Argentine Aircraft in the Falklands

8/3/2019 Argentine Aircraft in the Falklands

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By

Diego Zampini

The web masters of Britain's Small Wars have always been interested in publishing accounts from the 'Other Side',

as we think it is important to show both sides of the story. Therefore we would like to thank Mr. Diego Zampini, the

author of this page, for kindly allowing us to publish his work. We'd like to point out that we, the web masters, do

not agree with Mr. Zampini's account of the attack against HMS Invincible.

Note: This article mainly contains the Argentine version of the war. The British version will be mentioned, but I will

consider the Argentine assertions as the truth. This article is also devoted to all the personnel from the Argentine

Navy that fought and worked hard during the Malvinas/Falklands conflict in 1982. - Diego Zampini.

In September 1980, fif ty pilots and technician personnel of the 2ª Escuadrilla Aeronaval de Caza y Ataque (2nd Air

Naval Fighter and Strike Squadron) of the CANA (Comando de Aviación Naval Argentina, Argentine Naval Aviation

Command) arrived at Rochefort Naval Base, in France. Among the group of pilots were the unit's commander,

Frigate Captain Jorge Colombo, and sub-commander, Corvette Captain Augusto Bedacarratz. The rest of the pilots

were: Corvette Captains Roberto Agotegaray, Roberto Curilovic and Alejandro Francisco, and Warship Lieutenants

Luis Collavino, Julio Barrraza, Juan Rodriguez Mariani, Armando Mayora and Carlos Machetanz. All the pilots had

hundreds of hours flying A-4Q Skyhawks (the main type of combat plane used by the CANA by that time).

After three months of French language teaching, they were sent to Landivisiau Air Naval Base, where they flew

training sorties in Morane Saulnier planes during 30 days and then began to know their future combat tool - the

AMD-BA (Avions Marcel Dassault - Breguet Aviation) Super Etendard. Later, the Argentine pilots started to learn the

basic flight lessons in the Super Etendard (a maximum of 50 hours of flight by each pilot) and basic notions about

the weapon systems, especially the anti-ship missile AM.39 Exocet. The technical specifications of them are:

AMD-BA Super Etendard:

Engine: turbojet SNECMA Atar 8K-50 with a throtle of 5.000

kilograms.

Top speed at sea level: 1200 km/h.

Ceiling: 13,700 mts.

Range flying at sea level: 720 kms.

Weapons: two 30 mm cannons, and 2,270 kgs of weapons load

(including bombs, air-to-air R.550 Magic missiles and anti-ship

AM.39 Exocet missiles).

entine Aircraft in the Falklands http://www.britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/Exocet.html

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AM.39 Exocet

Type: airborne "fire and forget" anti-ship missile.

Lenght: 5.20 meters.

Diameter: 35 centimeters.

Wingspan: 1 meter.

Weight: 655 kgs.

Range: 70 kms (35 miles) Cruise speed: 1100 km/h (Mach 0.9)

Left: The Exocet family. The SM.39 is the submarine launched version,

while both the MM.38 and MM.40 are the ship-to-ship versions. Thelast member of the family is the AM.39; the air-to-ship version. This

was the type of missile used by the Argentine 2nd Air Naval Squadron.

To attack a ship with the AM.39 version is a work of two stages: f irst, the missile is guided by the plane's fire control

system, which gives to the missile the target's coordinates and these coordinates are obtained by the plane's radar.

When the missile is launched, it dives to an altitude of 30 meters, which is later fixed at only 2.5 meters by the

missile's radio altimeter. In the few f inal seconds of f light, the missile activates its own radar and searches for the

target. If it finds any, the missile locks on to it and guides itself to the impact point.

The Argentine pilots and technicians returned to Comandante Espora Air Naval Base (Buenos Aires Province,

Argentina) in July 1981 and began the preparation for arrival of the first five Super Etendards, which finally happened

in November 1981. The Argentine Navy had ordered a total number of 14 aircraft, and the same number of Exocets.The Argentine pilots tested the navigation system of the five planes as much as they could, and started to do the

same with the weapon system.

The War Began

But on April 2nd 1982, when the 2nd Squadron was waiting the arrival of the French technical team to put the

Exocets in an operational status, Argentina performed the military reconquest of the Falklands Islands - called

Malvinas in Spanish language - usurped by the British government in 1833. One of the first acts of the French

government was to declare a weapons embargo against Argentina until the conflict ended.

Of course, it deprived the 2nd Squadron of the possibility of being assisted by French technicians but the Argentine

personnel of the unit, far from giving up, faced on their own the challenge to set up the Exocets. Two weeks later, the

interface between airplane and missile had been solved, and the tests on anti-ship strikes began. Fortunately for the

Argentineans, the country had bought from Great Britain two Type 42 destroyers (the same class used by the Royal

Navy), the ARA Hércules and ARA Santísima Trinidad. In consequence, the unit's pilots tested and improved the

attack tactics against these kinds of ships.

On May 1st 1982, The RAF and Royal Navy planes attacked the main Argentine airfields and positions in the

islands. The Argentine Navy organized a combined strike against the British aircraft carriers: eight A-4Qs belonging

to the 3rd Air Naval Fighter and Strike Squadron on board the Argentine carrier, ARA Veinticinco de Mayo, and two

Super Etendards from Río Grande Air Naval Base would attack at the same time on May 2nd. But that day both

arms of the attack had problems; the naval Skyhawks needed a minimum wind to help them take off from the carrier,

and unexpectedly the wind, normally strong in the South Atlantic, did not blow. On the 2nd Squadron's side, both

Super Etendards, piloted by the unit commander, Jorge Colombo, and his wingman Carlos Machetanz, were

affected by problems that did not allow them to receive fuel from the KC-130H Hercules tanker. Later that same daythe British submarine HMS Conqueror sunk the Argentine cruiser ARA General Belgrano and forced the Argentine

Sea Fleet to come back to Puerto Belgrano Naval Base.

A recent photograph of the SP-2H Neptune 0708/2-P-112 in the Air Naval Museum placed at Puerto Belgrano Naval

Base, within Comandante Espora Air Naval Base. On May 4th 1982 this plane, when piloted by Corvette Captain

Ernesto Proni Leston, detected the destroyer HMS Sheffield and gave her coordinates to the Super Etendards

armed with Exocets.


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The End of the HMS Sheffield

At 5:07 hrs on May 4th 1982, a SP-2H Neptune, serial number 0708/2-P-112, call sign 'Mercurio', belonging to the

Exploration Squadron of the CANA, took off from Río Grande Air Naval Base. The plane's crew was composed of

three members, and the pilot was Corvette Captain Ernesto Proni Leston (the other members were the copilot and

Operative Control Officer, surnamed Pernussi). Originally the mission was to detect any British naval activity to allow

a group of C-130s to land on Puerto Argentino's airport, but even when the flight of the Hercules was aborted, theNeptune sortie stands. At 7:50 the Neptune had his first radar contact with a British warship, and Proni reported the

news to the CANA. He was ordered to keep contact but with discretion. 'Mercurio' had two o ther contacts at 8:14

and 8:43. A few minutes later an order from the High Command of CANA arrived to evade any contact until 10:00

hrs. Proni guessed that an Exocet sortie was on the way, and set the Neptune's course to the area of the wreckage

of the ARA General Belgrano, pretending to be part of a rescue mission searching for survivors.

This was the flight path followed by the Neptune of CorvetteCaptain Proni Leston on May 4th 1982.

The news about Captain Proni's f indings arrived to Río Grande quickly, and it was the turn for Corvette Captain

Augusto César Bedacarratz and Frigate Lieutenat Armando Mayora to fly the anti-ship sorties, and all the other

pilots helped to prepare the flight paths, points of meeting with the KC-130H tanker, etc. Both Super Etendards took

off from Río Grande at 9:45 hrs. Bedacarratz, the leader, (call sign 'Aries') flew the plane 0752/3-A-202, and Mayora,

the wingman, (call sign 'Boina') did so with his plane 0753/3-A-203. At 10:00 hrs they met the KC-130H tanker

provided by the FAA (Fuerza Aérea Argentina - Argentine Air Force) piloted by Vicecommodore Pessana and

received all the necessary fuel to complete the mission.

At 10:35, Corvette Captain Proni did his last climb at 1,170 meters (3,500 feet) and detected a big contact and two

medium-size in the coordinates 52º 33' 55'' South, 57º 40' 55'' West. A few minutes later he radioed both Super

Etendards and gave the information to Bedacarratz. After that, Proni set his course to Río Grande and landed at12:04 hrs. His long sortie had reached the end.

But the mission of the SUEs (nickname given by the Argentine pilots to the Super Etendards) had just begun. Flying

at very low altitude, around 10:50 hrs they climbed at 160 meters (500 feet) to verify the coordinates given by Proni,

but they found... nothing! Both pilots turned back to searching and Bedacarratz decided to continue. 40 kms (25

miles) later they climbed again and, after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.

Both pilots loaded the coordinates in their weapons systems, turned back to low level, and after the last minute

check, launched their AM.39 Exocets. The exact time was 11:04 hrs.

During the flight back to the base, Bedacarratz realized that they would not need the KC-130H assistance, and called

to Vicecommodore Pessana declining the refuelling. Pessano was then the first Argentine officer to know the

success of the mission. Bedacarratz and Mayora landed at 12:04 hrs, exactly an hour after having launched the

missiles. It is unnecessary to say that they were received by their happy comrades as heroes.

Argentine pilots belonging to the 2nd Air Naval Fighter

and Strike Squadron of the Argentine Navy.

From left to right: Frigate Lieutenant Rodríguez Mariani,

Corvette Captain Curilovic (who participated in the May

25th sortie when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk), Frigate

Captain Colombo (unit commander) , Corvette Captain

Agotegaray, Warship Lieutenant Francisco (who hit the

British carrier HMS Invincible on May 30th), Corvette

Captain Bedacarratz (who participated in the attack on

HMS Sheffield on May 4th), and Warship Lieutenant

Collavino (who supported Francisco on May 30th). The

Super Etendard behind them is the 0752/3-A-202, the

plane used by Bedacarratz on May 4th 1982 during the

mission against the Sheffield, and the aircraft flown by

Alejandro Francisco on May 30th 1982.

What happened to the Exocets? According to British sources, Peter Walpole, an officer on the deck of the destroyer

Type 42 HMS Sheffield, who was trying to identify visually a radar contact reported by the Operations officer of the

ship, Nick Batho, saw a little smoke trail and finally identified it as an Exocet, but he did it when the missile was at

only 1 mile away from the destroyer. Four seconds later the missile hit the ship with tremendous strength. It was one

of the war's ironies that one of the most modern ships of the Royal Navy had only shouts as a missile warning.

Some sources affirmed that what caused the fire in the Sheffield was not the warhead, but the remaining missile's

fuel; but others, including the Sheffield's Captain, Samuel Salt, assert that the missile's warhead exploded, destroying

the Operations Center and the engineering. Whatever the actual cause, the result remains the same; the destroyer

HMS Sheffield had received a death wound. It was the f irst time that an airborne anti-ship missile was tested in

combat.


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One of the many photographs showing the burning HMS Sheffield.

The Exocet missile hit the engines room, where the warhead

exploded. The ship was left without electric supply instantly, and so the

anti-fire system could not be activated. The fire soon expanded

through all the ship. A total number of 22 British sailors died in the

wreckage

Right: Another picture of the dying HMS Sheffield. The fate of the second Exocet

remains a mystery, but according to British sources, it narrowly missed the frigate

HMS Yarmouth and finally fell into the sea.

Changes in the Searching Method

A very important trouble appeared then. The 'eyes' of the Super Etendards were the Neptunes, but on May 15th

these machines were deactivated from active service, due to the lack of spare pieces and the obsolescence of their

radar crystals. After that, the Argentine Navy had the idea to use the services of the three-dimensional radar

AN/TPS-43F and the surveillance radar AN/TPS-44 Alert IIA, both placed in Puerto Argentino. These radars wereconstantly following the movements of all the British planes, establishing with some accuracy the sites from where

the British carriers launched their Harriers and Sea Harriers. Soon it was clear that these movements fo llowed a

certain pattern, and so they could be fairly predicted and anticipated.

