Annexe 6 Version publique expurgée de ICC-02/11-01/11-592

Annexe 6

Version publique expurgée de

ICC-02/11-01/11-592-Conf-Anx6-Corr

Rapport sur des groupes rebelles actifs àAbidjan durant la violence post-électorale

ICC-02/11-01/11-592-Anx6-Corr-Red 28-02-2014 1/29 NM PT

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Prepared by OTP Investigation Division

Date 13 January 2014

Subject Armed groups in Abobo, including the “Commando Invisible”,December 2010 - April 2011

1. TERMS OF REFERENCE ..............................................................................................2

2. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................2

3. EMERGENCE OF ARMED GROUPS IN ABOBO, DECEMBER 2010 – JANUARY2011 .......................................................................................................................................3

4. ESCALATION OF ACTIVITIES, FEBRUARY-MARCH 2011 ......................................3

5. REFERENCE TO THE “COMMANDO INVISIBLE” ...................................................4

6. AFFILIATION ...............................................................................................................6

7. STRUCTURE .................................................................................................................7

8. LEADERSHIP................................................................................................................8

9. PERSONNEL/ELEMENTS/STRENGTH.....................................................................10

10. IDENTIFICATION ......................................................................................................11

11. AREA OF CONTROL..................................................................................................11

12. DEPLOYMENT ...........................................................................................................13

13. AREA OF OPERATIONS............................................................................................15

14. WEAPONS ..................................................................................................................18

15. ANONKOUA-KOUTÉ INCIDENT ............................................................................18

16. FINAL OBSERVATIONS ............................................................................................19

Le Bureau du Procureur

The Office of the Prosecutor


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1. TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. On 3 June 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I requested the OTP to provide furtherevidence on “The position(s), movements and activities of all armedgroups opposed to the “pro-GBAGBO forces” (for example CommandoInvisible and Forces Nouvelles) in Côte d’Ivoire (including particularly inand around Abidjan) between November 2010 and May 2011, includingspecific information about confrontations between those armed groupsand the “pro-GBAGBO forces” between November 2010 and May 2011”.1

2. INTRODUCTION

2. During the post-electoral violence of 2010-2011 in Côte d’Ivoire, thesecurity forces loyal to Laurent GBAGBO, referred to hereafter as theForces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS), came under attack in the commune ofAbobo in Abidjan. Armed attacks on the FDS began sporadically inDecember 2010 and continued in January 2011. The level of attacksescalated in the period from February to March 2011, becoming moreregular and resulting in further FDS fatalities and the loss of FDS controlof areas of Abobo. The total number of FDS fatalities in Abobo during thepost-electoral violence is believed to be around twenty-seven.2

3. The identity and organisational structure of the armed groups responsiblefor these attacks on the FDS was unknown at that time, later leading tothese groups being commonly referred to as a “Commando Invisible”. Theevidence currently available indicates that there were a number ofdisparate groups carrying out armed attacks on the FDS in Abidjan in thisperiod. These groups are known to have been based in Abobo but theirorganisation and command structure remain unclear, given the covertnature of their activities and the current lack of related documentation.

1 ICC-02/11-01/11-432, para.44.1.2 See Annex 1.


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3. EMERGENCE OF ARMED GROUPS IN ABOBO, DECEMBER 2010 –JANUARY 2011

4. The armed attacks on the FDS first came to prominence in December 2010,in the neighbourhood of PK 18 in Abobo. On 16 December 2010, four FDSmembers were reported to have been killed in Abobo.3

5. Sporadic attacks continued into January 2011, with further FDS fatalitiesand a number of armed attacks on police commissariats and other FDSpositions in Abobo. 4 At this stage, the identity of the attackers wasunknown and the attacks were not claimed by any recognised armedgroup. The FDS responded with further military operations in Abobo andattacks on the civilian population.5

4. ESCALATION OF ACTIVITIES, FEBRUARY-MARCH 2011

6. During February and March 2011 the level of attacks on the FDS in Aboboescalated and FDS attacks on the civilian population of Abobo alsoincreased. There were armed attacks on FDS units carrying out operationsin Abobo and positions held by the FDS in Abobo.6

7. From 23 February 2011 onwards, the FDS operations in Abobo were led bythe armed forces, which carried out further attacks on the civilianpopulation in Abobo. This led to an increase in support and recruits forthe armed insurgency in Abobo. A number of FDS members also defected,with some of them joining the armed groups in Abobo. 7

8. On the night of 6-7 March 2011, an armed group from Abobo carried outan attack on the neighbourhood of Anonkoua-Kouté, which was perceivedas a reprisal for attacks on supporters of OUATTARA. 8 A number ofcivilians were killed in this attack and many others were evacuated by theFDS.9

3 See Annex 1.4 See Annex 1.5 Document amendé de notification des charges, 13 January 2014, para. 82, paras. 119-125.6 See Annex 1.7 Written Statement of P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01 at 1454, para. 212; Written Statement of P-0105, CIV-OTP-0019-0245-R01 at 0253, para.45-46; Written Statement, P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01 at 0410 and 0411, para. 196; Written Statement, P-0169, CIV-OTP-0029-0323-R01 at 0336, para.77.8 Witness Statement of P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01 at 0389-0391, paras. 88-96.9 See para.13.


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9. The Abobo armed groups increased the frequency of their attacks andthere were further FDS fatalities in this period, along with the loss ofweapons, and a number of FDS vehicles were destroyed or captured.10 TheFDS began to lose control of certain areas of Abobo and their presencebecame increasingly confined to the Camp Commando in Abobo. 11

10. In late March 2011, the FDS withdrew the majority of its forces fromAbobo, which by this stage was effectively out of its control. The armedgroups from Abobo continued to push back the FDS forces, advancingtowards other communes of northern Abidjan, such as Adjamé.12 On 31March 2011, the pro-OUATTARA forces, which by that time had beennamed the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), arrived in Abidjanand the insurgency against pro-GBAGBO forces developed into the Battleof Abidjan.

5. REFERENCE TO THE “COMMANDO INVISIBLE”

11. Until late February 2011, the armed persons responsible for attacks on theFDS did not have a recognised name and did not claim responsibility fortheir attacks via the media. Their attacks on the FDS were identified withwider public resistance in Abobo against the FDS and were sometimesreferred to as self-defence groups (“groupes d’autodéfense”) orneighbourhood youth (“jeunes combattants” or “jeunes du quartier”). 13

12. During the post-electoral violence, the pro-GBAGBO authorities used theterm “rebels”, “terrorists”, or “bandits”14 to refer to their opponents and

10 Transcribed Statement P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0326-R01 at 0352; Transcript of interview, P-0319,CIV-OTP-0051-1442-R01 at 1474-1480; CIV-OTP-0051-1482-R01 at 1505; Transcript of interview P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0298-R01 at 0319-0320.11 Transcribed Statement of P-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0084-R01 at 0092-0093, l.286-318; TranscribedStatement P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0354-R01, at 0360, l.217-218.12 Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1458, para. 226.13 Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01 at 1454, para. 212; Written Statement of P-0105, CIV-OTP-0019-0245-R01 at 0253, para.45-46; Written Statement, P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01 at 0410 and 0411, para. 196; Written Statement, P-0169, CIV-OTP-0029-0323-R01 at 0336, para.77; Witness statement, P-0184, CIV-OTP-0032-0011-R01 at 0029-0030, at paras. 106-113.14 Hérodote revue de géographie et de géopolitique, « Les évangéliques à l'assaut du monde », quatrièmetrimestre 2005, CIV-OTP-0051-1969 at 1969; Video clip, 26 March 2011, CIV-OTP-0015-0547 at 00:12-00:14; Transcript of video, CIV-OTP-0044-2519 at 2525, l.199-206; French translation of WitnessStatement P-0369, CIV-OTP-0049-2866-R01 at 2934-2935, paras. 282-284; Transcribed Statement P-0044, CIV-OTP-0014-0713-R01 at 0718, 178-206; Minutes du Conseil du Gouvernement du mardi 22février 2011, 22 February 2011, CIV-OTP-0025-0082 at 0084; Witness Statement P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0221, paras. 53-54; Witness Statement P-0164, CIV-OTP-0028-0481-R01 at 0487,para.38; Witness Statement P-0185, CIV-OTP-0029-0656-R01 at 0665, para.36; Witness Statement P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01 at 0155-0156, paras. 45-46; Simone GBAGBO video of 15 January2011 meeting, CIV-OTP-0012-0003 at 00:58-06:00; Transcript of CIV-OTP-0012-0003, CIV-OTP-0019-


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these terms were also used to describe the armed groups in Abobo. Theterms “militants RHDP”15 and “manifestants armés”16 were also occasionallyused by the pro-GBAGBO sources.

