Cases LTD and Crimpro

7/31/2019 Cases LTD and Crimpro

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LAND, TITLES AND DEEDS

HEIRS OF MANUEL A. ROXAS and TRINIDAD DE LEON VDA. DE ROXAS (insubstitution of original petitioner)

vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MAGUESUN MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATIONG.R. No. 118436March 21, 1997

ROMERO, J.:Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas, substituted by her heirs, 1 instituted this petition forreview of the Court of Appeals decision dated December 8, 1994 in "Trinidad de LeonVda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management and Development Corporation," (CA G.R. CVNo. 38328), alleging reversible error committed by respondent appellate court whenit affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite. The issue presentedbefore us is whether or not private respondent Maguesun Corporation committedactual fraud in obtaining a decree of registration over two unregistered parcels ofland in Tagaytay City, actual fraud being the only ground to reopen or review adecree of registration.

The facts of the case are narrated below:On July 2, 1990, herein private respondent Maguesun Management and DevelopmentCorporation (Maguesun Corporation) filed an Application for Registration of twoparcels of unregistered land located in Barangay Sungay, Tagaytay City (Lot Nos.7231 and 7239, Cad-355, Tagaytay Cadastre) with an area of 3,641 and 10,674square meters respectively. The original registration case was docketed as Case No.

TG-373 before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18, presided over by JudgeJulieto Tabiolo. In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporationpresented a Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 10, 1990, executed by Zenaida Mellizaas vendor and indicating the purchase price to be P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza inturn, bought the property from the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. deRoxas for P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Saledated March 26, 1990 and an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated March 24, 1990.Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration Authority (theNational Land Titles and Deeds Registration Authority or NALTDRA) to Hilario Luna,

Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of Maguesun Corporation's application forregistration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoiningowner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings.Publication was made in the Official Gazette and the Record Newsweekly. 2 After anOrder of general default was issued, the trial court proceeded to hear the landregistration case. On October 4, 1990, the Land Registration Authority reported,among other things, that the subject parcels of land had previously been applied forregistration in Land Registration Case No. 500, GLRO Record No. 55072 at the Court

of First Instance of Cavite by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon but no decisionhas been rendered thereon. 3 Eventually, on February 13, 1991 the Regional TrialCourt granted Maguesun Corporation's application for registration (Land RegistrationCase No. TG-373) in a three-page decision with the following dispositive portion: 4WHEREFORE, this Court gives imprimatur to the application for registration of saidlands described in plan As-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, one with an area of3,641 and the other with an area of 10,674 square meters, as supported and shownby the corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the records, in thename of Maguesun Management and Development Corporation, with office address at

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521 Edsa, Quezon City, free from all liens and encumbrances and from any otheradverse claims of any kind and nature.Upon finality of this Decision, the same ipso facto becomes executory, upon whicheventuality the corresponding decree of registration may thus be issued.SO ORDERED.Consequently, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order for Issuance of the Decree onMarch 14, 1991, after the afore-mentioned Decision in LRC No. TG-373 became final 5but not before it ordered, on February 14, 1991, Land Registration Case No. 500(GLRO Record No. 55072) applied for by Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon,dismissed.It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the landthat petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the registrationof the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name.Hence, on April 21, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for review before the Regional

Trial Court, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-1183 to set aside the decree of registrationon the ground that Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged thatthe lots were among the properties she inherited from her husband, former PresidentManuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that her family had been in open,continuous, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in theconcept of owner for more than thirty years before they applied for its registrationunder the Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she sold thelots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before and that her signature wasforged in both the Deed of Sale and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. In support of herclaims, she also listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actualfraud. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, she claimed that MaguesunCorporation intentionally omitted her name as an adverse claimant, occupant oradjoining owner in the application for registration submitted to the Land RegistrationAuthority such that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As aresult, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun Corporation's applicationfor registration was granted. She charged Maguesun Corporation's with knowledge orauthorship of the fraud owing to the fact that the Maguesun Corporation's president,

Manolita Guevarra Sunatay after whom the corporation was named, was her niece.Manolita Suntay is the daughter of Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin ofpetitioner Vda. de Roxas who used to help with the lather's business affairs. ManolitaSuntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the latter' s cars. 6

The sole issue of the case, as laid down by the trial court after the pre-trial, waswhether or not Vda. de Roxas' signatures on the Deed of Absolute Sale and theAffidavit of Self-Adjudication in favor of Zenaida Melliza were forged. 7 Petitioner, whowas then already 92 years of age, testified in open court on February 11, 1992 thatshe has never met Zenaida Melliza, that she did not sell the subject lots and that hersignatures on the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were forged. 8 Adocument examiner from the Philippine National Police (PNP) concluded that therewas no forgery. 9 Upon petitioner's motion, the signatures were re-examined by

another expert from National Bureau of Investigation. The latter testified that thesignatures on the questioned and sample documents were not written by the sameperson. 10 Despite the foregoing testimonies and pronouncements, the trial courtdismissed the petition for review of decree of registration April 15, 1992. 11 Placinggreater weight on the findings and testimony of the PNP document examiner, itconcluded that the questioned documents were not forged and if they were, it wasZenaida Melliza, and not Maguesun Corporation, who was responsible. Accordingly,Maguesun Corporation did not commit actual fraud. The court further noted thatpetitioner Mrs. Trinidad Roxas had not been paying taxes for several years, which fact

