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Philosophy of ValuesOn Emotion and Value in David Hume and Max SchelerMarek Pykampyka@oeto.pk.edu.pl

ABSTRACT: While some philosophers tend to exclude any significance of emotion for the moral life, others place them in the center of both the moral life and the theory of value judgment. This paper presents a confrontation of two classic positions of the second type, namely the position of Hume and Scheler. The ultimate goal of this confrontation is metatheoretical particularly as it concerns the analysis of the relations between the idea of emotion and the idea of value in this kind of theory of value judgment. In conclusion, I point to some important theoretical assumptions which underlie the positions of both thinkers despite all the other differences between them.

In at least four types of ethical theories emotions and feelings are regarded as a vital factor in explaining the nature of both value judgement and value itself. Such types of ethical theories, however, offer not only different theories of value and valuation but they also assume or imply quite different theories of emotions and feelings. A look at the history of philosophical psychology can convince us that there has been no generally accepted theory of emotion but the idea of emotion has been changing together with the idea of mind or soul. (1) One could expect that there is a correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of value or the good in each type of the above mentioned theories.

In what follows, I shall discuss this correlation for two ethical theories in greater detail. I shall consider the moral philosophy of David Hume which I construe as psychological naturalism of non-relativistic type. (2) I shall also consider the case of emotional intuitionism exemplified by Max Scheler. Both Hume and Scheler have formulated classic theories of emotion and this is one of my reasons for choosing them.

Hume on Passion and ValueThe relation between passion and value in Hume's philosophy has been repeatedly discussed. (3) In contrast to some contemporary writers, Hume devoted a lot of effort and space to the theory of passion before presenting his, based on emotion moral theory, in Book III of the Treatise. (4)

However, as I believe, Hume's philosophy on the whole, contains not one, but two theories of passion. One of them is a theory of the genesis of passions from pains and pleasures. The second theory, on the other hand, refers to the group of passions which are after N. Kemp Smith called 'primary' passions; and I will call it the descriptive theory of passion. The Treatise is dominated almost exclusively by the theory of genesis but the role of the descriptive theory in Enquiries is more important, and particularly in those places where Hume argues against hedonism and egoism in his theory of motivation. On the theory of genesis, passions are produced from pains and pleasures either directly or indirectly which, as it is well known, leads to Hume's distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' passions. According to the descriptive theory, however, the situation is quite different. In their existence, the 'primary' passions do not depend on pleasures and pains, on the contrary, pains and pleasures are 'produced' by them. There is an interesting tension between these two theories in Hume's philosophy but this problem cannot be discussed here.

Theoretically, Hume could have related his moral theory to either of the two discussed theories of emotion. The whole logical construction of the Treatise, however, reveals, that he decided to base his moral theory on the theory of genesis. Hume devotes more than a half of Book II of the Treatise to four 'indirect' passions, that is to: pride, humility, love and hatred. In Book III, in turn, he determines the conditions in which the above passions become 'moral sentiments' or 'objective' forms of love and hatred. (5)

What kind of emotion is felt towards a good or an evil in Hume's philosophy? Within the framework of the theory of genesis it must be a kind of pleasure or pain respectively. Even if someone would like to relate a good to another passion, this passion, according to Hume's theory, must come from a certain pleasure or pain. In the theory of genesis, the relation between a good and pleasure is causal, a good 'produces' pleasure, as Hume puts it. On the other hand, Hume's idea of the good is influenced by his theory of emotion. The only feature of the good which is justified is that it is the cause of pleasure, and for Hume any other characteristics of the good would be speculative in its character.

The above analysis is also valid for 'moral sentiments' in Book III of the Treatise. 'Moral sentiments' are pleasures or pains of a special kind, and their causes are considered to be the moral good and evil respectively. These pains and pleasures, in turn, give rise to particular kinds of love or hatred and pride or humility. What can be a cause of "moral sentiments?" As it is known, in Hume's stance, a 'character' or 'act' is morally good if it is useful or pleasant for a given person or any other persons in question. H. Aiken says that Hume does not give any justification that 'moral sentiments' should be related to the principle of utility. (6) In Aiken's opinion 'moral sentiments' should be related to human rights rather than to the principle of utility.

Are there any other possibilities open for Hume? As a matter of fact, Hume mentions one of them but the scope of his discussion is limited by his theory of passion. (7) Let us examine this point more carefully. On the theory of genesis, there are two kinds of relations between a passion and its object. (8) An object can be related to a passion in virtue either of a 'natural' principle or a 'natural' and 'original' principle. In the first case there is a common factor acting in many different objects, whereas in the second case, due to 'emotional constitution' of mind a passion has the only, specific object. Moral rules, and particularly the rules of justice, as Hume argues, cannot be related to 'moral sentiments' in virtue of the 'original' principle. Given the great number of the rules of justice, this would mean too much complicated 'emotional constitution' of mind. The same argument is repeated by Hume in his Enquiry Concerning the Principle of Morals, but the first time a very similar argument appears is in Hume's theory of pride in the Treatise.

Nonetheless, Hume has not considered a much simpler alternative of the relation between good and feelings. For he could have related certain kinds of goods to certain kinds of feelings and not singular objects to singular and specific feelings. In such a case the 'emotional constitution' of mind would not be too complicated. Hume has not considered this alternative in spite of the fact that he was fully aware of the differences among both pleasures and goods; Hume's implied hierarchy of values is very close to that of J. S. Mill. Why has Hume not considered the above alternative? Some reasons for this are likely to be found in his theory of passions. One of them is that in Hume's theory of 'indirect' passions some different pleasures, regardless of their character, can be the 'causes' of pride or love. The other one is that Hume has not made any explicit distinction between sensual and non-sensual pleasures. (9)

In Enquiries Hume gives up his theory of sympathy and bases his moral theory directly on 'sentiment of humanity' which he also calls 'general benevolence'. This means, however, that this time Hume unconsciously relates his moral theory to the descriptive theory of passion. This also means that a good cannot be defined as a source of pleasure any more as 'primary' passions are prior to pains and pleasures. In Hume's new position, however, there is no explanation in what way a primary passion and its object are mutually related. (10) From contemporary perspective we can say that it lies in the nature of some emotions that they have certain intentional objects in their structure. Moral goodness would be thus the intentional object of general benevolence. This interpretation, however, contradicts to Hume's fundamental assumption that the nature of any good is exhausted by the fact that it is a source of a pleasure. Two theories of passion imply two different interpretations of the nature of moral feelings.

In the Treatise the nature of moral feelings is explained within the framework of the theory of the genesis of passion with the help of the theory of sympathy, whereas in both Enquiries moral feelings should be regarded as a kind of primary passion. It is interesting to notice, however, that Hume does not list general benevolence when he introduces primary passions in the Treatise. What is more, according to the theory of genesis, there cannot be such a feeling as general benevolence since benevolence, due to the emotional constitution of mind, is limited to those who we love. There is also a consequence of Hume's two theories of passions in his theory of motivation; the theory of genesis at least seems to have hedonistic implications, whereas the descriptive theory clearly has not such implications.

Max Scheler on Feelings and ValuesMax Scheler has developed his theory of emotion and value within the phenomenological tradition of continental philosophy. What kind of emotion is felt towards a good in the light of Scheler's theory? To answer this question I have to sketch the outline of his two kinds of fundamental distinction in the realm of emotions. One of them concerns the difference between 'intentional' and 'unintentional' forms of feelings. (11) 'Emotional acts' and 'feeling function' (feeling of something) are of an intentional character, whereas 'feeling states' are not. Within the framework of the phenomenological theory of mind, intentional acts (and 'functions' in our case) have their own, 'immanent' objects. According to Scheler, values are the objects of intentional forms of feelings, and values are regarded by him as some objective, ideal properties.

What kind of feelings do we experience in the face of, say, a masterpiece? In the light of Scheler's theory, there is not one but three different kinds of feelings at play. Firstly, there is a value of beauty which 'is given' to us directly, secondly, there is our feeling of this value (a feeling function), and finally, there is a pleasure (a feeling state) which appears as a consequence of the first two. Such a theory of feelings, of course, supports a theory of the good which is quite different from that of Hume's. The good is, first of all, the 'bearer' of an ideal property, that is, the 'bearer' of value. The relation between a good and an emotion is not causal, as in the case of Hume, but it is the relation of knowing in the phenomenological meaning of the term, in which an ideal value 'is given' to us directly.

