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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaeda-11

Is this the end of al-Qaeda? Bin Laden's network is being destroyed by Isis, loyalists admit Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals. This fact is especially true for an

ideology that teaches adherents that there is a war against Islam, that “true believers” will be persecuted for their beliefs, and that encourages followers to embrace and even celebrate martyrdom. Al-Wahayshi’s death will not lead to the death of the global jihadist ideology — or of the militancy that emanates from that ideology — any more than the deaths of Azzam or bin Laden did. A man is dead, but the ideology he promoted and the organization he founded clearly live on.  

“ You know that al-Qaeda exists from Algeria to the Philippines ... it's everywhere." Has ISIL won? A year of occupying huge chunks of Iraq and longer in Syria means that ISIL is somewhat victorious, but has it won?  C: ISIL has won if we allow, the standard being able to impose brutal rule and hold territory. ISIL certainly thinks it has won. It hasn't won in the most crucial of ways. Defeating ISIL in Syria means giving Assad a boost - not something the West wants. Defeating ISIL in Iraq requires a boost in resources - not something the West wants

On June 25, 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) published a special edition of its English-language magazine, Resurgence, featuring a lengthy interview with Adam Gadhan, the American Al-Qaeda operative who played a leading role in its media apparatus. Al Qaeda is Down, but Not Out Security Weekly June 12, On Tuesday, George Friedman laid out his net assessment of the Middle East. In it, he laid out the tectonic geopolitical forces at work in the region, including the shift from secularism to Islamism, and how this shift led to the radical form of Islamism as represented by the jihadist movement. At the strategic, level, George is right about that shift. However, at the tactical level, I disagree with George's conclusions that al Qaeda is a spent force, that the Islamic State's brand of jihadism is the logical successor to al Qaeda, and that the Islamic State is the only strain of jihadism that will survive. Perhaps I am at least partially responsible for George's assessment that al Qaeda is a spent force. I have been writing for years about how the al Qaeda core has struggled to remain relevant ; even in my January 2015 net assessment of the al Qaeda core, I wrote that it was weak and threatened by the Islamic State. However, I also wrote in January that the al Qaeda core's weakness and irrelevance were not necessarily permanent. We have seen jihadist groups rebound after experiencing substantial losses on the battlefield; the Islamic State is a prime example of this resilience. Because of this ability to regenerate, I wrote that if the intense pressure on al Qaeda was reduced, and if it were able to find some space in which to operate, the group could regain strength. This is exactly what has happened. The past six months have been very good for al Qaeda, and the group is in fact recovering strength. In addition, the vigorous internal and external efforts to brand al Qaeda as the "more moderate brand of jihadism," and therefore more politically acceptable than the Islamic State,

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will also help ensure it can receive more foreign support. These factors may help ensure that al Qaeda's ideology will outlast the Islamic State's version of jihadism.

Focus on Ideology Ideologies are harder to kill than individuals and organizations. As we've seen in the past with an array of other radical ideologies, including Marxism and white supremacy, leaders and groups come and go, but ideology can outlive individual leaders and groups. That said, individual leaders can leave their imprint on an ideology, shaping it in a manner that outlives them. Josef Stalin and Leon Trotsky had very different ideas about Marxism and how to implement it, while the jihadism developed by the Islamic State and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi differs significantly from that of al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. And as with the physical and ideological battles between Stalinists and Trotskyites, there are also battles between the Islamic State and al Qaeda jihadists. Indeed, the Islamic State and al Qaeda are locked in active combat in places like Syria, Pakistan and increasingly, Libya. But beyond physical confrontations, the Islamic State has also attacked al Qaeda's ideology and operational philosophy. The Islamic State's more extreme form of jihadism poses a clear existential threat to al Qaeda's ability to retain its current adherents, recruit new members and solicit funds from wealthy donors. But this extremism is a double-edged sword in that it also serves to alienate many Muslims, and this alienation has constrained the Islamic State's ability to spread beyond its core areas.

Certainly, we have seen some militant groups pledge allegiance to the Islamic State and its self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, but so far these groups have operated like al Qaeda franchises rather than true Islamic State provinces operating under a central authority. For example, Boko Haram has changed its name to Wilayat al Sudan al Gharbi to reflect that it is an African wilayat, or province, of the Islamic State. But Abubakar Shekau still leads Boko Haram, and we have seen no evidence suggesting the Islamic State has been funneling money, fighters or weapons to the group. Indeed, the Islamic State has prioritized drawing recruits from these other places to fight in Iraq and Syria rather than pushing fighters out in the other direction. The organization's primary concern is clearly the fight in Syria and Iraq to retain and consolidate control over the core of its self-proclaimed caliphate, and the remote wilayats are really little more than propaganda efforts in support of this primary effort. While the Islamic State core has traditionally been close to the Libya's Wilayat Barqa, outside of that group, we have not seen evidence suggesting that the core group has close contact with — much less the ability to exercise centralized command and control over — wilayats outside Iraq and Syria. While Islamic State propaganda seeks to portray its wilayats as being centrally controlled, these claims ring hollow. The group's only evident coordination with many franchises has been at the public relations level. Furthermore, while the emergence of new Islamic State franchises has garnered much attention, it is important to recognize that these groups have all emerged from existing jihadist groups, and that many of them — such as the

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franchises in Yemen, Pakistan and Algeria — remain overshadowed by the far more powerful al Qaeda franchise groups from which they split.