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"exhibited what appeared to be unmistakeable signs of not actually owning (the lots)any more," and that her application for registration was "previously dismissed andabandoned," thus indicating that "petitioner herself is aware that she had already lost. . interest, if not actually her rights, over the property in question. 12In a decision dated December 8, 1994, 13 respondent court denied the petition forreview and affirmed the findings of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held thatpetitioner failed to and demonstrate that there was actual or extrinsic fraud, notmerely constructive or intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annuling a

judgment or reviewing a decree of registration. Additionally, respondent court statedthat the discrepancies or irregularities in the Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Self-Adjudication pointed out by petitioner are not patent or obvious, involve matters thatare too trivial, requiring knowledge of the intricacies of the law and are "notnecessarily and exclusively indicia of extrinsic fraud and/or bad faith especiallywhen considered in the light of circumstances hereinafter discussed." The recordsalso show, according to the appellate court, that Maguesun Corporation had notconcealed from the court either the existence of petitioner or any interest she mayhave had in the registration proceedings. Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled thatpublication of the initial hearing in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer

jurisdiction upon the court. 14Hence, the instant petition for review where it is alleged that the Court of Appealserred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation had not commit actual fraud warrantingthe setting aside of the registration decree and in resolving the appeal on the basis ofMaguesun Corporation's good faith. Petitioners pray that the registration of thesubject lots in the name of Maguesun Corporation be cancelled, that said property beadjudicated in favor of petitioners and that respondent corporation pay moraldamages not less than P100,000.00, exemplary damages not less than P36,000.00and attorney's fees of P60,000.00.We find the petition for review impressed with merit.1. Registration of untitled land under the Torrens System is done pursuant toPresidential Decree No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree which amended andcodified laws relative to registration of property. 15 Adjudication of land in a

registration (or cadastral) case does not become final and incontrovertible until theexpiration of one year after the entry of the final decree. Before such time, thedecision remains under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering thedecree, which court after hearing, may set aside the decision or decree andadjudicate the land to another party. 16 Absence, minority or other disability of anyperson affected, or any proceeding in court for reversing judgments, are notconsidered grounds to reopen or revise said decree. However, the right of a persondeprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation oftitle obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law (Section 32 of Presidential DecreeNo. 1529) as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree ofregistration. 17 It is further required that a petition for reopening and review of thedecree of registration be filed within one year from the date of entry of said decree,

that the petitioner has a real and dominical right and the property has not yet beentransferred to an innocent purchaser.18Fraud is of two kinds: actual or constructive. Actual or positive fraud proceeds from anintentional deception practiced by means of the misrepresentation or concealment ofa material fact. 19 Constructive fraud is construed as a fraud because of itsdetrimental effect upon public interests and public or private confidence, even thoughthe act is not done or committed with an actual design to commit positive fraud orinjury upon other persons. 20

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Fraud may also be either extrinsic or intrinsic. Fraud is regarded as intrinsic where thefraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action, or where the actsconstituting the fraud were or could have been litigated therein, and is regarded asextrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entirecase to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgmentitself but to the manner in which it is procured, so that there is not a fair submissionof the controversy. 21 Extrinsic fraud is also actual fraud, but collateral to thetransaction sued upon. 22

The distinctions are significant because only actual fraud or extrinsic fraud has beenaccepted as grounds for a judgment to be annulled or, as in this case, a decree ofregistration reopened and reviewed. 23 In the oft-citedMacabingkil v. People'sHomesite Housing Corporation case, the Court drew from American jurisprudencestating that "relief has been granted on the ground that, by some fraud practiceddirectly upon the party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, (and) that partyhas been prevented from presenting all of his case to the court."24 The "fraud"contemplated by the law in this case (Section 32, P.D. No 1529) is actual andextrinsic, which includes an intentional omission of fact required by law. 25 For fraudto justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts uponwhich it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the

judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. 26 Persons who were fraudulentlydeprived of their opportunity to be heard in the original registration case are entitledto a review of a decree of registration.In Ramirez v. CA, 27 this Court adopted the Court of Appeals' ruling that thesuppression of the fact that the applicant spouses possessed the subject ricefieldmerely as antichretic creditors and the fraudulent concealment andmisrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interestin the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported bycompetent proof. Failure and intentional omission of applicants to disclose the facts ofactual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actualfraud. 28Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefitis obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 29