With this information, on May 23rd two new sorties by Super Etendards attempted to attack the British carriers. The

aircraft were piloted by Corvette Captain Roberto Agotegaray and Warship Lieutenant Juan Rodríguez Mariani, who

took off in the first hours of the evening, and the meeting with the KC-130H was completed without problems, but

when both planes reached the target area they did not find anything. Even when the Argentine pilots scanned the

area carefully, they were unable to find a target and so decided to return at 17:50 hrs. But this unsuccessful mission

did not invalidate the search method, which was tested again two days later.

14,946 British tons sink in the waters of the South Atlantic

On May 25th 1982, the Argentine radars in Puerto Argentino could define a possible target placed 176 kms (110

miles) Northeast of Puerto Argentino. At 7:30 this data arrived at Río Grande, and a mission was programmed for

9:00 hrs, but it was delayed until the evening due to the lack of a KC-130H to refuel the planes in flight. Finally both

Super Etendards took off from Río Grande at 14:28 hrs and set their course to a meeting point with the KC-130H at

256 kms (160 miles) East of Puerto Deseado. The Argentine leader, Corvette Captain Roberto Curilovic, (call sign

'Tito') flew the Super Etendard 0753/3-A-203, and the wingman, Warship Lieutenant Julio Barraza, (call sign 'Leo')

did so with the 0754/3-A-204.

The Super Etendard in the picture is the 0753/3-A-203. It was f lownby Warship Lieutenant Armando Mayora on May 4th, and used

again by Corvette Captain Roberto Curilovic on May 25th 1982

against the MV Atlantic Conveyor. The photograph was taken a few

minutes before the beginning of the latter mission (you can see the

AM.39 Exocet under the right wing of the aircraft).

Curilovic and Barraza met the KC-130H in the planned time and place, and after the refueling, both set their course

to the South East, right to the target (at this time 480 kms away - 300 miles). When they were at 240 kms (150 miles)

of the target coordinates began to fly in at only 8 or 10 meters over the sea. Both pilots found the target exactly

where the radars had predicted (58º 38' South, 56º 8' West), and they loaded the coordinates in the weapon system,

launched the Exocets at 16:31 hrs and turned back. After a second meeting with the tanker, they returned to Río

Grande at 18:38 hrs. It was the longest range mission of the Super Etendard. They flew 2,592 kms (1,620 miles)during 3 hours and 50 minutes. According to British sources, the Exocets hit the cargo ship MV Atlantic Conveyor at

16:36 hrs and the ship caught fire and sank in a couple of hours. It was the greatest logistic loss suffered by the

British Task Force 317, because the Atlantic Conveyor was carrying tents for 5,000 men, at least ten helicopters

(three Chinooks HC.1 of the 18th Sqdn. RAF, six Wessexs HU.5 of the 848th Sqdn. RN, and one Lynx HAS.2 of the


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815th Squadron RN), spare engines and pieces for the Harriers, a plant to make sea water drinkable, and the

materials to build a mobile runway for the Sea Harriers. In the wreckage also 12 British sailors were killed, including

Ian North, the captain of the Atlantic Conveyor.

The map shows the course of all the missions performed by the Argentine Super

Etendards, including the aborted mission on May 2nd and the unsuccessful sortieon May 23rd. The date of each mission is indicated next to the path, and the small

pictures of ships indicate which target was sunk/hit in each mission.

A drawing of the Super

Etendard 0753/3-A-203

piloted by Curilovic on May

25th 1982.

The unit's badge, nicknamed 'La Lora' ('The Female Parrot'), though it actually

represents a sparrow hawk armed with a stick. The picture also shows the marked

silhouettes of the ships that this plane contributed to sink: the HMS Sheffield and

the MV Atlantic Conveyor.

A photograph of Corvette

Captain Roberto Curilovic

taken when he was

descending from the cockpit

of his Super Etendard after

the mission on May 25th.

