.
266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information for
theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
On Feb 1, 1975, Police searched the ice plant owned by Opulencia; they discovered
electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed without necessary authority fromcity government.
On Nov 24, 1975, Asst. City Fiscal filed info against Opulencia for violation of a city
ordinance which prohibits unauthorized wiring installations. Opulencia pleaded not guilty and
filed motion to dismiss on the ground that the crime had already prescribed (offense charged was
a light felony w/c prescribes 2 months from discovery thereof.)
Lower court dismissed the case. Acting City Fiscal filed another information for theft of
electric power. Opulencia filed Motion to Quash upon the ground of double jeopardy. Judge
Relova granted motion and dismissed the case. Motion for Recon denied, hence this appeal.
Issue: WON there was double jeopardy
Ratio Decidendi: Yes. A person who was charged for violating a city ordinance for having
installed a metering device to lower his electric bills which was dismissed for prescription of the
offense may not be charged again for theft of electric power under the RPC.
Reasons: The second sentence of Art. IV Sec. 22 embodies an exception to the gen. proposition:
the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense
charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national
statute such as the RPC, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes, the
inquiry for purposes of double jeopardy is on the identity of offenses charged BUT where
an offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts.
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Since the dismissal of the case against Opulencia for violation of an ordinance already
amounted to an acquittal, he can no longer charged with an offense punishable under a statute
which arise from the same act.
JEJOMAR C. BINAY V. HON. SANDIGANBAYANG.R. Nos. 120681-83, October 1, 1999
Nature: Motion for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their
arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.
Facts:
Cases were filed by the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan (SB for brevity) against
Mayor Binay of Makati for Illegal Use of Public Funds (RPC A220) and Violation of Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019) on September 1994. The informations filed
constituted crimes which were committed by the petitioner in his incumbency in the year 1987.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6
yearsconstituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore
washeld in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a
resolutiondenying petitioners motion to quash and further the latters motion for
reconsideration. In themeantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused pendente
lite (benefits) whichwas later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension.
Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that theresolutiondenying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of
his rightswhen the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the
petitionersopposition. SC then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB
nonethelessreiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply.
Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so
muchso that the petitioner filed before SB a motion to refer his cases to the RTC of Makati
allegingthat the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and
suspension orderon June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioners motion.
Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB
over the criminal cases.
Issue: Whether or not SB has jurisdiction over the case of after the passage of RA 7975.
Held: YES. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act No. 3019
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otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense:
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher.