Closing the Candor Chasm: The Missing Element of Army Professionalism

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CLOSING THE CANDOR CHASM:

THE MISSING ELEMENT OF

ARMY PROFESSIONALISM

Paul Paolozzi

Volume 5

Professional Military Ethics Monograph Series

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

U.S. Army War College Press

CLOSING THE CANDOR CHASM:THE MISSING ELEMENT OFARMY PROFESSIONALISM

Paul Paolozzi

September 2013

The views expressed in this report are those of the author anddo not necessarily reect the ofcial policy or position of theDepartment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) andU.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy fullacademic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiedinformation, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresentofcial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them tooffer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the inter-est of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared forpublic release; distribution is unlimited.

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This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code,Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not becopyrighted.

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I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Don Sniderfor his counsel and constructive content suggestions during allphases of this research work. His willingness to invest his timeand provide candid comments was essential. I would also like tothank Dr. Peter Singer for his insightful remarks and the manage-ment of the Federal Executive Fellowship Program at Brookings;Mr. Michael OHanlon, my research advisor, for his thought pro-voking ideas and benecial critique; and Mr. Brendan Orino forhis assistance in keeping my progress on schedule, assistance in


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publishing, and indispensable editing skills. I would like to of-fer my special thanks to Lieutenant General (R) James Dubik andthe Brookings Federal Executive Fellows: Ms. Amy McFadden,Lieutenant Colonel John Barnett, Commander Richard McDan-iel, Colonel Brad Hoagland, and Commander Joe Kramek, all ofwhom were very instrumental in testing ideas in open discussion.Advice given by fellow Army Colonels Everett McDaniel and JeffPeterson was a great help in fully developing many of the con-cepts within this work. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Rae AnnPaolozzi, for her rst-line editing patience, support, and unend-ing encouragement throughout my study.

Previous titles in this series include:

1. The Armys Professional Military Ethic in an Era of PersistentConict, by Dr. Don M. Snider, Major Paul Oh, and Major KevinToner, October 2009.

2. The Army Ofcers Professional EthicPast, Present, and Fu-ture, by Colonel Matthew Moten, February 2010.

3. Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conict, byMajor Tony Pfaff, April 2011.

4. Once Again, the Challenge to the U.S. Army Military during aDefense Reduction: To Remain a Military Profession, by Dr. Don M.Snider, January 2012.

ISBN 1-58487-596-8


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FOREWORD

In June 2013, the Army published Army DoctrineReference Publication (ADRP) 1, The Army Profession,the rst ofcial doctrine the Army has ever issued thatdescribes itself as a unique military profession. One ofthe essential characteristics of the military professiondescribed in that doctrine is Stewardship:

The ve essential characteristics of the Army Profes-

siontrust, military expertise, honorable service,esprit de corps, and stewardshipestablish whatGeneral George C. Marshall described as the com-mon spirit that binds us together as a unique militaryprofession. Together, these characteristics provide themoral and motivational rally points around which weorganize our self-understanding about what it meansfor the Army to be a profession and for members of the

Army to be professionals.

It is our commitment to the effectiveness of these char-acteristics in action, everyday in everything we do asprofessionals. As a profession, stewardship ensures weremain worthy of the trust of the American peoplenot just now, but also in the future. This is the essenceof stewardship. Stewardship of the Army Professionis our moral responsibility to ensure the long term ef-

fectiveness of the Army as a military profession.

In this monograph, the fth in the series on theArmys Professional Military Ethic, Colonel PaulPaolozzi challenges the Stewards of the Army Pro-fession by addressing the well-known fact that suchearned trust can only be based on relationships and

communications of candor. Paolozzis head-on ap-proach addresses what he coins the candor chasm,the space between what we say we value and what


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is actually said or written. He argues that the topicof candor is largely absent in Army literature, muted

in professional dialogue, and individually valuedbut organizationally uncommon. He posits that, as aprofession, the Army cannot have it both ways. Ei-ther candor is valued, heralded, rewarded, and en-couraged, or it remains peripheral. If the latter, it isto the detriment of new leaders who learn that forth-right communication is not valued, a lesson that is asdamaging to individual character as it is institution-ally to the Army.

Paolozzi posits that candor involves risk, exposure,and contention, but at the same time he recognizes thatencouraging authentic communication is not a licensefor unbridled exchange. His rst-hand experiencewith all three Army components provides him withunique insights and personal illustrations developed

while he served as an engineer battalion and brigadecommander in Afghanistan. From his perspective,the bedrock of the Army can only be built on trust,trust that relies on forthright communication and can-dor. Without it, the professional status of the Army isin jeopardy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute and

U.S. Army War College Press

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL PAOLOZZI, a colonel in the U.S. Army, iscurrently the Armys Senior Fellow to the BrookingsInstitution. He was commissioned an Engineer andserved in the 15th Engineer Battalion, 9th InfantryDivision, including service in Operation DESERTSTORM. He then commanded a company in the 6thEngineer Battalion, 6th Infantry Division, in Alaskaand subsequently served as a tactical ofcer, U.S.Corps of Cadets (USCC), and staff ofcer at the U.S.Military Academy. Colonel Paolozzi was selected tobe a Joint Staff intern with service in J5, Joint Staff, andas the executive ofcer of the Army Initiatives Group.Colonel Paolozzi joined the 11th Engineer Battalion,3rd Infantry Division, as the Battalion S3 in Kosovoand subsequently served as the Engineer Brigade S3.

He departed Kuwait in December 2002 to become theaide-de-camp to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Armyand later a congressional fellow before taking battal-ion command of the 864th Engineer Battalion in 2005.Colonel Paolozzi commanded the 864th during theunits rst combat deployment to Afghanistan andthen returned to Fort Lewis, WA. In 2008, ColonelPaolozzi served as the military assistant to the Assis-tant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs). In 2009 hetook command of the 18th Engineer Brigade, Schwetz-ingen, Germany and deployed the Brigade to Afghan-istan for the units second rotation. Colonel Paolozzigraduated from Utica College of Syracuse Universityand the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Col-lege, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He holds masters de-

grees from Long Island University and the NationalDefense University.