This picture shows the aspect of the Atlantic Conveyor once the fire was finally

extinguished, and it was evident that the ship could not be saved. While some

sources assert that only one of the Exocets hit the cargo ship, others affirm that

both missiles hit and exploded. A great amount of British military supplies sank with

the ship, including three out of four HC.4 Chinook helicopters of the 18th Sqdn.

RAF and six HU.5 Wessexs of the 848th Sqdn. RN. The loss of these helicopters

delayed the British offensive against Puerto Argentino, the capital, and the main

Argentine garrison of the islands.

The attack against the HMS Invincible

After the Atlantic Conveyor wreckage, the Argentine Navy had only one Exocet left, and the British carriers still were

the main Argentine targets. For these reasons, on May 29th the CANA and the FAA decided to perform a joint

operation. Four pilots of A-4C Skyhawk belonging to the Grupo 4 de Caza (4th Fighter Group) received the

assignment -actually two of them, 1st Lieutenants Ernesto Ureta and José Vazquez, volunteered, and chose the

other two pilots, 1st Lieutenant Omar Castillo and Ensign Gerardo Isaac- and were sent to Río Grande. The plan

was that once the Super Etendards launched the remaining Exocet, the Skyhawks followed the trail of the missile and

hit the carrier with their 227 kgs (500 pounds) bombs. Of course, the A-4Cs would face the worst of the enemy

defences.

About 12:30 hrs on May 30th 1982, two Super Etendards took off from Río Grande; the SUE 0752/3-A-202, piloted

by the leader, Warship Lieutenant Alejandro Francisco, took off first , and second was the SUE 0755/3-A-205, f lown

by the wingman, Warship Lieutenant Luis Collavino. Five minutes later, the A-4Cs, belonging to the Air Force, also

took off. Francisco carried the Exocet, and Collavino provided support and verification. The call signs of the Super

Etendards and Skyhawks were 'Ala' and 'Zonda' respectively.

All the planes climbed to an altitude of 7,000 meters (21,000 feet) and flew to the rendezvous point with the


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KC-130H, where all the fighters were resupplied with fuel for 300 kms. After this refueling the planes turned to the

east, with both SUEs separated by 1,600 meters (1 mile) and two Skyhawks behind each. When all of them were at

304 kms (190 miles) from the target area, they dived to an altitude of 30 meters (100 feet). Around 14:32 'Ala 1',

Francisco, reported they had locked the Exocet on the target. 'Ala 2', Collavino, confirmed the lock and so Francisco

launched the missile. With this launch, the participation of the 2nd Air Naval Squadron in the war came to an end.

Both Super Etendards turned back and headed towards the meeting point with the KC-130H, and after that arrived at

Río Grande without problems.

This historical photograph shows the SUE # 0752/3-A-202 piloted by Warship Lieutenant Alejandro Francisco when

refueling on its way to the target, HMS Invincible on May 30th 1982. The last AM.39 Exocet can be seen under the

right wing of the SUE, and the four A-4C Skyhawks of the 4th Fighter Group of the Argentine Air Force can also be

seen far behind, waiting for their turn to refuel.

After the Exocet's launching, the Air Force's Skyhawks followed the trail of the missile, and watched the appearance

of a thick smoke column on the horizon, an so they headed for it. When they were at 12 kms (7.5 miles) a SAM

destroyed Vazquez's aircraft and so did another to Castillo's Skyhawk at 2 kms (1.25 miles) to the target. According

to British sources, they were Sea Darts launched by the destroyer HMS Exeter. Both pilots died. But the survivors,

Ureta and Isaac 'Zonda 3' and 'Zonda 4' respectively, reached the target, dropped their bombs and fired all their

gun's ammunition. After that, they turned back, perfo rmed evasive maneuvers against the British SAMs and AAA,

and got out of the danger zone without damage. Both planes reached the KC-130H and refuelled, arriving at Río

Grande 3 hours and 47 minutes after they had taken off. During the debriefing, both pilots described the attacked

target as a carrier, and specifically as the HMS Invincible.

