ISLAND DEMOCRACIES UNDER THREAT: TAIWAN, THE SENKAKU, AND THE FALKANDS1

ABSTRACT: These three territories share the following traits: their sovereignty and precise legal status is disputed, they enjoy democratic political systems, China is directly or indirectly a party to the dispute, in case of an outbreak of hostilities sea denial and amphibious capabilities would be crucial, and under those circumstances the countries attacked would all seek the support of the United States.

The purpose of the paper is to employ the comparative approach to describe the situation of the three territories with regard to the aspects mentioned above, not just treating them separately but engaging in a meaningful comparison whenever possible. This is also done between two of them when a certain trait is not to be found in the third, an example being the presence of disputed offshore oil or natural gas.

Each of the issues listed will be treated in a separate section. First, the status of each territory both in international law and in the internal laws of both parties to the territorial dispute will be examined. This will include an examination of the arguments put forward by the claimant to question the status quo. In the case of Japan, the restrictions on travel to the Senkaku will be analyzed, while in that of Taiwan the different legal self-perceptions will be considered.

We shall next examine the impact of democracy in their relations with the claimant, and the relationship between democracy and self-determination. The nature of China's political system and traditional approach to international relations (Tribute System) will also be examined, together with other geopolitical and geoeconomic factors fuelling the disputes.

The last two sections of the paper will seek to analyze two crucial aspects of the struggle over the three territories from a military and political and diplomatic point of view. In all cases, an invading force would have to cross a body of water, and prevent the arrival of reinforcements. Also in the three scenarios, should hostilities break out, Taipei, Tokyo, and London, would all seek US support. This would lead to two key questions, to be addressed in these last two sections: first of all, whether naval reinforcements may safely reach the area or whether anti-ship missiles currently being developed by China (and likely to be transferred to Argentina) could impose a high cost. Second, what Washington's position in a shooting war would be.

The last point would involve a comparative study of the legal and political relations between Washington and Tokyo, Taipei, and London, including an examination of the exact extent of the security agreement with Japan (which is not clear whether it is

1 This paper was written to be presented at the panel on "Geopolitics and Security" of the 9th annual

conference of the European Association of Taiwan Studies, held on 18-21 June 2012 at the University of Southern Denmark, Campus Sonderborg. The author would like to thank the organizers for their kind acceptance of his paper proposal, and all the help, assistance, and encouragement received. He is also in debt with the School of Oriental and African Studies (London University) for the provision of library facilities, and to the University of Kent for the possibility to attend the conference "The Falklands Conflict: thirty years on", University of Kent at Canterbury, 26-28 April 2012, program available at http://www.kent.ac.uk/history/events/documents/Falklands-Conference-Programme.pdf

applicable to the Senkaku), America's commitment to Taiwan, and the special relationship with London (sorely tested although ultimately prevalent following the 1982 Argentine invasion).

INTRODUCTION

Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the Falklands, may seem at first sight, to be three unrelated territories, above all when we consider the distance between the latter and the other two, as well as the many other differences in terms of human geography, political history, and military balance. However, a closer look at these realities quickly prompts the doubt of whether they are so different or whether, after all, they share some traits. When that closer look is followed by a detailed examination, some common characteristics become obvious, as well as some points where although the differences may be clear the comparative approach could shed some light and allow us to better understand the dynamics on these disputed territories.

To begin with, this is their first common characteristic, they are in dispute because two2 different states claim them as part of their territory. This may lead us to survey their legal history, in an attempt to see what international law can tell us about the rightness of otherwise of the arguments put forward by the different claimants. At the same time, however, no matter what the law may say, and it does not always provide clear answers, two key issues are likely to ultimately determine their status, the views of their population (where applicable) and the military balance between their pretenders (in terms not only of hardware and capabilities, but of readiness to resort to force if necessary). Another common characteristic is the powerful presence of Beijing, claiming two of these areas and potentially playing a role in the third. Whereas China does not claim sovereignty over the Falklands, it supports Argentina diplomatically and may supply weapons to Buenos Aires. One of the reasons why the South Atlantic is of interest to China is its natural riches, which brings us to a common characteristic of that area and the Senkaku Islands, namely their existing or suspected energy and other resources. In addition to these economic assets, the three areas are significant in terms of geostrategy, being located at key junctures granting access or control over major sea routes. Finally, linked to all of the above, it is necessary to examine Washingtons posture concerning the three disputes, from her views on sovereignty to the likelyhood of intervention, and the form it would take, should hostilities break out.

All of this is first summarized in the table below, and then discussed in some more depth in the ensuing chapters.

LEGAL STATUS

POPULATION, DEMOCRACY AND

SELF-DETERMINATION

CHINESE POSTURE

MILITARY BALANCE

NATURAL RESOURCE

S

GEOSTRATEGIC VALUE

US POSTURE

TAIWAN

Formally part of China, of the Peoples Republico of China according to Beijing, and of the Republic of China according to

Divided identity and loyalties. Complex relationship between the former and positions on independence and unification due to pragmatism and socioeoconomic differences with China. Self-determination not

The island is seen as a Chinese province, to be ultimately incorporated into the PRC. Mixture of threats and inducements.

Increasingly favourable to Beijing following the 1979 economic reforms, specially in areas such as missiles and naval units.

Small deposits of coal, natural gas, and other minerals.

Very high, being China's door to the open waters of the Pacific. Location also key for Japan, sitting astride essential SLOCs.

Formal recognition switched to PRC, but unofficial trade and other relations with Taiwan in place.

2 Actually three in the case of the Senkaku Islands

the authorities in the island. De facto independent. Recognized by a small number of states. Member of many international organizations, under names such as Chinese Taipei.

formally recognized by Taipei or Beijing, but democratic political regime in the island.

Emphasis on diplomatic isolation and military pressure. Pragmatism as to home rule, with HK often cited as a model.

Weapons supplies and opposition to a settlement of its status by force. Shared democratic system.

FALKLANDS

British Overseas Territory. This basically means self-governing except in defence and foreign affairs. Claimed by Buenos Aires.

Population strongly pro-British and hostile to Argentine pressure and harassment. Mainly of British origin, with Chilean minority also pro-British. Right to self-determination recognized by London, which has placed it at the forefront of the arguments to confront Argentine claims.

Diplomatic support for Buenos Aires. Great interest by officers in studying the lessons of the 1982 War. Potential interest in oil, which could lead to weapons sales to Argentina.

Clearly in favour of the British, due to Argentine failure to modernize forces after 1982. However, a "carrier gap" until at least 2016 must be noted.

Fisheries and oil.

High, due to location near one of the passages between the Pacific and the Atlantic.

Officially neutral concerning the dispute. In 1982 unsuccessfully mediated following invasion, but gradually veered towards political and logistical support for Britain.

SENKAKU

Part of Japanese territory, but citizens not allowed to settle or even visit. Claimed by Beijing.

No population. Japanese MOFA bent on keeping it this way in order to freeze dispute and leave options open. Tokyo governor keen to buy and develop three of the islands.

Claimed as Chinese territory. Regular incidents take place, in the context of a bilateral relationship combining engagement and balancing / containment.

Gradually more favourable to China, although Japan is also developing her own carrier force, shifting her forces to the South-West, and reinforcing relations with third countries.

Fisheries, oil, natural gas.

Very high, being part of the "First Island Chain" separating China from the Pacific. Essential for Japanese security.

Officially neutral concerning ultimate sovereignty. Some ambiguity concerning the inclusion of the islands in the US-Japan security treaty, although finally confirmed.

LEGAL STATUS

International law does not always provide a clear answer as to the rightful ownership over a given territory, and thus the world is plagued by myriad such disputes. What it does is to put forward a set of principles which, subject to a good number of exceptions and differing interpretations, can be employed by claimants to defend their case. Such legal arguments are of course always accompanied by the resort to a wide range of instruments, including force (and its threat), as well as economic pressure, alliances, and soft power, to name some of them. That is, international law is relevant, but not always the determining factor. Furthermore, laying excessive hopes on it may result in emboldening potential aggressors, thus achieving the opposite result to that intended, a lesson from the 1938 Munich Agreement which unfortunately is often forgotten.

Furthermore, whereas original sovereignty often rests on concepts such as occupation, the concept of self-determination, also recognized in international law, can later amend the resulting borders. It is a principle which clashes with others, such as the inviolability of borders or national sovereignty, and therefore its application is often to some degree controversial.

Having said that, a quick historical survey of the three areas we are dealing with shows how both the Senkaku and the Falklands islands were originally uninhabited. The former were formally incorporated by Japan in January 1895, on the understanding that they were not under Chinese or other third country control, and that they were not part of Taiwan and the Pescadores, ceded to Tokyo later that year, under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which entered into force in May3. However, China sees this event as part of the era of submission and humiliation at the hands of foreigners opened in the mid XIX Century and still not fully left behind. More precisely, she considers the Senkaku Islands, which Beijing calls "Diaoyutai,4" to have been part of Taiwan, and thus ceded to Japan in 1895 but later recovered de jure following the Cairo Conference in 1943 and de facto after the Japanese surrender in 1945, despite the KMT regime not having then pressed the issue5. To support this view, they argue that the Japanese originally administered the Islands from Taipei6. Tokyo, on the other hand, puts forward the argument that, as part of Japanese territory, the Senkaku islands were taken over by the US at the end of the war together with Okinawa, and returned to Japanese sovereignty by a treaty signed in 19717. Whereas Beijing says that the islands were long used by her fishermen, Tokyo retorts that it was not until the late 1970s, following evidence of nearby offshore oil deposits, that China showed an interest in them8.

Concerning the Falklands, their history is somehow more complex but at the same time simpler. More complex because the actors involved go beyond Argentina and Britain, including also the US and France, and the Spanish Empire, from which Argentina emerged. Simpler because the time scale is much shorter, actually leading some observers to note that Argentina had not really become a consolidated nation-state by the time that Britain's definitive occupation and administration of the islands began, in the year 18339. Despite this shorter history, the Falklands featured a complex list of sightings, failed settlements, and disputes, including the first recorded landing by the British in 1690, a French settlement in the 1764, its sale to Spain in 1766, a few British expeditions, the Spanish retreat from the islands in 1811 during the Napoleonic Wars, the expelling of some Argentines by a US warship, the USS Lexington, in 1831, an the resulting reoccupation of the islands by Great Britain, continued to this date10. Although history lies at the roots of the dispute, a number of British sources have expressed the difficulty of settling the matter purely by looking at the past11, and the current position

3 "Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands" , Global Security, available at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm 4 Despite this Chinese term, for sake of simplicity the term "Senkaku" is used throughout this paper. The

same policy is followed with regard to the Falklands / Malvinas. 5 "Senkaku / Diaoyutai Islands" , Global Security, available at

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/senkaku.htm 6 Ibidem

7 Ibidem

8 Ibidem

9 "In fact Argentina as a modern dates from 1862 and country maps made in 1833 (the year of the so-

called Falklands 'usurpation') did not even include Patagonia" BICHENO Hugh, Razor's Edge. The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, London, Phoenix, 2007, p. 61. 10

FREEDMAN Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 1-14. 11

In 1985 a House of Commons select committee "declared itself 'unable to reach a categorical conclusion on the legal validity of the claims' of either Britain or Argentina'", while noting that the "'historical argument ... has been rendered less relevant by Argentina's illegal resort to arms.'" FREEDMAN Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 2.

in London is to rather stress the right to self-determination of the local population12. At present, the Falklands are a British Overseas Territory, which roughly means that they govern themselves except in defence and foreign affairs and that they retain their links to the United Kingdom out of their own volition1314. We can also note that their budget is in balance and requires no transfers from the United Kingdom15.

It may also be simpler because, while London and Buenos Aires have different views on past events and their legal interpretation, they both frame the dispute in terms familiar with traditional Western international law, whereas the Senkaku dispute is overshadowed by Beijing's longing for a return to the Tribute System. However, some authors well versed in Argentine politics, culture, and personality, have stressed the huge gulf separating the country from some commonly held notions in English-speaking democracies16.

In a way, perhaps, we could observe a contrast between a young, somewhat artificial nation, trying to assert or even "build" itself, and a millennia old civilization bent on regaining her lost power, and, above all, the lost respect by other countries that she deems inferior. The result, though, is the same, a persistent territorial claim on a neighbouring territory. We can also observe how the passage of time has altered the legal landscape, in the case of the Senkaku it is the fall of the Tribute System and its replacement by contemporary Western international law, whereas in the case of the Falkands we see the emergence of self-determination, much stronger now than it was in the XIX Century.

In the case of Taiwan, the island was populated by a number of ethnic groups, later gradually colonized by the Chinese, and taken over by Japan in 1895 following Tokyo's victory over Beijing that year. In 1945, Japan lost her following her defeat in World War II and it was transferred to the Republic of China, which soon afterwards began evacuating the bulk of her armies and other war-making potential, artistic treasures, gold reserves ... in other words, the core of her government, to the island. What was

12 Over the past few months, Prime Minister David Cameron and other government officials have

repeatedly referred to this in public. For example, on 25 May he said "We will back them, we will support them, we will defend them. We have the Falkland Islands properly defended for a very simple reason - we believe in self-determination, the right of people in the Falkland Islands to determine their future. I think it's important on this, the 30th anniversary, to reaffirm that and to tell people in the Falkland Islands they have our backing, they have our support" "Cameron pays tribute to Falklands conflict dead and reaffirms Islanders right to self determination", Merco Press. South Atlantic News Agency, 25 May 2012, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2012/05/25/cameron-pays-tribute-to-falklands-conflict-dead-and-reaffirms-islanders-right-to-self-determination?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily 13

"Britains Overseas Territories retain their connection with the United Kingdom because it is the wish of their peoples that they do so. They have a substantial measure of responsibility for the conduct of their own affairs.", "Overseas territories and the Commonwealth. What are Britains Overseas Territories?" , British Embassy Washington, available at http://ukinusa.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/faqs/overseas-territories/overseas 14

A point also made clear in the website of the Falkland Islands Government "The Falkland Islands are a United Kingdom Overseas Territory by choice", "Government. Organisation", The Falkland Islands Government, available at http://www.falklands.gov.fk//Government.html 15

One of the surprising conclusions of the Shackleton Report was precisely that the Falklands had been overall net contributors to the British Treasury over the previous few decades. The development of the fisheries industries and the discovery of commercial oil deposits is only reinforcing the islandss fiscal position. 16

See BICHENO Hugh, Razor's Edge. The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, London, Phoenix, 2007, p. 54-67, for a full discussion.

supposed to be a temporary retreat, to be followed by a victorious return to the mainland, became a permanent de facto division, and Taiwan's gradual development and democratization led not only to a large social and economic gap, compounding cultural and ethnic cleavages, but to the emergence of a new actor in the dispute. Alongside the two rival governments, and the world powers, the island's population gained a voice, and a vote, in its future. At the same time, though, the international status of the ROC suffered the gradual decrease in the number of states formally recognizing it, following the normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington, thus narrowing the scope to escape the current straightjacket in its status.

Beijing has never desisted her claims, and only changed tactics when she realized that open threats backfired, moving to a more subtle broadcast of her willingness to resort to force combined with the exercise of her soft power, at a linguistic, cultural, and historical levels, and above all by brandishing her newly gained status as a land of opportunities for business17. At the same time, the Republic of China, while gradually emphasizing her Taiwanese identity18, has retained her formal claim to being the legitimate ruler not only of the island but of the mainland as well. There thus seems to be a consensus, on the international legal plane, between Taipei and Beijing, whereby regardless of its de facto division, the China appearing on official maps is treated as a single juridical entity. This is also mentioned in the Shanghai Communique signed by the US and China.

However, as already mentioned, the liberalization of Taiwan's political system means that this consensus is under threat, since a clear majority could emerge in favour of severing the formal links to the mainland. Even if it never does, the island's population is no longer an object, but a subject, in the conflict.

This may lead to an interesting comparison with the Falklands and the Senkaku, to be addressed in the following section.

POPULATION, DEMOCRACY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION

As already noted, the wishes of the population are in no way the only determinant of the ultimate fate of disputed territories, and this results both from the influence of often more powerful factors such as military realities and also because, while increasingly accepted as a basic principle of international law, self-determination clashes and must compete with other tenets, such as the intangibility of borders or national sovereignty and non-intervention19. It is important to note that the discussion on self-determination often centers on the self, rather than the determination, that is it is not so much a disagreement on whether certain human groups have a right to freely decide their political and legal status but rather on the precise boundaries marking out those groups

17 Which, however, and despite all the publicity and praise for her economic record over the last three

decades, should not blind us to the fact that China is suffering from a number of structural imbalances, which include for example massive hidden private and local government debts, an artificial exchange rate, and a huge state sector kept alive with constant injections of easy money. Historically, China oscillates between unity and disintegration. 18

Clear in all sorts of areas, from the name of some state-owned corporations, to passports, the "tw" Internet domain, or labelling. 19

This has not prevented the gradual increase in the number of independent states over the last few decades.

from others. In other words, a Chinese citizen may well be in favor of the principle of self-determination, while considering that it applies to nations and therefore to China (including Taiwan) but not to a lesser entity making up the former, such as that Island or any other province. How can we decide who is entitled to the right to self-determination? There are basically two approaches, the first being to settle on a given set of characteristics (language, culture, ethnicity, religion ...) necessary for a group to be considered a nation, and the alternative being to rely on the wishes of the population of a given area, regardless of those characteristics20.

In the case of the Senkaku Islands, this is irrelevant since they are not populated. We must note however that some Japanese are in favor of their falklandization, a term meaning their settlement so that the resulting population, wishing to remain Japanese, would prevent their handover to China in an attempt to appease Beijing21. This is precisely what Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara is trying to do, by buying three of the islands from their private owners. For many decades, on the other hand, Japans MOFA has been very strict in preventing not only the settlement of the islands, but even mere visits by Japanese citizens22.

This is an interesting connection with the Falkands, since from the 1960s to 1982 this form of appeasement was precisely the policy followed by its British counterpart. There, the peace in our time bureacrats had a little problem, namely that the islands were already populated, so their strategy was to block any project or funds for development and finally commission a report designed to show that their economy was not viable unless integrated with Argentinas. The report, by Lord Shackleton23, backfired, because the authors deviated from that purpose and found out that the Falklands could not only survive but thrive, if some changes and investments were carried out, a posture vindicated by their later economic success24. The 1982 invasion finally put to rest all the relentless pressure brought to bear by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on the islanders, and led to a dual British decision to set up a proper garrison and to formally recognize and stress their right to self-determination.

It is important to note that in the decades of negotiations with Buenos Aires prior to the invasion, Londons posture was not just to press the islanders but to prod Argentina into seducing them, by offering all sorts of material advantages, from air links to healthcare, and more generally a promise of a much better future for their children.

20 Very broadly, this would correspond to the two notions of citizenship, ethnic and civic, although

definitions of a nation based on factors such as language trascend the former and can well be placed in the latter. 21

Of course, limited territorial concessions usually result in further demands, thus increasing instead of lessening the chances of war, as the European experience in the 1930s shows. However, it is always very tempting, and even politically attractive, to appear to favour peace by adopting a flexible posture before expansionist totalitarian regimes. 22

Tokyo has followed this policy in an attempt not to provoke Beijing and to prevent domestic public opinion and politics from leaving the government with no room for maneuver in its quest for a negotiated solution a solution which however seems as far away as ever. CALVO Alex and OLSEN Olivia, "Senkaku, Daioyu; Falklands, Malvinas", The Tokyo Diplomat, 30 January 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at www.shingetsunewsagency.com. 23

FREEDMAN Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 43. 24

Which is independent of oil discoveries, since production is still some time off, although it is certainly expected to raise living standards and tax revenues even further.

