Contentslibrary.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/singapur/04601/d+c2004-2.pdf · 2007-06-27 · iii Contents v Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia vii Editorial Norbert von Hofmann

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Contents

v Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

vii EditorialNorbert von Hofmann

1 Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Religions: An Asia-EuropeDialogue on the Impact of Multinational Institutions –Conference SummaryTina Pfeiffer and Norbert von Hofmann

5 Europe: Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions –Linking DiversityMark Neville

20 The Politics of Human Rights and Democratization in ASEANMC Abad, Jr.

22 The Position of the European Union of the Rights of EthnicMinorities and Religions – An NGO Perspective of theEuropean Union’s Internal and Foreign PolicyNils Rosemann

26 The Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on NationalMinoritiesFrederick John Packer

31 Regional Security Institutions and the Rights of EthnicMinorities and Religions: The Case of the ASEANRegional ForumMely Caballero-Anthony

37 The Importance of the United Nations in the Protection ofUniversal Rights for Ethnic Minorities and ReligionsNicholas Howen

43 Promoting Human Rights Development in the People’sRepublic of China: The Germany-China Human RightsDialogueJiang Shu Xian

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47 The Asia-Europe Dialogue of Cultures: ‘Bridging Tensionsbetween Traditions and Modernization in the Era ofGlobalization’

Ten Statements

History of a Conflict-sensitive Relationship: Tradition versus Modernity

in Asia and EuropeJudo PoerwowidagdoDonald SassoonClaudia Derichs

The Cultural Impact of Globalization and ModernityRandolf S DavidAnand Kumar

Indrajit Banerjee

Modernization under the Rules of GlobalizationJaved JabbarSigrid BaringhorstJavier Viudez

Cultural Difference, Citizenship and Global CooperationThomas Meyer

79 Asia-Europe Dialogue of Cultures – Conference SummaryNorbert von Hofmann

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Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Southeast Asia

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been present in Southeast Asia for more than 30 years. Its country officesin Bangkok, Jakarta, Manila and Hanoi have been active in implementing national cooperationprogrammes in partnership with parliaments, civil society groups and non-governmental organizations,academic institutions and ‘think-tanks’, government departments, political parties, women’s groups,trade unions, business associations and the media.

In 1995, the Singapore office was transformed into an Office for Regional Cooperation in SoutheastAsia. Its role is to support, in close cooperation with the country offices, ASEAN cooperation andintegration, Asia-Europe dialogue and partnership, and country programmes in Cambodia and otherASEAN member states where there are no Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung offices.

Its activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. on humanrights, social policy, democratization, comprehensive security), Asia-Europe exchanges, civil education,scholarship programmes, research (social, economic and labour policies, foreign policy) as well asprogrammes with trade unions and media institutes.

Dialogue + Cooperation is a reflection of the work of the Office for Regional Cooperation in SoutheastAsia of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Singapore: it deals with ASEAN cooperation as well as the Asia-Europe dialogue.

n Dialogue + Cooperation will tell you about our activities in Southeast Asia by publishing importantcontributions to our conferences and papers from our own work.

n Dialogue + Cooperation will contribute to the dialogue between Asia and Europe by systematicallycovering specific up-to-date topics which are of concern for the two regions.

n Dialogue + Cooperation will be an instrument for networking by offering you the opportunity tomake a contribution and use it as a platform for communication.

Head of Office: Norbert von Hofmann

Address: 7500A Beach Road#12 - 320/321/322 The PlazaSingapore 199591Tel: (65) 62976760Fax: (65) 62976762

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: http://www.fesspore.org

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Dear Reader

This edition of Dialogue + Cooperation includes documents from two recent conferencesorganized by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in November 2003 and in March 2004. These werean international conference entitled ‘Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Religions: AnAsia-Europe Dialogue on the Impact of Multinational Institutions’, which was held inManila, the Philippines, 10-11 November 2003; and an Asia-Europe Dialogue entitled‘Bridging Tensions between Traditions and Modernity in the Era of Globalization’, whichtook place in Berlin, Germany, 23-24 March 2004.

The Human Rights Conference in Manila was the sixth in a series the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia had organized since 1996.

The conference summary by Tina Pfeiffer and Norbert von Hofmann is followed by sixpapers presented at this meeting. Mark Neville introduces in his paper the position onminority and religious issues of two multilateral institutions – the European Union (EU),with its 25 member states, and the Council of Europe, with its 45 members. He highlightsissues Europe has been struggling with, for example, the question of who belongs to a‘national minority’, the issue of tackling non-discrimination through the development ofcomprehensive legislation and institutions, and the need for statistical data, crucial for anyattempts to analyse discrimination.

Contrary to Europe, Southeast Asia’s regional organization, the Association for SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) does not – as MC Abad explains in his paper – have on its agendathe specific issue of the protection of rights of ethnic minorities and religions. Instead,ASEAN engages in dialogue on the issue of human rights in general. However, outside ofthe ASEAN framework, there are a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) inSoutheast Asia dealing with the protection of rights of ethnic minorities and religions,such as the Minority Rights Group International, whose Southeast Asian Project Officer,Minnie Degawan, participated in the conference. On the European side, the NGOs wererepresented by Lotte Leicht from Human Rights Watch in Belgium and Nils Rosemannfrom the Human Rights Forum in Germany, who presented an NGO perspective of theEU’s internal and foreign policy. Rosemann explains that European history in general andGerman history in particular are closely associated with the struggle of minorities for theirindependence and self governance. The task for ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religiousminorities in Europe is not so much the struggle for new rights, but to bring existing rightsinto practice.

The two security arrangements in Europe and Southeast Asia – the Organization for Securityand Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – and theirrole in protecting human rights and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, areintroduced by Mely Caballero-Anthony from the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies(IDSS) in Singapore and by John Packer from the Office of the OSCE High Commissioneron National Minorities in The Hague.

Editorial: Dialogue + Cooperation 2/2004

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John Packer concludes by stating that the populations of most states are to some extentdiverse. No state, and no putative nation, is ‘pure’. Nor is the state by nature neutral; byvirtue of decision-making in any number of fields of policy and law, some persons areadvantaged and others are disadvantaged. Where such disadvantage relates to matters ofnational or ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, there is the prospect that thesedisadvantaged persons will not enjoy life in equal freedom or dignity. The challenge, therefore,is to manage existing diversity in such a way that there is equality, as well as peace andsecurity, stability and chances of economic and social development for all. This requiresinstitutions, both domestic and international. No doubt such an institution exists in Europewith the Office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in The Hague, but theARF is still far away from such a development. Human rights promotion is nowhere in theagenda of the ARF. Unlike the OSCE, the ARF steers clear from advocating democracyand human rights. One could also add that, given its loose structure, the ARF does noteven have any capacity at this stage to promote and monitor human rights. However,according to Mely Caballero-Anthony, it is necessary to go beyond the limitations of theARF and look at what it has that can be utilized to move the human rights agenda forward.She highlights four points:

1. Continuing with norm-building exercises;2. Revisiting the issue of institutionalization and pushing the preventive diplomacy agenda

forward;3. Building linkages with ‘Track Two’ institutions; and4. Expanding the circle of ‘inclusiveness’ to non-state actors.

Nicholas Howen from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for HumanRights in Bangkok highlights in his paper the importance of the United Nations (UN) inthe protection of the universal rights for ethnic minorities and religions. He explores theeffectiveness of the UN human rights system on minority issues under four headings:

1. Creating UN human rights standards to protect minorities;2. The UN as a forum on minority issues;3. The UN human rights system as a source of remedies for injustices against minority

groups;4. The UN as an operational development agency active on the ground.

He concludes with a quotation by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan, which could very wellhave served as a theme for the whole conference:

We must do more to prevent conflicts happening at all. Most conflicts happen in countries,especially in those which are badly governed or where power and wealth are very unfairlydistributed between ethnic or religious groups. So, the best way to prevent conflicts is topromote political arrangements in which all groups are fairly represented, combined withhuman rights and minority rights and broad-based economic development.

The final paper on the human rights issue of this edition of Dialogue + Cooperation waspresented at the fourth German-Chinese Human Rights Dialogue held in June 2002 inStuttgart/Germany. This human rights dialogue has been an annual event since 1999 and isorganized jointly by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the Chinese Foundation for theDevelopment of Human Rights. The statement of Jiang Shu Xian from the China Associationfor International Understanding reflects the different standards of discussion on human

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rights issues between Europe and Southeast Asia on the one side and Europe and China onthe other.

The Asian-Europe Dialogue of Cultures was the second dialogue the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia organized after the meeting inSingapore in November 2002, when 25 politicians, academics and civil societyrepresentatives from six Southeast Asian countries and Europe – Buddhists, Christians,Jews and Muslims – were invited to exchange opinions about the topic ‘Towards a GlobalCivic Identity’.

Fundamentalism, political extremism, exaggerated nationalism, racism, xenophobia andthe loss of values occur in Europe just as much as they do in Asia, but are often expressedin different ways and to different degrees of violence, depending on specific combinationsof negative factors. This phenomenon can be seen as the negative outcome of unresolvedconflict between traditions and the process of modernization, leading to feelings of alienation,insecurity and fear in people and to the risk of falling into the trap of fundamentalist and/or extremist actors. However, the forms and strengths of fundamentalism/extremism inEurope and Asia are often different because they spring from different cultural backgroundsand also because the process of modernization in the two regions has been quite different.

Social and economic imbalances as well as the implications of globalization are seen bymany people in both regions as the main reasons for tensions within and betweencivilizations. But growing fundamentalism is not only the result of the fight for a fairerdistribution but also a mirror of cultures gradually deprived of their national identity.

The increasing discrepancy between tradition and modernity, also as a result of globalization,contributes to the growing insecurity and apathy of many people. Globalization impingesupon the sovereignty of states and the nation state is often only able to fulfil its classicaltask of safeguarding its citizens in a limited way.

The meeting in Berlin in March 2004 was attended by about 50 politicians, academics,representatives of international organizations and NGOs from Asian and European countries.In an open and fair debate, the participants discussed how to overcome culturalmisunderstandings between the different civilizations in Asia and Europe, as well as deepenthe mutual understanding about problems and conflicts on both sides; and how to definecommon ground which allows the civilizations in the East and the West to live togetherpeacefully and at the same time enable them to remain ‘different’. Besides a conference summary, this edition of Dialogue + Cooperation includes ten shortstatements, five from each of the two continents, that were used as introductions duringthe two days of deliberations.

All papers and statements reflect the opinions of individual authors. The Singapore Officeof Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung would like to express its sincere appreciation to all thecontributors to this edition.

The EditorFriedrich-Ebert-StiftungOffice for Regional Cooperation in Southeast AsiaSingapore

Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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The two-day international conferenceentitled ‘Human Rights, Ethnic Minoritiesand Religions: An Asia-Europe Dialogueon the Impact of Multinational Institutions’took place in Manila, the Philippines, on10-11 November 2003. It was the sixthhuman rights conference since 1996 thatthe Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Officefor Regional Cooperation in SoutheastAsia (Singapore) had held in Manila incooperation with the FES country officesin Southeast Asia.1

For about 60 representatives of differentinstitutions from Southeast Asian andEuropean countries,2 including politicians,academics and representatives ofinternational organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) andminority groups, the conference served asa platform for an open and constructivedialogue on recent issues and developmentsregarding indigenous peoples, ethnicminorities and religions in Europe and

Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities andReligions: An Asia-Europe Dialogue on theImpact of Multinational Institutions –Conference Summary

Southeast Asia, and addressed theimplications of these issues formultinational organizations in a national,regional and global context.3

There is an emphasis on the promotionand protection of the rights of indigenouspeoples and ethnic and religious minoritiesin several international conventions andtreaties:

n The United Nations (UN) InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights,1966 (in force since 1976) is the firstinternational treaty that includesprovisions specifically referring tominorities (Article 27) and the right toreligious freedom (Article 18).

n The International Labour Organization(ILO) Convention No. 169 ConcerningIndigenous and Tribal Peoples inIndependent Countries, adopted in1989, has, until now, been the onlytreaty which fully protects the rights of

Tina Pfeiffer and Norbert von Hofmann*

* Tina Pfeiffer works as an intern in the Human Rights Project of FES Manila; Norbert von Hofmann is the Headof the Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, FES Singapore.

1. The previous conferences were: ‘Human Rights – Democracy and Development: An ASEAN-European ValueDiscussion’ (August 1996); ‘Human Rights – What Do We Have in Common? An ASEAN-European ValueDiscussion’ (October 1997); ‘Human Rights and Civil Society in Southeast Asia and Europe’ (December1998); ‘Human Rights and Social Development – Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the ILO Conventions’(January 2000); and ‘Parliaments and Human Rights Policy: An Asia- Europe Dialogue’ (December 2001).

2. The participants came from Belgium, Burma, Cambodia, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,the Netherlands, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines.

3. The participants included representatives from international organizations such as the International LabourOrganization (ILO), the (United Nations) Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR),members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat, the European Commission, theOrganization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),government and parliamentary representatives from several ASEAN states, as well as representatives of Europeanand Southeast Asian NGOs.

Dialogue + Cooperation 2/2004

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minorities. The convention specificallystates that indigenous and tribalcommunities have the right to a distinctethnic and cultural identity.

n The UN Declaration on the Rights ofPersons Belonging to National orEthnic, Religious and LinguisticMinorities, adopted by the UN GeneralAssembly in 1992, urges UN memberstates and the international communityto promote and protect minority rightsand the participation of minorities inall aspects of political, economic, social,religious and cultural life.

In 1994, the UN General Assemblyproclaimed the International Decade of theWorld’s Indigenous Peoples (1995-2004)with an objective to strengtheninternational cooperation for solvingproblems faced by indigenous people insuch areas as human rights, environment,development, education and health. Withthe culmination of the decade in 2004, theSoutheast Asian offices of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung deemed it necessary to probe intoissues concerning indigenous people andminority rights.

Divided into five different panels, theconference focused on the following:

1. The situation of ethnic minorities andreligions in Southeast Asia;

2. The position of the European Union(EU) and the Association of SoutheastAsian Nations (ASEAN) on theprotection of the rights of ethnicminorities and religions;

3. The ILO Convention No. 169;4. The rights of ethnic minorities and

religions and the tasks of the regionalsecurity institutions of the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) and the ASEAN RegionalForum (ARF); and

5. The importance of the United Nationsin the protection of universal rights forethnic minorities and religions.

In taking stock of the situation of ethnicand religious minorities, specifically in theSoutheast Asian countries of Burma(Myanmar), Indonesia, Malaysia, thePhilippines and Thailand, the first panelnoted that there is still much to be donewith regard to the promotion andprotection of minority, religious andindigenous rights.

In the European context, the relevance ofan in-depth evaluation of the issues ofethnic minorities and religions hasemerged, particularly since the early 1990swhen unsettled minority issues led todestabilization and even wars in Centraland Eastern Europe. The main regionalinternational organizations that started toengage in these minority issues were theCouncil of Europe and the OSCE.

Since the early 1990s, the Council ofEurope has taken several steps towards thepromotion and protection of nationalminority rights (for example, the EuropeanCharter for Regional or MinorityLanguages in 1992). At the heart ofEuropean efforts for national minorities isthe Framework Convention for theProtection of National Minorities, whichentered into force in 1998.4 It is the firstand so far the only binding andcomprehensive international treaty dealingwith the protection of national minoritiesin general.

During the discussion, the participantsidentified many similarities between theirregions in the questions and problemsregarding ethnic and religious minoritiesand indigenous peoples, and came to therealization that the protection of their rights

4. As of November 2003, 35 of the 45 member states of the Council of Europe have ratified the convention.

Human Rights, Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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is neither a Southeast Asian nor aEuropean issue alone, but something thatconcerns both sides.

In the context of the rights of minority andreligious groups, the issue of nation-building as an ongoing priority in SoutheastAsian politics was raised. On the questionof how to build a nation-state in SoutheastAsia and Europe with different ethnic,minority and indigenous groups, theparticipants agreed that state-buildingshould be understood in the sense ofmanaging diversities, and that strong statesare necessary for the rule of law and goodgovernance to prevail.

In response to the existing dilemma on thedefinition of minorities, the participantsconcluded that the determination of ethnic,minority and indigenous groups andcommunities should come from the groupsthemselves. The granting to ethnic,minority and indigenous groups of the rightto self-determination will ultimatelystrengthen a nation-state, not weaken it.

Besides the right to self-determination, thefocus of the discussion was on the rightsof ethnic, minority and indigenous groupsto determine for themselves the pace,speed and direction of their owndevelopment, and their right to landownership and the utilization of their land,as well as certain collective rights (such asthe right of access to media).

The 1989 ILO Convention No. 169Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoplesin Independent Countries is seemingly ofless importance compared to the eight coreconventions of the ILO, and still lacksratification by most ILO member states.5

The participants agreed that more action

is needed when it comes to the position ofthe member countries of the EU andASEAN on the protection of the rights ofethnic minorities and religions, especiallyon the part of trade unions which shouldappeal to their governments to ratify thisILO Convention. Only two countries inthe EU, namely Norway and Denmark,6

have ratified the document, and none inASEAN. However, plans for futureratification processes are imminent insome member countries.

As far as the interdependence ofmultinational organizations and humanrights is concerned, the participantsstressed the demand for the developmentof independent national human rightsinstitutions in all ASEAN member statesalong the lines of those that already existin Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and thePhilippines. This could lead to theestablishment of a formal and commonstructure of human rights in the form of aregional human rights mechanism forSoutheast Asia, similar to those inEuropean, African and American contexts.

The participants expressed regret that theemphasis of ASEAN seems to be more onpolitical and economic cooperation, andthat ASEAN has no common human rightsstandards.

Despite the efforts of some SoutheastAsian states in building up national humanrights institutions, according to (Asian)participants, the progress of ASEAN inestablishing a common human rights policyleading to a regional human rightsmechanism that might take over the roleof a monitoring body is still too slow, andactually achieving this is seeminglyimpossible. The reason for such

5. As of November 2003, ILO Convention No. 169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in IndependentCountries was ratified by only 17 countries.

6. cf. ILO, Ratifications for Convention 169, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (16 November2003).


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development delays can be attributed tocertain cultural, political and religiousbarriers within ASEAN. The participantspointed out that ASEAN needs a policyadvocacy on human rights issues tointensify the existing dialogue concerninghuman rights and that this advocacy shouldbe supported by a network of academics,government officials and NGOrepresentatives.

Concerning the issue of globalization andits impact on minorities and ethnic andindigenous groups, the participantsemphasized that without human rights,long-term and sustainable developmentcannot be attained.

In the panel discussion on the role ofregional security institutions like the ARFand the OSCE, the participants stressed,that these ‘soft’ security organizations cancontribute to and should deal more withhuman rights issues, for they are able tosee security in a much wider sense,including human security, which is alsoabout human rights matters.

On multinational institutions and theirimpact on human rights, ethnic minoritiesand religions, the participants concludedthat institution-building is fundamental andthat these institutions must not be static,but able to change dynamically and adaptto new upcoming problems. This concernsall multinational institutions as well as theUN. There was a brief discussion on the

need to revise the UN UniversalDeclaration on Human Rights of 1948 andto include a paragraph on the protectionof minorities. However, many participantsperceived that there was a risk that majorpowers would use such a revision to re-define human rights and thereforejeopardize the whole Declaration.

The important role of civil societies in theprotection and realization of human rightsof ethnic minorities, religions andindigenous people was a focal point in allpanels of the conference. Participantsstressed that civil society groups have tobe included to a larger extent in all humanrights discussions, a fact that needs to beaddressed, especially in the Southeast Asianinstitutions of ASEAN and the ARF, whichstill lag behind the EU and the OSCE asfar as the involvement of civil societygroups is concerned. But participants alsoconcluded that civil society groups – likemultinational institutions – should not bestatic if they want to be accepted andparticipate successfully in changesconcerning human and democraticdevelopment.

The panel discussions left many questionson human rights, ethnic minorities andreligions, and indigenous peopleunresolved. This gave sufficient reason tocontinue the discussions in the near futurein order to motivate as well as intensifythe cooperation and dialogue amongSoutheast Asian and European states.

Europe: Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions – Linking Diversity

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Europe: Rights of Ethnic Minorities andReligions – Linking Diversity

Mark Neville*

* Mark Neville is the Executive Secretary for the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in theCouncil of Europe, Directorate General of Human Rights, Strasbourg, France.

1. The member states of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and, as of 1 May 2004,the ten new accession states of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,Slovakia and Slovenia (see http://europe.eu.int). Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey have also applied for EU membership(the first two hope to become members in 2007). (See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/enlargement.htm).

2. The member states of the Council of Europe are Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosniaand Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia,Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, ‘the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia’, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, RussianFederation, San Marino, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraineand the United Kingdom (see http://www.coe.int).

Introduction

In this paper, the position on minority andreligious issues of two of Europe’s inter-governmental institutions is introduced,first the European Union (EU) with its 25member states, including the ten accessioncountries which joined the EU in May2004.1 The paper then concentrates ondevelopments within the Council ofEurope, with its 45 member states.2 Itconcludes by highlighting some issues thatEurope has been struggling with in the hope

that these issues may stimulate furtherthought and discussion.

By outlining the current position in Europe,the intention is not to seek to transportany Western model to Southeast Asia. Theapproach is rather that of a cameramanproviding a snapshot of developments inregional minority and religious protectionat the European level, which neverthelessmay provide inspiration for other regions.

The European Union

One aspect of the immense and wonderful colour and mystery of life is that groups ofpeople differ from each other in their customs, their way of life, their faith, the colour oftheir skin and their way of dressing and so on….This ‘otherness’ of different communities can of course be accepted with understandingand tolerance as something that enriches life; it can be honoured and respected, it caneven be enjoyed.

Vaclav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic

The economic focus of the EU has meantthat human rights in general and minority/religious issues in particular have only

recently been addressed in the EU’sinstitutional framework.


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Whereas minority issues have become animportant aspect of the external andaccession policy of the EU, they have been

less relevant as far as the internal policy ofthe EU is concerned.

Internal Policy of the European Union

References to human rights and the(Council of Europe) European Conventionon Human Rights were first included inthe 1992 Maastricht Treaty (whichintroduced in Article 6 an explicit referenceto the respect of human rights) and the1997 Amsterdam Treaty, which transposedthe ‘Copenhagen Criteria’3 into primary lawwith one exception, namely the provisionconcerning minority rights. Both of thesetreaties were therefore silent on the issueof minority rights.4

Similarly, the adoption in 2000 of theCharter of Fundamental Rights of theEuropean Union and the ongoing relatednegotiations for an EU Constitution do notcontain any direct reference to minorityrights. While there are a few lone voices(mainly from Hungary, as approximately3.5 million Hungarians live inneighbouring states), there are unlikely tobe any major advances in this area in theimmediate future.5

All is not bleak on the EU side, however,as particular advances have been made interms of setting standards in the field of

non-discrimination. These are of clearrelevance to minorities and religions.

In the Charter of Fundamental Rights ofthe European Union the followingprovisions are made:

■ Article 10 provides for the freedom ofreligion, which includes the freedom tochange religion and to manifest religionor belief alone or in community withothers and in public or in private.6

■ Article 21 prohibits any discrimination,including on the grounds of race, ethnicor social origin, language, religion orbelief, or membership of a nationalminority. However, it only coversnegative discrimination and does notprovide any positive duty to eliminatediscrimination.7

■ Article 22 states that the ‘Union shallrespect cultural, religious and linguisticdiversity’.8

In addition, the European Counciladopted in 2000 the Race Equality

3. In June 1993, the Copenhagen European Council recognized the right of the countries of Central and EasternEurope to join the EU once they had fulfilled three criteria: (1) political: stable institutions guaranteeingdemocracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities (emphasis added); (2)economic: a functioning market economy; (3) incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the variouspolitical, economic and monetary aims of the EU. These accession criteria were confirmed in December 1995 bythe Madrid European Council, which also stressed the importance of adapting the applicant countries’administrative structures to create the conditions for a gradual, harmonious integration.(See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement).

4. However, Article 128 in the Maastricht Treaty and Article 13 in the Amsterdam Treaty dealt with the culturaldimension of European integration.

5. Hungary has proposed the inclusion of reference to minority rights in the basic provisions of the forthcoming EUConstitution. The Minority Rights Group has called for Article 57, relating to EU applicant states, to beamended to include specific reference to the Copenhagen Criteria. ‘Minority Rights Group, EU Constitutionrisks letting states off the hook on minority rights’, press release, 8 October 2003.

6. See http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/CharteEN.pdf7. Ibid.8. Ibid.


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External Policy of the European Union

Directive9 (based on Article 13 of theTreaty of the European Community).10 Thisreflects an extensive approach todiscrimination, covering direct and indirect

discrimination as well as harassment. Itgoes well beyond employment, including,for example, social protection, educationand housing.

9. Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment betweenpersons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin.See http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_180/l_18020000719en00220026.pdf

10. Article 13 of the Treaty of the European Community reads: ‘the Council … may take appropriate action to combatdiscrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’.

11. These Regular Reports have served as a basis for the Council to take decisions on the conduct of the negotiationsor their extension to other candidates on the basis of the accession criteria. The Commission produced acomprehensive monitoring report for the Council and the European Parliament on 5 November 2003.(See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm).

12. The agreement provides a framework for supporting the mutually reinforcing effects of trade cooperation anddevelopment aid. According to the rules laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a breach ofan essential element of such a treaty would allow the EU to withdraw from the agreement.(See http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/index_en.htm).

13. Communication from the Commission, ‘A New Partnership with South East Asia’, COM (2003) 399/4, p. 14.This communication also notes that ‘the EU and a particular Southeast Asian country may also decide to initiatea bilateral dialogue specifically on human rights’. Cf. the EU-China dialogue.

14. See also Commission Working Document on Support for Indigenous Peoples in the Development Cooperationof the Community and the Member States, SEC (1998), (http://www.fern.org/pubs/archive/indig98.pdf). Seealso minutes from the workshop (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/ip/report_98.pdf).See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12001.htm for a summary of the Declaration of the Council andthe Commission of 20 November 2000 on the European Community’s development policy (note that amongthe five main topics that ‘must be promoted’ – human rights, equality between men and women, children’srights, protection of the environment and conflict prevention and crisis management which also require systematicattention – minority/indigenous rights are not included).

It can be said that concerns for minorityprotection have more dominantly figuredin the EU’s external relations:

Firstly, in the context of Easternenlargement of the EU, acceding states weremonitored in terms of the CopenhagenCriteria, borrowing standards of minorityprotection from the Council of Europe andthe Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE). Thismonitoring was conducted by theCommission, which provided RegularReports to the Council on a yearly basisfrom 1998.11 After the accession of the tennew member states in May 2004, themonitoring in relation to these countriesceased.

