The Fall of Soviets

8/12/2019 The Fall of Soviets

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EasternEurope:Is thePartyOver?ValerieunceNorthwesternniversity

Absoluteystemsre trongs ongstheyare bsolute.henheyeginoreform,theyre ost.et heyannotvoideform,or hey illxplode. MilovanjilasIntroduction

VALERIEUNCEt seasy omake strongasefor co-nomic nd politicaleformsn EasternEurope.irst,hisswhatMikhailorbachevants,ndwhat Sovieteader antsar-riespecial eightn hebloc. econd,t sclearhatocialistconomicsoesnotwork,especiallynEasternurope.t snotust hat our fthese tates-Romania,oland,HungaryndYugoslavia'--haveufferedn actual eclinen heirtandardf ivingince1980;t s lso hat here as een longtermeclinehroughouthe egionn apitalndlabor roductivity.inally,hepoliticaluturef he egionsmortgageds well.Manyfthese arties, ostnotablynHungary,olandndYugoslavia,anbe termedmereshadowsf heirormereninistelves.Whats communistarty,fterll,ft annotmanagehe conomy,gree npoliciesr controlhepublic?Ifhe ressuresor eformregreat,owever,oare he ressuresgainsteform,ndformanyf he amereasons.alteringconomies,ividedarties,ervousrivilegedinterestsnd ngry,mpatientublicsrehardlyhe tuffut fwhich reformoalitioncanbe cobbled. his sthe essonfPolandrom956 othepresentBunce, 989b).Second,venfuch coalitionouldomehoweconstructed,heresnoguaranteehatreformsould olve heproblemsf ocialism.ndeed,heyouldmakemattersorse.Marketeformsould ndoubtedlyntheshorterm nleashnflation,ncreasen-employmentnd reatehortages-allor he amiliarromisehathingsouldmprovein he uture.oliticaleformsouldlsohaveheirosts.f he artyorfeitstsmonop-oly,he acuumreated ould efilledy ngryublicsndpossiblyy he oviets.fheparty erelyretendedogive ppower,ts lumsyeassertionsfprivilegeouldnvitepublicutcries.inally,t snot sthoughorbachev'sressuresere ll n he irectionofreform.n the nehand, e sdemandingmulation;nthe ther,e s rguinghatEasternuropeo more f ts wn hingBunce,989a).Easternuropeaneaders,herefore,recaughtetweenheproverbialockndhard lace.Major eformsould itherave ocialismrhastents emise. owdid heEasternuropeanset ntouch pickle? hat oesGorbachevanthemo do?WillglasnostndperestroikaaveEasternuroper functionsa preludeorevolution?TheCurseofGeopoliticsTheEasternuropeanrisesf odayanbe seen sthe ndproductfwhat appenstostateswhenhey ave hemisfortunefoccupyingaluableeal state.n traddlingEast nd Westfor enturies,asternurope asbeen ubjectedo constantthnic,religious,conomicndpolitical-militaryressuresSeton-Watson,962;Anderson,

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Reform n the Soviet Union

1974).Thishada numberfconsequencesor hehistoricalevelopmentftheregion.Onewas aggingnd unevenocio-economicevelopment,ighlyypicalf heperiphery.Anotherwas a poorfitbetween tate andnation ndtherefore legacy frecurringethnicensions,order isputesndtesty egime-societyelations. finalffect asthedevelopmentn this rea of "imported" tates.These states and/or mpires)werecaughtn contradiction.norder o fend ffnternationalressures,heyhad to "pre-tend" to be strong-by, ay, centralizingheir ontrol ver economic nd politicalresources,lockinghedevelopmentfcivilociety,ndextractinghat hey ould romtheir omestic nvirons. he result asa successionf op-heavytates,ong n themili-tary, hebureaucracynd shortexcept nCzechoslovakia)n a bourgeoisiend a land-owningeasantry-infertileround,herefore,or hedevelopmentf itherapitalismrliberal emocracy.t was also infertileround orpoliticaltability. ith oreign atronsdriven ytheir wn nterests, ith onflictsaginglong lass nd ethnicines,ndwithstates ivided etween ural nd urbannterests,hese egimesecessarilyeakened ndthereby invited" rowingoreignntervention.ffortso build utonomy,herefore,often ndedup reducingt.E4e'wEa4i0tts e4e',04r4wfrse,,A4 4hte~Be ~rw~sr~ral rJ1~d ~e~e.