Mainstreaming The past six months have been good to al Qaeda franchises in Syria and Yemen. First, the Syrian franchise Jabhat al-Nusra has been successful in casting itself as a more moderate jihadist alternative to the Islamic State. After crushing the moderate Western-backed Syrian rebel group Harakat Hazm, Jabhat al-Nusra managed to forge a

coalition of Islamist groups that conquered the Syrian city of Idlib. Yet despite its key role in the operation, Jabhat al-Nusra did not impose its brand of Sharia, but rather worked with allies to rule the city. The Jabhat al-Nusra led rebel coalition, Jaish al-Fatah, has continued to score victories against the regime. Despite an Islamic State offensive north of Aleppo (that the United States claims the Syrian government aided via airstrikes), the group has just succeeded in crushing a regime and pushing government forces out of nearly all of Idlib province. This victory solidifies its control over the province and gives Jabhat al-Nusra the latitude to continue its offensive in one (or more) of three directions: westward into Latakia, southward into Hama or eastward toward the ongoing battle of Aleppo.  Jabhat al-Nusra controls significant portions of Syria and the Syrian population, yet this control gets very little attention compared to that given to the Islamic State. For example, scant attention was paid to the conquest of Idlib, whereas the Islamic State's seizure of Palmyra garnered a great deal of media coverage. As Jaish al-Fatah quietly continued to notch up battlefield successes, rumors began circulating that the leadership of Jabhat al-Nusra was considering breaking with al Qaeda to open up the way for more external support in its fight against the Syrian government. These rumors apparently started when contacts from Qatar began urging the group to "mainstream" so that Qatar could openly support it without violating international law. Despite these entreaties, Jabhat al-Nusra did not break with al Qaeda. Nevertheless, efforts to mainstream Jabhat al-Nusra continue, as do efforts to funnel support to the group via its partners.

Jabhat al-Nusra also scored a major media coup that has helped advance its mainstreaming when Al Jazeera aired a two-part special featuring a non-confrontational interview with Jabhat al-Nusra leader Abu Mohammad al-Golani. (Al Jazeera is funded by Qatar's government, which is no coincidence given Qatari sympathies for the Syrian jihadist group.) Unlike Islamic State propaganda, which is self-produced and viewed mostly by Islamic State supporters, the Al Jazeera interviews of al-Golani had a similar format to television interviews of heads of state or important media celebrities, and they were broadcast globally. For the interview, al-Golani sat in a gilt chair in what appeared to be the governor's palace in Idlib city. This was a far cry from earlier media interviews of Osama bin Laden sitting in a cave or

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tent, and it gave al-Golani a tremendous air of respectability. During the interview, Al-Golani made clear that he is still following orders from al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Jabhat al-Nusra is still al Qaeda in Syria, and individuals and countries that support Jabhat al-Nusra or its Jaish al-Fatah allies are supporting al Qaeda. Even so, some parties clearly see empowering al Qaeda as a better alternative to allowing either the Islamic State or the Syrian government to win in Syria.

Breathing Room on the Arabian Peninsula Syria is not the only place were al Qaeda is seen as the lesser evil. The Saudi-led air campaign against the Houthi rebels and military and security forces loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen have taken a great deal of pressure off of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Saudi airstrikes have directly targeted what had been the two most effective anti-al Qaeda forces in Yemen: the Houthis and the U.S.-trained Special Security Forces. In the midst of the chaos now wracking Yemen, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has taken over Hadramawt province. Its conquest has permitted it to seize large quantities of territory and cash, along with military equipment abandoned by government forces. Like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is ruling Hadramawt with a soft hand. It has established a subsidiary organization called the Sons of Hadramawt to rule the province, and it has not imposed the type of harsh Sharia that the Islamic State has imposed in areas it has conquered in Iraq and Syria. This is in keeping with the advice that al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Nasir al-Wahayshi gave to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb to refrain from excessive fundamentalist and brutal behavior in northern Mali. Al Qaeda has also gained additional favor with conservative Yemeni tribal leaders by sending fighters to assist them in their battles against the forces of the Houthis and Saleh loyalists. In some of these battles, Saudi aircraft have provided close-air support for tribal and al Qaeda fighters. Moreover, the Saudis have not conducted any airstrikes against al Qaeda troop concentrations or the weapons stockpiles and heavy weapons systems the group has captured. And while the United States has conducted a few airstrikes against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula using unmanned aerial vehicles in Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt province, these strikes have had no impact al Qaeda's control of the area. Delegations from the Sons of the Hadramawt have traveled to Riyadh to confer with the Saudis. The Saudis accordingly seem to see al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula as part of the mainstream anti-Houthi resistance.