Secondly, since the entry into force of theMaastricht Treaty, minority issues have

played a considerable role within theCommon Foreign and Security Policy.

The respect for human rights anddemocratic principles has gradually becomean ‘essential element’ of various cooperationagreements, including the former Loméand current 2000 Cotonou agreementsbetween the EU and the African,Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries.12

EU cooperation agreements currently existwith three countries in Southeast Asia(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). TheCommission stated in a communicationin 2003 that this ‘essential element’ mustbe included in all future bilateralagreements (i.e. development programmes)with countries of Southeast Asia.13

However, while religious freedom wouldclearly fall within the scope of the ‘essentialelement’ clause, explicit references to


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minority rights (as in the CopenhagenCriteria) are absent.14

The EU has defined a strategy of‘conditionality’ for its future relations withthose countries of Southeast Europe withwhich association agreements have not yet

been concluded (Bosnia and Herzegovina,Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, ‘theformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’and Albania). Bilateral relations with thesecountries will be developed ‘within aframework which promotes … higherstandards of human and minority rights’.15

15. Council conclusions on the principle of conditionality governing the development of the EU’s relations withcertain countries of Southeast Europe, adopted on 29 April 1997, Bull. EU 4-1997, points 1.4.67 (commentary)and 2.2.1 (full text).

Summary

At the EU level, while issues of minorityprotection and religious freedom haveincreased in importance, they have clearlynot been treated as a priority and havemainly been in relation to external policiesor subsumed in a developing human rightsapproach. In the internal relations of theEU, the most significant development hastaken place in the sphere of non-discrimination, where the ‘Race Directive’

is already having a major impact in EUstates and candidate countries.

It can be said that, notwithstanding itspolitical and economic power andinfluence, the EU is not the main Europeaninstitution to examine human rights abusesin the context of minority protection andfreedom of religion. It is in fact the Councilof Europe and the OSCE.

Council of Europe

The European Union is Europe’s wallet, the Council of Europe is Europe’s soul.Robert Runcie, Archbishop of Canterbury

Democracies do not become Nazi countries in one day. Evil progresses cunningly, witha minority operating, as it were, to remove the levers of control. One by one, freedomsare suppressed, in one sphere after another. Public opinion and the entire nationalconscience is asphyxiated … it is necessary to intervene before it is too late. A consciencemust exist somewhere which will sound the alarm to the minds of the nation menacedby the progressive corruption, to warn them of peril …

Pierre-Henri Teitgen, former French minister of justice,following the founding of the Council of Europe, 5 September 1949

The raison d’être of the Council of Europe,founded over 50 years ago on 5 May 1949,was to ensure that the suffering anddestruction brought about by World WarII should, in the words of WinstonChurchill, ‘never again’ happen.

The work of the Council of Europe hasthus been firmly anchored in themaintenance and further realization ofhuman rights and fundamental freedomsacross Europe. In its 50 years of existence,the Council of Europe has developed a


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cobweb of standards, intricately linked witha range of other measures, which has givenit the reputation of being the ‘conscience’of Europe and the ‘soul’ of Europe.

The protection of religious freedom andthe rights of ethnic minorities make up partof this cobweb. Council of Europe actionin the field of protection of minorities andintegrating diversity is based on theprinciple that the protection of minoritiesis part of the universal protection of human

rights, thus not solely an internal matterfor states.16

I will refer firstly to the legal standardsdeveloped by the Council of Europe, theinstitutions that have been set up whichcontribute to the development andprotection of these standards and also someof the programmes which are run in orderto move the standards, and the monitoring,to the level of implementation and practice.

16. Article 1 of the FCNM.17. For the text of the Convention and case law, see the homepage of the European Court of Human Rights,

http://www.echr.coe.int18. G. Gilbert, ‘Jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission of Human Rights in 2001 and Minority

Groups’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2002/WP.2 24 May 2002. See also G. Gilbert, ‘Religious minoritiesand their rights: a problem of approach’, IJMGR, vol. 5, no. 2.2 (1997), pp. 97-134.

19. Cf. the Belgian Linguistics case in which the European Court of Human Rights found that the absence of Frenchlanguage schools in a Dutch unilingual region of Belgium was discrimination on grounds of language. Decisionsfinding discrimination seem to require a high standard of proof, displaying some reluctance to find discriminationrelevant and proven; dealing with discrimination only when a ‘clear inequality of treatment in the enjoyment ofthe rights in question is a fundamental aspect of the case’. Airey v. Ireland (1980). Indirect discrimination onlyexists ‘fleetingly in the jurisprudence’ (Patrick Thornberry, Committee Member for UK on the UN Committeeon the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2001).

20. ‘The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is alsoviolated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat differently persons whosesituations are significantly different.’ See European Court of Human Rights, Thlimennos v. Greece (2000).

21. In Kelly v. UK, the Court explicitly acknowledged for the first time, and repeated in 2002 in McShane v. UK, that‘where a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group, it is notexcluded that this may be considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed ordirected at that group’, see European Court of Human Rights, Kelly v. UK, 4 May 2001, para. 148.

European Convention of Human Rights

The ‘jewel in the crown’ of the Council ofEurope’s standards is the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights (ECHR)with its system of individual complaints tothe European Court of Human Rights,which has great potential to advance therights of persons belonging to minoritiesand guaranteeing freedom of religion.17

Whereas there are no explicit provisionson minority rights under the Convention,many articles deal with issues of importancefor the protection of minorities, includingArticle 8, the right to private life; Article9, the freedom of religion; Article 10, thefreedom of expression; and Article 2 ofProtocol 1, the right to education.18

Existing case law on minority protectionhas, however, mainly been of an ‘indirect’nature, including, through the provision ofnon-discrimination in Article 14, providingprotection from discrimination in theenjoyment of the rights and freedoms setforth in the Convention.19 Recentjurisprudence indicates a development ofrequiring that ‘equal situations are treatedequally and unequal situations differently’,thus significantly expanding the Court’snon-discrimination jurisprudence in favourof substantive equality, which can greatlybenefit the situation of often disadvantagedpersons belonging to minorities.20 TheCourt also seems to be opening up to theidea of indirect discrimination, albeitrather hesitantly.21


10

The additional Protocol 12 to theConvention provides for a general non-discrimination clause, adding non-discrimination as an independent right,while it has been regarded as accessoryunder Article 14.22 The new Protocolremoves this limitation and guarantees thatno one shall be discriminated against onany of the stated grounds by any publicauthority. This Protocol is not yet in forcebut will certainly provide for enhancedprotection, in particular for minorities, andit could open up juridical space between

the ECHR and the Framework Conventionfor the Protection of National Minorities.

The extension of the non-discriminationprovisions will undoubtedly provide a boostfor advancements in the protection of therights of minorities and freedom of religion.While there have been calls to extend therights in the European Convention ofHuman Rights through the preparation ofan additional protocol of individual rightsin the cultural field, these have not yet metwith sufficient political support.23

22. Protocol 12 requires ten ratifications: currently Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia and SanMarino have ratified.

23. At the Vienna Summit (8-9 October 1993), the heads of state and of government of the member states of theCouncil of Europe asked the Committee of Ministers to ‘begin work on drafting a protocol complementingthe European Convention on Human Rights in the cultural field by provisions guaranteeing individualrights, in particular for persons belonging to national minorities’. An Ad Hoc Committee for the Protectionof National Minorities (CAHMIN) was set up to examine the question and met six times. The CAHMINwas faced with many problems in the course of its work, both of a legal nature (interpretation of the ECHRand its protocols, identification of new individual rights such as the right to cultural identity) and of apolitical and economic nature (the possible expense of securing these rights might force states to restrict theirobligations). Another difficulty identified was that some of the rights suggested might involve a ‘transfer ofcompetences’ between the executive and legislature on the one hand and the judiciary on the other, forexample, in the field of national education.

24. See http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Esc25. See http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_Rights/Esc/5_Collective_complaints/Index.asp#TopOfPage

European Social Charter and the Revised European Social Charter

There are various provisions in theEuropean Social Charter and the RevisedEuropean Social Charter that are importantfor minorities and could be more effectivelyused by them to further their rights andimprove their situation.24

Here reference can be made to rights suchas the right to just conditions of work,the right to protection of health, the rightto housing, the right to education and theright of migrant workers and their familiesto protection and assistance (whichincludes under the Revised Social Charter,the need to promote and facilitate, as faras practicable, the teaching of migrantworkers’ mother tongues to their children).

Under a protocol opened for signature in1995, which came into force in 1998,complaints of violations of the Charter maybe lodged with the European Committeeof Social Rights.25 Certain organizationsare entitled to lodge complaints with theCommittee (there is a list of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] withconsultative status with the Council ofEurope). This so-called ‘collectivecomplaints procedure’ could provide abreath of life to the monitoring of socialrights in Europe. Currently, 22 collectivecomplaints have been lodged, one of whichconcerns access to housing for RomaFamilies in Greece (Complaint Number 15,European Roma Rights Centre v. Greece).


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The Framework Convention for theProtection of National Minorities of 1994entered into force on 1 February 1998 andcurrently has 35 state parties.26 Althoughit is not the only instrument developedwithin the Council of Europe relevant tothe protection of national minorities, theFramework Convention for the Protectionof National Minorities is certainly the mostcomprehensive document in this area.Indeed, it is the first ever legally bindingmultilateral instrument devoted to theprotection of national minorities in general.

The Framework Convention sets outprinciples to be respected as well as goalsto be achieved by the Contracting Partiesin order to ensure the protection of personsbelonging to national minorities, while fullyrespecting the principles of territorialintegrity and political independence ofstates. The principles contained in theFramework Convention have to beimplemented through national legislationand appropriate governmental policies. Itis also envisaged that these provisions canbe implemented through bilateral andmultilateral treaties.

The main operative part of the FrameworkConvention is Section II, containingspecific principles on a wide range ofissues, inter alia:

■ non-discrimination;■ promotion of effective equality;■ promotion of the conditions regarding

the preservation and development of theculture and preservation of religion,language and traditions;

■ freedoms of assembly, association,expression, thought, conscience andreligion;

■ access to and use of media;■ linguistic freedoms;■ promotion of minority languages in

private and public sector;■ use of one’s own name;■ display of information of a private

nature;■ education;■ freedom to set up educational

institutions;■ transfrontier contacts;■ international and transfrontier

cooperation;■ participation in economic, cultural and

social life;■ participation in public life;■ prohibition of forced assimilation.

The monitoring mechanism of theFramework Convention is based onArticles 24-26 of the FrameworkConvention for the Protection of NationalMinorities and on the Committee ofMinisters’ Resolution (97)10 as well as otherrelevant decisions. The evaluation of theadequacy of the implementation of theFramework Convention by the Parties isto be carried out by the Committee ofMinisters, which is assisted by the AdvisoryCommittee (AC). The Advisory Committeeis composed of 18 independent andimpartial experts appointed by theCommittee of Ministers.

State parties are required to submit a reportcontaining full information on legislativeand other measures taken to give effect to

26. The parties to the Framework Convention are: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino,Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, ‘the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia’, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Whereas Belgium, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Latvia, Luxembourgand the Netherlands have signed but not yet ratified the Framework Convention, Andorra, France and Turkeyhave not yet signed the Convention.

Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities


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the principles of the FrameworkConvention within one year of the entryinto force. These state reports are madepublic and examined by the AdvisoryCommittee, which prepares an opinion onthe measures taken by each reporting state.Having received the opinion of theAdvisory Committee and the commentfrom the respective state, the Committeeof Ministers is called on to adoptconclusions and, where appropriate,recommendations in respect of the stateparty concerned.

States have increasingly made the opinionsof the Advisory Committee and thecomments of the states concerned publicat an earlier date. This has been the casefor Albania, Austria, the Czech Republic,Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary,Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Norway,Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland,Ukraine and the United Kingdom.27

With respect to various working methods,an important step was the introduction ofcountry visits by the Advisory Committeeas a customary element of the monitoringprocedure (in fact, the first human rightstreaty monitoring mechanism based onstate reports, which has country visits as aregular element of monitoring). A furtherstep was an agreement to authorize theAdvisory Committee to submit a proposalregarding the commencement of the

monitoring of the Framework Conventionwithout a state report when a state is morethan 24 months behind in submitting astate report.28

Governments are of course importantactors and key sources of information formonitoring, but equally important has beenthe cooperation and input of NGOs,minority associations and civil society ingeneral, without which the AdvisoryCommittee could not fulfil its monitoringtasks effectively.

It is pleasing to note that most of thecountries concerned welcomed the opinionsof the Advisory Committee and providedconstructive comments on them, in manycases indicating that the opinion has alreadyprompted increased action to addressspecific shortcomings in the implementationof the Framework Convention. Theopinions appear to have stimulated freshrounds of interdepartmental discussionswithin governments, and in some cases theyhave prompted an immediate dialogue withnational minorities on the issues raised.29

It is imperative that these opinions,together with the resolutions of theCommittee of Ministers, are translated intothe languages of the countries concerned.So far, a number of states have already donethis, but there remains scope forimprovement in this respect.

27. For state reports, Committee of Ministers’ resolutions, Advisory Committee opinions, comments by the statesconcerned and information on follow-up seminars see the homepage of the Secretariat of the Framework Convention,www.coe.int/Minorities

28. Decision of the Ministers’ Deputies at their 832nd meeting on 19 March 2003.29. Examples of positive action following Advisory Committee opinions include: the Czech Republic adopted a law

on National Minorities; in order to eliminate the legal impossibility of a Greek and Turkish Cypriot concludinga civil marriage in Cyprus, the Cypriot authorities decided to draft a law granting all persons this legal rightirrespective of their race or religion; in order to bring legislation concerning the use of language into line withEuropean standards, Estonia amended the language proficiency requirements for electoral candidates; as a steptowards addressing the problem of the over-representation of Roma in ‘schools with special curricula’, Hungaryadopted a decree guaranteeing that pupils, including Roma, are placed in such institutions only in justifiablecases, on the basis of an aptitude test at the request and with the consent of the parents; in order to strengthen thelegislative framework to protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility orviolence, the United Kingdom has strengthened provisions concerning incitement to racial hatred and providedcover for religiously aggravated offences. See the Secretariat Fact Sheet of the Framework Convention for theProtection of National Minorities, www.coe.int/Minorities


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In all resolutions adopted so far on theimplementation of the FrameworkConvention, the Committee of Ministershas asked the country concerned to‘continue the dialogue in progress’ withthe Advisory Committee and to keep itregularly informed of the measures takenin response to the conclusions andrecommendations of the Committee ofMinisters. In particular, a number of state

parties have taken the initiative to organize,in cooperation with the Council of Europe,so-called ‘follow-up seminars’, bringingtogether governmental representatives,experts from the national side,representatives from civil society andmembers of the Advisory Committee, todiscuss the implementation of the firstresults of the monitoring of the FrameworkConvention in the country concerned.

30. For information on the Charter on Regional and Minority Languages, see http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Minority_languages

In conclusion

Approaching the second cycle ofmonitoring, the Framework Conventionand its monitoring mechanism has greatlycomplemented the traditional mechanismsof human rights protection within theCouncil of Europe, namely the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights and theEuropean Social Charter. While theFramework Convention has its detractorswho complain, inter alia, about theweakness of some of the provisions andtheir programmatic nature, the lack ofdefinition of what a minority is, etc., there

can be no doubt that it has made animportant contribution to the overall webof human rights protection offered throughthe Council of Europe treaties. Its successhas been to stimulate debate and provide apeg on which minority issues can be placedboth at a national and European level. It isclear that the provisions are minimumprovisions, but it does provide a safety netfor countries in Europe, and it does providean enormous boost for visibility forminority issues in the region.

European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages

Millions of people in Council of Europemember states speak a regional or minoritylanguage, but many such languages areunder threat of extinction. The purpose ofthe European Charter for Regional andMinority Languages is to prevent theirdecline and help them develop bypromoting their spoken and written use inpublic life and in social and economiccontexts, as well as through the teaching ofthem. The Charter was opened forsignature in 1992 and entered into forcein 1998. Currently, it has been ratified by17 states.30

The overriding aim of the Charter, whichwas instigated by the Standing Conference

of Local and Regional Authorities ofEurope (CLRAE), is cultural: to protect andpreserve minority and regional languagesas an essential part of the European culturalheritage. Thus the Charter is a furtherpositive step in Council of Europe policyfor intercultural understanding in Europe.

Part I of the Charter defines regional orminority languages as non-official languagestraditionally used in a country by nationalsof that country who form a groupnumerically smaller than the rest of thecountry’s population. The definitionexcludes dialects of official languages andmigrants’ languages but gives specialtreatment to ‘non-territorial’ languages not


14

identified with a particular area of thecountry (e.g. Yiddish or Romany).

When states ratify the Charter, they arerequired to specify what regional orminority languages are covered.

Part II sets out the aims and principles withwhich states must comply:

■ recognition of regional or minoritylanguages;

■ respect for the geographical area inwhich they are spoken;

■ the need for resolute action to promotesuch languages;

■ provision of facilities for teaching andstudying them;

■ provision of facilities to enable non-speakers of the languages to learn them;

■ elimination of discrimination;■ promotion of mutual respect and

understanding between linguisticgroups;

■ establishment of bodies to represent theinterests of regional or minoritylanguages;

■ application of the Charter’s principlesto non-territorial languages.

Part III sets out measures to promote theuse of regional or minority languages inpublic life.

Concerning the implementation, stateparties are requested to submit periodicreports to the Secretary General (thesemust be made public) on their policies forimplementing the Charter. These reportsare then examined by an independentCommittee of Experts. Legally constitutedbodies or associations wishing to giveadditional information are allowed to makesubmissions to the committee of experts.States’ reports as well as the Committee ofExperts’ reports will be made public.

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance

31. For information related to ECRI, see http://www.coe.int/T/E/human_rights/Ecri

The European Commission AgainstRacism and Intolerance (ECRI)’s task is tocombat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitismand intolerance at the level of greaterEurope and from the perspective of theprotection of human rights.31 ECRI’s actioncovers all necessary measures to combatviolence, discrimination and prejudicefaced by persons or groups of persons,notably on grounds of ‘race’, colour,language, religion, nationality and nationalor ethnic origin.

Members of the monitoring mechanism ofECRI are appointed on the basis of theirin-depth knowledge in the field ofcombating intolerance. They serve in theirindividual capacity, are independent andimpartial in fulfilling their mandate, and

do not receive any instructions from theirgovernment.

ECRI’s programme of activities comprisesthree aspects: a country-by-countryapproach; work on general themes; andactivities in relation to civil society.

The country-by-country reports focus on arange of matters, including legislative andinstitutional frameworks which exist in the45 member states of the Council of Europe.They also highlight the main issuesconcerning racism, discrimination andintolerance in these countries.

ECRI makes an important contribution toprotecting the rights of minorities andreligions from the angle of non-


15

discrimination. As a body it has been inexistence since 1994 and has built up anumber of policy recommendations whichare of particular interest, including:

■ General Policy RecommendationNo. 2: Specialized bodies to combatracism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism andintolerance at national level;

■ General Policy RecommendationNo. 5: Combating intolerance anddiscrimination against Muslims; and

■ General Policy RecommendationNo. 7: National legislation to combatracism and racial discrimination.

Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe

32. For information related to the CLRAE, see http://www.coe.int/t/e/CLRAE33. See for example, ‘Territorial autonomy and national minorities’, Recommendation 43 (1998) of the Congress

of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. For the reply from the Congress of Local and Regional Authoritiesof Europe, see http://cm.coe.int/stat/E/Decisions/2002/797/d10_2.htm

34. For information of the mandate and work of the Council of Europe High Commissioner for Human Rights, seehttp://www.coe.int/T/E/Commissioner_H.R/Communication_Unit

Other Bodies Operating within the Council of Europe, which Contribute to the Protectionof Minorities and Religions

The basic aims of the Congress of Localand Regional Authorities of Europe(CLRAE), such as the achievement of localand regional self-government, arefundamental for minorities, and havebrought minority issues into themainstream of its monitoring procedures.32

The CLRAE’s monitoring of local andregional democracy in member states has

mainly centred on the implementation ofthe European Charter of Local Self-Government. An increasing number ofstates have adopted this and otherinstruments related to the development ofdemocratic practices, which have a bearingon various issues of minority concern,including territorial autonomy.33

Making up the cobweb of protection withinthe Council of Europe are a number ofother bodies and institutions, each makinga contribution.

The Office of the Commissioner forHuman Rights was established in 1999 asan independent institution within theCouncil of Europe.34 In accordance withhis mandate, and without excluding thepossibility of complementary actions, theCommissioner focuses his activity on fourmain areas. These are:

■ the promotion of education andawareness of human rights;

■ encouragement for the establishment ofnational human rights structures where

they do not exist and facilitation of theiractivities where they do exist;

■ identification of short-comings in thelaw and practice with regards to humanrights; and

■ the promotion of their effective respectand full enjoyment in all the memberstates of the Council of Europe.

The Commissioner has not shied away fromtackling sensitive minority issues, such asallegations of forced sterilization of Roma inSlovakia and the statelessness of Russians inLatvia as two recent examples.

The Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) ofthe Council of Europe is sometimesreferred to as ‘the democratic conscience


16

of Europe’ and is made up ofparliamentarians appointed by nationalparliaments.35 PACE is the Council ofEurope organ with the longest and mostactive record in dealing with minorityissues. PACE has often placed emphasison the justifiability of the rights ofminorities, insisting on bringing thequestion of minority protection under theEuropean Convention through anadditional protocol.36 PACE has alsorecommended that the Committee ofMinisters draft an additional protocol tothe Framework Convention, conferring onthe European Court of Human Rights thepower to give advisory opinions on theinterpretation of the FrameworkConvention.37

Through the work of its committees, PACEnot only develops policy recommendationsbut carries out monitoring on issuesrelevant to the protection of minorities andreligious freedom.38

Also, the Assembly has called onremaining states to swiftly ratify, withoutreservations or declarations, theFramework Convention, and hasrecommended that the Committee ofMinisters reconsider the confidentialityrequirements set by Resolution (97)10 ofthe Committee of Ministers, so as to allowthe Advisory Committee, if it deems itnecessary, to hold joint meetings with therepresentatives of governments and of civil

society.39 The importance of this type ofpolitical support from the ParliamentaryAssembly for preparing an instrumentsuch as the Framework Convention, orfor the ongoing work of its monitoringbodies has to be stressed.

The Committee of Ministers of the Councilof Europe is the decision-making organ ofthe Council of Europe through whichagreements and common action by statesare adopted and undertaken.40

The Committee of Ministers commencedmonitoring in 1994, based principally uponthe 1994 Declaration on compliance, withcommitments accepted by member statesof the Council of Europe. In theCommittee’s thematic monitoring, topicsrelevant to minority protection have beenaddressed, for example on the theme ofnon-discrimination.41 However, since theprinciple of equal treatment among statesis characterized by ‘thematic monitoring’,the minority issue has not been firmlybrought under the Committee’smonitoring agenda.42 Its resolutions andrecommendations on a range of issues,prepared for it through a network ofintergovernmental committees, have,however, provided important soft lawguidelines on issues concerning minoritiesand also religions.43

Regarding the Framework Convention, theCommittee of Ministers has emphasized

35. For information concerning PACE, and related documents, see http://assembly.coe.int36. See the proposal for an additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental Freedoms, concerning persons belonging to national minorities, in PACE Recommendation1201 (1993).

37. PACE Recommendation 1492 (2000), para. 12; PACE Recommendation 1623 (2003), para. 12.38. See for example PACE Resolution 1309 (2002) 36, Freedom of religion and religious minorities in France,

http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1309.HTM39. PACE Recommendation 1623 (2003), para. 12 viii.40. For information of the work of the Committee of Ministers, see https://wcm.coe.int/rsi/cm/index.jsp41. To date, eight themes have been adopted, including the themes of non-discrimination and local democracy.42. Note however, the Committee’s important role in the monitoring under the Framework Convention for the

Protection of National Minorities.43. See, for example, the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. (1997) 20 on ‘Hate Speech’; Recommendation

No. (1997) 21 on the media promotion of a culture of tolerance; Recommendation No. (2000) 4 on theeducation of Roma/Gypsy children in Europe.


17

that states should be encouraged to removethe obstacles that exist at national level inorder to sign and/or ratify as soon aspossible the Framework Convention.44

Member states are further encouraged bythe Committee to be ‘judicious in theiruse of reservations or declarations’.45

The intergovernmental work of the Councilof Europe is carried out by the different

Directorate Generals within the Councilof Europe with expert committees withrepresentatives from all member statessitting in the meetings. Many of thesecommittees deal with issues important forminorities and religions in one form oranother. Examples abound and includehistory teaching, data-protection, Roma/Gypsy/Travellers, migration, etc.

Cooperation Activities Concerning Ethnic Minorities and Religion

44. Reply from the Committee of Ministers to the Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1492 (2001), adoptedby the Committee of Ministers on 12 June 2002 at the 799th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.

45. Ibid.46. Some examples of types of cooperation activities organized by the Council of Europe concerning ethnic minorities

include the ‘Non-discrimination Review’ under the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, training programmesfor NGOs and meetings of government offices for national minorities. See www.coe.int/T/e/human%5Frights/Minorities/3%2E%5FCO%2DOPERATION%5FACTIVITIES

Some Emerging Issues in Europe

Agreement on Who Should Be Protected as a National Minority in Europe

While developing standards and monitoringstandards can produce important results,this may not in itself be sufficient.International back-up and heightenedawareness are needed.46 The Council ofEurope provides such assistance where itcan. It has recently been assisting on lawson national minorities and has providedlegislative assistance on non-discrimination

legislation in a wide range of countries. Ithelps states prepare for ratification ofinstruments such as the FrameworkConvention, provides training for manydifferent professional groups (media,police, judges, etc.), and provides a rangeof awareness-raising materials ranging frombrochures to websites to make itsinformation widely available.

A good deal of this paper is devoted tomechanisms and development of the rightsof persons belonging to minorities andreligions in Europe. It may, however, beinteresting to take a step back and look atsome of the emerging issues in Europewhich could have an echo for SoutheastAsian countries too.

It is outside the scope of this paper totry and cover more than a handful ofissues, but I will briefly stress threeissues, – the definitional issue of whobelongs to a ‘national minority’, theissue of non-discrimination and theneed for statistical data.

Defining a ‘national minority’ is stillcontroversial and will likely remain so inEurope. There is no generally accepteddefinition of the term ‘national minority’in international law, and there is no legally

binding definition in any Council of Europeinstrument. Whereas the ParliamentaryAssembly suggested a definition in 1992in relation to the proposal of an additionalprotocol to the European Convention of


18

Human Rights and Fundamental Freedomsconcerning persons belonging to nationalminorities,47 the Framework Conventionhas no definition of what a nationalminority is. States have adopted verydifferent approaches to this issue. Underthe Framework Convention for theProtection of National Minorities, stateshave been left with a margin of appreciationbut not unfettered discretion, and theAdvisory Committee on the FrameworkConvention has stated clearly that it isready to challenge any arbitraryinterpretation given by a state. Its initialapproach has been cautious, encouragingstates to discuss with persons belonging toexcluded groups and seeing whether at least

some of the rights contained within theFramework Convention can be extendedto them.

The same type of questions are relevant inthe context of Southeast Asia: Shouldthought be given to developing a regionalequivalent protection mechanism? Shouldthere be a distinction betweenautochthonous groups and other groups?How should migrants be treated? Whatrelevance does citizenship have? Howshould linguistic groups, religious groups,etc., be covered? These questions have asmuch relevance to Europe as they do toother regions of the world.

Tackling Non-discrimination

47. In PACE Resolution 1201 (1993) with regard to the proposal for an additional protocol to the Convention forthe Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning persons belonging to national minorities,the expression ‘national minority’ was suggested to refer to a group of persons in a state who:a. reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;b. maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state;c. display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;d. are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or

of a region of that state;e. are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including

their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.

Availability of Comprehensive Statistical Data

It is in this area that Europe has seen aflurry of activity. The development ofcomprehensive non-discriminatorylegislation and bodies and institutions totackle issues of discrimination has receivedan enormous boost by the EU’s RaceDirective and the growing body of findingsand developing standards by the EuropeanCommission against Racism andIntolerance, and now also the AdvisoryCommittee on the Framework Conventionfor the Protection of National Minorities.

One project mounted by the Council ofEurope in this area has been a non-discrimination review for Southeast Europein which a methodology for examining thelegislative framework in existence incountries has been established. Thismethodology can be used as a starting pointfor countries both inside and outside ofEurope in order to identify gaps in legislation.The review also develops a number ofindicators to assist in analysing discriminationin practice so that discrimination can beidentified and appropriate measures taken.

This is crucial for any attempts to analysediscrimination or to gear policy in relationto ethnic minorities, religious communities

or other. While a census is one way ofcollecting such information it is not theonly way. The collection of ethnicity data,


19

however, requires certain safeguards, bothin terms of the rights of individuals to self-identification, and also in terms ofprotection of data.48 Abuses of thecollection of such data in the past (forexample in Nazi Germany in relation to

Jews, Roma and others) remains an issuein certain countries, but the majority ofcountries in Europe have begun to tacklewith increasing efficiency the question ofthe collection of accurate statistical data.

Conclusion

The implementation of the FrameworkConvention for the Protection of NationalMinorities and of the European Charterfor Regional and Minority Languages ispromoted by awareness-raising activities onthese instruments, which are directed atparliamentarians, government officials andrepresentatives of national minorities in allmember states of the Council of Europe.Monitoring based on juridical instruments,political monitoring and the judicialmechanism of ensuring rights at theEuropean Court of Human Rights add afurther dimension to the cobweb ofprotection at a European level.

Challenges of linking diversity,accommodating different ethnic groupswithin states and the enjoyment of thefreedom of religion exist in any political

system and in all geographical regions.While there remains much to be done toensure a coherent system of minorityprotection in Europe, perhaps theexperiences from the European institutionscan lend some inspiration of a possibleapproach, or combination of approaches,which could be suitable for the context inSoutheast Asia. An organ or committee tohelp promote inter-governmentaldiscussions, programmatic provisions in aconvention monitored by independentexperts under political supervision, aregional High Commissioner on NationalMinorities, country-based ombudsmen/human rights commissions dealing withminority issues, a judicial mechanismensuring the protection of individual rightsand a collective complaints procedure, areall options.

48. Cf. the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation No. (1997) 18 concerning the protection of personal datacollected and processed for statistical purposes.

The Politics of Human Rights and Democratization in ASEAN

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The Politics of Human Rights andDemocratization in ASEAN

MC Abad, Jr.*

* MC Abad, Jr. is an Assistant Director in the Office of the Secretary-General of ASEAN, based in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The latest pronouncement of theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Foreign Ministers on humanrights and democratization was in June2003, when they reaffirmed their‘commitment to the protection andpromotion of human rights’. Similarpronouncements can be found in theirannual Joint Communiqués since the 1993World Conference on Human Rights.

Interestingly, in 1993, the ForeignMinisters agreed that ‘in support of theVienna Declaration and Programme ofAction (of the World Conference onHuman Rights), ASEAN should alsoconsider the establishment of anappropriate regional mechanism on humanrights’. Fortunately, this matter was takenup by an independent group of men andwomen from different countries inSoutheast Asia, predominantly Indonesia,the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia.Every year since 1996, this group has heldinformal meetings with ASEAN officialsto press for the establishment of such aregional mechanism. Nothing much hashappened yet, but ASEAN has been underconstant pressure to reaffirm its owncommitment. One of the reasons for theslow progress is the expansion of ASEANfrom six to ten countries. The differentpolitical orientations of ASEAN countriestoday make consensus difficult to reach.But this is only half the problem. There isalso the fact that older member states havelittle interest in following the commitment

through. Nevertheless, pending a region-wide mechanism, there is nothing toprevent the existing national human rightsinstitutions in these four member statesfrom collaborating among themselves. Infact, they are all members of the Asia-Pacific Forum of National Human RightsInstitutions that was established in 1996.They are also parties to the Framework forTechnical Cooperation under the auspicesof the United Nations RegionalCooperation for the Promotion andProtection of Human Rights in the Asia-Pacific Region.

In the broader field of democratization,some ASEAN member countries areplaying an advocacy role towards greaterpolitical openness in the region. Forinstance, Thailand authored a section inthe ASEAN Vision 2020, which gave theregion a mandate to work towards ‘openASEAN societies consistent with theirrespective national identities, where allpeople enjoy equitable access toopportunities for total humandevelopment, regardless of gender, race,religion, language, or social and culturalbackground’.

Indonesia and the Philippines, for theirpart, have pushed for the notion ofdemocratic peace in Southeast Asia. Thus,after 36 years of existence, the word‘democracy’ has finally found its place inan official ASEAN agreement. The ASEANLeaders have signed the so-called Bali


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Concord II, which states that the ASEANSecurity Community is envisaged to ensurethat countries in the region live at peacewith one another and with the world in ademocratic environment.

Malaysia, on the other hand, has activelysupported the role of the United NationsSecretary-General Special Representative inMyanmar, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, with a viewto facilitating a democratic transition inthat country. Beyond the unprecedented callfor the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyiand members of the NLD (National Leaguefor Democracy), ASEAN has urgedMyanmar to resume its efforts of nationalreconciliation and dialogue among allparties concerned towards a peacefultransition to democracy.

Efforts to promote and protect humanrights cannot be separated from the broaderissue of democratization. To call for theprotection of human rights is to worktowards democratization. Respect forhuman rights can only be sustainable andmeaningful within a certain politicalenvironment.

Sponsoring items like democracy andhuman rights in the ASEAN agenda is noteasy, not only because of the politicaldifferences among member states and theirpotentially regime-threatening consequences,but also because of the organization’spreoccupation with other regional issuesthat require attention. These includeeconomic integration, the spread of HIV-AIDS, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome(SARS) and other communicable diseasesas well as transboundary pollution.Moreover, international terrorism andvarious forms of transnational crimes, such

as drug trafficking, money laundering, armssmuggling, piracy and trafficking inpersons, particularly women and children,have become major concerns for theregion. Some of us continue to hope thatgreater economic openness andempowerment might be a catalyst for moreopen societies.

All of the above are important andlegitimate preoccupations, but they cannotserve as an excuse to neglect the equallyimportant and universal values of humanrights and freedom. At the same time, it isimportant to understand the limitations ofinter-governmental institutions in dealingwith issues that have regime-threateningpolitical implications, whether real orimagined. ASEAN can only function theway the member states want it to. It is notindependent of its member states.Therefore, the more democratically like-minded the ASEAN region, the more wecan expect advances in the field of humanrights. This is how crucial Indonesia’stransformation is as the world’s third largestdemocracy in the political development ofSoutheast Asia.

This leads me to my conclusion. In orderfor us to see progress in issues that weconsider important, we must have regionalnetworks of advocates and champions.They might be ASEAN member states,members of civil society, eminentindividuals, local communities or well-meaning friends from abroad.Nevertheless, I believe that internationalor regional public opinion and pressure isonly as important as the domesticconstituency of political and social changewilling and able to make a difference.

The Position of the European Union on the Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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The Position of the European Union on theRights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions –An NGO Perspective of the European Union’sInternal and Foreign Policy

Nils Rosemann*

* Nils Rosemann is a research associate of the German Institute for Human Rights (part-time) and a Ph.D. Candidatein the Faculty of Law at Friedrich-Schiller University Jena, as well as a member of the board of the World UniversityService (German Committee), the German Association for the United Nations and the steering committee ofFORUM Human Rights Germany.

1. Kristallnacht (literally ‘crystal night’), usually translated into English as the ‘Night of Broken Glass’, was a massivepogrom against Jewish citizens and their property throughout Germany during the night of Wednesday 9November 1938.

The Narrow Concept of ‘National’ Minorities

European history in general and Germanhistory in particular is closely associatedwith the struggle of minorities forindependence and self-governance. The twoprocesses of nation-building – immediatelyafter World War II and at the beginning ofthe 1990s – are over. The new task forethnic, cultural, linguistic and religiousminorities is not the struggle for new rightsbut to bring existing rights into practice.

From a non-governmental organization(NGO) perspective there are three mainareas of concern:

1. The narrow concept of ‘national’minorities;

2. The backlash of minority rights andfreedoms after 11 September 2001;

3. The different concepts of protectionwithin the European Union (EU) andwithin European Development Aid.

In light of the recent sixty-fifth anniversaryof the Kristallnacht1 in Germany, I wouldfirst like to ask: ‘Who belongs to a minorityand who defines the minority?’ When, in1938, synagogues and public buildingswere burnt, Germans of Jewish faith didnot consider themselves a minority – theyperceived themselves as a religious group.Thus becoming a minority often has to dowith the denial of certain rights andfreedoms by another group. In addition,in Germany it was the ‘Aryan’ majority thatdeclaimed themselves as something better,as a superior race, by excluding othergroups of society. This example shows that

it has to be the minority who defines itselfas such.

Unfortunately the definition andcategorization of minorities is still a matterfor the majority. Minorities are able toclaim their rights only if the majorityacknowledge them as a specific minoritygroup. The narrow concept of ‘nationalminorities’ in the European FrameworkConvention for the Protection of NationalMinorities and the European Charter ofRegional and Minority Languages followsthis doubtful concept instead of acceptingthe right to self-determination as the


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International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights does.

Article 27 of the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights reads:

In those States in which ethnic, religious orlinguistic minorities exist, persons belongingto such minorities shall not be denied theright, in community with the othermembers of their group, to enjoy their ownculture, to profess and practice their ownreligion, or to use their own language.

The European Framework Convention forthe Protection of National Minorities(adopted 1 February 1995 and entered intoforce 1 February 1998) protects ‘nationalminorities’. In addition, the EuropeanCharter of Regional and MinorityLanguages protects ‘historical developedlanguages’.

The underlying concept of theseinstruments is the protection of ‘old’ andacknowledged minorities instead ofguarding numeric minorities fromassimilation. As an example, Germany has82.5 million inhabitants and fouracknowledged minorities:

1. 50,000 Danish people in the North;2. 50-60,000 Frieses, a German tribe in

the North;3. Up to 60,000 Serbs or Wenden, a Slavic

minority in the East; and

4. Approximately 70,000 Sinti, Roma andTravellers, who received minority statusafter a long struggle for recognition.

The precondition for recognition as aminority is the historical background ofthe people. If they are able to show thatthey have existed and lived in a certain areawith certain cultural differences, thenrecognition as a minority is just a questionof procedures and fact-finding. But if aminority is mainly assimilated, like theSinti, Roma and Travellers, or even moreproblematically, if the people are notdomestic, the acknowledgement of aminority is a political issue rather than ajuridical question.

Compared to the almost 60,000 people ofeach minority, there are 7.35 million non-Germans living in Germany, among them1.9 million Turks, 590,000 Yugoslavs and610,000 Italians. For the Turks inparticular, minority status could protectthem from assimilation and could fostertolerant coexistence instead of outlawingcultural habitudes and facilitating theradicalization of Turkish and Muslimsociety in Germany.

This brings me to the second issue: Thebacklash against human rights and, inparticular, religious freedom after 11September 2001.

After 11 September 2001, Germany passedtwo ‘anti-terror-packages’. Both of them arethreats to civil and political freedom, butthey are largely neutral in terms of anydistinction between certain groups.However, there are points that arediscriminatory:

n Changes in asylum law: A ‘terrorist’,and this includes any member of a group

The Backlash against Minorities after 11 September 2001

that agrees (even in exceptional cases)on violence to reach their political aims,can never get asylum;

n The introduction of Racial Profiling/Screening (Rasterfahndung): Since July2002, most German AdministrativeCourts have forbidden ‘screening’ ofGerman students, but not foreignstudents;

The Position of the European Union on the Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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n Change of German Association Law:The privilege of religious communitiesunder German Association Law(Vereinsrecht) has been withdrawn.Although this is applicable to Christiancommunities too, it is aimed at banningMuslim communities.

n Although there is no rise in anti-Semiticviolence and crimes related to 11September because violations ofsynagogues and Jewish cemeteries areunfortunately ‘common’ in Germany,there have been cases of members of

the Muslim community assaultingpeople because of a Star of David, apolarization on the Israel-PalestinianConflict as well as an unholy alliancebetween the German Far RightMovement and Islamic terrorists. Inaddition, during the last election in2002, a member of the presidium ofthe Liberal Party accused the vice-president of the Jewish community ofcausing anti-Semitism in Germany byhis behaviour.

The Different Standards of Protection within the EU’s DevelopmentAid Policy and Foreign Economic Relations

As outlined above, the protection ofminorities within the EU can be stated assufficient for so-called national minoritiesbut insufficient for groups of migrants in aminority position. Although there is still aneed for progress, minorities in the EUare able to foster their own cultures andpractise their religious beliefs within theircommunities.

The last issue I would like to focus on isthe protection of minorities in the externalrelations of the EU. There are quite goodconcepts in Development Aid, but a lackof coherence within European economicpolicies. I take the example of indigenouspeople to outline the underlying problems.

The active participation of indigenouspeoples plays an important role in thedevelopment process as it enables thesepeoples, who are often vulnerable anddisadvantaged, to shape their owndevelopment. The EU has alreadyestablished a framework for its activitiesin this area through a working paperpresented by the Commission in May 1998and adopted by the Development CouncilResolution in November. The outlinedframework for cooperation is covered bythree specific guidelines:

1. integrating concern for indigenouspeoples into all of the EU’s policies,programmes and projects;

2. consulting indigenous peoples onpolicies and activities that affect them;

3. providing support in key thematicareas.

Under these guidelines, the EU carried outa vast range of activities between 1998 and2000. It allocated 21.9 million Euros toprojects directly benefiting indigenouspeoples. These EU policies and activitiesincluded the promotion of human rightsand democracy and the policy on theenvironment and sustainable development.

In a report to the Council, the Commissionconcluded in June 2002 that cooperationwith indigenous peoples is an evolvingprocess. Certain measures are proposed toimprove this cooperation in the future:

n continuing to improve the integrationof this issue into policies, programmes,etc. (The methodology formainstreaming this topic must befurther developed, projects relevant toindigenous peoples must besystematically identified as such and aspecific reference to indigenous peoples


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must be made with a view toestablishing a central database onactions in support of indigenouspeoples);

n continuing to enhance cooperation andcoherence within the Union and withother donors;

n incorporating specific guidelines toprotect indigenous peoples in theCommission’s official documents,including all relevant policies;

n enhancing the consultation ofindigenous peoples; (in particular, smallorganizations must be better informedof the Union’s action and theCommission’s delegations on theground must be strengthened so thatthey can help with the management ofmicro projects.)

However, these aims of the EU’sDevelopment Cooperation are notcomplemented by the EU’s InternationalEconomic Policies, which are harming therights of indigenous people directly. TheEU is, next to the United States and Japan,the main engine behind globalization. Theframework of globalization lies in the WorldTrade Organization, supported by market-driven concepts of the World Bank and theInternational Monetary Fund.

Within the World Trade Organization,basic needs and values of indigenous peoplebecome a tradeable good, like water, foodand natural resources. Under the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),services, lying traditionally within thecommunity, are becoming or shouldbecome commercialized, like education,water or environmental services. Under theAgreement of Trade Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),knowledge might be patented and willbecome an internationally protectedintellectual property right instead ofbelonging to a community.

This process has led to the situation where,according to a statement of the WorldBank, indigenous peoples are the poorestin the world, despite living in the richestareas of the planet.

There should be an aim to build upcoherence between the EU’s DevelopmentAid Policy and its Foreign EconomicRelations under the concept of humanrights in general and minority rights andrights of indigenous people in particular.

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The Approach of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities

Let me begin by stating the obvious: thereis no shortage of problems and, indeed,no lack of complexity in understanding,much less tackling, them. But, roughlyspeaking, notwithstanding some importantquestions of definition, I believe we knowwhat the basic problem is. Let mesummarize it in simple terms: How canwe all live together? I mean this both literallyin the sense of survival and also in the fullersense of getting along. For if we do notsettle our disputes, we face the prospect ofviolent conflicts which endanger our livesand those of others. And if we fail to findadequate modes and structures, we willhardly coexist, never mind be free to pursueour individual and collective development.So, we have before us a challenge – at oncesimple and yet profound.

There is no simple answer. The challengeis multidimensional and manifests itself ininfinite variety. To be sure, no twosituations are the same. People’s needs,interests and aspirations differ, sometimessubstantially and other times only in nuance(although no less importantly for thoseconcerned). But, I submit, there are someuniversally valid aspects of theproblèmatique, and there are also someuniversally valid responses, mutatismutandis.

Permit me to cite just the naturalrequirements and limits of life, and theuniversally valid value of life. If we startwith this, with human nature, we can agree

The Approach of the OSCE HighCommissioner on National Minorities

on the need to respect life for all in equaldignity. This is not radical. Indeed, it isthe essential message of all great religions,philosophies and of civilization itself. Yet,while all human beings are fundamentallythe same, and, to quote Article 1 of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights,are ‘born free and equal in dignity andrights’, ‘are endowed with reason andconscience’ and so ‘should act towards oneanother in a spirit of brotherhood’, it isalso a fact that human beings differ incultures, languages, religious beliefs andassociations through which they canmaintain and develop their unique socialand individual identities and pursue theiraspirations. Of course, in so far as suchdifferences, sometimes profound, inspirediffering behaviour and choices, so livingtogether becomes a challenge. For we donot share all the same needs, interests oraspirations. The more precise question,therefore, is, how can we organize ourselvesas societies and even as a species such thateach may enjoy the maximum freedomcompatible with that of others?

The paradox is that one’s own freedom isconditioned by the freedom of others, atleast to the extent that we are socialanimals, and humans are very social. So,we need regimes and institutions toregulate and guarantee our mutual freedom.I dare say there is no freedom in theabsence of institutions. This is a universallyvalid proposition, although where and howwe draw the lines may and does vary

Frederick John Packer*

* Frederick John Packer was at the time of presentation Director in the Office of the High Commissioner onNational Minorities of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, The Hague, Netherlands.


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because what is acceptable for some is notso for others.

Still, universally, we have drawn some lines,first and foremost in basic internationallaw, as largely expressed in the Charter ofthe United Nations. This essentiallyconstitutional instrument clearly expressescommon interests that reflect ourinterdependence. First, there is peace andsecurity followed by an order of justice bothbetween and within states. But this is notwithout reason. Rather, it is clear that theobjective is economic and socialdevelopment, and not for some, but forall, including very clearly on the basis ofuniversal respect for human rights. This isa base line. The progressive developmentof international law and more generallyinternational relations in our increasinglycomplex world leads us to address on thisbasis a number of related issues. Thesituation of minorities is an important oneamong these.

I will not now recount the many problems.We know them well enough. Rather, let metalk about how we might address andpossibly solve some of them by focusingon possibilities and then organizingourselves to work together in the commoninterest to realize those possibilities step-by-step. I leave aside respect for basichuman rights and fundamental freedoms,not because I mean in any way toundervalue these. It goes without sayingthat especially the freedoms of thought,expression, association, movement andassembly, along with the rights to life,physical integrity and due process of laware not only basic rights, but alsoprerequisites for peace, stability anddevelopment. So, I will take these forgranted, and if this is not the case in anysituation then we have a more fundamentaland preliminary problem.

Let me share a perspective from a step downthe line. Admittedly, my perspective is

somewhat top-down and even what somemight label ‘static’. This perspectiverecognizes and works within the existinginternational order – it is realist in thissense. Moreover, it seeks to achieve whatis possible and to make internationalrelations work constructively, consistentwith declared values and existinginternational law. So, it is evidently political.From this perspective, the state is vital asan instrument of public security, a guarantorof rights and a facilitator of opportunity.

I begin with common interests, which isorthodox international relations theory andpractice. There are many such interests. Ihave already mentioned these in generalterms. Let me be more specific in relationto national or ethnic, cultural or linguisticand religious groups – whether they are inthe position of minorities or majorities,or as equal communities, or simply ascomposites or associations of individualhuman beings.

Positively, there is the common interest thatthe full extent of human knowledge,ingenuity, creativity, understanding andwisdom can be free and even facilitatedwith a view to solving common challengesthrough scientific, technological andorganizational development, thusprolonging our lives with better conditionsof living. Potentially, this increases the pieof total freedom accessible to all. Thismeans that more needs, interests andaspirations can be met or facilitated.Similarly, there is the common interest incivilizational development seen in morethan just physical or material terms. Thereis the common interest in social andspiritual development for which cultural,linguistic and religious diversity isenriching.

Let me be clear about one thing: diversityis a fact, not a policy question. The policyquestion is what one may wish to do aboutit. Suppress it? Destroy it? Facilitate or

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promote it? And if we think of any of these– for we are speaking about diversityamong human beings – we must think ofhow we propose to go about implementingsuch policies for better or for worse.

Let us consider things less positively, ifsuch diversity is not viewed in terms of itsenriching value. At the least, benign neglectimplies lost potential. Much worse, if thediversity is suppressed either forcefully orless so by malignant neglect, then there arepotentially serious precipitations. For sometime, such suppression (especially ifamounting to oppression) may do ‘no more’than harm specific victims. But, over time,history shows that suppression is notsuffered long without reactions. Peopleresist – and will fight for liberty and moreso for the maintenance of their basicidentity, especially for their ethnic orcultural communities and religious beliefs.This raises the spectre of violent conflictwith all its attendant implications. First,there are the costs of destruction andinsecurity. Second, displacement andrefugee outflows often result. At the sametime, there are arms flows – both legal andillegal. Then there are covert actions on allsides, often involving trafficking andsimilar organized crime. And so violencespirals and begets corruption and socialdeterioration. This is to say nothing ofinstability, which gives no basis for peopleto plan their lives or to invest – much lessfor foreigners to invest; to the contrary,there is capital flight both foreign anddomestic.

Nothing of what I am describing isimagined. And none of it is unique to anyone part of the world or one culture. Letme speak about Europe. The last centuryis a bloody legacy of all I have mentioned,with tremendous cost in material andhuman terms. I do not believe it is anydifferent in Asia. Your own stories paintthe same picture, whether of Burmeserefugees in Thailand, or the demands of

independence movements in Aceh andIrian Jaya, or the challenges of traffickingor of terrorism, whether domestic ortransfrontier. I do not need to tell you aboutyour own situation, and I would notpresume to do so.

Instead, let me share the perspective of howin Europe we have been struggling to dealwith our own similar problems andchallenges. My colleagues from otherintergovernmental and non-governmentalorganizations have shared their specificexperiences, views and some concerns. Wehave been trying, in starts and stops (andadmittedly far too late), both to protectourselves from the risks and costs and also,more positively, to create the conditionsfor social and economic developmentunleashing the totality of human potential– viewing diversity as a public good andcommon wealth.

One way – an institutional means – hasbeen the establishment of the HighCommissioner on National Minoritieswithin the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE). TheOSCE is a soft security pan-European andEuro-Atlantic intergovernmentalorganization which is essentially politicalin nature (i.e. with almost no legalinstruments), born of the Cold War andthe common threats that entailed for thenow 55 participating states. The OSCEfunctions by consensus and it includesPartners for Cooperation, among which areThailand, Japan and South Korea – so thereis one member of the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and,with Russia, Canada, the United States ofAmerica and the European Union, anumber of members of the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF).

Within the OSCE, the High Commissioneron National Minorities (HCNM) is not ahuman rights instrument, neithersupervising state compliance with


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international standards nor protecting oreven necessarily acting for minorities.Rather, the HCNM is an instrument ofconflict prevention, constituting anindividual of high integrity and reputation,who acts independently and impartially onthe basis of his own judgement to addresssituations involving national minorities,which have the potential to erupt intoviolent conflict affecting relations betweenOSCE states. Importantly, and this is nodoubt the basis upon which states agreed(some reluctantly) to the creation of thisinstrument, the HCNM is obliged to workthrough quiet diplomacy, is precluded fromtaking up individual cases (so, he is in noway an ombudsman) and cannot becomeinvolved in situations concerning organizedterrorism. Still, within these terms, theHCNM has managed to build theconfidence of OSCE states throughrespectful, careful and helpful assistance insolving the real problems facingparticipating states. Following thiscooperative, problem-solving (and let meadd face-saving) approach, the HCNM hasproven a useful instrument of conflictprevention in a number of situations,especially those of transitional societieswhere the risks of inter-ethnic conflict aregreat. The proof is in the eating, so to say,such that a number of states have invitedthe HCNM either to become involved incertain situations where bilateral relationswere awkward (and bilateral approacheswere overly politicized and showed poorprospects for resolution despite commoninterests to this end), or they have invitedthe HCNM and his specialized staff toshare their expertise and accumulatedknowledge to assist with policydevelopment and legislative reform withintheir own states. This last aspect of theHCNM’s work was hardly expected whenthe institution was created, but has becomecommon as confidence has grown.

