Set 3 Case Digest Consti

SET 2 CASE DIGEST Constitutional law 1Compiled by: Josemari C. Quijada

Subject: Constitutional Law 1

Topic: International Treaty

Title: Kuroda v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

Facts:

This is a case of war crime against Shigenori Kuroda who were charged under Hague Convention.

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines during a period covering 1943 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" — comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

(1) The Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention on rules and regulations covering land

warfare and that petitioner is charged of crimes which are not based on law; (2) Participation of the United States attorneys and their appointments is a violation of the constitution since they are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines; (3) US attorneys are not proper parties in interest in the case.

Issue:Can Kuruda be charged of crimes under Hague

Convention?

Court Ruling:Yes.In accordance with Article 2 of our Constitution

provides in its section 3 that ” The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of nation.”

Under the Incorporation clause, the generally accepted principles of international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. The petition of Kuroda will not prosper, for even though the Philippines is not a signatory of the Hague Convention, the fact that the convention is with regards to generally accepted principles of international law, the Philippines is bound to adopt it automatically even without legislative authorization.

The crime charged against the petitioner is based on law, for, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate the unfinished aspect of war,


namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68, which is in conformity with the generally accepted principles of international law. The Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional, thus the military commission has jurisdiction over it.


Topic: Doctrine of Icorporation

Title: PHILIP MORRIS, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, G.R. No. 91332

Facts:

PHILIP MORRIS, INC , "MARK VII", "MARK TEN", and “LARK” filed a preliminary injunction against Fortune Tobacco Corporation claiming that it has no right to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the identical or confusingly similar trademark "MARK" in contravention of Section 22 of the Trademark Law.

Fortune Tobacco alleged further that it has been authorized by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to manufacture and sell cigarettes bearing the trademark "MARK", and that "MARK" is a common word which cannot be exclusively appropriated.

The prayer for preliminary injunction was denied file, premised upon the following propositions:Plaintiffs are not doing business in the Philippines .This simply means that they are not engaged in the sale, manufacture, importation, exportation and advertisement of their cigarette products in the Philippines.

Plaintiffs asserts that their trademarks are entitled to protection by treaty obligation under Article 2 of the Paris Convention of which the Philippines is a member and ratified by Resolution No. 69 of the Senate of the Philippines and as such, have the force and effect of law under Section 12, Article XVII of our Constitution and since this is an action for a violation or infringement of a trademark or trade name by defendant, such mere allegation is sufficient even in the absence of proof to support it. To the mind of the Court, precisely, this is the issue in the main case to determine whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs' right of property to such trademark or trade name. This claim of plaintiffs is disputed by defendant in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Answer; hence, this cannot be made a basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:

Can the international law of trademark overrule our local trademark law?

Court Ruling:


“Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments”

***

“A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.”


Topic: Extradition Treaty

Title: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs.HON. RALPH C. LANTION, G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000

Facts:

This concerns the Extradition Treaty between the Philippines and the United States, the extradition of Mark Jimenez , the court is called to decide whether to uphold citizen’s right of due process or to comply our duties under a treaty.

In this case, the respondent is asserting his rights of due process by requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S. Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.

Private respondent also requested that preliminary, he be given at least a copy of, or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

To which the petitioner answered, they cannot provide the documents and they can only determine whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said documents.

They are not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of


Treaties, to which we are a party provides that "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

Such then , private respondent filed for petition for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein petitioner's letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

The court decided in favor of Mark Jimenez and ordered the respondents, namely: the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a

Regional Trial court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

Issue:

Would private respondent's entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause in the Constitution?

Court Ruling:

Compliance with due process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect — a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the


Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.

Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 55).

In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957];


Topic: International Trade Agreement

Title: ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

Facts:Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf

of other alien residents’ corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines;

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) A prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (3) An exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry;

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) The Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (3) No treaty or international obligations are infringed;

Issue:


Whether or not there’s a violation of international treaties and obligations?

Court Ruling:

No, there is no violation. The Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects, and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.

The Supreme Court ruled that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because

no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.


Topic: Extradition Treaty

Title: GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Represented by the Philippine Department of Justice vs HON. GUILLERMO PURGANAN, G.R. No. 148571 September 24, 2002

Facts:

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001 and July 3, 2001 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42. 3 The first assailed Order set for hearing petitioner’s application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez.

This Petition is a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.


Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez.Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.

The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion," which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail

2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.

Court Ruling:

Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

Answer to Issue # 1. YES.


The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.

Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community.

The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to

trial in the requesting country. 45 Prior acts of herein respondent –

(1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is charged with are bailable -- eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as his predisposition to avoid them at all cost. These circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying high risk of flight. He has demonstrated that he has the capacity and the will to flee. Having fled once, what is there to stop him, given sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second time? Answer to Issue # 2. NO.

Potential extradites are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in that country. He already had


that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.


