Falklands ST269 Article

7/27/2019 Falklands ST269 Article

1/10


2/10

S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011 7

Contxt

The 74-day Falklands War provided

the world with a new perspectiveon military conict and intel-

ligence gathering in the early 1980s. Itwas a unique sequence o events thatbrought new terms into the publicvocabulary while revealing the capabili-ties and highlighting the shortalls otwo dierent military systems. At thesame time, it was also an old ashionedfght in that it could also airly becalled a colonial war (perhaps the lasto them). Its implications arguablychanged the mindset o governmentsand militaries across the globe and,or those fghting on and around the

windswept islands deep in the SouthAtlantic, it provided a test o militarycompetence to a degree neither sidesparticipants had ever dealt with beore.

Its important when looking atthe Falklands War to begin by puttingonesel into the mindset o the warringparties at that time. In early 1982they were in diametrically opposedpositions. For the United Kingdom asan active member o NATO withmajor responsibilities within thatorganization it was viewed as unlikelyany major commitment to a war beyondEuropes borders would ever againoccur. For Argentina, though, the

chaotic nature o that nations politics,and the takeover o its government bya militaryjunta in 1981, provided a

platorm rom which to demonstrateits capability as a regional power.

For observers outside the conict,the question was instantly raised asto the intrinsic value o fghting over acluster o islands located 400 miles osouthern Argentina, just north o the 60degree Antarctic Circle. Indeed, the war

can also be taken as having been the frstought within Antarctica as encoun-ters occurred on the sub-Antarctic

island o South Georgia, and even as arsouth as the South Sandwich Islands.There were also wider implicationsor non-involved militaries. Revisionsin tactical and operational methods

were real outcomes or many servicesaside rom those o the participants.

Jorge Anaya in 1976. During the 1982 war,

Anaya commanded Operation Algeciras, in

which Argentine commandos were to sabotage

a Royal Navy warship harbored in Gibraltar;

the plan was thwarted at the last minute

when communications were intercepted.

continued on page 10

Falklands Showdown:A Strategic Analysis o the Anglo-Argentine War, 1982

by Adam Colman


3/10

8 S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011

Killd in Action Summay

In total, 907 military personnel were killed during 74 days o the war.

Agntina 649

Ejrcito Argentino(Army) 194

(16 ofcers, 35 NCOs and 143 privates)

Armada de la Repblica Argentina(Navy) 375

(including 321 on Belgrano, 4 naval aviators and 34 marines)

Fuerza Area Argentina(Air Force) 55

(including 31 pilots and 14 ground crew)

Gendarmera Nacional Argentina(Border Guard) 7Prefectura Naval Argentina(Coast Guard) 2

Civilian Sailors 16

Unitd Kingdom 258

Royal Navy 86

& 2 Hong Kong laundrymen (see below)

Royal Marines 27

(2 ofcers, 14 NCOs and 11 marines)

Royal Fleet Auxiliary 4

& 4 Hong Kong laundrymen

Merchant Navy 6

& 2 Hong Kong sailors

British Army 123(7 ofcers, 40 NCOs & 76 privates)

Royal Air Force 1 (ofcer)

Falkland Islands Civilians 3 (women killed by riendly fre)

O the 86 Royal Navy personnel, 22 were lost on HMS Ardent; 19 & 1 on HMS Shefeld;

18 & 1 on HMS Coventr; 13 on HMS Glamorgan. Fourteen naval cooks were among the dead,

which was the largest number rom any one occupational branch within the Royal Navy.

Thirty-three o the British Armys dead came rom the Welsh Guards, 21 rom

the 3rd Battalion o the Parachute Regiment, 18 rom the 2nd Battalion o

the Parachute Regiment, 19 rom the Special Air Service (SAS), 3 rom Royal

Signals, and 8 rom each o the Scots Guards and Royal Engineers.


4/10

S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011 9


5/10

10 S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011

Though neither Britain norArgentina ought a total war, theydid commit key resources in termso their most proessional unitsand equipment. While there werenumerical dierences, each orcepossessed conventional hardwaredrawn rom among the worlds mostvaluable and deadly at that time.

Each orce also had behind it anational populace that was culturallyand politically supportive o theirmilitaries. Signiicant emotionalsentiment erupted on both sides asthe tactical blow-by-blow occurred.