I do not want to mislead you into believingthat everything is a rosy picture of

cooperation and confidence in the OSCEregion. This is far from the case. But today,no one doubts the validity of either theinstitution or the basic approach of theHCNM. And, I might add, for relativelylittle expense (i.e. the cost of a dozen or soprofessional staff and their travels), animportant source of violent conflict andrelated instability has a dedicatedinstitution to address it at its earliest stage.The sum of material goods protectedagainst loss and of human potentialunleashed, as opposed to suppressed, isdifficult to calculate.

First, there is the initial importance of thevalue of human life and diversity. Thismeans to respect and facilitate equally thedignity of persons with differing needs,interests and aspirations. It also means tomanage such diversity, viewing it as a socialand economic asset rather than threat. Thisimplies, in turn, both domestic andmultilateral institutions to address thechallenges of diversity management (andthe effects of its possible neglect or failure).On the basis of accumulated experience,at least in Europe, there are a number ofrecurrent issues that can benefit fromdeveloped regimes of management, suchas education, public use of languages,public administration, delivery of socialservices and participation in public life(especially political processes of decision-making). Let me emphasize that, happily,most of these admit to the accommodationof considerable diversity. Few requireabsolute conformity of all to just one way.For example, while we cannot imagine asystem of management of our highways thatwould let people choose which side of theroad to drive on, we can imagine (in fact,it is common experience) that schoolingand public administration take place in anumber of languages, to varying degrees.These may not be infinite in theirpossibilities; to be sure, there are limits towhat is feasible especially where significantpublic expense is involved. This also does

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not mean that there is no need or legitimacyfor states to require, for example, everyoneto learn a common language. Indeed, suchrequirements are also a means to ensurefreedom in the sense of equal opportunitiesto participate in public life and have fullmobility in the job market and so forth.Certainly, since each situation is unique,the exact arrangement or policy mix willvary tremendously from situation tosituation. But with a view to helping states,minorities and ordinary citizens understandthe organizational possibilities, the HCNMinvited a group of internationallyrecognized independent experts to makesome general recommendations, known asthe Lund Recommendations on theEffective Participation of NationalMinorities in Public Life. Similar generalrecommendations have been made onissues of education, the use of language,elections and, only recently and quitespecifically, the use of minority languagesin the broadcast media. These are allavailable on the OSCE web site, and inmany languages.

To conclude, the populations of all statesare to some extent diverse. No state, andno putative nation, is ‘pure’. Nor is thestate by nature neutral; by virtue ofdecision-making in any number of fieldsof policy and law, some persons are

advantaged and others are disadvantaged.Where such disadvantage relates to mattersof national or ethnic, cultural, linguistic orreligious identity, there is the prospect thatthese disadvantaged persons will not enjoylife in equal freedom or dignity. Thechallenge, therefore, is to manage existingdiversity in such a way that there isequality, and that there is peace andsecurity, stability and chances of economicand social development for all. Thisrequires institutions, both domestic andinternational.

The good news is that this is possible andcan be done constructively, based on respectfor human rights, especially non-discrimination, under the rule of law.Participation is particularly important, notjust for its own sake or to placateminorities, but to make better policy andlaw which will inspire voluntary complianceand the loyalty of the whole population inthe common interest. This is the route topeace, security, stability and ultimately toprosperity. We are trying in Europe. I seeno reason why the rich diversity of Asiashould not be similarly managed, takinginto account its own peculiarities, to thebenefit of all Asians and the world beyond.I encourage you in this direction and wishyou every success.

Regional Security Institutions and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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Regional Security Institutions and the Rightsof Ethnic Minorities and Religions: The Caseof the ASEAN Regional Forum

Mely Caballero-Anthony*

* Mely Caballero-Anthony is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), NanyangTechnological University, Singapore.

Introduction

The conventional role of protecting humanrights for all individuals, regardless ofcolour, race and creed has been entrustedto the state. If one goes back to classicalsocial and political thought, the notion ofa ‘social contract’ between the people/society and the state underscores the dutyof the latter to ensure that the rights of itspeople are guaranteed and protected. Inexchange, the people give up their rightsto the state and its political leaders andgive them the moral authority to rule. Soentrenched is this thought that, as historywould tell us, revolutions and wars havebroken out within and between states inthe fight for and the protection of humanrights.

Beyond the state, the internationalcommunity, through various regional anduniversal institutions, supplements and/or complements this role in manydifferent ways. One could thereforeconsider the role of the United Nations(UN) and its various agencies and examinetheir respective functions within thecontext of human rights protection. Todate, there has been a proliferation ofinternational human rights instruments

that have been developed, and many moreare being developed under the auspicesof the UN. More recently, apart from themore defined international human rightsinstruments that have been developed,there have also been several initiatives bythe UN to promote and protect humanrights, particularly in the area of conflictprevention and conflict resolution. Thiswould include the United NationsSecretary General’s Report on Preventionof Armed Conflict (RPAC) released on 7June 2001 and the Report of theInternational Commission onIntervention and State Sovereignty,otherwise known as the ‘Responsibility toProtect’ (RTP) Report submitted to theUN on 30 September 2001. The multitudeof international covenants and recent UNinitiatives reflect the fact that the task ofpromoting and protecting human rightsis a multidimensional effort, requiringcomprehensive and multilateralapproaches, and more importantly, thatthe protection of human rights is no longerconfined to state and interstateinstitutions but necessarily requires theparticipation and active engagement ofother non-state actors.


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The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) wasestablished in 1994 and is the onlymultilateral organization in the Asia Pacificdedicated to security issues. The work ofthe ARF has been outlined in the 1995Concept Paper which laid out the threestages of security cooperation in the region:confidence-building, preventive diplomacyand conflict resolution (later renamed‘elaboration of approaches to conflict’).

Since its inception, the ARF has essentiallybeen a forum for dialogue of securityissues. It has adopted a loose, informalapproach in its work toward building trustand confidence among states of differentideological orientation. Currently, we havein the ARF a 23-member groupingcomprising like-minded and non-like-minded states across the vast expanse ofthe Asia Pacific. The ARF has also as itsmembers all the major powers in theinternational system – the United States ofAmerica (USA), China, Russia, Japan,India and the European Union (EU). Inplacing a premium on the process of

inclusive regionalism, the ARF haseschewed legalistic frameworks and bindingcommitments. Instead, the ARF works onthe basis of consultation and consensus,and focuses on developing habits ofdialogue and on the development of normsof cooperative security.

Given this framework, the work of the ARFhas been mainly on confidence-buildingmeasures (CBM), and it has had in the pastnine years a crowded agenda of CBMprogrammes. Most member states haverecognized the importance of the ARF asa vehicle for airing their own securityperceptions. Some analysts in fact creditthe socialization through the ARF ofengendering a more positive attitude instates that were initially suspicious ofmultilateralism. Although the ARF hasofficially moved from CBM stage topreventive diplomacy (PD), the progresshas been slow and marked by controversy.This is discussed in more detail in thenext section.

The Importance of Preventive Diplomacy

In examining whether the ARF can have arole in the promotion of human rights inthe region, it is clear that it is in its workor progress on preventive diplomacy thatthe ARF can make a relevant contribution.As the phrase implies, PD is the criticalstage at which appropriate non-militaryinterventions can be deployed before aproblem or dispute breaks into a conflictsituation and eventually poses a threat toregional security. The principles of PD asproposed in the ARF call for:

n Diplomacy – reliance on diplomaticmeans and peaceful methods, e.g.persuasion, negotiation, enquiry,

mediation and conciliation.n Volunteerism – employed only at the

request of parties or with their consent.n Non-coercion – does not include

military action or the use of force, orother coercive activities, e.g. sanctions.

n Based on international law – any actionshould be in accordance with the basicprinciples of international law.

n Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the international affairsof states.

n Timeless – deploying most effectivepreventive (not curative) action at anearly stage of a dispute or crisis.

The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum in Promoting andProtecting Human Rights


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But, as noted earlier, the progress on PDhas been impeded by controversy. Somemembers see PD as a threat to theircountries’ sovereignty. As a result, the ARFhas been bogged down over definitionaldebates about PD, i.e. whether the scopeof PD should cover interstate conflicts only,and whether it should be limited strictly todiplomatic measures.

So far, a lot of time has been spent by ARFcountries deliberating on what appropriatemechanisms to adopt to get the PD agendastarted. These have involved, among others,plans for:

n An enhanced role of the ARF Chair;n A register of lists of Experts/Eminent

Persons (EEPs);n Voluntary submissions of Annual

Security Outlooks (ASO).

Of the three mechanisms above, there hasbeen progress on the annual publication ofASOs and compiling the list of EEPs, whilethe guidelines for the enhanced role of theARF Chair are still being deliberated. Giventhe fact that the ARF is not institutionalized– it has no secretariat or structuredcommittees – these mechanisms are theextent to which the ARF can go with regardto any proactive PD efforts. Although theARF notes that CBM work overlaps withPD, there is no visible PD programmebeyond the activities of the ARF’sIntersessional Support Groups (ISGs) on

CBMs, peacekeeping operations, disasterrelief, and search and rescue missions.Aside from these three areas, the ARF hasrecently focused quite a lot of attention onefforts at enhancing cooperation in thefight against terrorism and has hadintersessional meetings on counter-terrorism and transnational crime.

Evidently human rights promotion isnowhere on the agenda of the ARF. Asmentioned earlier, the ARF is all aboutCBMs for promoting security cooperation.Unlike the OSCE, the ARF steers clearfrom advocating democracy and humanrights (or even the principle of marketeconomics). One could also add that, givenits loose structure, the ARF does not haveany capacity at this stage to promote andmonitor human rights, unlike the OSCEwhich has a specific body, i.e. the HighCommissioner for National Minorities. Atbest, the ARF during its annual ministerialmeetings can only make note of humanrights concerns during their deliberations.This was reflected, for example, in theChairman’s Statement of the Tenth ASEANRegional Forum, held in Cambodia in June2003.1 Yet even this can be selective, sincewhile the concerns for democracy andhuman rights in Myanmar were discussed,there was silence about human rights issuesin other ARF countries like Russia, Chinaor even the USA. Where then can welocate the ARF in the global effort ofpromoting and protecting human rights?

1. See Chairman’s Statement of the Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting, Phnom Penh, 18 June 2003,http://www.aseansec.org/14845.htm

Locating the ARF in the Human Rights Agenda

As an evolving institution with the ultimateobjective of promoting securitycooperation in the region, one could andshould go beyond the limitation of the ARFand look at what it has that can be harnessed

to move the human rights agenda forward.I shall highlight four points that I thinkare realistic given where the member statesof the ARF are at the moment.


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Regardless of its image as a ‘talk shop’, theARF has managed to survive largely becauseof the kind of approach it has taken.Beyond instituting habits of dialogue andits emphasis on process rather thanproduct, the ARF is also all about norm-building. These norms, based on generalprinciples such as the non-use of force, theneed to solve disputes by peaceful means,the right of each state to choose its ownpolitical, social and economic system,cooperation among states and nations, andothers, all contribute to engendering apositive and peaceful environment. Thesenorms serve various purposes, whichinclude, among others, the restraint forcedon states not to act with force and threatenthe security of states and communities.

These associative norms are also useful inthe promotion of evolving security concepts

such as comprehensive and humansecurity. The ARF member states are being‘socialized’ to the importance of regardingsecurity beyond the conventional confinesof state and military security to relatedissues like economic, political,environmental and other security issuesfalling under the general rubric ofcomprehensive and non-traditional security.It is also through these associative normsthat the security concerns of individualsand communities under the rubric ofhuman security can be propagated. Thedevelopment of these evolving securityconcepts is salient in the promotion ofhuman rights since, at the very least, itraises the standards of what security is andhow security cooperation might be betterachieved.

2. See ‘A New Agenda for the ASEAN Regional Forum’, IDSS Monograph No. 4 (Singapore: Institute of Defence andStrategic Studies, 2002).

Continuing with Norm-building Exercises

Revisiting the Issue of Institutionalization and Pushing the PD Agenda Forward

In crafting strategies to improve theinstitutional capabilities of the ARF, it istempting to aim high and yet difficult toseek a balance between what is desirableand possible, between the desired ends andavailable means. Within this context, theARF could act on the suggestions that havebeen offered, particularly moving the PDagenda forward. I shall highlight some ofthe most important ones:

1. Providing for appropriate institutionalresources to coordinate activities, gatherinformation and possess analyticalcapabilities to process information anddata.

2. Developing fact-finding and good officesmissions to promote conflict preventionand crisis management. It is in this areathat progress on the enhanced role ofthe ARF Chair must take place.

3. Establishing an OSCE-type ConflictPrevention Centre to deal with conflictprevention and reduction. The ARFcould consider establishing a similarinstitution that would institutionalizeactivities such as fact-finding and earlywarning.

4. Formulating a set of norms beyond theestablished regional set of norms toensure the security of minoritypopulations while discouragingsecessionist aspirations.

These issues are now being studiedextensively in the region. The Institute ofDefence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) ofthe Nanyang Technological University,Singapore, for example, published amonograph on ‘A New Agenda for theASEAN Regional Forum’.2 The monographexamined comprehensive options to push


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the ARF agenda forward, particularly onthe work on preventive diplomacy. In fact,some of the recommendations by IDSSincluded adopting certain preventivediplomacy mechanisms, which are foundin the OSCE. These included, amongothers, the establishment of an ARFSecretariat, the setting up of a RiskReduction Centre (RRC), and promotingenhanced defence participation at ARFmeetings (so far ARF meetings have beenattended mostly by the foreign ministersof ARF member states). Theserecommendations have already been

officially forwarded to the ARF for theirconsideration.

While the work on preventive diplomacyin the region has been bogged down by thesuspicion of some countries that this couldlead to interference in internal affairs, therehas nevertheless been an appreciation thatprogress must take place. This wouldnecessarily require a change in politicalmindset, otherwise there will only beheightened uncertainty in the region andthe ARF will risk losing its relevance.

Building Linkages with Track Two Institutions

Within the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN), the ASEAN-Institutesof Strategic and International Studies(ASEAN-ISIS) has been one of thepioneering Track Two bodies that hasmade its mark in Southeast Asia by thekind of work it has done in supportingpolitical and security cooperation in theregion. Through workshops andconferences, academic research, policyoutput and its own networking activities,ASEAN-ISIS has built up valuableexpertise, and has, in fact , beenresponsible for pushing for more ideas thathave had concrete outcomes. One of thesewas the need to have an enhanced PostMinisterial Meeting within ASEAN thatgerminated into the idea of establishing amultilateral security forum, now knownas the ARF. ASEAN-ISIS has, as one ofits core activities, an annual meeting onhuman rights. One of the things that ithas tried to help promote is theestablishment of the Regional HumanRights Commission.

On the broader region, the Council forSecurity and Cooperation in the AsiaPacific Region (CSCAP), of whichASEAN-ISIS is a core group member, has

made a significant contribution inproviding an informal mechanism bywhich a political and security dialogue cantake place between scholars, officials andothers in their private capacities. CSCAPhas produced important policy inputs.One of its latest policy outputs is a reviewof the progress and prospects of the ARF.Under the initiative of CSCAP’s SingaporeNational Committee, a working paper on‘The ARF into the 21st Century’ examinedways to move the ARF forward,particularly towards pushing thepreventive diplomacy agenda. CSCAP hasalso done a lot of work on promoting theconcept of comprehensive and humansecurity. These reservoirs of ideas andnorms can go a long way towardspromoting human rights in Asia Pacific.

As Track Two institutions, ASEAN-ISISand CSCAP are known to push theenvelope by examining issues thatgovernments may perceive as sensitive. Thecollaboration and linkages between TrackTwo institutions and ASEAN and the ARFare therefore important in contributing tothe promotion and protection of humanrights, as well as conflict prevention in theregion.


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If Track Two bodies are the epistemiccommunities that we can count on, theparticipation of Track Three, or membersof civil society, in promoting humanrights is crucial. Civil society groups cancomplement the efforts of regionalinstitutions and the UN through theirown work on human rights advocacy.More importantly, they are well placedto serve as conduits between local actorsand the UN, ASEAN and the ARF inconflict prevention. There shouldtherefore be a need for a vertical dialoguebetween the ARF, with people’sorganizations and non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) as Track Three.

There has not been much contactbetween local actors and ASEAN or the

Expanding the Circle of ‘Inclusiveness’ to Non-state Actors

10. For details relating to the disputes see references listed in note 9.

ARF in the region. Unlike the EU, whichprovides for a structured representationof civil society in its various activities,or even Southern Africa ’s SADC(Southern African DevelopmentCommunity), which provides for anNGO division in its secretariat, neitherASEAN nor the ARF provide for civilsociety representation. However, there issome progress in engagement betweenTrack Two and Track Three in ASEAN.Through the initiative of ASEAN-ISIS,the ASEAN People’s Assembly (APA) wasstarted in 2000. It was the first time everthat representatives from a wide array ofcivil society groups in the region werebrought together to dialogue with TrackTwo. The third APA was held in Manilain September 2003.

The Importance of the UN in the Protection of Universal Rights for Ethnic Minorities and Religions

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The Importance of the United Nations in theProtection of the Universal Rights for EthnicMinorities and Religions

Nicholas Howen*

* Nicholas Howen is Regional Representative for Asia Pacific in the United Nations Office of the High Commissionerfor Human Rights (OHCHR), Bangkok, Thailand.

I think the United Nations (UN) isambivalent, or maybe even schizophrenic,when it comes to minorities. Member statesin the UN created the GenocideConvention, yet in Rwanda, UNpeacekeepers were not permitted to protecteven a small fraction of the hundreds ofthousands of Tutsis (and moderate Hutus)who were killed during the genocide in 1994.

It is perhaps not surprising to see thecontradictions within the UN when youask, ‘What is the United Nations?’ The UNis a group of governments, but also withthe participation of civil society. The UNis a series of agencies and programmes thatwork on the ground, with international civilservants who have some space to act, withinsignificant political constraints. The UNis also the bodies and mechanisms, someof them independent, set up bygovernments to protect human rights.

What is important for us today is that theUnited Nations is all of us. This issomething that Kofi Annan as the UNSecretary General has very muchemphasized. Therefore, as we consider howthe UN is relevant for minorities, I wouldask you to consider how you want tochange the organization. After all, almostevery body or mechanism or treaty createdsince the UN was established exists becauseof the power of ideas and advocacy ofpeople and organizations of the formalstructures of the United Nations. This

gathering of civil society and governmentaland political figures should consider howwe actually want to make the UN moreeffective on minority issues.

If we were to write about minority issuesas a security issue, the chapter on the UNwould be very short, unlike the chapter onthe OSCE. There has been insufficientthinking within the UN, except at therhetorical level, about the fact that if youfail to deal with minority issues, situationscan lead to violent conflict. You will findsome references in General Assemblyresolutions and Security Councilresolutions. In the early 1990s, the conceptof preventive diplomacy was developed: theUN would put people in place, on theground, to help stabilize situations beforeconflicts erupted, especially where minorityissues were involved. Unfortunately, thiswas only put into practice in relation toMacedonia in the 1990s.

Within the UN, when addressing minorityissues, you need to look at the humanrights system. I would like to explore theeffectiveness of the UN human rightssystem on minority issues under fourheadings: first, using the UN to createstandards or norms; second, the UN as aforum; third, the UN as a source ofremedies for injustices suffered by minoritygroups; and fourth, the UN as anoperational organization on the ground inall of your countries.


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In the area of standard-setting we againconfront the schizophrenia of the UN.Some of you know that in 1948, statesrejected the proposal to include an expressparagraph in the Universal Declaration onHuman Rights to protect minorities. True,we have the Genocide Convention, but weknow that the weak implementation of thistreaty has been particularly tragic.

So we have to rely on the rather briefreference to minorities in Article 27 of theInternational Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights, the protection of freedomto practice religion found in the UNDeclaration on the Elimination of All Formsof Intolerance and of Discrimination Basedon Religion or Belief (1981) and, of course,we have the 1992 Declaration on the Rightsof Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,Religious and Linguistic Minorities(adopted by the General Assembly on 18December 1992, Resolution 47/135). Imention this Declaration because it is oftenoverlooked. But its text does actually speakin a very relevant way to many of theminority issues. I want to point to eightkeywords or themes in this Declaration thatresonate with me.

The Declaration is about recognizingfundamentally the right of existence ofminorities. It is about the right to assertan identity and to do so in different waysor forms that are important to particularminority groups. It is about the right toeffective participation of minorities incultural, religious, socio-economic andpublic life. It is about maintaining contactswithin a country and cross-border. It isabout the community, being able to be partof a community, as well as maintaining one’sidentity as an individual. It is about theobligation of states to take special measuresto protect minorities. It is about the factthat the interests of minorities must betaken into account whenever there are

decisions that affect them. And finally, itis about the duty of internationalcooperation, the obligation of governmentsto work together to address minority rightswith fairness and justice.

For me, these eight keywords or themesreally encapsulate many of the issues wehave discussed: existence, identity,participation, contacts, the community,special measures, due regard for legitimateinterests and international cooperation.

Should there be a legally binding UN treatyto protect the rights of minorities?Objectively, many human rights advocateswould say the answer is obvious: ‘Yes, ofcourse’. In the process of internationalhuman rights law-making over the last 15years we have seen marginalized groups insociety and those working on their behalf,standing up and saying ‘we have missed outon the light of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights, we must be brought infrom the shadows’. This has led to treatiesprotecting certain groups. It has happenedfor children with the Convention on theRights of the Child; for migrant workerswith the Migrant Workers’ Convention. Itis happening now as the disabilitiesmovement is working for a new conventionon the rights of persons with disabilities.It is not happening in relation to minoritygroups because the UN is a political bodywithin which there are of course clashes ofpolitical interests.

But if those working on minorities believethat a new, legally binding globalbenchmark or standard is required, thenthey should present and introduce thisvision for further discussion. The outcomewill depend on the decision of memberstates, but civil society can propose it.

And of course, I suppose, the starting pointI should have made was that if all human

1. Creating UN Human Rights Standards to Protect Minorities


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rights already guaranteed in the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and existinghuman rights treaties were alreadyrespected for all people, we would not havethe same sort of difficulties relating to therights of minorities. It is because their

rights are not adequately protected byexisting standards that minority groupsmake a claim to special rights and measuresto be able to enjoy the same rights as othersin society.

2. The UN as a Forum on Minority Issues

Despite all the weaknesses of the UN, Ibelieve a particularly strong aspect of itswork is its ability to act as a forum forgroups to raise issues and create politicalspace at the international level. The UN isremarkably open to civil society incomparison to most other intergovernmentalorganizations. This is especially true inrelation to indigenous populations andminority groups. In most cases, groupsseeking to access and speak at UNmechanisms on indigenous and minorityissues do not have to go through thetorturous bureaucratic process of applyingfor some form of consultative status.

The Working Group on IndigenousPopulations, I think, has probably becomeone of the most important internationalforums where indigenous groups have beenable to amplify their voice internationally.And now we also have the New York-basedPermanent Forum on Indigenous Issues.

Similarly, we have the Working Group onMinorities, which is eight years old. TheSub-commission on Human Rights (agroup of 26 independent experts electedby the Commission on Human Rights)established it in 1995 to implement theDeclaration on Minorities. It is the onlymechanism in the UN entirely devoted tominority issues. It consists of five expertsfrom five regions of the world, includingfrom this region, Soli Sorabjee, theAttorney-General of India.

During the Working Group’s annual one-week sessions, any minority group can go

to Geneva and speak on the record beforeexperts, governments and civil societypresent. Groups are only excluded if theyadvocate violence or are a political party.Otherwise, freedom of expression is therule at the Working Group. And so it reallydoes give a sort of resonance to opinionsand is an opportunity for networking.

During the 2003 session of the WorkingGroup, groups from Southeast Asia raisedminority issues relating to Mindanao in thePhilippines, Aceh in Indonesia and WestPapua in Indonesia. These issues were alsoall reflected in the report of the session.

The Working Group on Minorities couldbe more effective, but it has, by and large,fulfilled this role as a forum. One of theweaknesses of the Working Groupexpressed by some is that it has never beenable to address an actual situation ofminority rights. It can listen to issues raisedby minority groups at the meetings andreflect them in the report. But it does notdo any fact-finding. It does not makerecommendations about particularminority problems in particular countries– because the Commission on HumanRights, the parent body of the Sub-commission, has not given it this mandate.

So the question for you is whether memberstates in the UN Commission on HumanRights should be encouraged to direct theSub-commission on Human Rights to domore with its Working Group onMinorities. Clearly, it is politically sensitive.This needs to be explored with member


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states in a way which is constructive andcooperative, and which tries to work

through these minority issues pragmaticallyand with principle.

Thirdly, the UN can be a source ofremedies for individual victims of humanrights violations and a way to address realcountry situations. Because of the lack ofany minority-specific mechanism, apartfrom the Working Group on Minorities,we have to turn to the general humanrights system. Minority groups haveperhaps underutilized this system.

Over the years, the UN Commission onHuman Rights (53 member states thatmeet for six weeks every year, March toApril, in Geneva) has created 26independent thematic experts to deal witha vast range of human rights issues, fromarbitrary detention to disappearances, totorture, to health, to education, to food,to violence against women. They are, Ithink, one of the best kept secrets of theUN human rights system. Most canreceive complaints and raise individualcases with governments, any government.This is mainly done as confidentialcorrespondence, but they also make publicstatements when they consider thisappropriate. Most can make countryvisits with the consent of the governmentconcerned. All write annual reports to theCommission, with recommendations tomember states about how to tackleparticular human rights problems.

One of the 26 thematic experts is theSpecial Rapporteur on IndigenousPopulations, Mr Stavenhagen, who visitedthe Philippines last year.

3. The UN Human Rights System as a Source of Remedies forInjustices against Minority Groups

The thematic experts could be encouragedto shape more of their work to addressminority issues. For example, at sometime the Special Rapporteur on the Rightto Health could come up with a report onthe right to health relating to minoritygroups. (The Special Rapporteur onHousing has already produced a specialreport on women and adequate housing.)

The UN human rights system is also basedon six (now seven) core human rightstreaties (relating to civil and politicalrights; economic, social and culturalrights; children; discrimination againstwomen; torture and racial discrimination,with the seventh being the new migrantworkers’ convention). Under each of thesix treaties, an independent committeeexamines how states that have ratified therelevant treaty have implemented theirobligations.

But we have a problem in Southeast Asia,because relatively few states have ratifiedthe core human rights treaties. If we areserious about the universality of humanrights we need to work together toencourage governments in the region toratify all these treaties. This would be animportant, symbolic moment, when thereshould no longer be controversy about theuniversality of human rights.


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Fourthly, the UN is more than a series ofintergovernmental meetings, it is more thancivil society advocacy or the bodies andmechanisms in Geneva I have mentioned.The UN is also the practical development,human rights and humanitarian work in-country carried out by the UNDevelopment Programme, by my office,by agencies working on refugees, food,health, agriculture, education, children,culture and so on.

We are now seeing one of the mostsignificant changes in the way UNdevelopment agencies work on the ground.We are moving slowly from the idea ofdevelopment as the provision of services,to the idea of development as a process tohelp social change in society so thateveryone can enjoy their full freedoms andmake choices about their lives. Increasinglydevelopment practitioners are asking:which groups are marginalized anddiscriminated against? What are the long-term underlying and structural, economic,political and social reasons why these groupshave never benefited from trickle-downeconomics, why do they lack a voice indecisions that affect them? And how do youbuild the capacity of these groups to claimtheir rights? How do you build the capacityof governments to respect, promote andfulfil rights?

It is potentially a huge change. The changeshave been driven by an understanding that‘development’ has often failed because ithas failed to deal with structural inequalitiesin society that prevent developmentreaching marginalized groups. Too oftendevelopment practitioners have justaccepted what is often called the ‘elitecapture’ of resources, the elite capture ofdevelopment. It happens again and again.

This change in development is happeningin a gradual and cooperative way withgovernments, because that is the way theUN works.

Clearly this is all potentially of great benefitto minority groups to the extent that theytoo have been marginalized. It includes theUN working with authorities to say that astable and harmonious society is onlypossible if the inequalities that lead toconflict are addressed. It involves helpinggovernments to implement their obligationsunder international human rightsstandards, which, if respected for all, willoften prevent such conflict.

I would say to you that you need to betalking to the UN agencies in yourcountries and asking how are they dealingwith the most marginalized anddiscriminated groups. Because even withinmarginalized groups, there are moremarginalized groups. For example, I havedone a lot of work with the disabilitiesmovements, within which the intellectuallydisabled are themselves discriminatedagainst by others who have disabilities.

So if the rights-based or human rightsapproach continues to be encouraged ina very cooperative way, it can assistminority groups.

A good recent initiative of the WorkingGroup on Minorities has been to startorganizing sub-regional seminars. The firstone in Asia Pacific took place in ChiangMai, Thailand, in December 2002. It wasa gathering mainly of minority groups andit adopted a series of recommendationsand conclusions that reflect the way thesegroups see the reality of their lives inSoutheast Asia.

4. The UN as an Operational Development Agency Active onthe Ground


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I would like to highlight seven particularrecommendations or themes.

First, the gathering put particular emphasison civil society participation and effectiveparticipation, a word that was repeatedagain and again.

Secondly, there was an emphasis on theneed for minorities to have remedies forviolations of human rights. Withoutremedies, human rights are merelyrhetorical.

Thirdly, the seminar concluded thatcitizenship rules must be applied in arational, objective and non-discriminatoryway, and birth registration must beprovided for all children.

Fourthly, transmigration policies should notbe carried out in a way which implantssettlers in minority areas and weakens theireffective participation.

Fifthly, states should guarantee transbordertravel and facilitate cooperation betweengroups split by borders.

Sixthly, states should respect and protectby law customary lands and domains.

Finally, states should ensure autonomy anddecentralization. The minority groups sawas basically positive the changes inSoutheast Asia in this respect, butemphasized the need to tailor such changesto the specific requirements of eachsituation and to ensure that they really doresult in actual, effective participation ofminority groups.

Let me finish with a quote from Kofi Annan.One of the reasons I am in the UnitedNations is because I do respect my boss. Ithink he is a moral leader. And he is alwaysgood for a quotable quote. I would like toleave you with these thoughts. The UNSecretary General said in April 2000, andI quote:

We must do more to prevent conflictshappening at all. Most conflicts happen incountries, especially in those which are badlygoverned or where power and wealth arevery unfairly distributed between ethnic orreligious groups. So, the best way to preventconflicts is to promote political arrangementsin which all groups are fairly represented,combined with human rights and minorityrights and broad-based economicdevelopment.

Promoting Human Rights Development in the People’s Republic of China

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Promoting Human Rights Development inthe People’s Republic of China: TheGermany-China Human Rights Dialogue

Jiang Shu Xian*

* Jiang Shu Xian is the General Secretary of the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU),Beijing, People’s Republic of China.

Since September 1999, there have beenfour people-to-people dialogues betweenChina and Germany on human rights. Bothparties have felt that the dialogues weremeaningful and beneficial.

Each dialogue has gone deeper into theissues and carried greater influence thanits predecessors. The governments of bothcountries are also placing increasingimportance on them.

The theme of the first seminar was ‘TheDevelopment of Human, Social, Economicand Cultural Rights’. During the seminar,both parties exchanged opinions on theconcept of human rights, obtainedcommon consensus and clarified numerousmisunderstandings. A stage of mutualunderstanding was reached.

In the second and third seminars, bothparties discussed in great detail the themesof ‘Human Rights Policy and Social Rights’,and ‘Development of Human Rights andLegal Systems’, among other things. Thediscussions went deeper and were moreconcrete. Both sides not only touched ontheory, but also shared their individualsuccesses and experiences in implementingpolicies to safeguard human rights invarious sectors. The dialogues wereconstructive as both sides came to the tablewith the sincere desire of promoting theircountries’ human rights development. In

the course of the discussions, there weredifferences of opinions. However, as anattitude of openness and desire to learn anddraw lessons from each other prevailed, thedisagreements did not affect the friendshipbut strengthened the understanding andfriendly relations between them.

Through dialogues on various fields ofhuman rights, we have enhanced ourmutual understanding, communication,knowledge and learning from each other.The friendship between the two countrieswas further developed and human rightsdevelopment on both sides benefited. As aresult, the dialogues were valued andsupported by the governments of bothcountries.

On 30 June 2000, during Chinese premierZhu Rongji’s visit to Germany, the directorof the China Legislative Affairs Office ofthe State Council, Yang Jingyu, and theGerman minister of justice, Herta Däubler-Gmelin, signed the ‘Sino-GermanAgreement on Law Exchange andCooperation’. One of the items in theagreement is the people-to-people dialogueon human rights between the two countries.This treaty has provided the workingmechanism for our dialogues to continue.

In summarizing the outcome of theseseminars, I believe we have reached thefollowing common consensus:


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Through exchange, both sides have gainedmore understanding on the universality andpeculiarity of the human rights relationship.To safeguard human rights is to realize aperson’s dignity and freedom. Until everyperson in a society has complete freedomof development, human rights have notbeen achieved. This can only happen whenthere is high productivity and society istruly equal. Currently no country in theworld has reached this stage. As such, everycountry has the tremendous and difficulttask of continually improving its humanrights. The issue of human rights willbecome more prominent when theeconomy, society and political environmentmove forward. People’s understanding ofand demands for human rights will alsoincrease. As such, improving human rightsis a long-term task.

We acknowledged that as every country’ssituation is different, every country has a

Dialogue on equal footing and mutual exchange should take place because bothcountries have similar principles yet each is unique in its approach to safeguardinghuman rights

different responsibility to safeguard itshuman rights at different stages. Everycountry is unique. To a developing countryand its people, the most critical humanrights issue is to take care of the right tosubsistence and development. Those wholive in developed nations must not forgetthat there are still billions of people in thisworld living in hunger. A child in adeveloped country will not seek food andwater whereas a child in a developingcountry cannot enjoy a symphony on anempty stomach. If poor people seek thefreedom of migration, it is very likely thatthey will be treated as illegal immigrantsand put into jail. Human rights issuescannot be resolved with the same modeland system. Every country needs to assessits own economic climate, religious andcultural heritage, political background, etc.,and will have to adopt different strategiesto promote human rights development.

Human rights must be guaranteed through legal systems

Although safeguarding human rights needsthe push of the people and media, the mostimportant step is through legislation andlaw enforcement. Whether legislation canbe effective or not will depend on who holdsthe power of legislation. Before China wasliberated, the country had no sovereignrights and its people had no status. China’sinvaders and oppressors robbed its peopleof their rights. It was only after the peopleof China fought courageously that theyobtained the right to be the masters of theircountry. This is a prerequisite ofsafeguarding human rights. It is also thefoundation for the birth of the Constitutionof the People’s Republic of China. TheConstitution is the fundamental law of acountry. Under the provision of theConstitution of the People’s Republic of

China, ‘all the rights of the country belongto the people of the People’s Republic ofChina’. Through this legal framework, theChinese people have made their dreamscome true. The Constitution hasspecifically defined the political rights ofcitizens, such as the rights to vote and standfor election; the rights to freedom ofspeech, publishing, gathering, formingassociations and demonstration; the rightsto personal freedom, wealth ownership,religious belief and freedom; as well as therights to monitor government organizationsand public servants. The economic, culturaland social rights of citizens are also draftedinto the Constitution. In order to ensurethat citizens enjoy the benefits of humanrights, the Constitution stipulates that‘every citizen of the People’s Republic of

Promoting Human Rights Development in the People’s Republic of China

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China is equal in the eyes of the law’. Noperson or organization has privileges abovethe Constitution and the law. Allgovernment agencies must carry out theirofficial duties in accordance with the lawto safeguard citizens’ rights. When citizensexercise their rights, they must not harmthe interests of the country or society, northe freedom and rights of other citizens.

In order to fulfil the provision under theConstitution, there is a need to formulatespecial laws in different sectors to safeguardthe rights of different people. Since Chinaimplemented its policies of reform andopening-up and opted ‘to rule the countryby law’ as its basic national policy, its legalsystem has been strengthened. The NationalPeoples’ Congress and its StandingCommittee have formulated nearly 400nation-wide laws, the State Council hasformulated over 700 administrative laws,while the Local People’s Congress at variouslevels has formulated over 6,000 local lawsand regulations. The National People’sCongress is planning to establish a Chinesesocialist legal system by 2010.

Setting up special legislation is a long-termprocess and legislation has to becontinuously refined. In every country, asthe social economy develops, the interestsof people will change. In order to handlethe relationships among people andsafeguard the rights of different people insociety, the legal system must continue toimprove and develop. As every countrysituation is different, each countrylegislature has its own unique model.Hence, there is scope for mutualexchange, learning and drawing lessonsfrom one another. This will promote thedevelopment of human rights issues. Theexchange between China and Germany onlegal matters has already started and verygood results have so far been achieved.Non-governmental organizations from thetwo countries have also discussed therelationship between human rights and thelegal framework. In future there will beother exchanges on protecting the interestsof different people groups. This is howwe work solidly towards safeguardinghuman rights.

Presently we are facing rapid expansion ofthe economy through globalization anddiversification. We have encountered newopportunities and challenges to safeguardhuman rights. From a global point of view,international relations have evolved into avery complex matter. The two importantquestions on peace and development havenot been resolved. The key issue that needsto be addressed urgently to safeguardhuman rights is the reduction of theinequality between the countries of thenorthern and southern hemispheres and theeradication of poverty in developingcountries. Unless poverty is eradicated,social imbalances will become acute,politics will become unstable and people’s

Changes in situation have provided new scenarios for human rights issues to beresearched together

sense of security jeopardized. As economiesexperience new interrelated yet competingchanges, every country in the world willhave to face the task of economicrestructuring. Governments have to ensuretheir economies grow continuously tosafeguard the employment rights of theirpeople and achieve social justice. This is anew challenge faced by all countries in orderto safeguard their human rights. When thesocial environment changes, the first to beaffected are the rights of women andchildren, old people, the handicapped, thepoor and the unemployed. Though theeconomic development of our twocountries is different, the rights of thesegroups of people still have to be addressed.


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The dialogue on human rights needs to beconcerned not only with concepts, but alsowith practical steps and concrete measuresto safeguard human rights. An atmosphereof willingness to learn and draw lessons

from each other will benefit human rightsdevelopment in both countries. Both sidesfeel that the dialogue has been very usefuland needs to be continued.

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Bridging Tensions between Traditions and Modernization in the Era of Globalization

With regard to the history of the conflict-sensitive relationship between tradition andmodernity in Asia, I have eleven theses toshare:

1. Traditional societies, in Asia in generaland in Indonesia in particular, werefeudalistic, hierarchical and non-democratic. Throughout the history ofAsia, from Afghanistan in the west, toSouth Asia, Northeast Asia andSoutheast Asia, there were manydifferent monarchies. Traditionalsocieties were organized hierarchically,and were characteristically feudalistic.

2. These traditionally feudalistic societiesof Asia were also generally maledominated, and did not believe ingender equality. Women were notconsidered equal with men. However,there have been some exceptional casesin Asian history where women have hada significant role, or occupied apowerful position in society. Indonesia,for example, had a Queen of theKingdom (Ratu Kencana Wungu in theMajapahit Kingdom) and in traditionalKorean society, priests called syamanwere mostly women and played asignificant role in society.

The Asia-Europe Dialogue of Cultures:‘Bridging Tensions between Traditions andModernization in the Era of Globalization’

3. These traditional Asian societies werealso deeply spiritual and upheld highmorality, that is, social mores (adat orcustoms) were considered sacrosanct forthe sake of harmony. Any transgressionof these rules of conduct, any violationof the mores, created an imbalance andproblems, and had to be rectified. Thisusually was done through customaryrituals.

4. Asians encountered modernity whenWestern people ventured to Asia,bringing with them not only differentreligious traditions, but also secularismand its fruits, i.e. science and technology.This does not mean that there was noscience or technology in Asia, but thatWestern science and technology werelargely the fruit of secularism.

5. When traditional societies in Asia wereconfronted with modernity andsecularism, Asian tradition yielded toit. When you see a traffic sign thatindicates ‘yield’, you have to give wayto other vehicles before you cancontinue. Asian tradition yielded toWestern modernity and secularism andits science and technology, and as aresult was somewhat left behind.

* Judo Poerwowidagdo is the Executive Director of the Centre for Empowering Reconciliation and Peace, Jakarta,Indonesia.

History of a Conflict-sensitive Relationship: Tradition versusModernity in Asia and Europe

Ten Statements

Judo Poerwowidagdo*


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6. When Asian societies adopted themodernity, secularism, democracy,science and technology brought byEuropeans, conflicts were inevitablebecause Asian traditional values andpractices were not in accord with these.

7. As long as Asian societies, Indonesiansociety in particular, remained‘traditional’, i.e. keep their traditionsintact, there was no conflict with theWest. They were simply dominated orsubjugated and ruled by modernWestern (European) powers (society).

8. Indonesian political leaders realized thatAsia could defeat the West only afterJapan won the war against Russia in1905. This was possible because Japanhad opened itself to the modern West.In 1908, the Indonesian NationalAwakening Movement (Boedi Oetomo)began to use or apply modernorganization techniques and secularscience and technology in their fight forindependence from Dutch colonialpower. Conflict between themodernizing Indonesian society and theDutch colonial power was inevitable.

9. The struggle for independence inIndonesia was successful. Independencewas achieved because national political

leaders used modern organization,ideology (nationalism) and secularscience and technology in their strategyto gain freedom and independence.

10. ‘Dialogue’ is the best method orstrategy to resolve conflicts betweensocieties (parties) of different interests.‘Diplomacy’ eventually became the bestmeans of solving conflicts between theIndonesians and the Dutch colonialpower. Diplomacy (round-tabledialogue) resolves conflicts better thanthe use of force or power. Diplomacycan prevent violent conflicts and shouldbe applied more in preference to theuse of force (weapons) to resolvedifferences in political, cultural,economic, social and religious interests.

11.The current situation of terrorism isthe fruit of the inability (orunwillingness) of powerful nations tounderstand the needs and interests ofthe less powerful, marginalized societiesglobally; and the inability (orunwillingness) of powerful nations toprovide justice and equality at the globallevel. I do not think or believe that‘terrorism’ is a result of the conflict oftraditions and modernity, or amanifestation of the clash of civilizationsin Huntington’s terms.

Donald Sassoon*

* Donald Sassoon is Professor of Comparative European Studies at the Department of History at Queen Mary,University of London, United Kingdom.

Tradition versus modernity? This is amodern question. The concept of traditionnecessarily requires its counterpart:modernity.

Before the modern era, all discussion aboutchange, progress and reform requiredmodernity – ‘the new’ – to be somewhatdisguised, masquerading as a return to an

‘authentic’ pre-existing tradition, often aninvented one. All the challenges mountedagainst the Roman Catholic Church weredepicted by their promoters as a return tothe true tradition. Even the movement forthe unification of Italy, a modern movementaimed at an objective that had never existedbefore, was called by its supporters IlRisorgimento, the resurgence.

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The lure of the new is, in itself, not new.Since the end of the last century, modernityhas had considerable appeal, hence theproliferation of the term ‘new’: art nouveau,the New Imperialism, the New Woman,the New Liberalism and, later, the NewOrder (Hitler), the New State (Salazar), theNew Deal (Roosevelt), the New Freedom(Woodrow Wilson), the New EconomicPolicy (Lenin), the New World Order(George Bush senior), the nouveau concerteuropéen (Jacques Delors), the New Right,the New Left, the New Age, the nouveauxphilosophes, the New Economics, etc. TonyBlair’s 1996 speech ‘New Britain: MyVision for a Young Country’ was precededby Harold Wilson’s 1964 ‘The New Britain’.

In the modern age, modernity faces a worldwithout, if I may say so in this context, anyveil. It feels itself to be the superior twin.Tradition, at least in Europe and probablyeverywhere else, is on the defensive. To befor change is good. It is a positive value. Tobe against change requires some sort ofjustification. Modernity has won.

But this victory has not been easy. To tracethe site of this conflict one needs to returnto the end of the nineteenth century whenwe had the obsessional use of the word ‘new’and when modernism raised its head, evenin a religious movement within the Church,duly condemned as heretical, false, rash,bold and offensive by the Pope (Pius X) on3 July 1907 with the decree LamentabiliSane (with truly lamentable results).

Behind the word ‘modernism’ there lurksanother word, the same one that lurksbehind ‘globalization’: it is capitalism. Inthe present era, the era of its great victory,the word ‘capitalism’ has a distinctive, old-fashioned sound. It is suggestive of ancient,no longer ‘modern’ Marxist dogmas. It isequally suggestive of an older, brasher formof capitalism, of manufacturing andsmoking chimney stacks, of proletariansand industrial bosses.

Yet it is worth reminding ourselves of theenormous modernity of Marx’s prophecy,written in 1848:

Modern industry has established the worldmarket … This market has given an immensedevelopment to commerce, to navigation,to communication by land … The need ofa constantly expanding market for itsproduct chases the bourgeoisie over thewhole surface of the globe. It must nestleeverywhere, settle everywhere, establishconnections everywhere … The bourgeoisiehas through its exploitation of the worldmarket given a cosmopolitan character toproduction and consumption in everycountry … In place of the old wants,satisfied by the production of the country,we find new wants, requiring for theirsatisfaction the products of distant lands andclimes. In place of the old local and nationalseclusion and self-sufficiency, we haveintercourse in every direction, universalinter-dependence of nations. And as inmaterial, so also in intellectual production.The intellectual creations of individualnations become common property … Thebourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement ofall instruments of production, by theimmensely facilitated means ofcommunication, draws all, even the mostbarbarian, nations into civilisation … Itcompels all nations, on pain of extinction,to adopt the bourgeois mode of production;it compels to introduce what it callscivilisation into their midst, i.e., to becomebourgeois themselves. In other word, itcreates a world after its own image …

These are very familiar lines, not onlybecause they have been cited so manytimes, but because the 30-year old KarlMarx, writing the Communist Manifesto in1848, is describing a world which isfamiliar to us. It is our world. Reading thesewords, once again, we are jolted into aninescapable feeling of recognition. Thisbourgeoisie on the rampage, destroying thepast wherever it goes, with no memory ofit, and no wish to remember, may havebeen only a glimmer in 1848, but we nowrecognize it as the apparently unstoppable


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force it has become. In fact we recognizeourselves in it, at least those of us (and inthe West it is the majority) who, whetherfrom a position of hostility or of support,feel part of this new world as we go aboutour daily life, consuming, communicating,shopping, travelling.

The great debate about globalization hasonly just started, but most people agreethat today the convergence ofconsumption, including culturalconsumption and lifestyles, has reachedunprecedented intensity. Increasingly webuy, eat, wear, watch and listen to thesame things. And most of those who arenot part of this enchanted world ofconsumer capitalism – the majority of theworld’s population – appear to want to joinit and work hard to do so.

Underpinning this world-wide system is anequally global ideology – market capitalism– which no longer needs defending. Itsuniversal appeal encounters nocountervailing force. We are all, as somesocialist prime ministers would put it, ‘pro-business’.

If today, we are in fact at the beginning ofa new great age of capital, what are we tomake of the second half of the nineteenthcentury, a period regarded as one ofunparalleled optimism in capitalism, nearlyuniversally considered the royal road toprogress and human amelioration?

Yet, at no time in the nineteenth centurywas capitalism defended and accepted withthe vigour and conviction characteristic ofour own times, when even its mostvociferous opponents, those who had oftenpredicted its downfall, having long resistedits seductions, have laid down theirideological weapons conceding that thereis no alternative. This is the Age of Capital.

In the decades after the 1850s, however,the anti-capitalists had more support than

the pro-capitalists. The advance ofcapitalism caused considerable anxiety,even in prosperous England; and not only,as one might expect, among sufferingworkers and threatened peasants, but alsoamong the middle classes themselves whowere afraid of everything: of potentiallyseditious workers, of economic uncertainty,of rapidly changing status, of Jews and theIrish, of cholera and smallpox, and, aboveall, of the poor.

The real pro-capitalists were those whoconsistently advocated the removal of alllegal and political obstacles to the fulldevelopment of market freedoms:competition and individual enterprise.Many within this uninhibited minority –for it was a minority – recognized thatcapitalism, if unleashed, would produce,at least in the short term, far too manyvictims and consequently generate a degreeof hostility dysfunctional to capitalismitself. Correspondingly, the rapidlydeveloping socialist movement realized thatpure antagonism was not the proper basisfor a wide popular movement. Whileconfidently expecting capitalism’s collapse,they thought it better to advance a reformistprogramme that, paradoxically, wouldmake capitalism more tolerable.

Laissez-faire liberalism and the glorificationof self-interest and individualism gainedwidespread acceptance in VictorianEngland. Yet even in England, practicalliberals had to acknowledge that their ideascould not be defended with intransigence.Even William Gladstone became, whenprime minister, an advocate of limited stateinterventionism and social reformism.

The so-called Great Depression of 1873 –now held to be exaggerated – coincidedwith a growth of anti-capitalist ideas and aretreat from the rosier versions ofManchester Liberalism throughoutEurope.

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By the end of the century, traditionalindividualistic liberalism was giving way toa new ‘collectivist’ liberalism (TH Greenand LT Hobhouse). This envisaged apositive role for the state in the solution ofsocial problems and the establishment of ajust society. The road was open for the greatreforming administration of Asquith andLloyd George that laid the foundation ofthe British welfare state.

Even old-fashioned liberals were not surewhere the boundaries of state interferenceshould be erected. All agreed that the stateshould have, as Weber put it later, amonopoly of the means of force. Most alsoagreed that some basic infrastructures couldonly be built and maintained by the state,such as roads and bridges. Educationgenerated more debates. In principle,liberals were happy to leave it to those whocould afford it, but they were suspiciousthat if the state refrained from running theschools, the priests would do it. Clericaleducation was an evil to be avoided at allcosts, hence the rapid development ofcompulsory and free state education in mostEuropean countries.

The real capitalists were equally ambivalent.They somewhat understood that the freemarket, like socialism, was very nice intheory but did not work in practice. Theywanted a state that protected them fromforeign competition, i.e. from marketforces. In the real world of capitalistenterprises, the protectionists prevailed.Capitalists needed a state to lord over them,discipline them, nurture them and kill afew to save the rest; a real Hobbesian State-Leviathan overseeing the war of all againstall. Stateless capitalism never had a chance.

In Japan, the ‘invisible hand’ was simply non-existent. Japanese capitalists, created by thestate, remained grateful, obedient and loyalto it. And, by the beginning of the nineteenthcentury, Japan was the second fastestgrowing country in the world.

At the time, the critics of capitalism andmodernity were numerous.

First there were reactionaries who wantedto go back to an idyllic pre-capitalist ruralpast. These were mainly intellectuals,because few politicians could afford,politically speaking, to propose wiping outthe entire manufacturing sector. ButThomas Carlyle and Matthew Arnold hadno such inhibitions. They turned to thepast to recover the ties of affection, socialloyalty and solidarity which held togethera stable and humane hierarchy, and whichhad been destroyed by the remorselessadvance of money-based relationships.

In France, Ernest Renan lamented thephilistine attitude towards culture whichindustrialized England so prominentlydisplayed. Some of the most significantthinkers of the nineteenth centuryconcurred, including Swiss historianBurckhardt and German Heinrich vonTreitschke, who argued against theminimalist state of the liberals.

In Russia, the hostility towards capitalistdevelopment was even more widespread.Religious-minded slavophiles, like thesocialists, believed that common ownershiprepresented the best form of socialorganization, and hoped that Russia wouldbe able to skip Western-style capitalism.

In Roman Catholic countries, religioustraditionalists believed that socialism wasa godless state-worshipping creed, to befought at all costs; but they were equallyscornful of what they regarded as thefoundation of liberal capitalism:individualism. They believed that theeconomy should be organized on craftassociations based preferably on the family.

Throughout Europe, as suffrage expanded,conservative, nationalist and socialistparties had, at best, an ambivalent attitudetowards capitalism. Conservatives liked the


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idea of private property, but were afraid ofthe consequences of frenetic individualism.Socialists were not afraid of capitalistmodernity – single anti-clericalism wasimportant to them – but were hostile tocapitalism.

Traditionalist anti-capitalism wasenormously helped by the simple fact thatmuch of Europe was still deeply traditional,something which socialists and liberals,mesmerized by modernity, urbanizationand rapid economic change, had notrealized. Virtually everywhere in nineteenth-century Europe, popular religious imagesand books constituted the only real formof mass popular culture, especially inRoman Catholic countries with areasonably high level of literacy such asFrance. Women were of paramountimportance in this revival, particularly inthe countryside. They were the mainmarket for the new forms of popularreligious art. They were responsible for theunquestionable feminization of the RomanCatholic Church, the astonishing growthof the cult of the Virgin Mary and themassive pilgrimage to new shrines such asLourdes in France and Marpingen inGermany. These masses had not yet beenco-opted by capitalism, felt excluded fromthe modern society it was bringing about,and were anxious about the socialdisruption it was begetting.

What Now?Today tradition is no longer defendedseriously. However, the capitalism that rulesEurope still faces constraints: the welfarestate and the multiplicity of regulation ofthe labour markets may be on the retreat,but they still exist and cannot be done awaywith easily. This is because it has not beenthe result of the struggle of a single politicalforce – social democracy – but the resultof a complex resistance that has includedvarious shades of conservative thought(usually religiously based). Each has playedits role.

Now the situation has reversed. All themain political parties are, in one way oranother, pro-business. All of them are, withdifferent shades of emphasis, pro-globalization.

In the West, religion – with some significantexceptions – appears to be largely a spentforce, one which can activate politicalmovements only when it bases itself onprinciples which are shared by the non-religious majority: pacifism and solidarity.

There are two important exceptions. Oneis constituted by the significant Muslimminority in Europe, almost all made up byimmigrants or their children (apart fromAlbania and Turkey). This community isdeeply divided, as immigrant communitiesoften are, between a strongly assimilationistmajority and a fundamentalist minority.

The assimilationist majority is keen to playa complete role in modern society. Forthem, the appeal of tradition is residual.Tradition is, at most, a way of stayingtogether to defend themselves againstdiscrimination as well as a set of symbolicrituals (such as food and festivities) meantto keep them together.

The fundamentalist minority, in spite ofappearances, has little to do with tradition.Their ideology is new and largely invented– the case of young French Algerian womenwearing the chador is emblematic. It wasnot worn 30 years ago in the street of Parisby their mothers. Today it is an act ofdefiance and identity. It is worn by womenwho are very unlikely to want to remain inthe kitchen and have lots of children.

The other important exception to themodern waning of religiosity is in the UnitedStates of America. But there, religiousfundamentalism, the ideology of a minority,is totally modern. Though disguised underthe cloak of opposition to abortion anddefence of the family, its practices are, like

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those of Islamic fundamentalism, solidlyin the late twentieth century and thebeginning of the twenty-first. But whileIslamic fundamentalism can be traced, tosome extent, to the fury and anger of youngintellectuals and students who find that the

path of prosperity and wealth (the path tomodernity) has been barred to them,American fundamentalism is based on aconservative defence of those who haveachieved such prosperity and wealth.

Claudia Derichs*

* Claudia Derichs is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Institute of East Asian Studies at theUniversity of Duisburg, Germany.

1. Anwar Ibrahim, The Asian Renaissance (Singapore/Kuala Lumpur: Times Books International, 1996), pp. 127ff.2. A pioneer among such institutes is the Institute of Malay World and Civilization (Institut Alam dan Tamadun

Melayu, ATMA) at the National University of Malaysia in Bangi, Selangor.

The history of conflict between traditionand modernity is long and rich in topics,in Europe and Asia alike. I am not ahistorian – that is why I can barely claim aproficiency in evaluating historicaldevelopments from such a perspective.Rather than from a historical perspective,I would like to look at history, at therelationship of tradition and modernity inthe various civilizations and cultures of theworld, from a political science perspective.I would like to apply a comparative viewto the relationship of these two categories,hence compare the relationship of traditionand modernity in Europe to that in Asia.

Europe’s modernity is characterized by theterm ‘enlightenment’. Enlightenment servesas a rallying point in the European historyof ideas. This is, however, not valid forAsia. The former deputy prime ministerof Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, puts it intoclear words:

Unlike the West, Asia does not have itsdefining moments in history, and a commonstock of ideas that moulds a shared outlookand conscious identification with a commoncivilization … There was no Enlightenment,as in Europe in the eighteenth century, tospawn a cluster of ideas and commonattitudes towards life, the individual andsociety.1

When we say ‘Asia did not have this’, weimplicitly refer to Asia as an entity that

forms a counterpart to Europe. This makesour discussion difficult, because the termswe use today – Asia, Europe – are termsthat have been brought forward by politicalhistory, by Realpolitik, to be more concrete.Who talked about Southeast Asia, let aloneSoutheast Asian studies, before the periodof decolonization? Nobody, because it wasdifferent spheres of political influencewhich determined regional names likeBritish India, Indochina and others. Today’snation-states in Southeast Asia were createdby way of decolonization. They were thenperceived as an encompassing geographicalregion commonly known as Southeast Asiaand distinguished from Northeast Asiarather than from one another. Europeanacademia well reflects this perception: areastudies separate between Sinology,Japanology and Korean studies, butsubsume a culturally and politically highlyheterogeneous assembly of countries in thesouth quite simply under Southeast Asianstudies. It is because of this view that theMalay civilization, to name an example,has been submerged as an epistemologicalunit. The Malays (understood as a culturalcommunity) have been ‘allotted their place’in today’s nation-states of Indonesia,Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and others.Malay civilization as a subject of scienceis barely approved, it is but a few institutesin the region that hold up this transnationalperspective.2


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We do not find such a situation in Europe(with regard here to Europe as a discursivezone within which the ideas ofenlightenment were spread). As early as thenineteenth century, the nation-states inEurope possessed the opportunity to shape,write and construct their national history.There was no need for them to struggle forliberation from colonial masters in thetwentieth century; instead of fighting fornational independence, they were able tocultivate their civilizational achievementswith intensive commitment, and to adoptmodernity. This was thoroughly carried outwith transnational diffusion in terms oflanguage and culture – think, for instance,of the usage of French in the higherechelons of society, where this languagesymbolized a ‘high culture’. A commonreligious base (Christianity) served as aplatform for epistemological development,in particular the discourse onenlightenment. In Asia, different religiousand civilizational spaces produced new ideasas well, and these new ideas of coursequestioned old traditions. A commondiscursive space as found in Europe,however, could hardly evolve in the regionof today’s East Asia, primarily because

(a) discourse within the different religiousspaces tended to be practised more indepth than in breadth (withinBuddhism, for instance, Mahayana andTheravada developed their owndiscursive currents); and

(b) the political conditions (colonization)heavily discouraged an intensivediscursive diffusion that might havepromoted the development of a sharedcultural-religious ground.

After independence, practically everynation-state in the region strove to combinemodernity with a strong national notion inorder to promote its individual path ofnation-building. It is remarkable that thosestates which did not suffer fromcolonization – Thailand and Japan – had

other options and opportunities than thecolonized entities. For Japan, the historyof ideas of this country put forth quite alively and complex discourse. After ‘openingtowards the West’ in 1868, Japan had noproblem with the integration of elementsof indigenous tradition and ‘Western’modernity into its nation-building processof the nineteenth and twentieth century.The discursive space allowed for such anintegration because it could develop muchmore ‘freely’ than in the discourse incolonized neighbour states.

Frankly spoken, what seems to us inEurope as less conflict-sensitive in therelationship between tradition andmodernity is essentially contingent uponthe political history of today’s world regionsand their nation-states respectively.However, if we concentrate on cultural-religious civilizations instead of focusingon single nation-states, we discover the factof what the humanities and the socialsciences call different modernities. For theIslamic civilization, the shape of thisdifferent (or other) modernity has alreadybeen analysed substantially. For the above-mentioned Malay civilization, this processhas yet to be intensified. A prime reasonfor the slowness of the process is the factthat ‘Malay’ is understood as an ethniccategory, and as such it serves primarily toidentify Malay communities in the differentnation-states of Southeast Asia. Atransnational view that crosses the bordersand relates to a common Malay civilizationis barely applied. A (different) Malaymodernity is thus not on the researchagenda of regional scholarship. Thedominance of politics – or Realpolitik – hasonce again occupied the worldview. Fromthe perspective of national politics, doingresearch on the national history ofindividual nation-states is obviously moreimportant a task than opening atransnational view. Within the EuropeanUnion, intensive efforts have been madeto give ‘region’ priority before ‘nation’. It

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The Cultural Impact of Globalization and Modernity

* Randolf S David is Professor at the Department of Sociology, University of the Philippines in Diliman.1. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,

1986), p. 30.

has become a leading idea of the Europeanintegration process. Conversely, in Asia the‘nation’ takes precedence over the ‘region’,

Randolf S David*

In his intriguing work, Nationalist Thoughtand the Colonial World,1 the Indian writer,Partha Chatterjee, examines thecontradictions of nationalist discourse inthe developing world.

Nationalism denied the alleged inferiorityof the colonized people; it also asserted thata backward nation could ‘modernize’ itselfwhile retaining its cultural identity. It thusproduced a discourse in which, even as itchallenged the colonial claim to politicaldomination, it also accepted the veryintellectual premises of ‘modernity’ onwhich colonial domination was based.

Whether conceived in the consciousnessof the native intelligentsia or of the colonialmasters, the ‘people’ who form the nationare treated as passive subjects who mustbe rescued from themselves, tutored oreducated before they can become theauthors of their own lives. This kind ofarrogance has not been a monopoly of thecolonialists; it has also been the frame ofmind of the dominant native élite and evenof the progressive intelligentsia.

The élite’s bilingualism allows them tonavigate the waters of globalization withoutmuch effort, functioning as effectivecarriers of a sensibility that is, however,alien to the consciousness of the massesthey seek to govern. In the Philippines, theyspeak of civic duty, while the people talkof pakikipagkapwa (intrinsic responsibilityto others). They speak of independence,

while the people talk of kasarinlan(identity). They speak of citizenship, whilethe people talk of pagpapakatao (beinghuman). The intelligentsia speaks of the ruleof law, while the people talk of theobligations of kapatiran (fraternity).

These are not only different languages,they are also incommensurable valuesystems founded on differentphilosophies of life. Finding this gapproblematic, technocrats have beentrying for the longest time to drown it inthe vocabulary of modern nation-building. The persistence in thePhilippines of the various insurgencies,of millenarianism, of folk practices, ofthe great divide between rich and poor,and of the thousand and one markers thathistorians label as components of the‘little tradition’ – all attest to the failureof their efforts.

Today, like many nations in the developingworld, the Philippines is a divided societythat goes through the rituals of nationhoodwith diminishing enthusiasm. We have astanding army whose main function hasbeen, since independence, to quell internaluprisings rather than to counter externalthreats. Its mission has been not so muchto defend the nation but to complete thecampaign of pacification of the islandsbegun by colonialism. We have anintelligentsia that uses its energies more toexplain the society to the outside worldthan to interpret the national experience

and this fact is largely a result of the(political) history of that part of the world.


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in terms that our people themselves couldunderstand. The relationship between ournational leaders and the masses has beenmainly transactional and devoid of moralcommitment. Our politicians do not somuch lead and govern as preside over anuneasy truce. The recalcitrance of theexcluded has become so troublesome overthe years that many members of thedominant élite have proposed a more overtauthoritarianism in order to consolidate thenation and place it on the track tomodernity.

Modernity has tended to prioritizeinstrumental rationality, economicproductivity and individual autonomy overother equally important human concernssuch as community, good interpersonalrelations, inner calm and honour. The lattervalues may not be modern, but they areimportant sources of the kind of solidarityneeded to build citizen democracies.

In an ideal world, there should be alternativepaths to modernity. Every nation must createits own path based on the contingencies ofits own history and the sensibilities of its ownpeople. It has been disastrous for countriesaspiring to development to have taken ashortcut by importing wholesale theinstitutional framework of other societieswhose experiences were vastly different fromtheir own.

Institutions must grow from the instinctsof the people if they are to have anyenduring authority. Alien institutions,imposed from the outside, are easilysubverted. They command obedience onlyfor as long as they are supported by coerciveand remunerative power, but they do notevoke any sense of responsibility on thepart of the people, nor any of ‘the will tosolidarity of generational chains stretchingforwards and backwards’ that Nietzsche

once talked about in reference to theGermany of his time.2

Such has been, in many ways, the historyof the Philippines’ own institutionalframework, which was wholly constructedfrom the material of its colonial past. Ourleaders failed to transform and adapt thiscolonial legacy to the changing sensibilitiesof our people. Instead, it became the mainsource of the divide between the educatedfew and the vast masses. The judicial systemin my country is a telling example: its civilcode was taken from Spain, its penal codefrom the United States. What aggravatesthis situation is that the legal proceedingsin our courts have always been conductedin a foreign language – in Spanish until thearrival of the Americans, and in Englishfrom then on. To this day, witnesstestimonies rendered in a local Filipinolanguage have to be translated into Englishin order to become part of court records.

The extensive use of English by those whowere fortunate enough to go to schoolhastened the modernization of the Filipinomiddle classes and their insertion into thecircuits of the global economy. But the pricehas been the further estrangement of thevast majority who were already beingmarginalized by the effects of a dualisticeconomy.

The so-called new nations that arose fromthe ashes of colonialism today confront notonly the inherited fault lines of theirsocieties but also the problems unleashedby globalization. Many societies areimploding beneath the pressure ofglobalizing forces. As a result of thisimplosion, sub-national communities areemerging along the old fault lines, and newpowerful forces at a global level are seekingtheir incorporation. A resurgent Islam thatoffers itself as a shield against the corrosive

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, translated by R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1990),p. 105.

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* Anand Kumar is Professor and Chair of the Centre for the Study of Social Systems, School of Social Sciences,Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Anand Kumar*

effects of modernity is seeking the politico-cultural integration of its adherents acrossnations, races and continents. On the otherhand, an American-led war on terrorismis incorporating domestic conflicts bygiving them a global spin.

What is to be done? The answer cannotpossibly lie exclusively in the promotionof a cosmopolitan identity revolving arounduniversalist ideals. If they are to be commonenterprises in self-rule, nations must beallowed and supported to rebuildthemselves along lines that tap their own

cultural resources for mutual commitment.This has become more necessary todaybecause of the great inequities that theglobal market economy is creating, not onlybetween nations but especially within them.

These inequalities cannot be eased by aidand charity alone. They require decisiveredistributive policies that only a societywith a high degree of mutual commitmentamong its citizens can possibly enforce.And such commitment cannot be nurturedwithout common identities rooted ininherited traditions.

It would have been easier for me to presentmy understanding about ‘Traditions andModernization in the Era of Globalization’if the title of the session or the wholeconference had been ‘UnderstandingTensions between Traditions andModernities in the Era of LimitlessEconomic Globalization and Limits ofCultural Globalization’. Because to putglobalization and modernity in the singularwhile giving space for plurality in traditioncreates problems in the context of thequestion for us to consider. Similarly, myown presentation could be ‘Surrender,Suicide or Sustainable Development:Understanding Tensions Between Traditionand Modernity in the Era of Globalization’.

Let me begin with a footnote that traditionand modernization could be better locatedif we also gave some attention to theprocesses of nation-building andglobalization in the context of South Asia,which are related to two other processes:decolonization and democratization. I alsowant to begin by remembering two giantsof modern time: one representing Asia, theother representing Europe. They areGandhi and Einstein. Both had definiteproblems in approaching complex

relationships between traditions andmodernities. They were nervous about theclaims of modernizers. They were worriedabout the passion of the traditionalists.

Keeping that spirit in mind, let me drawyour attention to the fact that the presentwave of globalization is linked with thelate 1980s and early 1990s. People say thatthe fall of the Berlin Wall was the eventthat marks this new process. Before thewave of globalization, tensions betweentradition and modernity in South Asiawere absorbed in three areas. First andforemost was the state, because colonialhistory created a situation of state-centricinitiatives. Colonial society by definitionwas a state-centric social formation. Inthe post-colonial era, too, the stateemerged with greater legitimacy becauseof the successful introduction ofdemocratization. The second area was themarket and the third community. Thesethree together created a kind of interfacewith the external pressures and internaldynamics of tensions and changes. Therewere certainly five major patterns innegotiating social change, which is thelarger theme for the specific considerationof modernization and modernity.


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Social changes were either accepted andresulted in reforms, or rejected as aresistance of the modern, or a dialogue tookplace, or there was a destruction oftraditions, or finally, there was also abypassing of traditions. These createdtrajectories of modernization in the SouthAsian experience. There were also situationsof disenchantment with modernity inSouth Asia’s 150 years of engagement withmodernity via Westernization, which wastwinned with colonization. Now in thisenvironment you have the introduction ofglobalization.

How can globalization be defined, sincenot everything is globalization?Modernization is related to globalization.Capitalism is also related to globalization.But globalization requires specificity. Forthis paper it is better to define globalizationas the compression of time and spacebeyond the nation-state. The importantpoint is the reference to the nation-state,otherwise there is internationalization andthere is nation-building. They both havesimilar features and consequences in termsof ‘space’ and ‘time’. But globalization isunique because it is the compression oftime and space beyond the nation-state.This has three major aspects. One is thedeath of distance. Another is the end ofhistory. And a parallel attribution is thedisenchantment with modernity. Let us alsonote that there are economics ofglobalization, but politics of the nation-stateand culture of ethnicization. These threedo not gel together. They create zones oftension and domains of deprivation. Theold indicators of modernization werepolitical movements and parties, education,the process of planning, the process ofelections. This is in the realm of polity.Now there are new indicators accompaniedby the process of globalization. They arethe dream of sustainable development, theimperative of cultural dialogue, humanrights regimes, gender justice movementsand environmental care-related movements.

We find that as there are economics ofglobalization, politics of nation-state,culture of ethnicization and society ofdifferential integration, we have to payattention to ‘exclusion and inclusiondynamics’. This is where the tension islocated. People feel afraid of globalizationbecause of the possibility of exclusion. Andpeople feel attracted to globalizationbecause of the chance of inclusion. Thereare two communities of gainers and losersand they cannot be divided between Asiansand Europeans. There are gainers and losersacross continents and they are linked witheach other. Therefore there are five shiftsin the making in the context of looking atthe potential for new cultural integrationin these times of globalization, which is areality as a process. It is not a choice. Itcannot be wished away. And at the sametime it is not really something that can beput exclusively in dark colours or brightcolours. These five shifts are in need of anew global contract for millenniumdevelopment goals, which are transnationalgoals and part of process of theglobalization discourse. But they are notpart of capitalist, consumeristglobalization, which is creating so manynegative emotions and structural tensions.

What are these five shifts? First, there isthe shift from representative democracy toparticipatory democracy becauseglobalization is creating limits torepresentative democracy. It has increasedpressure to reduce the role of the state evenbefore welfare states have been fullydeveloped in South Asia.

Second, there is the shift from theglobalization of human rights to thehumanization and democratization of theglobalization process itself. The pressurefor the globalization of human rights isresisted by South Asian regimes. It is notvery fair on their part but it will be muchbetter if the agenda is larger to democratizethe process of globalization itself.

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* Indrajit Banerjee is Acting Secretary-General of the Asian Media Information and Communication Centre inSingapore and Associate Professor at the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang TechnologicalUniversity, Singapore.

The third shift is to move away from thecult of violence. Whether we like it or not,a cult of violence has been promoted inthese 15 years of globalization in terms ofinterstate relations in a mannerunprecedented since the end of World WarII. The cult of violence has to be replacedby a culture of non-violence, which has tobe around a spirit of dialogue andappreciation of differences.

The fourth shift should be from despotichegemony to democratic harmony. I do notwant to elaborate on it any further, becausethere is a need to have Americanparticipation, or at least the official voicesof the American establishment to makesense of what the critique is. For example,there is a book entitled Why Americans AreHated around the World that advocates the

replacement of this despotic hegemonywith democratic harmony.

And the fifth shift in the making is the movefrom the deepening of disparities anddeprivations to sustainable and equitabledevelopment. In short, what we have totry to do is to bring back the need to defineglobalization before getting deeper into thisdebate and also differentiate the economic,political, cultural and social moments andcomponents of globalization in the contextof tradition-modernity engagements. Thiswould establish an appropriate frameworkto explore and understand the contrast andcompatibility, communalities anddiversities between Europe and Asia, andwithin Europe and Asia with reference tothe interaction between tradition andmodernity.

Indrajit Banerjee*

In this era of increasing and acceleratedglobalization, there are undoubtedly newopportunities for intercultural andinternational understanding, tolerance andintegration. Yet, our world is alsowitnessing increasing tensions betweennations and peoples, between races,religions and communities. The threats ofterrorism are ringing out across the worldand human beings increasingly live in fearand insecurity.

Ignorance and mistrust are perhaps themost significant dangers in a world that ischaracterized by intensifying global andlocal articulations. It is here that thedialogue between cultures becomes a crucialingredient to maintain peace and harmony.

The theme of this dialogue ‘BridgingTensions between Traditions andModernization’ is particularly relevant tothe contemporary cultural landscape.

Globalization fundamentally challengesmany established cultural beliefs andpractices. Globalization alters the scopeand scale of cultural change throughprocesses of integration anddisintegration. Local cultures that havethrived and imbedded themselves forcenturies are being forced out of theirisolation through the increasing impact ofdistantiated cultural influences on theirvalues, attitudes, lifestyles and practices.

These dramatic changes create conflicts andtensions between the forces ofmodernization and those that represent deep-rooted traditions which persist and resistchange. In many ways, modernization canbe considered a natural progression and allsocieties have changed over the centuriesdue to structural political and economicfactors. Yet it is the sheer scale and speed ofchange that globalization brings with it thatcreates resistance to change.


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Resistance to modernization andglobalization also springs from historicalexperience. Globalization has been seen bymany as being coextensive with the historyof Western imperialism. Centuries ofconquests and colonization of Asia by theWest have made Asian nations sceptical ofWestern intentions. As Western nations areat the forefront of the globalizationmovement, there is fear that the processof globalization will result in the increasedhegemony of the West over the world.Recent developments in Iraq and otherparts of the world underline some of thesehegemonic tendencies and unfortunatelyjustify some of these fears and suspicions.

These fears can lead to conflicts betweenthe developed and modern nations of theWest and the emerging but still largelytraditional societies of Asia. Reconciliationand respect for cultural specificity thusbecome central to a mutually beneficial andharmonious cultural, political andeconomic cooperation between Asia andEurope. Globalization can succeed only ifit is founded on respect for culturalspecificity and diversity.

Asia has undergone profound changes overthe past two decades. Strong andunprecedented economic growth, expandingliteracy, development of infrastructure andother critical factors have forged a newAsian reality. These have in turn led tosignificant changes in Asian society andculture, and resulted in progressiveindustrialization and the emergence of anincreasingly cosmopolitan consumer society.Asia’s encounter with modernity isapparently challenged by strong local culturesand traditions that resist change andrevolution. In many Asian countries, amajority of the population still live in ruralareas that are deeply imbedded in tradition.The move towards modernity in the urbanareas thus continues to be in stark contrastto the traditionalism of rural societies andcommunities.

It is interesting to examine the discoursesand practices of Asian governments in thisconflict between modernization andtradition. While faced with the economiccompulsion to modernize their nations tobenefit from global economic integration,many of these governments have to besensitive to the local traditional practicesand values of a vast majority of theirpopulations who are also their key politicalconstituencies. Thus time and again,discourses on technology and modernizationare delicately balanced with references tolocal traditions and cultures. It is alsoimportant to highlight the fact that theprocess of nation-building, which manyAsian nations have had to undertake sinceachieving their independence, is difficultwithout the forging of a national cultureand identity, and these imperatives, too,make it mandatory for governments toemphasize the traditional values andcharacteristics of their nations as a sharedsymbolic framework which constitutes thenational identity. Religious, ethnic andlinguistic sensitivities, often identified withtradition, thus constitute importantdimensions of government policy anddiscourse.

Asia-Europe dialogue is critical in this eraof globalization. New opportunities existin increased economic and politicalcooperation between these regions andtheir nations. Yet the first task at hand isto build bridges through dialogue. Onlywhen mutual understanding, tolerance andrespect between Asian and Europeannations are established will the full potentialof globalization be achieved. It is notdesirable to reject traditionalism to espousemodernity and they are never mutuallyexclusive anyway. Traditions often concealwithin themselves the core values of asociety and community. While mostsocieties undergo superficial material andphysical changes from time to time, theyrarely lose their spiritual essence which isdeeply imbedded in history and what we

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refer to in our ordinary parlance as‘tradition’.

The greatest challenge to globalizationrests in the ability of societies to espousechange and modernity while maintainingtheir core values, practices and traditions.This is also vital for the maintenance ofcultural diversity. If modernity represents

a progressive homogenization of theworld’s cultures and practices then it isindeed not desirable. Unity in diversity,respect for the other, and a great toleranceand understanding of the world’s culturesand civilizations constitute some of thegreatest hurdles faced by mankind in thistwenty-first century.

Modernization under the Rules of Globalization

Javed Jabbar*

* Javed Jabbar is the founding Chairman of the South Asian Media Association and a former minister ofinformation in Pakistan.

1. Henri Bergson, French philosopher 1859-1941, Nobel Prize Winner in Literature 1927.

When referring to the ‘rules of globalization’it is tempting to drop the ‘s’ and sayglobalization is the rule of a single state.And to say this is not to demonize theUnited States. It is to appreciate itsextraordinary power and creativity. Forinstance, the World Intellectual PropertyOrganization in 2002 registered 44,500applications for new patents from theUnited States. The next four countries,including Germany, Great Britain, Japanand the Netherlands, could not togetherequal more than 40,000. That is the kindof unprecedented lead a single countrytoday enjoys in terms of technical creativity.

And that is related to the real root of itspower. That root is the first amendment tothe United States Constitution which says,in effect, that there shall be no law toabridge freedom of thought or expression.

We are living in a world where a singlecountry’s economy is ten trillion dollarsstrong. Elements of its armed forces arephysically present in over 100 countries atthe same time. That is certainly going toshape globalization. How do we deal withthe singularity of a particular state? It maybe the World Trade Organization, theInternational Monetary Fund or the World

Bank, which were precursors ofcontemporary globalization. Or it may bedemocracy, which is offered as the ultimatemodel, but which, particularly now inSouth Asia but also earlier in the 1930s inEurope, fails to produce checks andbalances. It can distort the whole directionof society and generate extremism whileall the institutional and theoretical checksand balances collapse.

How are these emerging tensions viewed?First, we have to note some contours, forexample, cultural contours. Bergson1 saidthat ‘culture is the sum total of man’sproducts’. But that may be too physical adefinition. There is also the view thatculture is about a society’s capacity tostimulate the creativity of its peoplesimultaneously on several levels. The levelof life and family, the level of work andproductivity, the level of free speech, thelevel of arts and crafts, the level of politicalinstitutions.

And if the individual in Asia or Europetoday lives in that context of culture, themedia are inevitably part of thismodernizing process. They are a kind ofsoothsayer who advances globalization. Butthe media also deliver self-fulfilling


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prophecies. There is a dangerous nexusthat seems to be emerging betweencorporate media and state power as a silentpartnership and even under the banner of‘freedom of expression’, wherebycorporate media actually advance theinterests of states.

The other contour is the decline of thestate. News of the death of the state ispremature. We are, in fact, living not inthe age of nations as suggested by the term‘United Nations’. We are living in the ageof the state. Never before has there beensuch a large corpus of global laws, policiesand rules on an interstate basis. States havenegotiated this new framework of humanexistence. So the state is not goinganywhere. However large multinationalsmay become, the state is only changing itsrole. It is not being eroded, particularlypost-9/11.

Another contour is that modernizationwants us to separate church from state,which is fine, because the church representsa theocratic extreme that is not acceptable.But it also wants us to go to another extreme– the secular state. And what does this meanin terms of an individual’s life? You separatethe church from the state: you separate thebody from the soul. You want the individualto fill this vacuum with the pursuit ofrational scientific thought. And that iswhere the crisis begins, with the bypassingof the spirit.

It is spirituality that is required in a state.A state need not be religious and need notbe theocratic. It does not need to besecular but it can be spiritual. And the needtherefore arises to foster the spiritual statebased on the Sufi tradition,2 which is thereal essence of Islam and which takes amystical, value-based, experientialapproach to Islam and not a hand-me-downtype of approach.

Where do we stand in Asia in general andin the Islamic world in particular againstthese contours?

I would refer to the great Muslimphilosopher and social scientist, Ibn-i-Khaldun, who lived about 700 years ago.He formulated the concept of ‘assabia’,which really represents social cohesion,group loyalty and solidarity. Even thoughit is sometimes misread as cultivatingloyalty to a tribe or promoting parochialinterests over those of humanity, the moreprofound application of assabia is theuniversality of the human communitywhich has broken down in virtually everyIslamic country.

And that is the root of the crisis, becausethe tensions within Islam are perhaps fargreater than the tensions between Islam andEurope today. There are tensions betweensects and schools of thought, and tensionsbetween a government that might representa Muslim majority but is unable to satisfythe expectations of Muslim civil society.The tensions between Muslim states wereperhaps worst expressed in the Iran-Iraqwar, which lasted almost a decade and costthe lives of millions of people.

There are the tensions of Islam and theabsence of ijtihad which is the realdevelopment of jihad that has nothing todo with violence. Jihad is the struggle forself-improvement. The Prophet of Islam,after scoring a decisive military victorysaid, ‘And now begins the real jihad’. Andfrom that comes ijtihad, which is allowedfor in Islam but which we in Muslimcountries have abandoned for centuries.It is the interpretation of Islamic sources,applying contemporary and newknowledge and rationality to what has beenrevealed in the Holy Quran and by thetraditions of the Prophet.

2. Sufism is a mystical Muslim school of thought.

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The rules of globalization from thePakistani perspective have to be seen fromhow unique Pakistan is. Pakistan could becalled the single most unique country onthe planet today.

There are five categories of nation states.The first is the historical state, of whichChina, Persia and Egypt are examples. Thehistorical state occupies the same territoryand has had the same people and the samelanguage for thousands of years. Thesecond is the migratory state. Millions ofEuropeans migrated to North America,South America, Australia and SouthernAfrica, and got rid of the locals orsubsumed them. They created beautifulnew states: migratory states. The third isthe permutated state, for example Germany.This is no disrespect to Germany, butBismarck brought together Germany in thenineteenth century and created the stateout of something very historical. The fourthis the post-colonial state, such as Jordan,Iraq, Uganda and Kenya. The fifth is thereligion-based state, and there are only twostates in this category: Pakistan and Israel.Whereas Israel does have a historicalconnection with the land on which theirprophets first preached Judaism, Pakistanhas no similar historical claim of a directconnection between our Holy Prophet’soriginal land and the territory of Pakistan.As a word, ‘Pakistan’ is a synthetic creation.It is a beautiful but new ‘put-together’name, unlike Israel, Egypt, or China.Pakistan is a country that had to developits identity soon after it was created.

Pakistan was the most modern state to beborn – and at only three month’s notice.Lord Mountbatten, on 2 June 1947,decided to ‘create’ India and Pakistan on14-15 August 1947 by arbitrarily movingup the original approximate target of 1948.Pakistan became the first country in theworld born with two wings separated by athousand miles of territory. It was the firstcountry post-World War II to disintegrate,

in 1971, and therefore had to reinventitself, to create a sense of ‘Pakistaniat’.

We are a lopsided federation with fourprovinces, one larger in population thanall the other three. And it began with aman who was an ultra-modernist:Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Under the shadowof Gandhi he is not as well-knowninternationally and is misperceived as the‘divider’ of South Asia. The fact is that hewanted to remain within a confederal Indiaright up to 1946. He could barely speakthe Urdu language and yet millions listenedto him rapt, because they totally trustedhis integrity.

Today Pakistan is ruled by a militarygeneral, which is one of our manycontradictions. But the good news is thatthe mullah alliance, known as the enemyof liberalism, secured less than 11% of thepopular vote. After the bombing ofAfghanistan, the people of Pakistan,uneducated as the majority may be, hadgreat political sense. They gave GeneralMusharraf 84% approval rating in anopinion poll (by Pew Research), whichshows the kind of enlightened motivationthat people have the capacity for.

There is a silent revolution going on inPakistan today. 33,000 women are electedto local government councils, 17% of seatsare reserved for women in our legislaturesand yet the barbaric custom of karo-kari,where a woman can be killed by herbrother or her husband merely onsuspicion of illicit sexual relations, remainsin certain areas.

Lastly, Pakistan is the epitome of freedomof expression in Asia and in Muslimcountries. By any standard it has some ofthe highest levels of freedom of expression.In fact, I would suggest there is morefreedom of expression in Pakistan’s mediathan in countries with higher levels ofsocial and economic development such as


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Singapore or Malaysia. Singapore’s percapita income is about US$22,000 andPakistan’s is about US$400.

The tensions arising from the rules ofglobalization will have to be dealt with by

each Muslim country in its own context.Islam is a very heterogeneous set ofcultures. It has its homogenous unifyingfaith but it is necessary to increase the levelof enlightenment and knowledge in Europeabout each individual Muslim society.

Sigrid Baringhorst*

* Sigrid Baringhorst is Professor for Political Science at the University of Siegen, Germany.

Globalization has led to a fundamentalchange in the nature of statehood, but thatdoes not mean that we can speak of a totalerosion of the state. Globalization hasrather lead to a transformation of the state,which takes place at two levels. On the onehand, political decision-making hasbecome a multi-layered process.Governance does not only take place at thelevel of nation-states. Political regulationsare more and more defined andimplemented below the nation-state, thatis, at the local and regional level, andbeyond the nation state, that is, on thesupranational level such as the EuropeanUnion, in international organizations suchas the United Nations, or in transnationalregimes. For citizens, this situation has animportant impact on the perception of thestate: political steering has become complexand thus it has become much more difficultto adequately assign political responsibilityand accountability.

On the other hand, we are witnessing asubstantial change in the relationshipbetween state, market and society in thatstate regulation has shifted in favour ofsocial self-regulation. The consequences ofthis shift are ambivalent. Owing to thegrowing deregulation of economic andsocial processes, individual autonomy hassignificantly increased. However, at thesame time, new problems are arising fromthe deficits of political regulation. Manycitizens feel that too much is expected ofthem – they do not feel prepared for thisnew kind of self-regulation and they are

not willing to take over the self-responsibility that state actors now expectfrom them.

What kinds of social and political cleavagesare resulting from this transformation ofthe state and, most importantly, from thechanged relationship between state, marketand society? The cleavage structures thatcharacterize current European societies arenot a new phenomenon. They are closelyrelated to the emergence of the nation-statein the nineteenth century and theconsequences of the process ofindustrialization at that time.

There are three cleavages that seemed tohave been solved in the middle of lastcentury, before they unexpectedly gainednew relevance as a result of acceleratedprocesses of globalization since the 1970s.These can be summed up as cleavagesbetween centre-periphery, state-church andcapital-labour.

The cleavage between centre and peripheryis a cleavage at the territorial level. Thenation-state in Europe was created by thepolitical incorporation, cultural adoptionand social and economic marginalizationof regional peripheries. Conflicts that arosefrom this ‘internal colonization’ are, forinstance, conflicts such as those betweenthe state and territorial minorities inScotland and in the Basque region. Theestablishment of supranational unions suchas the European Union have made itpossible for these formerly oppressed

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regions to assert their rights of autonomy.The weakening of the state at a nationallevel creates new spaces, which enable themto redefine controversies between centreand periphery. At times these conflicts canbe solved peacefully. For example, countriessuch as France and Spain have solved themthough devolution and decentralization, bystructuring their states in a more federalway. At other times these conflicts areexpressed more violently, giving cause toterrorist movements and attacks.Supranational unions provide regions andterritorial minorities with the politicalframework to claim more independencefrom the nation-states in which they areincorporated. Supranational agreementsrender regions economically moreautonomous. In terms of security, they alsobecome more independent, becausenation-states are needed less as militaryprotectors in a supranational framework.Now many regions prefer to refer toBrussels as the political centre for theirparticular claims and interests. Apart fromthe economic and security aspects, thecultural question has become a crucial oneas regional identity has grown in the contextof a general increase of collective identity-building and identity politics.

The second cleavage that characterizesEuropean societies was supposed to havebeen solved by the end of the nineteenthcentury. It is the one between religiousinterests, predominantly those of Christianchurches, on the one hand and secularistinterests of states on the other. In France,for example, this was solved throughlaicism, that is, the strict separationbetween state and church. There, thearticulation of religious identities has beenclearly confined to the private sphere. InGermany, a concordat (treaty) whichdefines the role of the church, has solvedthe conflicts arising from this cleavage inso far as there is a clearly defined andinstitutionalized cooperation between stateand church actors.

The cleavage of church versus state orsecularism versus religious interests hasbeen rearticulated in recent years in twoparadox forms. One is characterized by agrowing repression and privatization ofreligion in favour of the secular state. Therehas, for example, been a judgement by theGerman Federal Constitutional Court,which ruled on the question of whether itshould be allowed to hang up crucifixes inschool classrooms in the state of Bavariaas a symbol of Christianity. The Courtreaffirmed the state character of schools,thus supporting the right of parents to havetheir children educated in a public realmthat is free from an identifiable anddominant religious orientation.

Another controversy that is still currentconcerns the preamble of the EuropeanConvention. The question here is whetherthe European Union should profess to itsChristian origin and so include a definitereligious orientation. This debate appearsto be a rearguard action of claims made bythe churches in Europe and simultaneouslya repression of secular forces.

However, the growing importance of thecleavage between religious interests and thesecular state is, above all, a result ofglobalization processes in the form ofinternational migration movements. Labourand refugee migration have led to theestablishment of strong non-Christianethnic minorities. Ethnic minority interestsare often articulated in religious terms, suchas the demand for wearing headscarves andthe introduction of halal meat in schools,the building of mosques or, more generally,the equal treatment of Muslim and othernon-Christian religious groups in societyand state. Thus, contrary to the tendencywithin mainstream society to suppressreligion in the state sector, immigrantcommunities are asking for an increasedarticulation of religious identities in thepublic sphere.


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The third cleavage that was also supposedto have been more or less resolved is theone between capital and labour. During the1970s and 1980s there were a lot ofacademic studies dealing with this topic.Ronald Inglehardt,1 for example, argues thatthere has been a trend towards post-materialism since the late 1960s. Newsocial movements have put new issues onthe agenda that deal with questions of lifepolitics or even lifestyle politics.

After 1945, the establishment of the welfarestate and corporate arrangements betweenstate, employers and trade unions inGermany lead to a decrease in socialconflicts about employment conditions andsocial security. In the 1980s, it even seemedthat these old issues had been successfullyand permanently institutionalized in thebargaining process of the corporatist state.However, in the last decade it has becomeobvious that the old cleavage betweencapital and labour has been rearticulatedin a new form. As a result of thereformulation of the relationship betweenstate, market and society, the promise ofthe welfare state to offer institutionalizedsolutions for questions of social justice canno longer be kept and thus the corporatistarrangements are not working any more.

Altogether it seems that the position oftrade unions in the process of negotiating,especially in Germany, is harmed. Socialrights are reduced and globalization hasbecome a central element in the publicdiscourse, legitimating severe cuts in socialbenefits and a general reduction of socialcitizenship rights. Consequently, thereduction of social rights is externalized asbeing solely caused by globalization and theunhampered mechanism of the market.This has resulted in a strong anti-globalization movement, not only in Francebut in Germany too.

In this context, a fourth and new cleavagehas to be introduced, a cleavage thatspecifically addresses the issue ofglobalization and that can be characterizedby the dichotomy of universalism versusprotectionism. Universalism is understoodas the positive side of globalization: thepossibility of the regulation of the marketby supranational, transnational regimes,the establishment of a global civil society,the political participation of INGOs(international non-government organizations)and others – altogether forces whichpropagate global governance and a globalworld ethic. Contrary to this position areforces that support a protectionist opinionabout globalization. Three positions ofprotectionism can be identified:

The first one is an attitude that can be foundin most right-wing groups in Europe. Thisattitude propagates the ethnic homogeneityof nation-states. From this point of view,protectionism means the exclusion offoreigners and control of immigration.

The second is taken by most sectors of thetrade unions but also by representatives ofEuropean labour parties and church actors.In their claims and demands, protectionismis mainly implied in order to maintain thewelfare state as it is and protect nationaleconomies against global competition.

The third position of protectionism isone that is not recognized at first sight.Most conservatives and liberals plead forfree trade, the World Trade Organizationand others. However, strictly speaking,these are not universalistic positions.Their main objective is a protectionistone, namely to save the nation-state andthe national economy by making it moreable to compete successfully on aninternational level.

1. Ronald Inglehardt is Professor of Political Science and Program Director, Institute for Social Research, Universityof Michigan, USA.

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The strength of protectionist positionscompared to the st i l l rather weakinfluence of universalistic actors leads usto the f inal question: Why dogovernments as well as the majority ofthe population prefer protectionistsolutions over universalistic ones?

To my mind, the dominance ofprotectionist political positions can beexplained by two arguments: The first oneis the rational choice or self-interest ofnational actors. However, self-interest israther complex in heterogeneous societieslike those of Western Europe. There arelosers as well as winners of globalization.For the winners it makes sense to pursuetheir self-interests in terms of protectionistpolicies that strengthen the competitivenessof their national economies.

The second argument refers more to thelosers of processes of acceleratedglobalization. They support protectionistsolutions and vote for conservative or evennationalistic parties because of growing

feelings of insecurity and fears of losingout on the globalized market. As socialpsychological reactions these fears can onlybe overcome by an increasing ability toaccept risks and tolerate ambiguities, anability to see open-ended situations asopportunities and not only threats since itis not yet known what impact globalizationwill have. What is needed is the favour ofdoubt, the openness to speak about thepossible risks and advantages ofglobalization and to bear results that cannotyet be estimated.

In terms of social psychology, the mainproblem of globalization lies in the factthat, particularly in situations whentolerance of ambiguity is needed most,people tend to favour dogmatic solutionsand other forms of closed thinking becauseof their feelings of insecurity. This actuallymeans they remain closed to necessarychanges and support conservative forces ofperseverance over political forces ofreform.

Javier Viúdez*

* Javier Viúdez is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Spanish Foundation for Foreign Policy ‘EXTERIORXXI’ in Madrid, Spain.

We could state that both the logic anddynamics of modernization met togetherat a certain point in Spanish history.Modernization was, for Spain, not only apolitical aim but also a social need, or, inother words, because it was a socialnecessity, modernization became our mostimportant political aim, the symbol of ourfreedom. Changes in Spain were sonecessary that nobody thought about thenegative consequences of modernizing thecountry. No debate about globalization tookplace at that time in Spain.

Why did the process of modernizationbecome an indispensable element, anecessity, in our recent history?

During the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, the history of Spain can bedescribed as the story of an empire’sdecline – the decline of a country thatmissed the Industrial Revolution and didnot know the meaning of liberal reforms;a country that was, in fact, underdeveloped.Through the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies, Spain went from dictatorship todictatorship until the Second Republic, asmall period of time in which democracywas more appearance than reality andwhich ended in the final collective tragedythat was our civil war.

The dictatorship that followed under Francohad a tremendous impact on the daily lives


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of Spanish people over a period of 40years. Spaniards were not free and theyfaced discrimination, in particular womenand minorities. Discrimination againstwomen was easily perceptible in the areaof civil rights, family rights and commercialtransactions. Women needed thepermission of their husbands for almostevery step they wanted to take. People’sbehaviour was scrutinized by the CatholicChurch, which acted as an instrument ofsocial cohesion. Spanish people did not paytaxes because the state – the dictator –decided on the level of social rights andsocial protection the population couldenjoy. Paternalism was the essentialcharacter of the state. And there was nomercy for political dissidence. In 1975,despite being very ill and close to death,Franco ordered the execution of someyoung dissidents, ignoring appeals tocommute their sentences that came fromall over the world, including the Vatican.

With this brief description of the Spanishsituation at the beginning of the 1970s itis easier to understand how strong the willto modernize the country was.Modernization meant at the same time thepossibility of achieving a real democracyafter so many years of dictatorship. At thattime, no discussion of the advantages ordisadvantages of modernization was on thetable. Modernization was just considerednecessary and there was a great belief thatit would bring mostly progress to ourcountry and a consolidated democracy.During the 1980s, when Spain joinedNATO (the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization) and became a member ofthe European Community, the opinion ofall those who had worked so hard to bringthis to fruition seemed to be confirmed.

In Spain, modernization and globalizationhave been considered a part of the dynamicprocess of our recent history. To theSpanish mentality, globalization does notautomatically represent a danger. Although

social organizations, such as trade unions,and the rise of well known politiciansstarted during the 1990s, there was nodebate about the consequences ofglobalization, its challenges and its negativeeffects, the loss of jobs for instance.Globalization is perceived by the majorityin Spain as more of a technologicalphenomenon than a social problem. Thenumber of personal computers growsmonthly and the connectivity of homes hasincreased to an incredible extent in the lastfew years. In my view, and taking intoaccount that globalization also means anexchange of cultural influences, nobody inSpain seems to feel that we are losing ouridentity or that we are missing somethingin our lives. We are proud of our traditionsbut at the same time we do not forget thatduring the Franco era, only one politicalparty was allowed – the Traditionalist Party– and that the name of tradition has oftenbeen used against the notion of democracy.

With regard to the influences of Americanculture on the ‘Spanish way of life’, in myopinion, the influence of computers ortelevisions as technological products thatchanges our lives is more important thanthe influence of the philosophical contentsof American television series or websites,for example. In fact, we belong to the samecultural context and there is clear culturalinteraction. Spain was present in Americaand America is present in Spain. For thatreason I do not think that Spaniards supportan anti-American position. I think we areanti-imperialistic. We do not like certaindecisions taken by certain governments andin particular the vast majority of theSpanish population disagree with most ofthe decisions taken by the BushAdministration. On the contrary, PresidentClinton was very popular in Spain. Inshort, the majority of the people in mycountry might be against governments andthe decisions of governments but not againstother people or countries.

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The Spanish language is not in dangereither and neither does it represent a dangerto other languages, despite the opinion ofHuntington. Over 500 million people speakSpanish, many of them living in the UnitedStates. Here, the mutual influences betweenboth English and Spanish are important,fruitful and inevitable. Spain is not on theedge of cultural disintegration. Spain issearching for new forms of culturalintegration.

Through its membership of the EuropeanUnion, Spain has attained high democraticstandards and a reasonable level ofprosperity. The increasing number ofimmigrants living in Spain – over twomillion nowadays, and it is said the countryneeds even more – indicates for us howimportant the growth of our economy hasbeen in the last 25 years. But this newsituation of reasonable prosperity cannotbring us to the conclusion that Spain hassolved all its historical problems. On thecontrary, some of them have reachedalarming levels of tension in the last eightyears, particularly in the last four under theabsolute majority of the Partido Popular inthe National Parliament. In my view, thesepolitical tensions together with theprepotency of the government are the mainreasons for the defeat of the Partido Popularin the general elections on 14 March 2004.These tensions are firstly those between thecentral government and the AutonomousCommunities, especially the BasqueCountry; secondly those that have arisen asa result of cuts in our nascent welfare state,which have caused a new form of socialconflict, and thirdly those that have arisenonce again over the role of religion and thechurch in our secular state.

On top of this, former Prime MinisterAznar’s government put Spain in a verydifficult position within the EuropeanUnion, far removed from the decision-

making process of the EuropeanConstitution and furthermore, ourtraditionally good relationship with theUnited States of America has turned into akind of submission, whose most importantconsequence has been that Spain founditself involved in a war that nobody wanted,loosing by the stroke of Aznar’s pen itstraditional and well-known role of peace-maker in the international arena. Moreover,Aznar’s government consciously used liesand manipulation as essential elements ofthe political debate, for example when theywanted Spaniards to believe the explanationabout weapons of mass destruction forgoing to war in Iraq and also when theywanted Spaniards and the whole world tobelieve that the criminal organization ETA1

was responsible for the terror attacks inMadrid on 11 March 2004. Thegovernment went so far on that terrible day,that many foreign and Spanish journalistswere called by Spanish authorities toconfirm ETA’s responsibility, in spite ofinformation to the contrary coming fromthe police and the secret services headingthe investigation into Al-Qaeda and itscommandos in Spain. In my opinion, theseare reasons that better explain the outcomeof the Spanish general elections on 14March 2004. People voted againstsubmission, confusion, lies andmanipulation, they voted for freedom andnot because of fear. Unfortunately Spainhas been suffering from terrorism for almost40 years. We are used to it, as hard as itsounds. So it is not fair or true to say itwas fear that influenced their voting.

We hope the new socialist governmentunder the leadership of Rodriguez Zapaterowill be able to overcome the difficulties andcleavages that are creating tensions in oursociety today, to bring back transparencyand dialogue to our political life, to returnSpain to its traditional place in Europe andon the international scene, and to position

1. ETA: Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Fatherland and Liberty)


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Spain as an active participant in discussionsabout cooperation and development andpeace and security in the world, and thefuture role of multilateral institutions suchas the United Nations. In short, we wantthis new socialist government to makeSpain a solitary country again, even thepeace-maker it so recently was.

I would like to conclude by saying that withregard to Asia and our relationships withAsian countries, we are convinced that ournew government is going to pay moreattention to this increasingly important partof our foreign policy. Although the Houseof Asia, founded a few years ago inBarcelona, has developed interestingactivities, Asia was never a priority on the

Spanish agenda, excluding perhaps ourrelationship with the Philippines. Theformer government worked out a projectcalled the Asia-Pacific Programme, focusingmuch more on economic and financialaspects than on cultural exchange, but verylittle has been done from the institutionalpoint of view. The new socialist governmenthas already appointed a new specialambassador, the former director of theHouse of Asia, whose most important taskwill be to develop the Asia-PacificProgramme. We are sure our renewedinterest in Asia and the efforts of ourspecial ambassador will open a new phasefor mutual understanding, so that Asiancountries can find in Spain a reliable partner.

Cultural Difference, Citizenship and Global Cooperation

Thomas Meyer*

The Challenge of Today: The Politics ofCultural IdentityThe 11 September attacks by Muslimfundamentalists on symbols of Americanworld dominance in New York andWashington have massively revived thedebate about the challenge of a world-wideclash of civilizations. The argument, asforwarded by Samuel Huntington, goes thatwe are facing an unavoidable clash betweenthe civilizations of this world – particularlyIslam and the West (Huntington 1996;Meyer 2001). As a crucial reason insupport of this grim prospect, thehypothesis is offered that the differentcivilizations or cultures of today’s world areunable to cross the barriers or fault-linesset by their divergent definitions of basicvalues for ways of living together.

This scenario of clashing civilizations –plausible in light of the atrocities that entireethnic communities have inflicted on each

other in a crumbling Yugoslavia, or of theactivities of Bin Laden’s network of terror– seems to be gaining ground. It isbecoming the paradigm for a new world-view, causing a stir world-wide in editorialoffices and seminars, on planning boardsand during political consulting sessions,and even in the minds of the powers-that-be who hope to gain politically from it.

Not surprisingly, many are beginning toact as though the model were valid; eachparty considers itself well advised toreckon with reality as described therein,and others for their part conductthemselves in line with the model’sprognoses. In this way, the paradigm offundamentalism threatens to spreadbeyond the boundaries of its true believers.

On closer scrutiny, Huntington’s clash-of-civilizations scenario reveals all the classicfeatures of those very enticing ideologies

* Thomas Meyer is Head of the Political Academy of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn/Berlin and Professor forPolitical Science at the University of Dortmund, Germany.

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whose end it actually wishes to proclaim.Picking out some select facts from the worldof real events according to its own needs,the theory binds these into a concludingstatement on the occurrence as a whole,leaving aside what does not automaticallyfit into this deliberately evolved picture.Constructed in this form, the theory canbe used to justify interests relating to powerand supremacy, which a fair and impartiallook at the world cannot defend with anydegree of conviction. Huntington treatsdifferent civilizations as though they allconsisted of nothing but fundamentalism.

However, fundamentalism everywhere isjust one among various available optionsfor understanding and practising a culturaltradition (Marty and Appleby 1993-1995).As an extreme form of the politicization ofcultural differences, fundamentalism isneither confined to the civilization of theWest, which produced the term, nor is itessentially characteristic of, or for thatmatter, reserved for, certain civilizationssuch as Islam, widespread views to thecontrary notwithstanding. Neither is itmerely a Western instrument of analysisfor which examples may be found in othercultures, but which has simply beenimposed on alien cultures through Westernperspectives.

Contrarily, all cultures of today’s worldprove to be social discourse spaces whichare intrinsically highly diverse anddynamic. In all of them, in varying measure,fundamentalism occurs; in none of themis fundamentalism the unchallengedexpression of a culture’s identity as a whole.Empirical comparison spanning all culturesshows that under certain conditions everyculture generates currents offundamentalism alongside the omnipresentmodernizing and traditionalist ones.Despite the wide differences betweencultural environments, the fundamentaliststream in its structural features andfunctions reveals the same characteristics

everywhere and caters to similar politicaland psychological needs in all cultures: theneeds of certainty, identity and recognitionof those who feel themselves excluded orthreatened by superior forces or trends ofdevelopment (Tibi 2000).

In each of these cultures, fundamentalismdeclares war on the two rival currents ofmodernism and traditionalism,unswervingly defending the goal ofredeeming the real identity of thetraditional culture from its sullied state andresurrecting it by taking over the reins ofpolitical power and achieving absolutesupremacy, so that society is once and forall rid of the tortuous contradictions ofmodernization.

All brands of fundamentalism – be theyChristian, Jewish, Islamist, Hindu orBuddhist – tend to establish a closed systemof thinking that artificially excludesdifferences, doubts, alternatives andopenness (Meyer 1989). Thus they aim atproviding security, assurance oforientation, firm identity and absolutetruth. Thereby they arrive at some self-manufactured certainty of their beliefsystem immunized against doubt. Modern-day fundamentalism serves in its militantforms as legitimization for intellectual,religious and political claims to power andsupremacy over those who differ.

The politicization of cultural differencesconstitutes a threat in foreign policy and atemptation in the domestic. In many cases,challenges on both fronts automaticallyextend into each other, as exemplified withclassic clarity in South Asia where the samecultural differences between the two nuclearpowers, India and Pakistan, dominate bothexternal relations and domestic politicswithin the two societies, proving equallyexplosive in both cases once politicized withthe intention of creating antagonisms.Nevertheless it is almost never culturaldifferences per se, but almost always their


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political exploitation which often enoughfollows in the wake of economic conflicts.

Negative Globalization andFundamentalismFundamentalism is reinforced and in somecases even created by a variety of factorsthat are closely connected to the processof globalization (Barber 1995; Castells1997). In many cases it emerges and gainsstrength as a counter strategy to real orperceived threats to local cultural identitiesfrom the cultural and economic dominanceof the great Western, particularlyAmerican-based players on the worldmarket. Be it a counter-ideology in thedescribed sense, or a convenient tool formass mobilization in situations of socio-economic crisis and political alienation, inall cases fundamentalism is a politicalideology of the twentieth century thatrecruits members based on their sharedethno-religious characteristics.

Combining elements of the late modernage in an ambiguously pragmatic mannerwith aspects drawn from the dogmatizedstock of pre-modern traditions,fundamentalism seeks to attack not onlyillegitimate bids of foreign culturaldomination but the very structures andconsequences of the culture of the modernera – which do not find favour with it – allthe more effectively using modern meansand in a modern way. Fundamentalismprojects itself as a political ideology whichposes a – for the most part – religious and– less frequently – secular-ideological ethicas a politically absolute answer to the crisesof modernization and globalization. It doesnot, however, in any of its many varieties,offer positive solutions to the crises ofmodernization and globalization to whichit reacts – neither in social nor in economicor political terms.

Cultural Differences and the CommonGround for Democracy and GlobalCooperationResearch data show that the cultures of thisworld are by no means distinguished fromeach other by sharp or even welldemarcated differences in the validity ofcore fundamental values that are at the basisof ways of living together. It is indeed truethat individual cultures are, to a limiteddegree, characterized by special regard forparticular basic political values, such asindividualism, equality and desire for moreor less regulations of social life.

But at the same time, there is also aconsiderable overlap with regard to the fullprofile of relevant basic values between allpresent day cultures. The historicalexperiences of individual countries and thelevel of their socio-economic developmenton the whole obviously have a greaterimpact on their respective value profilethan religious-cultural roots. Culturaldifferences do not serve as a barrier tosimilarities and overlaps in the valueprofile. Cultural commonalities, on theother hand, are no guarantee for similaritiesor overlaps in the value profile. To give justtwo examples: with respect to the politicalvalues of individualism, equality andavoidance of uncertainty, Portugal andBritain, belonging to the same civilization,find themselves at opposite ends of thescale, whereas Portugal and Turkey,belonging to very different culturaltraditions, share the same value profile.

Thus empirical data do not validate theideology of a clash of civilizations on thegrounds of irreconcilable differencesamong their basic social and politicalvalues. Rather, overarching similarities andoverlaps may be identified among all thecultures that were surveyed. The actual linesof conflict instead run within thecivilizations.

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This complies with the outcome of anattempt to arrive at a commonunderstanding of the values of livingtogether recently made by representativesof practically all relevant religions of today,as laid down in the ‘Declaration on theWorld Ethos’: the right of every individualto humane treatment, the principle offreedom from violence and respect for life,solidarity between people all over the worldand advocacy of a just world economicorder, tolerance for other religions,opinions and cultures, equal rights for allmen and partnership based on equalitybetween men and women. There is acommon basis for understanding andcoexistence in all of the world’s civilizations.

Thus the basic values determined revealsome average data characteristic of thevarious cultural groups. Of greatersignificance, however, is the heterogeneitywithin cultures on the one hand and anextensive congruity in the value profile ofcountries belonging to very differentcultures on the other. On the basis of thisdata, one may logically arrive at a numberof cautious yet clear and well foundedconclusions:

n The cultures of this world are by nomeans distinguished from each otherby sharp or even well demarcateddifferences in the validity of corefundamental values.

n It is indeed true that individual culturesare characterized by special regard forone or two of the basic values, but atthe same time there is also considerableoverlapping with other basic values.

n Even where characteristic differencesin some basic values may be ascertainedbetween the cultures, these differencesare comparatively limited in extent.

n Even where culture-specific emphasesare observable in the average findingswith regard to some basic values, thedifferences that emerge are stillcomparatively narrow in extent.

n Some of the countries with the mostmarked value profile differences belongto the same cultural groups, others withthe largest degree of congruity belongto completely different cultures.

n The experiences of countries and thelevel of their socio-economicdevelopment on the whole obviouslyhave a greater impact on theirindividual value profile than religious-cultural roots.

n Cultural differences do not serve as abarrier to similarities and overlaps inthe value profile.

n Cultural commonalities, on the otherhand, are no guarantee for similaritiesor overlaps in the value profile.

Thus the empirical data do not validate theideology of a clash of civilizations on thegrounds of irreconcilable differencesamong their basic social values. Rather,overarching similarities and overlaps maybe identified among all the cultures thatwere surveyed. The lines of conflict insteadrun within civilizations. Thus thefundamentalist argument is refuted by theavailable empirical data. Fundamentalismis not, as is claimed by both thefundamentalists themselves and byHuntington, the purest expression of acultural tradition but rather a particular wayto make use of it in order to gaindominance among the various contendersof that tradition. It is, in that sense, a formof politicization of cultural difference thatthwarts civic cooperation both withinsocieties and globally.

Cultural Difference and GlobalCitizenshipCitizenship in a democratic polity requiresthat all citizens are ready and able totranscend the horizon of their cultural-religious identity in their role as citizensof that polity (Kymlicka 2000:35). Theyneed to develop a certain sense of politicalidentity as members of one and the samepolity that is strong enough to pave the way


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for a sufficient degree of solidarity andcooperation. Comparative studies in thepolitical culture of stable and fragiledemocracies since the 1950s havedemonstrated that in order to make ademocracy sustainable, citizenship needsto be embedded in a shared political culture(Almond and Verba 1963). In order tosustain democracy, such a democraticpolitical culture needs, according toGalston, to encompass such core elementsas independence and openness, loyalty,respect of the rights of others, recognitionof cultural difference, political judgementand readiness to engage in political activities(Galston 1991: 221 ff ).

From the point of view of empiricalresearch in democratic political culturesome additional features are required: trustin fellow citizens, cognitive knowledge ofthe political systems citizens belong to anda sufficient degree of affectiveidentification with it and with their ownrole as citizens, active tolerance, thecompetence to balance limited politicalconflict with basic democratic consensus,the capability of realizing a clear-cutdifference between political conflict withfellow citizens and their recognition ashuman beings (Almond and Verba 1963);and, last but not least, a sufficientcommand of the language that is themedium of public life in their polity.Though all this is seldom the status quo ina given culturally diverse society, it needsto serve at least as the hallmark for thedirection in which that society and itspolitical culture is moving. If the oppositeis the case, the gradual destabilization ofthat polity would become more probablethan not.

It is obvious that there can be no place foroutright fundamentalists in the frameworkof a democratic polity under the rule of

law. A prerequisite for the coexistence ofdifferent ethno-cultural or cultural religiousidentities is rather a process of ‘de-fundamentalization’ of those who are stillinclining towards a fundamentalist identity.The very meaning of a democratic polityunder the rule of law is to make only thatminimum set of norms and rules bindingfor all that are necessary to guarantee themaximum of liberties for all individuals andgroups to autonomously decide on theirown ways of believing and living. Thus, allcitizens are obligated to define and practisetheir own cultural identities within theseframeworks of rights, norms and rules.

We have seen earlier that this is by nomeans in contradiction to divergent culturalidentities. Due to the process of internaldifferentiation, each of the culturaltraditions in the world today materializesits contents and claims at three clearlydistinct levels:

1. The metaphysical level of believing, wherethe ‘last’ questions about the meaning oflife and death are answered;

2. The level of individual or group ways oflife, where the ethics, aesthetics andpragmatics of everyday life findsometimes temporary answers; and

3. The level of social and political basic valuesthat establish ways of living together.

The ideal of citizenship and the sharedorientations of political culture are entirelysituated on level 3. There is, as theempirical evidence has shown, nothing inthe core of any of the world’s religions orcultures that would in principle stand inthe way of convergence on level 3.Overlapping here creates and protects thespace for as much divergence as any of thecultural traditions needs to take in orderto define and live up to the standards ofwhat it understands as its genuine identity.1

1. For the idea and theory of overlapping consensus see Rawls 1993.

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The potentiality of such convergence at level3 is enshrined in all the different cultures,and in many societies it is actualized andworking well. To accept it is, so to speak,the admittance ticket of any culturalidentity to a democratic polity under therule of law. It is a fact that the idea ofdemocracy under the rule of law today findsbroad-based and strong support withineach of the great cultural traditions (Meyer2002: ch.VIII; Merkel 2002). This doesnot come as a surprise as it became evidentin the course of the twentieth century thatas soon as unanimity in the interpretationof a shared tradition is lost there is no otherpeaceful and mutually acceptable way leftto different currents and identities forliving together but to seek refuge indemocracy and the rule of law.

In order to help the overlapping consensusat level 3 to gain strength it is not onlyhelpful but, under normal conditions, anecessity that different identity cultures donot encapsulate in parallel societies withoutcivic and everyday life interaction with eachother. A political culture that incorporatesbridging social capital (Putnam 2000) andtrust is built through civil society activities.It is a must for culturally diverse societies.Culturally, ethnically and communallyoverlapping organizations and initiatives incivil society are necessary to build this kindof social orientation. Such are thefoundations that make transculturaldialogue the necessary basis for social andpolitical cooperation both possible andmeaningful within every multiculturalsociety or within the multicultural worldas a whole.

Dialogue, Recognition and CooperationDetailed sociological studies on Islamicfundamentalism in Iran and Protestantfundamentalism in the USA have clearlyindicated that traditionalistic milieus, inparticular, react to the danger of their owndisintegration as a result of urbanmodernization, often caused by

globalization, by withdrawing intofundamentalist isolation. Fundamentalistsin these two countries tend to seek refugewith like-minded compatriots for threereasons. They may fear that socialrecognition for their accustomed lifestyleswill gradually diminish; they resent havingtheir socially acquired identity devalued;or they may worry that their children willembrace more modern, open ways of life.The latter would of course pose a threat totheir whole existence as a separatecommunity.

The fundamentalist impulse can growstrongly especially where unexpected socio-cultural humiliation combines with theexperience or threat of downward mobilityand economic insecurity. Cultural-economic double crises of this sort offerthe most fertile breeding grounds for therapid growth of fundamentalistmovements. Outstanding examples of thisare German national socialism with thetremendous fascination it held for themasses against the backdrop of culturalcollapse, break with tradition and economiccrisis, and Islamic fundamentalism in Iran,which emerged out of modernizationimposed from above, accompanied byofficial contempt and ridicule fortraditional socio-cultural identities.Present-day Algeria demonstrates that thereis a dramatic rise in the feeling that thefuture holds no prospects when the politicalleadership élites prove themselves to becorrupt and incapable of reform.

A fundamentalism with mass appeal worksthrough powerful organizations, charismaticleaders, effective communication techniquesand populist slogans, which combine asuperficially plausible description of thesituation with their political promises ofsalvation. The credibility of the offer is inmany cases considerably enhanced by thefact that fundamentalist organizations offerpractical help in the living environmentsof the groups being wooed.


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Furthermore, all these examples show thatfundamentalist leaders and theirorganizations often bide their time over along period without any broad responseuntil their hour strikes in a crisis. As GillesKepel has observed, it is no coincidencethat fundamentalism has gained in influenceand appeal world-wide since the mid-seventies (Kepel 1991). This period marksthe point where the crisis in the culturalmodel of the modern age, particularly inits Marxist alternative, coincides with amanifest socio-economic stagnation and theexperience of growing inequality as a resultof globalization. Real experiences of crisis,unfulfilled promises of progress and nearapocalyptic fears of being threatened havevarying impacts in individual countries,although all of them have in some measurestrengthened fundamentalism.

Depending on the groups affected and thesituation that triggers the fundamentalistimpulse, experiences of cultural humiliationor socio-economic fears could act as therallying point at which cultural, social andeconomic crisis-experience combines withpolitical alienation to generatefundamentalism. Even in this respectfundamentalism reveals many facets.

Thus, a purely cultural counter-strategy willhardly prove successful, as the aboveexplanation for the growing strength offundamentalism brings home to us. At thesame time we need to fight the tangiblecauses of fundamentalism with crediblepolicies, lest people be driven into itsembrace.

In that sense, political fundamentalism andthe terrorist strategies sometimes derivedfrom it require a two-dimensional politicalcontext, one dimension being the triggersfrom outside – the perceived threats to therespective collective identity – and theother being the emergence of a wider milieuof relevant supporters. The first context isusually created by the perception of a

variety of threats, such as humiliation orthreats to the self-esteem of the respectivegroup’s identity; the perception of refusedrecognition by the threatening other; or amassive destabilization of the socio-economic status of that collective incombination with a lack of confidence thatthe incumbent political leaders will be ableor ready to redress the perceiveddegradation. As we can see from theirdiscourses with respect to Islamicfundamentalism in the world of today,three experiences seem to be of crucialimportance:

1. The Middle East Conflict and the wayit is dealt with by the West, especiallythe USA;

2. The world-wide increase in theinequality of life chances; and

3. The hegemony of a tiny group of (non-Islamic) big powers, especially thesuperpower USA.

The second context, in our case thefundamentalist Islamic milieus, isconstrued, held together and energized bythe shared perception of what happens inthese three crucial fields of experience thatare seen as the main source of identitythreats. Presently it seems very much thatthe way the USA and some of its allies dealwith both the terrorism that has beenperpetrated against them and the threeaforementioned identity issues fuels thefundamentalist milieus rather thandiscouraging them.

Our analysis of the experience of deniedrecognition as the main source offundamentalist politics of identity suggeststhat any counter-strategy aimed atsustainable success must also contain astrong, visible and credible component ofthe politics of recognition, not, of courseof terrorism and its underlying ideology,but of the wider cultural identity which itclaims to represent and the legitimatesocial, political and economic interests of

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the people who share it. Given the deepstructure and the role of fundamentalism,neither the refutation of the ideologicalaspirations of fundamentalism, howevercogent they may appear, nor successes inthe military fight against terrorist activists,however sweeping they may seem at anygiven point of time, form a coherentcounter-strategy. A credible and thuspotentially successful strategy can only bea comprehensive politics of recognition.It needs to be three-pronged:

1. At the political level: multilaterialismas a strategy of mutual recognition;

2. At the socio-cultural level: absence ofany form of humiliation or non-recognition of the identity of the other;

3. At the socio-economic level: non-exclusion, giving all a fair share of theworld’s resources and life chances.

There need not and cannot be, of course,a great jump into a new world characterizedby such ambitious hallmarks. A visibledevelopment in that direction, clear andnon-ambivalent, would, however, seem tobe the crucial starting point for a counterstrategy to fundamentalism and terrorismthat has the potentiality of long-termsuccess. Fundamentalism shared by largesocio-cultural milieus is a new threat tosecurity in the globalized world of todaythat requires new ways to counter it.

Obviously it is in the first place socialexperiences and life-situations, and theproximity to cultural modernizationdetermined by them that prove decisive in

defining the cultural ways of life of groupsin terms of their affiliation to a greatreligious-cultural tradition. Included inthese formative experiences are crises,ruptures and deprivations, as the case offundamentalism reveals. However, socialvalues regarding ways of living together thatare shared by all the existent cultures createspace for the coexistence of differentcultural identities as ways of believing andliving.

Today, however, against the actually givenopportunities for mutual understanding, therisk is imminent that the politicization ofcultures is becoming a self-sustainingprocess. Those who are pursuing it fromwithin and those who are working on itfrom outside are playing into each other’shands, their explanations and prognosescorroborating each other deceptively, theirenergy being mutually reinforcing.

Like any society, the emerging global orderrequires some common values and normsof living together. Such basiccommonalities exist in the heart of allcultures, although they are expressed indifferent languages, symbols and images.More often than not they are hardly obviousbut need to be discovered and brought intothe full light of day. It requires purposefulefforts to recognize, develop and bringthose elements in the various cultures closeto each other to facilitate understandingand common action, particularly since theyalmost always manifest themselves indiverse forms. This is the real challengeafter 11 September.


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‘Asian-European Dialogue of Cultures’: Conference Summary

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A two-day international conferenceentitled ‘Bridging Tensions betweenTraditions and Modernization in the Eraof Globalization’ took place in Berlin from23 to 24 March 2004.

It was the second Asia-Europe Dialogueof Cultures the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES) Office for Regional Cooperation inSoutheast Asia (Singapore) had organizedsince November 2002, when a similargroup of concerned people met inSingapore.1

For about 50 representatives of differentinstitutions from Asian and Europeancountries,2 such as politicians, academics,representatives of internationalorganizations and non-governmentalorganizations, the conference served as aplatform for an open and constructivedialogue with two basic objectives:

1. to overcome cultural misunderstandingsbetween the different civilizations inAsia and Europe and to deepen mutualunderstanding about problems andconflicts on both sides, their multiplecultural, political, socio-psychological,social and economic causes, as well astheir anti-democratic, xenophobic,aggressive and violent expressions;

2. to try to define common ground whichallows civilizations in the East and the

Asia-Europe Dialogue of Cultures –Conference Summary

West to live together peacefully and atthe same time enable them to remain‘different’; in other words, to thinkabout how to avoid clashes withincivilizations and clashes betweencivilizations on the basis of commonvalues, such as democracy, pluralism,equality, trust and responsibility.

Terrorist attacks, such as the ones in Madridand Bali, make it clear that Asians andEuropeans have to fight side by side in thebattle against international terrorism.National solutions alone are not effective.The classical measures of protecting thenation-state no longer provide cover againstnew, present-day risks. Furthermore,globalization processes have a deep impacton the economic, social and, increasingly,cultural fabric of societies world-wide.

The discussion started with a closer lookat the relationship between tradition andmodernity in Asia and in Europe. JürgenHabermas, the German philosopher, oncesaid that modernization is the firstexperiment in the history of mankind. Aslong as culture has existed there have beentensions between tradition and modernity.Or, as one participant said, ‘Tensionsbetween tradition and modernity areessential for development’. Questionswhich arose then were: Have these conflictsand tensions changed due to globalization?;

Norbert von Hofmann*

* Norbert von Hofmann is the Head of Office for Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia of FES-Singapore.1. Details regarding the first dialogue were published in Dialogue + Cooperation 1/2003, which can be found under

http://www.fesspore.org2. Participants came from India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Austria, Belgium,

France, Germany, Great Britain, Spain and the Netherlands.


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What do we mean by ‘tradition’?; What dowe understand by ‘modernity’?

If tradition could be understood asheritage, than who determinates heritage?Many of the Asian participants found thatit is the West who determinates the heritageof countries in the East.

There was the argument that modernity isnever questioned, but always taken forgranted: To be for change is good and it isa positive value, while to promote traditionneeds to be justified. To be against changeand for tradition always requires some sortof justification.

Modernity was defined in many differentways: as the free market economy,capitalism, Americanization, globalization,and as development in general. After theFranco regime, the people of Spain sawmodernity as equal to democracy andhuman rights. It was agreed that modernityhas many dimensions: economic, cultural,social and political. All these dimensionsare characterized by different speeds ofdevelopment and this could be one of theroots of the tensions. Modernity itselfcould not be sustained without tradition,but modernity is a prerequisite fordevelopment. Modernization is a conditionand not a programme or a plan. Being ableto make choices can be seen as one themain characteristics of modernity.

In this context, the relationship betweenreligion and churches on one side and thestate on the other came into discussion asa result of the perception that religion hassomething to do with tradition while thestate is always connected with the idea ofmodernity. Contrary to this thesis, someparticipants saw religions as bridges toovercome the tensions between tradition andmodernity, denying the general perceptionthat Christianity is modern while Islam istraditional. World religions could be seenas positive agents of globalization.

From a European perspective, religions thathave gone through a period ofenlightenment are most likely to find iteasier to cope with modernity.

Many of the Asian participants sawmodernity as part of the struggle forindependence, the struggle for nation-building, the struggle for development:modernity is equal to development. Thecolonial powers could only be overcomeby using modern, Western tactics. Traditiontherefore had to give a way to modernityin Asia. Modernity was adapted withoutasking what it would finally mean. Therewas the opinion that Asian countries adaptto modernity at a higher speed thanEuropean countries. Many leaders ofdeveloping countries in Asia thought thatthey could take a short cut to modernityby importing models from countries withcompletely different cultural and historicalbackgrounds – again without questioningthe final cost.

Asia and Europe share similar problemswith regard to tensions between traditionand modernity, but the dimensions aredifferent. The European participants foundthe relationship between tradition andmodernity in Europe far less controversialsince the process of modernization tookplace at a much slower pace. The NordicEuropean countries are a good example ofhow tradition and modernity can existtogether – many northern European statesare simultaneously well established modernsocial democracies with monarchies andProtestantism as the state religion.

Dialogue is the only suitable way ofresolving tensions and conflicts betweentradition and modernity, but it is dialoguewith a pre-condition: the social, politicaland economic participation of all partiesconcerned is essential. Without such all-embracing participation dialogue is useless.


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The second part of the conference dealtwith the impact of globalization. Allparticipants agreed that globalization isa matter of fact. The question thereforeis how to manage it or, as one participantput it , ‘how to tame the beast’ . I sglobalization responsible for growingviolence, for growing terror? Is thedecline of traditional structures in oursocieties linked to globalization? Isglobalization a new form of colonization?Who promotes globalization and whobenefits from it?

Globalization was defined as the liftingof all types of borders. It removes allforms of existing boundaries and controlswithout the setting-up of new rules andregulations. The process of globalizationwas and is neither organized norconsistent. No doubt, certain groupsbenefit from it, but it would be far toosimple to conclude that some nations orwhole continents are winners while othersare losing out. In every state in the world,parts of society benefit from it whileothers do not.

The fear of uncertainty amongpopulations and the impact globalizationhas on ordinary people was discussed.The main problem seemed to be thatchanges are taking place too fast – muchfaster than in the past. Examples raisedduring the discussion were thedislocation of people, massive migration,the separation of people from theirtraditional environments, the growingincome disparity within societies and thegrowing competition of nationaleconomies, and also the fear thatindustries are moving to other continentsand unemployment is rising.

Why is the majority of people againstglobalization? One answer to that questionis that there is a lack of openness andtransparency in the process. Nevertheless,

there are also positive developments inglobalization, such as much easier andfaster access to information and theimproved possibility of documentation.

Globalization should not be understoodsimply as economic globalization. Thereare also forms of political globalizationas well as a socio-cultural globalization,which do proceed more slowly thaneconomic globalization. These differentspeeds in globalization, as mentioned inthe case of modernization, are reasonsfor tensions which have lead to gaps ordivides between social classes, betweenrich and poor countries and betweenethnic groups. Many conflicts might beold, but they have to be newly defined inthis era of globalization.

Discussing the actors in the globalizationprocess, the United States of Americaand the Bretton Woods Institutions werenamed, as well as private sectormultinational corporations that are onlyresponsible to shareholders, not statesand people. Globalization is largelyshaped by the United States because itdominates the world economically,polit ical ly and militari ly. Mostparticipants considered it impossible tomanage globalization against the interestsof the United States.

A demand shared by all was that theworld’s population should be representedin a fairer and more equal way withinboth the United Nations and the BrettonWoods Institutions. A politics ofrecognition – accepting the equality ofall cultures – is necessary to overcomethe problem of exclusion and non-participation.

In this context, the increasingly positiveimpact of global civil society groups, suchas the Association for the Taxation ofFinancial Transactions for the Aid of


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Citizens (ATTAC),3 was mentioned, butalso the problems inherent in such groups,such as the lack of internal democracy,transparency, accountability and theproblem of external funding.

What is the role of the actor ‘state’ inglobalization? Some participant saw the roleof the state declining after 11 September,while others saw the strength of the stategrowing. No common position on howstates should manage globalization wasreached.

European states see themselves as undergrowing pressure from two oppositesides: globalization on the one side andthe demand for more decentralization onthe other.

In Asia, many states have assumed controlof more or less all spheres of of theircitizens’ lives. This was found to benecessary in the cause of nation- andidentity-building. With regard to theEuropean suggestion that regionalismprovides one answer to globalization, theAsian participants replied that it is noteasy to surrender sovereignty tomultilateral institutions when states arestill in the process of developing.Therefore, Asian participants demandedthat tensions resulting from globalizationhave to be dealt with by each country inits own national context.

All participants agreed that states shouldbe mediators and protectors of culturaldiversity.

In relation to the impact of globalizationon culture, four points were raised:

1. The dominance of commercializedAmerican (and in parts of Asia alsoChinese) culture;

2. Legitimated local cultural reforms andthe revitalization of local culture;

3. The un-legitimate fundamentalistformulation of culture as a tool to gainpower; and

4. The necessity of a global dialogue withall cultures as a basis for internationalcooperation.

Culture has to be understood as somethingfluid and constantly changing. Culture isalso shaped by trade which is an importantpart of globalization.

Asian participants talked about growingcultural disintegration. Asia has borrowedtoo many instruments and cultural valuesfrom outside; it has to tap more from itsown resources in order to reconcile withits people. A very important way to tackleglobalization and indeed to live with it isthrough education.

In conclusion, optimism, openness andtransparency are needed to tackle thenegative aspects of modernization andglobalization. Democracy is the decisivebridge between tradition and modernity.

Participants found that managingglobalization and bridging tensions betweentradition and modernity are possible –despite the fact that concrete plans arelargely missing. The report of the WorldCommission on the Social Dimension ofGlobalization, entitled ‘A Fair Globalization– Creating Opportunities for All’,4 was seenas one right step forward.

3. ATTAC was founded in France in 1998, and now has over 80,000 members world-wide. It is an internationalnetwork of independent national and local groups in 33 countries. It promotes the idea of an international tax oncurrency speculation (the Tobin Tax) and campaigns to outlaw tax havens, replace pension funds with statepensions, cancel Third World debt, reform or abolish the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, moregenerally, recapture the democratic space that has been lost to the financial world.(Quoted from http://www.attac.org.uk).

4. Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2004. See also http://www.ilo.org/wcsdg


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The conference ended with a unanimouscall for the continuation of the dialogue.Several participants suggested as a possible

topic for a fourth Asian-Europe Dialogueof Cultures ‘The Concept of Justice inAsian and European Cultures’.