Outside of Syria and Yemen, al Qaeda also received a boost in mid-May when high-profile Sahel-based jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar denied that his faction of al-Mourabitoun had joined the Islamic State. In late May, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan issued a 60-page statement rejecting the Islamic State's caliphate and listing errors in al-Baghdadi's claim to be caliph. The statement also reaffirmed the Pakistani Taliban's relationship with al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Afghan Taliban's Mullah Mohammad Omar. The move by the Pakistani Taliban is important, because it counters the pledge made by a small group of Pakistani Taliban leaders to al-Baghdadi in January and signals that the powerful Pakistani Taliban will not be defecting to the Islamic State en masse. As George noted in his net assessment, the Islamic State is confined in a cauldron and is

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trapped between hostile forces. Despite its apocalyptic ideology, the leadership of the Islamic State core group is very worried about its survival , and it is pressing hard to publicize its gains while glossing over its losses. However, despite its propaganda hype, the group has suffered substantial losses of men, resources and territory over the past year. The fight to destroy them will take some time, but it will continue. In the meantime, the al Qaeda leadership must be relieved that it is no longer the sole focus of the international anti-jihadist campaign. The support it will receive as part of the opposition in Syria and Yemen will help ensure that al Qaeda does not totally fade away. In fact, given these circumstances, it is entirely possible that al Qaeda could outlast the Islamic State and remain the dominant strain of global jihadism. 

Why al Qaeda survives the assassination of its leaders Summary: Stratfor gives an answer to an oddity of US geopolitical strategy. We have killed so many enemy leaders, yet the flames of fundamentalist Islam continue to spread. See the links at the end for other explanations. But the answers matter not, as our foreign wars run beyond beyond logic — and beyond our control.  Why Ideologies Outlive Ideologues, By Scott Stewart at Stratfor, 18 June 2015 “Killing ideologies is harder than killing people.” Last week I made this statement when I was writing about how the al Qaeda form — or brand — of jihadism should not be written off as dead. It is quite possible that the al Qaeda brand of jihadism could even outlast that of its competitor for jihadist hearts and minds: the Islamic State. The following points are among the several I made to support this argument: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has been able to gain considerable strength in Yemen’s current chaos, and high-profile Sahel-based jihadist Mokhtar Belmokhtar recently denied that he had sworn loyalty to the Islamic State.

However, these particular considerations seemed to dissolve this week when Libyan government officials announced that Belmokhtar had been killed by a U.S. airstrike June 14 and (C: AQ denies this) when Yemeni sources noted that the leader of AQAP, Nasir al-Wahayshi, had been killed by a U.S. airstrike June 9 (C: AQ confirms this). The death of Belmokhtar has not been confirmed. Jihadists associated with the Libyan militant group Ansar al-Sharia, which was reportedly involved in the attack on a U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi in 2012, provided a list of those killed in the airstrike in Libya that did not include Belmokhtar. It appears that Belmokhtar may once again have escaped an attack that was reported to have taken his life.

Conversely, AQAP’s al-Malahim Media released a video June 16 announcing al-Wahayshi’s death and his replacement, Qasim al-Raymi, one of the group’s founding leaders and the chief of its military operations. The video featured Khalid Bartafi, a senior jihadist leader who was one of some 300 hundred jihadists rescued from prison when AQAP conquered the eastern Yemeni city of Mukalla on April 2. As we have noted before, al-Wahayshi was an exceptional individual and an effective jihadist leader. However, the claims by some commentators that his death signifies the end of the global al Qaeda movement, or of AQAP, are vastly overstated. As demonstrated by the quick and orderly transfer of command, the organization that al-Wahayshi built is strong and has a deep roster of experienced jihadists.

The Death of a Prominent Jihadist Leader Certainly, al-Wahayshi was an important jihadist figure. After his 2006 escape from prison, he was able to forge a united group out of the fractious jihadist landscape in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. His united group then grew and gained operational momentum until it assumed a leading position on both the physical jihadist battlefield and the ideological battlefield. Following the Islamic State’s defection from the al

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Qaeda orbit and the establishment of an alternative ideological pole in the jihadist universe, al-Wahayshi and his group became an important counterweight to help slow the exodus of jihadists leaving al Qaeda for the Islamic State. AQAP reaffirmed al Qaeda’s philosophy of jihad and the importance on focusing jihadist efforts on the far enemy — the United States and its European allies. Because of this, it will be hard to replace al-Wahayshi. At the same time, the jihadist movement has weathered the loss of a number of influential individuals, from the assassination of Abdullah Azzam to the arrests of the Blind Sheikh and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to the deaths of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and Osama bin Laden. Yet despite these losses, the ideology of jihadism has continued to flourish: New members have been recruited to the ideology and new leaders have stepped in to fill the voids left by their dead or imprisoned leaders. Jihadists today control far more territory than they did at the time of bin Laden’s death in May 2011.

Creating a Robust Organization As with the wider jihadist movement, AQAP has experienced a great deal of military and intelligence pressure — and loss — since its formation. Within the first month of its creation, one of the group’s four founding leaders, Mohammed al-Awfi, surrendered to Saudi authorities. Of the group’s four founding leaders, which included al Wahayshi, al-Raymi, and Said al-Shihri, al-Raymi is the only one still with the group. Al-Shihri was killed by an U.S. drone strike in July 2013. But the strength and resilience of the organization is no accident. Both al-Wahayshi and al-Raymi witnessed how the al Qaeda organization in Yemen crumbled after an airstrike killed Abu Ali al-Harithi in November 2002 and al-Raymi and several other al Qaeda colleagues were arrested the same month. They knew they needed to build an organization that was able to withstand such losses, and, according to some sources, this was a subject they discussed at length while still in prison planning their future organization.