Buenos Aires at first went along with this, the 1971 Communications Agreement25 being the flagship and main fruit of that policy, but soon got tired. Why? The main reason is that when someone believes that something belongs to him, it is difficult to accept to make an effort to convince or seduce that thing. Argentine political culture could simply not accept a need to seduce the Falklanders because it rested on the assumption that the islands where they lived were an integral part of the country, a country not founded on the free joining of a number of disparate territories but rather on some sort of mysthical geography, despite its recent historical origins and often arbitrary borders.

A question we must ask ourselves is whether this is the same approach that the Chinese take towards Taiwan, and the answer is that it is, but only to some extent. To begin with, as already noted, China is an ancient civilization painfully trying to close more than a century not only of division and subjugation but of lack of respect by those it considers its inferiors, be it hairy barbarians or dwarf pirates26, instead of a young political reality trying to consolidate its credentials and internal cohesion. Having said that, both China and Argentina see the object of their desire as lacking any capacity to decide its own future, and the local population as not entitled to a say in that matter. However, whereas Buenos Aires soon got tired of her half-hearted attempts at gaining the trust of the islanders, and decided to resort to force, Beijing has followed a more checkered path. When the island started to move decisively towards democracy, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Chinese openly threatened to use force and even went as far as test-launching missiles over it, however this backfired, with most Taiwanese refusing to be coerced and more than a few otherwise leaning or at least friendly towards China disgusted at Beijings heavy handed tactics. As a result, Chinese leaders chose to be more subtle, not renouncing the use of force but emphasizing instead soft power, both on the cultural and economic fronts.

Are these enticements enough to desactivate Taiwanese temptations to turn the islands de facto sovereignty into a formal declaration of independence? Setting aside the issue of the extent to which her economy is dependent on China and whether this is positive for its future continued development, it is clear that the identity and loyalty of the population is diverse and divided. Whereas in the Falklands it is most rare to find any islander ready to accept stronger links to Argentina, let alone a transfer of sovereignty, attitudes toward China cover a whole spectrum in Taiwan. We have on the one hand those who consider themselves to belong to a Chinese nation, straddling both sides of the Strait, who see Mandarin as the standard form of the Chinese language, with any other variant a mere dialect to be used only at home and gradually extinguished, and whose framework of reference, that is geospatial identity, is a China comprising both the mainland and Taiwan. On the other extreme stand those whose geospatial identity is strictly Taiwanese, who do not consider themselves to be part of a wider Chinese nation27, and who see Chinese as a family of languages, rather than a single language, with Taiwanese the equal of Mandarin28.

25 FREEDMAN Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, London, Routledge, 2005, p.

23. 26

The traditional Chinese way to refer to the Japanese. 27

Of course, there are different concepts of nation, and it is possible for some people to see Greater China as constituting a cultural but not a political nation. Also, as the case of Austria and Germany shows, sharing a same standard language does not necessarily mean sharing a political identity. 28

However, the people holding these views have failed to date to develop a written standard able to challenge the public and formal roles of Mandarin. We also need to note that it may be possible for a

These divided identity is, however, much more complex than may appear at first sight, since we do not observe a clear-cut division into two camps. This is because although one of its main determinants is ethnic origin, this has been impacted by more than half a century of nation-building by the ROC authorities, and also because when it comes to translating identity into practical policy options, views of what is possible or prudent, plus socioeconomic differences with China both play a powerful role. Thus we can find, for example, people who feel Taiwanese but who do not favor formal independence out of fear of a military reaction by Beijing, or because they consider the islands economy to be too dependent on the Chinese market, while there are also those who see themselves as Chinese but deem the political, social, and economic, gulf with the mainland as too wide to allow for unification in the short or even medium term. This diversity of opinions is one of the reasons for the current stand off between unification and independence, which is sometimes described as a consensus and sometimes simply seen as a lowest common denominator among the different political factions.

Right now, those favoring unification with Beijing seem to be concentrating on increasing the already high level of economic exchanges, promoting for example Chinese tourism in Taiwan, which until recently was almost non existant, while making sure that the islands Armed Forces fall behind the PRCs and gradually lose their ability to oppose a blockade or invasion. It must be noted, however, that growing contacts between the people on both sides of the Strait could result in two very different outcomes. On the one hand, they may bring the two populations closer, reinforcing the perception of a common culture, interests, and ultimately nationality. They could also, however, by exposing the differences in for example the political culture on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, bring the contrast into focus and reinforce, rather than lessen, the views that there are two very different realities at play. Although the starting point was different, since as we have already said no islanders identified with Argentina, the case of the Falkands may be a reminder of this second possibility, since the 1971 Communications Agreement, rather than bringing the islands and Argentina closer, rather had the opposite effect, increasing the suspicions long held by the islanders29.

In the case of the Falklands, differences in culture and language and all sorts of values and practical aspects of daily life were compounded by the nature of the Argentine regime, devoted to a dirty war against her own population30. In Taiwan, the repressive nature of the Chinese regime may also contribute to the opposition to the islands takeover by Beijing. In some cases, this may reinforce an existing hostility to the idea based on a feeling of a separate national identity. In others, among those who consider themselves to be Chinese, it may give pause for thought and cool down any enthusiasm for a quick unification. Of course, the experience of Hong Kong under Chinese rule may

nation to emerge without necessarily developing its own linguistic standard, as would be the case of both the United States and the Latin American Spanish and Portuguese colonies. We also find cases of nations adopting another language but retaining a strong sense of a separate identity, which may rest on other factors, such as religion or ethnicity, as could be the case of Ireland. 29

"The 'hearts and minds' campaign had as its main vehicle the 1971 Communications Agreement, but the increased contacts between the Islands and the mainland produced more irritation than amity. Whatever the theory behind the idea that more regular and intense communication might improve mutual respect and understanding, in practice it often reinforced stereotypes" FREEDMAN Lawrence, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 23. 30

A matter conveniently overlooked by the FCO officials bent on pushing the Falklands on to the arms of Buenos Aires.

have a role here, since the one country, two systems formula was expressly designed not only to serve the former British colony but to provide a blueprint for a future Taiwan under Beijing. Fears of fuelling pro-independence sentiments in Taiwan may constitute to a certain degree a brake on Beijings posture when faced with dissent and opposition in Hong Kong.