13. The earliest available documentary evidence from a group or organisationidentifying itself as the “Commando Invisible” is a communiqué dated 26February 2011, which was reported in a news article on 27 February2011.17 The term “Commando Invisible” may already have been in use bypeople in Abobo as early as January 2011, although it appears to haveoriginated as an informal term for the unknown persons carrying outattacks against the FDS.18

14. Additionally, the population of Abobo referred to the armed insurgents as“Fognon” or “Fonyo” (“wind”, in Dioula)19, as well as “Mogo Bah” (“greatmen”, in Dioula).20

15. From the end of February 2011 onwards, the name “Commando Invisible”was commonly reported as the name of those responsible for the armedinsurgency in Abobo. The majority of attacks against the FDS in Aboboduring the post-electoral crisis violence were attributed to the “CommandoInvisible”, which was usually referred to as a single group.21 However, theavailable evidence indicates that there were different groups active indifferent areas of Abobo and at this stage there is no clearly definedcommand structure to show that these groups formed a singleorganisation.22

0018 at 0019, l.16-43, l.25; Gal Dogbo Blé Bruno (commandant de la garde républicaine): « Si la batailledoit avoir lieu, il faut qu'elle fasse rage », CIV-OTP-0007-0105 at 0105, para.1, second to last sentence;Communiqué du Gouvernement, CIV-OTP-0018-0564 at 0566.15 Police report, 31/12/2010, CIV-OTP-0045-1232; Report, Agence nationale de la stratégie et del’intelligence, 21/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0018-0066; Rapport LMP, Mémorandum sur la crise postélectoraleen Côte d’Ivoire, undated, CIV-OTP-0018-0603, at 0069; Report, Renseignements généraux, 03/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0047-0568, at 0572; Police report, 28/01/2011, CIV-OTP-0046-0336.16 Rapport Gendarmerie, 16/12/2010, CIV-OTP-0043-0334.17 News article, En exclusivité, Communiqué 002/Commando invisible, 27/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0053-0301.18 Written Statement of P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01 at 0411, para.200; Written Statement of P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01 at 0551, para. 168.19 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1347-R01 at 1361, line 506-519; Witness statement,P-0218, CIV-OTP-0040-0446-R01, at 0460 and 0461, para. 84; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0550, para. 161; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0227, para.87; Statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 74; News article, Jeune Afrique,10/07/2012, CIV-OTP-0052-0785, at 0786.20 Witness statement, P-0362, CIV-OTP-0046-1271-R01, at 1279 and 1280, para. 49.21 Written Statement of P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01, at 0411, para.200.22 See paras. 27-31.


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6. AFFILIATION

16. During the post-electoral violence, the Abobo “jeunes combattants”, theAbobo “groupes d’autodéfense”, the group which described itself as the“Commando Invisible”, and the Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles (FAFN) atthe Hôtel du Golf had the same enemy, namely the FDS. However, on thebasis of the currently available evidence, the link between the armedgroups opposed to the FDS remains uncertain.

17. On one hand, Laurent GBAGBO’s supporters said that the “CommandoInvisible” was part of the FAFN.23 This allegation is partly supported bythe fact that there were telephone contacts and exchange of informationbetween the Hôtel du Golf and some of the groups opposed to the pro-GBAGBO forces, in reference to the operations and movements of theFDS.24

18. On the other hand, OUATTARA’s government and elements of the“Commando Invisible” each denied any links to the other.25 Notably, in apress release of 16 March 2011, the FAFN denied having any presence inAbobo. On 4 April 2011, the self-proclaimed leader of the “CommandoInvisible”, Ibrahim COULIBALY (aka IB), declared that he had no linkwith the pro-OUATTARA forces.26

19. Furthermore, in early April 2011, IB allegedly provided assistance to FDSunits at Camp Agban and was also alleged to be liaising with pro-GBAGBO militias. 27

20. On 31 March 2011, the FRCI arrived in Abidjan and took control of Abobo,apparently with the acceptance of the majority of armed groups in thecommune. However, during April 2011, the FRCI continued to clash withelements reportedly under IB’s control in the neighbourhood of PK 18.28

23 Amnesty International, report, They looked at his identity card and shot him dead, 01/05/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0647; Defence witness statement, Alain DOGOU, CIV-D15-0001-1577, at 1593.24 Witness Statement, P-0234, CIV-OTP-0041-0534-R01 at 0545-0546, paras. 42-45.25 UNOCI, Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côted'Ivoire, CIV-OTP-0002-0010, para. 45; ONUCI, Weekly Situation report, 26/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1388, at1390, para. 5-7.26 Amnesty International, report, They looked at his identity card and shot him dead, 01/05/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0680 and 0681; UN report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; Written Statement, P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01 at 0411, para. 202.27 Transcript of interview, P-0330, CIV-OTP-0049-2634-R01, at 2651 and 2652, line 587-622; WitnessStatement, P-0107, CIV-OTP-0020-0064-R01 at 0086, paras. 162-163. News articles at CIV-OTP-0021-5935; CIV-OTP-0048-1384; CIV-OTP-0021-6633.28 Daily Situation Report, UNOCI, 21/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1285 at 1289, para.11.


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21. A news report dated 01 April 2011 refers to IB stating that he hadrenamed his group the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité Impartiales (FDSI)and that this was the new name for the “Commando Invisible”.29 However,this group of IB does not appear to have had control of areas outside theirbase in PK 18 during April 2011.

22. On 27 April 2011, once OUATTARA had taken power, he called on IB’sgroup to disarm but they did not comply. The FRCI then attacked thelocation where IB was staying and he was killed in an exchange of fire , incircumstances which remain unclear. 30

7. STRUCTURE

23. In light of the available evidence in the possession of the OTP, it iscurrently difficult to establish the structure, if any, of the armed groupsactive in Abobo at the time of the post-electoral violence.

24. There is insufficient evidence to confirm the existence of any formalstructure within any particular group or among the various armed groupsin Abobo. However, there is anecdotal evidence that certain personswould report to others, and that there may have been some hierarchywithin the group controlled by IB.31

25. The available evidence suggests that the Abobo rebels were composed ofvarious groups within the rebellion, one of them being the group of IBwhich referred to itself as the “Commando Invisible”.

26. However, the term “Commando Invisible” also appears to have been usedto describe a collection of several independent armed groups active in thesame location, Abobo, against a common enemy, the FDS. 32

29 News article, L’Express, 01 April 2011, “D’où vient Ibrahim Coulibaly, chef du ‘commandoinvisible’?”, CIV-OTP-0052-0802 at 0802-0804.30 UN report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; AmnestyInternational, report, They looked at his identity card and shot him dead, 01/05/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0680 and 0681.31 Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1455, para. 215; Witness statement, P-0189,CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0552, para.173 and 176, at 0553, para.179; Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1431, line 588-604.32 Witness statement, P-0169, CIV-OTP-0029-0323-R01, at 0336, para.77; Witness statement, P-0189,CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0552, para. 176; News article, www.linfodrome.com, Justice international:Des ex-combattants invite la CPI à poursuivre Soro, CIV-OTP-0052-0793; Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586; Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1454, para. 212-213, at 1456,para. 217; News article, Du complot de la Mercedes noire au "Commando invisible", un commandantFRCI confesse tout, interview with Koné Bilhamany, 2ivoire.net, 14/11/2011, CIV-D15-0001-1612 at1615.


