Anglo-American Relations in the 1950s

Korea, Iran. Churchill/Eisenhower, Egypt, Eden and Suez, Macmillan/Eisenhower, Iraq Eisenhower Doctrine, Bombs and rockets

The Korean war

Began 25 June 1950 with North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Aggression brought before the UN: called on members to provide assistance to South Korea in resisting aggression. US provided most, but other countries, especially UK, were also involved.

US / UK in the 1950s

Why did Britain agree to become involved?

Belief in UN and fear of consequences of giving in to dictators. The shadow of Munich.

The war went badly for the UN forces to begin with: they were pushed back into a small pocket outside Pusan.

US / UK in the 1950s

The US commander-in-chief took the daring step of sending troops to effect a landing at Inchon. It was a gamble which paid off and added to MacArthur's prestige. This exposed the North Korean's extended supply line and MacArthur was able to resume control of the South. He then decided to press on and attack the North, and almost reached the Chinese border.

US / UK in the 1950s

The Chinese then sent large numbers of troops placing the UN forces in a desperate position. MacArthur apparently sought permission to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and if necessary mainland China. In the meantime despite the pressure the UN line held.

Truman announced at a press conference that he would not rule out the use of any weapon, and this shook public opinion in Europe.

US / UK in the 1950s

Was Truman on the verge of approving the use of nuclear weapons in Korea?

The House of Commons was at least worried and Attlee agreed to go to Washington. In fact Truman almost immediately made it clear that his intention was not to use the A-bomb, so this was not a real issue in the talks between Attlee and Truman.

US / UK in the 1950s

However Attlee did secure a commitment on the part of Truman to keep the UK PM informed of use of nuclear weapons. Indeed the two men had had private discussions at the end of which Truman had apparently said he would not use the bomb without the agreement of the UK. Aides said this was unconstitutional. British agreed to redraft.

US / UK in the 1950s

US / UK in the 1950s

US / UK in the 1950s

US / UK in the 1950s

US / UK in the 1950s

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/Korean_war_1950-1953.gif

In 1951 the Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddeq announced he was nationalising the oil refinery at Abadan: the world's largest, at a time when Britain was desperately short of reserves.

Attlee declined to send in the troops.

The US felt that any price was worth paying to keep the USSR out of Northern Iran

The British were not ready to abandon their asset.

http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/052051iran-britain.html

Iran

The British wanted to get rid of Mossadeq, because they felt it was his hostility towards Britain which lay behind the nationalisation. The Americans wanted to keep him, as they felt he would be able to keep out the communists in Iran. As Evelyn Shuckburgh said, "For the US the Cold War is paramount, whereas for the UK our economic strength is at the moment fundamental".

Iran

FRUSIran

FRUSIran

Iran

When the Americans finally lost patience they engineered, apparently with the help of MI6, a coup, toppling Mossadeq and putting the Shah in control. The Americans also got a 40% share in access to Iranian oil.http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,858076,00.html

Iran

The story of the CIA coup is told in graphic detail in the CIA report published on line by the NYT

http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html

Iran

Under the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty Britain had rights to keep a military base along the Suez canal until 1956.In the late 1940s and early 1950s there was friction over the Sudan: Britain thought it had a right to self-determination, Egypt thought it should be under their control.In 1952 a coup d'état under Colonel Neguib deposed King Farouk.

Egypt

The Egyptian government wanted Britain to withdraw its base from the canal zone. Churchill was robust; Eden wanted a negotiated solution. Churchill found Eden's restraint repulsive. He "had not known", he said, "that Munich was situated on the Nile".Churchill tried to get American acquiesence at least for Britain's position of standing up to Neguib (Young, 142).Some in the US sympathised with Egypt: a victim of British colonialism.

Egypt

In 1954 the balance of power in Egypt was changing in favour of Nasser. Britain was in increasingly dire financial straits and Churchill began genuinely to see Egypt as ripe for savings.Meanwhile some feared the US was trying to take over: from the French in Indochina and from the British in the Middle east.The British understood that the explosion of an "H" bomb in 1953 changed things dramatically.