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SUMMARY

Expressing openness and transparency is some-thing we all say that we want but often choose toforego. Candor intimidates and creates discomfort;consequently, its presence is most often inversely pro-portional to rank and organizational size. There is noshortage of reasons why authentic communication isnot used, but it is difcult to nd precisely where can-dor stops being important or why it seems to be soundervalued. It is tough to measure, cannot be legis-lated, and is often organizationally absent, even wheneveryone seems to want it desperately.

Candor stands as the keystone element in creat-ing the foundation of trust in the Army, yet the topicis muted. The difcult issues of balance in the Armybetween competing demands and, equally important,

the maintenance and development of the people whomake up the Army in a decade of expected budgetcuts, requires plain-spoken leaders at all levels. Butthese leaders do not express authentic communicationbecause the time is right; they do it because they areloyal stewards of the Army Profession. It is time todiscuss what is missing in Army Values. Resurrectingcandor requires a new taxonomy that is simple andexplains the relationship with honesty. Previously,the Army incorporated candor in doctrine, yet nearlyno mention of it currently exists in education, train-ing, and professional discourse. Could this be the rea-son it is not as prevalent as it should be throughoutthe Army?

Fully developing the topic of candor involves ex-

posure, risk, and possibly contention to embody au-thenticity. Two examplesthe demands placed onthe Army Reserve Components and a review of the


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Armys counseling and evaluation environmentserve as areas where candor requires revitalization.

The Army now has an opportunity to reevaluate howtrust, the bedrock of the profession, can be bolsteredthrough leadership and an infusion of candor at alllevels, revisiting the sacrosanct seven Army Val-ues, and by bolstering education and training withforthright communication at the earliest levels ofleader development.


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CLOSING THE CANDOR CHASM:THE MISSING ELEMENT OF

ARMY PROFESSIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

. . . If as an ofcer one does not tell blunt truths orcreate an environment where candor is encouraged,then they have done themselves and the institution adisservice.1

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,2008

Openly expressing truth and being transparentitis something we all say that we want, but often choosenot to execute. Candor intimidates; it is messy, hard,creates discomfort, and its presence is most often in-

versely proportional to rank and organizational size.Culture, politics, and societal developments, allserve as culprits for why it is not used. It is difcultto nd precisely where candor stops being importantor why it seems to be so undervalued. It is tough tomeasure, cannot be legislated, and is often organiza-tionally absent even when everyone seems to want

it desperately. Welcoming candor is not a license tobe brash, angry, or habitually wrong; it is the con-structive contribution to communication that buildstransparency. Naturally, nearly everyone can thinkof a vivid illustration of candor, closely followed byan expectation of how candor should be a part of howprofessionals communicate.

Larger than life leaders, such as General of the

Army George C. Marshall, serve as symbols enshrinedin our minds because his timeless character provides aguide for future generations. Marshall is routinely ref-


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erenced as a quintessential role model with legendarystature as a straight-shooter. Those who have read

of his famous private exchanges, in which he chal-lenged General John Pershing during World War I inFrance as a captain and President Franklin Rooseveltduring World War II, are amazed at his steadfastnessas a man of candor.2 During the rst exchange, Mar-shall boldly placed his hand on Pershings arm in aneffort to return Pershings attention to his comments.Unable to recall exactly what he said, Marshall re-leased a torrent of facts in what he called an inspiredmoment.3 In the second example, Marshall followedthen Secretary Henry Morgenthaus advice for ad-dressing President Roosevelt, Stand up and tell himwhat you think. . . . There are too few people who doit, and he likes it!4 Marshall quietly demanded 3 min-utes of the Presidents time and ended with If you

dont do something . . . and do it right away, I dontknow what is going to happen to this country.5

Following each of Marshalls candid episodes, oth-ers believed he was destined for an abbreviated ca-reer, but Marshall experienced exactly the opposite.What is often forgotten about these stories is that Per-shing and Roosevelt personally valued candor. Theychose to reinforce and reward candor as opposed toextinguishing it. In these two examples, candor wasnot only valued but transportable for Marshall in verydifferent environments. Their trust in Marshall wassimply illuminated in these events, not created there.Marshall created trust by being a man of candor earlyin his career and not veering from the path.

Candor is a critical mark of character in commu-

nicationproviding strength, purpose, boldness, andvalidity. A dearth of candor impedes the ow andaccuracy of information and ultimately erodes trust


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between parties. The net effect of its absence goesbeyond ineffective communication; it degrades con-

dence in institutions, leaders, and organizations. Forthe U.S. Army, it should serve as bedrock in a profes-sion that espouses a sacred bond with the Americanpeople, civil leaders, and fellow soldiers. Whether inmatters of strategic importance, such as advising ournations most senior leaders, or daily interpersonal ex-changes, such as providing feedback and evaluationsto subordinates, forthright communication is equallyimportant. Candor in the Army has eroded throughneglect, chiey in training, education, counseling, andevaluations, effectively limiting the manner in whichtrust is reinforced.

Exercising candor is not the same as telling thetruth; candor more accurately embodies the achieve-ment of honesty often by revealing risk, contention,

openness, and authenticity.6

In February 2003, thenGeneral Erik K. Shinseki answered a question posedby Senator Carl Levin regarding the magnitude of theArmys force requirement during an occupation ofIraq truthfully when he deferred the precise numbersto the Combatant Commanderno further answerwas needed. When Levin pressed Shinseki, Howbout a range? Shinseki replied with uninching can-dorcandor unwelcomed by senior Department ofDefense (DoD) leadership, who later characterized hisaccurate testimony as outlandish and wildly offthe mark. The experienced Levin knew the questionwas best answered by the Combatant Commander,but was still well within Shinsekis knowledge. Shin-seki exemplied frankness when replying several

hundred thousand, even though he knew seniorDoD leaders advocated a light-footprint and quick re-sponse campaign.7 Candor involves exposure.