Other AQAP leaders who have been killed by U.S. airstrikes include:Anwar al-Awlaki — English-speaking ideologue, recruiter; killed Sept. 30, 2011Samir Khan — Creator of Inspire Magazine; killed Sept. 30, 2011Adel bin Abdullah al-Abab — Chief of AQAP’s Sharia Council; killed October 2012Fahd al-Quso — Participated in USS Cole bombing; killed May 6, 2012Harith bin Ghazi al-Nadhari — Member of the Sharia Council; killed Jan. 31, 2015Ibrahim Suleiman al-Rubaish — AQAP’s Mufti, or religious official; killed April 12, 2015Nasser bin Ali al-Ansi — AQAP spokesman; killed April 22, 2015

AQAP has been able to recover and continue to function after multiple losses of its leaders because it was designed to have a clear chain of command and succession. Sometimes these transitions have gone smoothly, as seen by the group’s recent capitalization of the physical battlefield in eastern Yemen after civil war and Saudi airstrikes plunged the country into chaos. In other areas, the succession has not gone so smoothly: Inspire Magazine has never really recovered the vitality it had prior to Khan’s death. Nevertheless, unlike the leadership transition of the al Qaeda core from bin Laden to al-Zawahiri in 2011, which took several months, the transition to al-Raymi was efficient, and Khalid Bartafi, another senior member of the group, quickly announced the new leader. There was no sense of doubt or indecision. This assertiveness is important because the group is threatened by U.S. airstrikes and by the ideological threat posed by the disaffected al Qaeda members who have created a nascent Islamic State franchise in Yemen.

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Loyal to the al Qaeda Core The transition to al-Raymi’s leadership means that AQAP will remain firmly in the al Qaeda orbit. According U.S. government records, al-Raymi spent time fighting with al Qaeda units supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan, and even worked as a trainer at al Qaeda’s al-Farouq training camp, and another camp near Kabul called Training Center No. 9. He was also reportedly responsible for helping Yemeni jihadists return to Yemen from Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban government. Al-Raymi was reportedly arrested in November 2002 for participating in a plot to kill the U.S. ambassador in Yemen and remained in prison until his 2006 escape. Al-Raymi had known al-Wahayshi from Afghanistan and was reunited with him in prison after Iran extradited al-Wahayshi to Yemen in 2003. Al-Raymi was allegedly a driving force in planning and executing the prison escape that sprung the pair from a Yemeni prison along with 21 other jihadists, though there are persistent rumors that the escape plot was aided by corrupt officials. As previously noted, al-Raymi worked hand-in-glove with al-Wahayshi to create AQAP. While al-Wahayshi was the organizer, al-Raymi has been the military brains of the group, both in terms of training and in planning and executing operations. While al-Wahayshi was the group’s administrator, al-Raymi was the group’s general. Given this background, there is nothing to suggest that al-Raymi will stray from the al Qaeda ideological line. Besides, with his younger brother Ali in captivity in Guantanamo Bay, al-Raymi has the motivation to focus on attacking the far enemy.

Al-Raymi’s ideological adherence to the al Qaeda core’s targeting guidance was perhaps most evident in the video he made apologizing to the victims of an attack against the Yemeni Ministry of Defense compound in Sanaa on Dec. 5, 2013. Al-Raymi said in the video that the team of attackers had been instructed to avoid the mosque and the hospital in their assault on the compound but that one of the attackers disobeyed those orders and attacked the hospital. Al-Raymi offered to pay restitution to the families of the victims for the mistake, a targeting philosophy clearly in keeping with Ayman al-Zawahiri’s “General Guidelines for Jihad” that was published in August 2013. Bartafi and AQAP’s high-profile bomb maker Ibrahim Hassan Tali al-Asiri also appear to be firmly in the al Qaeda camp ideologically.

AQAP has also made several statements criticizing the Islamic State for its attacks that intentionally target Muslims and the places of worship of non-Muslims, things the al Qaeda targeting guidance forbids. While the authors of those statements, al-Ansi and al-Nadhari, are now dead, there is little doubt that the statements also reflect the opinions of other members of AQAP’s Sharia and Shura councils.

Ideologies are far harder to kill than individuals. This fact is especially true for an ideology that teaches adherents that there is a war against Islam, that “true believers” will be persecuted for their beliefs, and that encourages followers to embrace and even celebrate martyrdom. Al-Wahayshi’s death will not lead to the death of the global jihadist ideology — or of the militancy that emanates from that ideology — any more than the deaths of Azzam or bin Laden did. A man is dead, but the ideology he promoted and the organization he founded clearly live on.

June 25, 2015 Special Dispatch No.6083 Al-Qaeda's 'Resurgence' Magazine Features Posthumously Released In-Depth Interview With Al-Qaeda Media Operative Adam Gadhan

The following report is a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). On June 25, 2015, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)

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published a special edition of its English-language magazine, Resurgence, featuring a lengthy interview with Adam Gadhan, the American Al-Qaeda operative who played a leading role in its media apparatus. In the interview, which stretches over 80 pages, Gadhan touches on his youth and conversion to Islam, his radicalization and turn to militancy, his experiences as a new recruit in Al-Qaeda's training camps, and on a wide range of issues concerning the global jihad movement, such as the attitude toward the Islamic State (ISIS).