Egypt

The H bomb made it more likely Britain could resist a Soviet attack on Iraq and so it made sense to reinforce its air bases there. However it became unwise to concentrate so many men and stores in Egypt and Churchill was persuaded to agree to a phased withdrawal from the Suez canal zone. The agreement was signed in October 1954. There followed a brief improvement in Anglo)-Egyptian relations.

Egypt

However Nasser seemed progressively keener to vent anti-British views. Churchill did not want to sell weapons to a country which referred to Britain as the enemy: Nasser responded by looking to the East for his arms deals.Meanwhile the British Ambassador in Washington Sir Roger Makins felt there was "a very understandable suspicion that the Americans are out to take our place in the Middle East" Young 152

Egypt

Egypt was worried by the "Baghdad pact", a defence treaty involving Turkey and Iraq (Feb 1955), Britain (April), Pakistan (July) and Iran (September). Britain was keen to join the pact because its treaty with Iraq came to an end in 1957 and it wanted to keep military bases there. However it raised Egyptian hackles. The Egyptians saw Iraqi PM Nuri el-Said as an "Anglo-American stooge".

Egypt

1956 Aswan dam roject. US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew US funding for the project because Egypt was buying weapons from Czechoslovakia and seemed to be playing one power against another to get better terms.Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Eden wanted to act vigourously to free the canal. In the end a plan was hatched involving British, French and Israeli collusion.

Suez

Eisenhower, who in late 1956 was campaigning for re-election to the Presidency as a man of peace, did not want direct action. He was furious when he learnt of the Anglo-French ultimatum and subsequent Anglo-French attack on Egypt.Britain's currency reserves were hit by speculation fuelled by uncertainty and petrol shortages.

Suez

The Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan told Eden Britain would have to stand down and pull out or face economic collapse.This made the French furious ...

Eden later resigned and Macmillan was appointed PM. Worked hard to rebuild strong relations with US (Bermuda conference March 1957).

Suez

US and UK had already agreed (at Bermuda conference) that Thor rockets should be stationed in Britain under a "dual key" system (first ones operational in UK June 1959).http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/theater/thor.htmBritain was still developing its own rocket system to replace its V-bombers: Blue Streak.

Thor in US-UK nuclear cooperation

Already in 1957 Britain had granted independence to Ghana (almost exactly 50 years ago today).

Withdrawal from Empire

US worried by Sputnik (October 1957). In Oct 1957 Eisenhower agreed to limited nuclear scientific cooperation with UK (which had made great progress in bulding its own thermonuclear weapons and exploded its first H-bomb 15 May 1957). There has been some suggestion that the US had something to gain from access to British research: not an entirely one-way exchange.

From Sputnik to Skybolt ...

British and American nuclear cooperation was formally agreed to in an "Agreement between the Government of the UK and the Government of the USA for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes", signed at Washington 3 July 1958. Only the UK was granted such close cooperation.

From Sputnik to Skybolt ...

In March 1960 Eisenhower agreed that Britain would be allowed to buy American rockets (or "delivery systems") for nuclear weapons. This was granted in exchange for permission to use a base in Scotland (Holy Loch) to service America's Polaris submarines. The system Macmillan was promised was Skybolt.

Rockets

Eisenhower offered Macmillan the opportunity to buy Polaris. However Macmillan preferred Skybolt because, as a missile launched from a plane, it provided a way of prolonging the life of Britain's V-bombers as an effective deterrent.Neither the Navy (who thought it would diminish their resources) nor the RAF were keen on Polaris.

Rockets

On Feb 3 1960 Harold Macmillan went to Cape Town to address the South African Parliament. The message he delivered was unpalatable to the South Africans: abandon apartheid, recognise the strength of nationalist movements throught the continent as "political realities".

Withdrawal from Empire

Perhaps at least as important was the world audience. Macmillan was making it clear that Britain would not stand in the way of legitimate nationalist movements, for to do so would not only be politically unrealistic and perhaps morally indefensible, but it could also encourage nationalists to seek the support of the eastern bloc. Thus the British handling of withdrawal from empire was explicitly framed in the Cold War.

Withdrawal from Empire

Macmillan ... radio extract. Also extract from Vorwoerd's reply.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/february/3/newsid_2714000/2714525.stm

Withdrawal from Empire

In the meantime Macmillan had finally come round to the view that the EEC was a success and that Britain ought to join.