Note: There is not an official British version about the attack, but the theory exposed in the book 'Falklands, the Air

War' is the following: the ship attacked by Ureta and Isaac was the frigate HMS Avenger, which was loosing white

smoke as a curtain, and its helicopter's flight deck was wrongly mistaken as the flight deck of a carrier by theArgentine pilots. All the bombs of the Skyhawks missed. The problem with this version is the fact that the smoke

seen by the Argentine pilots was not white, but black. It is also ridiculous that well trained pilots as Ureta and Isaac

could misidentify the short deck of a frigate with the long and lateral one of a carrier. It is also suspicious that the

Invincible appeared at Port Stanley almost two months after the attack, in August 1982 and when she returned to

Portsmouth on September 17th 1982, a big strip on the port side looked as if it had been recently repainted.

The Argentine version said that the last Exocet missile was perfectly locked-on to the target (a big ship) by the Super

Etendard pilot, who fired it and turned back to Río Grande without troubles. The four A-4C Skyhawks of 4th Group

followed the trail of the missile and finally saw in the distance a big column of black smoke, possibly the place where

the missile impacted. Two of them were shot down, but the survivors confirmed that they saw a carrier, and

specifically the HMS Invincible with a thick black smoke column coming out of it. They attacked it, f iring their

cannons and dropping their bombs, without confirming any results. After avoiding all the SAMs fired against them,

the Skyhawks met their tanker and returned home.

The British version of this incident exposed that the Exocet failed its mark, the HMS Invincible, due to it being

downed by a 114 mm shell from the frigate HMS Avenger, or due to it being neutralized by decoys. Additionally,

they asserted that the ship attacked by the A-4C Skyhawks was the HMS Avenger, which was deploying a curtain of

white smoke to hide the carrier f rom any attacker. Many specialists said that the Argentine pilots misidentified the

small flight deck of the anti-submarine helicopter with the flight deck of the carrier, and wrongly thought that the

smoke of the curtain was cause by the Exocet hit.

But from the Argentine point of view, the problems with such versions are:

1) it is highly unlikely that a 114 mm shell could actually destroy a sea-skimming missile flying at 10 metres high at

1,000 km/h.

2) the decoys fully failed only five days before, when the MV Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, and why should they work

that day?

3) the smoke seen by the Argentine Skyhawk pilots was not white, but black.


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4) Even in a stress situation like being attacked with AAA and SAM f ire, it is hard to mis-identify the big, lateral flight

deck of a carrier with the small helicopter flight deck of a frigate.

5) Besides all that, HMS Invincible did not appear in Port Stanley until late July 1982, and when she returned to

England in September 1982, it looked like a big stripe on the port side (the side attacked by the Exocet and the

Skyhawks) recently painted.

All that made me think that the carrier, HMS Invincible was actually hit that May 30 1982 (not seriously hit, but hit at

last) and we have good reason to think that. Of course we could be wrong, but we truly and sincerely believe that.´

The A-4C Skyhawk pilots belonging to the 4th Fighter Group, who survived the

attack against the British carrier HMS Invincible, were 1st Lt. Ernesto Rubén Ureta

(Left) and Ensign Gerardo Guillermo Isaac (Right). They are posing with WWII

French Ace Pierre Clostermann (Center). Both pilots are completely sure that the

ship which was hit by the Exocet, and later attacked by them, was the Invincible.

The lesson extracted from the war was that a small group of professional pilots and technicians can ruin the day of

the most powerful fleet in the world. The Argentine pilots of Super Etendards taught that lesson to the proud RoyalNavy in May 1982.

Sources:

Emilio Villarino, "Exocet", September 1986, Editorial Abril, Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Brigadier Benigno H. Andrada, "Guerra Aérea en las Malvinas", Emecé Editores S.A., Buenos Aires,

Argentina, 1983.

Rodney A. Burden, Michael I Draper, Douglas A. Rough, Colin R. Smith & David A. Wilton, "Falklands, the

Air War", Arms and Armour Press, 1987.Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater, Peter Gillman & Insight team of The Sunday Times, "The Falklands War", 1982.

Acknowledgments:

To my brother Pablo for his help in the production of the text in English language.

Diego Zampini

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