Anderson, Albin T., The Soviets and Northern Europe

7/28/2019 Anderson, Albin T., The Soviets and Northern Europe

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The Soviets and Northern EuropeAuthor(s): Albin T. AndersonSource: World Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Jul., 1952), pp. 468-487Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008961 .

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THE SOVIETSAND NORTHERN EUROPEBy ALBIN T. ANDERSON

THE mainsprings f Soviet action,expressed ocally andgenerally, re a themewhich has confounded scholarsandjournalistsformorethan threedecades.A lack ofadequate docu-mentationhas contributedto the dilemma of those seeking toresolvetheenigma that s Russia. One obvious consequence hasbeen torelyheavily upon thedoctrinalpremises n an abundantMarxist iterature.This is understandable,but it is also an invita-tion to innumerable pitfallsbecause of the varietyof ways inwhich Soviet societyand Soviet policies can be conceptualized.A furtherdanger is the loss of perspective.One cannot lightlyignorethefactor fa people's historicalexperience,conditionedas it is, in part, by persistentgeographic and economic forces.The culminatingerroris to overlook the frequent gaps whichexistbetweenprofessed imsand Sovietcapacitytoachieve them.ConsideringSoviet foreign policy as a whole, one is impressedwiththe factthat t has been pursuedwith a realisticevaluationof the consequences. Not since the early years of the revolu-tionary ra has therebeen anyrecklesspursuitof deological endswithouta careful nventory f the available resourcesof power.Geography, emphasizing as it does factorsof size, location,resources, nd relationshiptoneighbors,helps greatly o explainwhy Russia, whetherunder tsars or commissars,was destinedeventuallyto play an unusually significant ole among the na-tionsof theworld. With one-sixth f the and surface ftheearth,witha varietyof natural resourceswhichhave only awaited theday of theirfull exploitation,witha rapidly expanding popula-tion,and witha determinedand ruthless eadership,the SovietUnion has achieved a status n worldaffairs n themiddle of thetwentieth enturywhichreflectsmoreaccurately haneverbeforethepotentialitiesof Russian power. It may even be argued thatit has been onlyof secondary mportancethat this leadership is


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 469professedly ommunistic, nd that thevalues espoused are aliento theWest. Words-whether Leninist, Kautskian, liberal-bour-geois, or reactionary-are not nearly so important as the stagefromwhich they re spoken.The Russian stage s enormous,andinsofar s a threat o the West has existed, nd exists, thas arisennot so much fromwhat the pronounced aims of Soviet leadershave been throughout heyears, s from hecapacityof the USSRto implement hoseaimsand toachieve theends. Means and endshave been a continuum.The Bolshevik revolutionariesof modern times not only ex-propriated power; theybecame simultaneously the heirs of aRussian tradition. Part of that tradition was a Russian conceptofdestiny.The otherpartwas the legacyof suspicion of Russiathatwas promptedby Russian action and nourished by outsidecritics.Russian expansionismwas discussedalmostas vigorouslyin the salons and drawing-rooms f the nineteenthcentury s ithas been discussed on twentieth-centuryorums of the air. Inhis day, the astute Bismarck tried to divert the Russians fromEurope by hinting that theirmanifestdestiny ay to the east.When the Swedes unveiled a majestic statue of Charles XII ina communal park, the venerated king appeared with drawnsword,and with his left arm extended to the east, symbolicallysuggestingto later generationsof Swedes that fromthere, andonly there,would come any real threatto their security.MostofEurope applauded thespectacleof Russian defeatat thehandsof theJapanese in 1905. It seemed as if thegodshad intervenedwith just retributionagainst overweeningambition.

PREMISES AND PROMISESApprehensionsabout Russia duringthepast half-centuryavebeen inspired in part, and fortifiedn part, by the geopoliticaltheoriesgradually formulatedby Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder,and Haushofer. Geopolitics seemed to provide a scientific x-planation for currentdevelopments n the power strugglethenunderway in theworld. It mattered ittle that thecredibility fmany geopolitical concepts was questioned by more cautiousscholars.Deprived of other kinds of documentation,there were


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470 WORLD POLITICSthose who succumbed to the temptation to interpretSoviet ac-tion and Soviet policies in classical geopolitical terms.This move-ment reached its full floweringduring World War II, and thenumber of ts adherents n thepostwarperiod has not diminishedappreciably. The partisans of this school of thoughthave in-sistedthatSoviet policy,eithergeneral or specific, s incompre-hensible withouta knowledgeof geopolitics.1This led to a re-newed analysis of the concepts of Raumsinn and Lebensraum.Sir Halford Mackinder's hypotheses about the "geographicalpivot," or Heartland, acquired new devotees and protagonists.2There was an understandable tendency o view everynew mani-festation f Soviet policyin thelightofpredilections and proph-esies uttered by Mackinder or Haushofer. All the mystiquein-volved in the controversy f land empires versus sea empires,thehypothesis bout spatial instincts f peoples, and the erupt-ing potentialitiesof the Heartland was revived. The aging Mac-kinderreinforced hefaithof his partisans n themidst ofWorldWar II by solemnly statingthat "The Heartland . . . for thefirst ime in history s manned by a garrison sufficient oth innumberand quality."3At the end of thewar,whenSoviet powerseemed destined to spill farbeyond its "natural" confines,Mac-kinder'sfollowers evivedtheprophetic njunctionhehad utteredas early as 1919: "West Europe, both insular and peninsular,must necessarilybe opposed to whatever Power attemptsto or-ganize the vast resourcesof East Europe and the Heartland."4The specterof Russian power sitting triumphantly stride thegreatHeartland of Eurasia was a frightening eopolitical night-mare.A second premise frequentlyadduced in interpretations fSoviet policy is Marxist ideology. Classical Marxism is replete

1 Their enthusiasmwas derived directlyfromKarl Haushofer, who closed his Welt-politikvonHeute (Berlin, 1936)withthesewords: "The studyof world politics requiresa brave spiritand a strongheart. But he who comprehends ts meaningbelongs to thatselectgroup of souls forwhom lifeat last has real meaning" (p. 264).2 At the same time honest German scholars were sounding warningsabout the un-criticalgeopolitical approach. Cf.,forexample, Carl Troll, "Die geographische Wissen-schaft n Deutschland in den Jahren1933bis 1945," Erdkunde: Archiv furWissenschaft-liche Geographie, (1948),3ff.3"The Round World and theWinning of the Peace," Foreign Affairs, xi (July 1943),595-605.4 See his Democratic Ideals and Reality, London, 1919, p. 79.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 471withquotationspredictingthe decay of all othersocio-economicsystems nd the inevitable triumph of Communism. Marxiandisciples differed s to ways and means, as to time and place,but none questioned the dialectical promises of a new heavenand a new earth. The triumph of the Bolshevikrevolution, theestablishmentof the Third International, and the widespreadconspiratorial activities of Communist agentsseemed a portentofthefuture.Communismappeared destined to spread rapidly,eitherthrough nfiltration r overt conquest.Something of a climax of apprehensions took place duringWorld War II when Westernersbegan unhappily to contem-plate Marxian promises and geopolitical premises.Two dogmasseemed suddenly oined in a threatening lliance. The firstwasthe dogma of the Heartland: "Who rules the Heartland com-mands theWorld-Island;who rules the World-Islandcommandsthe World."5 The second was the dogma of inevitable worldCommunism. Even those who might normallybe expected toview such aphorisms with suspicion were uneasy. The logic ofgeography nd the emotion of ideology both seemed to point tothe inescapable destinyof a Communistworld ruled from Mos-cow. Stalin's assurance that he saw no reason whythe two sys-tems could not peacefullycoexist for a long time to come wascold comfort.When Soviet writers tried to satirize the wholegeopolitical conceptual system s a "reactionary heory" uitableonlyfor uchmisguidedsouls as Japaneseimperialists,Hitlerites,and American warmongers, t was onlynatural to interpret hisaction as disarming propaganda in the currentcold war.6West-ern fears were galvanized quickly into Westernaction.It isnotinconceivablethat there re elements n Sovietforeignpolicy which can be linked to classical geopolitical concepts.It is more certain thatmanySoviet actionsare direct reflectionsof obvious Marxian premises.But an exaggerationof theseele-ments obfuscates,rather than clarifies, he problem of under-standingtheUSSR. The USSR is notmerely"a riddle wrapped

5 Part of Mackinder'sfamous formula. Cf. his Democratic Ideals and Reality, p. 186.6 Typical of the Soviet critiqueof geopolitics s an articleby P. Fedoseyev,writing nPravda, April 2, 1951. He stated,"Historyis not made by geographical designs,but onthe basis of the laws of theeconomicdevelopmentof society;thepopular masses are thedecisive force."


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472 WORLD POLITICSin a mysterynside an enigma." It is a country nd a state. It is aland of great ize and immenseresources. t is a people-some 2oomillions of them-for whom the problem of day to day existenceis as omnipresentas it is for other peoples. It is also a regimewhose ultimateresponsibility s thatof the "security"ofthestate,the well-being of its citizenry however strangelydefined), and,certainlynot least important, he perpetuation of itself n power.The men of the Kremlin have a keen appreciation of factorsofpower,a highlydeveloped sense of timing, nd a skill in exploit-ing every possible situation by means of propaganda, but geo-politics is not a part of their vocabulary. And it is questionableif Marxian theory s as important as a mainspringof action asit is as a justification orfaits ccomplis-accomplished acts whicheverymodern state is wont to justify s "vital to national secu-rity."The attentionof Soviet leaders to the practicalitiesof powerpolitics is evident in northernEurope, as well as in other areascontiguous to the USSR. Fortunately, the broad outlines ofSoviet policy in the northern rea can also be documentedwithconsiderableprecision.Here it is possible to adduce some of thesubstantiveevidence of Soviet motivationand perhaps ultimateSoviet ends.

THE SOVIETS AND THE BALTIC SEAThe Baltic has been a long-standing heme n Russian thoughtand policy. It was personalizedfor the Russians when Peter theGreat built his new capital on the lower Neva River, whichdebouched into the Finnish Gulf, one of the two importantfingers f the Baltic. Russians looked upon this city,and thetraditionwhich it represented, s a mixed blessing,but it never-theless xerteda persistent nfluenceupon Russian policy. Whenthe Bolsheviks returned the seat of power to Moscow, it was byno means an act of voluntary solation or a repudiation ofBaltic

and Western interestsby the new regime. As a matter of fact,there s evidence that n the first lush f theirnewlyfound powerafterNovember 1917 some Bolshevik propagandists hoped totransform heBaltic Sea into the "sea of the Social Revolution.""7As quoted in August Rei, Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States, London,1948,p. 27, and drawn from zvestia of December 25, 1918.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 473The recognitionof the independence of theBaltic states and ofFinland were simplyacts ofprudence dictatedby calculationsofcurrentstrength nd weakness.

Although the Soviet governmentwas not in a favorableposi-tion to pressher claims in the Baltic until afterWorld War II,she at no time voluntarily relinquished any of her alleged"rights." An earlypost-revolutionary xample of thispolicy washer insistenceupon a voice in thedecisionregardingtheAalandIslands. The Soviet foreign commissar, Chicherin, outlinedclearlyhiscountry's tandpoint n 1919 when he stated, n a mes-sage to the governments f France, Italy,Japan, Great Britain,and the United States that ". . . the verygeographicalpositionof the Aaland Islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Finlandbinds theirdestinyclosely to theneeds and requirementsof thepeoples inhabitingRussia. . . ."8 In subsequent messagesthe So-viet government tatedcategoricallythat any decision as to thestatus of the islands would be considered null and void, "ifRussia has not takenpart in thenegotiationsconcerningthem."9The Soviet governmentmaintained this attitudeconsistentlyin the interwarperiod, and she made her voice mostaudible inthemiddle and late 193o's. Her violent castigationof theAnglo-German Naval Conventionwas largely nspiredby the factthatthe agreementwould enable Germany to establish naval he-gemony n the Baltic.10When the Finns and Swedes once againtook up the problem ofremilitarizing he islands in 1938-1939,theSovietgovernmentwas quick to point out her own interestsin the matter. t was alleged that the programformilitarizingAaland was inspired by Finnish fascists nd German geopoliti-cians, who had long dreamed of convertingAaland into a navalbase forthe Third Reich. An Izvestia correspondentwrote omi-nously in October 1938 that "The fortifyingf Aaland, with a1oo per centguarantee of the conversion of thearchipelago intoa German military base, is an agreement militating against

8 Message of October 2, 1919; cf.Jane Degras, SovietDocuments on Foreign Policy, ,London, 1951, p. 169.9 Ibid., p. 90o.10Vladimir Potemkin, storia Diplomatii, Moscow, 1945, III, 547. Also Gudmund Hatt,.stersjdproblemet,Malmd, 1941,pp. 9-io; and Max Beloff,The ForeignPolicy of SovietRussia, London, 1947, I, 133-34,


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474 WORLD POLITICSpeace in northeastern urope."" The strong ovietstandagainstsuch exclusive participation in the fortificationf the islandswas responsible for bringing the Swedish-Finnish plans tonaught. The crisishad political repercussions n Sweden. Rick-ard Sandler,the foreignminister, elt t necessary o hand in hisportfolio, n partbecause of thegovernment's ailureto providethepropersecurityforAaland, whichhe considered"the bucklein thebelt which linksFinland and Sweden in a communityofinterest t the entranceto the Bothnian Gulf."'13Soviet sensitivity bout Aaland did not abate afterthe con-clusion of hostilities.Efforts y theFinnishgovernment o alterthestatusoftheislands, n responsetoa requestfrom he Aaland-ers themselves,were met by several strong deimarches n Hel-sinki and considerable press criticism.Since the proposed billwould have giventheAalandersa considerably nlargedmeasureof self-government,twas the Russian contentionthat this wouldviolate both the armisticeand thepeace treatybetweenFinlandand the USSR. Finnish sovereignty ad been guaranteedbyboththese documents; therefore, o alter the status of the islandswould be "restricting innish sovereigntynd violatingthepeacetreaty.''l4 his fantastic nterpretation f treatyobligationswasa piece of sophistryn whichtheKremlin could lightly ndulge.But more seriously, t showed the purposefulnesswith whichthe Soviet government ntended to guard her Baltic interests,not least in Aaland.

The Baltic, unlike theMediterranean, s not so much a con-nectinglink ofwater as it is an inland sea. A comparisonwiththeBlack Sea would be more apt, particularly n that thewaterentrance n each case is controlledbynon-Soviet (one mightsay,anti-Soviet)powers.The long history fdispute as to thecontroloftheStraits swell known,but therehas never been any"north-ern Montreux Convention" to fix the statusof the Baltic out-lets.The Little Belt and GreatBelt are partsof the defensezoneofDenmark; and controlover the Oresund is sharedby Sweden

11 Izvestia,October II, 1938.12 RtitgerEssen, Den Ryska Ekvationen, Stockholm,1940, p. i62.13 Quoted fromhis speech to the firsthouse of the Riksdag, January 17, 1940; inSvenskUtrikespolitik nder andra Virldshriget, tockholm,1946,p. 57.14 In both Pravda nd Izvestia,May 25, 1951.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 475and Denmark. It is perhaps with some justice that Russia hasbeen likened to "a man who cannot get his arms throughhissleevesbecause theyare sewed at the bottom."15

Only afterWorld War II was anyeffortmade to clarifymorethoroughly he SovietpositionregardingtheBaltic Straits.Thiswas a natural concomitantto the changed power situation n thenorth, marked by the reabsorptionof the Baltic states into theSovietUnion and theeliminationof Germanyas a naval power.Sovetskoyegosudarstvo pravo forMay 1950 contained a clearexpressionof the Soviet viewpoint regardingthe Baltic and theBaltic Straits.'6Here it was asserted that the responsibilityforopening and closing the Baltic was a matter for all the littoralpowers. The writer nsisted that ". .. the foundationof the re-gime of theBaltic Straits n international aw mustbe the effec-tive closing of them to thewarshipsof non-Balticstates." Sucha policy, it was said, was in full harmonywith the traditionalposition of the Soviet governmentand its implementationwasnow particularly ppropriate, n view of the recentvictory f theSoviet Union over Germany."The Baltic states," t was empha-sized,"and among them thegreat peace-lovingpower,the SovietUnion, have legitimate, uridical, and historically ubstantiatedrights o carry ut thismeasure,which does not exclude freedomof commercial navigationin theBaltic forall countries and hasthepurpose ofprotecting hesovereigntynd security f the na-tionsinhabitingthe shoresof the Baltic."

The Soviet attitudetowardthe general problem of the Balticwas thusclarified.The Baltic was an internalsea and purelytheconcern of the stateswhose shoreswere washed by its waters.Those states should collaborate in preventingthe intrusion ofany outside, "warmongering"parties.The area of authorityforthis recommended condominium of powers extended to thestraits onnectingthe Baltic with theKattegat. Throughout thearticlewas an unmistakable mplicationthat otherBaltic powersmust accustom themselves to thinking in terms of Russian,ratherthan German, predominance in the Baltic. The span of

15 Hatt, op.cit.,p. 40.16 This discussion appeared in the form of a long, laudatory review of a recentmaster'sdissertation,The Regime of the Baltic Straits n InternationalLaw," by S. V.Molodtsov.


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476 WORLD POLITICSher interests ow obviously encompassedthreepointsofstrategicimportancein the Baltic-the straitsat the westernoutlet, theAaland Islands, which dominated access to the Bothnian Gulfas well as the approachesto theFinnishGulf,and the islands andwatersof the latter.

SOVIET POLICY: FINLAND AND SCANDINAVIAFroma strategic oint ofview,there were at least three majorfrontierpoints in the Soviet northwestwhich seemed to be ofspecial concern to the USSR. In the south, it was the Karelian

Isthmus through which the Finnish frontier,prior to 1939,passed within 32 kilometersof the cityof Leningrad. Farthernorth was the Karelo-Finnish line, which brought outposts ofFinnish defenserelativelyclose to the Murmansk Railway, aswell as to the Stalin Canal. In the far north the impingementof Finnish territory pon Murmansk and the Kola Peninsulawas importantbecause Russia possessed there her only year-round ice-free pening to the west.Although Soviet-Finnish elationswill not be dealt withherein detail, t isnotinappropriatetopointout some ofthestrategicconsiderationswhich seem to have shaped Soviet policy towardFinland. Soviet uneasiness regardingthe proximityof the Fin-nish frontier o vulnerable Soviet centers had been manifestedprior to 1939.17 While acquiescing in the Treaty of Dorpat(1920) which had delimitedthefrontier,heSoviet leaderswerenever happy or satisfied. or one thing,theAllied interventionin the Baltic and in the portsof Murmansk and Archangel lefta legacy of suspicion which it was not necessary to keep alivein people's minds by artificialmeans. Second, the obvious anti-Communist orientationof the successiveFinnish governmentsdid not tend to allay suspicions.And perhaps most important,Finns and Western writers lmostwithout exception frequentlysinned against the sensibilities of the Kremlin by referring oFinland as a "glacis"-a political, social, and cultural outpostof theWest againstthebarbarism of the East.

17 Extensive, although inconclusive,discussions took place in 1938 which are sum-marized in Vainb Tanner's memoirs,Finlands Vig 1939-I940 (Swedish edition), Hel-singfors, 950,pp. 7-27.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 477No Soviet spokesmanever suggestedthatFinland alone con-stituted tangible threat,but therewerefrequentwarningsthatFinland mightbecome the tool of Western,imperialistic,war-

mongering powers. Until the Soviet-GermanPact of August1939, it was clear that the Russians included Germany in theabove indictment.Forced by thepact to exclude Germany fromthiscategory,most pronouncements ended to become vague andpatently meaningless. The Russo-German division of "spheresof influence" in 1939 must have given the Kremlin a respitefromreal fears n regard to Finland, even while she continuedto insist that the dangers fromthatsource had intensified.It is impossible to state with scientificprecision what thecompleteextent ofSoviet aims was in regard to Finland in 1939.One can only build an hypothesisupon the rather imited evi-dence which exists.But in termsof immediate strategicaims,it is clear that the Russian intentionwas to bring Finland tightlywithinthe orbit of Soviet influence.The abortivesupport giventoKuusinen's government uggests ven morefar-reachingims.Finland mighthave been leftcompletely ndependent-howevertenuously and uncertainly-but acceptance of the militaryde-mands of 1939 would have resulted in two positive advantagesto thepolicy-makersf the Kremlin. The USSR would have en-hanced her capacityfor immediate and decisive reprisal,whichwould have had a soberingeffect pon possibleFinnish extremistaction. And second, the advantages gained would have made itpossible for the Russians to anticipate the occupation of Fin-land by any of the belligerents,Germanyor theAllies. Finlandas an independent, unoccupied, and armed power was out ofcontrol.Subjected toa constricted nd demilitarizedfrontierndpartial occupation (islands of the Finnish Gulf, and the HangoPeninsula), she could be kept under control.The initial premiseforSoviet demands upon Finland in 1939was the insecurity fLeningrad. The Finns could maintain thatjust as the Finnishborderwas thirty-twoilometersfromLenin-grad,so was Leningrad thirty-twoilometersfromFinnish terri-tory,but this type of legalistic argumenthas never had muchrestraining nfluence on big power diplomacy. Subsequently,many responsible Finns, even while noblyacquittingthemselves


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478 WORLD POLITICSin a struggle which theyconsidered just and honorable, cameto a betterrecognitionof the cogencyof the Russian case.18There was no hint of geopolitical design or of ideologicalmotivation n the conversationsheld between the Finnish dele-gates on the one hand and Stalin and Molotov on the other.Paasikivi reported ater thatfromthe very first talin was frankand realistic.With mapsspread out on a huge table before them,Stalin, in a matter-of-factnd not unfriendlyway, remarked,"Neither of us can do anything bout the geographical fact thatwe are neighbors.'9 He and Molotov then proceeded to arguetheircase froma simple premise: at a border point where theinterestsof two powers are involved, the one with the most atstakehas an a priori rightto thegreatest onsideration.In the various communiques to the Finnish government, ndperhaps even more clearlyin the speech by Molotov to the Su-preme Soviet on October 31, 1939, the importanceofLeningradto the Soviet Union was frankly tated,even thoughthe detailswere not tabulated.20 his site of the initial Russian revolutionshad nostalgic historical, s well as practical,meaningto the lead-ers of the USSR-perhaps shared in large part by themassesofthe Soviet peoples.21 Between the twowars the cityhad doubledin size, with a population somewhatin excess of three millionby 1939. Despite therapid developmentof other areas and manynew cities, Leningrad continued to be one of the largest in-dustrialcenters n theUSSR, responsiblefor theoutput ofsome-thingmore than 10 per cent of the industrialproductionof thecountry,22nd with a much higher figurefor such critical itemsas machinesand machine tools. It was a communication hub andterminalof major importance,with rail and water connectionsto the interiorof theUSSR, to the Arcticnorth, nd to theout-side world. It served as an administrativecenter next in im-

18 For one person'sopinion of the legalistic-optimisticttitudeof the Finnish govern-ment, cf. Carl 0. Frietsch, Finlands 6desar, i939-i943, Helsingfors, 1945, especiallyChapters-iII.19 Ibid., pp. 86-87.For a slightlydifferent ersion,cf.Tanner, op.cit.,p. 40.20 Finnish Blue Book, New York, 1940, pp. 56-60, for the appropriate extractsofMolotov's speech.21 It seemsto the author that nothingelse can explain the unusual amount of pub-licitygiven to the specificdemands.22 Theodore Shabad, Geographyof the U.S.S.R., New York, 1951, p. 151


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 479portance only to Moscow. A German writer tated in 1938 that"The USSR can never abandon such an important . . center,and the militarypreparations taken to date indicate that such isnot the intention."23All of the above considerations were no doubt honestly ad-duced in the negotiations of 1939. The fact that the regimedecided to publicize these demands when negotiations laggedmakes t plausible to believe that the Sovietleaders felt that theirdemands were reasonable, and that they would seem so to bothfriend and foe. Furthermore, t should not be overlooked thatthe Russians were willing to jeopardize the security of otherstrategicpoints farthernorth-the Murmansk Railway and theStalin Canal-in order to provide land "compensation" to theFinns for territorywhich, in the Soviet scale of values, was ofgreater mmediate importance to themselves.24The results of two wars and the terms mposed by the treatyof 1947 confirmboth the politico-military nd the economicobjectives of Soviet policy. To the surprise of most observers-although an inadmissible emotion forhardenedSoviet apologists-the Russians contented themselveswith only limitedterritorialannexations of Finnish territory. he most important was thewhole of theKarelian Isthmus, along with a substantial bloc ofterritorywest and north of Lake Ladoga. Leningrad was nowprovided with a protective belt of land and water which wasundeniablymore advantageous to the Russians than thatwhichtheyhad in 1939. The so-called Mannerheim Line was trans-formed ntoa Russian defensezone, and theformer innishportcityofViipuri became a keySovietoutposton theBaltic.Viipuri,theislands oftheGulf,and the leased territoryf Porkkala nowformed n integratedpartof theSoviet-Balticdefensesystem.By the termsof the treaty f 1947, the Russians also strength-ened theirposition along the Finnish waistline.They acquireda fifty-mileide stripof territorywhich,among otherbenefits,gave them control over the railway line fromKandalaksha toKuolajarvi. The Finns were obligated to complete a portionof

23 Vitalis Pantenburg,Russland's Griff m Nordeuropa, Leipzig, 1938,p. 72.24 See map opposite page 35 in the Soviet "colored" book, Die Sowietunion undFinnIand, Moscow, 1939.


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480 WORLD POLITICSthe line, Kemi to Kuolajarvi, providing the Russians with ameans of transporting eavygoods and equipment from the So-viet northto the Gulf ofBothnia. Its potentialitiesas a militaryroutewereobvious to everyone.The shift f theFinnishfrontierwestwards n thismiddle sectionput both the Stalin Canal andthe Murmansk Railway in a somewhatimprovedsecurityposi-tion. Lakes, marshes,and timberlands n the annexed territorydid not represent substantial conomicgain,but theydid widentheSovietdefensive one in an area ofunusuallyruggedterrain.Not the least importantof the Russian acquisitions was thenorthernport of Petsamo (Pechenga) and its surroundingterri-tory.Finland was thus cut offfromher Arctic outlet, and theprotectivecircle around the port of Murmansk was enlarged.Complete controlof Petsamo had not been a part of the initialRussian demands,and in the treaty f 1940 Finnish sovereigntywas onlyslightlyimited,but the treaty f 1947 forcedtheFinnsto relinquish both their political control and their economicholdings.Petsamo maythus be classified s war bootyratherthanas an incipientpolitical and military bjective.A very ubstantialprize for the Russians was the nickel industry n Petsamo, forwhich they compensated the previous owners and concession-aires.By means of territorial cquisitions and the delimitingtermswithin the final treaty,the USSR achieved a measure of "se-curity"on theSoviet-Finnish rontierwhichwentfarbeyondtheannounced aims of 1939. But there remained an additionalsphere n the northwhereher statushad never been satisfactorilyresolved.That was theArctic.A moreincisiveformulation fSo-vietpolicyin that area awaited the postwarperiod.

SOVIET POLICY: THE ARCTICConnected intimatelywith the establishmentof a favorable

poweradvantagefortheUSSR in the northwestwas a continuedSoviet interest n the Arctic and the Polar area. Murmanskhadlong been a port of paramount importanceto the USSR. Withits facilitiesfor basing large numbers of naval and merchantcraft,t had become a centerof Sovieteconomiclife n thenorth.And yet,even afterthewar, it remainedvulnerable to potential


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 481enemies. It was easy to visualize a blockade of ships or of minesinterposed between North Cape and the solid ice to the north,thus eliminating the Soviet corridor to the North Atlantic.25Soviet strategistshad not been insensitive to this danger, butthere was no evidence that theyhad accepted the premises of atleast one German geopolitician; namely,that ". . . an expansionto the west must thereforenecessarilybe one of the prime ob-jectives of Soviet foreignpolicy."26 his would mean, specifically,that the Soviet Union would be drivenby considerationsof se-curity o seize certain Norwegian fjordsand coastal islands. Nazioccupation of the northern and westernNorwegian coastlandsduring World War II highlighted the strategic mportance ofthisarea forbothnaval and air warfare. t was theconsciousnessof thisfactbytheWesternpowers, s well as bytheUSSR, whichmade theparticipationofNorway in NATO a matterofcriticalimportanceforboth sides. In this case, the country nvolved-Norway-was far enough removed fromthe reach of effectiveSoviet pressureto hazard a decision which could not be otherthan distasteful o the Kremlin. At the same time, the realisticNorwegians were aware of the risks,should East-West tensiondevelop into a shootingwar.Largely throughthe instrumentalityf the press,the Sovietgovernmenttried to clarify ts viewpoint on the Arctic afterWorld War II. It was then reiterated n unmistakable termsthatthe USSR subscribedofficiallyo the "sectortheory" n the Arc-tic.27 vidence wasproduced toshow thatRussia, as earlyas 1916,had "notified the powers of her claims to the islands north ofSiberia."28The tacitagreementbetweenCanada, Denmark, andNorway, n 1924, that ". . . sectorswere tobe consideredas underthe sovereigntyof the correspondingstate" was accepted andreinforced n principle by the Soviet government when, two

25 Allied experiencesduring World War II made this fully apparent. Cf. "AlliedConvoys to Murmanskand Arkhangel'sk, 941-45,"by an anonymousBritishAdmiraltywriter,n The Polar Record (January1950), pp. 427ff.26 Pantenburg,op.cit., p. 123.27 See thearticle byV. Durdenevsky, Antarctica nd theArctic,"VestnikMoskovskovoUniversiteta, ctober 1950; also published in full in C.D.S.P., Iv: 40. For a summaryofearlier Russian claims,see C. J. Webster,"The Growth of the Soviet Arctic and Sub-arctic,"Arctic (May 1951),pp. 27-45.28 Cf. Durdenevsky,bid.


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482 WORLD POLITICSyears ater, ". . . all the lands and islands,both thosediscoveredand those which mightbe discovered later, lying between thecoastsofthe USSR on the ArcticOcean, the North Pole and themeridianoflongitude 32 degrees4 minutes35 seconds East and168degrees 49 minutes30 seconds West (fromGreenwich)wereproclaimed Soviet territory."A Soviet decree of September 8,1931, ncluded in itsdefinition f theFar Northall theislands ofthe Arctic Ocean and of the Okhotsk, Bering, and Kamchatkaseas.29An exceptionwas made in the west to exclude thatpartof the easternSpitsbergen rchipelago,32 degrees to 35 degreesEast, which lay inside the western line of demarcation. TheSoviet governmenthas let it be known that she considers theKara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Chukotsk seas as Soviet in-ternalwaters, nd that theWhite Sea, south of a line from theKanin headland west to Svyatoion theKola Peninsula, is underdirect Soviet jurisdiction. Official Soviet geographies speak ofthe Barents Sea as a "Soviet ArcticSea."30 It can thus be assumedthat the Sovietgovernmenthas served notice thatshe will be thesole arbiter over the destinies of thewaters, slands,and the iceof thegreat wedge-shapedpolar sector fromtheRybachii Penin-sula in the westtoBering in the east.Current Sovietgeographiesand atlases support this claim.Sovietsensitivitybout the Arcticwas heightened n thepost-war period by thepossibilitythatSpitsbergenmightbe utilizedas a base by the North Atlantic powers. The Russians rightlyclaimed that such a use of the archipelago would violate theagreement made when Norwegian sovereignty ver Spitsbergenwas initiallyrecognized bya group ofpowersin 1920. Soviet in-terestsn thearea dated particularly rom1931,when the Sovietcompany,Arctic Ugol, purchased the propertyof the Anglo-Russian Grumant Company, Ltd., and in the following yearacquired the holdings of the Nederlandsche Spitsbergen Com-pagnie. They too were forbiddento maintainmilitaryforces nthe area, but having once obtained an economic stake in Spits-bergen, t was perhaps onlynatural that the Russians should be

29 Webster,op.cit.80 S. S. Balzak, V. F. Vasutin, and Ya. F. Feigin,Economic Geography of the U.S.S.R.,New York, 1949,P. 27.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 483concerned withmaintainingthe relativelyfavorablepower rela-tionship. During World War II the Germans occupied Spits-bergen with little opposition. That prompted the Russians topropose to the Norwegians, as early as 1944, that the treatyof1920 be revised and that some provision be made for thedefenseof the islands.31What the Russians would have preferredwas abilateralagreementbetween thepowers havingprimary ntereststhere,Norwayand the USSR, but the Norwegians insistedthatall signatory owers takepart in thenegotiations.No doubt feel-ing thatmultiple participationwould not be to theiradvantage,the Russians suspended conversations.Meanwhile, they began apress campaign whichenlargedupon earlierRussian exploits inSpitsbergen, nd one writerustified heSovietposition byassert-ing that the treatyof 1920 "was signed without the knowledgeor participationof the Soviet Union and consequentlyfailed totake intoaccountthesecuritynterests ftheUSSR in the Northand theimportant conomic interests f theSoviet Union in theSpitsbergenarea. 32In addition to argumentsbased upon security onsiderations,Sovietspokesmenhave stressed heeconomic importanceof Spits-bergen to the USSR. Primarily, t had "supplied the northernareas ofthe USSR and the Soviet northernfleetwith more than400,000 tonsof coal annually."33 Two decades ago thatargumentwould have had some validity; today it is only an argument.There is no coal in theEuropean Arctic,and it is no doubt con-venientfortheadministration f theNorthernSea Route to tapthis island supply,but two developmentsof recent years haverenderedobsolete the Soviet dependence upon coal from Spits-bergen. The first s the rapid expansion of coal production inthe Pechora basin, somewhatwest of the northernUrals. Theresourcesof this fieldmaypossiblyexceed thoseof theUkrainianDonbas.34The second is themarkedimprovement n land trans-portation facilitiesin the Soviet northwest.Perhaps most im-

31 R. N. Rudmose Brown, "Svalbard of Today," Scottish Geographical Magazine(December 1950),p. 177.32 G. Rassadin, writing n Pravda, October 28, 1951.33 Ibid.34 Cf. William Mandel, "Some Notes on the Soviet ArcticDuring the Past Decade,"Arctic (April 1950), p. 61.


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484 WORLD POLITICSportant was the wartime constructionof a railway linking theArchangel-Vologda ine with the Pechora basin, terminating nVorkuta on the Usa River. There is a northern inkage of theArchangel-Vologda nd Leningrad-Murmansk ines, which wouldpermiteasy transit o all the major northwestern orts and cities.Up to World War II, the north had to import some coal fromthe Donbas35; but that s probably no longer necessary.Arguments based upon the economic importance of Spits-bergen to the Soviet Union are, therefore, argely specious. ButRussian coal operations on Svalbaard remain a symbol of Soviet"interests,"a symbol which can be conjured up whenever theKremlin feels that ts sphere of influence s being trespassed.Forthat reason, and because of the useful weather data which in-stallations there afford, here is little likelihood of the USSRabandoning its operations, even if it should ultimately provemore economical for them to obtain coal elsewhere.The Arctic is thereforeone part of a securityzone for theSoviet northwestwhich stretches n a sweeping arc from theNorth Pole through Spitsbergen,northern Norway, the BalticStraits, nd then to the south Baltic. Soviet sovereignty s notexercised at any of the peripheral points,but Soviet spokesmenhave nothesitated to specify he placeswhereSoviet interests reinvolved, and the premisesupon which theseclaims are asserted.Within this arc of and and water, policies have been pursued tostrengthen he politico-strategic osition of the USSR. The keyBaltic coastal points, nd especially offshoreslands, uch as Dagb,Osel, and the various islands of the Finnish Gulf, have beenheavily militarized. Alterations in the Soviet-Finnishfrontierimproved the strategic position of the USSR vis-a-visFinland.But farmore significantwas the virtual disarmamentof Finland.Not only has Leningrad been givena degreeofsecuritywhich itcould neverclaimbefore,but the presentpowerratiomeans thatFinland could be occupied entirelywithina matterofdays.ThethreatofSoviet military etaliationand thestrictures onsequentupon reparation obligationsand tradeagreementshave meant asevere imitationupon Finnishfreedom f action.This has served