Perhaps also Audit of Empire ...

In 1961 Britain made its first application to join the EEC.

Europe

After the tension over Berlin (with the building of the Berlin wall in 1961) had died down a little, the hot-spot in East-West relations was Cuba.

Cuba

After the abortive Bay of Pigs fiasco, the US imposed sanctions on Cuba. Unlike other NATO countries, Britain agreed to sanctions covering military equimpent and so on but not other products. The US complained. Britain explained that foreign trade represented 40% of GNP, whereas for the States it was 6%.

Cuba

Britain was selling buses. Alec Douglas-Home pointedly remarked that he did not think London buses could be used as strategic weapons ...Cuban Missile Crisis. Late 1962 (October)David Ormsby-Gore ambassador in Washington (appointed at Kennedy's request: a personal friend of Bobby K)Macmillan and Kennedy on the phone during the crisis.

Cuba

Cuba crisis development see http://www.hpol.org/jfk/cuban/

See the George Washington University site on the crisis:

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/

Cuba

The United States sought British support for an intervention in Laos. The British refused, saying they thought the political objectives were not clear and that there was a risk that forces would get bogged down in the area.An important "sub-text" of British thinking is that Britain was worried that any growing involvement in US forces in Asia might detract from the priority (for Britain) of defence in Europe.

South-East Asia

Almost immediately after the Cuban missile crisis another nuclear crisis threatened Macmillan. Two things were happening at the same time:1) many Americans wished to see an end to other nuclear forces. Britain's independent deterrent not helpful as perhaps encouragement to other countries to acquire nuclear capacity.

Nassau and Polaris

2) Skybolt was running into technical difficulties. Under the agreement with Eisenhower the US would bear the development costs for Skybolt and let Britain buy it without contributing to those costs. However it was no longer very significiant for the US (because of Polaris) and was not working well. So they announced they were stopping development.

Nassau and Polaris

This put Macmillan in difficulty. He had advanced the idea of "inter-dependence" and had presented the American agreement as the key to an independent British nuclear deterrent.In December 1962 Macmillan and Kennedy met in Nassau in the Bahamas.Ultimately obtained from Kennedy the right to buy Polaris, as part of a MLF, but with Britain allowed to use it in case of overriding threat to her security.http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/documents/nassau.html

Polaris launch: http://kittyhawk.public.hq.nasa.gov/essay/Air_Power/Missiles/AP29G6.htm

Nassau and Polaris

In January 1963 General de Gaulle announced he would veto Britain's application: Britain too close to the US. Nassau was no doubt one of the reasons.

Nassau and Polaris

Not explicitly an issue in Anglo-American relations (though there might have been a suggestion that American military aid might have been necessary had the military option been pursued). However the Rhodesia crisis brought Wilson into conflict with new members of the Commonwealth and no doubt made this "circle" a less comfortable "club" to be in.

UDI 11 November 1965 (idi)

Rhodesia

The relationship was naturally dominated by Vietnam.Britain gave support to the US though Wilson did on occasion criticise American tactics (esp. bombing cities in the north) "disassociating".Johnson wanted the UK to send troops. Wilson steadfastly refused. Partly because his left was very much against it, partly because he believed Britain could broker a peace treaty and perhaps partly because SE Asia was a diversion (for Britain).

Wilson and Johnson

Wislon almost certainly agreed to a) maintain the parity of the pound sterling and b) maintain British bases "East of Suez" in exchange for American undertakings to provide financial assistance.Gradually the economic realities of the 1960s led Wilson's government to review its defence arrangements and cut spending. This meant a gradual phasing out of bases East of Suez. The Americans complained (early 1967).In November 1967 Britain devalued the pound.(see BBC page on this with audio)

Wilson and Johnson

Wilson and Johnson

This obliged Britain to make cuts in spending. In January Britain annouced it would not be buying American fighters (F-111s) it had ordered to replace the TSR-2 project it had scrapped (strategic fighter-bomber) and, more significantly, announced that it would be accelerating withdrawal from East of Suez (which had already been decided in the July 1967 Defence Review). Johnson pleaded with Wilson to rethink and continue playing a "British" role in the world. But Wilson had no choice.

