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Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-122-Caliphate-al-Zawahiri-10-8-Russia

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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.

If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.” ― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Russia's Military Will Get Bigger, Better, Equipped and TrainedDeputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin joked that "tanks don't need visas".

 

Russia: US Military Plan Is 'Confrontational'

July 3, Putin biding his time 1 ? New evidence is exposing Russia's deepening role in the conflict in eastern Ukraine, suggesting Vladimir Putin may be preparing to gobble up more territory undeterred by NATO -- as a new U.S. military document highlights the extent of Moscow's aggression. Bloomberg View reported that Ukraine security officials have found five Russian generals are playing a lead role commanding separatist units inside the country, despite Kremlin denials. This comes as aerial video shot by a drone -- and provided by pro-Ukraine fighting units -- depicts the build-up of a Russian military base with tanks and other gear in eastern Ukraine.  "We see a more assertive Russia trying to intimidate neighbors and change borders," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recently said. The NATO secretary general spoke after inspecting one of six new forward bases the alliance is building in Romania and the neighboring Baltics -- a response to Russia's actions in Ukraine. It's the biggest reinforcement of NATO's collective defense since the end of the Cold War.  Whether it will be enough remains to be seen. Retired Maj. Gen. Bob Scales, a Fox News military analyst, said that western action may be no more than a "pinprick" at this stage and that Putin's got five or six "modernized divisions" on the Ukrainian border.  Meanwhile, the U.S. military released an updated "National Military Strategy" which mentioned Russia seven times -- even more than it cited the Islamic State threat.

Pentagon Releases National Military Strategy, By Aaron Mehta July 2, 2015     "We now face multiple, simultaneous security challenges from traditional state actors and transregional networks of sub-state groups — all taking advantage of rapid technological change," Dempsey continued. "We are more likely to face prolonged campaigns than conflicts that are resolved quickly."Later, the strategy authors note that "today, the probability of U.S. involvement in interstate war with a major power is assessed to be low but growing." However, "hybrid conflicts" — not just the Islamic State, but forces such as the Russian-backed rebels in Ukraine — are likely to expand. The full strategy document can be read here. http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/07/01/pentagon-releases-new-national-military-strategy/29564897/

1 http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/07/03/putin-biding-his-time-evidence-shows-buildup-russian-tanks-generals-in-ukraine/

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Russia: US Military Plan Is 'Confrontational' The document listing Russia as a 'concern' comes as relations between the two countries are at their lowest since the Cold War. The Pentagon strategy, released this week, says Russia has demonstrated a number of times that it doesn't respect the sovereignty of its neighbours and will use force to achieve its goals. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov hit back at the plan, saying it showed a "confrontational attitude, devoid of any objectivity towards our country". He added: "Of course this will hardly contribute to attempts to steer bilateral relations in the direction of normalisation." The document - the National Military Strategy of the United States, said: "Russia's military actions are undermining regional security directly and thorough proxy forces." The strategy also mentions Iran, North Korea and China as "providing challenges", adding that none of the countries were believed to be "seeking direct military contact" with the US or its allies. "Nonetheless, they each pose serious security concerns which the international community is working to collectively address by way of common policies, shared messages and coordinated action."

Russia’s Bankrupting Empire Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 121June 29, 2015 By: Matthew Czekaj (Source: exchangeratenews.com)Following the June 22 decision by the European Union to extend its sanctions on Russia for another six months, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev soberly declared two days later that the country’s faltering economy would force the government in Moscow to make some difficult choices regarding meeting its spending commitments. Citing the negative impact of the West’s sanctions—passed in response to Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine—as well as low oil prices, which have been squeezing government revenues, Medvedev noted, “We all need to assess the existing risks realistically. The budget parameters largely depend on the current economic situation” (RIA Novosti, June 24). He further warned that Russia has few current opportunities to increase the state’s finances, which may necessitate carrying out highly unpopular measures like cutting back on pensions (Interfax, June 24). The Kremlin attempted to paint a much rosier picture. Dmitry Peskov, the spokesperson for the Russian presidential administration, declared that Moscow’s decision to extend its own counter-sanctions on European imports would be healthy for Russia’s economy because the country could rebuild its domestic industry to replace the now banned imports from the West—the so-called strategy of “import substitution” (Interfax, TASS, June 24). However, mounting evidence suggest that the reality is much more likely to reflect Medvedev’s gloomy predictions over the Kremlin’s bombastic defiance. Not only are the government’s vaunted promises of the benefits of “import substitution” unlikely to make any substantial headway for many, many years, if at all (Windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com, Globalsib.com, January 20, 2015; see EDM, December 8, 2014; June 22, 2015), but Russia’s ruinous financial situation looks increasingly likely to break apart some of the final vestiges of Moscow’s imperial holdings—both at home and beyond the Russian Federation’s internationally recognized borders. Close to home, the impact of Western sanctions and low oil prices have already resulted in one region of the Russian Federation defaulting on its debts—the northwestern federal subject of Novgorod Oblast. Meanwhile, the ethnic republics of the volatile North Caucasus themselves represent a looming economic crisis. Each of the North Caucasus republics—Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan—draws more than half of its annual budget from the central government.

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Chechnya and Ingushetia are even more dependent, taking in over 80 percent of their revenues from Russia’s shrinking state coffers. With the weak economic situation continuing unabated and revenues from taxes plummeting, Moscow has had to prioritize its most vulnerable regions over their less conflict-ridden neighbors, which have been forced to borrow to make up the shortfall. But as North Caucasus scholar Valery Dzutsev notes, after 10–15 years of heightening these regions’ economic reliance on Russian subsidies, the sudden cut off from federal funds may result in uncontrollable popular unrest (see EDM, June 22). The country’s financial problems extend beyond its borders, to its client states and proxies, which make up what could be termed Russia’s external empire. Perhaps the most visible consequence of Russia’s economic decline is now playing out in Armenia. Thousands of Armenians have taken to the streets to protest proposed increases to their monthly electrical bills. The transmission firm Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA)—the local subsidiary of Russian electric power holding company RAO UES International—has tried to justify its latest price increase by claiming low profitability and overall losses, despite RAO UES’s published reports of fast growing revenues over the past year. According to analyst Armen Grigoryan, ENA’s financial losses were in actuality most likely the result of corrupt management and acquisition practices (see EDM, June 12). Still, Russia’s domestic energy market seems to be suffering its own fiscal crisis: as Deputy Energy Minister Vyacheslav Kravchenko noted on June 25, shortcomings in the collection of utility payments from Russian citizens and corporations has reached “catastrophic” levels. The energy companies’ debts have now exceeded 800 billion rubles ($14.6 billion)—including 200 billion rubles ($3.65 billion) for electricity, 400 billion ($7.3 billion) for heating, and 165 billion ($3.01 billion) for gas—because of Russians’ failure or refusal to pay (Interfax, June 25). Increasingly, therefore, markets in Russia’s “near abroad” represent a shrinking opportunity for Kremlin-connected businesses to make money as domestic prospects turn grimmer. Armenia, once the beneficiary of Russian economic subsidies and largesse, looks increasingly the victim of growing profiteering in the face of Russia’s economic decline at home. Russia’s financial troubles are also now negatively impacting its ability to continue to support its unrecognized proxy regimes across the post-Soviet space. Specifically, on June 17, the de facto government of Georgia’s breakaway region of Abkhazia—which Moscow recognized as “independent” in 2008—announced it was told it would not receive a promised Russian aid payment of 5 billion rubles ($91 million) until next year. Sukhumi had been expecting these Russian funds for the past six months, and its legislature recently passed Abkhazia’s annual budget with the expectation of receiving this money from Russia. Abkhazian politicians were furious at the news, some even pledging to never accept money from Moscow again; and the parliament will now need to rework its budget from scratch (Rezonansi, June 17). Across the Black Sea, in the unrecognized Moldovan region of Transnistria—whose annual budget relies 70 percent on subsidies from the Russian government (Osw.waw.pl, May 16, 2013; EurasiaNet, February 18, 2015)—the economic news has also been gloomy. According to Moldovan TV (June 17), the breakaway territory’s budget revenues have dropped 30 percent since last year, and its government has said it may have trouble paying all pensions in 2015. If Tiraspol fails to make good on its welfare payments, the resulting popular discontent could possibly transform into wide-scale street protests. In the West, much ink has been spilled debating the effectiveness of sanctions on crippling the Russian economy and their usefulness in reversing Moscow’s aggressive policies in Ukraine (Ecfr.eu, June 2015; Chathamhouse.org, June 8). However, relatively little attention has been paid to how Russia’s economic troubles are affecting its ability to maintain social cohesion at home and loyalties abroad. In other words, as recent developments make clear, Russia is increasingly forced to prioritize its once lavish financial support for its federal subjects and