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Beyond a personal belief that candor exposes forth-right thinking, the dictionary denition identies the

character and manner in which candor is exchanged:The state or quality of being frank, open, and sincerein speech or expression.8 The Merriam-Webster Dic-tionary reinforces qualities that dene candor as free-dom from prejudice or malice and unreserved, hon-est, or sincere expression, which represent candorsrole as an independent element of trust.9

Fully developing the topic of candor requires morethan a bold example and a dictionary denition, how-ever. This research will rst present a new taxonomyof how candor should be viewed as a multifacetedethic through different examples. Next, I will reviewthe Armys recent past and current perspective fromliterature guiding how candor is viewed and valued.Third, I will provide two examples to illustrate how

candor is muted at both the organizational and theinterpersonal levels. Finally, I will offer recommenda-tions for reviving candor in the Army, a revival thatstarts with identifying the four facets of candor andoutlining the different ways in which it operates.

THE FOUR FACETS OF CANDOR

Establishing, or reinvigorating, candor in theArmy is professionally important and more eas-ily understood through its multifaceted framework.Routinely, candor is understood within an archetypalframework: a subordinate summoning the courage toexpress genuine thought to a senior. Subordinate tosenior candor is commonly addressed, but three ad-

ditional types of candor are particularly relevant tothe Army context: senior to subordinate candor; peercandor; and self-candor.10


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Subordinate to Senior Candor.

The most widely understood directional conceptof candor is represented by a subordinate speakingcandidly to a senior as opposed to sharing only whathe perceives the senior wants to hear. Subordinatesare often junior, less experienced, and may feel uneasedisplaying candor because of the seniors supervisoryauthority and/or evaluative position. In lower ech-elon units, subordinates may have more experience,which may facilitate candid communication. For easeof reference, Ill refer to it as subordinate candor.

The best noncommissioned ofcers (NCOs) earntheir reputation as professionals skilled in exercis-ing subordinate candor. They speak plainly and oftencreate healthy professional discomfort due to their

straightforward approach. They understand they arenot placed in senior enlisted advisors positions tobe liked, make friends, or be popular. Their role is tosteadfastly guide and advise regardless of whethertheir opinion is solicited. NCOs promoted too soon orimmersed in a candorless culture seldom fully gain anunderstanding of how their professional custodian-ship is essential to the Army profession.

Damage to an organization can be manifestedbeyond the primary participants when subordinatecandor does not exist. Sarah Chayes, a former specialadviser to the Joint Staff, courageously implicated her-self and a host of others in their collective role as aresponsible party allowing General David Petreaus tocontinue what appeared to be an inappropriate rela-

tionship in Iraq.

In a community, friendsand even military subor-dinatesbear some collective responsibility for the


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behavior of their friends or superiors, as uncomfort-able as it may be to intervene. Even more importantly,those who claim a stake in national security policyought to bear some collective responsibility for the na-tional interest. That national interest, if not Petraeusswelfare, should have outweighed any reticence. Yetnone of us, that I know ofincluding measked hima tough question.11

Subordinate candor is ideally displayed at thehighest levels of authority as well, particularly whenArmy senior leaders provide expert military advice tothe President or Congress. The agents (senior Armyleaders) have the responsibility to provide the princi-pal (Chief Executive or Congress) candid knowledgeto make well-informed decisions.

Senior to Subordinate Candor.

Within this form of candor, two scenarios routine-ly serve as the model in the Army: a senior counselingand providing evaluations for those within the estab-lished chain of command, and mentorship. Likewise,for ease of reference Ill refer to it as senior candor. Se-nior responsibilities are delineated in U.S. Army FieldManual (FM) 6-22, but the missing essential element ofproviding candid feedback has serious repercussionsfor each party in both of these contexts.12 Providingformal and informal feedback to subordinates servesas an important factor in subordinate development.One of the most frequent complaints from CareerCourse captains and Intermediate Level Educationmajors is that their superiors never took the time to

counsel themthe interaction is desired and cannotbe replaced by experiential learning.


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In my experience, junior leaders will, in turn, ex-ercise candor in feedback engagements they lead if

they see it modeled by seniors. What may appear tobe a routine and expected duty for the senior can be-come more daunting than combat for those unskilledor inexperienced in providing feedback. Investing in asubordinate through candid feedback and counselingis not a skill conferred through rank; it is difcult andrequires proper modeling, education, and frequentpractice through training.

Mentorship, an important facet of leader develop-ment in the Army, shares this facet of senior candor.Whereas most common mentoring relationships focuson career development and navigation, senior lead-ers infrequently take the time to invest in more juniorleaders by providing the blunt comments essential fora healthy mentoring relationship.13 Mentoring is not

simply providing a navigational chart for clear wa-ters in a similar career path. It involves the courage tospeak forthrightly and provide the mentee guidanceand correction. Mentors serve best when in a role thatencourages development through revelation, reec-tion, and periodic correction.14

Peer Candor.

Peer candor is exercised routinely through in-formal interpersonal interaction. Given the locus ofsuch conversations, it is difcult to make an assertionof how well developed this form of candor is in theArmy, and it almost certainly varies widely. Duringthe past year, peer candor has taken a more formal

shape in the Armys Multi-Source Assessment andFeedback (MSAF) tool, which provides concrete feed-back through a less-used form of peer candor.15 In


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my experience, the feedback delivered through thismasked mechanism is candid and includes valuable

information because of the maturity and experience ofthe peers who participate.

In September 2006, retired General Jack Keanerendered his unvarnished thoughts to Secretary Don-ald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace regarding theIraq Wars trajectory. His subordinate candor was arare interaction with a secretary known for his dis-trust of senior generals.16 Three days later, Keane metwith Pace who bluntly asked Keane . . . how do youthink Im doing as Chairman after 1 year on the job?What followed the unusual question was Keanesroutine display of candor: I would give you a failinggrade.17 Keane was known then as he is today for hisforthright candor.

Peer candor dwells in a sense of loyalty to a per-

son with an established relationship and a desire toconstructively contribute to his or her development.Indirectly, the loyalty invested in a peer may also beto the organization because of the need for correction.As Sarah Chayes aptly wrote, action may be necessary. . . as uncomfortable as it may be to intervene.18 Forsome leaders, peer candor may have been completelyabsent throughout their careers, posing a serious ob-stacle to exercising self-candor.

Self-Candor.