At the end of the day, it is difficult for a democratic country not to recognize self-determination, specially when the self is the population it de facto controls. That is, whereas many states in the world may not recognize this right to its minorities, the case of the Republic of China is one where it does not recognize it onto itself, or at least onto the self which for practical purposes has constituted the ROC since 1949. Is this situation sustainable? Probably not, although this does not mean that the island must inevitably move towards independence, since her population is divided on the matter, but with the passage of time and the consolidation of the democratic system, those favoring unification with Beijing may be forced to increasingly rely on the carrot of economic integration and the stick of fear of military action, without openly challenging the right of the people to decide their own future.

CHINESE POSTURE

Summaritzing what we have already said, Beijing claims the Senkaku Islands on the basis that they were taken over by Japan at the time of her annexation of Taiwan, and that this was reversed de iure at the Cairo Conference and de facto following Tokyos defeat in the Second World War, although the ROC authorities may have failed to act at that stage. This has led, in recent years, not only to diplomatic pressure but to a continued string of incidents, which for example in September 2010 led Beijing to impose an embargo on rare earths exports to Japan31.

What are the aims of such incidents? On the one hand they may serve as a reminder of Beijings territorial claims, and a propaganda tool directed at Japan, her own domestic public opinion, and the wider world. At the same time, they may also constitute a test of Japanese capabilities and morale32, in that never ending game which features so preeminently in international relations, with countries constantly checking how far they can go, how much others will tolerate without responding in kind. Of course, the regime must at the same time be careful not to be overtaken by private initiatives and appear soft before its own domestic public opinion33, in a difficult balancing act. Buenos Aires

31 Ultimately self-defeating, since it only raised the awareness of the need to find alternative suppliers

and develop new technologies and boost recycling. Beijing wasted a weapon, getting nothing in return, other than the satisfaction of seeing the Japanese release the captain of the fishing boat which caused the accident. CALVO Alex, Rare Earths: Chinas Weapon Too Soon, PanOrient News, 1 October 2010, available at http://www.panorientnews.com/en/news.php?k=468 . For an examination of the renewed emphasis by Japan on cooperation with Central Asian countries, see CALVO Alex, Japan returns to Central Asia in search of rare earths, Shingetsu Electronic Journal of Japanese-Islamic Relations, March 2011, Shingetsu Institute for the Study of Japanese-Islamic Relations, available at http://shingetsublog.jugem.jp/ . 32

As the fall of France in 1940 illustrates, it is not only the bigger army which prevails, since weapons and military units are useless without the political will to employ them, a will which must go beyond the goverment and permeate the whole society. 33

"Peron himself would never have been so foolish as to invade the islands. A territorial claim is politically useful as something to be trotted out at need to distract the masses from whatever may be exercising them. The downside is that it creates a an issue others will exploit to question the Nationalist

also seems to be tempted to engage in a low-intensity harassment campaign, designed to attract attention while avoiding a full scale blowback. Recent examples are the attempted unathorized landing by two kayakers34 and the clandestine filming of an olympic video35.

Concerning China and the Falklands, Beijing may be interested in gaining control over her oil resources, and therefore reaching a deal with Buenos Aires whereby diplomatic support and weapons would be provided in exchange for those deposits. We must note that China holds a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council, and would therefore be able to veto any resolution condemning Argentine aggression. Although this should not be an obstacle for a successful defence of the islands, it may complicate the search for international support and provide an excuse for people reluctant to use force to defend democracy, who often cite as a pretext the lack of UN legal cover. In addition, the kind of anti-access weapons systems currently being stressed by Beijing would be most useful in the event of a successful Argentine invasion, specially before the carrier gap is closed. This is a big if, though, since the current garrison has considerable capabilities, but one should never place too much reliance on fixed defences36.

Finally, concerning Taiwan, the lowering of tensions over the last few years and Beijings renewed emphasis on soft power should not blind us to the fact that China has not ruled out the use of force and is fast increasing her military might across the Strait. If Beijing has not forced the islands finlandization and ultimately Anschluss is simply because the regional security architecture, and above all the mighty presence of US forces in the area, has prevented her from enjoying a free hand. The situation, however, cannot be truly described as peace. This is something we could also say about the Senkaku and the Falklands.

MILITARY BALANCE

Here, the situation in the Falklands on the one hand, and in the Senkakus and Taiwan on the other, is quite different.

In the South Atlantic, Buenos Aires has failed not only to modernize her military forces but even to replace, 30 years later, some of the losses suffered in 1982. At the same time, while the UK has cut down some units and capabilities under successive defence reviews, her Armed Forces remain a formidable machine, with first-rate equipment,

credentials of whoever is refraining from recovering the lost lands" BICHENO Hugh, Razor's Edge. The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, London, Phoenix, 2007, p. 64. 34

"A Malvinas war veteran dies in an attempt to cross to the Falklands in a kayak", Merco Press. South Atlantic News Agency, 31 December 2011, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2011/12/31/a-malvinas-war-veteran-dies-in-an-attempt-to-cross-to-the-falklands-in-a-kayak. 35

Particularly offensive since some scenes were filmed at a war memorial. 36

Fixed fortifications are a monument to the stupidity of man, General George S. Patton Jr., available at http://www.generalpatton.com/quotes.html . It is also due to the fact that the Italians and Germans spent tremendous efforts in time, labor, and money, building defensive positions. I am sure that, just as in the case of the Walls of Troy and the Roman walls across Europe, the fact that they trusted to defensive positions reduced their power to fight. Had they spend one-third as much effort in fighting as they did in building, we never could have taken the positions, PATTON JR, George S., War as I knew it, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947, p. 57-58.

superb training, highly proffesional standards, and plenty of operational experience in all sorts of theaters and missions. A dark spot, however, is the failure to build the new Elizabeth II class carriers in time to replace the Invincible class before the latters withdrawal from service. The resulting carrier gap,37 to be closed no earlier than 2016, means that it would be very difficult to reconquer the islands should they fall for a second time, although the forces permanently deployed there mean that it would be difficult for this to happen with the current Argentine order of battle and absent any third party intervention.

On the other hand, in East Asia it is the continental power, the PRC, which has made great strides in her Armed Forces over the last three decades. The opening up decided in 1979 has allowed China to devote much more funds to the military, while her economic model based on manufacturing exports and her thirst for oil and other commodities has provided a rationale for the building of a blue water navy and political support for its proponents38. At the same time, the settling of the border disputes with the post-Soviet states39 and a better relation with Moscow40 has allowed Beijing to concentrate on her maritime front41.