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foreign clients; and this is likely to have a centrifugal effect on both its internal and external imperial holdings. Punitive Western sanctions, coupled with low oil prices, may not dissuade Russia from intimidating Europe’s East in the short term, but in the long term they appear to be contributing to the fracturing of Vladimir Putin’s vaunted idea of a “Russian world.”

Financial Defaults May Loom for North Caucasian RepublicsPublication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 116June 22, 2015 By: Valery Dzutsev

(Source: dcclothesline.com) Russian news agencies reported in early June that Novgorod Oblast in central Russia had become the country’s first region to default on its financial obligations. An official from the Novgorod financial department told RBK news agency that the region failed to make a payment of $33 million to the Russian state bank VTB (Rbc.ru, June

9). VTB Group is the second largest financial institution in the country and the Russian state is its primary stockholder (Vtb.ru, accessed June 22).

Russian authorities, however, appeared reluctant to admit Novgorod’s financial default. Meanwhile, Standard & Poor’s credit rating agency said that Russia’s federal government has prescribed inflexible social welfare expenditures for the regions, but is unlikely to be able to provide them with adequate budgetary funds, so the regions increasingly borrow to fulfill their obligations. Moreover, even when the government has the funds to prop up the regions, the assistance often arrives only after the region is hit by a payments crisis (Rbc.ru, June 9).

The political damage done by regions defaulting is quite severe in Russia because it undermines the government’s paternalistic model of economic development. It is notable how reticent government officials and even VTB representatives were about Novgorod’s default. The S&P report stated that “at least one region” has defaulted on its obligations since the start of 2015 (Cbonds.com, June 4).

In fact Novgorod Oblast is by no means in the worst financial situation among Russia’s regions. At this stage of Russia’s economic crisis, regional defaults are caused primarily by the central government’s propensity to order the regions to provide social welfare without giving them resources to do so, and to be late in helping the regions when they are facing difficult circumstances. However, the situation is projected to deteriorate further as Russia continues to be the target of Western economic sanctions over its aggressive actions in Ukraine.

The North Caucasian republics are among the most economically vulnerable in the Russian Federation to the fluctuations of government revenues. More than 50 percent of the budget revenues in each of the seven republics in the region—Adygea, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya and Dagestan—come from Moscow. However, Moscow’s handouts have been shrinking in the current economic environment, forcing some republics to step up their borrowing. The current financial slump appears to be deepening because of the lag between the plummeting industrial output, the decrease in tax revenues and subsequent shrinking of government budgets (Ranepa.ru, June 11). In an interview with the Russian publication The Insider, Natalya Zubarevich, the well-known Russian economist who is an expert on the country’s regions, said that financial defaults in the regions can be only “technical”: the Russian government is unwilling to admit defaults of regions for political reasons. According to the economist, one of the worst

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consequences of the economic crisis is the rise of uncertainty, particularly over the government’s economic policies (Theins.ru, June 11). President Vladimir Putin demonstrated the government’s view of the economy recently at the St. Petersburg economic forum, saying that Russia was successfully weathering the crisis, despite reports about Russian regions running out of money (Novaya Gazeta, June 19).

According to the latest data, the North Caucasus leads the Russian Federation in only one indicator—life expectancy. According to all other socio-economic indicators, the region lags behind the rest of the country. Dagestan places 80 th among Russia’s 85 regions in terms of per capita production of goods and services. Low as it is, Dagestan’s indicator of goods and services production is twice as high as that of its two neighbors, Chechnya and Ingushetia, both of which also have the highest degree of dependency on handouts from Moscow—over 80 percent of their budget revenues come from the central government. Even relatively well-off North Caucasian republics like North Ossetia have quite poor economic indicators, especially in terms of dependency on the central government and having a level of regional government debt (Kavkazskaya Politika, June 17).