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8. LEADERSHIP

27. It has generally been reported in the media that the leader of the armedgroups in Abobo was Ibrahim COULIBALY aka “IB”, who wasproclaimed as the leader of the “Commando Invisible” in a communiquédated 27 February 2011.33

28. IB has been referred to as the leader of the “Commando Invisible” by the media,the UN34, Amnesty International35 and the Human Rights Council of the UN.36

29. A number of FDS officers have also referred to IB as the leader of the“Commando Invisible” and therefore of the insurgency in Abobo. However,their information in this regard has often been obtained from reports in themedia, rather than from detailed FDS intelligence concerning the armedinsurgency in Abobo. 37

30. Despite the media reports of IB’s leadership of the “Commando Invisible”,there are indications that IB only arrived in Abobo in February or March2011, thus after the beginning of the rebellion. He then declared himselfthe leader of the “Commando Invisible” and presented himself as the leaderof the armed groups fighting against the FDS in Abobo. But manycombatants in these groups did not consider him their leader. 38 As aresult, there is inconsistency in the way IB was portrayed, the way he wasperceived, and his true role in the Abobo insurgency.

31. In addition to IB, the available evidence identifies a number of otherleaders associated to the armed groups in Abobo, sometimes also referredto as “Commando Invisible”:

33 News article, IB, l'homme invisible d'Abidjan, Slate Afrique, by Damien GLEZ, 01/04/2011, CIV-D15-0001-0692.34 UN Report, 'Rapport sur les violations des droits de l'homme commises dans le District d'Abidjan,01/05/2011 (estimated), CIV-OTP-0044-0392, at 0409.35 Amnesty International, report, They looked at his identity card and shot him dead, 20/06/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0647, at 0656.36 Human Rights Council, Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Coted'Ivoire, 14/06/2011, CIV-OTP-0003-0352, at 0359, para. 30.37 Interview transcript, P-0324, CIV-OTP-0047-0008-R01, at 0021, line 471-474; Interview transcript, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0256-R01, at 0264 line 260-264; interview transcript, P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0210-R01, at 326-332; Interview transcript, P-0009, 08/10/2011, CIV-OTP-0011-0376-R01, at 0382 and0383, line 205-226.38 Witness statement, P-0217, CIV-OTP-0040-0372-R01, at 0411, para. 200-202; Transcript of interview,P-0330, CIV-OTP-0049-2760-R01, at 2776-2779, line 557-683; News article, Du complot de laMercedes noire au "Commando invisible", un commandant FRCI confesse tout, interview with KonéBilhamany, 2ivoire.net, 14/11/2011, CIV-D15-0001-1612; News article, lebanco.net, IB n’est pas le« père » du commando invisible, 31/07/2012, CIV-OTP-0052-0783.


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Colonel/Commander [REDACTED]39 [REDACTED]40 [REDACTED]41

Commander [REDACTED], deputy to Colonel [REDACTED].42

Commander [REDACTED], spokesperson ad interim.43

Commando [REDACTED], allegedly a retired FDS element.44

[REDACTED]45

[REDACTED]46

[REDACTED]47

[REDACTED]48

[REDACTED], referred to as the leader of the armed group that waspresent in Anonkoua-Kouté after the incident of 6-7 March 2011.49

[REDACTED] – leader of a group based in the Derrière Railsneighbourhood of Abobo. 50 [REDACTED] was reported to be a[REDACTED] and the majority of elements under his command were[REDACTED].51

[REDACTED] – [REDACTED], who was described as being active in themobilisation of rebels in order to prepare an attack against the FDS.52

Commandant [REDACTED] – leader of about 65 elements operating inAbobo at PK 18.53

[REDACTED] - Chairman of the [REDACTED].54

39 Witness statement, P-00189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0552, para.173; Video, Côte d’Ivoire,reportage sur le Commando invisible d’Abobo, 28/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0052-0790; News article,lebanco.net, IB n’est pas le « père » du commando invisible, 31/07/2012, CIV-OTP-0052-0783; Newsarticle, Le Monde, Côte d’Ivoire : Ibrahim Coulibaly, tué par ses ex-alliés, était une menace pour M.Ouattara, 29/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0052-0094.40 News article, lebanco.net, IB n’est pas le « père » du commando invisible, 31/07/2012, CIV-OTP-0052-0783.41 Witness interview, P-0362, CIV-OTP-0046-1271-R01, at 1279 and 1280, para. 49.42 Video, Côte d’Ivoire, reportage sur le Commando invisible d’Abobo, 28/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0052-0790, at 00’ 43’’.43 News article, En exclusivité, Communiqué 002/Commando invisible, 27/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0053-0301.44 News article, Le Temps, 18/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0021-4857, at 4859.45 Transcript of interview, P-0330, CIV-OTP-0049-2760-R01, at 2779, line 676-707; Transcript ofinterview, P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0210-R01, at 326-332.46 Witness statement, P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0421, para.57; News article, Du complot de laMercedes noire au "Commando invisible", un commandant FRCI confesse tout, interview with KonéBilhamany, 2ivoire.net, 14/11/2011, CIV-D15-0001-1612 at 1615.47 News article, Du complot de la Mercedes noire au "Commando invisible", un commandant FRCIconfesse tout, interview with Koné Bilhamany, 2ivoire.net, 14/11/2011, CIV-D15-0001-1612 at 1615.48 News article, Du complot de la Mercedes noire au "Commando invisible", un commandant FRCIconfesse tout, interview with Koné Bilhamany, 2ivoire.net, 14/11/2011, CIV-D15-0001-1612 at 1615.49 ONUCI, Special Report on Anonkoua-Kouté Attacks, 01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-0309.50 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0552, para. 176.51 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1418, line 130-132 and at 1420, line203-217.52 Commissariat de Police of 21sr District to Head of Abobo Police District, Report, 07/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1287.53 Document registering a radio message emitted by the Commander Gendarmerie Brigade of Alépé tothe Commander of the 1st Gendarmerie Legion of Abidjan, 17/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0043-0436.54 News article, www.linfodrome.com, Justice international: Des ex-combattants invite la CPI àpoursuivre Soro, CIV-OTP-0052-0793.


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[REDACTED] – a leader of a group near [REDACTED] (PK 18). 55

[REDACTED] – leader of the group based between [REDACTED] and thevillage of Anonkoua-Kouté.56

[REDACTED] – leader of a group in [REDACTED] area.57

[REDACTED] – a leader of a group in [REDACTED], subordinate to[REDACTED].58

[REDACTED] – a leader of a group in [REDACTED], subordinate to[REDACTED].59

[REDACTED] – leader of a group in Abobo Derrière Rails. 60

9. PERSONNEL/ELEMENTS/STRENGTH

32. According to a report of the Human Rights Council of the UN, the“Commando Invisible” had some 5,000 members by the end of hostilities.61

This number has not been corroborated.

33. A number of witnesses describe the armed groups in Abobo as beingcomposed of local youths and other volunteers who were defending thelocal community against attacks from the FDS.62 Witness P-0189 reportedon the presence of FDS personnel who defected from the pro-GBAGBOforces and fought on the side of the armed groups.63

34. There are allegations that the “Commando Invisible” also includedmercenaries from France, Burkina Faso and Mali. From the currentlyavailable evidence, the information suggesting the presence of[REDACTED] is uncorroborated, although there is evidence that nationalsfrom [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] may have been active in Abobo.64

55 Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586.56 Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586.57 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1428, line 469-495.58 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1428, line 469-495.59 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1428, line 469-495.60 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1428 and 1429, line 469-509.61 Human Rights Council, Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Coted'Ivoire' dated 14/06/2011, CIV-OTP-0003-0352 at 0359; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 86.62 Witness statement, P-0362, CIV-OTP-0046-1271-R01, at 1278, para. 43-44; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0225, para. 74-76; Statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at0226, para. 74; Witness statement, P-0234, CIV-OTP-0041-0534-R01, at 0549, para. 56-57; Witnessstatement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0226, para. 80.63 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01 at 0552, para.174.64 Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0227, para. 84; Interview transcript, P-0100,CIV-OTP-0020-0283-R01, at 0293, line 355-363; Report recovered in Laurent GBAGBO’s residence,CIV-OTP-0018-0169 at 0170; Letter of the DST Director to the Director of the DGPN, 20/01/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1093.