The second kind of Scheler's distinctions is of equal importance. Scheler also distinguishes four 'strata' of feeling which are different from one another in their nature or 'essence', (12) all the 'strata' are equally original phenomena and they are independent of one another. Does this distinction, in the realm of emotion, influence Scheler's idea of value. The results of it can be easily observed, for, in Scheler's stance, there are four kinds of value which differ from one another in their nature or 'essence'. There are, namely, the following kinds of value: values of sensual pleasures, values of life, spiritual values and finally religious values. (13) All these kinds of value are ordered in an objective hierarchy and this order is also 'given' in emotional acts of 'preferring' and 'placing after'.

In what way does Scheler justify that the above values are of a different nature or 'essence'? Of particular interest for us is the fact, that in order to justify the generic differences among values, Scheler resorts to the generic differences among feelings in which these values 'are given'. Spiritual or religious values, for example, are given in feeling functions and acts which have nothing in common with all the feelings of life in the biological meaning of the term. There are also some other similarities between Scheler's idea of value and his idea of emotion. Values of different kinds and feelings of respective 'strata' have some other 'essential' features in common.

Both Scheler's and Hume's ethics is of a teleological character. Hume relates moral feelings to the principle of utility, whereas Scheler refers to the objective hierarchy of values. If our preferences or acts conform with this objective hierarchy, then they are morally good; otherwise the are morally wrong.

Some General Remarks and ConclusionThe main difficulty which faces any moral theory based on emotion consists in distinguishing morally relevant emotions from all other emotions. It is very difficult, if possible, to point out these emotion and not to resort to the notion of the good or value at the same time. Both Hume and Scheler have made much effort, perhaps more than anybody else, to overcome this difficulty. Have they been successful? On the one hand, they place moral feelings (or value feelings) within the framework of their general theory of emotion. But this would not do. They also have to resort to the notion of the good and value. Hume resorts to the principle of utility. In his fundamental distinction between intentional and not intentional forms of feeling, Scheler resorts to the notion of value; intentional feelings are these feelings, in which values 'are given'.

On the logical level, therefore, both Hume's and Scheler's theory have some elements which are circular. However, for each of them his own theory does not have such a character, since each of them is sure that his theory is a pure description of mental phenomena (or of what 'is given' in them). If the naturalistic interpretation of Hume's moral theory is correct, then value judgements in both Hume and Scheler are of a cognitive character. On the other hand, their theories of emotion have also something in common. Firstly, both of them can be classified as 'normative' theories of emotion (14) which means that they are developed as much to explain the nature of valuation as the nature of emotion. Secondly, and what is more important, both Hume and Scheler share a fundamental assumption concerning emotion; namely, that there is an original order between human emotions, on the one hand, and the realm of the good and values, on the other. At this point their positions contrast sharply with that of subjectivists and emotivists. One can risk here the statement, that a similar mutual correlation between the idea of emotion and the idea of the good (or value) could be found in any ethical theory which is based on emotion. Should we have an absolute theory of emotion, we could decide which of these ethical theories is right. There is a hope, however, that further research on emotion will throw some new light on the problem.

Notes(1) See: Gardiner, H. M., Metcalf, R. C., Beebe-Center, J. G. - Feeling and Emotion. A History of Theories, American Book Company, New York 1937.

(2) As I believe, this is the best interpretation oh Hume's moral philosophy; cf.: Norton, D. F. - David Hume. Common - Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1982; Capaldi, N. - Hume's Place in Moral Philosophy, Peter Lang, New York 1991.

(3) The 'classic' books on this subject are: Kemp Smith, N. - The Philosophy of David Hume, Macmillan, London 1941; Glathe, A. B. - Hume's Theory of the Passions and of Morals, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1950, (reprint 1969); rdal, P. - Passions and Morals in Hume's Treatise, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1963. One should also mention here N. Capaldi, op. cit.

(4) Hume, David - A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby - Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1888; hereafter cited as TN.

(5) See also: Baier, A. - Persons and the Wheel of Their Passions [in:], A Progress of Sentiments. Reflections on Hume's Treatise, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1991.

(6) Aiken, H. - An Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason in Ethics and Politics, "Ethics" 90 (1979), October.

(7) TN, pp. 473-474.

(8) For recent discussion of the objects of emotion see: Sousa, de R. - The Rationality of Emotion, The MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1990.

(9) For excellent discussion of this point see: Hudson, S. D. - Humean Pleasure Reconsidered, "Canadian Journal of Philosophy" 5 (1975), no 4, pp. 545-62; Fieser, J. - Hume's Classification of the Passions and Its Precursors, "Hume Studies" 18 (1992), no 1, pp. 1-17.

(10) See note 8 above.

(11) Scheler, Max - Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 2, Francke Verlag, Bern - Mnchen 1954, pp. 256-278; hereafter cited as F.

(12) F, pp. 341-356. See also: Smith, Q. - Scheler's Stratification of Emotional Life and Strawson's Person, "Philosophical Studies" (Irleand), 25 (1977), pp. 103-127.

(13) F, pp. 125 -130.

(14) Cf. Calhoun, Ch., Solomon, R. C. - What is an Emotion, Oxford University Press, New York 1984.

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Valu/ValuMin.htm

Philosophy of ValuesA Study on the Hierarchy of ValuesTong-Keun MinChung Nam National University

ABSTRACT: I attempt to look into the issue of the ranks of values comprehensively and progressively. Anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by ascending order: (1) the act of destroying the earth-of annihilating humankind and all other living organisms; (2) the act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or committing treason; (3) the act of murdering or causing death to a human being; (4) the act of damaging the body of a human being; (5) the act of greatly harming society; (6) all other crimes not covered by the above. Higher values can be classified into the following five categories in descending rank: (1) absolute values such as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty and absolute holiness; (2) the act of contributing to the development and happiness of humankind; (3) the act of contributing to the nation or the state; (4) the act of contributing to the regional society; (5) the act of cultivating oneself and managing one's family well. Generally, people tend to pursue happiness more eagerly than goodness, but because goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to pursue goodness more eagerly. In helping people to get the right sense of values and to internalize it, education and enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience rather than compulsion will be highly effective.

1. Classification of ValuesI will discuss what kinds of values exist, before talking about their hierarchy. Walter Goodnow Everett classified values into the following eight categories; (1) economic values, (2) bodily values, (3) value of recreation, (4) value of association, (5) character values, (6) aesthetic values, (7) intellectual values, (8) religious values.

Everett's classification does not cover all the values in our life. To this we can add political values, social values, legal values, cultural values moral values, educational values, scholastic values, industrial values, athletic values, values of life, medical values, values of language, technical values and emotional values. In addition to values in our life, things have natural values, whether they are directly related to us humans or not.

The nature system such as the universe, the solar system, the earth is composed of time, space and material, and is the most basic world of existence which provides living organisms with the base for their existence. If there is no land, water, air or light, the universe will become an empty space, in which no life can exist.

The nature system generates living organisms, letting them grow or become extinct, by physically sustaining its constant state or changing itself, or chemically combining or dissolving its various elements. The stars are moving, exploding or transforming themselves in the apparently boundless universe by unmeasurable mysterious power. The stars have limitless power and values over the humans as well as all the other living organisms on the earth. These stars have values of sustenance and change, values of combination and dissolution, values of conservation and generation, and values of standstill and movement. Weight, energy, objects and light realize various values.

Thus the nature system has many values which constitute the base for the existence of the humans. Values can be classified as follows by their qualities; (1) individual values and social values, (2) natural values and artificial values, (3) physical values and mental values, (4) instrumental values and intrinsic values, (5) temporary values and permanent values, (6) exclusive values and universal values, (7) lower values and higher values, (8) unproductive values and productive values, (9) active values and inactive values, (10) personal values and impersonal values, (11) theoretical values and practical values, (12) relative values and absolute values, and so on.

Values are indeed manifold and countless, and values in our life are interconnected. For example, artistic values and social values depend on physical values, because we cannot do artistic or social activities without our lives or bodies. Science, education and political activities depend, more or less, on economic values, because we need some degree of economic support for our social life. Conversely, we know that intellectual values and political values influence our economy as some remarkable talent or excellent policy can make a home or a nation prosperous.

2. Hierarchy of ValuesIn this chapter, I will think about the hierarchy of various values in this world, that is, the question of what is the highest value and what is the lowest value.