35 Balzak et al., op.cit.,p. 2 14.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 485not only to keep Finland out of NATO, but it has helped todetermine Swedishpolicy towardmembership n thatcoalition.It was abundantly clear to the Swedish governmentthat shewould jeopardize Finnish independence by joining such anopenly anti-Sovietbloc of powers. In the far north the SovietUnion has expanded rapidlyboth its naval and air strength.Allof these measures reflect uite normal "bourgeois" calculationsof politico-military trength nd weakness, and seem quite di-vorced fromclassical geopolitical and Marxian premises.

IDEOLOGY: HANDMAIDEN OF EXPANSIONIdeology has a role in Soviet policy-making, ut largelyone ofsecondary mportance. Soviet pronouncementson policy towardtheBaltic and northernEurope, containing as theydo the usualideological overtones,appear designed to make the position oftheUSSR a matterof public record should exigencies arise,andmajor changes ensue, which would require proper rationaliza-

tion.There is no hint of imminent ction to alter the status quo.Soviet diplomatic language contains no allusions to a need for"living space," "breathing pace," or "population pressure,"andthe like. Efforts re frequentlymade by official pokesmen todeny that Soviet diplomacy has any resemblance to "bourgeoisdiplomacy,"but thedenial is meaningfulonlyto thedegreethatone is willing to accept the Marxian premiseswhich are postu-lated.No Soviet policy declarations, however, are so worded as topreclude future ction in the north. Soviet criticism f the north-ern countries is couched in such terms as to leave the specificimpression that these countries are allowing themselves to be-come the bonded servantsof the capitalistic West; and further,thattherespectiveregimesare bent upon the enslavementof themasses of their people. To conjure up such a picture for theSoviet citizenry could have useful consequences. It would fitneatly nto what the Soviet masses have been taught about justand unjust wars, and about non-interference nd intervention.Public support for possible future Soviet action would then beforthcoming ecause the ideological groundworkhad been laid.


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486 WORLD POLITICSIntervention n the Leninist-Stalinist exicon can take manyforms.86 hese include not only armed intervention,but thefinancing f counterrevolutionaryroups,as well as simple finan-

cial-economic ntervention, particularly the utilizationof busi-ness firms nd trademissionsas the best reconnaissanceagents ofthe world bourgeoisie." This then develops into a kind of capi-talistic encirclementwhich ties the victimized countries-notleastthesmall ones-to the bourgeois-capitalisttates, nspires theruling circles of thesecountries to one or anotherkind of adven-turistpolicy, and, in the process, the massesof workingpeoplebecome enslaved. It was this of which Finland was accused in1939, and it has been a recurrent heme in the postwar period,but is now directedmost sharply gainst Norway.Having thenestablishedthe case for "intervention"on thesepremises, t becomespossible to ustify ventualmilitary nvolve-ment n these areas, giventhese circumstances. uch a war wouldbe justified n the Marxist catechism because it would be a waragainst imperial-colonialexploitation, a war of national libera-tion for peoples, and therefore "just war."37Since it is theSovietviewpointthatRussian action in Eastern Europe after hewarwas a model of properaction, thereshould be no illusion onthepart of Finland or the Scandinavian countriesas to what toexpect under such circumstances.38Meanwhile, politicsremainsthe art ofthepossible,even in theland of the Soviets. Past experience has demonstratedthat suchpronouncements are rarely followed by early action, and fre-quently by none. But they are reiterated to demonstratecon-tinuity-and purity-ofdoctrine.As shown duringWorld War II,and in the postwar period, theycan thenbe convenientlycitedto justify ction in a given situation. However, such situationsdo not arise in a vacuum, nor is Soviet action solely a conse-quence of certain deological premises.The Sovietsact and react

36 Cf. M. I. Lazarev's summaryof the Stalinist position in Sovetskoyegosudarstvo ipravo,December 5, 1949. Complete ext lso in C.D.S.P., ii: 6.37 For the militaryviewpoint,cf. Lt.-Col. E. Khomenko,"On Wars Justand Unjust,"Krasny Flot, October 9, 1949; also the appropriate sectionsofHistory of the CommunistParty of the Soviet Union (Short Course).38 Lazarev, loc.cit.


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THE SOVIETS AND NORTHERN EUROPE 487in accordancewith the power situationwhich prevails,a powersituationwhich is measured in psychologicaland tactical termsas well as in termsofmilitary trength.Were thatnot true, Fin-land would long ago have disappeared into the maw of Stalin'sRussia.