Topic: Delegation of Power

Title: RAMON A. GONZALES vs RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

Facts:

This is a petition filed by Ramon Gonzales, a rice planter against Executive Sec. Hechanova for authorizing importation of rice from Vietnam and Burma.

The petitioner disputes it us unconstitutional since Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 states "that the importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions.

Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the

Executive Secretary to import the foreign rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Respondents prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction, claimed that the petitioner has no legal standing, no cause of action , and that the petitioner has not exhausted all administrative remedies before going to court.

Respondent assails that the authorized importation is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1.

Issue:

Is the authority granted by the President for the importation of rice valid?

Court Ruling:

It is unconstitutional.

“Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended by petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed — we are unanimously of the opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force — that the two Acts are


applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines". Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207,

"it shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines", although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly, Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency" from importing rice and corn.”

***

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for the armed forces, preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security — predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension created by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section

2 of the National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national emergency.

Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

***The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards, commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition, purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ... produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities, subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such


quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies".

Moreover, it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the administration throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by the Government of the Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not exist. Inferentially, therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are such laws.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that there is no rice shortage. And the importation is

avowedly for stockpile of the Army — not the civilian population.But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be rejected - we still live under a rule of law.

And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now — as respondents explicitly admit — Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies precisely in the compliance with said Acts.It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws permit importation — but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be complied with.


Topic: International Trade Agreement

Title: WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA , et al.vs. EDGARDO ANGARA,PANGANIBAN, J. et al. G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997


Facts:

This case is a question of constitutionality of the international treaty our country will be committing through World Trade Organization.

WTO is revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst states. WTO can be best describe by using the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity.”

However, petitioners claimed that WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."

Petitioners are praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement, asking the court’s constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate Resolution No. 97.

Issue:

1. Is World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement unconstitutional?

2. Will the WTO limits the sovereignty of our country?

Court Ruling:

All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.

In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of


equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

***Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development." These basic principles are found

**The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets

****

Answer to issue # 2.

“Sovereignty Limited by International Law and TreatiesThis Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.

One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda — international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken."


By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or pact.

After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.

Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations, the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the establishment of international organizations. 46 The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy, "Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is over. The age of interdependence is here."



Title: People vs Vera , G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937

Facts:

This case is in relation to “delegation of legislative power” which is delegated to the provincial board through the enactment of Act 4221.

People of the Republic of the Philippines and HSBC as petitioners prayed for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and of prohibition against the respondent JOSE O. VERA (presiding Judge of Court of First Instance in Manila), from taking any further action or entertaining further the application for probation filed by Mariano Cu Unjieng under the provisions of Act No. 4221.

History:

Mariano Cu Unjieng’s was held guilty in a criminal case and was at large for 4 years since the judgment was rendered. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision correctional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prision mayor but applied for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221. The Fiscal of the City of Manila and a private prosecution filed an opposition to the granting of probation to Mariano Cu Unjieng. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality on Act No.


4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial boards of several provinces.

Act 4221

ACT 4221 AN ACT ESTABLISHING PROBATION FOR PERSONS, EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE OR ABOVE, CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; PROVIDING PROBATION OFFICERS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Issue:

Question of constitutionality on Act 4221 resulting to undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial board.

Court Ruling:

“Supreme Court concluded that section 11 of Act No. 4221 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason, unconstitutional and void.”

***

“By section 11 if the Act, the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial boards to determine. In other words, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves, whether the Probation Law shall apply to their provinces

or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If the provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. The plain language of the Act is not susceptible of any other interpretation. This, to our minds, is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial boards.”

Section 11 of Act No. 4221 This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

“In testing whether a statute constitute an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.”

“As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.”


“The provincial boards may be regarded as administrative bodies endowed with power to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces. “

“In the case at bar, what rules are to guide the provincial boards in the exercise of their discretionary power to determine whether or not the Probation Act shall apply in their respective provinces? What standards are fixed by the Act? We do not find any and none has been pointed to us by the respondents. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.”


Topic: Delegation of Power to Administrative Bodies

Title: EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988

Facts:

In this case a delegation of authority to POEA has been questioned. The petitioner here is Eastern Shipping Lines who own the vessel where Vitaliano Saco was working and was killed in an accident in Japan. The petitioner claimed that Saco is not an OFW but just a domestic employees thus POEA has no jurisdiction over this matter and it should be the SSS that should take cognizance on this case.

The petitioner also questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.

The award of P180,000.00 for death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses was made by the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1, 1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment.

Issue:

Is Memorandum Circular No. 2 created by POEA valid?


Court Ruling:

Yes, POEA created under Executive Order No. 797 was authorized to issue regulations.

“The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, reading as follows:... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).Similar authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA.”

“Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."


Topic: Separation of Church and State

Title: Imbong vs Ochoa G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

Facts:

This case is a petition against RH Law where petitioner alleged the bill as unconstitutional on the following grounds:

• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it


authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.

Issue:

Is the RH Law unconstitutional based on the grounds alleged by the petitioner?

Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as

they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;


7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

“At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.”

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of

society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.



Title: US vs Ang Tang Ho, G.R. No. 17122 February 27, 1922

Facts:

In July 30th, 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 granting a legislative power to the Governor General. Two days after this act was passed, the Governor General issued a proclamation Executive Order No. 53, fixing the price at which rice should be sold.

Due to this proclamation, Ang Tang Ho was charged for the sale of rice at an excessive price and was found guilty for the violation of Executive Order No. 53 to which he appealed, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.

Act No. 2868


"An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which are as follows:Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand.

Issues:

Question of validity of the delegation of power to the Governor General by the Philippine Legislature through Act No. 2868.

Court Rulings:

The Supreme Court ruled- We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

Reasons:

If the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and


without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action to depend.

The issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities.”

Supreme court decides - The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged.


Topic: Delegation of Power to the President

Title: EMMANUEL PELAEZ vs THE AUDITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965

Facts:

The President of the Philippines, issued Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The Vice President of the Philippines, Emmanuel Pelaez, filed a civil action to stop the Auditor General and his representatives and agents from funding the said executive orders. Pelaez said that the EO has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 therefore it is unconstitutional.

Pelaez said that according to Republic Act No. 2370, barrios may not be created nor altered or even changing their names thus it is not possible for the President to create municipalities which consists of barrios under this new Republic Act.


The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:

Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:

All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions hereof.

Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire membership of the said council: Provided, however, that no new barrio may be created if its population is less than five hundred persons.

Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a

barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?"

Issue: Whether or not the Executive Order Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129 creating 33 municipalities is null and void because of the Republic Act 2370.

Court Ruling: In Section 10 (1), Article VII of the Philippine Constitution provides: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. According to the constitution the president doesn’t have the power to create or control local governments. Therefore the court ruled that the EO is null and void.


Topic: People’s Initiative and Referendum


Title: MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997

Facts:

This case is in relation to delegation of power to people at large through initiative which is to amend the constitution and a test of validity of rules and regulations implemented by the delegate administrative body like Comelec.

COMELEC and Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed the “DELFIN Petition” it is a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative”. The Delfin Petition sought to amended Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI, 7Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution.

According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC. To support this petition, Comelec promulgated COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from

the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following proposition:DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?

Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin’s Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.

Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:

• The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;

• COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is beyond one's legal power or authority since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the implementing law.

• The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.


• Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.

Few of the defense of the respondents are:

• Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall

• Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.

1. The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.

As for Comelec, it claims that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.Issues:

1. Can people exercise its initiative to amend constitution without legislative grant?

2. Is R.A. NO. 6735 valid?

3. Is COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 valid?

Court Ruling:


No. The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

“R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein.

No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.


The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.”

Answer to Issue # 2.

No, according to Supreme Court R.A. No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation.

“The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4) Delegation to local governments; and(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. 62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the COMELEC is then invalid.


No, Supreme Court void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and

It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose


amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the "sufficient standard" tests.

Subject: Constitutional Law I


Title: ABAKADA VS. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Facts: This case questions the constitutionality of RA No.

9337 , petitioner claimed it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987 Constitution. RA 9337 amounts to an undue delegation of legislative power, the increase in the VAT rate to 12% violates the due process clause as it imposes an unfair and additional tax burden to the people. It is unconstitutional for being oppressive, excessive and confiscatory.

RA No. 9337 is a consolidation of House Bill No. 3555, House Bill No. 3705 and House Bill No. 1950 which, these three House Bills have Disagreeing

Provisions on matters concerning the no pass-on provision, the stand-by authority in favor of the President, the 70% limit on input tax credit and the amendments to be made to the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) provisions regarding income and excise taxes.

The Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions convened, and on May 23, 2005, the enrolled copy of the consolidated House and Senate version on disagreeing provisions was transmitted to the President, who signed the same into law on May 24, 2005, thus, the birth of RA 9337.

In the present case, the challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6 which reads as follows:

That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%

On July 1, 2005, RA 9337 took effect and on the same date, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately enjoining respondents from implementing and enforcing RA 9337 because accordingly, the provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President upon recommendation of the


Finance Secretary to raise the VAT rate to 12% effective January 1, 2006 after any of the two conditions are identified to have occurred, namely, (1) VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5% or (2) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 1 ½%.

Issue:Whether or not there has been an undue delegation of power.

Court Ruling:

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.53 Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.54

Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present. The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the legislature itself.

The Court finds no merit to the contention of petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al. that the law effectively nullified the President’s power of control over the Secretary of Finance by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance. The Court cannot also subscribe to the position of petitioners

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.49 While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends.


WHEREFORE, Republic Act No. 9337 not being unconstitutional, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463, and 168730, are hereby DISMISSED.

There being no constitutional impediment to the full enforcement and implementation of R.A. No. 9337, the temporary restraining order issued by the Court on July 1, 2005 is LIFTED upon finality of herein decision.

Documents

Set 3 Case Digest Consti