The following is a review of the interview:[1]

Gadahn's Childhood And Upbringing In California

Gadhan begins the interview by speaking of his childhood and upbringing in California. He mentions that he did not attend school as a child, and accuses the American education system of being a main factor in corrupting the American youth: "There is no doubting the fact that schools — particularly American public schools — are one of the leading causes of the corruption of children's minds, values, morals, manners and health. Atheism, godlessness, sex, drugs, petty and violent crime, disease, junk food: you name the vice, you'll find it at school and be taught all about it..."

Gadhan discloses that he did not have many friends and explains the peculiar part religion played in his upbringing, until he finally fully embraced Islam. Although his parents did adopt Muslim names and some customs, they did not consider themselves Muslim. Gadhan explains that as a youth he was exposed to Islamic proselytizing texts on the Internet, which convinced him to convert to Islam. He speaks of his encounters with different schools of Islamic thought in California, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tableeghis, Hizb Al-Tahrir, Salafis, and more.

Gadahn mentions that he was first drawn to the ideology of global jihad when he encountered Muslims who lived in the U.S. who supported jihad, including some who had been to a jihad front before: "There were a handful of individuals in the area [southern California] who were inclined to Jihad and supportive of the Mujahideen. It was through these brothers — some of whom had actually been to places like Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya — that I was eventually directed towards Jihad." A great impact in this area came from Abu 'Aa'id al-Filisteeni (real name Khalil Said Al-Deek, aka "Joseph Adams"), a veteran of jihad in Bosnia and an acquaintance of 'Abdallah 'Azzam, who brought video recordings of the Bosnian jihad and speeches by 'Azzam back to the U.S. Al-Deek eventually facilitated Gadhan's travel to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region and his joining of jihad.

Gadhan says that "the urge to protect persecuted Muslims" and to help build the burgeoning Islamic state being built by the Taliban were the two reasons behind his decision to join the jihad. He then speaks of his experience at the jihadi training camps in Afghanistan in the late 90's, during which he received basic training and met with leading figures in the movement. He makes special mention of the time he spent with Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri's group fighting alongside the Taliban.

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Gadhan explains his decision to officially join Al-Qaeda after wandering between various groups in Afghanistan, a decision which was encouraged by his American counterpart Abu 'Aa'id: "Abu 'Aa'id advised me to join 'the Sheikh's group' — as we knew al-Qaeda then — rather than continue to float aimlessly between the various and sundry groups, camps and guesthouses which were scattered across the Afghan landscape." Gadahn also touches on the five points that distinguished Al-Qaeda at the time from other jihad groups:

1)      Its Global reach 2)      Its focus on the war against the U.S., the West ("Crusaders") and the Jews3)      The fact it did not have a written creed to which all members had to agree and sign on to4)      Its emphasis on public relations5)      Its particularly close ties to the Taliban

Joining Al-Qaeda And Meeting Osama Bin Laden After joining Al-Qaeda, Gadahn recalls starting a course in an Al-Qaeda training camp that was designed "to train new bodyguards for Sheikh Osama bin Laden." Gadahn recalls that the camp had a different purpose: "However, I later came to the conclusion — two years later, to be exact — that it was meant to train the 'muscle men' for the September 11th operations!" Gadahn recalls meeting Osama bin Laden several times. He recalls one instance in particular in 1999, on the same day when bin Laden was famously filmed shooting an AK47 from a crouched position. Gadahn describes bin Laden as a good shooter, and as a caring leader, who always paid attention to his men.

Mullah Omar And The Taliban

Gadahn recounts the story of how he started to work for the Taliban English-language magazine "The Islamic Emirate," where he proofread, translated, and wrote some articles.

When asked about meeting Taliban leader Mullah Omar, Gadahn remembers only seeing him once, in a mosque

in Kandahar. He also states that, while he did not actually meet him, seeing Mullah Omar "made quite an impression" on him. Gadahn relays anecdotes he had heard about Mullah Omar. For example, he says that "the military ruler of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, sent Ameer-ul-Momineen [Mullah Omar] a gift of an armor-plated, bulletproof Mercedes-Benz sedan or limousine worth about one million dollars for Ameer-ul-Momineen's own personal use. Ameer-ul-Momineen not only didn't use the vehicle himself, he also prohibited it to be used by any other official in the Emirate, and told them, 'A luxury vehicle like this isn't appropriate for us.'"

Gadahn also mentions former British journalist Yvonne Ridley, who converted to Islam after she was released from captivity in Afghanistan under a direct order from Mullah Omar, and recalls her story as an example of Mullah Omar's wisdom. Gadahn says that the prospects of the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan "look good." He also notes that the Taliban already holds large swathes of territory, making its return to power more realistic. "All the indicators point to the likelihood of the return of the Islamic Emirate bigger, better and stronger than ever before," he says. Gadahn also predicts that the Taliban's return to power

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will provide a "big morale booster and inspiration for Islamic resistance and jihad movements everywhere."