These trade and energy security factors should not disguise the fact, however, that the Taiwans finlandization or Anchsluss remains a major policy objective, and one requiring a powerful navy and air force, also needed in order to apply pressure on the Senkaku Islands. There is therefore a confluence of goals resulting in a major naval buildup, which is accompanied by a strong emphasis on the development of access-denial weapons systems. Most spectacular among them, and a major cause of concern for naval analysts, is the Dong Feng 21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM)42.

37 The Battle of the Coral Sea, in 1942, is a good example of the difficulties faced by an amphibious

assault force to operate without direct embarked aviation support. Concerning the problems faced by warhips operating without carrier cover, the classical example is the sinking, in the opening days of the Second World War in the Pacific, of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse in the South China Sea. "A carrier should have accompanied them, but casualties among those in home waters and the need to keep the only other uncommitted carrier to watch the German battleship Tirpitz in its Norwegian fiord meant that they had to sail unescorted. ... The Japanese landing troops had already occupied the airfield from which the two capital ships have been afforded fighter cover" KEEGAN John, The Second World War, London, Arrow Books, 1990, p. 256. 38

There is a clear strategic shift under way in China on force planning. Historically a major land power, China is now putting the accent on building long-range maritime power to help underpin geopolitical interests, including winning new allies and safeguarding its energy and economic investments in distant lands. CHELALA Cesar, China plays maritime chess, The Japan Times, 22-01-2009, disponible en http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20090122cc.html . 39

One of the principles behind the setting up of the SCO. Note though the strong mistrust of Chinese intentions in Central Asia, where moves to acquire agricultural land and deals such as that with Tajikistan, whereby the latter ceded some disputed territory, are fuelling these preventions. 40

Not as good as the official story goes, though. Despite the lack of border incidents over the last few decades, Moscow is aware of Chinese designs on Siberia and this is one of the main reasons both for the post 2008 military reforms and for the continued opposition to cuts in her tactical nuclear arsenals. The latter aret the only way for Russia to confront a Chinese invasion while the former are underway. 41

Note the similarities with Japanese policy in the 1930s. China is aware that she cannot trust Russia to remain passive in areas such as the Korean Peninsula, where there is a strong rationale for an accomodation between Moscow on the one hand and Seoul and Tokyo on the other. 42

ERICKSON Andrew S., "Chinas Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches Equivalent of Initial Operational Capability (IOC)Where Its Going and What it Means", Blog of Andrew S. Erickson. China analyses from original sources, 12 July 2011, available at http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/07/china%E2%80%99s-anti-ship-ballistic-missile-asbm-reaches-equivalent-of-%E2%80%9Cinitial-operational-capability%E2%80%9D-ioc%E2%80%94where-

However, this trend is being matched by two significant developments. First of all, the continued normalization of Japan as a military power43, meaning the gradual adoption of the traditional elements of state power in the defence and security arenas. Among other key changes, this is resulting in an increasingly robust posture, in particular among the younger Japanese, and in the building of a carrier force, consisting of three Hyuga-class helicopter destroyers, which may be converted in the future to be able to operate VTOL planes. Japan is also gradually shifting her forces from the North, facing Russia, to the South-West, facing China44, and is a major US partner in the development of a missile shield45. Although Taiwan is not a formal partner in the global US-led anti-missile alliance, its naval nature means that it could be easily deployed during a crisis, putting a dent on Beijings sizeable missile arsenal across the Strait. The possibility that Taiwan may end up joining this allied shield sends shivers through Chinese defence planners.

Second, we have Americas Pivot to the Pacific, announced by President Obama in December last year, which may mean the closing down of a window of opportunity for Beijing, during which China had a freer hand in the face of US commitments in the Middle East and Central Asia. Although such commitments will remain paramount, the number of troops deployed in the latter theatre is already being cut, while the latest round of defense cuts is sparing the Navy and the Pacific theater. It must be noted that Beijing has to a large extent wasted this window of opportunity since, although building up her forces in recent years, she has been unable to articulate an alternative regional security architecture. Rather the contrary, her aggressive posture has pushed her neighbours to rearm46, coordinate among themselves47, and demand more attention to the region from Washington.

it%E2%80%99s-going-and-what-it-means/ . This author regularly follows developments in this area, and other Chinese naval issues, and his articles quote extensive sources most useful for researchers. 43

For a wide ranging study of Japan's "normalization" see HUGUES Christopher W., Japans Re-emergence as a Normal Military Power, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, Volume 44, No 368-369, 2004, and HUGUES Christopher, Japans Remilitarisation, Adelphi Papers, Issue 403, London, Routledge, 2009. 44

CALVO Alex, "The Axes of Japan's Territorial Disputes", The Tokyo Diplomat, 20 February 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at www.shingetsunewsagency.com. 45

As made repeatedly clear by many speakers at the "RUSI Missile Defence Conference 2012", Royal United Services Institute (London), 30-31 May 2012, program available at http://www.rusi.org/missiledefence/programme2012 . Concerning the possibility that Japanese advances in this field may be shared with NATO, it was already being touted by a number of observers prior to the recent relaxation of weapons exports guidelines. See, for example, CALVO Alex, A Call for Japanese Defense Industry Cooperation with the EU, Shingetsu News Agency Newsletter, 12 May 2011, Shingetsu News Agency, available at http://shingetsublog.jugem.jp/ . With regard to the recent deployment of Aegis ships and PAC-3 interceptors, in response to the latest North Korean missile test, see CALVO Alex, "Anti-Missile Deployment and the Senkaku-Daioyu Islands", The Tokyo Diplomat, 23 April 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at www.shingetsunewsagency.com. 46

Note for example the purchase of Russian submarines by Vietnam. In 2010, Hanoi was the top customer of the Russian weapons industry. The country is also increasing her links with Japan. CALVO Alex, The Expert Eye: Alex Calvo on Asia's Odd Couple, The Tokyo Diplomat, 31 October 2011, Shingetsu News Agency, available at http://shingetsublog.jugem.jp/ . 47

CALVO Alex, "Is Pacific Trilateralism Heading toward Quadrilateralism?", Shingetsu News Agency News, 09 January 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at http://www.shingetsunewsagency.com/SNA/SNA_News/Entries/2012/1/9_Is_Pacific_Trilateralism_Heading_toward_Quadrilateralism.html.

Thus, while the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has changed in favor of China over the last three decades, it has not done so decisively. In particular, as long as she held firm politically48, the island should be able to resist an onslaught if supported by the US and Japan.