The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation committed actual fraudin obtaining the decree of registration sought to be reviewed by petitioner.Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation intentionally omittedtheir name, or that of the Roxas family, as having a claim to or as an occupant of thesubject property. In the corporation's application for registration filed with the trialcourt in LRC No. TG-373, the following declaration appears:6. That the names in full and addresses, as far as known to the undersigned, of theowners of all adjoining properties; of the persons mentioned in paragraphs 3 and 5(mortgagors, encumbrancers, and occupants) and of the person shown on the plan asclaimants are as follows:Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Provincial Roadall at Tagaytay City (no house No.) 30

The highlighted words are typed in with a different typewriter, with the first fiveletters of the word "provincial" typed over correction fluid. Maguesun Corporation,however, annexed a differently-worded application for the petition to review case(Civil Case No. TG-1183, "Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Managementand Development Corporation, et al."). In the copy submitted to the trial court, theanswer to the same number is as follows:Hilario Luna, Jose Gil, Leon Luna, Roxas. 31

The discrepancy which is unexplained appears intentional. If the word "Roxas" wereindeed erased and replaced with "Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City (no house No.)"

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in the original application submitted in LRC No. TG-373 but the copy with the word"Roxas" was submitted to the trial court in Civil Case No. TG-1183, it is reasonable toassume that the reason is to mislead the court into thinking that "Roxas" was placedin the original application as an adjoining owner, encumbrancer, occupant orclaimant, the same application which formed the basis for the Land RegistrationAuthority in sending out notices of initial hearing. Section 15 of Presidential DecreeNo. 1529 also requires the applicant for registration to state the full names andaddresses of all occupants of the land and those of adjoining owners, if known and ifnot known, the extent of the search made to find them. Respondent corporationlikewise failed to comply with this requirement of law.

The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the propertyuninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez. 32 Respondent MaguesunCorporation also declared in number 5 of the same application that the subject landwas unoccupied when in truth and in fact, the Roxas family caretaker resided in thesubject property. Respondent corporation is likewise charged with the knowledge ofsuch possession and occupancy, for its President, who signed the Deed of Sale overthe property, knew fully well that her grandaunt Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxasowned the property. It is reasonable to expect her as a buyer to have inspected theproperty prior to the sale such that the ascertainment of the current possessors oroccupants could have been made facilely. Respondent corporation's intentionalconcealment and representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots aspossessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying the reopeningand review of the decree of registration. Through such misfeasance, the Roxas familywas kept ignorant of the registration proceedings involving their property, thuseffectively depriving them of their day in court.2. Respondent Court of Appeals held that Maguesun Corporation had not concealedfrom the court either the existence of Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas or any interestshe may have in the registration proceedings for the records are replete withreferences by Maguesun Corporation itself to petitioner. 33 Mention of the latePresident's name as well as that of petitioner was made principally in the Formal Offerof Exhibits for respondent corporation, in a Copy of Plan of Lots 7231 and 7239, tax

declarations and as predecessor-in-interest. However, this is not sufficient compliancewith what the law requires to be stated in the application for registration. Disclosureof petitioner's adverse interest, occupation and possession should be made at theappropriate time, i.e., at the time of the application for registration, otherwise, thepersons concerned will not be sent notices of the initial hearing and will, therefore,miss the opportunity to present their opposition or claims.3. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the Official Gazette and inthe Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of general circulation. The Courtof Appeals held that pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Said provision oflaw expressly states that "the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a noticeof initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper

of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided, however, that the publication in theOfficial Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."While publication of the notice in the Official Gazette is sufficient to confer jurisdictionupon the court, publication in a newspaper of general circulation remains anindispensable procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is acomponent of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide publicity aspossible" so that all persons having an adverse interest in the land subject of theregistration proceedings may be notified thereof. 34Although jurisdiction of the courtis not affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general

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circulation is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to theland.4. The allegations of forgery and the discrepancies in the documentary, as well as inthe testimonial evidence regarding this issue which are all crucial to this case,compelled the Court to undertake a careful review of the facts of the case. 35 A closescrutiny of the evidence on record leads the Court to the irresistible conclusion thatforgery was indeed attendant in the case at bar. Although there is no proof ofrespondent Maguesun Corporation's direct participation in the execution andpreparation of the forged instruments, there are sufficient indicia which proves thatMaguesun Corporation is not the "innocent purchaser for value" who merits theprotection of the law.In response to the questions fielded by the trial court and by counsel for petitioner,PNP Document Examiner Zacarias Semacio sought to explain all the differencespointed out in the questioned signatures and in the sample signatures as having beencaused merely by "natural variation." 36 He concluded that the questioned signatureswere not forged. In contrast, Chief of the Questioned Documents Division of theNational Bureau of Investigation, Arcadio Ramos, testified with more specificity asbefits an expert that the questioned and sample signatures were not written by oneand the same person because of "(t)he manner of execution of strokes; thepersonalized proportional characteristics of letters; the linking/connecting betweenletters; the structural pattern of letters and other minute details . . . 37 Moreover,petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas categorically declared that she has nevermet Zenaida Melliza and did not sell the subject property. 38 Petitioner, then overninety years old, has no motive to attest to a falsehood. Petitioner and her family alsoown several other pieces of property, some of which are leased out as restaurants,e.g. Leo's Restaurant and Ma Mon Luk Restaurant. 39 This is an indication thatpetitioner is not unaware of the value of her properties. Hence, it is unlikely thatindication that she would sell over thirteen thousand square meters of prime propertyin Tagaytay City to a stranger for a measly P200,000.00 Finally, even to a layman'seye, the documents, as well as the enlarged photographic exhibit of the signatures,reveal forgery. The questioned signatures taken from the Deed of Sale and Affidavit