Self-candor, a construct infrequently discussed,may be the wellspring from which the other threeforms of candor are generated. It is the leaders abil-

ity to have self-understanding through introspectivediscussions of their own position that makes thecandor they provide to others valued. Authenticity


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within oneself allows candor with others. A leadersmotives, intent, feelings, and emotions are fully real-

ized through self-candor. Through self-candor, lead-ers can more accurately assess their strengths andweaknesses, measure effectiveness as they lead others,and provide forthright feedback and advice at strate-gic levels. Directors at the Center for Creative Leader-ship and coaches within the Armys MSAF both notethat toxic leaders inate their self-assessments andhumble leaders tend to underestimate their leadershipattributes.19 The abusive leader is delusional, and thehumble leader may not fully realize his potential, butboth require a better grasp for candor when under-standing themselves.

All four facets of candor are directionally differ-ent but in substance the samea forthright and trans-parent way of presenting information.20 Candor may

reveal itself in many ways in a profession but is bestunderstood through the examples in common com-munication. To further develop the topic of authenticcommunication from an Army perspective, recent lit-erature serves as a strong starting point.

THE ARMYS VIEW OF CANDOR:INDIVIDUALLY VALUED,ORGANIZATIONALLY UNCOMMON

The trust between all levels [of interaction] dependson candor.21

The beginning quote from Secretary Gates is com-plemented by his Reections on Leadership, which out-

lines candor, credibility, and dissent as key dimensionsexercised by Army leaders with uncommon agility.Although war and the environment where the ght


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resides may change, he still encourages . . . men andwomen in uniform to call things as they see them and

tell their subordinates and their superiors alike whatthey need to hear, and not what they want to hear.22Gates espousal of subordinate and senior candor isan embrace for authentic communication at the mostsenior DoD level. As Gates writes of the disservice tothemselves and the institution, he is detailing loyal-ty (to the institutionthe nation or DoDand fellowsoldiers) while establishing trust and reinforcing it.

While Gates bold style displays his own individ-ual appreciation for candor, Army literaturebothdoctrinal and white paper referencesare not as as-sertive. From a recent historical perspective, the De-partment of the Army Pamphlet 600-68, The Bedrock ofOur Profession, White Paper from 1986 outlines whatthe Army previously referred to as the four individual

values: commitment, competence, candor, and cour-age.23 As late as 1986, when candor was addressedas an individual value, the paper lightly dened itas honesty and delity to the truth.24 The authorsgrazed the subject but struggled with fully describingcandor and its importance to establishing trust in aprofessional setting.

In the 2010 The Profession of Arms White Paper ap-proved by General Martin Dempsey, then the Com-manding General of the Armys Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC), the Profession of Arms witha professional culture is codied.25 The White Paperserves as the basis forArmy Doctrine Publication (ADP)-1 and Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP)-1(draft dated September 25, 2012) and makes the rst

purposeful step forward on the Army as a professionsince the late 1990s discussion on Army Values.26 No-tably absent is the role of candor as an individual con-


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struct. Candor appears once in the 21-page documentin a commonplace reference, . . . committing Soldiers

and leaders to disciplined candor when advising andinteracting with civilian ofcials or public audiences.The sentence reects an example of senior candor,but the document never develops why candor isessential in communicationto build trust andcreate transparency.27

The Armys current work, The Army Professionin ADRP-1 outlines the ve essential characteristicsof the Army Profession: trust, military expertise, hon-orable service, esprit de corps, and stewardship of theprofession.28 Trust leads the publication and is her-alded as The Bedrock of our Profession. As part oftrust, and the means by which Army professionalsbuild trust in their units, the document outlines threecertication criteria: competence, character, and com-

mitment.29

Sound familiar? The organizing constructseems clear and simple, but trust and the means bywhich the three certication criteria are put into prac-tice require something more. Assuming trust is theend-product of skilled, ethical, and committed profes-sionals, it lacks the source from which it is created,communicated, and modeled. Candor is essential inthis role.

Why is Candor Muted in ArmyProfessionalism Writing?

Simply recognizing that candor is muted in theArmy requires an explanation of the key causes. Ad-mittedly, candor creates discomfort, it can be attrib-

uted to several factors present in doctrine, systems,and culture. Trust and candor show no relationship toone another in Army literature. Recent Army writings


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make a valued step forward in establishing the char-acteristics of the Army as a profession but fail to link

candor and Army trust. ADRP-1 details that:

. . . trust serves as a vital organizing principle thatenables effective and ethical mission command and aprofession that will continue to earn the trust of theAmerican people.30

That trust is maintained by:

. . . doing our work each and every day in a trustwor-thy and effective manner, one the American peoplejudge to be ethical according to the beliefs and valuesthey hold dear.31

Granted, there are many ways of earning trustand enshrining it as a part of the Army Profession,

but Army doctrine and supporting literature must bemore direct on the role of candor. Doctrine provides acommon foundation for the concepts that unite pro-fessionals; with no mention of the role of candor, how-ever, it is rare in practice and training.

Major General (Ret.) Dennis Laich and Lieuten-ant Colonel (Ret.) Charles Young argue that contrar-ian views, often expressed with candor, are oftenhammered into conformity due to a top-down ratingsystem combined with a rigid retirement system thatproduces group-think.32 They submit that if a cultureof conformity exists, then espoused values such ascandor, courage, and integrity are overwhelminglystrained. Although separately conceivable, the com-bined effect of rigid systems and an absence of can-

dor in doctrine double the impact. It is also likely thatthe Armys myopic focus on the seven Army Valueshas created an institutionalized blindness to other vir-


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tues.33 Even though candor is nearly absent in Armydoctrine, it can only be reinforced, not established, by

doctrine. Interaction with candor is personally experi-enced and then reinforced through doctrine. Doctrineplays a supporting role, not the lead.

An equally plausible, yet rarely expressed, reasonfor the lack of candor can be found in the Army can-do culture itself. The duty-driven Army that neveraccepts defeat and never quits might nd it heresy toadmit that the 2006 strategy in Afghanistan was notworking or that in 2003 the Army in Iraq was not pre-pared to ght an insurgency. Is it culturally accept-able to admit mission or operational shortcomingswhen you are the commander? When candor is notembraced, how long does it take for leaders from com-pany to coalition level to candidly assess their currentsituation? An inability to properly understand condi-

tions and admit errors is equally as damaging to theArmy as thoughtless pretense that accompanies can-do approaches that lead down the wrong course.

