Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-122-Caliphate-al-Zawahiri-10-12-Russia

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-122-Caliphate-al-Zawahiri-10-12-Russia

Putin said that ISIS has become a serious threat not only for the Middle East but also for the six CSTO countries. "The dimension of this organization's activity has gone far beyond the limits of Iraq and Syria," RIA Novosti cites Putin as saying. "They plan to spread their activity to Europe, Russia, Central and Southeast Asia. And we are preoccupied."

The point of departure for Putin’s intervention in Syria was the conclusion that Western policies for managing this disaster were in total confusion: as the US failed to defeat the Islamic State (IS) by its air campaign, while the European Union is overwhelmed by the inflow of refugees. Exploiting this confusion appeared easy because the moderate opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was in disarray, so close air support provided by a few squadrons of Russian jets should have made an offensive by government forces toward Aleppo swift and decisive

President Assad met with Russian President Putin in Moscow, in his first trip abroad since the start of the war in 2011. Oct 4, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has said Russia's military intervention in his war-torn country was vital for the entire Middle East, as Moscow ramped up its bombing campaign. In an interview with Iran's state television on Sunday, Assad said Syria's alliance with Russia, Iraq and Iran "must succeed, or else the whole region will be destroyed". "The chances of success for this coalition are great and not insignificant," he added

“Complete military victory for Assad, however, is impossible, and the Russians know it. Military success is only worth as much as can be translated into political leverage at the negotiating table” if Moscow becomes further drawn into the conflict marked by sending in larger numbers of Ground Forces, an “Afghan scenario” is the main danger.

The question of strategy remains equally unanswered, as the Kremlin’s approach to Syria leaves this unclear. Khodarenok cites the Soviet strategist Alexander Svechin, who noted that strategy is not unlike politics, in that often a chicken will hatch ducklings: in other words, consequences are not all similar to their causes

While the fear of falling into an “Afghan scenario” may limit Russian planning, the unpredictable risks of second- and third-order consequences may undermine the domestic popularity of the conflict.

Moscow’s military intervention in Syria has not simply overturned the fortunes of war and spread panic throughout the ranks of the jihadist groups. It has also shown the rest of the world the current capacities of the Russian army in situations of real warfare. To everyone’s astonishment, it has proved to possess a system of signal jamming capable of rendering the Atlantic Alliance deaf and blind. Despite a far superior budget, the United States have just lost their military domination.

Russian Memories of Soviet-Afghanistan Conflict Cloud Syria Operation More than 25 years after the Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan, Russia is engaged in an out-of-area operation beyond its frontiers. The Kremlin’s message alleges the air campaign is restricted to combatting the Islamic State in Syria though most of the sorties carry out strikes on the rebel opposition. However, the Kremlin has been clear that the campaign itself will be “temporary,” though

1The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see. –Winston ChurchillCees de Waart: CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 13

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this has been contradicted by top brass statements about the number of sorties reaching 300 daily at some point, and others indicating the future emergence of a “massive” air, land and sea military basing presence in Syria (Komsomolskaya Pravda, October 18). Nonetheless, among Russian defense and security specialists, there are certainly signs of unease concerning the Kremlin’s foray into the Middle East and widespread concern about its objectives and even the timescale of the air operations in support of Bashar al-Assad’s forces. Beyond Russian officialdom and the tightly controlled state media evidently intent on boosting the popularity of the military intervention in Syria’s civil war, experts debate and criticize the campaign across a wide range of issues and potential risks; one common theme is the national memory of Afghanistan and the risk of being drawn into an unwinnable war. Yet, the complexity of the operational environment is acknowledged in Russian experts’ discourse, as well as the difficulties in conducting such military operations far from Russia’s borders. Security scholar Alexei Arbatov considers that the intervention in Syria may be risky, though he sees no link between the war-torn eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas and the operation to prop up al-Assad. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his view, genuinely presented an alternative approach and possible means of cooperation with the United States, which had not been possible in Ukraine. Arbatov implies that the main “geopolitical” risk is that the US and Russia now operate parallel but quite different air campaigns in Syria (Kommersant, October 12). Mikhail Khodarenok, the editor of Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer and a member of the Moscow-based Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (SVOP), points to the difficulty in Russia’s military strategy as rooted in the condition of al-Assad’s armed forces: it is an unclear structure, with limited resources and riddled with internal contradictions. Moreover, it is an endlessly beaten army that has not tasted military victory. Khodarenok believes. “It will probably be rather difficult for them [al-Assad’s forces] to achieve any tangible operational results, and in addition to all this, offensive operations in urban conditions with dense built-up areas will lead to extremely palpable human losses in any scenario” (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, October 8). Risks also exist for the Russian operation linked to targeting and the potential strength of rebel forces. Military expert Colonel (retired) Viktor Murakhovskiy sees the Syrian Army’s main targets as the cities of Homs and Hama: “[T]he SAR [Syrian Arab Republic] Army would significantly improve its position [by capturing these two enclaves]. Of course, there is no question of a large-scale operation, only tactical tasks [that, when achieved, would allow] the Syrian Army [to] take full control of the country’s industrially developed west.” Murakhovskiy also points to the risk of friendly-fire incidents with Russian airpower attacking Syrian positions during ground offensives. Moreover, Murakhovskiy is convinced that a rebel counteroffensive will be bloody, as they will not flee from their positions, but will manage to organize a serious defense (Moskovskiy Komsomolets, October 8). Dmitry Trenin, the Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, argues that President Putin has engaged in a gamble in Syria that goes far beyond the country itself, presenting both opportunities and risks for Moscow in the Middle East. Trenin sees the military intervention as Russia’s first “US-style” war in which air strikes characterize a “no-contact” approach to warfare and reduce the risk of Russian causalities. In his view, commencing with the seizure of Crimea in March 2014, Russia has broken out of the post–Cold War world order, and engaged in differing types of conflict in Donbas and Syria to demonstrate this new reality. Trenin sees Moscow’s military strategy as aiming to soften up al-Assad’s enemies to enable an effective offensive, though he argues: “Complete military victory for Assad, however, is impossible, and the Russians know it. Military success is only worth as much as can be translated into political leverage at the negotiating table” (Tabletmag.com, October 13).