Wilson and Johnson

Britain had already decided not to build more aircraft carriers.

It had in short decided on a major reduction in its world role, concentrating on its role within NATO and in Europe (especially BAOR in Germany, approx 50,000 servicemen) - retrenchment.

Wilson and Johnson

President Johnson tried hard to get the government to change its mind. The US had hoped Britain would not devalue: the pound had been the "front line of defence" for the dollar. Devaluation of the pound exposed the dollar to greater pressure on the currency markets. It also wanted Britain to maintain a role in South Asia, at least for a few more years: already Vietnam was absorbing a huge amount of US resources (at this time almost half a million men).

Wilson and Johnson

The US would have preferred to share the role of policeman of the world with Britain. Johnson wrote to Wilson twice asking him to think again. On January 11 1968 he wrote:

"Dear Harold:

I have just learned from Dean Rusk of your plans for total British withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by 1971.

Wilson and Johnson

... I cannot conceal from you my deep dismay upon learning this profoundly discouraging news. If these steps are taken, they will be tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs, with all that means for the future safety and health of the free world. The structure of peace-keeping will be shaken to its foundations. Our own capability and political will could be gravely weakened if we have to man the ramparts all alone ...

Wilson and Johnson

While the hour is late, I urge you and your colleagues once more to review the alternatives before you take these irrevocable steps. Even a prolongation of your presence in the Far East and the Persian Gulf until other stable arrangements can be put in place would be of help at this very difficult time for all of us.With warmest personal regards,Lyndon B. Johnson"http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2283.htm doc 289

Wilson and Johnson

When, on January 15 1968, LBJ learnt of the decision to cancel the F-111 order, he again wrote to ask Wilson to reconsider:

"The question of Britain's future in the world, about which I wrote you the other day, continues to be very much on my mind. I know that you and your colleagues will be making crucial decisions on this question in the coming hours ... The London press this morning carries reports that the Cabinet has in fact decided to cancel the F-111.

Wilson and Johnson

Though I know how unreliable the press can be, I have decided to communicate to you my extreme concern about this matter in particular.As Dean Rusk and Bob McNamara explained to George Brown during his recent visit, and as I stated in my recent letter to you, the announcement of accelerated British withdrawal both from its Far Eastern bases and from the Persian Gulf would create most serious problems for the United States Government and for the security of the entire free world.

Wilson and Johnson

Americans will find great difficulty in supporting the idea that we must move in to secure areas which the United Kingdom has abandoned.It has been our hope that a demonstrated ability of United Kingdom military forces speedily to deploy to these areas from its own bases might alleviate somewhat the strong reaction which will inevitably take place. The F-111, because of its range and overall capability, would demonstrate this rapid deployment ability.

Wilson and Johnson

But if you decide to forego the acquisition of the F-111, everyone here will regard this as a total disengagement from any commitments whatsoever to the security of areas outside Europe and, indeed, to a considerable extent in Europe as well ...Both Dean and Bob made it clear to George Brown that financial penalties will have to be applied if there is a decision to cancel the F-111 contract.

Wilson and Johnson

But even these severe economic effects would be overshadowed by the foreign policy consequences of an F-111 cancellation. Many in this country, including influential members of Congress, would bring the strongest pressures to bear on us to sacrifice international security interests to ease our present financial problems. Our ability to maintain substantial forces in Europe, while fighting a difficult and costly war in Southeast Asia, would be greatly endangered ... Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson"http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2283.htm doc 290

Wilson and Johnson

Wilson replied to Johnson, explaining the circumstances in which these difficult decisions had been made, and asserting that Britain would continue to make a contribution to the preservation of peace in the world consistent with its resources. He concluded his letter:"Believe me, Lyndon, the decisions we are having to take now have been the most difficult and the heaviest of any that I, and I think all my colleagues, can remember in our public life. We are not taking them in a narrow or partisan spirit.

Wilson and Johnson

We are taking them because we are convinced that, in the longer term, only thus can Britain find the new place on the world stage that I firmly believe the British people ardently desire ...