Whether candors lack of value is a result of its ab-sence in professional literature and discourse, the mil-itarys hierarchical structure with industrial pay andretirement systems, or the Armys unintentionally ad-verse can-do culture, the Army needs to reinvigoratecandor in both concept and practice. But illuminatingonly historical examples comes with the ease of per-fect hindsight and often ignores current and possiblycontentious areas that need improvement. Instead, byfocusing on two areas that currently need attention,the Army Reserve Components and the Army evalua-tions and feedback environment, I will describe areas

where transparency and candor can make a positiveimpact and align Army trust with espoused values.34No one has to like or agree with the following ex-


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amples, because one aspect of candor is respectfuldisagreement.

The Capability of the Army Reserve Components.

Authentic communication matters at the compo-nent organizational level as much as it does at the in-terpersonal level. A review of concerns in the ArmyReserve Components will serve as the rst illustrationof the impact of muted candor. It may not have beenobvious to the average American, but a controversialchange occurred in the military during the early partof the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Implemented in2003 and formalized in a DoD directive in 2008, theReserve Components shifted from a strategic reserveto an operational reserve.35 In other words, the his-tory of the mobilization of the Reserve Components

for large scale wars, such as World War II, or partialmobilizations, such as Operation DESERT STORM,shifted to periodic deployments with longer stabiliza-tion periods, relative to the active component. Thereare notable exceptions, such as the frequent use of theAir National Guard prior to 2001 as a part of the U.S.Air Force overall mission, but my comments will fo-cus on the two Army Reserve Components after 2003.

The decision to change to an Operational Reserveushered in a new era for the Reserve Components.Throughout the Army Reserve and Army NationalGuard, training, material, and personnel or manninghave signicantly improved in the last decade. Judg-ing by my experience, most of the brigade to detach-ment level units signicantly enhanced readiness for

deployment. Training has also improved, but the ma-jority of training events remain exclusively ReserveComponent activities. Under most circumstances,


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units have the requisite amount of personnel assignedfor the deployed mission, and most are trained in

their assigned specialty. Similarly, todays materialreadiness replaced the previous paradigm in whichthe Reserve Components received secondhand equip-ment only after Active Component units received newequipment. The division between have and have-not was replaced by similar units receiving similarequipment, regardless of component. One facet of theReserve Components, however, has not changed sincethe founding of the National Guard over 375 yearsagothey are lled with dedicated professionals whodeeply desire to serve their nation and Army.

Due to the absence or limited representation ofcandor, patriotism serves as the aegis in conversationswhen making recommended improvements about theArmy National Guard and Reserve. Suggestions that

reserve units are not as prepared after training or ascapable when deployed are met with political and se-nior military attacks that make most leaders unwillingto present valid concerns. Congressional testimonyand senior level conversations tend to focus passion-ately on the basic underlying assumption that, withthe requisite amount of training and preparation be-fore deployment, a reserve component unit will havethe same prociency as an active duty unit.36 This maybe true with some units, but in my experience it ap-plies to less than one-quarter of the Reserve Compo-nent units I have served with in 27 years of service.The operational reserve has not been fully resourcedto be operational.37

Injecting openness into the professional discourse

would give prominence to the stresses placed on thereserve components during the last decade. After com-manding an engineer battalion in Afghanistan from


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2005 to 2006 and an engineer brigade across the wholeof Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012, with 50 to 60 per-

cent of assigned units coming from the Army Reserveor National Guard, I noted areas of concern. Chiefamong them was that authentic communication wasnot a part of the dialogue at the tactical to operationallevel prior to deployment when determining the capa-bility of elded units. Of equal concern, some generalofcers, senior-level staff members, and those within abrigade-level peer network detailed deciencies in Re-serve Component units capability while deployed.38These privately expressed comments exposed leaderdevelopment shortfalls and training limitations be-fore and during mobilization that periodically limitedoverall combat readiness. Units deployed from theArmy National Guard ranged between 45 percent and80 percent original members and required substantial

individual llers. Regretfully, the shortcomings notedprivately were never expressed openly or, when pub-lically expressed later, became less critical.

To the credit of many Reserve Component battal-ion and company commanders, they often expressedtheir concerns to superiors and trainers in a multifac-eted way.39 They understood themselves and wherethey required change, provided forthright commentsregarding where they needed improvement, and didall they could during the combat deployment to focuson returning home a more competent unit. Concernsbefore deploying were met with focused commentsregarding the requirement the unit must ll, an aware-ness of training limitations, and an expectation of whatthe unit would receive as they arrived in Afghanistan.

There is an unrecognized disconnect between thosewho identify the shortfalls at battalion level and be-low and those senior to them who are cognizant of thecapability of the reserve component units.


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Lieutenant General James Dubik (Retired) andColonel David Hodne recently wrote in the February

2013 issue ofARMY Magazine:

Senior commanders, whether during their own battle-eld circulation or via reports, rely heavily upon bat-talion commanders and command sergeants major foraccurateeven brutally honestdescriptions and as-sessments. Such communications are absolutely essen-tial to the coherency and efcacy of wartime commandand form the grist for a fact-based dialogue amongechelons of command, a dialogue that increases theprobability that the organization as a whole has suf-cient understanding and can, therefore, adapt its op-erations properly to the enemy and situation it faces.40

Absent the descriptions and assessments char-acterized as brutally honest, it is impossible for theArmy to fully understand the strengths and limitationsof the Total Army. Assuming that the Budget ControlAct of 2011 (Defense Sequestration of 2013) continuesto the full 10-year term, the reductions in the ActiveComponent of the U.S. Army will result in heavier re-liance on the already stretched Reserve Components.41Now is a better time than ever, at a point of reec-tion and transition, to begin the discourse regarding

the full magnitude of strain on the Reserve Compo-nents, limitations with the frequency of deployments,and realistic expectations within the current trainingmodel. The realized benets of how the Total Armycould better integrate training, personnel systems,and realistic pre-deployment assessment might yieldthe total force that the Army espouses but that is

difcult to realize.Culturally, it is unacceptable to make any commentthat detracts from the esteem of Reserve Components.