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The formidable challenges and risks facing the Russian military campaign, in the views of Russian defense specialists appear to hinge on the memory of the Afghanistan War; if Moscow becomes further drawn into the conflict marked by sending in larger numbers of Ground Forces, an “Afghan scenario” is the main danger. Navigating this risk will demand a political-military balancing act, which may prove more difficult the longer the campaign continues. Some experts see the main risks stemming from the air war becoming long and drawn out (with limited or no real value added on the ground) or avoiding military confrontation with Western powers. Others note the difficulty in finally finding a way to end the operation itself (Livejournal, October 8). Khodarenok ties concerns about the security of the airbase in Latakia and other Russian facilities to the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Force protection, in his view, must address the vulnerability of air assets during take-off and landing, the question of protective shelters at the Latakia base, and, indeed, how these platforms are used in operations. To date, most fixed-wing missions appear restricted to high altitudes and, despite claims to the contrary, use mostly unguided munitions. Questions also persist about the value of intelligence provided by Damascus, whose vested interest is to keep Russia in the conflict for ongoing support, in addition to the relatively small number of sorties compared to the US-led efforts against the Islamic State (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, October 5). Khodarenok also rightly highlights the supply and logistics challenges of the operation, since traditionally Russian military campaigns are heavily tied to the use of railways to move hardware, forces and supplies. The question of strategy remains equally unanswered, as the Kremlin’s approach to Syria leaves this unclear. Khodarenok cites the Soviet strategist Alexander Svechin, who noted that strategy is not unlike politics, in that often a chicken will hatch ducklings: in other words, consequences are not all similar to their causes (Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, September 30). While the fear of falling into an “Afghan scenario” may limit Russian planning, the unpredictable risks of second- and third-order consequences may undermine the domestic popularity of the conflict. --Roger McDermott

Putin’s Desperation Deepens as His Blunders Accumulate Russian foreign policy took an unexpected turn and suffered a serious setback last week when President Vladimir Putin suggested sending to Washington a delegation headed by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, which was firmly turned down by the United States government. The initiative was poorly prepared, and the fruits of Putin’s recent meeting with US President Barack Obama after their respective addresses to the United Nations General Assembly turned out to be quite sour; thus, it was hard to see any point in resuming this bilateral dialogue (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 16). Nevertheless, Putin declared he could not understand this refusal to talk, while Medvedev announced he was deeply offended and called the US’s position “weak” and “stupid” (RIA Novosti, October 16). The assumption that Washington would not dare reject Putin’s proposal betrays the Kremlin’s misunderstanding of the United States’ stance on the Syrian war—and also a delusion that Russia has regained a position of strength. The point of departure for Putin’s intervention in Syria was the conclusion that Western policies for managing this disaster were in total confusion: as the US failed to defeat the Islamic State (IS) by its air campaign, while the European Union is overwhelmed by the inflow of refugees. Exploiting this confusion appeared easy because the moderate opposition to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was in disarray, so close air support provided by a few squadrons of Russian jets should have made an offensive by government forces toward Aleppo swift and decisive (Gazeta.ru, October 14). However,