In the end the British were thevictors. They won every strategic andoperational aspect o the ightingand, except or a small number otactical exceptions, deeated the

Argentines by bringing to bearbetter preparation, leadership,reconnaissance, aggressiveness,deployment o assets, and adeeper will to win down to theman-to-man level, in combat.

Th Bitish Amy

British military doctrine in theearly 1980s was being inuencedboth by actors at home and abroad.Obviously the issue o Northern Ireland

was important, as was the economicpressure to retrench being put onthe armed orces at that time. Bothhad consequences on how the military

was to be confgured, as well as its

combat doctrines, in the uture.For the Army, little o the experi-

ence rom Northern Ireland provedapplicable in the Falklands, except orsome techniques or helicopter opera-tions. The Royal Navy was then alreadyseen as a service in decline due to thestrictures o the 1981 Deence NavalReview. For instance, key units suchas the Royal Marineswere soon goingto be entirely without landing ships.

There are other specifc exampleso such cuts; essentially, though, ia military asset didnt have use inthe North Atlantic or Europe it wasseen as non-essential. In the largercircumstances o early 1982, that sug-

gested to the Argentines, at least roma strategic capability standpoint, theend o British power in the South

Atlantic was at hand and the islands thathad or so long been a national quest

would soon be open or the taking.At the same time, though, the British

armed orces still maintained a highdegree o proessionalism within allits branches. The Army was proes-sional, with its positions flled through

selective recruitment. Training wasmulti-phased, with an emphasis onphysical ftness, thus educating recruitsinto the notion that going beyondnormal levels o exertion was pos-sible and expected. That oundationalconcept o mental determination andphysical toughness was to prove itselon a daily basis in the Falklands.

Emphasis in the training processwas also put on personal initiative andleadership at every level. The creed thatevery soldier must contribute and mustbe able to step up ollowing the inca-pacitation o his leader was paramount.

That physical capability o therecruits was urther enhanced by

continued from page 7


6/10

S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011 11

an emphasis on hand-to-hand andclose-quarters combat, coupled withan inculcated orientation to operateaggressively, even in small groups,

with any available weapons. Thatemphasis enabled average Britishsoldiers to unction in varied tacticalenvironments with minimal adapta-tion time needed something the

Argentines proved unable to do.Within the units o the British Army

there was an organizational pride thatshowed itsel in many instances duringthe war. The insularity o elite units cancreate an environment in which thosein them see themselves in a competitiverelationship with other members otheir own army. That maniested itselin a willingness to add an even sharperedge to combat operations, and specifcunits among them most notably theRoyal Marines, the Parachute Regimentand the Blues and Royalsarmoredunits approached the fghting withtremendous esprit dcorps. Almostevery land battle in the Falklandsproved to be an eort revolving aroundone key unit, with support rom theRoyal Artillery and, to a lesser extent,the Royal Air Force or Royal Navy.

For a ground orce centered onsuch units, success is oten magnetic,and the eorts attained by each unitactually increase along with the hoursand tempo o battle. The soldiers o theBritish Army in the Falklands, no matter

what numbers they were committedagainst, were willing and motivatedto perorm to the highest level. They

were well led and held their ofcers inesteem, as those men also belongedto the same elite tactical grouping. As

was said by one junior NCO to Maj.Phillip Neame, whod raced to the heado the advance as his company tried

to fnd its way through a hail o fre atthe height o the Battle o Goose Green:You wait here, sir. We dont want torisk you on this. This is Toms work.

Th Agntin Amy

The three arms o the Argentinemilitary the Army (Ejercito), Navy(Armada ARA) and Air Force (FuerzaAerea Argentina FAA) all held

diverse and ultimately incompatibleapproaches to warare. Yet, when lookedat singularly, each displayed eorts thatmade them capable adversaries, even

while lacking the overall situationalawareness and larger competenciesthat wouldve been necessary inorder to overwhelm their opponentsdesire to persevere. In short, they

were able to fght but never to win.That, o course, begs the question

as to why they couldnt perorm at thelevel needed or victory. That answeris rooted in their deeper militarytraditions as well as their approachto the situation in 1982.