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Avoiding the point actually creates a greater concernas the Army prepares for increased reliance on the

Reserve Components. Our nation needs leaders whoare comfortable enough to properly project exactlyhow all units are prepared for deployment across alllevels of capability. Simply expressing comments thattout the cost-benet value of Reservists without alsoaddressing the actual capability of Reserve Soldiersreinforces the need for accuracy.42 My intent is not tocreate animosity between components; conversely,I advocate that assignments between componentsshould be a requirement before reaching the grade ofmajor. Joint qualication is required for colonels to bepromoted to general because they must understandall services. Likewise, Army ofcers who master theirprofession should be fully experienced across both theActive and Reserve Components before they become

eld grade ofcers.43

A greater blending of the com-ponents will be the best course for leaders who under-stand each component and have the ability to speakopenly from experience.

The focal point in this candor example has less to dowith the improvements still needed in the OperationalReserve Components and more with the gap betweenwhere the Total Army stands and how senior leadersportray the capabilities of the Reserve Components.The organizational self-candor needed to present theforthright concerns within the Reserve Components isessential as the Army understands itself and then ac-curately depicts the Total Army outwardly, throughsubordinate candor, to the Joint Force and Congress.


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Candor in Army Evaluations and Counseling.

The impact of interpersonal candor in evaluationsand counseling is fundamentally as important asidentifying shortfalls at the large organizational level.How leaders model communication within the Armyreveals as much about the Army culture and profes-sion as what is communicated outside of the Army.It is indisputable that integrity and forthright com-munication are espoused values. They are timeless,unbending, and essential for the Army as a professionand serve as a foundation of trust; yet the way mostcounseling sessions and evaluations are communicat-ed, authentic communication is wanting. Evaluatorsuse faint (untruthful) praise rather than explicitly de-scribing poor performance in written evaluations afterfailing to provide periodic counseling and feedback.

Empty praise has become the accepted written evalu-ative communication. More damning is the educationof junior leaders, who observe that candor is not val-ued and, consequently, are condemned to perpetuatethat misconception.

The importance of candor in evaluations couldnot be more evident than in the extreme example ofthe Fort Hood, TX, shooting. Major Nidal Hasan wasidentied by his supervisors and colleagues dur-ing his residency and post-residency fellowship as achronically poor performer, was ranked in the bottom25 percent of his class, and clearly exhibited escalatingviolent Islamist extremism.44 His conduct disturbedmany of his peers and superiors, yet Hasan was neverdisciplined, referred to counterintelligence ofcials, or

removed from his otherwise successful career path.45Even though one of Hasans supervisors twice at-tempted in counseling to encourage him to leave the


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service after telling him, I dont think you and themilitary will t, Hasan was later promoted, placed

in an elite fellowship, and received evaluations thatatly misstated his actual performance.46 Both of hisevaluations from June 2008 and June 2009 were lledwith the same owery and empty praise that contin-ues to plague evaluations across the Army.47

Hasans evaluations bore no resemblance of thereal Hasan.48 Yet Hasans candor chasm, the dif-ference between his evaluations and his real perfor-mance, is commonplace in the Army today. In an ef-fort to make all leaders feel as if their contributionsto a demanding profession (especially during thelast decade at a time of war) are valued, evaluationslack accurate narrative comments. Those who thriveon openness and want the best for the Army are dis-mayed when poor performers are promoted at the

same rate as the talented. Ironically, in my experience,below average performers value candor as well, yetthey rarely hear it. Initially, true comments may sting,but even a poor performer with a modicum of self-candor is repulsed to hear faint praise disguised as thetruth. Some with below average potential have evenexpressed relief when the candor chasm is closed.Tragically, it may be mid-career before a leader re-ceives candid comments, to the detriment of the Armyand the individual.49 Unsurprisingly, having been atwar for over a decade and maintained a constantly ro-tating force, the Army retained even low performers,many of whom were promoted beyond their level oftalent. The Army can benet from the complementarymission of reinvigorating forthright communication

while simultaneously restoring credibility to the re-tention and promotion system.


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Evaluations and quality counseling form the cor-nerstone whereby leaders receive accurate perfor-

mance feedback and assess their future potential in theArmy. Junior and senior leaders alike thrive on forth-right feedback but can become disillusioned when it isnot provided. They are starving for bold leaders whospeak candidly and are willing to show the courage toinvest in subordinate leader improvement and estab-lish a foundation of trust. On a more mechanical path,the Army has focused the last 3 years on another effortto improve the Ofcer Evaluation Report (OER) andNon-Commissioned Ofcer Evaluation Report (NCO-ER). The effort to further rene how the top, middle,and bottom performers are identied through rotemeasure will improve, but the effort bypasses the im-portance of forthright communication, while assess-ing performance and leadership potential. The recent

return of potential stratication (also known as blockcheck) for all company grade ofcers is a manifestsign that candor is absent in the narrative of evalua-tions and could only be corrected through the returnof forced candor as the one clear indicator of how asenior rater evaluates potential.50

Forced candor is one means of identifying a leaderuncomfortable with performing his or her duty. JackWelch, the former Chief Executive Ofcer (CEO) ofGeneral Electric, was accused of being caustic in hisdelivery of candor to his employees, but he believesthat representing performance with candor is the mostdirect and respectful way of building trust, benet-ing the organization, and letting people know wherethey stand.51 Most Soldiers, too, would appreciate the

Welch approachthey did not enter the Army to bemollycoddled and instead expect forthright leaderswho have the courage to provide senior candor. Near-


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ly all leaders, regardless of whether the senior leaderfeels comfortable providing it, value direct communi-

cation and want senior leaders to invest in counselingwith developmental comments. Welch chastises su-pervisors who abdicate their responsibility with gut-punching directness: Admit ityoure doing thisfor your own sake. You just dont want to have thoseconversations.52 Motivated by the defense of the na-tion, Soldiers must communicate forthrightly becauseit is their duty, a sacred responsibility to invest in theArmy between Soldiers at the interpersonal level andthose who trust the Army to protect our nations inter-ests at the strategic and national security level.

Moreover, leader management lacks evaluativecontinuity, limiting the Armys ability to grow a lead-er from one organization to the next. Army evalua-tions are restricted from gaining organizations, limit-

ing new supervisors ability to effectively determinethe development needs of newly arriving leaders.Receiving units and senior leaders then must relearnthe developmental needs of recently arrived leadersbecause all counseling (even if conducted properly) isconsidered local and not shared with gaining units.The intent to provide impartial treatment and a freshenvironment for development eclipses the Armysneed to develop each leader with continuity. Thecombination of mediocre counseling, less than candidevaluations, and the lack of any established system ofArmy-wide continuity causes some unskilled leadersto drift upward through their career because there islittle or disconnected evidence that they need furtherdevelopment before advancement. Additionally, the

profession abdicates individual professional develop-ment to a centralized selection process; those promot-ed within the board process are assumed to possess


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the skill required of the grade. This is not the case inall circumstances. The ill-effects resonate throughout

the profession, and the shortfall of leadership most di-rectly impacts the Soldiers led by the unprepared.

The question remains how best to reinforce candorin evaluations across the Army. I can personally at-test to the value of the 360-MSAF as an adjunct toolto support evaluations. My feedback from selectedsubordinates and peers provided me with a level ofcandid feedback not normally received in routine con-versations. Similarly, the senior feedback was equallycandid, not comments I would expect in counseling oron an evaluation. Although I was originally not an ad-vocate of 360 feedback on all Army evaluations, I fullysupport the initiative. I am convinced that the over-riding value of the full perspective could be normedinto the total evaluation process to further reinforce

authenticity within the Army profession. Regretta-bly, the December 2013 change in Army evaluationswill passively focus on the evaluation form and theforced candor imbedded therein, instead of stew-ardship of the profession through meaningful writtennarratives.53

Leaders not only thrive on candor through indi-vidual performance feedback but equally value forth-right conversations regarding career assignments andfuture potential. For active duty Army leaders, theHuman Resources Command (HRC) retains the onlycapability to provide continuity for a leaders develop-mental potential and make future assignments. Cur-rent trends to reduce the size of all three componentsof the Army have resulted in several personnel man-

agement changes across ofcer and enlisted popula-tions. Previous retention practices that sacriced qual-ity are now changing in the face of budget constraints,


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deployment reductions, and congressional desire toreduce defense spending overseas. The Army lead-

ership is taking the opportunity to leverage the wisereduction in the size of the force after a period of mod-erate growth, and the net effect has been very positive.

The strategic shaping of the Army through policychanges is implemented as leaders interact with hu-man resource managers. Transparency should alwaysbe at the fore in conversations with HRCthe onlyorganization possessing individual career continuity.Interestingly, most human resource managers are notinformally measured by the population they serve ac-cording to their ability to readily present statistics ordivine the future, but whether or not they present ca-reer potential and personal information forthrightly.The straight-shooter establishes trust through open-ness and forthright conversation, not by making the

managed population feel as if it is equally capable oflling any position. Leaders want to operate in a cul-ture of transparency modeled by their supervisors aswell as their career managers. This duo of franknessallows leaders to better serve as leaders, gauge po-tential, plan for the future, and improve through self-development. The multiplying effect can be furthercomplemented by a mentoring relationship. With atriangulated representation of performance with can-dor from the supervisor, career manager, and mentor,leaders can develop in a manner congruent with theirtrue potential.

Shortfalls across the Total Army within the Armyfeedback and evaluations system are just two of sever-al challenges that the Army faces today that have their

genesis in the absence of candor. Some things willnot change. Communication among individuals andwithin organizations will always require leaders to


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create environments that encourage openness and en-sure it remains valued beyond their tenure. It remains

a constant that will always include risk because it in-cludes elements of human nature.54 Candor requiresattention and inculcation; it does not improve throughhope but through leadership and frequent nurture ofan environment that values authentic communication,making it transportable across a profession.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVIVINGCANDOR IN THE ARMY PROFESSION

The Army again nds itself in a position where themost important mission after an extended period ofwar is to preserve and develop leaders.55 After Viet-nam, the Army grappled with the same issues of trustand professionalism while the All-Volunteer force

emerged. Assuming that leader preservation and de-velopment during post-operation years remains im-portant, then there are areas of leader developmentthat would benet from an infusion of the four typesof candor into Army doctrine and culture. I proposethree recommendations for doing just this: saturateprofessional discourse from top to bottom with op-portunities to better develop open communication atthe interpersonal and organizational levels; revisit theArmy Values to include candor; and infuse candorinto training and education.

First, tone and culture are set within the Armyby the most senior leadersthe three- and four-stargenerals and the Sergeant Major of the Army. Theycreate environments that host open conversation or

conversely shunt the free ow of ideas. Candor willnot enter professional discourse by Chief of Staff ofthe Army decree but through each engagement where


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as well as across the Army. Seniors create the openenvironment, but exercising candor is every leaders

responsibility! Waiting for a senior to welcome or dis-play openness is the antithesis of courage.58

Second, start injecting the value of candor into doc-trine and practice by revisiting the Army Values. Re-examining values of the Army could serve as the rstmanifest characterization of how the sacrosanct canbe discussed and further reinforce why candor mustbe among the nal Army Values. Content value ismore important than whether an acronym is cleverlycrafted; LDRSHIP is catchy but cannot be an emptyconstruct.59 Rigorous reection following two wars toreview the values and determine the correct content ishealthy. Open values dialogue will help senior leadersrealize that a dysfunctional environment exists, one inwhich leaders are not as familiar as they should be with

authentic communication. For example, in Winning,by Jack Welch, Nancy Bauer paraphrased ImmanuelKant by stating: He believed that when people avoidcandor in order to curry favor with other people, theyactually destroy trust, and in that way, they ultimatelyerode society.60 How can the Army reinforce ArmyValues built on a bedrock of trust if candor is absent?General Cone, the TRADOC Commander, reinforcesthe point best by reviewing information in his Leader-ship Studies Findings: current counselings reect thateveryone is wonderful, 80 percent of junior ofcersbelieve they are in the top 50 percent (an obvious lackof self-candor) and junior NCOs believe that the mostsenior generals dont have our backs.61 The manifestpoints in one directioncandor is missing and must

be revalued.Candor must be more than a sideline subset of

character that enters peripheral conversation. The end


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result of the holistic campaign should yield a CandorCulture for Soldiersa belief that a Professional Sol-

dier instinctively speaks with candorthat is part ofthe Armys professional DNA. It should reside as oneof the Armys underlying assumptions, from CapitolHill to the squad in Afghanistan. Those who do notexpress frankness, do not reect Army Values, and itis every leaders responsibility to reect Army Valuesas a steward of the Army profession.