First of all, M. Scheler(1874-1928) presented the following five principles in deciding the rank of values;

First, the longer the value lasts, the higher it is. For example, while the value of pleasure lasts for the duration of the feeling of pleasure, the mental value remains after the disappearance of the circumstances. (timelessness);

Second, the harder it is to reduce the quality of the value as its carrier (Werttrager) divides or the harder it is to increase the quality of the value as its carrier enlarges, the higher the value is. For example, while the value of material goods reduces as the goods divide, the value of mental goods is indivisible and not related to the number of people concerned. (indivisiblity);

Third, the higher value becomes the base for the lower value. The fewer other values the value has as its base, the higher it is.(independence);

Fourth, there is an intrinsic relationship between the rank of the value and the depth of satisfaction from its realization. In other words, the deeper the satisfaction connected to the value is, the higher the value is. For example, the physical satisfaction is strong but shallow. On the contrary, the satisfaction from artistic meditation is a deep experience. The depth of satisfaction is not related to its strength. (depth of satisfaction);

Fifth, the less the sense of the value is related to the existence of its carrier, the higher the value is. For example, the value of pleasure has significance in relation to the sense of sensuality. The value of life exists for those with the sense of life, but the moral value exists absolutely and independently from those who feel it. (absoluteness).

In accordance with the above principles, Scheler classified the values into the following four categories(from the bottom to the top); (1) the value of pleasure and displeasure(the emotional value), (2) the value of the sense of life(and welfare as a subsidiary value to it), (3) the mental value(perception, beauty, justice), (4) the value of holiness.

Further he divided the mental value into the value of beauty, the value of justice, and the value of perceiving the truth. The value of holiness was strictly distinguished from all the other values, which were thought to be given as the symbols of the value of holiness.

Thus Scheler suggested five principles, by which the ranks of values can be decided, and presented four levels of values. This idea is very instrumental in deciding the ranks of values. He placed the durable mental values higher than the temporary physical values, put the mental goods higher than the material goods, placed the satisfaction from artistic meditation above the material satisfaction, appreciated the value of the sense of life more highly than the emotional value of pleasure and displeasure, and placed the mental value of perception, beauty, and justice higher than the value of the sense of life. This is an excellent idea that can offer the right sense of values for some contemporary people with the mistaken sense of values.

Scheler's idea of values was succeeded by Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), who left a number of creative papers on this subject. Emphasizing that we just started the study of values, he said that it was very difficult to decide on the ranks of values. He also said that the hierarchy of values was formed objectively and never changed.

He said that the analysis of values clearly showed difference in the ranks of values in a small range. For example, the love of neighbors (Nachstenliebe) is higher in terms of quality than honesty, and the love of remote people(Fernstenliebe) is higher than the love of neighbors. The love of persons(Personliche Liebe) is higher than the love of neighbors or the love of remote people. Likewise, courage is higher than self-denial. Credit and Faith are higher than courage. The virtue of giving(Schenkende Tugend) and good personality are higher than credit and faith. He suggested goodness(das Gute), nobility(das Edle), fullness(die Fuelle) and purity(die Reinheit) as fundamental ethical values.

He also talked about the relationship between the height and the strength of the value. He said that the higher value was weak, but the lower value was strong. The higher value is structurally complex, but the lower value is elementary. Something elementary is strong. The betrayal of the lower value is a more serious sin than the betrayal of the higher value. The realization of the higher value is more valuable than that of the lower value. For example, murder is the most serious crime, but the respect for others' lives is not the highest virtue. The property is the value lower than kindness, but the infringement of the property is more severely condemned than unfriendliness. The betrayal of the lower value is shameful(schimpflich), but the realization of the lower value is taken for granted. Even if one betrays the higher value, he(or she) will not lose honor. However, if one realizes the higher value, he(or she) will be praized. Thus the height of the value and its strength are different from each other.

Here are examples in which Hartmann arranged values by their height. He arranged honesty, integrity, the love of neighbors, unconditional faith, the love of remote people and the virtue of giving by their height. Honesty is the lowest among these and the virtue of giving is the highest. Furthermore, the anti-values corresponding to these values can be illustrated as follows; dishonesty(for example theft), lie, the lack of love for neighbers, inability for unconditional faith, the lack of love for remote people, the lack of the virtue of giving. The strength is in the same order. That is, dishonest is the strongest anti-value, while the lack of the virtue of giving is the weakest. Theft as dishonesty is a crime and the lowest anti-value. A lie is not a crime but it is related to honor, while the lack of love is not a matter of honor. Inability for unconditional faith is just a moral defect, and the lack of love for remote people or the lack of the virtue of giving is not a defect at all.

Bearing in mind these ideas, I will look into the issue of the ranks of values more comprehensively and more progressively. Hartmann's remarks that the higher value is weak and the lower value is strong can be appreciated as grasping values ontologically. This can easily be understood if we get to know his idea of layered existence in which he understood the world in layers and divided the world of existence into four levels, which constituted four layers of existence(Seinsschicht).

He said that there were (1)the layer of mental existence, (2)the layer of conscious existence, (3)the layer of live existence and (4)the layer of physical existence. In the layer of mental existence are the humans, in the layer of conscious existence are the higher animals, in the layer of live existence are the plants, and in the layer of physical existence are the lifeless things.

(1) The humans include all the four layers of existence in themselves and are understood as concrete objects assembling these in a peculiar way.

(2) The higher animals are the aggregates of the layers of physical, live and conscious existence.

(3) The plants are the aggregates of the layers of physical and live existence.

(4) The lifeless things include only the layer of physical existence.

The layer of physical existence is the lowest but most basic layer of existence on which all the living organisms in the world live. If this layer of physical existence is destroyed, all the living organisms as well as all the precious mental and cultural heritage of the mankind will disappear at the same time. Therefore, the conservation of the layer of physical existence is very important.

Hartmann said that murder was the most serious crime, but more review is required on the act of murder. As for murder, there are the act of individual murder by an offender, the mass destruction of humans by a war, or, in the modern era, the act of annihilating the mankind as well as all the living organisms in the world by nuclear weapons. Considering the destructive power of nuclear weapons held by some countries, which can turn the surface of the earth into ashes, the act of provoking a nuclear war or that of destroying the earth is the most serious crime. Thus the act of destroying the earth and annihilating the mankind as well as all the living organisms is the most serious crime and the most dreadful anti-value.

The second lowest anti-value is the killing of a number of people by the crime against the state or the nation. The nation states are among the largest organizations made by humans in terms of geographical size or the number of people.

The act of a ruler who, by using a large organization as the state, initiates a war and causes the nation to lose its lives and properties and suffer from the loss of the war, is clearly the crime against the nation or the people. To drive the nation toward a war under the pretext of the prosperty for the nation or the state and kill the people of another state is clearly the low anti-value as an act of genocide. In the past, belligerent kings or rulers, who were very good at martial art or military strategy and frequently invaded other states, were often praized as heroes and respected as objects of adoration, but that should be considered the mistaken sense of value. The person who defends the nation and the state from the invasion of another nation or state, is of course a hero and patriot whose patriotism and courage should be highly appreciated.

The act of treason against the nation and the state, which leads to the loss of a number of lives of the people, is also a very low anti-value. This kind of serious crime against the state is the act of destroying a group of values of life and the more comprehensive act of killing or injuring than that of killing or injuring an individual. The serious crime against the state becomes directly or indirectly the act of destroying many values. It destroys values of life, bodily values as well as artistic, religious, political, economic, cultural, social and industrial values.

The third lowest anti-value is the act of mudering a human. The act of murdering or causing to death a human is the act of destroying the life and body of the human and is heavily punishable up to death penalty under the Korean Criminal Code like the crime against the state.

The next is the act of damaging the human body through violence and other means. The act of damaging the life or the body, which is the base for human existence, is clearly the low anti-value.

The low anti-value next to the act of damaging the human body is the act of destroying the public security and order and harming a number of people such as arson, traffic violation, etc. In addition to these, there are numerous immoral crimes including crimes relating to the properties, which are basic and essential for human life, such as theft, fraud, etc.

The above anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by the ranks from the lowest one:

(1) The act of destroying the earth, the act of annihilating the mankind and all the other living organisms

(2) The act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or committing treason

(3) The act of murdering or causing to death a human

(4) The act of damaging the body of a human

(5) The act of greatly harming the society

(6) All the other crimes not covered by the above

When we are preoccupied by the evil, ugly, dirty anti-values which are committed by humans, it is easy to have prejudices or misperceptions that everybody in this world seems to be wrong and evil. Those who usually handle offenders in the court are prone to suspect others as offenders.

On the contrary, if we observe the humans and the society, we cannot ignore the fact that the human has a dual aspect. E. Durkheim(1858-1917), a French positive sociologist, advocated the dual nature of the human. While the human is a selfish being with desires, he(or she) is also a moral, religious being. While the human is a being of sense and sensual thinking, he(or she) is also a being of reason and conceptual thinking. There is a confrontation between holiness and filthiness, and there is a duality of the individual and the society. There is a confrontation between selfishness and morals in the human mind. In the society, there are good persons and bad ones, good deeds and crimes, and justice and injustice.

Now I proceed to think about right, good, beautiful, holy and wonderful higher values.

First of all, I will think about absolute values as the highest values. Plato(B.C.427-347) said that there were absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute goodness, and there were absolute greatness(as the essence or nature of everything), health and power. The above-mentioned absolute justice, absolute beauty and absolute goodness can be considered absolute values, but at the present time truth in logic, goodness in morality, beauty in art and holiness in religion are generally considered absolute values. Thus it can be said that absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty and absolute holiness constitute the system of absolute values as the highest values.

On the highest goodness or absolute goodness, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) said that the highest goodness as the inevitable highest goal of the will as morally prescribed was the genuine object of practical reason. He also said that the highest absolute goodness could be found in the will of the rational being. It would be difficult to realize absolute goodness, which could be found only in the will of the rational being. Absolute truth, absolute beauty and absolute holiness could be found in the will or the mind of the wise, artistic or noble being.

The second highest values are the acts of guiding the mankind to the right road or giving happiness to them. The acts of Confucius, Buddha, Jesus Christ or Socrates belong to this category. The acts of Edison, Beethoven or the sculptor who made Venus of Milo also belong to it. These people, through the religious, educational, scientific or artistic activities, saved the mankind, taught them the immortal truth, told them the lofty ideal or gave them happiness of artistic meditation.

The third highest values are the acts of contributing to the nation or the state. Aristotle(B.C.384-332) said that, although it was worthwhile to realize the personal goal, it was more beautiful and nobler to realize the goal of the nation or that of the city state, and he added that it was this goal that we studied scientifically, which was in a sense what politics pursued. It is more worthwhile and more valuable to do good things for the nation or the state than to do good things for an individual.

The fourth highest values are the acts of contributing to the development of the village or the work place or the school, etc. Although the acts contribute only to the small society or group, not covering the wide range of the nation or the state, they are also very valuable. The acts are those of helping others, or contributing to the regional society, the work place or the school, but basically it is necessary to observe the rules of the society, the work place or the school.

Lower than the above, the next category of values in the hierarchy of values are the acts of cultivating oneself and govern a household. It is very important to carry out the virtues of self-denyal, moderation, or perseverance.

Socrates(B.C. 470-399) said that the virtue of a man was to govern the state well and the virtue of a woman was to govern the family well. That was only because the man mainly did external activities and the woman mainly did activities relating to the family at that time. It is of course the virtue for a man to govern the family well. In the teachings of Confucious, cultivating oneself was the basic value and the value of benefiting the world was put in the highest place, and in between there were the values of managing well the family and the state.

The above-mentioned values can be classified into the following five categories by the ranks from the highest one:

(1) absolute values such as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty, and absolute holiness

(2) the act of contributing to the development and happiness of the mankind

(3) the act of contributing to the nation or the state

(4) the act of contributing to the regional society, social organizations, the work place, the school etc.

(5) the act of cultivating oneself and managing the family well.

According to this hierarchy of values, we can easily understand that the act of benefiting oneself is the most basic value and the act of benefiting neighbors, the state, the nation or the mankind is the higher value.

However, as the human has the greedy, selfish and evil character as well as the moral, religious, good and holy character, he or she is often inclined to pursue the lower value and not to pursue the higher value. Driven by the mistaken sense of values, the human often pursues the lower values such as emotional pleasure, the wealth and shuns the moral or religious values. As Aristotle said earlier, people believe that a certain degree of virtues are well enough, but they endlessly pursue the wealth, money, power and reputation.

Money and the wealth must be the basic things for our survival and life, but these are not the highest value but the lower value. Because the moral, artistic, religious values are higher than the economic value, and, moreover, truth, goodness, beauty and holiness are the highest values, we ought to pursue such higher values.

Yet because the human has the very strong emotional desire and the desire to possess, he or she is inclined to endlessly pursue the wealth, money and power rather than the virtues or the public welfare. Thus we first ought to make efforts to become a rightious and virtuous human and pursue the wealth, money or power in a just way.

Immanuel Kant's remarks "der bestirnte Himmel ueber mir und das moralische Gesetz in mir" show us his firm Western moral spirit. Kant clearly said that the good was different from pleasure, and he also said that the highest goodness was the genuine object of practical reason and the highest virtue as the first element of the highest goodness constituted moralism, but happiness constituted the second element of the highest goodness. Such words show us which one of goodness and happiness is higher as the value. Generally speaking, people tend to pursue happiness more eagerly than goodness, but because goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to pursue goodness more eagerly.

People generally pursue their own happiness and want others to be perfect, but they ought to pursue their own perfection and others' happiness. Because people want others to be perfect for the formers' own happiness, they blame others for the formers' unhappiness.

We ought to have goodness as our highest goal and others' happiness as our goal. Yet I do not mean that we should not mind our just happiness at all. In the past, the natural desire of the human was often considered bad and not to be pursued, while complete self-denial was considered a virtue. That should be corrected in the modern era.

For example, the moral value is higher than the economic value, but the desire to be rich or work diligently should not be regarded as unjust. We know the words by King Solomon or Saint Paul on the wealth and diligence. Thomas Aquinas(1225-1274) annotated the thesis by Saint Paul that those who do not work should not eat.

R. Baxter(1615-1691), a typical British Puritan, considered the wealth to be very dangerous and seductive but the writings of Puritans said that taking a rest with the wealth, laziness and lust caused by the enjoyment of the wealth, especially the deviation from the efforts for a holy life should be morally rejected and the waste of time is a serious sin. After all Protestantism did not view self-denial and the acquisition of the property as contradictory to each other.

Protestantism taught that people should work together with diet, vegetarianism, and cold shower. It is well known that as a result of the pioneer spirit and diligence of the Protestants, many countries or regions where many Protestants live have become economically advanced or rich. There is a saying that a miserly rich man is better than a generous poor man, which is because the poor man does not have the wealth to help others with. Thus, in this modern era, we should duly realize our just desire while controling our unjust desire, and contribute to the prosperity and development of the individual, the family, the society, the state, the nation and the mankind. By duly realizing the sexual desire, appetite, and desire to possess, we can give birth to a human, help the human existence, and enrich the human life.

Therefore, we ought to keep in mind that promoting other's happiness, cultivating our good character, duly fulfilling our duties and contributing to the prosperity and development of the society, the state, the nation, and the mankind are the higher values.

3. ConclusionI classified the anti-values into six categories and the higher values into five categories, all with the ranks.

The word "value" has orginated from the economic field, but the value is different from the price. It is difficult to convert the value into the price, and it is not easy to put the price on life. The price is the exchange value and it is different from time to time, from place to place, from people to people, and is constantly changeable.

No price or the cheap price does not necessarily mean no value or the small value. For example, we do not put the price on air, but it is very valuable for us. Water or tap water is cheap, but it is essential for human life and has the almost boundless value for us. Land, the sun, and light also have the boundless and essential value for the existence of humans, animals, and plants. Therefore, the air pollution, the water pollution, and the destruction of the ecological system are very grave anti-values, threatening the existence of the humans and other living organisms.

We now face not only the environmental pollution but also difficult problems such as human alienation and unemployment, the depletion of natural resources, crimes, drug addiction, the disintegration of the family, the deviation of youths and the mistreatment of the elderly, the inequality of distribution, the threat of weapons of mass-destruction, the disruption of the sense of values, etc.

The solution of these problems would require not only the individual efforts but also the efforts and cooperation of social organizations, government agencies, and, furthermore, international organizations.

In helping people to get the right sense of values and internalize it, education and enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience rather than compulsion will be highly effective.

Bearing in mind the ideas of some scholars on the classification and hierarchy of values, I have tried to look into the issue of the ranks of values more comprehensively and more progressively. The anti-values can be classified into the following six categories by the ranks from the lowest one; (1) The act of destroying the earth, the act of annihilating the mankind and all the other living organisms, (2) the act of mass killing of people by initiating a war or committing treason, (3) the act of murdering or causing to death a human, (4) the act of damaging the body of a human, (5) the act of greatly harming the society, (6) all the other crimes not covered by the above. Then, the higher values can be classified into the following five categories by the ranks from the highest one ; (1) absolute values such as absolute truth, absolute goodness, absolute beauty, and absolute holiness, (2) the act of contributing to the development and happiness of the mankind, (3) the act of contributing to the nation or the state, (4) the act of contributing to the regional society, (5) the act of cultivating oneself and managing the family well. Generally speaking, people tend to pursue happiness more eagerly than goodness, but because goodness is the higher value than happiness, we ought to pursue goodness more eagerly. In helping people to get the right sense of values and internalize it, education and enlightenment of citizens based on the guidance of conscience rather than compulsion will be highly effective.

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Philosophy of ValuesValores y Normas EticasJorge M. AyalaUniversity de Zaragoza, Spain

RESUMEN: En esta comunicacin abordamos un aspecto de la filosofa de los valores: el valor moral. Este participa de la naturaleza y de las caractersticas del valor en general, pero tambin presenta notas especficas. Dos cuestiones se plantean aqu: cmo llegamos al conocimiento del valores moral, y la distincin entre valors y normas ticas. Se concluye haciendo referencia a la educacin moral o adquisicin de los hbitos morales. Se analiza el concepto de ley. Entre el romanticismo o primaca del amor, y el rigorismo o primaca de la ley existe un trmino medio, la ley como expresin del bien general querido por el hombre.

An se sigue hablando de que "las cosas tienen un valor u otro," de que tienen valor "positivo o negativo." Esto es mirar el problema de los valores desde el punto de vista de las cosas. Importa considerar los valores como algo que tenemos o que podemos tener en nuestro interior las personas. Los valores estn arraigados en la misma condicin de la existencia y los valores constituyen un punto de mira y el objetivo ltimo en la formacin de toda la personalidad De hecho, una fuente de ansiedad de los jvenes es la de no contar con los valores accesibles para construir la base que le permita establecer su propia identidad y un modo personal de relacionarse con el mundo.

Un valor es la creencia estable de que algo es bueno o malo; de que algo es preferible a su contrario. Estas creencias nunca van solas, sino que siempre estn organizadas en nuestro psiquismo de manera que forman escalas de preferencia relativa.

Cada uno tiene una escala de valores. Esta afirmacin debera ser completada con otras, que actualmente son aceptadas por la psicologa:

El nmero de valores que posee una persona es relativamente pequeo. Los verdaderos valores, los que ntimamente me dicen "por dnde ir," son pocos, La existencia de muchos valores acaba en dispersin y despersonalizacin.

Los valores son universales. Es decir, que existe un conjunto de valores que so comunes a todos los hombres y a lo largo y ancho del mundo., Lo que diferencia a unos hombres de otros es la mayor o menor intensidad que con que los viven.

Es verdad que los valores que tenemos reflejan nuestra personalidad, pero tambin lo es que de nuestros valores son responsables, en gran medida, las instituciones en las que hemos vivido, la cultura en la que nos movemos, y, en toda su amplitud, la sociedad.

Importancia de los valores. Los valores son pautas y guas de nuestra conducta. Slo el hombre es capaz de trascender del estmulo al sentido. Las personas nos interrogamos constantemente acerca del significado de nosotros mismos, de lo que hacemos y del mundo que nos rodea. Esto es un indicador de que las personas tenemos necesidad de encontrar un sentido, de obrar con propsito claro, de saber a dnde nos encaminamos y por qu razn. Una escala de valores permite elegir entre caminos alternativos. Es como el mapa del arquitecto; no es necesario que continuamente, pero conviene tenerle presente.

Un sistema de valores permite al hombre resolver los conflictos y tomar decisiones. La escala de valores ser responsable en cada caso de los principios y reglas de conducta que se pongan en funcionamiento. La carencia de un sistema de valores bien definido deja al sujeto en la duda, a la vez que lo entrega en manos ajenas a su persona.

Los valores son la base de la autoestima. Se trata de un "sentimiento base" (McDougall), un sentimiento de respeto por uno mismo. Este sentimiento necesita, para mantenerse y verse reforzado, de un sistema de valores coherente. Slo s quin soy si s s lo que prefiero, si s definir algunos objetivos de mi vida con cierta claridad. Y solamente s lo que quiero si he asimilado algunos valores que me ayudan a entender, dar sentido y expresar mi relacin con el mundo y con las cosas de manera integrada y que me proporciona paz.

Los valores defensivos. Hay valores y antivalores. Estos aparecen a veces camuflados como valores. Por eso, los valores, como todo lo humano, deben pasar por la criba de la autenticidad. Existen valores negativos, que simplemente justifican lo que uno hace.

Tipos de valores. Desde la clasificacin de Spranger, que clasificaba los valores en "tericos," "econmicos," "estticos," "sociales," "polticos" y "religiosos," se han sucedido las clasificaciones que intentan aclarar un mundo tan intrincado. Cuando pensamos que una persona tiene un valor, estamos imaginando que estima mucho una forma de comportarse los hombres. Siempre que pensamos en valores deberemos preguntarnos por nuestra situacin interior en estos dos terrenos: el terminal y el instrumental.

Valores terminales. son los valores ms abstractos y de innegable universalidad (amistad, aprecio, armona interior, autoestima,. Belleza, estabilidad, igualdad, la paz mundial, la salvacin, libertad, placer, prosperidad, realizacin, sabidura, familia, felicidad, amor, plenitud vital). De estos valores, unos son personales y otros interpersonales. En qu orden los inculcamos y trasmitimos?

Los valores instrumentales son aquellos que se refieren a la estima que tenemos por determinadas conductas y formas de comportarse de los hombres (abierto, afectivo, ambicioso, animoso, autocontrolado, creativo, educado, eficaz, independiente, intelectual, honrado, limpio, lgico, magnnimo, obediente, responsable, servicial, valiente). Esta escala es relativa, pues de acuerdo con la consideracin social de cada uno, da preferencia a unos valores obre otros.

Los valores son inseparables de la tica. Esto es natural, porque todo lo relacionado con el hombre implica una dimensin tica. Por eso, educar en valores es una educacin en libertad y para la libertad; sta es la base de la tica. As pues, no es suficiente conocer r los valores, sino que hay que integrarlos en la propia vida. Este es el objetivo de la educacin moral. El hombre es un ser tico o moral. Posee un conocimiento operativo de la diferencia objetiva entre el bien y el mal y tambin de la posibilidad que el hombre tiene de realizar actos buenos o malos. La bondad o maldad de un acto no depende de su realizacin fsica, sino de su relacin a su propio fin y percepcin. Un acto es bueno cuando se ordena al fin propio del hombre. La expresin del orden que regula los actos humanos es la ley. Moralidad y ley se hallan estrechamente relacionados.

La conciencia, que incluye el conocimiento de la ley, es juez de la moralidad de nuestras acciones. Ley no es una coaccin de la libertad, como tan frecuentemente se oye decir, porque la ley expresa el orden que regula la bondad del acto humano. No proviene de fuera del hombre, sino de su misma naturaleza. La educacin moral ha de conducir, por tanto, a la formacin del hbito de cumplir la ley. Adquirir hbitos morales. A veces se ha contrapuesto la libertad a la ley. El romanticismo da especial relieve a los hechos afectivos, desvinculndolos de los actos de la voluntad. El rigorismo kantiano del imperativo categrico pone a la ley frente al amor. Esta divisin rompe la unidad del humano.

Por voluntad se entiende una instancia desiderativa que no es orgnica, sino que es de la misma ndole que el intelecto. Tiene la misma amplitud que el intelecto. El amor es una forma del querer, y se encuentra en el principio y el fin de todo acto de voluntad. La ley es expresin particular de la misma tendencia universal al bien que mueve al amor. La ley posibilita a la voluntad la realizacin del bien. Es, pues, fruto del amor.

Una hermosa tarea de la educacin es crear la conciencia de que el ejercicio de la voluntad est en el cumplimiento de las leyes y que en este cumplimiento se vuelven a ensamblar el amor y la ley.

La educacin moral, como cualquier educacin, es primariamente intelectual; pero no solamente intelectual. La necesidad de actividades concretas resulta fcil de programar y realizar cuando se trata de hbitos particulares o destrezas. Pero cuando se trata de un hbito tan general como "disposicin para el cumplimiento de las leyes," resulta muy difcil determinar qu actos deben realizarse para adquirir tal disposicin.

Un acto tiene valor educativo cuando est bien hecho; en otro caso sera indiferente o tal vez negativo para el fin que se persigue. Esto vale tanto como decir que en la formacin del hbito para el cumplimiento de la ley sirven los actos en los cuales se cumpla bien alguna ley. En otras palabras: la preocupacin por la obra bien hecha es esencial en la formacin de cualquier hbito.

ConclusinNo existe coincidencia a la hora de sealar si son antes los valores o las normas ticas. Unos creen que son las normas ticas las que sirven de fundamento a los valores: lo que se ajusta a unas normas ticas determinadas "vale" como bueno, lo que contradice esas normas ticas "no vale," porque es malo. Max Scheler introdujo la polaridad de valores, en la que los dos polos (lo bueno y lo malo) "valen." Por el contrario, otros piensan que los son valores lo que deben servir de fundamento a las normas ticas: lo que "vale," es bueno; lo que no "vale," es malo. Nuestro punto de vista es el siguiente: primero estn los Valores, despus vienen las Normas ticas y, por ltimo, est la relacin entre valores y normas ticas. Sealamos tambin la naturaleza del valor moral: ste afecta a los comportamientos en los que la persona se responsablemente (en libertad). Por eso, el valor moral aparece como la razn de ser del hombre. Es el que ms influye en la forja de la personalidad del individuo. De ah su complejidad: ha de realizar un ideal universalmente vlido, sin perjuicio de la peculiaridad irrenunciable del sujeto en que se encarna. Segn escribe Jolivet: "El hombre, al inventar los valores, invntase a s mismo a partir de s mismo y deviene propiamente lo que es."

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Philosophy of EducationPersonalism and Education: A Philosophical Retrospect/ProspectThomas O. BufordFurman UniversityTom.Buford@Furman.edu

ABSTRACT: Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality (to some degree), Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason (empirical coherence, for Brightman), and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus was on moral education. My interest, however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism.

IntroductionPersonalism deeply influenced education in America during the first two-thirds of the twentieth century. Their influence was felt through the liberal Protestant consensus, which was the intellectual framework for higher education, and which they helped forge. (1) During the twentieth century forces eroded that consensus, and by the late1960's its influence was weak. Many of us can remember the attack in the late 1960's on the Establishment waged by counterculture forces, specifically Woodstock. The result is that something is now missing that was in place fifty years ago. Let's call it the Center, the content of which was a theological understanding of the persons and their world, certain books, and the commitment to educating the intellect to know. Along with that Center went a view of person and an understanding of what moral education could mean if it were attempted. What I want to do is consider a part of what has been lost, specifically that view of persons and their moral education. My reason for this is more than historical; we may have cast aside a view of persons and moral education that ought to be given more careful consideration. To do that I want to discuss a Personalist (that form of Personalism known as Boston Personalism) view of education, particularly moral education.

Committed to the metaphysical thesis that Person is first, working within the Liberal Protestant Consensus, and believing that our minds are capable of grasping reality (to some degree), Boston Personalists have followed two roads in developing their thought: ratio and poeisis. The former is represented by Bowne and Brightman with their emphasis on reason (empirical coherence, for Brightman), and the latter by Bertocci with his emphasis on creativity. Though Bowne and Brightman were deeply concerned with education, it was Bertocci who wrote on the subject, and his focus was on moral education. My interest, however, is not in developing Bertocci's position. Rather I shall state the essentials of a Personalist view of moral education within the poeisis tradition. To do that I shall address this question: "Must one know to be good?" I shall discuss that question by examining the life of the developing moral person and the place of knowledge in that life. As this discussion unfolds, we shall see the educational ideal of Boston Personalism.

Structure of PersonsWe turn first to the life of the developing moral person. What can we say about that life? Humans are creative-finders. Being instinctually deprived and thus open to the world in a way that animals are not, they create structures for themselves. (2) They may be stable as in traditional societies or unstable and open to change, as in modern societies. Yet in their effort to overcome their instinctual deficit in their relation to the world and to provide safety for themselves, they craft a world, including institutions. The exercise of this capacity requires imagination and embodiment. This means that selves must "come up with," imagine what is not already available to them in the world and with ways of realizing those possibilities. The realization of the possible requires embodiment, the suggestiveness of the "medium" in which we live physically and socially. Selves and institutions are nothing more than abstractions if they remain only in the imaginative mind of the artist and on the drawing board of the draftsman. They must be instantiated by "artists" in contexts that will support them. But what is the place of creatively finding in the formation of our moral personhood? (3)

First, as a creative-finder a person is an agent. We not only initiate actions but we have the potentiality to act in a wide variety of ways. We shall call these "activity potentials." An activity potential is that which a person is able to do in a situation that calls for it. Persons have the following activity potentials: "sensing, remembering, imagining, thinking, feeling, emoting, wanting, willing, oughting, and aesthetic and religious appreciation." (4) To possess the activity potential of sensing means, for example, that one has the potentiality to see the color of the Aegean sea, even though one has never actually seen it. If one were in a position to see it, one would be able to do so. It is also possible for a person not to possess an activity potential. A blind person does not have the activity potential of sight. We call these activity potentials a complex unity because rarely is one potential developed without involving the others. Persons do not simply see; they also think about what they see, appreciate what they see, and remember what they see. And we must remember, that as agents with activity potentials, those potentials actualize in a suggestive and limiting context. For one to sense there must be something that is sensed. We cannot sense a red male cardinal as just any color we arbitrarily choose. The bird sets limits to the actualization of my activity potential, seeing.

Second, as creative-finders we are self-conscious of this complex of activity potentials as belonging to ourselves. And as belonging, these activity potentials are owned. They are mine. However, the fact that they belong to me does not mean they are consistent with each other or that they work well together. Rather, they "belong" in the sense that they are all owned by one person, me. But what is the person to whom these activity potentials belong? For them to belong to me there must be a unifier to whom they belong. To ignore belonging as implying a unity leaves us with simply unrelated experiences as the activity potentials actualize their potentiality. That could leave us with the following oddity: I could hit my finger with a hammer today and I could remember tomorrow that I hit my finger with a hammer yesterday and the two experiences have nothing to do with each other. But, of course they do; I connect them. Both belong to me and I am aware of that. The self cannot be only a succession of experiences, as Hume contended. There can be no succession of experiences without the experience of succession. Unless there is someone to whom they belong and who acts as unifier, change and the interrelation of the activity potentials are incoherent. A person is a unity-in-continuity.

Does this mean that a person is an entity that has the capacity to possess these characteristics? No, a person is not an entity; a person is nothing other than the experiences it has. No unchanging, mathematically identical soul unifies our activity potentials. While the complex unity of activity potentials is nothing apart from the self, the self is not reducible to this complex unity. The self is "a self-identifying unity in change, a self-identifying being and becoming." (5) We find that we are a self-conscious unity amid complexity. What does this mean?

Third, as creative-finders our identity is rooted in our experience of the continuity of "nows." We are self-consciously aware that we are both self-identifying and being-becoming. We are self-conscious of ourselves as complex unities who have identities and that remain through change. "The unity that is undeniable is the complex now of self-experience, a present that is no mathematical point but a saddle-back span, a telic moment erlebst that gives way to another moment." (6) How are these "nows" to be interpreted? They are our experience of ourselves as temporal beings. The most rudimentary experience we have of ourselves is our now, our duration. As enduring, we are continuous with the past and the future. For this reason we call this view a temporalistic view of the person. But how are the nows connected to form our ongoing continuous selves? It seems at first sight that reason is the best candidate to connect them. But reason is not the experiential basis for our conviction of a continuous self, an identity. What evidence do we have that there is an identity among our nows, that we are the same persons at the beginning of Franz Liszt's Les Preludes as we are at the end of it?

On the one hand, the experiential basis of our belief that we are identical through change is the experience of "again." The "now" that I am conscious of recurs again. "Againness" is rooted in memory, especially recall, as in recalling a person's name that you are talking to. This is the power both to form an image, an individual in the midst of the flux of sensation, and to recognize now the reoccurrence of that individual.

On the other hand, as we connect our nows as happening again we may be in error. But to be in error requires the identity of persons. Only persons are able to refer an experience to an object or to claim knowledge of an object. If my student advisee, Reed, says that he is better suited to being a salesman rather than an accountant, Reed believes something and refers it to himself. He may be wrong about himself. Let's assume that he is, and that he would make a better accountant than a salesman. The error was dependent on something being in Reed's consciousness: "only a being who can be aware of x, continue to be and become as he refers the x experienced beyond itself, and thus be the 'locus' of whether or not his reference is correctonly such a unity-in-continuity, only such a being-becoming, can render the very occurrence of error intelligible." (7) Only a person who remains self-conscious through nows, who has identity, can be in error.

Fourth, and finally, as creative-finders we direct our lives towards ends. We want to become doctors, salesmen, laborers, or whatever, and we work toward those goals. We may be wrong or "misdirected" about those goals. But we must believe that persons who purposively and imaginatively guide their successive experiences relative to ends are continuous and self-identical through those telic successive experiences. (Define the latter as tendencies toward and aversions from some object in the environment.)

Thus, as a creative-finder I am an interrelator of nows, a self-identifying, imagining interrelator whose nature it is to act and be acted upon. A person as being-becoming is deeply rooted in the constitutive imagination focused on the "medium" within which it lives. What are we to make of a person as an interrelator that forms her personality?

Let's consider the nature of personality, how it arises, and then its relation to persons. A personality can be defined as "that organization, by a self-identifying person, of those psychophysical wants and abilities that uniquely characterizes his expressive and adaptive adjustments to his environment." (8) How does the personality arise? Personalities are not mere products of their environments or mere unfoldings of capacities. Personality develops due to persons' responses to and understanding of themselves and their public environment. As human beings, persons have needs, tendencies, potentialities, and interests. Individuals select from their own capacities and telic tendencies. We select among these tendencies and the environmental options available to us. Telic tendencies include drives, propensities, needs, and motives, both innate and learned. Such tendencies are psychophysiological in character and include the "bodily me" as well as some aspects of self-identity and ego enhancement discussed earlier. Telic tensions, conflicts, and anxieties do not occur between individuals and their environments (social and physical). Rather, "they have their locus within the person whose dynamic, telic nature encourages the different meanings and values he gives to what surfaces in his constant interaction with some environment." (9) Personalities are the products of knowing-wanting agents who interact with their private and public environments in the attempt to satisfy their own selections and abilities.

What is the relation of person and personality? There is an interrelator (Descartes' crucial insight is correct), but this interrelator is not a timeless, unchanging, substantially identical being. Persons are being-becomings. They objectify themselves, become, in relation to their environment. In so doing their activity potentials through interaction with the total environment are formed into a relatively coherent becoming. This is the personality. No personality, no person. Likewise, no person, no personality.

We can now understand "poeisis," the metaphor drawn from art and its relation to the formation of personality. Both the imagination and medium play central roles in the formation of both the person and personality. If the self is to be understood as a complex time-binding interrelation of activity potentials, the act of relating is an act that brings something into existence that was not there before. The person is agent; but the person is deeply the constitutive imagination on the basis of which the "medium" (the total environment) is explored and the elements of the self are both interrelated and related to that medium. No image no relations; and no relations no personal identity. (10) Further, the self that forms its personality as it interacts with its environment must consider possible ends towards which to move, and that requires the creative imagination. It could be that the self forms its personality dyadically as in traditional societies. But even then it recognizes itself as numerically other than the persons in their community. Or it could be that the self forms its personality monadically as in modern, industrial society. In that case it attempts to form its personality independently of other persons even though it may be influenced by them. The modern personality is the peculiar development of the self as it relates to the specific environment, social, political, economic, moral that is found in the West since the sixteen hundreds. Thus, the temporalistic personalist helps us to understand how the self develops a personality and in so doing helps us to develop the metaphor of "medium" that is necessary to the imaginative development of the self, to creatively finding a self.

Summary: We now have before us an interpretation of the person as creator-finder. We have seen that the imagination and "medium" are central to the self's formation of itself as a personality. To bring into existence what was not there before, a person must imagine possibilities. The self is constrained by a "medium," which we have seen, both suggests and constricts by setting boundaries. Now we must discuss that which directs and unifies the activity potentials of the self, its telic and regnant ideals.

Values and the GoodAt the heart of the Personalist view of persons is that they are complex time binding unities with regnant ideals. As moral agents persons are "capable of thinking and conducting [themselves] in accordance with the ideals of truth and value." (11) But how do these ideals arise? To understand that we must discuss the Good and its place in the life of persons as creative-finders.

Persons are willing, feeling, emotive, wanting selves, as well as oughting ones. This means that oughting is an activity potential. Oughting does not arise from knowledge; neither does it arise from the person herself, as if it were made by that person or by society. As Bertocci says, " . . . any person mature enough to conceive alternatives, who decides that x-value is better than y-value, never experiences 'I ought to choose y' (even though it may turn out that he does choose y)." (12) But what ought persons to choose?

What is the good for persons? This good has two components, the first of which is that persons are ends. This means that "were persons not capable of thinking and willing in relation to the alternatives consonant with their affective-emotive tendencies, they would have no reason for treating themselves as ends; they could reasonably be treated as things. Only that person can be an end in himself who can be an end for himself. This is the baseline of a personalistic theory of the good and therefore of education." (13) However, this is not enough. It remains empty until a person "decides what values and ideals are the best for persons, . . . until we articulate an ideal of personality that ought to be realized as far as possible (meliorism) in the context of the raw materials [read "medium"] of personal experience. . . . The personalist's next question must be: How shall we reason about the actual good open to persons, by which all educational choices, formal and material, ought to be guided?" (14)

We must keep in mind that values are the wantings, strivings of persons. But some wants are prized over others. We must evaluate them in the situations in which we find ourselves. As we do so we find them forming patterns. "Any value pattern we discover will be a description about persons in their world, or of the world with persons left in it. The ideal of the life good to live will be a consequence of man's relating himself in thought and action to his own activity-potentials and to his environment, as conceived and as it really is." (15) Once we see this we find that some values are cardinal and support the development of others. These cardinal ones are existence, health, and truth-values. These values are not concoctions of impulse that can be dismantled in preference to others. "To live at all is to live 'in connections' we can't escape; our problemthe fundamental one in educationis to discover the framework, so to speak, of connections among our valueand disvalueexperiences." (16)

To live lives good to live also requires that we discipline ourselves by our ideals. That is our character. "Character . . . is a simple word for a person's complex, learned, moral dispositions to face value conflicts that inevitably or purposely arise in and around his efforts to discover and increase values in his own life and that of others." (17) Succinctly, persons ought to discover the best of which they are capable and strive to achieve it in the face of whatever difficulties present themselves in their environments.

The achievement of these values, however, also involves affiliative and vocational values. Persons find that their values are not only deeply "rooted in, but rendered more worthwhile by, their associations with others." (18) And "the job one has, the work one does 'for a living,' may well take its place alongside of family-experience as the gymnasium in which most persons shape their personalities." (19) However, vocation is broader than work to earn a living. It is one's calling, which is to actualize the purpose that allows for the full actualization of his individuality.

And what is the interrelation of these values? There is no hierarchy here. Our lives move and change as we creatively grow within and in response to our environments. Different values come to the front to guide us at different times in our lives. It is best to think of a symphony of values. "Hence the question always is: Which orchestration of values will not foreclose values unnecessarily?" (20) As Bertocci says, "The goal in life, the meaning of happiness, cannot be 'serene' fulfillment but a melioristic 'creative insecurity'. . . . His task, ultimately of self-education, is the task of finding where he is, and how far he can go, in relation to the total human venture in value realization." (21) "The moral life consists not in a flight from insecurity, but in risky but blessed creativity, guided by a larger, imperfect vision of what man and the universe can be." (22) Though the Personalist can develop a view of the life good to live on the basis of a person's Lebenschauung, it points to a grounding in a view of Being as Person.

Knowledge, the Good, and PersonsThe universe is deeply moral and we can know its structure through the revelation of God in the Judeo-Christian tradition. But we are not left to faith alone. Appealing to German Romantic thought, particularly Kant and Hegel, we can argue that the universe is moral and knowable by reason and experience. Nature is God's creation and by our own devices, notably science, we can learn what God placed there. Humans, made in the image of God, are best guided by reason as they interpret experience as well as being instructed by it. But left to reason and experience alone persons drift and find no stable meaning in life. (Scientific standards and procedures are not enough to build a life on.) Only on the basis of their purposive, aiming, valuing activity can persons find meaning. But values are not private or limited to society. Written in the heart of reality are moral patterns that are universal and available to all persons. By grasping these moral values a person can integrate them into her life, thereby finding the meaning that seems so elusive. Though a person, thinking philosophically can grasp them, any person through the Judeo-Christian faith, particularly the Protestant tradition, can grasp them and find in them meaning for their lives.