of Self-Adjudication are starkly different from the sample signatures in severaldocuments executed by petitioner. The questioned signatures are smooth androunded and have none of the jagged and shaky character of petitioner's signaturescharacteristic of the penmanship of elderly persons.

There are also added considerations reflective of the dubious character of theAffidavit of Self-Adjudication purportedly executed by petitioner. 40 In it she declaresthat she is a resident of 22 8th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, when she actuallylives in 2 Park Road, North Forbes Park, Makati. She also states that she is the "soleheir of the late Manuel De Roxas who died sometime on the year 1944 at Manila."Petitioner's husband is President Manuel A. Roxas and she refers to herself as

Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas. President Roxas was survived by petitioner and theirtwo children, Ma. Rosario Roxas and Gerardo Roxas (who predeceased petitioner).

The fact that petitioner was not the sole heir was known to the general public, as wellas the demise of the late President on April 15, 1946 while delivering a speech atClark Field, Pampanga. The aforementioned irregularities are too glaring to have beenignored. If petitioner did in fact execute said Affidavit, there is no reason why sheshould state facts other than the unadulterated truth concerning herself and herfamily.Additionally, Zenaida Melliza's non-appearance raises doubt as to her existence. Hergiven address was Matina, Davao City. How was she related to petitioner and whatled her to purchase the subject? Respondent corporation could very well have

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presented her to prove the legitimacy of their transaction. If petitioner were sellingsaid property, would she not have offered them first to interested relatives such asManolita G. Suntay? Would an ordinary person sell more than thirteen thousandsquare meters of prime property for P170,000.00 when it was earlier purchased forP200,000.00? These questions highlight several implausibilities in the alleged sale ofthe subject property by herein petitioner. As Maguesun Corporation's President who isrelated to petitioner, Manolita G. Suntay should have verified the sale of the subjectproperty by Zenaida Melliza. Manolita G. Suntay's closeness to petitioner Vda. deRoxas, as one who even registered the latter's car, suggests acquaintance with thelate petitioner's properties as well as the possibility that she took advantage of suchknowledge.From the foregoing, it is quite clear that respondent corporation cannot tack itspossession to that of petitioner as predecessor-in-interest. Zenaida Melliza conveyednot title over the subject parcels of land to Maguesun Corporation as she was not theowner thereof. 41 Maguesun Corporation is thus not entitled to the registrationdecree which the trial court granted in its decision. Palpably, petitioner has not beeninterrupted in her more than thirty years of open, uninterrupted, exclusive andnotorious possession in the concept of an owner over the subject lots by the irregulartransaction to Zenaida Melliza. She therefore retains title proper and sufficient fororiginal registration over the two parcels of land in question pursuant to Section 14 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529. 42WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court ofAppeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas v. MaguesunManagement & Development Corporation, et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subjectparcels of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with anarea of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and supported bythe corresponding technical descriptions now forming part of the Records of LRC No.

TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs,herein substituted as petitioners. Upon finality of this Decision, the Land RegistrationAuthority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the corresponding

decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to Section 39 of PresidentialDecree No. 1529.SO ORDERED.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

People v. Aruta

People v. Gatdula

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.

ROSA ARUTA y MENGUING.R. No. 120915

April 3, 1998

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ROMERO, J.:With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on oursociety, our law enforcers tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehendingdrug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-entrenched constitutionalguarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offendersmanage to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violatingSection 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. Theinformation reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City ofOlongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos andfive hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked "CashKatutak" placed in a traveling bag, which are prohibited drugs.Upon arraignment, she pleaded "not guilty." After trial on the merits, the Regional

Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of lifeimprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos. 1

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. JoseDomingo. Based on their testimonies, the court a quofound the following:On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only asBenjie, that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the followingday, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt.Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel Sudiacal, Sgt.Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in theafternoon of December 14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the PhilippineNational Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the Caltex gasoline station.Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt.Domingo and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other

group waited near the Caltex gasoline station.While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGOprinted on its front and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around6:30 in the evening of the same day from where two females and a male got off. Itwas at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team "Aling Rosa" who wasthen carrying a traveling bag.Having ascertained that accused-appellant was "Aling Rosa," the team approachedher and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked "AlingRosa" about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it to the former.Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in aplastic bag marked "Cash Katutak." The team confiscated the bag together with theVictory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed his signature. Accused-appellant

was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of PropertySeized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory,Camp Olivas, Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a

Technical Report stating that said specimen yielded positive results for marijuana, aprohibited drug.After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the abovetechnical report, the prosecution rested its case.