On The Taliban And Women Gadahn comes out in defense of the Taliban against the accusations that it was mistreating women. He dismisses such claims, and states that it was a case of "deliberate exaggerations or... malicious fabrications stemming from the animosity of the Crusader West, and those who revolve around it, towards Islam and Muslims in general and Islamic tenets like Hijab, separation of the sexes and prohibition of adultery and fornication in particular." Gadahn also accuses the media of distorting the Taliban's true position on women's issues: "Not only has the media covered up the Taliban's positions on female education and employment, it has also turned a blind eye to the sincere attempts made by the group to rid society of affronts to women's rights."

The Role Of Jihadi Media Gadahn emphasizes the importance of media in supporting Muslims and the mujahideen in the battle against their enemies: "It is so important for us as Muslims and as Mujahideen to fight the media war with every means at our disposal, so that the truth about us and our ideas, actions and objectives is disseminated and becomes available on as wide a scale as possible, and so that people realize the extent of the lies and slander spread by both the enemy forces as well as many of the mainstream corporate media outlets which pretend to adhere to journalistic ethics and standards." In another part of the interview, Gadahn speaks of his media role within Al-Qaeda, and responds to the allegations that he headed the Al-Qaeda media company Al-Sahab. Gadahn denies that he founded or acted as the head of Al-Sahab. He also notes that he did not start working for Al-Sahab until 2002 while he was in Karachi. Similarly, Gadahn denies being behind Resurgence magazine, and says that its idea was conceived by Al-Qaeda's Indian subcontinent branch (AQIS) and notes that its members were the producers and publishers of the magazine. 

Gadahn says his decision to start appearing in Al-Sahab productions came only after the FBI publically disclosed his name and picture in mid-2004. He also notes that his decision to do so came in part to "get back at the Americans for publicizing my identity and [to] make them regret it." Gadahn also says that his first interview had to be approved by bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and that he was subsequently encouraged by Al-Zawahiri to "start producing messages on a regular basis."

On The Importance Of Jihad In Afghanistan Gadahn considers the jihad in Afghanistan as the starting point of global jihad, and says that it provides Muslims with a place to gain experience. Gadahn also notes the global reach and impact of the jihad there: "The Afghan Jihad is the Jihad of the entire Ummah," he says. Gadahn praises the Taliban at length, insisting, for instance, that its decisions are made by a group of representatives who were chosen by the people. He also says that those representatives were the ones who chose Mullah Omar as a leader. Gadahn also explains that the Taliban have not imposed their ways on the Afghans, and that they have slowly educated the people on the right path.

Criticism Of The Islamic State (ISIS) Several pages of the interview are entirely dedicated to Gadahn's criticism of the Islamic State (ISIS), its methods, policies, and more. For instance, Gadahn harshly criticizes ISIS's decision to execute British aid worker Alan Henning, and says that "Islam doesn't call on us to treat all unbelievers alike." Gadahn also insists that Henning's killing was a political and religious mistake, and provides lengthy quotes from contemporary religious Salafi-jihadi scholars Abu Qatada Al-Filastini and Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi on the topic. Gadahn also criticizes ISIS's killing of Muslims, and says that "it has

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become clear that there are elements in this group and in its senior leadership [that] have little or no respect for the sanctity of Muslim life."

Gadahn also refutes ISIS ideology and accuses the group of being responsible for infighting between jihadi groups in Syria. He also accuses it of practicing baseless takfir of other Muslims and denounces it as being deviant. Gadahn says that one of its deviances was the declaration of the caliphate. He laments that ISIS has tarnished the image of jihad, and is distorting the caliphate image as well. Further, Gadahn provides other ISIS deviancies, including killing Muslims; refusing to abide by a shari'a decision during the infighting in Syria; refusing to take advise from known scholars; extremist use of takfir; attempting to impose its own leadership over other groups without consultation; and promoting dissent among other jihad groups by urging members of those groups to defect. Despite his criticism, Gadahn insists that the deviances within ISIS come only from its current leadership, while, on the other hand, he praises the leadership and wisdom of former ISIS leader Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi, whom he personally met in Afghanistan. For example, Gadahn asserts that, unlike current ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, Al-Zarqawi had no interest in fighting minority groups such as the Yazidis, Manaeans, and Christians of Iraq.

In a separate part of the interview Gadahn reiterates his criticism of ISIS, accusing the group of being extremist and irresponsible in its decisions and behavior in general: "The Ummah's jihad is not a video game," he says, "It is real life, with real consequences." Gadahn also accuses ISIS of committing crimes against Muslims: "While no one can deny the considerable strength and prowess of the Islamic State group in military terms, at the same time, the crimes it has committed against Muslims cannot simply be overlooked or forgotten with time, because in Islam there is no statute of limitations."