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10. IDENTIFICATION

35. The available evidence shows that the armed groups in Abobo had nodistinctive identifying feature.65

36. Witnesses most often describe the “Commando Invisible” as wearingcivilian attire66 or a mixture of civilian and military clothing.67 There areindications that some members started wearing pieces of military attire inMarch 2011.68

37. There is some evidence from several witnesses who mention combatantswearing amulets (gris gris) of mirrors and animal skin on their wrists,neck or under their clothing.69

11. AREA OF CONTROL

38. A Public Security document shows that from 21 January 2011, the policeforce was no longer in control of the situation in Abobo.70 On 23 February

65 Statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 84; Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0299-R01, at 0311, line 418-457; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at0226, para. 78 and at 0227, para. 84; Interview transcript, P-0009, , CIV-OTP-0011-0376-R01 at 0184,line 156-161; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0505-R01 at 0520, line 518-523; Interviewtranscript, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0033-0058-R01 at 0066, line 292-296; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0529-R01 at 0543, line 497-500.66 Note d’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 01/03/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0122 at 0123; Transcript of P-0009, CIV-OTP-0006-0112 at 0122; 43; UN report of theHigh Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; News article, Reportage/Anyama,Abobo : Nous avons laissé derrière la guerre en direct, 17/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0003-0582 at 0584;Information report of the Head of Abobo Police District to the Prefet de Police of Abidjan, 18/12/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0733; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0226, para. 78 and at0227, para. 84; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0376-R01 at 0183 and 0184, line 103-116,at 0381 line 163-170; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0505-R01 at 0520, line 518-523;Interview transcript, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0033-0058-R01 at 0066, line 292-296; Interview transcript, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0238-R01 at 0240, line 74-81.67 Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0299-R01 at 0311, line 418-457; Witness statement P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0420, para. 48; Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1419, line 161-175; Witness interview P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0552, at 175;Witness interview P-0362, CIV-OTP-0046-1271-R01-R01 at 1278, para. 43-44; Analyse, Direction desrenseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 08/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0148 and 0149.68 Analyse, Direction des renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 08/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0148 and 0149; Witness statement P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0420, para. 48; Video,Côte d’Ivoire, reportage sur le Commando invisible d’Abobo, 28/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0052-0790; video,Côte d’Ivoire : « le général IB » revendique sa part de la victoire, 21/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0052-0799.69 Witness statement P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 84; Interview transcript P-0069,CIV-OTP-0017-0299-R01 at 0311, line 418-457; Witness statement P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at0227, para. 84; Interview transcript P-0319, CIV-OTP0051-1347-R01 at 1375, line 1008-1024.70 Minutes of meeting, Public Security, 21/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0362; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0555, para. 193.


12

the armed forces took control of operations in Abobo but by mid-March2011 the Camp Commando was the last remaining position of the FDS inAbobo.71 By 30 March 2011 the FDS had been ordered to retreat from all theirpositions and were no longer based in Abobo.72

39. Prior to the FAFN/FRCI entering the city on 31 March 2011, armed groupsin Abobo, including the “Commando Invisible”, were present and active inAbobo.73

40. From late March 2011, the armed groups from Abobo also extended theiractivities in the following directions:

North: Anyama74

North-East: Road to Alépé75

East: Road to Alépé76

South-East: Northern areas of Angré77

South: Abidjan Zoo78

South-West: Williamsville79

West: MACA80

41. It should be noted that the armed groups reached the above limits of theirarea of operation by the end of hostilities in Abobo in April 2011.81

42. The currently available evidence is insufficient to demonstrate a clearchronology or a timeline of the progression of these groups. At this stage,it is not possible to establish the different areas of control of the group ofIB, the “Commando Invisible”, or other armed groups based in Abobo. Theevidence is not sufficient to demonstrate that any or all of the armed

71 Transcribed Statement of P-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0084-R01 at 0092-0093, l.286-318; TranscribedStatement P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0354-R01, at 0360, l.217-218.72 Transcribed Statement P-0009, CIV-OTP-0051-1137-R01 at 1149-1150, l.397-433, at 1150-1151,l.500-513; Witness Statement P-0316, CIV-OTP-0043-0461-R02 at 0494, para.134.73 Interview transcript P-0064, CIV-OTP-0026-0171-R01 at 0188, line 597-607; Interview transcript P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0244-R01 at 0264, line 776-798.74 Transcript of P-0009, CIV-OTP-0006-0112-R01 at 0146, para. 151.75 Interview transcript P-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0084-R01, at 0091 and 0092, line 248-255.76 Interview transcript P-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0084-R01, at 0091 and 0092, line 248-255.77 Transcript of interview P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0283-R01 at 0286, line 107-111; Interview transcriptP-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0084-R01 at 0091 and 0092, line 248-255.78 Interview transcript P-0011, CIV-OTP-0016-0301-R01 at 0313, lines 445-451.79 Transcript of interview, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0283-R01, at 0286, line 107-111; Witness statement,P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0226, para. 79.80 Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0226, para. 79.81 Transcript of interview, P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0354-R01 at 0355, line 26-30 and 0357, line 99-108;'Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Cote d'Ivoire' dated 08/06/2011,CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0584; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 72and at 0226, para. 78; Transcript of interview, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0006-0112-R01 at 0142, para. 18;Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1456 and 1457, para. 219-220.


13

groups in Abobo had at any time continuous or full control over the entirearea described above.

12. DEPLOYMENT

43. The starting point of the deployment of armed groups in Abobo was inthe neighbourhood of PK 18, near the Banco Forest.82 The armed groupsused many different sites in Abobo at different times of the post-electoralviolence. A number of these locations are listed below, although this list isnot exhaustive and the deployment of the armed groups appears to havebeen fluid:

PK 18 83

[REDACTED] PK 18)84

Carrefour [REDACTED]85

Proximity of Carrefour [REDACTED]86

[REDACTED]87

A site near the [REDACTED]88

[REDACTED]89

82 Transcript of interview, P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0354-R01 at 0355, line 26-30 and 0357, line 99-108;'Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Cote d'Ivoire' dated 08/06/2011,CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0584; Witness statement, P-0106, CIV-OTP-0019-0211-R01 at 0224, para. 72and at 0226, para. 78; Transcript of P-0009, CIV-OTP-0006-0112-R01 at 0142, para. 18.83 Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0051-0907-R01, at 0920, line 435-450; Daily informationreport, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 13/01/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0602 at0603; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090;Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1427, line 451-453; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0517, para.54, at 0551, para. 167, 171 and at 0552, para. 175; Dailyinformation report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 17/01/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0595.84 Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1429, line 526-258.85 Daily information report, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 23/02/2013,CIV-OTP-0045-0299 at 0301; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11,CIV-OTP-0045-1090; Note d’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et del’Intelligence, 01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0122 at 0123; Witness statement P-0226, , CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0170, para. 87.86 Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0051-0907-R01, at 0920, line 435-450; Analyse, Direction desrenseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 08/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0148 at 0148 and 0149;Direction de rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 24/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0306.87 Information brief, Chief of Police of Abobo Police District to Prefet de police of Abidjan, 14/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0362; Daily information report, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry ofInterior, 23/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0299 at 0301; Witness statement, P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0420, para. 48 and para. 51; Interview transcript, P-0321, CIV-OTP-0046-0908-R01, at 0914, line206-212; Interview transcript, P-0321, CIV-OTP-0046-0737-R01, 0745, line 272-274; Noted’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 01/03/2011, CIV -OTP-0045-0122 at 0123.88 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 17/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0595; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090; Note d’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et del’Intelligence, 01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0122 at 0123.