NATURAL RESOURCES

As already noted, none of these three territorial conflicts has its roots in competition for natural resources. However, both the Falkland and the Senkaku Islands have turned out to hold sizeable energy resources, and this is fuelling the disputes.

Japan affirms that it was not until, in the late 1970s, the likely presence of offshore natural gas became clear, that Beijing formally claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, whereas Buenos Aires complains bitterly about the development of oil deposits near the Falklands, something which could be raising Chinas interest in the region.

Taiwan, on the other hand, is not home to significant natural resources.

GEOSTRATEGIC VALUE

The same cannot be said about the islands geostrategic value, which is very significant, since it sits astride Chinas coastal waters and the Pacific Ocean, on the one hand, and Japan and the South China sea on the other. Thus, it is a crossroads and a potential blocking point in both axes, east-west and north-south49.

Taiwan is essential for China not only because Chinese nationalism feels the country is incomplete without it and considers it to be the last remnant of its subjugation at the hands of foreign powers50, but also because Beijing sees herself enclosed, boxed in, by

48 As always, navies and armies are useless without the iron will to fight hard for victory. The Argentine

Junta was convinced that Great Britain would not fight, and this strategic miscalculation was the ultimate spark that ignated the 1982 War. They ignored both Britain's traditional fortitude when pushed against the wall, clear in the summer of 1940, and the Prime Minister's strength and leadership. "But when you are at war you cannot allow the difficulties to dominate your thinking: you have to set out with an iron will to overcome them. And anyway what was the alternative? That a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queens subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister." THATCHER Margaret, Thatchers War: The Iron Lady on the Falklands, London, Harper Press, 2012, p. 16. 49

For which reason the US Navy proposed a landing there, thus cutting off Japan from her conquests in Indochina. At the end of the day, MacArthurs alternative proposal to liberate the Philippines was approved, and Formosa remained in Japanese hands until the end of the Second World War, but despite his deep political commitment to the Philippines he was the first to recognize Taiwan's key location. "Chief among them was Formosa, which he described as an 'unsinkable carrier-tender.' He said: 'The Geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center' of America's strategic dispositions in the Pacific" MANCHESTER William, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, New York, Dell Publishing, 1978, p. 676. 50

At least publicly, in private we should add the territories ceded and later taken over by Russia, despite the formal agreements reached following the fall of the Soviet Union. This is the essence of the Soviet-Chinese dispute: the Russians argue that the vast region was taken from them unfairly during Sophias regency and that, as Izvestia put it in 1972, this provided the grounds for Russian diplomacy in the mid-nineteenth century to review the treaty by peaceful means and to establish the final Russian-Chinese

hostile neighbours hosting US forces, preventing her access to the open waters of the Pacific. Thus, annexing Taiwan51 would open the door to direct access to those waters, and from a more offensive-minded point of view would facilitate cutting off Japan from South-East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa52.

Something similar could be said about the Senkaku, which are also part of the chain of islands limiting Chinese options. Furthermore, they sit between Japan and Taiwan, and therefore they could consitute a preliminary objective in a campaign designed to isolate the latter, should China suspect that Tokyo may support Taipei.

With regard to the Falkland Islands, the South Atlantic does not have the same geopolitical significance that East-Asia has. However, they are nevertheless also close to some important shipping lanes and, furthermore, they are a gateway to Antartica.

US POSTURE

Finally, it is necessary to consider and compare what Washingtons posture is and how the US may react to a crisis.

In all three cases, the American posture seems at first sight to be detached from the territorial dispute, avoiding a direct confrontation with China and Argentina. In the Falklands, the last few months have been witness to repeated statements of neutrality by US officials53. The Senkakus also seemed to suffer a similar policy, until Tokyo forced Washington to make it clear that they were also covered by the US-Japan security treaty. However, what the US did was to state that they were part of Japanese territory for the purposes of that treaty, while not taking sides as to the underlying territorial dispute. Concerning Taiwan, the US rapproachment with China under Nixon, later followed by successive administrations, involved recognizing the PRC and formally stating, in the 1972 Shanghai Communique, that The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on

border in the Far East. In reply, the Chinese argue that the Treaty of Nerchinsk was the legitimate treaty and that the Russians simply stole the territory from them in the nineteenth century. Today, the territory is Russian. But on Chinese maps it is Chinese MASSIE Robert K., Peter the Great. His Life and World, New York, Ballantine Books, 1980, p. 88. 51

Not necessarily in the strict sense of the word, finlandizing it may suffice for Beijings purposes. 52

Japan is aware of this vulnerability and this is one of the rationales for increased reliance on energy imports from Russia. For the case of coal, see CALVO Alex, "Prospects and Obstacles for Increased Russian Coal Sales to Japan", TESS Working Papers, 5 May 2012, The Eurasia Studies Society (TESS), available at http://eurasiasociety.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/japan-russia-coal-_calvo_.pdf . For a broader view of the reasons to expect a deeper relationship see CALVO Alex, "Incentives for a Tokyo-Moscow Rapprochement", The Tokyo Diplomat, 19 March 2012, Shingetsu News Agency, available at www.shingetsunewsagency.com. 53

See, for example "US confirms neutral position in Falklands dispute; hopes for cooperation on practical issues", Merco Press. South Atlantic News Agency, 17 March 2012, available at http://en.mercopress.com/2012/03/17/us-confirms-neutral-position-in-falklands-dispute-hopes-for-cooperation-on-practical-issues?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily. For criticism of this posture see CORUM James "American neutrality on the Falklands is a symptom of US foreign policy drift", The Telegraph, 26 February 2010, available at http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/jamescorum/100027451/american-neutrality-on-the-falklands-is-a-symptom-of-us-foreign-policy-drift/ , and GARDINER Nile "President Obamas Refusal to Back Britain on the Falklands is a Disgrace", The Foundry, The Heritage Network, 25 February 2010, available at http://blog.heritage.org/2010/02/25/president-obama%E2%80%99s-refusal-to-back-britain-on-falklands-is-disgrace/ .

either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. while reaffirming "its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves"54. That is the US agreed to consider China and Taiwan to be a single entity, while refusing to condone the Anschluss or finlandization of the island. In order to prevent any of these two outcomes, Washington kept providing limited military support, in the forme of weapons sales, a nearby regional presence, and emergency naval deployments in the Strait.