Warm regards,

Harold Wilson"

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2283.htm doc 291

Wilson and Johnson

However the State department prepared an assessment of the situation and felt that:

"Since November, the direction of Britain's defense and foreign policy has become clearer and firmer. The Government has accelerated curtailment of world-wide commitments and clarification of its policy toward Europe. Still, the process is far from complete. Continued frustration of Britain's new European vocation nourishes traditional British parochialism, resentment toward France, and suspicion of Germany.

Wilson and Johnson

Conservative Party leaders have attacked the Government's "retreat from East of Suez," but before they can come to power, the cutbacks will probably have gone so far as to be irreparable. Thus, we can see the Britain of the future as, at best, a middle-sized, European power, albeit one with a nuclear capability, a residual sense of extra-European responsibility, and a continuing, if diminished, status as a favored partner of the US."

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xii/2283.htm doc 295

Wilson and Johnson

Thereafter Johnson simply lost interest.

See Lapping's account of what he saw as the pragmatic mutual--or reciprocal--interests in the Anglo-American relationship which began to collapse after the announcement to accelerate the pace of withdrawal "East of Suez".

Wilson and Johnson

The US became increasingly embroiled in Vietnam, and later in 1968 LBJ announced that he would not be standing for re-election in the coming Presidential election. He felt that he could no longer pursue the policy in Vietnam on which he had staked so much. The Democrats lost, and the Republican Richard Milhous Nixon became the 36th President of the United States.Nixon had a tolerably good relation with Wilson, but Britain had less to offer the US now that sterling had been devalued and the decision taken to abandon bases East of Suez.

Wilson and Nixon

In France, on 28 April 1969, President de Gaulle resigned after he failed to secure a majority for a referendum which he had almost turned into a vote of confidence. He was replaced by Pompidou, who was much more sympathetic to British membership of the EEC.

Europe

The general election of 1970, to general surprise, was won by the Conservatives. Edward Heath was appointed Prime Minister. Heath had led the negotiations for British entry into the EEC under Harold Macmillan. He was determined to get Britain into the Common Market. He deliberately sought to distance himself from Nixon and the US.Britain's application was accepted and on January 1 1973, Britain became a member of the EEC. However, it was joining a community which had been formed some 25 years earlier.

Europe

Had it signed the treaty of Rome in 1957, it might have been able to play a leading role, and might also have been able to negotiate favourable terms for its Commonwealth partners. However the leadership of the community had been assumed by France and Germany, and the Commonwealth had no place in the EEC. It had, at any rate, developed new markets, and even before Britain joined the EEC trade with the Commonwealth had fallen substantially and trade with Europe increased.

Europe

Nixon welcomed the results of the 1970 general election. Heath was closer politically than Wilson.Nixon offered Heath almost unparallelled access: phone when you like.Heath declined. His overarching goal was getting into Europe. Need to persuade Britain's partners that Britain was firmly European. Britain would act in consultation with its European partners.

Europe

1973 irritation over "Year of Europe" initiative launched by Kissinger without any consultation.

"The Nixon Administration designated 1973 the 'Year of Europe', a diplomatic initiative aimed at refocusing US policy on Europe and redefining the transatlantic relationship. In a speech of 23 April 1973, Henry Kissinger called for a 'new Atlantic Charter setting the goals for the future'. The American initiative placed Edward Heath's Conservative administration in an awkward dilemma. Heath wanted to give priority to forging an ever-closer European economic and political union with its own distinct foreign policy but was keen to maintain traditional links with the Americans."

Europe

"He was anxious to allay French concern that Britain was an American Trojan Horse in Europe. The French foreign minister, Michel Jobert, was particularly suspicious of British intentions and viewed the Year of Europe exercise as an attempt by Washington to further institutionalise the relationship between the US and Western Europe. In the absence of a co-ordinated European response to his initiative, Kissinger took British statesmen and diplomats to task for their failure to 'deliver' the French."

Europe

"A primary aim of British diplomacy was to promote a notion of 'European Identity' based on cooperation, rather than competition, with the United States. This objective was frustrated by European doubts concerning US intentions. The Watergate affair compounded these difficulties undermining public confidence in the Nixon presidency."