This reformulation of the tradition of the calling aids persons to find answers to the deepest questions of their lives, specifically, Who am I? What am I to be? What am I to do? And in answering them one supposedly overcomes the truncated and splintered personality and finds rich identity. What gives our lives unity are values, purposes that transcend us and to which we commit ourselves. Writing in 1908 Josiah Royce, the great Harvard philosopher wrote, ". . . the answer to the question, 'Who are you?' really begins in earnest when a man mentions his calling, and so actually sets out upon the definition of his purposes and of the way in which these purposes get expressed in his life. . . . To sum up, then, I should say that a person, an individual self, may be defined as a human life lived according to a plan." (23) Further, we search for "some cause, far larger than ourselves, to which we are fully ready to be loyal.". (24) When we find that cause we come to our full moral consciousness, we find unity for our lives; and we also find our calling. It should not be assumed that the cause to which one is loyal will actually fully and finally unity and integrate one's life. Edgar S. Brightman wrote in 1925 that ". . . our incomplete and fragmentary minds give rise to an ideal of a full and complete personality, that this ideal is the only one that fulfills the demands of coherent thinking, and hence that the perfect personality is real." (25) And what is the relation of that cause, that which is supremely valuable to that perfect personality, to God? God is the home of universal values. They are the fundamental principles in terms of which God created, sustains, and redeems the world. And only they can provide the unity a purposive, aiming person seeks. Though our limited, finite, individual minds seek unity, only God is fully integrated, unified personality.

ConclusionNow, let me summarize. A Personalist answer to our question can be seen within the central personalist concern regarding the education of the whole person. The whole person rests on character and truth, the two rails on which the moral personality rests. Let's summarize what we have said by focusing on the original question, "Must one know to be good?"

Person is a time-binding, complex unity of activity potentials, governed by ideals, "a fighter for ends" (William James).For persons to be good, to be a rich, full personalities, they must know those ideals that give their lives coherence.If one were to claim to be virtuous and did not know that the values chosen were the best for the fully developed personality, that person cannot escape the charge that they could be acting badly while they thought there were acting virtuously.Hence, one must know the good to be good.

Notes(1) For a full discussion of the significance for higher education of the liberal Protestant consensus see George Marsden, "The Soul of the American University," in George M. Marsden and Bradley J. Longfield (eds.), The Secularization of the Academy (New York: Oxford UP, 1992): 9-45 and George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University, From Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford UP, 1994).

(2) See Arnold Gehlen, Man in the Age of Technology. Trans. Particia Lipscomb (New York: Columbia UP, 1980) and Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature. Trans. with an Introduction by Hans Meyerhoff (New York: Beacon, 1961).

(3) In what follows we shall be heavily dependent on the work of Peter A. Bertocci, especially his essay, "The Essence of a Person." We agree with Bertocci and Bowne that the starting point in our search for the nature of the person is experience and reasoning within experience. It makes no sense to go beyond what experience supports; yet, we must seek the most coherent account of experience as we find it. We want to achieve the most inclusively systematic hypothesis regarding the nature of persons, their identity, and their unity.

(4) Peter A. Bertocci, "The Essence of a Person." The Monist 61.1:458.

(5) Ibid., 460.

(6) Ibid., 461.

(7) Ibid., 463.

(8) Peter A. Bertocci, "The Person, His Personality, and Environment." Review of Metaphysics 32 (1979): 606.

(9) Bertocci, "The Person, His Personality, and Environment" 606.

(10) Vico is right. The central imaginative universal is Jove. From it all else human develops. The self finds itself in and through sacred story. See Stephen Crites, "The Narrative Quality of Experience." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 39 (September 1971): 291-311.

(11) Peter A. Bertocci. "A Personalistic Philosophy of Education." Teachers College Record. 80.3 (February 1979): 489.

(12) Ibid., 490.

(13) Ibid., 491.

(14) Ibid., 492.

(15) Ibid., 495.

(16) Ibid., 497.

(17) Ibid., 499.

(18) Ibid.

(19) Ibid., 501.

(20) Ibid., 503.

(21) Ibid. 504.

(22) Peter A. Bertocci. "Education and the Vision of Excellence." University Lecture 1959-1960. Boston: Boston UP 1960: 26.

(23) Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan 1908, 1918): 168.

(24) Ibid.,170.

(25) Edgar Sheffield Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy (New York: Holt, 1925):210).

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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducHuaq.htm

Philosophy of EducationEtica y Educacion Integral (1)Vctor R. Huaqun Mora (2)Universidad De Santiago De Chile

RESUMEN: Este trabajo establece una relacin entre tica, eticidad y educacin. Sobre la base de un humanismo integral, el hombre se comprende como un ser multidimensional. La multiplicidad de dimensiones o expresiones humanas, que se caracterizan por poseer autonoma y universalidad, pueden perfeccionarse mediante una educacin integral al evitar distorsiones e inadecuadas sobre valoraciones de stas. El ser humano es esencialmente personal y comunitario a la vez. Desde esta perspectiva, satisface su naturaleza cuando establece relaciones de sentido con sus congneres en un marco comunicacional; puesto que, pertenece a su esencia el ser-con-otro, el ser-por-otro y el ser-para-otro. De esta forma, compartir, recibir y dar constituye una exigencia tica que lo realiza o finaliza. La educacin, por ende, actualiza estas condiciones humanas al implicar con ello valores educativos fundamentales, que deben surgir de la bondad y sabidura de los educadores y reciprocarse en los educandos. La educacin integral realiza la educatividad de educadores y educabilidad de educandos en un proceso de desarrollo interactivo, continuo, crtico y creativo al considerer las dimensiones humanas en una perspectiva holstica. La Etica, en cuanto ciencia normativa, regula necesariamente la actividad educacional convirtiendo a la educacin en la dimensin perfeccionadora de todas las otras.

La tica es la ciencia que, al estudiar la conducta humana en cuanto al deber ser, traduce sus principios a exigencias prcticas que deben regular cualquier actividad, incluyendo el estudio de la misma. Esta exigencia, es tan importante que, al normar desde un comienzo su propia actividad, genera la paradoja que implica, por un lado, una responsabilidad inmediata prctica, traducida a la buena o correcta voluntad de actuar bien y, por otro, la posibilidad terica de descubrir principios ticos que pudieran contradecir la conducta eventual relacionada con tal estudio. En otras palabras, la conciencia moralmente recta puede, eventualmente, contraponerse a una conciencia ticamente errnea.

De la tica surge el fundamento terico de la moralidad de los actos humanos. Sn embargo, la moralidad es una exigencia que ha derivado de las costumbres de los pueblos y se impone por la conciencia moral nacida de esas costumbres. Esto suele llevar a errneas conclusiones en torno a la universalidad de los principios ticos, al confundirse los ethos culturales con principios subyacentes que implican necesariamente una conciencia recta aunque, jams, absolutamente verdadera; pero, tampoco, plenamente falsa, como puede apreciarse en las diferentes culturas. Es esa conciencia moral la que obliga a actuar responsablemente con el conocimiento tico de que se dispone en un determinada cultura y tiempo histrico. De esta forma, si la tica en cuanto ciencia se atiene a los principios de neutralidad objetiva, la eticidad de los actos humanos obliga a actuar responsablemente siempre. La dualidad de tica y eticidad puede percibirse en la historia.

El sensualismo de los epicureanos se basaba en una moral psicolgica traducible al equilibrio biolgico del cuerpo humano, el cual entregaba mayores beneficios que los desequilibrios. De esta manera, era tico obtener el mayor de los bienes posibles sobre la base de la moderacin de los apetitos. Los estoicos, por su parte, no aceptaban establecer principios ticos -supuestos inmutables- sobre la base de la mutabilidad de las pasiones humanas que eran para ellos ilusiones espontneas. As, el dolor es "una espontnea ilusin sobre la presencia de un mal" como el placer, "una espontnea ilusin sobre la presencia de un bien" (Hirschberger, J. 1964); por lo tanto, los impulsos o pasiones fueron rechadas a favor de conductas autocontroladas que implicaran ticamente un sentido de inmutabilidad, producto de una recta racionalidad que no se confunde con las ilusiones de lo mutable.

Histricamente, las investigaciones ticas han generado dos importantes concepciones con vingencia contempornea: Telelogica y deontolgica. La primera, busca las consecuencias benficas de los actos humanos y, sobre la base utilitaria de mayores bienes fundamenta las decisiones ticas y conductas correspondientes; el sacrificio de pocos por el beneficio de muchos es un criterio utilitarista bsico. La segunda concepcin, mira la consistencia del acto humano sobre la base de lo que debe ser correcto y no del beneficio obtenible. Manuel Kant consider, en su "Crtica de la Razn Prctica", que no era ticamente aceptable establecer una condicin para actuar sobre la base de ella. La posicin de los utilitaristas como Jerem