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Moscow apparently did not take into proper account the anger that such joint military operations undertaken by Russia and Iran would inspire within the Arab world. Therefore, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Mohammad bin Salman took time last week to explain these consequences to Putin (Newsru.com, October 12). Moscow also seemingly underestimated the anxiety and anger in Turkey about its bold intervention, and certainly did not expect that it could prompt Turkey and the EU to try to reach an agreement on the refugee problem (Kommersant, October 16). The US and the EU still do not have anything resembling a plan for bringing the civil war in Syria to an end, but every new day of Russian bombing strengthens the West’s conviction that rebuilding this devastated country can only start with the removal of the al-Assad regime. Putin has failed to convince the US and the EU to accept that the Russian intervention has turned the Syrian dictator into a necessary part of the solution for the catastrophe, for which al-Assad is ultimately responsible (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, October 12). The Russian leader has also failed, more broadly, to turn the Syrian intervention into a lever that would reverse the West’s position on the Ukraine conflict and make it accept the current ceasefire as a solution to this deadlocked problem (Slon.ru, October 16). Russia’s role in the Ukraine conflict was illuminated yet again last week: As the Dutch-led investigation of the downing of the MH17 flight on July 17, 2014, released its official report, on October 13, confirming the plane was struck by a Russian BUK surface-to-air missile, the Almaz-Antey corporation (the producer of the BUK system) attempted to counter the conclusions by presenting its own report. Yet, the Almaz-Antey presentation did nothing to help Russia escape international accusations of responsibility for that tragedy (Forbes.ru, October 15). Meanwhile, Putin’s geopolitical maneuvering is undercut by the deepening recession in Russia’s economy, which he tries to talk away by asserting that the “peak of the crisis” has already passed (Novaya Gazeta, October 16). The government has revised downwards its forecast for the contraction six times this year, and will likely have to continue this search for the bottom as the decline continues into next year (Rbc.ru, October 16). Manipulations of macro-statistics can camouflage the dynamics of the downfall, but there is no way around the fact that the state budget is shrinking fast, and the social programs suffer the most (Moscow Echo, October 16). The hopes for a strong recovery of oil prices are fading and giving way to fears that Saudi Arabia and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) are pushing Russia away from its traditional European market (Meduza.io, October 16). Even the politically privileged Gazprom has sunk deep enough into inefficiency and negative profitability that the government appears ready to consider a plan for splitting up this unhealthy monopoly (Newsru.com, October 16). This sustained economic decline has done nothing to diminish the predatory appetites of Putin’s “particular friends,” even as their shady financial schemes for laundering money in respectable European banks are increasingly targeted by US investigations (Rbc.ru, October 16). Alexei Navalny, the defiant blogger and opposition leader, has boldly used these facts as extra ammunition in his relentless anti-corruption campaign, which has chipped away at the reputation of such heavy-weights in Putin’s inner circle as Vladimir Yakunin, the former boss of Russian Railroads (Navalny.com, October 16). The public’s response to this exposure of dirty fortunes remains muted, but it is increasingly mixed with popular worries about falling incomes. According to opinion polls, 70 percent believe the economic crisis will last more than a year; and of those, 23 percent think that it could continue for many years (Levada.ru, October 12). Passive acceptance, rather than discontent, is the typical reaction to this gloomy perspective, but the authorities are driven by the need to pre-empt protests by delivering propaganda-amplified “victories” (Gazeta.ru, October 13). Syria is presently the main source of good news about the “spectacular” feats of the Russian Air Force, since Ukraine has been reduced to a stale propaganda show. But telegenic bombings can


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sustain mass enthusiasm for only so long, while the risk of accidents and casualties is high and growing. The task of rescuing the al-Assad regime is open-ended, and there is no plan to escape the quagmire of this intervention in order to project military power to another conflict zone and score a fresh “victory” (Carnegie.ru, October 16). Each of the Kremlin’s “proactive” moves since the annexation of Crimea has gradually turned into a heavy-maintenance blunder, and Putin cannot break out of this latest entanglement by raising the stakes or by showing readiness to take the kinds of risks that his opponents would consider unacceptable. The sinking economy compels him to experiment with the military instruments of politics, but a fast-shrinking resource base turns his smart strikes into bluffs, which are now being called. High-level dialogue makes little sense because Putin cannot be talked out of this conflict-exploitation pattern, but not talking involves the risk of intensifying his desperation. --Pavel K. Baev