Although this policy towards Taiwan has survived all sorts of crises and the coming into power of successive administrations, there may be reasons to doubt that it may go on for ever. Among other factors, Taiwans democratization opens the door to a denial of the Shanghai Communiques emphasis on the willingness on both sides of the Strait to be united one day, while Japans normalization implies growing concern in Tokyo over the possibility of a hostile Formosa, objectively speaking a major threat to Japanese national security. If Beijing sees the dream of unification slip away, it may resort to a much more forceful posture, forcing Washington to clarify her stand. We can note how, while many Taiwanese are friendly towards Japan and see her as a potential ally against Chinese expansionism, Chinese nationalists in the Island are wary of potential attempts by Tokyo to freeze the existing de facto division of China and Taiwan55.

In addition to this ambiguity, a common thread is that in all three cases, maritime democracies would seek strong American support in the event of a crisis. This is what the UK did in 1982, the resulting political and logistical support being one of the keys to her victory, and it is exactly the same thing that Taipei and Tokyo would do in similar circumstances. In the case of Japan it may be facilitated by the long-existing deep

54 " J O I N T C O M M U N I Q U O F T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A A N D

T H E P E O P L E S R E P U B L I C O F C H I N A ( S H A N G H A I C O M M U N I Q U , F E B R U A R Y 2 8 , 1 9 7 2 )", available at http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/china/shanghai_communique.pdf 55

Earlier this month, Masaki Saito, Japan's top envoy to Taiwan, resigned as director of the Interchange Association, Tokyo's de facto embassy in Taipei. Saito stepped down after he angered the Ma administration in May by referring to Taiwan's international status as "unresolved." Ma blocked Saito from contacting him, the prime minister or the foreign minister, effectively making his job in Taiwan impossible. "The way President Ma treated Ambassador Saito in such an unfriendly manner will definitely reinforce the image that he is a Chinese nationalist," Jaushieh Joseph Wu, research fellow at the Institute of International Relations in the National Chengchi University in Taipei, said earlier this month. Wu used to serve in the previous Democratic Progressive Party government. Kuo Chen-lung, former deputy editor-in-chief of the China Times, a national daily in Taiwan, agreed that the government's response to Saito was "disproportional." "It was very rude for a foreign representative to comment or even take a stand on domestic issues," he said, but added that Saito had only taken the same stance as the proindependence opposition party. Saito's resignation is the latest incident that has threatened to sour Japan-Taiwan relations. Shortly after Ma took office last year, Taiwan's then prime minister, Liu Chao-shiuan, threatened war with Japan over a collision between Taiwanese and Japanese vessels in disputed waters. Meanwhile, territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea continue to be claimed by Taiwan, Japan and China. According to Wu, Ma displays a streak of anti-Japan nationalism that runs counter to the feelings of many Taiwanese, who see Japan as an ally against China. "When the DPP was in power, Taiwan was described by some Japanese politicians as the only Japan-friendly country in East Asia," Wu said. KATO Mariko, Will Warmer Ties Burn Taiwan?, The Japan Times, 30-12-2009, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/mail/nn20091230f1.html .

defence relationship, which allowed then Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger to immediately provide support to the UK56.

CONCLUSIONS

We may say that nothing in the history of these three disputed territories provides a clear exit to the current territorial dispute. Rather, it is the interplay between public opinion and the military balance that will ultimately seal their fate. Public opinion means that of their population (in the case of the Senkaku Islands should they finally be settled), the metropolis where applicable, the claimant, and the potential allies.

Neither China nor Argentina seem likely, in the foreseeable future, to renounce their claims or even to agree to pursue them by peaceful and diplomatic means only, and therefore this is not a key variable. It must be stressed that in both cases this is not a matter of certain political leaders or even forms of government, but rather something deriving from the culture of both countries, whose self-image is based on the domination or at least control over neighbouring territories, be it to return to the "Tribute System" or to consolidate a still very young nation lacking many of the features necessary to survive.

This leaves at the forefront of the dispute local public opinion, solidly pro-British in the Falklands, divided in Taiwan, non-existent in the Senkaku, where Japanese politicians and bureaucrats trying to appease Beijing have been careful not to allow their settlement, in a policy harshly contested by Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara.

It also leaves at the forefront the local military balance and the potential alliances in case of a shooting war. In the Falklands the British retain a decisive military edge, despite a worrying carrier gap until at least 2016, whereas the Senkaku and Taiwan labour under the looming threat of a fast-modernizing Chinese military, and in particular its blue water navy and growing array of missiles and access-denial weapon systems. However, Japan is also modernizing her military, building a force of helicopter carriers (potentially able to embark VTOL aircraft), and gradually moving back to being a "normal power". Taiwan also retains a formidable military might, but suffers from a failure to update some key systems, for a number of reasons including political divisions concerning China, and may need to adapt her doctrines as a response to the new balance across the Strait. Although many observers have paid much attention to Beijing's development of a blue water navy, and in particular her first carrier, others are more concerned about her access denial capabilities, which may perhaps some day be exported to Argentina.

A rationale for such move would be the sizeable oil deposits found near the islands. Although none of the three disputes originally concern natural resources, this factor is currently fuelling the struggle over both the Senkaku and the Falkland Islands. On the other hand, a common characteristic of the three territories is their key strategic location, which although not necessarily the only or main reason for the dispute, is likely to

56 "The result was such a close working defence relationship that in 1982 Defence Secretary Caspar

Weinberger did not feel it necessary to obtain formal presidential approval before authorizing full support for the British" BICHENO Hugh, Razor's Edge. The Unofficial History of the Falklands War, London, Phoenix, 2007, p. 80.

feature in all calculations, not only by the actors directly involved but by third parties allied to them or which may potentially enter the fray anyway.

Although not the only such party, Washington stands out, for reason of her might and clear interests in East Asia, in any such analysis. It is extremely doubtful that the US could afford to let Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands be taken by force by Beijing, or even just "finlandized." This does not mean that America is necessarily going to choose a course of confrontation with Beijing, and for example support Taiwanese moves towards formal independence, but if an armed clash or a blockade takes place, it is difficult to envision the US not supporting her allies, for the price to be paid would be an unravelling of her standing in the region and ultimately of her status as the only truly global power. Key tenets such as the reliance by Japan on extended deterrence (the "nuclear umbrella") and her corresponding renunciation to the bomb, would be at risk. This provides another link with the Falklands, where US movements are being carefully watched by Tokyo. Should the US fail to decisively support Great Britain in the event of a second Argentine invasion or lesser armed action, it would be difficult for the Japanese defending the status quo to resist the voices pushing for an independent nuclear deterrent.

Alex Calvo is a Professor of International Relations and International Law, and head of the International Relations Department, at European University in Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain)