CITIZENS AND SOCIAL PROTECTIONMain results from a Eurobarometer survey

November 1993

by Maurizio FerreraUniversity of Pavia, Italy

The Eurobarometer survey on which this report isbased was conducted, in Spring 1992, by I N R A (Europe).

The views, assessment and commentaries contained inthis report are those of an independent expert and do not

necessarily represent those of the Commission of theEuropean Communi t ies . Interested readers may note that,

in addit ion to th i s detailed analysis, a more summaryoverview of the survey results and conclusions is also

available. This may be obtained by direct application tothe Commission service responsible :

Division V/E/2CORTENBERG 80 2/66

rue de la Loi 200B-1049 Brussels

BelgiumFAX : 00.32(2)299.05.09

INTRODUCTION

espite the enormous successes of its century-long expe-

rience, the welfare state has entered the 1990s with a

s igni f icant number of serious problems, which seem to put many of its principles and practices into question. To a lar-

ge extent , these problems are of a functional nature, i.e. they arise from the pressure of "new" needs and challenges on

•'old" solutions. European societies are in the middle of a profound socio-economic transformation, affecting the i r occu-

pational, demographic and family structures and requiring a thorough revision of the traditional approaches to social

protection. As with all such institutional changes, this revision encounters many obstacles and is further hindered by

persisting economic crisis and severe fiscal constraints. To some degree, however, the current problems of the welfare

state are also of a socio-political nature, i.e. they are connected to a growing diversification of citizens' preferences on

the social responsibilities of government and to the break (or at least the substantial dilution) of that uncontroversial

consensus which accompanied welfare developments un t i l the mid-1970s. Once almost unanimously supportive of an

ever-expanding public provision of benefits and services, European populations have increasingly mixed feelings about

the subject, addressing their attention also to the final and bureaucratic implications of this type of provision. In many

countr ies tax and welfare issues have assumed great prominence in the political arena during the last ten years (also in

[he wake of various "austerity" experiments), thus causing policy conflicts and occasional social confrontation. If the

1990s must be a decade of functional re-adaptation of social protection to a changed socio-economic environment, this

re-adaptation will have to take into serious consideration not only the "objective" situation, as defined by emerging

problems and available resources, but also the "subjective" context, i.e. the overall mood and the specific orientations

prevailing among the European citizenry.

But what exactly is the state of public at t i tudes towards social protection in the European Community? The sur-

vey evidence accumulated during the 1980s signals - as mentioned - a state of "mixed feelings", both within and bet-

ween countries. The pessimistic prognoses regarding a mounting and generalized "tax-welfare backlash" (i.e. strong

discontent about the tax burden and thus a demand for lower social spending) have proved basically wrong (I): no

country for which attitudinal data are available has witnessed the explicit emergence of anti-welfare majorities which

favour expenditure cuts or an outright dismantling of the existing programs. Yet, compared with the "golden 1960s",

when consensus on public welfare provision reached its zenith, the picture of the 1980s is certainly more "mixed" in

character. People are still interested in social protection, but increasingly complain about its cost in terms of taxes and

contributions; their support tends to be more selective and to distinguish between, on the one side central and virtually

universal programs such as pensions and health (still highly supported) and, on the other, more peripheral and often

residual programmes such as unemployment benefits or social assistance (which are less firmly supported); the prin-

ciples of equity and solidarity are not fundamentally challenged, yet growing numbers blame the excessive red tape and

the lack of efficiency of public provision and express themselves in favour of more choice(2). Signals are mixed also

concerning the trends observed in different countries during the 1980s: the British public seems for instance to have

gradually increased its support for social programmes, while the Italians have tended to restrain their expansionist in-

clinations (Ferrera, 1986). All these signals are obviously interesting and important: the relatively limited and scatte-

red evidence of the 1980s prevents however not only the elaboration of a focussed picture of the overall EC situation

but also reliable cross-country comparisons.

A unique opportunity to draw such a picture and systematically compare the attitudinal profiles of the twelve

member states is now offered by a comprehensive Eurobarometer survey promoted by the Commission in Spring 1992

The survey has asked a wide range of questions aimed at tapping both general orientations on social protection (its

principles, its size, its problems and perspectives) and specific preferences for single programmes (health, minimum

protection, family and unemployment benefits, pensions). The next chapters of this report will be devoted to a summa-

ry presentation of the findings of this Eurobarometer. The presence of mixed feelings both within and between coun-

tries is confirmed also by this survey. Yet the bottom line is quite unmistakable: social protection is still highly valued

by a large majority of Europe's citizens. Their support is certainly more nuanced and qualified than in the past, espe-

cially in some countries and within certain population sub-segments; citizen's views on specific programs are rather di-

verse and occasionally contrasting. Accordingly, institutional re-adaptation (and inter-country convergence) will be a/

very delicate process, and certainly not immune from socio-political controversies and strains. But citizens' attachment

to the fundamental tenets of the European welfare tradition does not appear to be in doubt: thus indicating that the ne-

cessary adaptive reforms may be able to rest on a precious layer of normative continuity.

SOCIAL PROTECTION AT LARGE2

2 a What model of social protection ?

The survey opened by presenting a number ofstatements a imed at encouraging respondents to reveal theirfeelings about t h e social protection funct ion and to expresstheir v iews on those aspects most f requent ly the object ofpublic debates

As table. I shows the near t o t a l i t y of EC citizens(92% 67% strongly ) subscribes to the idea that socialsecurity is a major achievement of modern society' and thatit is the gove rnmen t s responsibility to combat socialdeprivation No other question in the survey has elicitedsuch a marked degree of consensus and such positiveuniformity across the twelve countries Both indications areof the utmost re levance they testify to the fact that thewelfare state is deeply rooted in the pol i t ical culture of allmember stales and can thus be considered as a highlylegitimate centrepiece of the common European institutionalfabric

Despite- th i s consensus divergence of opinion isapparent w hen questions as to the scope and content ofsocial prom-lion are raised Above this floor of basicconsensus w h a t we have termed as mixed feelings' start toappear In t une w i t h current political debates the survey hasproposed t w o contrasting options a minimalist one,suggesting the prospect of only limited basic socialguarantees -and increased individual i n i t a t i v e and a'maximal i s t one calling for the maintenance of a broadrange of social guarantees even at the cost of increased taxesand c o n t r i b u t i o n s

The respondents choices arc re ported in table 2 Asmay be seen w i t h i n the EC as a whole the second option ismore w i d e l y supported than the first The maximalistsvictor) is clear and significant (65% vs 41% ), indicatingthat the we l f a re status quo enjoys high public appreciationand that people may even be willing to undertake further taxefforts to maintain it By way of contrast however, it must benoted thai four Europeans out of ten do favour a departurein a minimalist direction and express a preference for a"lighter social protection, this is a signal which cannot beignored

The two options were not presented in the form of aneither/or alternative, but as two separate statements anumber of puzzled respondents have thus agreed with both,causing some blurs and overlaps in the overall picture(especially for some countries of Spain and Portugal) In

order to neutralize such effects, the figures in brackets reportthe percentages of those respondents who have "agreedstrongly" (as opposed to "slightly) ) with either statementthese respondents are in fact less likely to have expresseddouble agreements As is seen, the maximalist option canrely on a higher number of strong supporters Notsurprisingly, the choice between the two options is visiblyassociated with political orientations, but the occupationalstatus seems also relevant (3) Welfare minimalism appearsto be particularly rooted among right wing o«lf cr"p;c/£-:socio-economic category which has long been identified asthe most natural constituency for a tax-welfare backlash(Peters, 1991)

Country breakdowns reveal rather marked variationsLooking at the overall balance between the two options(right column of table 2) we can observe that maximalistorientations heavily prevail in Germany (especially in theEastern Lander). Greece, Luxemburg, Portugal and the UKTheir margin of advantage thins out (if compared withminimalist orientations) in Spain, France, Ireland andespecially in Belgium and Italy Finally (and interestingly) inDenmark and the Netherlands the balance betweenmaximalists and minimalists is very tight in these twocountries the "light" option is endorsed by majorities almostas large as those favouring the traditional "heavy" option,with a high proportion of support in the "light" camp Itmust be noted that Denmark and the Netherlands havehighly developed social protection systems their socialexpenditure levels are the highest in the Community Theemergence of diffuse minimalist inclinations among theircitizens are thus likely to signal a sort of "post-maturity"syndrome at high levels of development, the welfare statemay be perceived as producing diminishing marginal returns(as suggested by Inglehart, 1990), thus encouraging ademand for trims and flexibility This explanation holds acontrario in countries such as Portugal, Greece or(increasingly so) the UK, which in fact display widespreadmaximalist orientations

2.b The cost and complexity of social protection

"Cost" and "complexity" are two frequent indictmentsof social protection in public debates Two differentstatements encouraged respondents to reveal their views in ..this regard As table 3 shows, the costs of social securitypreoccupy somewhat more than a third of the total ECsample (36%), who would even like to see benefits and thuscontributions lowered As in the case of minimalist

note that the measure of perceived complexity is the same inNorth European Britain and Ireland and in South EuropeanItaly and Portugal Table 4 indicates that juridical andadministrative simplification must become a top priority forthe welfare systems of all member states only theintroduction of more user-friendly procedures can improvethis picture of public alienation

2.c Enough social protection?

When asked if their country provides sufficientprotection against a standard catalogue of social needs, - ECcitizens manifest, on average, a high degree of dissatisfaction,presumably considering that a lot more could be done

Turning from general to program-specific statementthe public seems to display much higher propensity for"maximalism" (a common finding in survey research onthese topics) As shown in table 5, dissatisfaction isparticularly acute in the case of poverty (77%) not onlybecause specific anti-poverty programs are less developedthan the classical social insurance schemes, but also becausethe very mention of poverty probably itself evokes the idea oflacking (social and public) support. Dissatisfaction declineswhen old age, sickness and disability, work-related illnessesor accidents are considered and is lowest (though stillwidespread 53%) for unemployment The level ofdissatisfaction tends to be slightly higher among women -- as one would expect - among the unemployed, low incomesand respondents with leftist political orientations

Aggregate percentages and breakdowns hide howeverextensive national variations The country figures reported intable 5 reveal a clear North-South cleavage In Greece,Portugal, Spam and Italy dissatisfaction is really massive.overwhelming majorities of respondents consider thecategories mentioned in the question as insufficientlyprotected Although worried by the costliness of socialprotection (table 3), Southern Europeans demonstrate herethat they are fully aware of the gaps still existing in theircountries' welfare nets. Moving northwards the pictureimproves significantly, displaying much higher degrees ofsatisfaction Particularly noteworthy is the case of theNetherlands, where dissatisfied respondents tend to be aminority for all the mentioned risks: the degree of Dutchdissatisfaction is the lowest in the Community (especially asregards unemployment and poverty). Respondents fromDenmark and Luxemburg also manifest low levels ofdissatisfaction. Within the Northern cluster, only the UK and

do a lesser extent) Ireland display relatively higher negativevalues, close 10 the EC average

To a large extent, this North-South divide isobjectively" rooted, i e n mirrors actual differences in the

social protection efforts (spending levels and institutionalformulas) of the various countries. As already noted theNetherlands and Denmark possess the most highlydeveloped systems, while Greece and Portugal findthemselves at the lower extreme of welfare maturation thisgap is perceived by and reflected, in public opinion The UKand Ireland, in turn, have never been big spenders comparedwith the other Northern countries and have witnessed arelative decline in expenditure levels during the last decade.

This objective explanation of country variationscannot be pushed too far, however: national debates, politicalagendas and specific national experiences or culturalinclinations also play an important role in shaping popularaltitudes vis-a-vis social protection. How else can one explainthe enormous dissatisfaction of the Italians, who complain asmuch as the Greek and Portuguese while objectivelyenjoying more generous welfare benefits (especially for oldage)7 Similarly, how 10 explain the satisfaction differentialbetween the Dutch and the Belgians regarding the poor,considering that in Belgium poverty is as circumscribed as inthe Netherlands7 It is evident that only a detailed analysis ofcountry-specific and "soft" factors can fully illuminate themeaning of these seemingly contradictory signals

2.d Who should be protected and by what level ofgovernment ?

Social citizenship has always been closely linked withnationality. The increased migration flows both within theCommunity and from third countries into the Communityare, however, causing some strains in this traditional linkShould immigrants be granted welfare protection7 If so,which immigrants7

The survey has offered respondents three differentoptions regarding this issue: the concession of socialentitlements to all (legally resident) foreigners, regardless oftheir country of origin; a concession limited to other ECnationals; and no concession at all to any foreigner.

Table 6 shows thai the first option receives the widestsupport both at the aggregate level and within each memberstate. The prospect of many national "social fortresses" or of

HEALTH CARE

3 a Health services their scope, cost and performance

Health care is one of the major components of socialprotection The extension of its coverage to virtual!) t h ewhole population and the constant improvement of itsservices are positive achievements of the European welfarestate the subsequent impact on individual life chances hasbeen remarkable Yet health care is currently afflicted byserious problems Population ageing" is exerting increasingpressures on its performance in a context of limited financialresources Its distributional equity and organizationalefficiency are increasingly questioned, as is its effectivenessin responding to actual (and ever-changing) health needsThe imperatives of cost-containment are encouraginggovernments to experiment with various demand regulatingmeasures yet some of these may have undesirable side-effects What are the views of Europe's citizens on these (andother) controversial issues, which impinge so highly onordinary life7 The Eurobarometer survey has included a widerange of questions on health care, aimed at tapping bothattitudes and actual behaviours It is thus possible to providea rather articulate picture of the Community's moods andpractices in this important field

First of all the survey reveals high and persistingconfidence in medical progress in general 75% of therespondents (with negligible country variations) believethat "medical standards will continue to improve and enableeveryone to enjoy better health" This confidence in mea i.progress is however coupled with the awareness of theimportance of individual behavioural patterns (andpresumably prevention) 77% agree that "it is the individual'sresponsibility to lake care of his/her health and try to avoidhealth problems"

Secondly, the survey reveals that the majority ofcitizens still have high expectations about continuing publicinvolvement in health care As table 9 shows, health"minimalism" is clearly a minority view among theCommunity public a good 2/3 of respondents disagrees withthe idea that "the government should provide everyone withonly essential services such as care for serious diseases andencourage people to provide for themselves in otherrespects". The proportion of health minimalists issignificantly lower than that of general minimalists reportedabove in table 2 (41%) evidently health care is considered asa cornerstone of social protection and even those who havecontractionist orientations prefer to think twice beforedispensing with it The legitimacy of public health systemsappears as firm and robust among all population sub-

Italians, Spaniards and Portuguese show huge levels ofdissatisfaction not only concerning the q u a l i t y of care butalso efficiency and organization. The pic ture is exactly theopposite in the Northern countries, where 90% levels ofsatisfaction are not infrequent. We have already mentionedthat Southern Europeans manifest a tendency to complainmore about their public institutions than their Northerncounterparts: this is a traditional trail of their political culture. It is also true that their hea l th services are morerecent and less endowed than in the rest of Europe and t h u s presumably not as experienced in certain aspects of

performance. At least in part, however, [he dissatisfaction ofSouthern respondents has to do - we believe - with theseobjective difficulties of "Latin rim" welfare states to adopt amore user-friendly approach, based on effective procedures,simple rules, easy access and amicable staff. The reform ofpublic administration is a constant issue in the agenda ofSouthern governments (particularly as regards welfarebureaucracies): the findings of this survey confirm that sucha reform would certainly meet a high level of publicapproval.

3.b Medical consultation and medicine consumption

Europe's citizens differ not only in their healthattitudes, but also in their actual medical behaviour, e.gthe frequency with which they see their doctors or consunmedicines. As previous and well documented reserach hasshown, these behaviours tend to be generally associated withcertain biological and socio-economic factors (such as sex,age or occupation), but are also influenced by popular healthcultures and mentalities (medical cognitions, beliefs etc.) andprofessional therapeutic styles which are largely countryspecific (6).

For example, let us consider the matter of doctorconsultations. A survey question asked how many timesrespondents had talked to their practitioner during the last30 days. As expected (cf. table 14) , consultation rates arehigher for women and for the elderly. The greatest variationis however to be observed across countries, thus confirmingthe relevance of cultural and style factors. French andItalians appear as much more "consultation-prone"(especially among the elderly in France and among womenin Italy) than the EC average, while the Danes, Irish, Spanishand Dutch appear much less prone (especially among theiryounger populations and the self-employed). The Frenchand the Italians seem 10 be aware of this high propensity to

Table 16 enumerates subjective evaluations regardingdirect user charges for a number of T V pical services ataggregate EC level The question did not specificallyencourage respondents to answer uniquely in respect ofpublic services some may therefore have responded withreference to access on a private basis (e g for a visit to thedentist) The majority is however most likely to have indeedanswered on the basis of reference to the public healthsystem As a whole, direct costs are not perceived asparticularly high by EC citizens the average scores remainbasically within or around the bearability threshold (1 50in a 0-3 scale) This is especially true for GP consultations,hospital stays and (to a lesser extent) laboratory and clinicaltests The incidence of charges is felt to a higher degree inthe case of medicines and for denial consultations At theaggregate EC level substantial percentages of respondentsstate that what they have to pay directly' for these twoservices is much more than they can afford" 20% in thecase of medicines and 24% in the case of dental carePharmaceuticals have in fact been very often the target of co-pay mem (or ' prescription charge ) policies in the lastdecade while many EC health systems have establishedlimitations to unessential denial care Senior citizens andpeople with very low incomes have a lower perception ofdirect cost probably reflecting exemption regulations Costsare perceived to the highest degree by people just above the

very low income threshold and who are thus less likely tobenefit from exemptions On average, costs are moreperceived by the self-employed than by the employedpopulation

Close analysis of the country by country figuresreveals the usual wide variation once more confirming theNorth South divide In general North Europeans considertheir direct charges as much more bearable than SouthernEuropeans This is probably connected both with the higheraverage incomes of the North and with the morecomprehensive coverage (often, as in Britain or Denmark,with only modest co-payments if any) of their public healthsystems It must be noted that national "deviations" from theEC average scores do not necessarily reflect parallel"deviations" of their institutional regulations concerning co-payment For example, in the UK and Italy (two countrieswith comparable levels of prosperity) both GP consultationsand hospital stays were completely free of charge at the timeof the survey yet the perception of costs in the two countrieslooks very different (especially as regards hospitals) Besidesobjective causes (the actual amount of charges), culturalfactors, country specific "historical" comparisons mustcertainly play a role in shaping cost perceptions

MINIMUM PROTECTION

Increased and persisting unemployment, cost-coniainment policies, new waves of migration, urbandegradation, the crisis of the traditional family are some ofthe factors responsible for the growing dangers ofmarginalisation and sheer poverty within Europe. In recentyears the Community has promoted a number .of actions onthis front, including the approval of two recommendations,one on common criteria concerning sufficient resources andsocial assistance in social protection systems, the other onthe convergence of social protection objectives including til;;principle of guaranteeing a level of resources in keeping withhuman dignity(8). The Social Accord of the Maastricht Treatyhas in its turn included the combat against social exclusionas one of the objectives of EC action. This combat hasbecome an important component of the political agenda inmany countries.

As was seen above (table 5) EC citizens are definitelyworried about the persistence of poverty in their countriesand about the inadequacy of protection against it. Table 18shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents thinksthat lack of income should entitle the individual to a specificright to claim assistance from the government: 91% are inagreement with this .idea, with only slight country variations.As already signalled by table 1, the attachment to the basicobjective of social citizenship (governmental assistance incase of need) is firmly rooted in Europe's political culture,representing one of its constituent and distinct elements (a:..finding explicit acknowledgement in many Europeanconstitutions).

Despite these widespread positive feelings in favour ofbasic protection and despite the presence of specific publicprograms, we know from empirical research that the uptakeof minimum benefits in Europe -is far from complete: manyof those who are entitled to claim assistance for lack ofresources do not actually claim it (Room et al., 1992).Insufficient information and fear of stigma are frequentlymentioned as possible causes of the problem of "take-up".This interpretation is widely supported by public opinion. Astable 19 indicates, 64% of respondents agree with thestatement "some poor people remain so because they simplydon't know about the existence of support for them", thusconfirming the picture of a distant and opaque welfareapparatus already revealed by table 4. Lack of information isconsidered less of a problem in Greece, Italy and Portugal67% of respondents further agree that social stigma acts ("tobe seen as poor") as a clear disincentive to seekingassistance. Retired people and persons with low incomes (i.e.

two categories frequently most in need) present slightlyhigher perceniages (72% and 70% respectively). Stigma is

'cited by lusher proportions in Belgium. Germany, Franceand. especially, in Ireland and Br i ta in - wo countries whichmake extens ive use of means-tested programs and whichhave made "targeting" a lop priori ty in their social policyagendas in recent years. Social stigma is seen less as apo ten t i a l harrier to access in Denmark (which has a highlyuniversal welfare system) and especially in Southern Europe.The absence of a poor law tradit ion and the existence ofweak and inadequate, yet Flexible and "soft", programs ofm i n i m u m protection, may explain this relatively lowerincidence of stigma.

FAMILY POLICY;

Declining fer t i l i ty rates, the increase of divorce andseparation, of lone parent households and, more broadly, thegrowing difficulties in reconciling "work" and "family"spheres have prompted in recent years a renewed interest infamily policy within the EC (Dumon et al. 1991). Some ofthe survey questions were thus aimed at assessing publicattitudes on this delicate and important component of socialprotection. -

Two questions concerned maternity indemnities - atype of benefit which has recently been a target forCommunity action with the approval of the Council direct '<;on the protection of pregnant women at work (9). Is theduration of these indemnities considered as adequate bycitizens of the various Member States? As shown by table 20,the absolute majority (or a very large plurality) ofrespondents in each Member State considers this duration as"about right". In many countries, however, about onequarter or more of the respondents would favour benefits oflonger duration: cf. the case of Belgium, Denmark, Greece,Spain, France, Luxemburg, Portugal and the UK. It must benoted, however, that only in Portugal is the actual durationof maternity benefits substantially lower than the EC mode(last column of table 20): in the other countries the currentduration approximates (or surpasses) 16 weeks. The demandfor benefits to be more generous in terms of time does notseem to be significantly related with "objective" indicators.Furthermore, the UK is the only country with no statutoryrights in this respect. As expected, the reaction to thisquestion differs significantly between men and women. Thelower half of table 19 indicates that the proportion of womenconsidering maternity indemnities as "too short" is muchhigher than the proportion of men, especially amongyounger cohorts and among workers in dependentemployment.

A second question asked what proportion of previouswages should be granted to workers on maternity leave.Various options were proposed: 1) 50% (of the previouswage or salary); 2) 75%; 3) the full wage or salary. Responsedistribution illustrates the existence of three groups (table21). A first group comprises Spain, Portugal and Greece,where overwhelming majorities express themselves (withtypical Southern "maximalism") in favour of the full wageoption. A second group comprises Belgium, Denmark,France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands: in these countriesthe absolute majority is also in favour of the full wageoption, but there is also a significant share of respondents infavour of the 75% alternative. Finally in Ireland, Italy and '

•a

in Greece and Portugal, but also in Belgium, Spain, France,Italy and Luxemburg. Lower (but still majority) values areregistered in Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK- probably the four countries in which more has already beendone in favour of this target group.

The second question concerned the possibility ofincluding career interruptions due to family reasons (such aschild rearing, or the care of a handicapped or elderly familymember) in the computation of periods required » • > qualifyfor pension entitlements. This is certainly a serious andgrowing problem in most social security systems: the role of"caring" functions within the family is increasingly valued insocio-cultural (and moral) terms, but such functions (stillprimarily carried out by women) tend to be heavily penalizedin institutional terms, e.g. particularly in terms of securingfull pension entitlements (11). Table 24 shows that largemajorities support the introduction of appropriate correctivemeasures, thus lending popular support to the invitation inthis direction addressed to the member countries by theconvergence recommendation (12).

UNEMPLOYMENT

Individual "good will" is certainly not enough tolighten the burden of structural unemployment; but publiccash compensation alone docs not provide an absoluteremedy either. Thus a debate is currently proceeding withinthe Community on how best 10 design policies for labourmarket insertion or re-insertion (13). Training schemes arcoften seen as a very promising instrument to this effect. Thisview is supported by the majority of European publicopinion: 87%-of survey respondents agree that "theunemployed should accept additional training if they cannotfind another job" (table 27). The consensus is quiteoverwhelming in countries such as Denmark, the Easternpart of Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands; it is somewhat ....lower than the EC average in Italy, but still very high (76%).

Another unemployment issue relates to mobility.Should beneficiaries of unemployment benefits be required to accept jobs which do not match their qualifications andexperience? And what about employment possibilitieslocated at a distance from the beneficiary's residence? As table 28 shows, people have rather mixed feelings about thefirst suggestion. At EC12 level, 51% agree that anunemployed person should indeed be allowed to turn downan unsuitable job while receiving payments: and thispercentage is higher among people aged 15-24 (55%), 25-44(57%), among the better educated (58%) and those earninghigher incomes (55%), besides of course among theunemployed themselves (63%). Country by country analysisreveals, however, a somewhat more sophisticated picture. Onthe one hand, the French, Italians, Luxemburgers and Dutch'are more inclined to think that recipients of unemploymentbenefits should indeed be required to accept an offer even ifthis is not particularly suitable. The Danish and Spanish areequally divided between the two options. On the other hand,the Belgians, Germans, Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Britishtend to support the view that unemployment benefitrecipients should be allowed to be turned down unsuitablejob offers.

Regarding the distance question, the response is moreclearly in favour of flexibility; this response is also morehomogeneous across countries. Almost two thirds ofrespondents tend to agree that the unemployed should notbe allowed to turn down a job if it is located within anacceptable distance of the place where they live. The youngand the unemployed themselves are less enthusiastic but thesuggestion still meets with their majority support. Largestsupport is to be found in Denmark and in the Netherlands.

PENSIONS

Owing to the twin pressures posed by ageingpopulations and maturing of systems, the pension systems ofthe EC are confronted with increasing financial strains Tocope with these strains (and in anticipation of even worseprospects) some countries have, in recent years, introducedrestrictive measures in their pension formulas An intensedebate is being conducted in all Community) countries onhow to withstand the effects of the retirement 'boom' due tostrike in the second decade of the next century This is whenthe large cohorts born in the 1950s and early 1960s willreach pensionable age

In the light of such problems, some commentatorshave even expressed fears that the "intergenerational socialcontract" on which pension schemes are based may begun' 'founder, due to the increased tax and contribution burden.":,which are bound to be imposed on active generations (for adiscussion, cf Guillemard, 1993) In the light of surveyevidence, such fears may well be exaggerated, the willingnessof active (younger) workers to continue contributionpayments and honour the "contract" still pertains (Walker,1992) The debate constitutes evidence, however, of anoverall climate of preoccupation and uncertainty about thefuture of retirement protection

Although they have all witnessed rapid growth in thelast three decades, the Member States' pension systems differsignificantly in their institutional features, in the degree towhich they are actually exposed to demographic andfinancial strains and in their effectiveness The issue ofeffectiveness and adequacy has been somewhatovershadowed in recent years by financial preoccupations,but remain nevertheless crucial Despite the large amount ofresources spent on pension payments, the world ofretirement largely remains a world of "two nations", withsignificant numbers of elderly still inadequately protected,especially (but not exclusively) in Southern Europe (Walker,Alber, Guillemard, 1993) This dualism may well benegatively reinforced as a result of current trends

How do EC citizens view future prospects for theirpension systems7 Are they aware of the critical nature of thepensions debate and what are their expectations in thisrespect7 How adequate do they consider the pensions theyget or will (probably) get? The Eurobarometer surveyprovides some answers to these questions

The reform of Autumn 1992 introduced both these latterchanges in addition to the elevation in pensionable age. Withsuch contrary expectations among the public, it is notsurprising that this reform was met by substantial populardiscontent.

Another possible consequence of ageing on pensionsmay be the development of private schemes, in many casesemployer-sponsored to supplement state arrangements. Asshown by table 30, a small majority of respondents (51%!.)expect this to occur, especially (and predictably) among thehigher echelons of employees and those earning higherincomes. Such expectations are significantly higher inDenmark, France, the Netherlands and the UK all of whichhave already experimented with two- or three-tier pensionsystems, thus leaving substantial room for manoeuvre to non-public arrangements.

'!•'-A final statement on the consequences of ageing has

been of a "continuist" character, suggesting, in fact, that thewelfare stale will continue to grow in future and that "retiredpeople will be better taken care of then than they are now".On EC12 average, this statement is supported by a minorityof 32% of the people. Only in Spain , Portugal and the UK is.the statement supported by majorities. In the other countriespercentages are around or below the EC average, withnegative peaks of pessimism in Denmark, France, theWestern part of Germany (almost double than the Easternpart) and the Netherlands. As Alan Walker has stated:"perhaps the general public in those countries with some ofthe highest pension levels in the EC were saying that they donot think that it will last, alternatively we could interprettheir responses as meaning they do not think it possible toimprove on the present superior position" (Walker, 1992, p.23).

7.b The adequacy of benefits

How adequate do pensioners consider the benefitsthat they are currently receiving? How are they assessed interms of contributions paid and what are the expectations ofthose who will retire in the future? The survey asked twoquestions about benefit adequacy to pensioners on the onehand and to the non-retired on the other.

The answers of pensioners are reported separately intables 31 and 32. Three groups of countries can be observed.A first group comprises Denmark, Germany (including thistime the former GDR), Luxemburg, the Netherlands and (to •

7 c Gender equality and derived entitlements

Equality of treatment between men and women in thesocial protection sphere has been much emphasised in recentnational and Community debates and has been explicitlymentioned as an objective to be attained by the MemberSlates in the Recommendation on convergence (cf note 8)The survey asked respondents to express their v i e u w s ongender equality with respect to three aspects of pensioninsurance the age of retirement, contribution rates andbenefit amounts As table 33 indicates, equality incontributions and in benefit formulas is overwhelminglysupported by both genders and in all countries, with onlyminor cross-country variations As far as the age ofretirement is concerned, feelings are slightly more mixedThe consensus for equality is very high, both at aggreay;."level (80%) and within each single country In some Mem;States, however, a significant proportion of respondents(most probably women) disagrees with the idea of fullequality with respect to the age of retirement This happensin Greece, Portugal and Italy (where pensionable age stilldiffers between the two sexes and where there are proposalsfor equalization), in Germany (where equalization has beenphased in during 1992) and in France and Belgium ( wherethe age of retirement is now equalized, but with longtraditions of differentiation) It is interesting to note that theUK, where men retire at 65 and women at 60, 90% ofrespondents agree with the prospect of equalization

Another issue explored by the survey has been thai ofderived as opposed to individual entitlements The notion ofderived entitlement (i e those rights linked to thecontributory and employment status of another familymember -normally the husband or father) has beenincreasingly criticized in recent academic and politicaldebates on social protection, it is felt in fact that this type ofentitlement runs high risks of malfunctioning given theincreased instability of the traditional family (as witnessed bygrowing divorce and separation rates) and the emergence ofnew patterns of social relations (cohabitation, births outsidewedlock etc ) (13) The policy suggestion most frequentlyemerging from such debates is a shift from derived toindividualized entitlements, i e rights which areunequivocably and irrevocably earned by the individualperson, regardless of the position of her/his family membersThe recent Recommendation on the convergence of socialprotection systems (cf. note 8) has accepted this suggestion,inviting the member states to promote the "individualizationof rights and contributions, in order to gradually substituteindividual rights for derived rights, thus achieving better

work and pension incomes is possible As seen in table 35 ,substantial majorities in all countries (except France andItaly) express a preference for this possibility (which actuallyexists in many member states cf MISSOC, 1992) Given theclimate of increasing austerity and the restrictive inclinationof most EC governments, this is however a preference highlylikely - we believe - to be disappointed in the future

THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL PROTECTION : CONTRACTION OR CONTINUATION ?8

CONCLUSIONS9.