Modern Argentine military experi-ence in the time prior to 1982 consistedonly o some small counterinsurgencyoperations in the northern part otheir own country and an episode obrinkmanship with the Chileans in 1980,regarding another small group o islandssouth o Tierra del Fuego. It hardlyprovided a basis rom which to conronta core member o NATO. The Argentinemilitary had, however, been a relativelybig spender immediately prior to 1982,and had thereby amassed hardware ascapable as that o their opponent whenused appropriately. Their Army was thebenefciary o much o those purchases,but a consistent weakness on the battle-feld came rom its inability to utilize

the available frepower to best eect.That was due to the act the

Argentine Army o 1982 was a orcetrapped in a time capsule o earliermilitary thinking. They were trained andled according to the proverbial book,and the model o discipline presentedto the common soldiers was primarilygeared toward making them obedientlyaccept their low place in the militaryhierarchy. Rather than being cultivated

as valuable individual members otheir units, the distinction emphasized

was the one between ofcers andenlisted. That was true in all aspects omilitary lie, and it created what was,

when applied to combat, an untenableposition rom which soldiers would be

willing to act so as to achieve victory.The Argentine Army possessed both

regular and conscript components.Much has been made regarding the min-imal training o the latter groups youngsoldiers during their mandatory one-

year service. Aside rom their youngeraverage age and poor training, however,the conscripts in the Falklands wereequipped as well as their Regular Armycounterparts. Their weapons and cloth-ing were the same. The interspersing oRegular Army cadre within those unitsalso contributed some capable NCOsand junior ofcers, who at times wereable to motivate their subordinates.

In the weeks prior to the Britishstepping oot back on the islands,positions were prepared, felds o fre

were established, minefelds were laidand basic feld-crat was practiced.For example, at Goose Green theorward Argentine positions wereset up so as to have interlocking andmutually supportive positions.

Even so, the Falkland Islands werenta good place to deploy an unevenly


7/10

12 S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011

trained and less than ully motivatedground orce. Being an Argentine soldierin the Falklands wasnt a pleasantexperience, even beore shots were fred.

April was the middle o autumn, andby the time o the frst ground fghtingin May the winter was setting (in theSouthern Hemisphere). Snow then ellmany times in an already wet and bleakenvironment, which added yet anotherdimension to the declining morale.

Finally or the Argentines, logisticswas another erratic and sad aspect othe war. Basically, the arther a unit wasrom the main base at Port Stanley thesmaller was the logistical support itgot. Faced with such a challenge, whensoldiers were clearly going hungry, little

was done by their ofcers to resolvethe situation. In one classic example,

which occurred at Port Howard on WestFalkland, soldiers ound to be eating pil-ered chicken scraps were staked out onthe reezing ground as punishment or

what was termed unsoldierly conduct.The Argentines were commanded by

a socially separate and privileged ofcerclass. The rigid distinctions betweenofcers and enlisted proved a weaknessor both groups. The growing lack o

respect or the ofcers culminated inseveral incidents o violence againstthem ater the surrender. Photographsrom just ater the war reveal much.

Argentine ofcers are generallyimmaculate and usually appear in dressor service uniorms, and theyre in starkcontrast to their weather-beaten andatigue-uniormed British counterparts.Discussions by this author with several

Argentine soldiers who were in the

Falklands revealed their initial disbelieBritish ofcers carried a load likeeveryone else, ate the same ood in thefeld, yet, despite their near-identicalappearance with the enlisted aroundthem, always gave the clear impressionthey were in command, and all o that

was what their soldiers expected.In combat, a orce without leader-

ship will always all. Given their militaryculture, then, the Argentines were ableto fght and hinder the British, but they

were never able to deeat the will o theirattackers to press orward. Argentinetraining did little to ensure initiative wasever taken. Thereore, at times when theBritish were clearly o balance tactically,the Argentines ailed to take action thatcouldve restored the situation or them.

Opposing Navis & Ai Focs

The Argentine Navy was equippedwith a mix o old and new ships, butincluded several modern diesel subma-rines, Exocetsurace-to-surace missile-carrying vessels, and several UK-builtType 42 destroyers. Their one aircratcarrier, while old, was equipped with A-4Skyhawksas well as modern helicopters

with anti-submarine capabilities, and

their overall eet was bolstered by therecent acquisition o a handul o (then)ultra-modern DassaultSuper Etendards.Those planes, with their AM.39 Exocetmissiles, were the weapon system the

Argentines used to devastating eectin their eorts against the Royal Navy.