Thispatternhould oundfamiliar.he post-WorldWar II "settlement"fEasternEuropewas to continuehis heme fauthoritariantates aught etween nternationalpressures,ntheonehand, nd domestic ressures,ntheother. altawasalsoto con-tinue he ccompanyingubtexttsuch; hats, tates trugglingobestrong,etgenerat-ing ntheprocessmore and moreconstraintsn their utonomy-fromheir oreignpatrons,heir omesticllies, ndeventuallyheir omesticnemies s well.Therewere,however,wodifferencesnthepostwar eriod, ndthesedifferences,when nteractingith egacies ftheregion,ed to thecriseswe see today nEasternEurope.One differenceas international.he SovietUnion unctioneds the oleally ftheEastern uropean egimes,mediatingll their elations ith ach other nd with heoutsideworld ndmonopolizingswell ll heresourceshese tatesneeded o survive-inparticular,ationalecurity,oliticaluthority,nd primaryroductsBunce,1985).The other ifferenceas theSovietdecisiono recreate heStalinistxperiencenEast-ernEurope.While hese tatesusually adauthoritarianovernments,heir apacityocontrol omestic oliticsndto develop heirconomies asalwaysimited.talinizationchangedhis y mplementingtateownershipfthe means fproduction,entral lan-ningndLeninistarty ule. talinism,herefore,xpanded he domesticutonomyfthese tateswhile onstrainingheirnternationalutonomy-afamiliartory.While talinizationt home nddependence n theSovietUnion broadwere ntheshort erm ostabilizeheregionnddevelop ts conomies,heeffectsvertime f hisprocesswerequitedifferent.irst,talinismnthe clienttatesgenerated number feconomic roblems hichwere to deepenover thecourse f thepostwar eriod. t snot ust hat entral lanning,hen ombined ith ne-partyule nd solationromheglobal conomy,s inefficient,nd that uch nefficienciesometo drive conomic er-formancemore ndmore, nce newsources f abor ndcapital redepleted. t salsothat ucheconomies re very ood at resistingecessaryeformsZaslavskaya, 986;Sadikov, 986).Thisresistancesboth conomicndpolitical.heeconomiconstraintsthat hese ystemsresetuptoobscure ll hose ignals,uch s bankruptcy,allingales,decliningrofitsnd inflation,hich nmarket conomies ndicate hatsomethingswrong. hepoliticalonstraintsthat nymeaningfuleform ouldnecessarilyttack he"obvious"privileged-thelannersnd theparty-alongwith he "less obviousprivi-leged"--consumersnd enterpriseirectors enefittingrom ubsidiesCsanadi,1989;Zaslavskaya, 986).The end result s thathorizons,nsucheconomies,re (ironically)234 PS: Political cience& Politics



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EasternEuropeshort-term,nd tinkeringapacities tunted. Big" correctionsecomeas difficults"small"ones. "Thumbs"become s weak as "fingers"Lindblom, 977).