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Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a "Demurrer to Evidence"alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items thereby violatingaccused-appellant's constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure aswell as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said "Demurrer to Evidence" was, however, denied without the trial court rulingon the alleged illegality of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidenceof the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead, the trial court continued to hearthe case.In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, herversion of the incident differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed thatimmediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from Choice Theater where shewatched the movie "Balweg." While about to cross the road, an old woman asked herhelp in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingoarrested her and asked her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity ofthe woman and averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she wasarrested. Moreover, she added that no search warrant was shown to her by thearresting officers.After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a "Commentand/or Objection to Prosecution's Formal Offer of Evidence" contesting theadmissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a product of an unreasonablesearch and seizure.Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of OlongapoCity convicted accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred(500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City in violation of Section 4,Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous DrugsAct of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twentythousand (P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.2In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a

warrant for the search of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of therequirements for applying a search warrant is that the place to be searched must bespecifically designated and described.2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied forby the NARCOM agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason thatthe same would be considered a general search warrant which may be quashed.3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to thearrest of accused-appellant violated the latter's constitutional rights.4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yetthe evidence of the prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.In People v. Ramos, 3 this Court held that a search may be conducted by law

enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge asprovided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, andeffects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for anypurpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issueexcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons orthings to be seized.

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This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches andseizures as it operates only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. The plainimport of the language of the Constitution, which in one sentence prohibitsunreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisitesfor a valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unlessauthorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, thefundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that betweenperson and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed withpower to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. 4Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures areinadmissible as evidence pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.5 This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article III, Section 3(2) of theConstitution, thus:Sec. 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall beinadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrudeindiscriminately into the houses, papers, effects, and most importantly, on the personof an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an impenetrable shieldagainst unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy andsanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint. 6

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure ofhis body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. Astatute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant ofarrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their applicationlimited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is aninfringement upon personal liberty and would set back a right so basic and deservingof full protection and vindication yet often violated. 7

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence;2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police arelegally present in the pursuit of their official duties;(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to bewhere they are;(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle'sinherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in publicthoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable causethat the occupant committed a criminal activity;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search; 9

6. Stop and Frisk; 10 and7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances. 11The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for lawenforcement officers to trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and morefundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and seizures. The essentialrequisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search andseizure can be lawfully conducted.Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies areasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in

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themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty ofthe offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such factsand circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man tobelieve that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) orobject(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destructionby law is in the place to be searched. 12It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average manweighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules ofevidence of which his knowledge is technically nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus ofcommon sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same quantum ofevidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before asearch warrant can be issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that theitems sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity,and that the items will be found in the place to be searched. 13In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probablecause to be present. Absent any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not beadmitted and used as evidence against the person arrested. Probable cause, in thesecases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crimehas been committed or is about to be committed.In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficientprobable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure.In People v. Tangliben, 14 acting on information supplied by informers, police officersconducted a surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those whomay be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, thepolicemen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously.

They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He accededlater on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuanaleaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of

Tangliben on the night of his arrest.In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their

informant regarding Aruta's alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen wereconfronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the policemen knew that the VictoryLiner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their "business address". Moresignificantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously. His actuations and surroundingcircumstances led the policemen to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committinga crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta was actingsuspiciously.In People v. Malmstedt, 15 the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles comingfrom Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that aCaucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs on his person. There was noreasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of thesuspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of

the officers conducting the operation. The Court held that in light of suchcircumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly,including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence andineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In presentcase, the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.Second, Aruta's identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta was not actingsuspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle, a legally

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accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, wassearched while about to cross a street.In People v. Bagista, 16 the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and searchall vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of theconfidential information they received from their regular informant that a womanhaving the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringingmarijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant's belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOMinformant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, anyevidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a movingvehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptionsto the requirements of a search warrant.In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People, 17 the policemen conducted a surveillancein an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts wereroaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of thecemetery who appeared to be "high" on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyesand to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoidthe policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, hetried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held thatthe policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if hewas actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the factthat based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts.In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the basesfor conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors andcircumstances were present which, when taken together with the information,constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures ineach of the cases.In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable causenecessitates a reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) Inthe morning of December 13, 1988, the law enforcement officers received

information from an informant named "Benjie" that a certain "Aling Rosa" would beleaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon ofthe same day carrying with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in theevening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted from a Victory Liner Buscarrying a traveling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the lawenforcement officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her andintroduced themselves as NARCOM agents; (4) When asked by Lt. Abello about thecontents of her traveling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they opened thesame, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought tothe NARCOM office for investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information twodays before the arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on

board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known, the vehicle was identified and the dateof arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the police could havepersuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of awarrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin.When the case was brought before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; henceany item seized from Aminnudin could not be used against him.Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise receivedconfidential information the day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informantthat Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board M/V Sweet