Russian Mercenaries Sign up for Combat Operations in Syria On October 11, in an interview with Russia’s Rossiya 1TV channel, President Vladimir Putin reassured his audience that he did not intend to send Russian ground troops to Syria. The interviewer asked Putin about it twice, and twice the Russian president denied such plans. “Are you considering the possibility of using the Russian armed forces in the ground operation in Syria?” he was asked. “No, it is out of the question,” he answered. “Whatever happens?” “No. We do not intend to do that and our Syrian friends know about that,” he answered (Vesti.ru, October 11). Since the Russian government started conducting air strikes in Syria on September 30, many Russians have wondered about Syria turning into the “second Afghanistan.” The Soviet government invaded Afghanistan in 1979, but was forced to leave the country after a brutal ten-year military campaign. The war in Afghanistan not only destroyed the myth of the omnipotent Soviet army, but also contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. In Syria, Moscow’s plan appears to be to use Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese forces on the ground to turn the tide in the Syrian war. On October 15, the ground forces supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad launched an offensive on the key city of Aleppo. However, despite claims of success from Syrian officials, the actual results have been fairly modest (Gazeta.ru, October 16). Few people take Putin’s reassurances about not sending ground troops to Syria seriously. Putin famously promised numerous times not to snatch Crimea from Ukraine but did exactly that in early 2014. He also promised not to interfere in eastern Ukraine, but he went on to do that as well. In an interview with CBS’s 60 Minutes program, in September, Putin said “Russia will not participate in any military operations on the territory of Syria or in other countries; in any case, we do not plan to do it as of now.” At the same time, Putin defended Russia’s right to “help” Bashar al-Assad’s government (BBC–Russian service, September 28). Two days later, Russia began conducting airstrikes in Syria. Given that there is little correlation between what Putin says and does, it is not surprising that his opponents regard his words as empty, while his supporters regard them as a legitimate tactical ploy to overpower his adversaries. Some evidence suggests Putin’s promise not to send troops to Syria may be one such ploy. Russian social media sites have become rife with pages on which volunteers can sign up to fight in the Syrian war: the VKontakte social media platform alone has over 1,000 pages requesting volunteers for Syria (Lenta.ru, October 14). A military recruiter for the mercenaries’ website Dobrovolec.org, calling himself Vadim, told Lenta.ru


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that they receive 30 to 50 applications a day, but only about one out of these turns out to be “real.” The primary criterion for selecting volunteers to fight in Syria is previous combat experience. People who have fought either in Chechnya or eastern Ukraine on the Russian side have a good chance to be selected and are briefly trained at a camp at an undisclosed location in southern Russia. According to Vadim, hundreds of Russians are already fighting in Syria, and his organization alone has trained and supplied dozens of volunteers. Vadim asserted that the Russians in Syria only deal with “high tech” arms and take part in “selective special operations” (“tochechnye spetsoperatsii”), not the daily fighting. Vadim said his organization has temporarily stopped signing up volunteers because all the available positions have been filled (Lenta.ru, October 14). The organization’s website, indeed, says that the recruitment for Syria has been suspended, but still has a large and detailed section on recruitment for fighting in eastern Ukraine. The candidate should be at least 23 years old, preferably have previous combat experience, be free of alcohol and drug addiction, healthy, and prepared to spend at least one month in eastern Ukraine. The website claims that since mercenaries are outlawed, only volunteers prepared to fight for “ideological” reasons can apply (Dobrovolec.org, accessed October 19). Would-be Russian volunteers to Syria, however, regard the war in the Middle East as a way to improve their material situation. Many of the volunteers also appear to come from the ranks of Russians who fought in eastern Ukraine, where a truce has been declared and has held for the past weeks (Onkavkaz.com, October 15). According to the Fontanka.ru website, the recruitment process takes place in the village of Molkino in Krasnodar region. The recruiters promise to pay about $1,300 a month during the training period, up to $2,000 while in Syria and up to $4,000 during “intensive fighting” there. Some sources allege that Russians contracted by private Russian firms already took part in the fighting in Syria back in 2013, but were withdrawn due to heavy losses (Fontanka.ru, October 16). Molkino is a small remote village on the administrative border between Krasnodar region and Adygea that hosts the special forces of Russia’s military intelligence body, the GRU (Voinskayachast.ru, accessed October 19). If the recruits are indeed trained in Molkino, the Russian government is likely behind the recruitment process. Even if the Russian government has decided to rely on volunteers in the Syrian conflict, it is unlikely to win the war just with volunteers. In the war in eastern Ukraine, volunteers were primarily used for propaganda and to cover up the participation of regular Russian military forces in the war against Kyiv. Volunteers may end up playing the same role in Syria. --Valery Dzutsev