Third, inculcate candor as a separate part of inter-personal development and communication. It muststart at the most basic level of military leadershiptraining: ofcer accessions programs and the WarriorTraining Course for NCOs. But it cannot stop there.Every educational opportunity thereafter must reem-phasize candor as an underpinning for the character-istics of the Army Profession. Early inculcation is a

start, but the act of putting frankness into action mustbe practiced at all training levels. Examples shouldinclude cadets interacting openly with a future pla-toon sergeant, junior NCOs understanding their time-honored role in counseling with junior soldiers andofcers, and future battalion commanders practicingbeing candid with company and brigade command-ers. Even at the most senior levels, general ofcersshould practice the difcult task of bluntly testifyingin congressional hearings or when in conversationswith civil leaders. Obviously, these practice scenariosare a challenge for Army leaders, but embracing it andpracticing candor will ensure success.

SUMMARY

Resurgence of candor in the Army is paramount.The Army will never serve as an authentic, trusted


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leaders will be estranged from it. Army Strong ismore than a current motto; it embodies how the Army

stands when candor is routine.

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Discussions by author with battalion commanders assignedto the 18th Engineer Brigade, Several provinces, Afghanistan.June 2011-June 2012.

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ENDNOTES

1. Robert Gates, Reections on Leadership, Parameters,Summer 2008, p. 11.

2. Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall, Education of a General1880-1939, New York: Viking, 1963, p. 153.

3. Ibid.

4. Pogue, pp. 31-32.

5. General George C. Marshall, Interview by Forrest C. Pogue,November 15, 1956.

6. James Bolton, The Candor Imperative, Industrial and Com-mercial Training, Vol. 38, No. 7, p. 342.

7. Statement of Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the U.S.Army, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearings

on the Posture of the U.S. Army, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., Wash-ington, DC, February 25, 2003; Statement by Mr. Paul Wolfowitz,Deputy Secretary of Defense, before the House Budget Commit-tee Hearingon Iraq, 108th Cong. 1st sess., Washington, DC, 2003.

8. See Candor, Dictionary.com, available from dictionary.reference.com/.

9. Candor,Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available from www.

merriam-webster.com.

10. Finer levels of gradation may be applicable to organiza-tions with unique structures, however, for most hierarchicalstructures, the four models in this taxonomy are suitable.

11. Sarah Chayes, David and Paula, Foreign Policy, December13, 2012, available from www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/13/david_petraeus_paula_broadwell_affair.

12. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual, (FM) 22-6,Army Leadership: Competent, Condent, and Agile, Washington, DC:U.S. Government Printing Ofce, October 2006, p. B-4. The quali-


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ties of an effective counselor in FM 22-6 include respect for sub-ordinates, self-awareness and cultural awareness, empathy, andcredibility.

13. U.S. Department of the Army,Army Mentorship Handbook,Roslyn, VA: Headquarters Department of the Army Printing Of-ce, January 2005, pp. 12-14.

14. James Bolton, Candor at Work, Ridge Training, p. 3,available from www.ridge.com/downloads/CandorAtWork.pdf.

15. U.S. Department of the Army, Multi-Source Assess-ment and Feedback, MSAF 360, available from msaf.army.mil/LeadOn.aspx.

16. Bob Woodward, The War Within, New York: Simon &Schuster, 2008, pp. 129-138.

17. Ibid., p. 143.

18. Chayes, p. 2.

19. Stanley F. Cherrie, Army MSAF 360 Senior Counselor,telephonic coaching session with author, Forward OperatingBase Sharana, Paktika Province, Afghanistan, April 2012; BarryBerglund, FORSCOMs High-Performance Leader Conference,CCL class discussion March 2006, Center for Creative Leadership,Greensboro, NC.

20. Warren Bennis, Daniel Goleman, and James OToole,Transparency: How Leaders Create a Culture of Candor, Kindle Ed.,San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2008, loc. 152.

21.Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)-1, Washington, DC: U.S.Department of the Army, August 2012, p. 2-2.

22. Gates, p. 9.

23. U.S. Department of the Army, White Paper 1986, Depart-ment of the Army Pamphlet 600-68, The Bedrock of Our Profession,Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Navy PrintingOfce, June 1986, p. 3.


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24. Ibid., p. 3.

25. U.S. Department of the Army Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC), The Profession of Arms, Fort Monroe, VA:Headquarters Department of the Army Printing Ofce, December2010, p. 2-10.

26.ADP-1; U.S. Department of the Army,Army Doctrine Refer-ence Publication (DRAFT), ADRP-1,Washington, DC: Headquar-ters Department of the Army Printing Ofce, September 2012.

27. TRADOC, The Profession of Arms, p. 5.

28.ADP-1, pp. 2-1 2-9.

29. U.S. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (DRAFT),ADRP-1, p. iii.

30. Ibid.

31.ADP-1, pp. 2-2 2-3.

32. Major General (Ret.) Dennis Laich and Lieutenant Colonel(Ret.) Mike Young, The Million-Dollar Muzzle: A Follow-up toYingling, DefensePolicy.org, August 8, 2011, available from www.defensepolicy.org/author/laich-young.

33. Don Snider, Distinguished Visiting Professor in the Stra-tegic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College, telephonicinterview by author, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 13, 2012.

34. Edgar Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, SanFrancisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2004, pp. 28-30.

35. Department of Defense Directive 1200.17,Managing the Re-serve Components as an Operational Force, Washington, DC: U.S.Department of Defense, October 29, 2008.

36. Schein, pp. 30-36.


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58. Welch, loc. 494-510.

59. John Mark Mattox, Values Statements and the Professionof Arms: A Reevaluation,Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 68, 1st Quar-ter 2013, p. 59.

60. Welch, loc. 436-444.

61. General Robert Cone, Leader Development, Brieng to theHeadquarters Department of the Army Senior Leaders, The Pen-tagon, Washington, DC, March 4, 2013.

62.ADP-1, p. 2-2.

63. Bennis, Goleman, and OToole, loc. 1204.


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