Given the act the French themselveshad provided the Argentines withthe training needed to efcientlyutilize those weapons, theArmadacertainly possessed everything it neededto accomplish some crucial degree odevastation. Ultimately, however, thatservice proved the frst to retreat romthe fghting. Its withdrawal rom suracecombat was made ater only two hostilecontacts: the sinking o the Guppy-classsubmarine Santa Feat South Georgia,


8/10

S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011 13


9/10

14 S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011

and the destruction o the ormer WorldWar II Brooklyn-class cruiser GeneralBelgrano. Irrespective o any purporteddeeper postures speculated about sincethe end o the war, the act remainsthe Argentine eet simply disappearedrom the tactical map. At the time,though, the Royal Navy couldnt counton that threat being gone totally, andso it still maintained active suracescreening until the end o hostilities.

The Argentine naval air arm had oneweapon that worked its inamous wayinto modern military history: the airlaunched Exocet. Argentina possessedfve o those missiles at the time o the

wars start, and tried to add to that countas hostilities evolved, but without suc-cess. Driven by two rocket motors whenlaunched rom a suitably confguredEtendard, they caused tremendousconcern to the Royal Navy. While arrom being the wonder weaponthats sometimes portrayed, the Exocetinvariably caused great damage when ithit and penetrated a ships hull at a 90-degree angle. The missile then explodedinside its target, generating muchcomplementary structural damage.

The Argentines launched threeEtendard/Exocetattacks, with theintention o destroying the crucial HMSInvincibleand Hermes. They scored twosuccesses the hit leading to the sinkingoHMSSheeld(a Type 42 destroyer),and another that led to an internal freon a cargo ship (Atlantic Conveyer),

which thereby removed its helicoptercargo rom potential service. Its impor-tant to note that in neither case werethe fnal victims o those Exocetstheiractual initial targets. Nevertheless, themissiles and their implication capturedthe ront pages o the world press, and itremains among the key military artiactsand human memories o the entire war.

The Royal Navy displayed severaltactical weaknesses during its time in theoperational area o the South Atlantic. Inact, its air to say it was more good luckthan good management the eets lacko a satisactory airborne early warning(AEW) system wasnt better exploited bythe Argentines. It appears they werentaware o that Royal Navy shortall, andthey certainly couldve been expectedto have pressed harder their oshore

attacks to exploit it had they known o it.(In NATO operations the AEW unction

was carried out by UK allies, hence theFaireyGannet, the last purpose-designedBritish plane or use in that role, hadbeen retired several years prior to 1982.

Without proper AEW, it took the loss oseveral ships beore the conversion oa radar carried bySea Kinghelicopters

was adapted, only arriving in-theaterseveral weeks ater the end o hostilities.)

The Royal Navy also carried a varietyo then-modern surace-to-air (SAM)missiles on its rigates and destroyers.Depending on circumstances thoseSea Darts,Rapiers and Sea Slugs wereeective at times and useless at others.Traditional older weapons, such as the4.5-inch anti-aircrat gun, the Oerlikon,and even inantry machineguns strappedto ship railings, had as much success.

For the Argentine Air Force, theirencounters with that weaponry hadless o an inhibiting eect than didtheir pilots general unwillingness topush hard in their attacks, coupled

with their use o iron gravity bombs ina traditional toss bombing method.Much has also been written about the

Argentine error o incorrectly timingtheir bomb uses, which resulted inmany bombs that hit ships ailing toexplode. Even so, the less than maximaleort put orth by the Argentines inthe frst days ater the British landings

continued to decline as more and morepilots ailed to return to their airfelds.In a typical mission profle, Argentine

jets would leave the mainland, make alow run toward the British eet, toss alltheir bombs in a single pass, drop theirauxiliary tanks and then return home.In that sequence o events, though,they had to run a gauntlet o Royal Navyfre, all the while risking attack by SeaHarriers; so their losses mounted even

as their commitment to combat ell.As mentioned above, a common

theme o much reporting during the warconcerned the eect o the Exocetmis-sile both in its air- and sea-launchedconfgurations. Though dangerous, theExocetdidnt prove decisive or severalreasons. First, the initial set up o theair-launched missile and subsequentdata transer required it to be attachedonly by a Super Etendard. No Etendardthereore meant no air-launched missile,and with only fve Sues on hand, anyloss wouldve been immediately critical.So missions that might encounter agood chance o being hit by anti-aircratfre were passed up in avor o launchesbeing made at the missiles range limit.