Gadahn advises fighters outside Iraq and Syria against joining ISIS, while maintaining that there is no Islamic justification for what ISIS is doing. Gadahn further encourages interested parties to join other Islamist groups, which, he says, are closer to the truth, and who can more readily achieve the objectives of jihad. Gadahn nonetheless makes it clear that Al-Qaeda is against any Western aggression on Iraq and Syria, and that the West, namely the anti-ISIS coalition, is merely a pretext which is being exploited to divert attention away from the U.S.'s humiliating withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Gadahn rejects allegations that ISIS and the support it had received thus far had greatly undermined Al-Qaeda and says that such claims are merely propaganda. He also asserts that Al-Qaeda is still around, and is stronger than ever. Gadahn also speaks of terrorist attacks that were carried out in the West in the name of ISIS, noting the attack on the Canadian parliament in particular. Gadahn welcomes any attacks against the West, reiterating Al-Qaeda's repeated calls for such attack, while calling upon Muslims living in the West to carry out attacks at home instead of traveling to Syria or Iraq to join ISIS: "We in A-Qaeda have been consistent in calling for attacks on America and its Crusader allies, and it's no secret that Canada is complicit both in the American invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as well as the new Crusade against Iraq and Syria, and that makes it a legitimate target for the Mujahideen, whether groups or individuals. That's why we support these operations and ask Allah to accept those who carried them out as martyrs. And my advice to Muslims in the West who are thinking of going to Syria or Iraq to join the Islamic State group is to instead follow in the footsteps of these two brothers and carry out armed attacks against the enemies at home."

Gadahn Denies Existence Of "Khorasan Group" Gadahn denies the presence of what media and government reports called the "Khorasan Group" in Syria and notes that Jabhat Al-Nusra (JN) and the Khorasan Group were, in fact, the same entity. Gadahn also accuses the U.S. of inventing the Khorasan Group to justify bombing JN without being accused of direct involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Gadahn: "Jihad Against The Regime In Damascus Remains The Most Important Battle For The Muslim Ummah In Decades" Gadahn emphasizes the role of jihad against the Syrian regime: "Despite [having] been pushed from the headlines... and despite the setbacks it has suffered, there is still a legitimate defensive jihad underway in Syria against Bashar Al-Assad and his family, allies, and backers," he says. Gadahn also calls the jihad against the Syrian regime "most important battle" for Muslims in decades, and that its outcome will determine the "liberation of Palestine and Al-Quds from the Zionist occupation." Yet, Gadahn doubts that liberation is going to happen soon; however, he notes, for example, the "raising of the flag of the Syrian revolution over the Quneitra [border] crossing with the occupied Golan Heights" as a "good omen." Gadahn also hopes for unity among the mujahideen in Syria: "One can't say it enough: groups, organizations and emirs are not things to be fought for: rather, they are means to an end." He also hopes that the mujahideen's momentum in Syria will pick up again so that their gains wouldn't have been for nothing.

On Jihad Against India And Bangladesh Gadahn notes India's collaboration and ties with what he calls the global Zionist Crusader coalition. He also notes India's growing ties with China. In addition, Gadahn mentions India's oppression of Muslims in Kashmir and elsewhere in the country, and calls for attacks on India: "It becomes clear that the mujahideen have no choice but to make targeting India one of their most urgent priorities." Addressing the

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situation in Bangladesh, namely its secular regime, which is repressive towards Muslims and backed by India and the U.S., Gadahn urges Muslims there to use da'wa and jihad to respond the challenges facing them. In addition to exposing the regime's crimes, he says, Muslims should use "all legitimate means to combat the regime, especially military action against its international backers like America and India..."

 Endnote:

[1] The original English-language quotes have been lightly edited for standardization and clarity.

Djibouti (HAN) June 11, 2015 – Public Diplomacy and Regional Geopolitical intelligence report. By. BEN HUBBARD. Al Qaeda is Down, but Not Out. Al Qaeda Tries a New Tactic to Keep Power: Sharing resources It (Oil & Money in Yemen). After they routed the army in southern Yemen, fighters from Al Qaeda stormed into the city of Al Mukalla, seizing government buildings, releasing jihadists from prison and stealing millions of dollars from the central bank. Then they surprised everyone. Instead of raising their flags and imposing Islamic law, they passed control to a civilian council and gave it a budget to pay salaries, import fuel and hire teams to clean up garbage. The fighters receded into the background, maintaining only a single police station to arbitrate disputes. Al Qaeda’s takeover of Yemen’s fifth-largest city in April was the most direct indication yet that the group’s most potent regional affiliates are evolving after years of American drone strikes killing their leaders and changing to meet the challenge posed by the Islamic State’s competing and land-grabbing model of jihad.

While the image of Al Qaeda has long been one of shadowy operatives plotting international attacks from remote hide-outs, its branches in Yemen and Syria are now increasingly making common cause with local groups on the battlefield. In doing so, they are distancing themselves from one of Osama bin Laden’s central precepts: That fighters should focus on the “far enemy” in the West and not get bogged down in local insurgencies.

In recent weeks, the Qaeda affiliate in Yemen has allied with armed tribes to fight Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, putting that alliance on the same side of the country’s civil war as the United States and Saudi Arabia. In Syria, Qaeda-allied fighters are important members of a rebel coalition against President Bashar al-Assad that includes groups supported by the West. This strategy has clear benefits for a group that has long been near the top of the United States’s list of enemies by allowing it to build local support while providing some cover against the threat of foreign military action. But despite Al Qaeda’s increased involvement in local battles, American officials say the group remains committed to attacking the West, a goal that could be easier to plot from sanctuaries where it enjoys local support.