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Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence informationregarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and hisexact whereabouts could have been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen tosecure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with Administrative Circular No.13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warranteven after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excusefor violating Encinada's constitutional right.In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant ofarrest. To legitimize the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag,accused-appellant must have been validly arrested under Section 5 of Rule 113 whichprovides inter alia:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private personmay, without a warrant, arrest a person:(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense;xxx xxx xxxAccused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was sheabout to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant wasmerely crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender areasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she wascommitting a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant andidentified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out asthe suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellantwere it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by theevidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect thataccused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of theinformant. This the Court could neither sanction nor tolerate as it is a clear violationof the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither wasthere any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable causeand warrantless arrests.Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless

search of accused-appellant's bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated otherwise, the arrest beingincipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal,it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. The constitutional guarantee againstunreasonable search and seizure must perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant.As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against accused-appellantfor these are "fruits of a poisoned tree" and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant toArticle III, Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidentalto a lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal.

Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a personand his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based

on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful,for being contrary to law. 18As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin 19 where, this Courtobserved that:. . . accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime norwas it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he wasdoing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outwardindication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the otherpassengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer

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pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect andso subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. Theidentification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediatelyarrest him.In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, thesearch and seizure of accused-appellant's bag would also not be justified as seizure ofevidence in "plain view" under the second exception. The marijuana was obviouslynot immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents still had torequest accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellant's bag be justified as asearch of a moving vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instantcase as accused-appellant was apprehended several minutes after alighting from theVictory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street and not whileinside the vehicle.People v. Solayao, 20 applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted inPosadas v. Court of Appeals. 21 In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he andhis companions were accosted by government agents. In the instant case, there wasno observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the NARCOMagents as to cause them to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in theabovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to flee from the NARCOMagents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is anotherindication of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicionthat accused-appellant was committing a crime.

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigentand emergency circumstances, as applied in People v. DeGracia. 22 In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building was beingused as headquarters by the RAM during a coup d' etat. A surveillance team was firedat by a group of armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of saidbuilding refused to open the door despite repeated requests. There were large

quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts wereclosed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstancessufficiently showed that a crime was being committed. In short, there was probablecause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could not be said in theinstant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search andseizure would be consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search asto amount to a waiver of her constitutional right. The Solicitor General argues thataccused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection citing Peoplev. Malasugui 23 where this Court ruled:When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his personor premises, he is precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional

Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.) The right to be secure from unreasonable searchmay, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly orimpliedly.In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello,thus:Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, whathappened after that?

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A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted herwith our informant and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bagshe was carrying.Q What was her reaction?A She gave her bag to me.Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside. 24

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor General's contention for the Malasugui caseis inapplicable to the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for thewarrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless search effected immediatelythereafter equally lawful. 25 On the contrary, the most essential element of probablecause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making thewarrantless arrest unjustified and illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompaniedthe warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and illegal. Thus, all the articles seizedfrom the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed asvoluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to the unreasonable search. Theinstant case is similar to People v. Encinada, 26 where this Court held:[T]he Republic's counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containingthe package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his rightagainst the warrantless search. This he gleaned from Bolonia's testimony.Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?A: Yes, sir.Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairsthat he carried, what did you do next?A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the twochairs.We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an

otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant based on the transcript quotedabove did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his belongings. Appellant'ssilence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The impliedacquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than merepassive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thusconsidered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without awarrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption ofregularity of the performance of duty." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused-appellant's lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to awaiver of her constitutional rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantlesssearch. As this Court held in People v. Barros: 27

. . . [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful searchconducted on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed toobject" . . . To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that theperson involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right;and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda.de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed to object to theentry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein

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Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched andthe persons or things to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to beseized to those and only those, particularly described in the warrant so as to leavethe officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize tothe end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made. 30Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have securedone without too much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General.

The person intended to be searched has been particularized and the thing to beseized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon ofDecember 14, 1988. "Aling Rosa" turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing tobe seized was marijuana. The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact,the NARCOM agents purposely positioned themselves near the spot where VictoryLiner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the NARCOM agentsfailed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them fromsecuring a search warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In anycase, this Court has held that the police should particularly describe the place to besearched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.31 (Emphasis supplied)While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by activelyparticipating in the trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waivedobjections to the illegality of the warrantless search and to the inadmissibility of theevidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for thefollowing reasons:1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrestas her plea of "not guilty" and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntarysubmission to the court's jurisdiction. 32 The plea and active participation in the trialwould not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible evidenceinto objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissibleupon failure to object thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected and opposed the prosecution's

Formal Offer of Evidence.It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros, 33 which stated:It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through aninvalid warrantless arrest or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by anaccused person. The a priori argument is that the invalidity of an unjustifiedwarrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may bewaived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop anaccused from questioning the legality or constitutionality of his detention or thefailure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not believe, however, thatwaiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former an argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of thenon-admissibility of the "fruits" of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless

search and seizure is not casually to be presumed, if the constitutional right againstunlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the protection of our people.In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional groundsto the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when thesewere formally offered in evidence by the prosecution. We consider that appellant'sobjection to the admission of such evidence was made clearly and seasonably andthat, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises canbe reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial. (Emphasissupplied).