Second, data transers to the missileproved to be prone to error, and i thehoming head on the missile ailed toreceive accurate data it couldnt locateits intended target. Finally, the angleo strike into the target was critical;its efciency decreased rapidly asthe angle became oblique. Thus theExocetscertainly occupied Britishthinking, but their eect was destructiveand not decisive. In act, one o themissiles was shot down mid-ight bya gun round rom HMSAvenger.

The Falklands War was also thefrst time night vision goggles wereused by the Royal Navy, somethingthat was an untested state o the art


10/10

S&T 269 | JULAUG 2011 15

technology at the time. The gogglesworked to give the British a urtheroperational edge, enabling support toground units that made attacks at night.

Outsid Infuncs

An oten overlooked aspect o thewar was the various gyrations by bothsides that came rom their collectiono intelligence. For both sides the

indirect involvement, via signalsintelligence (Sigint) sharing, by theUnited States with the British and, to alesser extent, by the Soviet Union withthe Argentines, caused them to takeinto account each others intentions.In the early 1980s the Soviet Unioncertainly wasnt an ally o Argentina,and the latter had actually expectedits riendship with the US to cause thelarger course o the crisis to turn in itsavor. At the operational level, then,the Soviet assistance to the Argentines

wasnt enough to enable them to crackany British cipher system or interere

with the transmission o inormationthey werent intended to hear.

Theres no doubt the US and severalother Western countries gave the Britishsupport at all levels o military, govern-ment and public arenas. Simply put,it was easier or the United Kingdomthan it was or the Argentines to call inavors rom many sources and, whethereach such avor was active or passive,collectively they worked to removeobstacles and help enable ultimateBritish success. Several countriesprovided intelligence: battlefeld satelliteimages came rom the US; Franceprovided data on the Exocetas well astactical tips on how Sea Harriers couldbest deeat Mirages; and general intel-ligence concerning the overall Argentinemilitary situation came in rom Chile.

All o that came together to giveBritish commanders a situational aware-ness rom which they could make timelyand correct decisions. It all worked wellenough that, in some cases, the local tac-tical intelligence available to the British

on-scene was o lower quality than

that available simultaneously at theirhighest command levels. The Britishalso had current copies oJanesmilitarymanuals, and they provided a wealth oopen-source documentation concerningthe Argentine orce composition.

More materially, the UKs militarycontacts led to their orces immediateprovisioning with AIM-9L Sidewindermissiles, airfeld support at AscensionIsland, the rapid sending o replacement

parts directly rom manuacturers,as well as the supply o the latestspecial orces weapons rom sourcesthat still remain covert. New Zealandeven oered to arrange an on-sta-tion reinorcement o a rigate.

The British also managed to aect theArgentines by the use o the unknown.They ran a disinormation campaign thatindicated the Royal Air Force was basingaircrat in Chile, that special orcesunits were preparing to operate on the

Argentine mainland, and that numerousatomic missile submarines were movinginto the South Atlantic. The eect wasthe Argentines prepared to counterthose alse threats, allocating resourcesin responses that ultimately did noth-ing or their real-world war eort.

For the British the overarching actwas they were 8,000 miles rom home,and what thereore mattered above allelse was their logistical chain, whichentered the theater via AscensionIsland (a UK territory) in the Atlanticand remained eective in all aspectso military supply. That vital localeprovided a sae area where equipmentcould be cross-decked, repacked, testedand/or stored. It worked throughoutthe war as an ideal and necessarylink in the logistical chain or thepreparation o combat operations.

Conclusion

The central question o 1982 orthe British was: how do you prepareor, and successully carry out, a

war o a type and in a location youthought you would never have tofght? The answer was that you have aproven core orce with a willingness topersevere through setbacks, work as acombined-arms team, ollow an overall

plan, call in avors as necessary, andhave leadership at all levels whodemand no less than victory. Incomparison, the Argentines struggledsimply to supply the bare logisticalneeds o orces just 400 miles romtheir homeland, while their leadershipapplied itsel only sporadically andonly rom the top down.

SOUrCeS

Adkin, Mark. Goose Green: A Battle is Fought to be Won.London: Guernsey Press, 1992.

Burden, Rodney, et al. Falklands: The Air War, 3rd ed.

London: Arms & Armour Press, 1986.Perrett, Bryan. Weapons o the Falklands Confict, 2nd ed.Dorset: Blandord Press, 1983.

Sunday Times o London.War in the Falklands The Full Story.New York: Harper & Row Pubs. 1982.

Documents

Falklands ST269 Article