14

[REDACTED], ([REDACTED], near N’Dotré)90

Carrefour [REDACTED]91

[REDACTED]92

A house in [REDACTED]93

The area behind the [REDACTED]94

[REDACTED], opposite to [REDACTED]95

Roundabout of the [REDACTED]96

The [REDACTED] near the [REDACTED] Abobo97

[REDACTED]98

[REDACTED]99

Quartier Derrière Rails, [REDACTED]100

Quartier [REDACTED]101

89 Witness statement, P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01, at 0416, para.24; Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1422, line 286-288 and 1427, line 449-462.90 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 17/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0595; Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586.91 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 17/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0595; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013,CIV-OTP-0045-0291.92 Interview transcript, P-0330, CIV-OTP-0049-2760-R01, at 2780 and 2781, line 717-725; Dailyinformation report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 19/01/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0591 at 0593; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013,CIV-OTP-0045-0291; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090; Note d’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et del’Intelligence, 01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0122 at 0123; Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586.93 Intelligence report, DST, Ministry of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0289; Note d’information,DGPN, 09/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0204.94 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 19/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0591 at 0593; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior,09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence,28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090.95 Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291; Note d’information (information note), Agence Nationale de Stratégie et de l’Intelligence,01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0122 at 0123; Document, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0586.96 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 13/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0602 at 0603; Information brief, Chief of Police of Abobo Police District to Prefet depolice of Abidjan, 14/01/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0362.97 Transcript of interview, P-0330, CIV-OTP-0049-2760-R01 at 2785, line 876-904.98 Information note, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0295.99 Daily information report, Direction des rensiegnements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 13/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0602 at 0603.100 Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090;Witness interview, P-0362, CIV-OTP-0046-1271-R01, at 1278, para. 43-44; Witness statement, P-0189,CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0551, para. 171.101 Information brief, Chief of Police of Abobo Police District to Prefet de police of Abidjan, 14/01/2011,CIV-OTP-0045-0362; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013,CIV-OTP-0045-0291; Document, Agence Nationale de la Stratégie et de l’Intelligence, 28/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1090; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0551, para. 171; Transcript ofinterview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1414-R01 at 1427, line 451-457.


15

44. However, it should be noted that the imprecision in reporting makes itdifficult to complete an exhaustive list of locations held by these groups atdifferent stages of the post-election violence.

45. As for the extension of territory in control of the armed groups, theevidence is insufficient to establish a chronology and timeline of theirdeployment, nor to distinguish between the areas where different groupswere present.

46. For geographical representation of the major locations held by thesearmed groups, see Annex 2.

13. AREA OF OPERATIONS

47. It is difficult to establish when the rebellion started or to determine withcertainty which operations directed against the FDS can be attributed tothese groups.

48. According to some senior FDS officers, operations of the “CommandoInvisible” started in December 2010 with attacks on Police positions, thefirst significant attack taking place on 16 December 2010.102 Some Policedocuments refer to attacks on the FDS in December 2010 by unknownpersons, attributing these attacks to “assaillants”, rebels or RHDPmilitants.103

49. Other sources indicate that operations of the armed groups in Abobostarted in January-February 2011.104

102 Interview transcript, P-0064, CIV-OTP-0026-0159-R01 at 0166, line 231-245; Interview transcript, P-0321,CIV-OTP-0046-0886-R01, at 0890, line 108-110; Witness statement, P-0297,, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0421, para.55.103 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unites d’intervention,Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336; Rapport sur la situation sécuritaire après le secondtour de l’élection présidentialle du 28 novembre 2010, Ministry of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0047-0332 at 0343; Information report of the Head of Abobo Police District to the Prefet de Police of Abidjan,18/12/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0733.104 News article, Jeune Afrique, Cote d'Ivoire : les secrets d'une offensive éclair, 08/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0295, at 0297; Euronews, news article, 24/10/2011, CIV-OTP-0008-0003 at 0005; Witnessstatement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0517, para.54, at 0551, para.168 at 0555, para.193;Witness statement, P-0226, , CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0169 and 0170, para.85-86; Interviewtranscript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0051-1008-R01, at 1025, line 592-593.


16

50. Therefore, although it is clear that the FDS were being targeted in Abobofrom mid-December 2010 onwards, and that the frequency of attacksincreased in early 2011, the evidence is insufficient to identify whichattacks are specifically attributable to which group.

51. A non-exhaustive list of “rebel” operations or attacks against the FDS inAbidjan is presented in Annex 1. By noting the geographical distributionof these attacks it can be concluded that the large majority of them werecarried out in Abobo, including the following incidents:

Unicafé (on 16/12/10105) PK 18 (on 16/02/10106, 09-10/01/2011,107 11/01/11,108 22/02/11109) Abobo Filtisac (on 17/12/10110, 11/03/11111) RTI antenna in Abobo (on 5-6/03/11112) Avocatier near 32 Police Arrondissement (on 18/12/2010113) 21 Police Arrondissement (on 07/02/11114)

14 Police Arrondissement, near Mairie (on 07/02/2011115) Anonkoua-Kouté (on 06/03/11116)

105 Witness statement, P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0421, para. 55.106 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unites d’intervention,Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336; Rapport sur la situation sécuritaire après le secondtour de élections présidentielles du 28 novembre 2010, Ministry of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0047-0332 at 0343.107 Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0292.108 Daily Information Report, from the Head of Police Abobo to the Préfet de police d’Abidjan, 11/01/11,CIV-OTP-0047-0409.109 News article, Le Nouveau Réveil, undated, CIV-OTP-0001-0396.110 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unites d’intervention,Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336; Document, Director of the DGPN to the Minister ofInterior, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0975, at 0976.111 Fax, Préfet de Police of Abidjan to the Ministry of Interior, 11/03/11, CIV-OTP-0045-0209;Chronologie des faits saillants de la semaine du lundi 07 au dimanche 13 mars 2011, Cabinet of theDirection générale de la police nationale, 16/03/11, CIV-OTP-0045-0665.112 Interview transcript, P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0244-R01, at 0259, line 536-542.113 Information report of the Head of Abobo Police District to the Prefet de Police of Abidjan,18/12/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0733.114 Report, Commissariat de Police of 21st District to Head of Abobo Police District, 07/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1287; Memo CPI, documents compiled by Géraldine ODEHOURI-BROU, legal advisor of LaurentGBAGBO, CIV-OTP-0001-0226 at 0241.115 Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0292; Letter, BREDOU M’BIA, Police Inspector, to Minister of Interior, 24/03/11, CIV-OTP-0045-0634. See also other attached documents under this ERN repeating (and detailing) the information;Amnesty International Report “They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at0656; Memo CPI, documents compiled by Géraldine ODEHOURI-BROU, legal advisor of LaurentGBAGBO, CIV-OTP-0001-0226 at 0241.116 UN report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; AmnestyInternational Report “ They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0680;'Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Cote d'Ivoire' dated 08/062011,CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0584; Crimes et exactions que l'ONUCI ne voit pas, on-line news article,


17

Police 43rd Arrondissement (Abobo) (on 11-12/01/2011)117

Rond Point Mairie – Collège St Joseph (on 11-12/01/11118) Plateau Dokui (on 11/03/11119) Rond Point Gagnoa Gare (on 12/03/11120) Premier pont (first bridge) of Yopougon (on 14/03/11121) MACA (on 18/03/11122) Rond Point Samaké (on 24/03/11123)

52. There were also FDS reports of “rebel’ incursions into Cocody inDecember 2010, 124 Yopougon in mid-March 2011, 125 Agban Village(undated), 126 Koumassi (undated), 127 Adjamé (undated), 128 as well as thepillaging of a Gendarmerie station in Alépé in mid-April 2011 outside ofAbidjan.129

20/06/2012, CIV-D15-0001-2419; Human Rights Watch Report: “They Killed Them Like It WasNothing”, CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0132; News article, Nouveau Courrier, Crimes contre l'humanité ducommando invisible pro Ouattara, 01/06/2012, CIV-D15-0001-0625; RAPPORT D'ENQUETE SUR LESVIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE L'HOMMECOMMISES A L'OCCASION DE LA CRISEPOSTELECTORALE, 16/07/2011, CIV-OTP-0003-0565, at 0574; Transcript of interview, P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0210-R01, at 0213, line 87-92, and at 0214 line 143-145; Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0280-R01, at 0296, line 593-619; Amnesty International, Ils ont regardé sa carte d'identité etl'ont abattu, retour sur six mois de violences post-électorales en Côte d'Ivoire, May 2011, CIV-OTP-0021-6752, at 6780.117 Rapport sur la situation sécuritaire après le second tour de l’élection présidentielle du 28 novembre2010, Ministry of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0047-0332 at 0344; Report, High Commissioner forHuman Rights on CIV, CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0054; Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-general on the ONUCI, CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0019, Memo CPI, documents compiled by GéraldineODEHOURI-BROU, legal advisor of Laurent GBAGBO, CIV-OTP-0001-0226 at 0239.118 Amnesty International Report “ They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647at 0656; Report, Direction des unites d’intervention to the Public Security, 19/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0316; Minsitry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior,09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0292; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at0518, para.63, at 0555, para. 193; Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1347-R01, at 1371and 1372, line 864-896.119 ONUCI report, 12/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1623; Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0299-R01, at 0300, line 18-31.120 Letter/report, Direction des Unités d’Intervention to the Head of Public Security, 23/03/1, CIV-OTP-0045-0630 at 0632. See also other documents under this ERN repeating the same information; List ofdeceased Police Officers, Direction des unites d’intervention, Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336.121 Document, Yopougon Police District to Prefet de Police d’Abidjan, 14/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0216.122 Witness statement, P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0169, para. 83.123 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0556-0557, para. 202-204.124 Rapport sur la situation sécuritaire après le second tour de l’élection présidentielle du 28 novembre2010, Ministry of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0047-0332 at 0342.125 Document, Yopougon Police District to Prefet de Police d’Abidjan, 14/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0216; ONUCI Daily Situation report, 15/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1167, at 1168 and 1169, para. 4.126 ONUCI, Investigation sur les atteintes au droit aux droits de l'homme, CIV-OTP-0044-1398, at 1429.127 Interview transcript, P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0134-R01, at 0153, line 673-680.128 Interview transcript, P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0134-R01, at 0153, line 673-680.129 Document registering a radio message emitted by the Commander Gendarmerie Brigade of Alépé tothe Commander of the 1st Gendarmerie Legion of Abidjan, 17/04/2011, CIV-OTP-0043-0436.


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53. Annex 3 is the map showing the geographic distribution of majoroperations in Abobo.

14. WEAPONS

54. The evidence currently in the possession of the OTP shows that the Aboborebels were seizing weapons from the FDS.130 They were in possession ofAK-47131, grenades132, RPG133 and it is also alleged that they mortars.134

According to witness P-0226, in early March 2011 the “CommandoInvisible” seized a large quantity of weapons that was left at the CarrefourN’Dotré by the pro-GBAGBO forces.135

55. One uncorroborated witness stated that the “Commando Invisible” had avehicle with a mounted machine gun, which was used in an operation on08 March 2011.136

15. ANONKOUA-KOUTÉ INCIDENT

56. On the night of 06-07 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” attacked theEbrié village of Anonkoua-Kouté, situated half way between the PK 18and the Mairie of Abobo. According to sources, the rebels killed between 9

130 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0553, para.179; Witness statement, P-106,,CIV-OTP-0019-0211 at 0224 and 0225, para. 74, 75, 76; Transcript of interview, P-0319, CIV-OTP-0051-1347-R01, at 1365, line 629-657.131 Information report of the Head of Abobo Police District to the Prefet fe Police of Abidjan,18/12/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0733; Ministry of Interior, Minutes of the Meeting with Police Director,08/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-1285; Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lorsdes manifestations du RHDP, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0376-R01, at 0381, line 183-187; Interview transcript of P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0256-R01, at0264 line 260-268; Witness statement, P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0170, para. 88; Transcriptof interview, P-0010, CIV-OTP-0051-0335-R01, at 0380, line 1618-1626.132 Transcript of interview, P-0046, CIV-OTP-0014-0326-R01 at 0327, line 11-19.133 Ministry of Interior, Minutes of the Meeting with Police Director, 08/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-1285;Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436; Interview transcript, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0011-0376-R01, at 0381, line183-187; Interview transcript of P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0256-R01, at 0264 line 260-268; Witnessstatement, P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0170, para. 88; Transcript of interview, P-0009, CIV-OTP-0006-0112-R01 at 0122; Transcript of interview, P-0100, CIV-OTP-0020-0256-R01 at 0264266-268; Amnesty International Report “They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0656.134 Transcript of interview, P-0010, CIV-OTP-0051-0480-R01 at 0496, line 582-585; Interviewtranscript, P-0321, CIV-OTP-0046-1005-R01, at 1006, line 31-37.135 Witness statement, P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0170, para.90.136 ONUCI Report, CIV-OTP-0044-1615, at 1616, para. 7.


19

and 20 civilians, wounded about 40, burned houses and provoked asignificant population displacement. 137 Based on the available evidencethis is the only reported instance of a large-scale attack by the “CommandoInvisible” against civilians.

16. FINAL OBSERVATIONS

57. According to the currently available evidence:

During the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire, there were a number ofarmed groups in Abobo which carried out attacks against the FDS.

There is insufficient evidence to provide a clear picture of the structure ofthese armed groups or of their relationship with each other. The evidenceindicates the existence of a number of independent groups rather than aunified structured organisation.

From late February 2011, the name “Commando Invisible” was used to referto different armed groups in Abobo which opposed the pro-GBAGBOregime.

The self-declared leader of the “Commando Invisible” was IbrahimCOULIBALY, aka IB, but he does not appear to have had command overall Abobo-based armed groups during the post-electoral crisis.

The armed groups in Abobo were composed of mainly local youth, alongwith some more experienced military officers such as IB and a number ofdefectors from the FDS. Their strength at different times of the post-electoral violence is unknown, although they appear to have grown instrength and resources during February and March 2011.

The members of the “Commando Invisible” were wearing mostly civilianclothing and, at a later stage, elements of military uniform. They werearmed with AK-47 and RPG’s. There is some evidence indicating that theywere also armed with mortars but this remains to be further clarified.

137 Amnesty International report, They looked at his identity card and shot him dead, 01/05/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0647; ONUCI, Special Report on Anonkoua-Kouté Attacks, 01/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-0309; UNOCI report, 10/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1150 at 1152, para. 5; Human Rights Watch, “Theykilled them like it was nothing”, October 2011, p. 56-57: CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0132-0133; Non-ICCstatement, P-0164, 15/09/2011, CIV-OTP-0027-0153, at 0155; Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1459-1460, para.231-233.


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The FDS gradually lost control of Abobo in February and March 2011.From the end of February the FDS were based only at the CampCommando in Abobo, where they remained based until late March. Bythis stage, a number of armed groups were active in fighting the FDS inAbobo but at present there is insufficient evidence to establish a clearpicture of which groups held different positions in Abobo at specific timesduring the post-electoral crisis.

There is evidence that the group of Ibrahim COULBALY (IB) wasoriginally based in PK 18 and that this remained their stronghold untillate April 2011. However, it is not possible, at this time, to establish withcertainty which other areas of Abobo were controlled by the armedgroups which attacked the FDS in this period.

The evidence currently in the possession of the OTP does not establish aclear connection between the pro-OUATTARA FAFN, the group of IBreferred to as the “Commando Invisible” and other Abobo-based armedgroups.


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ANNEX 1

ATTACKS BY ARMED GROUPS IN ABOBO, 3 DECEMBER 2010 – 31MARCH 2011

2010

On 3 December 2010, a police officer was shot and his throat slit inAdjamé while he was returning home. The FDS attributed the killing to “desindividus en guise de protestation contre le couvre-feu”.138

On 16 December 2010, three members of the Compagnie Republicaine deSecurité 2 (CRS2) were shot dead at PK 18; FDS attributed their killing to“assaillants lors de la manifestation du RHDP”. A witness reported a similarincident on 16 December, whereby young men, reportedly members of the“Commando Invisible”, attacked an FDS vehicle in PK18, killed those inside itand took their weapons.139 The evidence in the OTP’s possession is insufficient toestablish with certainty whether the three CRS members were killed during thesame incident reported by the witness.

On 16 December 2010, one police officer was killed in Abobo-St Joseph.The FDS reports do not identify the perpetrators.140

On 17 December 2010, two police officers (CRS 1) were shot dead atAbobo FILTISAC, in Abobo. Several FDS reports citing the incident either do notidentify the perpetrators, or they refer to them as “assaillants” or “rebelles”. 141

On 18 December 2010, “rebels” armed with Kalashnikovs attacked a policepatrol from the 32th Arrondissement police station in Avocatier, Abobo. Theattackers were reportedly wearing light blue clothing.142

138 Document, Director of the DGPN to the Minister of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0975, at 0976.139 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436 at 1436; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unitesd’intervention, Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336 at 0336-0337; Witness statement, P-0297, CIV-OTP-0041-0412-R01 at 0421, para. 55.140 Document, Director of the DGPN to the Minister of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0975, at 0976;PC Etat- Major DGPN, Election Présidentielle- Second Tour, Tableau Récapitulatif chronologique desévènements: période du 22/11/2010 au 07/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0897.141 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436 at 1436; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unitesd’intervention, Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336 at 0337; Document, Director of theDGPN to the Minister of Interior, undated, CIV-OTP-0045-0975, at 0976.142 Information report of the Head of Abobo Police District to the Prefet de Police of Abidjan,18/12/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0733.


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2011

On 11 January 2011, the FDS effected a large scale operation, with over500 FDS elements deployed, in Abobo PK 18 in search for hidden arms andammunition. 143 During this operation, the FDS were allegedly ambushed andattacked with “heavy weaponry” by “rebels”. Two FDS elements were killed bythe “rebels” during the incident, while at least two civilians were killed by theFDS during the same incident144. During the course of the operation the FDSarrested two individuals carrying armes blanches.145

In the night of 11 to 12 January 2011, “rebels” attacked a patrol of twoBAE vehicles who were standing watch at Abobo Mairie “rond-point”, near theCollège St. Joseph. The “rebels” used “heavy weaponry” (RPG and 12/7mm).They launched rockets at the police vehicles, setting them on fire. As a result ofthe attack, six police officers were killed and their vehicle burnt down. FDSreports identify the perpetrators as “assaillants” or “rebels”.146 P-0189 attributesall attacks on FDS in Abobo during this period, including the killing of FDSelements at Abobo St Joseph, to the “Commando Invisible”.147

143;Préfecture de Police d’Abidjan, Rapport de Permanence Centrale du 11 au 12 janvier 2011 a Monsieurle Préfet de Police d’Abidjan, CIV-OTP-0045-0560 at 0561 ; PC Etat-major DGPN, ElectionPrésidentielle-Second Tour. Tableau Récapitulatif Chronologique des Evènements période du 22/11/2010au 07/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0936;144 Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436 at 1437; Report, Direction des unités d’intervention to the PublicSecurity, 19/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0316 at 0316, 0317; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction desunites d’intervention, Ministry of Interior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336 at 0337; Transcript of P-0009,CIV-OTP-0051-1008 at 1025,1026 l.616-629; Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-generalon the ONUCI, CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0019 para. 43; Report, High Commissioner for Human Rights onthe situation of human rights in Cote d’Ivoire, 15 February 2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0046 at 0054; DailyInformation Report, from the Head of Police Abobo to the Prefet de police d’Abidjan, 11/01/11, CIV-OTP-0047-0409 at 0409, 0410; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior,09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0291,0292; Point de situation, RCI, Journée du 10 janvier 2011,Evènements ABOBO PK 18, CIV-OTP-0021-3671 at 3694 -3712; PC Etat-major DGPN, ElectionPrésidentielle-Second Tour. Tableau Récapitulatif Chronologique des Evènements période du 22/11/2010au 07/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0793 at 0936-0939 ; Préfecture de Police d’Abidjan, Rapport dePermanence Centrale du 11 au 12 janvier 2011 a Monsieur le Préfet de Police d’Abidjan, CIV-OTP-0045-0560 at 0561 ; Report, Direction des unités intervention to the Public Security, 19/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0316 at 0316.145 Report, Direction des unités intervention to the Public Security, 19/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0316 at0316.146 Report, Direction des unités intervention to the Public Security, 19/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0316 at0317; Ministry of Interior, Public Security, List des policiers décédés lors des manifestations du RHDP,undated, CIV-OTP-0045-1436 at 1437 ; Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry ofInterior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0292; Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0518, para. 63;; List of deceased Police Officers, Direction des unites d’intervention, Ministry ofInterior, 28/01/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0336 at 0337, 0338.147 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01, at 0555, para. 193.


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During the night of 11 to 12 January 2011, the 43 rd Arrondissement policestation in Abobo was attacked by RHDP militants supported by “heavily armedrebels”.148

● On 7 February 2011, a group of “rebels” attacked the 14th Arrondissement andattempted to attack the 21st Arrondissement. Two FDS were injured during theattack on the 14th Arrondissement. 149

● Between 8 and 25 February 2011, all police and Gendarmerie stations in Abobowere harassed during the night time and afterwards attacked by the“Commando Invisible”. The attacks caused several losses among the policeforces.150

● On 21 February 2011, barricades were erected between the neighbourhoods ofPK 18 and N’Dotre .151

● Around 20 February and until 26 February 2011, at least four CECOS elementswere killed in Abobo. After that the troops were pulled out from Abobo.152

● On 22 and 23 February 2011, violent clashes took place between the“Commando invisible” and FDS elements in PK 18, Abobo. Several elementsfrom both camps were killed and/or injured and at least one civilian waskilled.153

● On the night of 26 to 27 February 2011, “rebels of the armed branch of theRHDP” attacked the RTI antenna situated in Abobo with “heavy weaponry”. Asresults, two gendarmes were killed and three civilians were burned alive, while RTIequipment was destroyed or burned.154

148 Rapport sur la situation sécuritaire après le second tour de l’élection présidentielle du 28 novembre2010, Ministry of Interior, CIV-OTP-0047-0332 at 0344.149 Analyse, Direction de renseignements généraux, Ministry of Interior, 09/02/2013, CIV-OTP-0045-0291 at 0292; Report, Commissariat de Police of 21st District to Head of Abobo Police District,07/02/11, CIV-OTP-0045-1287 at 1287 and 1288; Memo CPI, documents compiled by GéraldineODEHOURI-BROU, legal advisor of Laurent GBAGBO, CIV-OTP-0001-0226 at 0241.150 Defence witness statement, Alain DOGOU, CIV-D15-0001-1577, at 1589.151 Daily information report, Head of Abobo Police District to Prefet de Police d’Abidjan, 21/02/11, CIV-OTP-0046-0037 at 0037.152 Interview transcript, P-0010, CIV-OTP-0016-0104-R01 at 107, lines 106-110 and at 0108, lines 111-142.153 UNOCI, Twenty-seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation inCôte d'lvoire, 30/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0010 at 0020, para. 45; News article, Côte d’Ivoire: le commandoinvisible donne son bilan des affrontements à Abobo, 23/02/2011, CIV-OTP-0002-0277 at 0277; Rapport dela Commission d’enquête internationale indépendante sur la Cote d’Ivoire, CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0584,para. 50; News article, Le Nouveau Réveil, undated, CIV-OTP-0001-0396 at 0396.154 Memo CPI, documents compiled by Géraldine ODEHOURI-BROU, legal advisor of LaurentGBAGBO, CIV-OTP-0001-0226 at 0242.