Stalinizationn Eastern urope lsoguaranteedhat conomic riseswouldbe joinedwith oliticalrises. his bunching"henomenonccurs or everal easons. ne isthatwith ocio-economicevelopment,he politicalystem ecomesas inefficients itseconomicounterpartLewin,1988). tructuredo manage simple ocietywith implegoals, he statecan no longermediate mong hosediverse alues nd nterestsharac-teristicf a complexndustrialociety. oliticalecisions,herefore,ecome s fractiousand as cumbersomes economic ecisions. hesociety,ike heeconomy,utgrowstsStalinistbritches."5UA&k4 4*44EA4e444'Wfe*tjlk A 4*ecooiccrise4o Ut4jo4iewi ho&"de4WcUMoreover,he economic ndpoliticalracksn tate ocialismre oined.Theproduc-tion nddistributionfeconomicoods ndservices repolitically-driven-aoliticizationof the economy-and political ower is definedntermsof control ver economicresources-an economization,"fyouwill, fpolitics. he resultsto tieeconomic opoliticalortunes.n hegoodtimes,hismeans conomic rowthndpoliticaltability;nthe bad times, tagnationndinstability.Linkagesetween conomicndpoliticalerformance,fcourse, recommon. his sone byproduct,fter ll,ofKeynesianisms well as Stalinism. hat sunique o statesocialism, owever,s its ackofbuoyancy.he economy annot scape itsdownwardspiral, ecause t sbasedoninefficiencies,ecause tgenerates ewclaimantsnthe ur-plus ust s accumulationapacity eclines,nd because"real" reform ouldrequirevirtualismantlingftheentireystem. t the ametime, here s noexitfrom oliticaldoldrums.heeconomyan no longerourt hepublic,nd othermodesofcourtship-say,genuine oliticalarticipation-wouldreakuptheparty'smonopolyndhence hevery ystemuchreforms ere to save. Economictagnation,nshort, egetspoliticalinstabilityhich egets conomictagnation.hese resystems ery oodatreproducingthemselvesntheshort erm nd,hence,not nthe ong erm.Thusfar, ll that have rgued ouldbe applied otheSovietUnion s well s EasternEurope. ndeed, his xplains hy he crisisn he blocrespects eithertateboundariesnor hosewhicheparate oliticsromconomics.What his oes not ell s,however,swhy hecrisiss more eriousnEasternuropeespeciallyomania,oland ndHungary)2thann heSovietUnion.Afterll, heSoviets avehadmore ime ogenerate hat heywould erm hecontradictionsf tate ocialism,nd whatwewould erm:more ime oscrew hings p.Here,we need tofocus na final actor:hecosts o Eastern urope flivingnthe Soviet hadow.T4 East E4"t4urea aruaiAve wco44bo4A~d~be4.cel o ~4w(~~sY c 4k*sI~tttokc4at~etd ? 4f4~4laio ri ~'4 ($o 041 4eu

Itwouldbe easy o argue hat oviet xploitationfEastern urope xplainshecriseswe see today.The story f intra-blocelations, owever, s morecomplicated.hereasons orgreater egime ulnerabilitynEastern urope re many. heEastern uro-peanregimesrerelative ewcomerso the ocialistold,nd this as efthem ess imeJune1989 235



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Reform nthe Soviet Unionto develop hepoliticalapital o ride uteconomictress. econd, talinizationn hesesystemswas comparativelyrief nd de-Stalinization,herefore,nusuallyraumatic.Third,hese tates itprecariouslyn thefaultine fEurope,ndthis asbeenparticular-ly ignificantor he Central uropeanmembersfthe bloc.Fourth,nyparty laimsolegitimacynEastern urope re severely ompromisedytheprocess f"liberation"duringnd after hewar andby heobvious conomic ndpoliticalependence f heseregimesn theSovietUnion.

G rbachevtasoeay rtsc to cissiE4ste44urope.Finally,nd essobviously,heSovietshave, ronically,eena major estabilizingorcewithinhe regionDawisha,1988).Each time-and the timeshavebeen many-thatMoscow hangesntra-blocolicies,e-defineshebloc'srelationshipo the nternationalsystem,nd/orntervenesn hedomesticffairsf ts llies, astern uropean artiesreweakened-Soviet ntentionso thecontrary. oreover,tcanbe argued hat ovietinfluenceithinhebloc sgreater hen heSoviets on'twant uchnfluencehanwhenthey o.TheSoviets avewantedmore ntra-blocconomicntegrationor ecades,butwith ittleuccess.Bycontrast,heir nfluencen Eastern uropehasbeenconsiderablewhenthe Kremlins turnednwardnd immersednmajor trugglesverpowerandpolicy. henEastern urope ollowsuit,ndmajor pheavalsnsue-as in heGDRandCzechoslovakian 1953,Polandand Hungaryn 1956,Czechoslovakian 1967-68, rPoland nthe 1980s.Withmoredelicate egimesnEastern uropehave come a seriesofpolicieswhichhave, n ffect,peduptheprocess f conomicndpoliticalecline. ne such olicy asbeenthe "social ompact,"whereinheregimerades conomic enefitsor ublicom-pliancePravda, 981;Pakulski,986).Theresultsto perch oliticaltabilityrecariouslyon publicvaluationsf "Whathaveyoudone formelately?" nother asthedecision(encouragedy he oviets)n he arly 970s oopenupEasternuropeanconomiesoWestern rade andcapital. twas thoughtt thetime hat oiningheglobal conomywould olveEastern uropean roblems,conomic ndpolitical.rade with nd loansfrom heWest,manyrguednEastern urope,would nhance heir argainingowerwithinhebloc,boostgrowth,mprove roduct uality,lacate ublicsnd,finally,itheraiddomesticconomic eformsHungary)rsubstituteor hemRomania). he ogicwas