Moscow’s strategy of resource reallocation has been predictable, but may be quite unsustainable. The Russian government resolved to invest more in unstable republics of the North Caucasus and sideline the stable republics. For example, conflict-ridden Ingushetia’s budget for 2014 reached an estimated $600 million (Garant.ru, January 17). The budget for relatively quiet North Ossetia that year was slightly less—$500 million (RIA Novosti, November 11, 2014). While North Ossetia’s population is nearly twice that of Ingushetia—700,000 versus 400,000—per capita budget resources in Ingushetia were twice as high as those in North Ossetia.

Moscow’s rationale for its policy toward the regions, especially the North Caucasus, may be that the greater their dependency on the central government, the greater their loyalty. While that has worked fairly well for Moscow over the past 15–20 years, this model of relations appears to be under strain as government revenues are projected to decrease. Moscow certainly can afford to discriminate between various republics within the North Caucasus, as in the case of Ingushetia and North Ossetia. Russian ethnic majority regions, however, are unlikely to tolerate such discrepancies in a time of crisis.

Moscow Reluctant to Permit Cooperation between Crimea and the North Caucasus Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 118 June 24, 2015 By: Valery Dzutsev

Aliy Totorkulov, head of the Russian Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus (Source: vestnikkavkaza.net)Following last year’s annexation of Crimea, Russia’s initial tactic was to propagate multiple connections between the people on the peninsula and the country’s population. A year later, North Caucasian activists say that the Russian government is insulating Crimea from

the North Caucasus and preventing the two regions from cooperating and developing relations. The head of the Russian Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus, Aliy Totorkulov, warned that resolving the problems of Crimea without taking into consideration the problems of the North Caucasus would be impossible. According to Ruslan Kurbanov, a senior fellow at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Oriental Studies, “Crimea and the Caucasus historically were not simply close to each other, they comprised a single cultural space, within which the peoples of the Caucasus–Black Sea region formed. Family, economic, spiritual and

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cultural ties between Crimea and the Caucasus are stronger even than those between many peoples of Europe” (Onkavkaz.com, June 17).

The Crimean peninsula is indeed an extension of the Caucasus region geographically. It is not surprising that relations between the North Caucasians—specifically, the Circassians in the northwestern Caucasus—and the Crimean Tatars were historically quite strong. However, the ethnic structure of both Crimea and the northwestern Caucasus has changed profoundly since the Russian conquest of both areas. The most significant change took place in the northwestern Caucasus, where the Circassians were ethnically cleansed from their homeland after the Russian conquest of the 19 th century. Currently, ethnic Circassians comprise about a half a percent of the 5.2 million people of the Krasnodar region, which borders the Crimean peninsula (across the Kerch Strait). The Crimean Tatar population in Crimea is just over 12 percent of the peninsula’s two million people.

Since the annexation of Crimea, Moscow has significantly increased the level of repression against the Crimean Tatars. Now, they cannot even openly mark the anniversary of their deportation by Soviet authorities in 1944. A large rally in the center of the city of Simferopol had become a tradition for the Crimean Tatars to mark their mass deportation to Central Asia by Joseph Stalin on May 18, 1944. Since the annexation, however, the Russian occupying authorities have banned the commemoration and forced the Crimean Tatars to mark those events privately or in mosques (Kavkazskaya Politika, May 17).

In the North Caucasus, most of the ethnic groups that were deported by Stalin’s regime can still mark those events openly in public. Balkars in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachays in Karachaevo-Cherkessia, and Ingush in Ingushetia can openly commemorate their mass deportation by the Soviet authorities during World War Two. However, the anniversary of the mass deportation of Chechens became a controversial issue after the ruler of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, started persecuting activists for organizing public commemorations. Crimean activists, most of them Crimean Tatars, visited all of the republics of the North Caucasus and Stavropol region in August 2014. In the fall of 2014, activists from the North Caucasus, in return, visited Crimea. Both visits were organized and sponsored by the Altair Foundation and Aliy Totorkulov’s Russian Congress of the Peoples of the Caucasus. The delegation of North Caucasians met, among others, the governor of the Russian administration of Crimea, Sergei Aksyonov. Totorkulov reiterated his vision of Crimea as a region with close connections to the North Caucasus. In turn, Aksyonov said in his concluding remarks that he was prepared to devise an entire strategy for the development of socio-economic, educational and cultural ties with the republics of the North Caucasus and personally supervise the project (Onkavkaz.com, June 17). Totorkulov’s initiative was not the only one in the North Caucasus: Aksyonov visited Chechnya in June 2014, and Kadyrov vowed to invest in Crimea and develop its infrastructure (Yuga.ru, June 15, 2014; see EDM, March 26, 2014).

Despite numerous promises of expanding cooperation, ties between Crimea and the North Caucasus have not taken off. Crimea is experiencing serious economic issues due to the Russian-Ukrainian hostilities, economic sanctions against Russia by the West, specific economic sanctions against Crimean businesses, and the peninsula’s geographic isolation from the Russian mainland. Crimea has no land access to the rest of Russia, so a ferry link from Krasnodar region brings the majority of goods to the isolated peninsula. According to the journalist Alina Manafova, the last thing the Russian government wants to see is an increase in the influence of the North Caucasus. “Contemplating any possible strengthening of the influence of the North Caucasian republics, especially beyond the boundaries of the North Caucasus, is a real nightmare for every Russian official,” she wrote. “The same hysterical

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reaction of officials to any increase in the influence of the North Caucasian republics can be seen in Stavropol and Krasnodar regions” (Onkavkaz.com, June 17).

Signals from Moscow that the Russian Federation is a state for ethnic Russians inevitably increase nationalism among other ethnic groups of the country. The Kremlin’s gamble in Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, unintentionally raised issues within Russia that the country’s leadership does not seem to be willing to address (see EDM, March 12, 2014; April 7, 2014).

Erdogan and Putin Meet in Baku: Will the Balance of Power Change in the South Caucasus? Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 119June 25, 2015 By: Orhan Gafarli

Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin meet in Baku, June 13 (Source: report.az)After years of preparations, Azerbaijan is hosting the first ever European Games, which kicked off on June 12 and will end on June 28. Besides being a high-profile international sporting event, the Games also serve as an important symbol for Azerbaijan to prove its ties to the European community of states (Cbc.az, May 26).

The opening ceremony of the European Games attracted tens of thousands of live spectators to the Olympic Stadium in Baku, as well as a number of international leaders, including Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin, the presidents of Turkey and Russia—the two biggest geopolitical players in the Caucasus region. In addition to watching the ceremony, the two heads of state held talks in Baku on regional cooperation (Yeni Musavat, May 10). Reportedly, the Turkish and Russian presidents discussed the future of energy cooperation between the two countries, and in particular the development of the proposed Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline project. The two sides also discussed suggestions for preparing a roadmap on achieving consensus over the issue of the Syrian civil war, as well as the recent report prepared by the Turkish Foreign Ministry addressing the widespread Russian maltreatment of the Crimean Tatars, which was presented to Putin. Finally, Putin and Erdoğan also raised the topic of the Karabakh conflict (T24, May 13). The chosen location for Putin and Erdoğan’s meeting—the Azerbaijani capital of Baku—is noteworthy and strongly suggests the growth of potential trilateral cooperation in the South Caucasus among Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.

According to the Russian daily Kommersant, prior to their meeting in Baku, relations between Turkey’s President Erdoğan and Russian President Putin were incredibly strained as of late (Kommersant, May 15). Dr. Togrul Ismayıl, a Eurasian expert at the Ankara-based TOBB University of Economics and Technology, noted: “Turkey’s report on the violations of human rights in Crimea, which was prepared by Ankara, causes tensions in the bilateral relationship,” and as he pointed out, “these tensions began after Putin visited Armenia [to commemorate] the 100th anniversary of the Armenian genocide” (Author’s interview, June 15). Yet, despite these difficulties in bilateral relations, the presidents of Turkey and Russia still met face to face.

The Turkish-Russian relationship encourages close scrutiny because of its potential effect on the regional blocs that have grown up in the South Caucasus since the end of the Cold War. In particular, Turkish and Russian joint support for Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus may affect the resilience of the pre-existing security-focused geopolitical triangle of Ankara, Baku and Tbilisi (see EDM, March 11, 2014). Formed, to some degree, in

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opposition to the geopolitical grouping of Russia, Armenia and Iran, the Turkish-Azerbaijani-Georgian trilateral partnership has been engaged in security and economic integration, and its interests have heretofore been more closely aligned with the Euro-Atlantic community than with Moscow’s policies in the region.

TOBB University’s Dr. Ismayıl commented that, for now, the two rival regional blocs are mostly tolerating each other, sometimes turning a blind eye to their many political conflicts or simply keeping silent while considering their mutual economic interests. And although the growing potential for cooperation among Moscow, Ankara and Baku “is perceived as a positive signal, it is not a substitute for Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan’s [trilateral] cooperation, at the moment,” Ismayıl asserts (Author’s interview, June 15). Officially, Russia appears to have a somewhat different point of view on this issue, as illustrated by remarks made by Tural Kerimov, the editor-in-chief of Sputnik Türkiye—the Turkish-language service of the Russian multimedia news agency financed and run by the Kremlin. Kerimov describes the growing developments of Turkish-Russian-Azerbaijani relations as follows: “The policy of the Russian Federation shows that the period of geopolitical triangles is over. The world is moving toward ‘multipolarity’; and stability, economic cooperation and development will be established solely by taking into account [all countries’] interests.” According to the Turkish Sputnik editor, Russia is particularly keen on developing bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, in the South Caucasus, with the aim to entirely dispense with regional blocs. Growing cooperation between Turkey and Russia in the South Caucasus will certainly result in a shift in the power balance in this region, he argues. That is, the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia and the Russia-Armenia-Iran triangles will gradually loosen. By acting through its bilateral relations with all these states, Kerimov explains, Russia is keen on continuing its influence in the region by dissolving the regional blocs and preventing them from crystalizing again (Author’s interview, June 14).

Referring to the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan as well as between Russia and Turkey, Kerimov sees their cooperation developing within the context of larger regional integration efforts: “Two integration projects currently operate in the Eurasian region,” he argued, “These are the Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Russia is open to cooperate within the framework of these projects” (Author’s interview, June 14).

Indeed, the reality of the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union is gradually having a stronger influence on Baku’s own foreign policy thinking. Last May, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov represented Baku at the European Union’s 2015 Eastern Partnership summit in Riga. Azerbaijan did not sign any meaningful documents with the EU at the summit, and several days later, Foreign Minister Mammadyarov paid a working visit to Moscow (APA, May 23). In the Russian capital, Mammadyarov noted the impossibility for Azerbaijan to sign a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between Azerbaijan and the EU—which Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova had signed last year. Speaking to Russian reporters, Mammadyarov explained: “Azerbaijan is not satisfied with [the EU’s] Association Agreement [of which the DCFTA would be a part], because we are not a member of the WTO [World Trade Organization], and therefore a free trade zone can’t refer to Azerbaijan” (Report.az, May 26). Turning then to the Eurasia Union, he clearly stated: “Cooperation with the Eurasia Economic Union is possible but not before the resolution of the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, this is, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” (Yeni Musavat, May 27).

Mammadyarov’s visit to Moscow was an important expression of Azerbaijani foreign policy, underscoring Baku’s commitment to maintaining “balance” in its foreign relations. Yet, Azerbaijan’s continuing need to prove its multi-vectorism to Moscow, combined with

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Turkey’s growing willingness to cooperate with Russia on regional issues of concern may leave the Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi trilateral grouping vulnerable to disruption. And this threatens to redistribute the current balance of power within the South Caucasus.

Moscow Announces the Creation of Rapid Reaction Forces—Again Eurasia Daily Monitor -- Volume 12, Issue 107 Russia’s top brass re-announced the creation of rapid reaction forces, with overall numbers of up to 70,000, based upon the existing elite Airborne Forces (Vozdushno Desantnye Voyska—VDV).

(C: remember: Sep 2014, Nato to announce 4,000-strong rapid reaction force to counter Russian threat 2 - May 2015 The NATO Response Force (NRF) is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. In addition to its operational role, the NRF can be used for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology.)

The idea of creating such a capability is hardly new, but the timing of its latest incarnation is interesting in that it coincides with the summer combat training period and the ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Sources in the General Staff indicated that the VDV will be wholly integrated into the new rapid-reaction force, but the timing of its completion was less than clear. The commander of the VDV, Colonel-General Vladimir Shamanov, envisages the final force strength for the airborne troops of around 60,000; representing an increase of 15,000 (Argumenty i Fakty, June 4).  

General Shamanov suggested that the priority of the summer training cycle is to maintain momentum in developing the Russian military. Shamanov also commented that he was once asked about receiving a foreign travel visa, to which he responded by saying “we [VDV] do not need a visa, we need only the order of the supreme commander.” Part of the reason for the upsurge in training is also about preparing forces for forthcoming strategic-operational exercises; Tsentr 2015 and Union Shield 2015 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 5). 

Shamanov’s key message, however, is that the plans to develop rapid reaction force capabilities with the VDV serving as its backbone alongside Special Operation Forces, marine infantry and GRU Spetsnaz (military intelligence special forces) have resurfaced and appear to be nearing actual implementation. This prompted some Russian media commentaries to link the move to a political-military reaction to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) plans to form a “spearhead” element of its own rapid reaction forces in order to reinforce Baltic and Eastern European security. However, the actual sources of Moscow’s initiative seem rooted in the internal development of Russia’s Armed Forces, building on existing experience with other “rapid reaction” capabilities within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Russian threat assessments (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 1). Within the CSTO, for example, Russia already contributes forces from the VDV—the 98th Airborne Division and the 31st Air Assault Brigade—to the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (Kollektivnye Sil Operativnogo Reagirovaniya—KSOR). In May, the KSOR held a military exercise in Tajikistan, rehearsing deployment to reinforce the Tajikistani-Afghan border (Ozodi.org, May 18). Nevertheless, in the latest iteration of rapid reaction force planning, Shamanov believes that the VDV will gain tank battalions and, by 2020, be manned by 80 percent contract personnel (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, June 1). Efforts to raise the number of contract personnel in the VDV are consistent with plans to increase the proportion of contract servicemen in the Armed Forces in order to be less reliant upon conscripts; this is complemented by some shifts in recruitment and the use of

2 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/05/nato-4000-rapid-reaction-force-baltics-russia

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mobile and other static recruitment points and recruiting directly from the population (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 19).  

Underlying these developments and the various remarks by Shamanov is a tension within the force development of the VDV that reflects the wider issue with the overall Armed Forces: that is, between modernizing and adopting “command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” (C4ISR) or network-centric approaches to warfare, and relying on old-style combined arms and over-reliance upon tank-centric approaches. This is accomplished by increasing the number of personnel. The move is driven by adding tank support units into its order of battle and the introduction of the automated command-and-control system “Andromeda” to facilitate C4ISR and support a greater drive toward conventional network-centric capabilities and reduce reliance upon nuclear systems in an escalating conflict. Undoubtedly, the conservatives within the top brass will point to the role played in Donbas by Russian tank platforms. Yet, with the Kremlin sticking to “deniability” of Russian actions in Ukraine, any sense of debate may be publicly stifled. This leaves the modernizers claiming higher ground and pointing to the success of Andromeda as the way forward in modernizing the VDV (Vzglyad, May 6). 

In terms of a tank capability for the VDV, though not entirely new in itself (such as PT-76 or Sprut-SD light tank models), Shamanov says, “In the very near future we plan to acquire tank subunits in order to strengthen firepower.” It appears he advocates the addition of modern airdropped self-propelled artillery mounts, comparable to light tanks. Such tank units would include either a few vehicles or up to several dozen. This novelty is certainly attracting attention within the Russian military press. Colonel Valeriy Yuryev, Deputy Chairman of the Central Council of the Paratroopers’ Union of Russia, noted that, “Although during the time of the Soviet Union paratroopers executed tasks in the rear of the enemy in airdropped equipment, now the VDV is faced with tasks that are in part those of the Infantry Troops. Naturally, providing tanks will raise firepower and the anti-tank capabilities of VDV units and subunits” (Vzglyad, May 6). 

In stark contrast, the VDV is also adopting a new highly technically advanced automated command-and-control system—Andromeda. This has now gone beyond field testing, and its introduction into the branch of service will assuredly increase demand for tech-savvy contract personnel. Captain Vladimir Sankin, a VDV officer, described some of its elements. Andromeda is a fully domestically produced system, specially crafted for the needs of the VDV. Taking account of the VDV’s combat mobility, the Andromeda “provides effective management of units in any situation using the most modern digital telecommunications equipment, which includes radio operating in different bands, radio relay stations, space communications, command and staff vehicles of the latest generation,” Sankin explained. In order to operate the system, the operator requires “deep theoretical knowledge and practical skills.” Contract personnel and officers are responsible for training service personnel to handle the system, and to develop an understanding of its functions and its value. In short, at the levels of command, control and communications (C3), it introduces decision making in real time and makes a step toward Russian network-centric warfare capabilities (Krasnaya Zvezda, May 20). 

In the context of Moscow’s unacknowledged actions in Ukraine, the Russian General Staff may be drawing the conclusion that tank-centric approaches will remain important on Russia’s periphery for the foreseeable future. But the Andromeda and Shamanov’s renewed interest in enhanced rapid-reaction capabilities confirm continued tension between modernists and traditionalists within Russia’s military. Modeling the needs for future operations close to Russia will depend on how the General Staff assesses the performance of Russian forces in Ukraine. --Roger McDermott

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 10 of 12 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

4 July, ‘Keys to the Sky 2015’ Missiles from Russia’s international bestselling Pantsir-S1 system were fired during a large-scale contest that saw the country’s various air defense forces competing against each other.

A Pantsir-S1 combined short to medium range surface-to-air missile weapon system (RIA Novosti / Mihail Mokrushin) The professional competition for antiaircraft gunners – entitled ‘Keys to the Sky 2015’ – has been under way during the week in the Russian Republic of Buryatia, close to the Mongolian border. The large-scale drill pitted teams from the country’s various military districts and forces against each other as they tried to determine who is more skillful in taking out enemy aircraft and missiles “During the competition, crews conducted simulated launches against an opposing force's planes, whose role was taken on by crews of Su-30SM fighter jets and Su-25 attack aircraft of the Eastern Military District. They also conducted live missile launches

against targets, which imitated the flight and characteristics of modern and prospective means of aerial attack of an opposing force,” a Defense Ministry spokesman was cited as saying by Sputnik news agency. The Aerospace Defense Forces came out as winners in the competition, with Russia’s Eastern Military District taking second place and the Southern Military District completing the podium. Pantsir-S1 wasn’t

the only air defense system used during the exercise as S-400, S-300PS and S-300PM1 systems were also applied. Russia currently sells Pantsir-S1 to eight countries, including Brazil, Syria, United Arab Emirates and most recently, Iraq, which plans to use the system in the fight against the Islamic State jihadist group. International orders for the export version of the system have been booked up to 2019, Russian Deputy PM Dmitry Rogozin said earlier. According to media reports, the export price of a single Pantsir-S1 unit varies between $13 million and $15.5 million. The Pantsir-S1, or SA-22 Greyhound, according to NATO classification, was designed to provide point air

defense of military and civil installations against aircraft, helicopters, precision munitions, cruise missiles and drones. It can also be used to provide additional protection to air defense units from enemy air attacks, especially on low ranges. One of the system’s unique features is the ability to the ability to track and destroy targets, while being on the move. The modernized Pantsir-S2 air defense system is expected to enter service in the

Russian military later this year.

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 11 of 12 15/04/2023

By Capt (Ret) C de Waart, feel free to share: in Confidence

Cees: Intel to Rent Page 12 of 12 15/04/2023