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● On 28 February 2011, the “Forces armées des Forces nouvelles (FAFN)” killeda Minister of Interior official at a crossroad in Abobo.155

● On 5 March 2011, members of the “Commando Invisible” took three people asprisoners when they were trying to pass with arms a checkpoint in Anonkoua-Kouté, a sub-neighbourhood of Abobo. The prisoners were taken to a higherlevel commander. They were questioned and then killed.156

● On the night of 5 to 6 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” attacked the RTIantenna situated in Abobo. The equipment was destroyed and at least twocivilians were killed on the occasion of that attack.157

● On the night of 6 to 7 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” attacked thesub-neighbourhood of Anonkoua-Kouté armed with Kalashnikovs, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), machetes, pistols, and inflammable liquid.Anonkoua-Kouté is located in the south of Avocatier and South-East of PK 18, inAbobo. Anonkoua-Kouté was mainly inhabited by individuals belonging to theEbrié ethnic group who were considered as GBAGBO’s supporters. At least ninecivilians were killed, some others wounded and property was destructed. As aresult of the attack, the majority of the inhabitants fled the village.158

● On 8 March 2011, following a women’s demonstration in Treichville, there wasa clash between the Compagnie Républicaine de Sécurité (CRS) and the“Commando Invisible”. “The “Commando Invisible” appeared with anarmoured vehicle mounted with a submachine gun”.159

155 Defence witness statement, Alain DOGOU, CIV-D15-0001-1577, at 1589.156 Human Rights Watch Report: “They Killed Them Like It Was Nothing”, CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0133and 0134.157 Defence witness statement, Alain DOGOU, CIV-D15-0001-1577, at 1589; Interview transcript, P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0244-R01 at 0259, line 536-542.158 UN report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; AmnestyInternational Report “ They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0681;'Rapport de la Commission d'enquête internationale indépendante sur la Côte d'Ivoire' dated 08/06/2011,CIV-OTP-0002-0573 at 0584; Crimes et exactions que l'ONUCI ne voit pas, on-line news article,20/06/2012, CIV-D15-0001-2419; Human Rights Watch Report: “They Killed Them Like It WasNothing”, CIV-OTP-0004-0072 at 0132; Nouveau Courrier, news article, Crimes contre l'humanité ducommando invisible pro Ouattara, 01/06/2012, CIV-D15-0001-0625; RAPPORT D'ENQUETE SUR LESVIOLATIONS DES DROITS DE L'HOMMECOMMISES A L'OCCASION DE LA CRISEPOSTELECTORALE, 16/07/2011, CIV-OTP-0003-0565, at 0574; Transcript of interview, P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0210-R01 at 0213, line 87-92, and at 0214 line 143-145; Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0280-R01 at 0296, line 593-619; Amnesty International, Ils ont regardé sa carte d'identité etl'ont abattu, retour sur six mois de violences post-électorales en Côte d'Ivoire, May 2011, CIV-OTP-0021-6752 at 6780.159 ONUCI Report, source identified as Lucien POUATI, 09/03/2011 (estimated), CIV-OTP-0044-1615,at 1616, para. 7.


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● On 11 March 2011, “rebels” killed one gendarme at the FILTISAC factory inAbobo and took four vehicles belonging to the company.160

● In mid-March 2011,161 the “Commando Invisible” attempted to take control ofPlateau-Dokoui.162

● On 12 March 2011, one police officer from the CRS1 was killed and onewounded when ambushed by “rebels” in Abobo. The attack took place nearGagnoa Gare.163

● In mid-March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” moved briefly towardsWilliamsville and Adjamé, took control of the area for several days but was soonpushed back to Abobo by the FDS. 164

● On 14 March 2011”rebels” fire shots at a position of the Garde Républicaine(GR) at “the first bridge” of Yopougon.165

● On 15 March 2011, the security situation in Abidjan further deteriorated.Sustained gun and heavy artillery fire were heard in several neighbourhoods inAbidjan during what were believed to be clashes between FDS elements backedby militias and the “Commando Invisible”, on the one hand, and between FDSelements and “RHDP supporters on the other”.166

● “The day before the shelling of Abobo market”, the “Commando Invisible”attacked again the RTI antenna in Abobo. The guard and his nephew were burntalive. The place was ransacked.167

● On 18 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” killed four FDS elements whenthey were leaving their post at the MACA.168

160 Fax, Prefet de Police of Abidjan to the Ministry of Interior, 11/03/11, CIV-OTP-0045-0209 at 0209,0210; Chronologie des faits saillants de la semaine du lundi 07 au dimanche 13 mars 2011, Cabinet ofthe Direction générale de la police nationale, 16/03/11, CIV-OTP-0045-0665 at 0665.161 Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0299, at 0301, line 42-75.162 ONUCI report, 12/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1623; Interview transcript P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0299-R01, at 0300, line 18-31.163 Letter/report, Direction des Unités d’Intervention to the Head of Public Security, 23 /03/1, CIV-OTP-0045-0630 at 0632, 0633.164 Witness statement, P-0369, CIV-OTP-0048-1396-R01, at 1458, para. 226.165 District de Police de Yopougon, Lettre au Prefet de Police d’Abidjan, 14/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0045-0216 at 0216, 0217.166 UN report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights , CIV-OTP-0002-0598 at 0604; AmnestyInternational Report “ They looked at his ID card and shot him dead”, CIV-OTP-0002-0647 at 0604.167 Interview transcript, P-0047, CIV-OTP-0015-0244-R01, at 0259, lines 536-552.168 Witness statement, P-0226, CIV-OTP-0039-0143-R01, at 0169, para. 83.


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● On 21 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” kidnapped two priests at PK 18,Abobo.169

● On 23 March 2011, at N’Dotré, Abobo, members of the “Commando Invisible”killed two civilians.170

● On 24 March 2011 the “Commando Invisible” and the FDS were clashing atDokui and Samaké, Abobo171.

● On 25 March, the “Commando Invisible” attacked an armoured vehicle thatwas going to Camp Commando. They hit it with a RPG grenade. The vehiclemade it to the Camp Commando but later that day the armoured vehicle and atank went out of the camp and were attacked and burned by the “CommandoInvisible” near the Samaké roundabout”.172

● On 30 March 2011, the “Commando Invisible” moved from Abobo to the RTIin Cocody as it wanted to make a declaration on the television. The FDSintervened on that occasion and pushed them back.173

169 ONUCI, call centre report, 21/03/2011, CIV-OTP-0044-1681, at 1689.170 UN Report, 'Rapport sur les violations des droits de l'homme commises dans le District d'Abidjan,01/05/2011 (estimated), CIV-OTP-0044-0392, at 0422.171 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01 at 0556, para.202172 Witness statement, P-0189, CIV-OTP-0042-0508-R01 at 0556 and 0557, para. 203-204173 Transcribed statement, P-0069, CIV-OTP-0017-0318-R01, at 0331, line 487-492.


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ANNEX 2: Abobo, Abidjan, Bases of Commando Invisible and Rebel Forces (December 2010 – April 2011)

[REDACTED]


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ANNEX 3: Abobo, Abidjan, Operations of Commando Invisible and Rebel Forces (December 2010 – April 2011)


Documents

Annexe 6 Version publique expurgée de ICC-02/11-01/11-592