Europe

(cont quote from FCO "blurb" on DBPO series III vol 4)

The documents also highlight the occult nature of Kissinger's diplomacy. A particular fascinating example is 'Operation Hullabaloo', the British codename for Kissinger's top secret employment of a senior British diplomat, Sir Thomas Brimelow, to draft the US/Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War without the knowledge of the State Department.

Europe

Anxiety over American support of Israel during Yom Kippur war (Oct 6-26 1973), and over its decision to go on high level of (nuclear) alert. Britain was informed, but not consulted. (4th Arab-Israeli War)"Transatlantic differences were exacerbated by conflict in the Middle East. On 6 October 1973, the Fourth Arab-Israeli War broke out, a conflict that relegated the 'Year of Europe' to the periphery of international diplomacy. British policy in the Middle East had been based on persuading Israel to withdraw from Arab lands occupied in 1967 so facilitating a settlement to be reached with her neighbours. The British repeatedly urged the Americans to apply more pressure on the Israelis to persuade them that this policy was the only viable long-term solution.

Middle East

"The Secretary of State, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, noted in June 1973, the existing deadlock could not be broken except by the United States, the only country which could exert the necessary leverage on Israel. In the absence of a settlement, he forecast that the Arabs would become 'more frustrated, radicalised and irrational'. The Egyptian and Syrian assaults on Israeli positions in Sinai and on the Golan, vindicated this analysis.Kissinger saw matters differently, viewing the conflict as an extension of the cold war confrontation between East and West. The British and the French had more parochial concerns and became increasingly alarmed by the prospect of the Arab states seeking to exploit Western Europe's economic dependence on their oil for diplomatic ends.

Middle East

"Britain and the US were also at odds when on 13 October Douglas-Home refused to sponsor an American draft UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in situ. Neither of the two superpowers intended to participate in the vote on the draft, and the British doubted Kissinger's claim that the Egyptians would acquiesce in such a move. Britain and its EC partners also refused to assist the US in the re-supply of arms to a temporarily beleaguered Israel. Even more disconcerting was Washington's announcement on 25 October that US forces were being placed on a 'low level military alert' in response to reports that the Soviet Union was planning to send contingents to Egypt to reinforce a three-day-old ceasefire. To the alarm of America's allies, Donald Rumsfeld's formal communication of this information to Nato followed reports of the move in the press." http://www.fco.gov.uk

Europe

The United States were going through a bleak period in their history: despite Nixon's promise to get the US out of Vietnam the US was to remain directly involved until January 1973, with the signature of the Paris agreement.

American disengagement

The US administration was shaken by the Watergate scandal. Nixon resigned office as President of the United States (August 9 1974). In 1975 (April 30 1975), the US was subjected to the humiliation of evacuating its embassy in Saigon by helicopter in an atmosphere of panic and disaster. For the rest of the decade, the US tried to avoid foreign entanglements.

American disengagement

With the US weakened internationally and Britain facing serious financial difficulties (Oil Crisis, then 1976 "IMF crisis") ... Labour continued cooperation with the US for Britain's delivery system for nuclear weapons, upgrading Polaris.Callaghan, as For Sec from 1974 until Wilson's surprise resignation in 1976, when he became PM, set out to stop "needling" the Americans unnecessarily. The 1975 referendum on Europe made Britain's position within the EEC more secure.

Labour 1974-1979

Margaret Thatcher was appointed PM in May 1979, Ronald Reagan wes elected President in November 1980. Their outlooks on economics and international relations were very similar. They both hated communism and the Soviet Union, and they both sought to reduce the extent of state involvement in the economy. Thatcher wanted to "roll back the frontiers of the state": cut taxes, reduce welfare payments, reduce the power of the unions, privatise ... and control the economy by reggulating the money supply ("monetarism").

Thatcher and Reagan

The Falklands war: a case study in conflicting interpretations.

Sometimes cited as quintessentially an example of the "special relationship" in operation, but in many ways also an example of conflicts of interest. It also highlights the often divided nature of US government, with competing power centres.

It shows that for the US the close relationship with the UK was one of many factors in US foreign policy.

Thatcher and Reagan

Among other sources online see

http://www.falklands.info/history/narra.html

Falklands War