Cooperating with others could also give Al Qaeda a long-term advantage in its competition with the extremists of the Islamic State, analysts said. Since its public break with Al Qaeda last year, the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, has stolen the jihadist limelight by seizing cities in Syria and Iraq and declaring a caliphate in the territory it controls. This has won it the allegiances of other militant cells from Libya to Afghanistan. The Islamic State has insisted that other groups join it or be considered enemies, a tactic that has alienated many in areas it controls. And its public celebration of violence, including the beheading of Western hostages, helped spur the formation of a United States-led military coalition that is bombing the group.

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Al Qaeda’s branches in Syria and Yemen have taken a different route, building ties with local groups and refraining from the strict application of Shariah, the legal code of Islam, when faced with local resistance, according to residents of areas where Al Qaeda holds sway. When Al Qaeda took over Al Mukalla in April, it seized government buildings and used trucks to cart off more than $120 million from the central bank, according to the bank’s director, Abdul-Qader Foulihan. That sum could not be independently verified. But it soon passed control to a civilian council, giving it a budget of more than $4 million to provide services, an arrangement that made sense to local officials seeking to serve their people during wartime.

“We are not Qaeda stooges,” said Abdul-Hakeem bin Mahfood, the council’s secretary general, in a telephone interview. “We formed the council to avoid the destruction of the city.”

While the council pays salaries and distributes fuel, Al Qaeda maintains a police station to settle disputes, residents said. It has so far made no effort to ban smoking or regulate how women dress. Nor has it called itself Al Qaeda, instead using the name the Sons of Hadhramaut to emphasize its ties to the surrounding province. One self-described Qaeda member said that the choice of name was deliberate, recalling that after the group seized territory in southern Yemen in 2011, the country’s military had mobilized to push it out with support from the United States. “We were in control for a year and six months, we applied God’s law, we created a small state and the whole world saw it, but they did not leave us alone,” the man said in an interview with a Yemeni television station. “So we came here with the name the Sons of Hadhramaut, but the people here know who we are.”

American officials have long considered the terrorist group’s Yemeni branch, known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the most dangerous to the West. It has sought to carry out attacks against the United States, and it retains sophisticated bomb-making expertise.Now, Yemen’s civil war has given the group an opportunity to expand, analysts said. After Houthi rebels seized the Yemeni capital and forced the president into exile, Saudi Arabia began leading a bombing campaign aimed at pushing the Houthis back. With all that going on, no one has tried to dislodge Al Qaeda from Al Mukalla, although American drone strikes have killed top Qaeda leaders nearby.

April Longley Alley, a Yemen analyst with the International Crisis Group, said there was reason to worry that the close ties between Qaeda fighters and other armed elements meant that any foreign military support given to fight the Houthis could eventually end up in Al Qaeda’s hands. “It is very likely that if the war continues, we’ll see a dynamic like we have seen in other parts of the region, where money and arms given to an opposition movement bleed out to other groups,” she said.

An American intelligence official said that Al Qaeda’s senior leadership had suffered losses in recent years, diminishing its importance and giving greater autonomy to the affiliates, some of which still pursue attacks on the United States and its allies. While Qaeda networks in South Asia and North Africa have struggled to recover from the losses of leaders, resources and territory, Yemeni and Syrian branches have “gained momentum and, in some cases, more resources due to ongoing instability,” the official said, on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak to journalists.

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Syria’s Qaeda affiliate, the Nusra Front, has made itself an essential component of the rebel forces seeking to oust Mr. Assad. It recently joined a rebel coalition called the Army of Conquest, putting itself in the same trenches as groups that receive support from the West. “They are Muslims, no different from us,” said Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the Nusra Front’s leader, in a recent interview with Al Jazeera. He also said his group had been ordered by Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda’s global leader, not to carry out foreign attacks that could disrupt the fight against Mr. Assad. American officials called that propaganda, and the United States has bombed Nusra bases, saying it is targeting operatives focused on attacking the West. But the strikes have been criticized by other rebels, reflecting the Nusra Front’s importance to the rebel cause. The group has worked to strengthen those ties to bolster its might against the government and the Islamic State, according to a Nusra Front coordinator based in northern Syria. Such cooperation also allows the group to benefit from arms given to other rebels. “The mujahedeen need sophisticated weapons, and the West provides these weapons to whomever it thinks is able to carry out its agenda,” said the coordinator, who goes by the name Abu Omar al-Muhajir and was interviewed via text message.

Civilians living in Nusra Front areas, too, say the group has built local support, refraining from imposing Shariah when residents resisted. Meanwhile, its fighters have distributed food and fixed plumbing systems. In the village of Binnish, it recently fielded a team in a friendly soccer match against another rebel group. Nusra’s team wore fatigues in line with Islamic modesty, and it lost against players wearing shorts. “Nusra are not extremists,” said an activist who attended the game and gave only his first name, Najid. “They distribute leaflets at checkpoints and call people to the religion.” Others worry that the group is merely laying the groundwork to eventually impose its will. “I am worried that after all the gains the Nusra Front has made in the past four months and the notable increase in popular support, locals will tolerate and accept the Nusra Front’s way of governing the liberated areas,” said Hasan al-Ahmed, an activist in the town of Kafr Nubul. Karam Shoumali contributed reporting from Istanbul, Hwaida Saad from Beirut, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.

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