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In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a searchwarrant considering that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously,this is again an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence illegaland inadmissible subsequently in evidence.

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing theconstitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition againstunreasonable searches and seizures. 34While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be heldcriminally and civilly liable, theStonehill case observed that most jurisdictions haverealized that the exclusionary rule is "the only practical means of enforcing theconstitutional injunction" against abuse. This approach is based on the justificationmade by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution which itself controlsthe seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong berepressed." 35Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutionalguarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at timesbe necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforcedwithout transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement ofno statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles ofgovernment. 36

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rightsof the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss ofliberty. As Justice Holmes declared: "I think it is less evil that some criminals escapethan that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in freesociety to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is theConstitution itself. 37WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch73, Olongapo City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence toestablish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA YMENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless she

is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.

RUBEN MONTILLA y GATDULA.G.R. No. 123872

January 30, 1998REGALADO, J.:Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula alias "Joy," was charged on August 22,1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, RepublicAct No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court,Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality ofDasmarias, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did thenand there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and delivertwenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibiteddrugs, in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage andprejudice to the public interest. 1

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of notguilty from appellant who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte. 2 Trial was

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held on scheduled dates thereafter, which culminated in a verdict of guilty in adecision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme penaltyof death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount ofP500,000.00 and to pay the costs of the proceedings. 3It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended ataround 4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran,Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, bothmembers of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmarias.Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana brickscontained in a traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a totalweight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in thearrest of appellant. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informedthem the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier,whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in BarangaySalitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. Itwas the same informer who pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant whenthe latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the aforestated day, hour, and place.4Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. Heclaimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, hetraveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket money and without anyluggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlieroffered a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he wouldreturn to Baguio City. He never got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1

Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite,he was never informed of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of theP500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the cousin, corroborated appellant'stestimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked asa supervisor, 5 although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any

document to prove her alleged employment.In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that hewas legally caught in flagrantetransporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after anobjective and exhaustive review of the evidence on record, discerns no reversibleerror in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance of thelower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motivescan be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which isevidently self-serving in nature.1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on thebasis of insufficient evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he willfully,unlawfully, and feloniously administered, transported, and delivered 28 kilos of driedmarijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged transporting

of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant issupposedly corrosive of the People's cause since, aside from impinging uponappellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him, that informantwas a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay andconflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared bythem.

The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article IIthereof, as amended, is as follows:

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Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of ProhibitedDrugs. The penalty ofreclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from fivehundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who,unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a brokerin any of such transactions.Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim ofthe offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under thisSection be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximumpenalty herein provided shall be imposed.Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,some of the various modes of commission 6 being the sale, administration, delivery,distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs as set forth in the epigraph ofSection 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends its punitivescope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these whoshall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit ortransport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions,"Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts specifiedtherein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, givingaway, distributing, dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, thetransgressive acts alleged therein and attributed to appellant being that headministered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The governing rule with respectto an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by lawis that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed inone, two or more modes specified therein. This is so as allegations in the informationof the various ways of committing the offense should be considered as a descriptionof only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground ofmultifariousness. 7 In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearlyestablishing that he transported marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that actalone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run afoul of that

particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informershould have been produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and hispresence in court was essential in order to give effect to or recognition of appellant'sconstitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State against him Theseassertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy ofappellant's right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in thisinstance was justified and cannot be faulted as error.For one the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merelycorroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trialcourt, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified upon matters in which theyhad personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed

with by the prosecution, 8 more so where what he would have corroborated are thenarrations of law enforcers on whose performance of duties regularity is theprevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not presented in courtbecause of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services tothe police.9 Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as itswitnesses, and not for the defense to dictate that course. 10 Finally, appellant couldvery well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to compel thateyewitness to appear before the court below, 11 but which remedy was not availed ofby him.

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2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of anunlawful warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the factthat as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day, June 19, 1994, the police authoritieshad already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's impending arrivalfrom Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure therequisite warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for andseizure of the marijuana, as well as the arrest of appellant on the following dawn.Once again, the Court is not persuaded.Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search andseizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absentwhich such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of saidconstitutional provision. 12 Evidence secured on the occasion of such anunreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being theproverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall beinadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. This exclusionary rule isnot, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs searches; 13 (2)searches of moving vehicles, 14 (3) seizure of evidencein plain view; 15 (4) consented searches; 16 (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;17 and (6) "stop and frisk" measures 18 have been invariably recognized as thetraditional exceptions.In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilianinformant to the law enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana atBarangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio City in the "early morning" of June20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would bebeside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was toosketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest orsearch warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, therecords do not reveal that he knew him by name.While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subjectof the warrant applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did notknow to whom the drugs would be delivered and at which particular part of the

barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise timeof the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivancewherein the drugs were concealed and whether the same were arriving together with,or were begin brought by someone separately from, the courier.On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for awarrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that wasstill open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and onwhich there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunityfor obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all thecoincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.In fact, the police had to form a surveillance team and to lay down a dragnet at thepossible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day notwithstanding the

tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had toreconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of thetime when and the place in Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up,and how he would do so.On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for,as both SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliablesource in past operations. Moreover, experience shows that although informationgathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal,and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional

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spymaster, such tip-offs are sometimes successful as it proved to be in theapprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of understandingassistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realisticappreciation of the physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of criticallyviewing them from the placid and clinical environment of judicial chambers.3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellantinvalidates the evidence obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and theconsequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as asearch incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.Under the provision, a peace officers or a private person may, without a warrant,arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, isactually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks thearresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of anoffense. 19 On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred byprobable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence withthe instances of permissible arrests set out in Section 5(a). 20 These instances havebeen applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicto. Theconventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term thedetermination of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, isunderstood as having reference to such facts and circumstances which could lead areasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the commissionof an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in theplace sought to be searched. 21Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measurefor the propriety of filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting awarrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In the past, our statutory rulesand jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree orquantum, 22 and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet,even in the American jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept,

probable cause is understood to merely mean a reasonable ground for belief in theexistence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of, 23 or an apparent stateof facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonablyintelligent and prudent man to believe that the accused person had committed thecrime. 24Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, atleast on the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Courtwhich provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required inpreliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well foundedbelief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guiltthereof. 25 It has the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts ofthe same Rule, that is, the investigating fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for

trial," or where "a probable cause exists." 26 It should, therefore, be in that sense,wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legallyauthorized.In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney theinformer at once indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointingto him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them thatthe marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box whichappellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their maneven if he was simply carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for

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personal effects. Accordingly, they approached appellant, introduced themselves aspolicemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the travelingbag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1Clarin, the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further searchthe box, they brought appellant and his luggage to their headquarter for questioning.Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and acarton box should not elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crimesince that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the ordinary nature of things that drugsbeing illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed fromview. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollowsuspicion since the informant was by their side and had so informed them, that thedrugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have been irresponsible, if notdownright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "waitand see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at thepoint prior to the search, were already constitutive of probable cause, and which bythemselves could properly create in the minds of the officers a well grounded andreasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search yieldedaffirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was thenactually committing a crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With theseattendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, hencehis arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were both

justified.Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by theevidence. To repeat, when the officers approached appellant and introducedthemselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his luggage, andafter he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to openthe traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resignedto the fact that the law had caught up with his criminal activities. When an individualvoluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same conducted upon hisperson or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, bewaived either expressly or impliedly. 27 Thus, while it has been held that the silenceof the accused during a warrantless search should not be taken to mean consent tothe search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of thelaw, 28 the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneouslyperformed affirmative acts of volition by himself opening the bag without beingforced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly be construed as a clearwaiver of his right. 294. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally,properly and adequately establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedlyconfiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by the forensic chemistand presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the

marijuana bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. Itshould be noted that the prosecution presented in the court below and formallyoffered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the traveling bag andthe carton box in which the same were contained. The articles were properly markedas confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that themarijuana turned over to the chemist for examination, and which subsequentlyproved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from appellant. The trial court,therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles wereindubitably no other than those taken from appellant.

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Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1Talingting who categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contentsof the traveling bag of appellant appeared to be marijuana, they forthwith asked himwhere he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City," thusconfirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion cantherefore be derived than that appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the wayto Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation in court of the subjectmatter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indianhemp, the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of thelaw is beyond doubt.Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claimingthat he was not allowed to communicate with anybody, and that he was not dulyinformed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independentcounsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The policeauthorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 743830 which defines certain rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodialinvestigation, as well as the duties of the arresting, detaining, and investigatingofficers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lowercourt will not necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted orconfessed anything during his custodial investigation. Thus, no incriminatoryevidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or admission waselicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence.Secondly and more importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by otherevidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the testimonies of the arrestingofficers together with the documentary and object evidence which were formallyoffered and admitted in evidence in the court below.5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death onappellant. As amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of theDangerous Drugs Act now provides inter alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article IIshall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of indian hemp or

marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugscarries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from fivehundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penaltycomposed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In the presentcase, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to beobserved in the application of said penalties.As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravatingcircumstances attending appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraphof Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case the lesser penalty of reclusionperpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of thecourt a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of thedangerous drugs involved exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty

of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory law is there a provision fromwhich such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court hasalready concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the RevisedPenal Code, 31 the rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of thatcase was also in excess of the quantity provided in Section 20.It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penaltywhere the violation thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the secondparagraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of S