unassailable;heresultsatastrophic,speciallynHungary,omania nd Poland. ucheconomies ouldhardlye expected o manage erywell healways ifficultrocess fintegratingith heglobal conomy. hat heyntegratedith global conomyn risis,ofcourse,madematters arworse.Fo0Goad*4v4rae&L4toCr4s ountrprtnE4444trurop#A, jorIrefoL4.4ea441~t444?j~4.

With conomicusterityamepoliticalonflict ithinheparty,mong heministries,andbetween heministriesndtheenterprises,hepartynd theministries,heregimeandthe ociety.Major oliticalndeconomic eformsecame nabsolute ecessityust sthecapacityo implement,etalone survivehem, lummeted.heball henpassed oGorbachev.236 PS: Political cience& Politics



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Eastern EuropeGorbachev'solutions

Gorbachev as noeasy nswers othecrisisnEastern urope.WhatGorbachev oesknow sthat omethingeeds o be done-andfast-about hebloc.While hebloc snotintegratednoughoachieve rationalivisionf abor,tspoliticalndeconomicntegra-tion ssufficiento makeEastern uropean roblemsovietproblemss well.HowcanGorbachev evive heSoviet conomy,f asternurope ontinueso be a burden? owcan he maintainower nd sellhis eformrogramthome, fneitherheSovietnor heEastern uropean egimesre showingmmediateesultsndifhis pponentsnterpretthe problemsnEastern uropeas one verygood reasonforputtingff r at leastmoderatingorbachev's eforms?ow canGorbachev laim hat hispoliciesmerelyexpose problems ong n themakingan argumente hasused as well at home withrespecto ethnicnrest),f oviet eaders till elieve,sthey idduringheCzechoslovakcrisisf 1968, hat allwe needfor his ighouse o be broughtown round urears sonesmall ncident"quoted nMaximov, 979: 51)?Finally,owcanGorbachevxpandSoviet nfluencebroadby advertisingheappealsofSoviet-styleocialism,fEasternEurope-the est ase,afterll-is in eriousconomic ndpoliticaltraits?llGorbachevneeds, n hort,sa replay fthe Khrushchevxperience, hen risesnEastern uropehelpedundermineoviet reforms-athomeand in the bloc (Reddaway,1988).ForGorbachev s well as forhiscounterpartsnEastern urope, hen,majorreforms asnecessarys it srisky.... t40 *o%Ea ern urop dayW41%UOp0 rath tod 4 (a- t4 (44o oeo4to 1vd&4I.

Hisplans orEastern urope hus ar re premisedn somekey ssumptions.ne isthat hecentral roblemnEastern urope, s in heSovietUnion,seconomic erform-ance. A strongconomysimportantn tselfndas a crucialmechanismorunitingheparty, emobilizinghe society, nd expandinghe attractionsf socialism broad.Second, herewillbe transitionosts,given oth he stress f reformnd thepent-upproblems equeathedbytheBrezhnevra. These,however,mustbe understoodstransitory,ot s groundsor lowinghepaceof reform.hird, astern urope s moredelicate han heSovietUnion. oliticaleforms,herefore, ust roceedmore lowly.Finally,he bloc can never eturno itsonceidealroleas an empiremaximizingovietsecurity,conomic rowthndpoliticaltability.nstead,rade-offs ust e made.Theseconsiderationsave edGorbachev, irst,o prodEastern urope o mimic isdomesticeformackage. his sespeciallyhe ase with especto his conomic eformsand their mphasis n, for nstance, runingackplanning,allingor both full ost-accountingf nterprisesndformarketelationsetween nterprises,ndfinally,reat-ingncentivesbothpositivendnegative)orworkersndmanagersobe more fficientand productive. e has tread muchmore ightlyn such ssues s personnel hange,politicalnstitutionaleformndglasnost. orbachev asalso reformedomecon-thebloc tradeorganization.ere,hehaspushed orgreaterconomicntegrationetweenthe SovietUnion nd Eastern uropeand betweendomestic nd foreignconomicdecision-makingn hebloc, reater loc oordinationfresearchnddevelopment,ndreductionnbureaucracyoupledwithdirect inks etween nterprisescrossnationalboundaries. hird,Gorbachevhas encouraged astern uropeanparticipationntheglobal conomy, utwith loccommitmentsn ffectcomingirst." inally,orbachevhas made tclear hathe wants o reduce hebloc'smilitaryurden,hathewill efrainfrom eavy-handedictateso Eastern urope, ndthathe will oleratewithinimits)June1989 237



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Reformn theSovietUnionmore economicallynd politicallyiverseregionallliancesee, inparticular,Rech'tovarishchaorbacheva,"1987;Bunce,1989a).

CanEasternurope urviven he aceofwhat s triplehreato theirtability;hat s,economic hortfalls,oliticalhortfallsnd,finally,ncreased ressuresrom reform-minded ovietGeneral ecretary? illGorbachev eapnot ust recalcitrantasternEurope,butalsoone indanger fdisintegration?Easternurope's uture

The discussionhus arpointso the trongikelihoodhat heEastern uropeantatesandhence heblocmay erywelldisintegrate.here sfirsthefact hat risesn hebloc"bunch"--notnly crosspoliticalndeconomicrenasbut lsoacross tates. uch sthecost,ofcourse, fcreatingerivativeystems ithin tightly-knitlocdominatedyaratherapriciousegemon.Second, heevents ftoday rereminiscentf he 1956 risisnHungaryndthe 1968crisisnCzechoslovakia.gainwefindoncurrentuccessionrisesn hebloc, conomicdifficultieshicheemto requiremajor eforms,ivisions ithinheSoviet ndEasternEuropean arties, ngrynd mobilized ublics,nd,finallyard-to-readhiftsnSovietpolicies oward he bloc see Mlynar,979).Lestonedoubts heapplicabilityfthefinalpoint o the ituationoday, ote hat:I) Gorbachevsdemandingeform,et egitimat-ing eviance t home ndabroad; 2) Pravda e-publishedn ate1985 he oviet-Czecho-slovak ommuniquenthe nvasionf1968"Vazhnyi oliticheskiiavet,'" 1985),nd 3)GennadiGerasimov, major oviet pokesman,laimedn1987 hat heonly ifferencebetweenGorbachev's eformsndthose nCzechoslovakian1968was"nineteenears(quotedinKaufman,987)7T4h,4ken4ues, as Lsewher44,tE4r maywaystaio440U44ttoAtum6WuwysstatestAoFinally,nmany espectshingsookworse oday han npreviousntra-blocrises. heEastern uropean conomiesre with heexceptionftheGDR) inworseshape.TheSoviets recertainlyesswell-endowedhan hey ncewere, speciallyinceGorbachevspromisingess nterventionthome ndabroad.Moreover,un)civilocietiesrepoppingup everywhere.inally,hebastionsf these ystems-statewnershipfthemeans fproduction,tate ontrolvertheeconomyndone-partyule-arebeinghallengedyprivatizationnthe economy,ointventures,nd expansion fthe politicalpace toinclude opular rontspurportedlyorperestroika),ewpartiesor reinvigoratedldones), ndeven-inHungaryndRomania, ot o mentionheSovietUnion--intra-partycompetitionone public.Indeed, heproblemsnEastern urope oday eem to correspondather ell o thefamiliarist ffactorshoughto be preconditionsorrevolution.nparticular,e find-mostnotablynPoland ndHungary-highlyentralizedtates aught etween omesticandforeignressures,ublics hichreangryndresourceful,ivided lites,nd,finally,not ust ne,but wo nternationally-imposedrises: orbachev nd everehard urrencydebts see Bunce,1989;Skocpol,1979;Jenkins,983;Krejci, 983).But re theprerequisitesorrevolutioneallynplace?The issuehere snotwhetherthese tates reunder xtremetress, or hey learlyre.However,tress sonethingandcollapse nother.ndeed,most heories frevolutiono thecontrary,tresss com-mon,but tatecollapse xceedinglyare.Thequestion efore s,then,swhetherhesestates anhold ndwhetherheir ublics ave heresourcesomount major hallengeo238 PS: Political cience & Politics



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EasternEuropestate uthority. y nswerwhich mayregret,ncethis ppears nprint)sthat hesestateswill urvive,lbeit reatlyhanged.

I argue his or our easons.First, orbachevsplayingis ardsverywell nEasternEurope.Forexample, e is notpushingard npoliticaleforms,e hasestablishedela-tivelybut nly elatively)lear arametersor eforms,ehasmanagedocoopt o somedegree he"professional"issidents,e hasgiven very tate n heregionome ncen-tives o comply,nd he has settled or blocwhichwill ver time ake onmany fthecharacteristics-especiallyolitical-ofn allianceBunce,1989).He isnot, n hort,om-mittingome ofKhrushchev'sistakes-althougharallels o existReddaway, 988).Second,Gorbachev as morepowerthanKhrushchev-atome ndthereforenthebloc Hough,1988).This uggestshat omeofthemostde-stabilizingeaturesfthatearlierttemptt reform illnotbe presentn his o-around.or xample,Khrushchevchanged is unedependingn theupsanddownsof hisdomestic ortunes,nd theseshiftsreatedgreatdivideswithinhe Eastern uropean arties,which nturn reatedspacefor ngry ublicso mobilize. y ontrast,orbachev's ower llows im he uxuryofa relativelyonsistentmessage.Moreover, ismessage s easier butnoteasy)toswallow. hesestates recomingut of he Brezhnevra,not talinization;hesepartiesknow hat omething ajormustbe done; and thosewho lead these states re, likeGorbachev, raduatesfboth he Khrushchevnd the Brezhnevras.Third,hese tates till ave ome resources. hey ain, irst,romovietpower n hebloc and inthelargernternationalystem. ne must emember ere thatwarshaveplayed crucial ole n revolution otonlybecausetheyhave underminedtates ndmobilizedocieties,ut lso because hey aveweakened he apacityf he nternationalsystemocontainrstoprebellionsnprogress.here s nosuchwartoday n heSovietbloc.Forexample, heSovietswould nd couldrespond ecisivelyo turmoilnEasternEurope,whereas he GreatPowers ouldnotdo the ame nRussiawhen heCivilWarbegan n 1918.At the same time, big" states, uch as these,create"big" vested nterests. amreminded ereof a story y Polish riend.n1979 fter hePope'svisit o Poland, utbefore herise fSolidarity,group fPolishournalistsatherednddiscussed hen hecommunistegime ould ollapse.One said:"I hopenot beforemid-1980,ecause 'mlikelyoget napartmenty hen.'Anotheraid: I hopenotbefore ebruaryf1980 rso,because am at thetopof waitingist oget car."Thepower odistributecarcegoods, herefore,sa crucialtate sset, s theEastGermannd Czechoslovakasessug-gest.Andthismaybe particularlyrue-for onsumersndfor nterpriseslike-indif-ficultconomic imessee Csanadi,1989).Finally,t is not clearthatEastern uropean ublics avethe resources o mountstrong hallengeostate uthoritysee Bunce, 988, ntheunique ituationnPoland)-aconditionarticularlyrucialorrevolutionndeveloped tates see Dix, 1983;Skocpol,1984).Forexample, conomic rises an demobilize,s well as antagonize ublics,scitizensespondo theeconomicpeed-up ymoonlightingndthereby uttingwayfora time heironger-termoncernsZupanov,1982). ndeed,heeconomicrisisnPolandhelped aruzelskior time. econd, ne effectf hecrisishus ar ndtheSovietprece-dent fglasnostasbeennotustdivided arties, ut lso dividedocieties. he commonwisdom as beenthatntra-partyivisionsn heblocprovidehe"space" for he xpan-sion fpublic issent. hispresupposes,owever,hat issentsthe amethings revolu-tion ndthat issentersreactingn oncert.n timewhennterestsavediversifiedndin time fboth risis nd economic ndpoliticaliberalization,owever,his s not ikelytobe thecase.Thepoliticalpectrum,s theHungarianndSoviet asesof ate uggest,squitebroad.Societal ivisions eaken heir ollectivempact;ndeed, uchdivisions aybe greater han hosewithinheparty.Andthis s not to mentionheRomanian,astGerman ndBulgarianases,whereunifiedarties acerelativelylacid ublics.Thus, nEastern urope, s elsewhere,here remanyways or tates o stumble,utprecious ewwaysfor tates o fall.There are also manywaysforpublicso becomeJune1989 239



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Reformnthe SovietUnionangry,utpreciousewways or hem omount stronghallengeothe tate.Andbothconditions ust e inplace, f revolutionsto occur.

Whatwewill ee, instead,nmy iew, s much tress ntheroadto reform.utdoesthisnot contradict hatwas argued arlierwith espect o the mpedimentso reform?Here, would rgue-albeitwith ometrepidation-thatinallyhepiecesmaybe inplacefor ignificanteformn heSovietUnionndEastern urope. he crisiss evere nough,theSovietGeneral ecretarytrong nough,ndthe essons fpastreformsearnedwellenough. inally,heres consensushat he tatus uoante s mpossible.ndeed, espitetheir ifferences,his s point n which egorLigachevnd Mikhailorbachev,s well sKaroly rosz nd mre ozsgay,an gree. uch consensussunprecedented,nd tpro-vides strong ase forreform.About heAuthorValerieunces ssociaterofessorn hedepartmentfpoliticalciencet Northwesternni-versity.hehaswrittenoNew eaders ake Difference1981). upportedy grantromheAmericanouncilfLearnedocieties,unces urrentlyritingbook neconomicusterityndpoliticalnstabilitynEasternurope.

Notes'In he iscussion,will efereriodicallyothe ugoslavase. hiss ppropriate,ince ugoslaviasharesmanyfherneighbors'roblems.owever,he ocusf hisnalysisill e onthe ovietbloc tatesndnot nYugoslavia.ence,manyf he eneralizationsrawnhouldot eassumedtoapplyoYugoslavia.2The ecessaryrevityf rticlesnPSpreventsefrommakingmportantistinctionsmongstates-fornstance,hyheGerman emocraticepublic,zechoslovakia,ndBulgariarenotunderreat conomictress,rwhy ublicnrests more ronouncednPoland hann, ay,Romania,espitequallyressingconomicircumstancesseeBunce, 989a).

ReferencesAnderson,erry. 974.LineagesftheAbsolutisttate. ondon:New Left ooks.Bunce,alerie.989a. orthcoming.Soviet eclines a Regionalegemon.orbachevnd ast-ernEurope."EasternuropeanoliticsndSocieties.. 1989b. Why omeRebel ndOthersComply: oland, astern urope nd Theories fRevolution."npublishedanuscript.. 1985. TheEmpiretrikes ack:The EvolutionfEasternurope rom SovietAsset o aSovietLiability."nternationalrganization,9:3-42.Csanadi,Maria. 989. Party-Statenterlockingirectorates:conomicnd Politicalecision-MakingnHungary."npublishedanuscript.Dawisha,Karen.1988.Eastern urope, orbachevndReform:heGreatChallenge.ambridge:Cambridgeniversityress.Dix,Robert.983. TheVarietiesfRevolution."omparativeolitics,:281-294.Hough, erry.988.RussiandtheWest:Gorbachevndthe oliticsfReform.ew York: imonndSchuster.Jenkins,.C. 1983. Resource obilizationheorynd he tudyfSocialMovements."nnualReviewfSociology,:220-246.Kaufman,ichael. 1987. GorbachevlludesoCzech nvasion."ewYorkimes,pril 2.Krejci,aroslav.983.GreatRevolutionsompared:he earch or Theory.ew York: t.Martin's.Lewin,Moshe.1988.TheGorbachevhenomenon:Historicalnterpretation.erkeley: niversityfCaliforniaress.Lindblom,harles. 977. oliticsndMarkets.ewYork: asic ooks.Maximov,ladimir.979. TheRussianeople nd heWest." nG. R.Urban,d.,CommunistReformation.ewYork: t.Martin's.Mylnar,denek. 979. August,968."nG. R.Urban,d.,Communisteformation.ewYork:St.Martin's,p.116-143.240 PS: Political cience& Politics



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The Fall of Soviets