The Russian army asserts its superiority in conventional warfareby Thierry MeyssanMoscow’s military intervention in Syria has not simply overturned the fortunes of war and spread panic throughout the ranks of the jihadist groups. It has also shown the rest of the world the current capacities of the Russian army in situations of real warfare. To everyone’s astonishment, it has proved to possess a system of signal jamming capable of rendering the Atlantic Alliance deaf and blind. Despite a far superior budget, the United States have just lost their military domination.19 OCTOBER 2015 The Russian military intervention in Syria, which was at first considered a risky bet by Moscow against the jihadists, has transformed itself into a demonstration of power which upsets the strategic balance of the world [1]. Originally conceived to isolate and then destroy the armed groups equipped by states who support the jihadists in violation of the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, the operation has now blinded all the Western actors and their allies.The Pentagon is now divided between those who tend to minimise the facts while attempting to find a weakness in the Russian system, and those who, on the contrary, consider that the United States have


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lost their superiority in terms of conventional wafare, and that it will take long years before they are able to recover it [2].browser.</div></d iv>We remember that in 2008, during the war in South Ossetia, although the Russian forces had managed to repel the Georgian attack, they had above all shown the world the deplorable state of their equipment. And only ten days ago, ex-Secretary of Defence Robert Gates and ex-National Security advisor Condoleezza Rice were describing the Russian army as a « second-rate » force. [3].So how has the Russian Federation managed to rebuild its defence industry, and to design and produce very high-technology weapons without the Pentagon measuring the importance of the phenomenon, and allowing itself to be over-taken ? Have the Russians used all their new weapons in Syria, or do they have other surprises in reserve ? [4]The confusion in Washington is so great that the White House has cancelled the official visit by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and a delegation of the Russian Chief of Staff. This decision was taken after an identical visit to Turkey by a Russian military delegation. There is little point in discussing the operations in Syria, because the Pentagon does not know what is happening there. Furious, the « liberal hawks » and the neo-conservatives are demanding a relaunch of the military budget, and have succeeded in stopping the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.In the most bizarre fashion, the Atlantist commentators who are witnessing the out-distancing of US military power are now denouncing the dangers of Russian imperialism [5]. And yet Russia is only acting to save the Syrian People, and proposing that other states work in collaboration with them, while the United States, when they enjoyed military pre-eminence, imposed their economic system and destroyed a number of states.We are obliged to note that the hesitant declarations by Washington, published during the Russian deployment before the offensive, should not be interpreted as a slow political adaptation of official rhetoric, but should be understood for what they actually reveal – the fact that the Pentagon did not know the terrain. It had become deaf and blind.A system of generalised jammingWe know, since the incident of the USS Donald Cook in the Black Sea on the 12th April 2014, that the Russian Air Force has at its disposition a weapon which enables it to jam all radars, all control circuits, all systems for the transmission of information, etc. [6]. Since the beginning of its military deployment, Russia had installed a jamming centre at Hmeymim, to the North of Latakia. Then, suddenly, the USS Donald Cook incident occurred, but this time within a perimeter of 300 kilometres – which includes the NATO base at Incirlik (Turkey). And this is still going on. Because the event happened during a sand-storm of historical proportions, the Pentagon first thought its measuring equipment had malfunctioned, but then discovered that it had been jammed. Completely.Modern conventional warfare is based on what is known as « C4i » - an acronym which corresponds to the English terms « Command », « Control », « Communications », « Computer » and « intelligence ». The satellites, planes and drones, ships and submarines, tanks and now even the combatants themselves, are all connected to one another by a system of permanent communication, which enables the Chiefs of Staff to oversee and command the fighting more efficiently. It is this entire system - NATO’s nervous system – which is presently jammed in Syria and part of Turkey.According to the Romanian expert Valentin Vasilescu, Russia has installed several Krasukha-4, equipped its planes with SAP-518/ SPS-171 jamming equipment (like the plane that overflew the USS Donald Cook), and its helicopters with the Richag-AV system. Besides this, it is using the spy-ship Priazovye (Project 864 Vishnya class, to use NATO terminology), in the Mediterranean [7].It seems that Russia has agreed not to interfere with Israëli communications – a US preserve – which means that it will not deploy its jamming system in South Syria.Russian planes have enjoyed the privilege of violating Turkish air space many times. Their purpose


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was not to measure the reaction time of the Turkish Air Force, but to verify the efficiency of their jamming capabililies in the area concerned, and also to keep an eye the installations which are at the disposition of the jihadists in Turkey.High-performance Cruise missilesRussia has used several new weapons, like the 26 stealth (or LO technology) cruise missiles (3M-14T Kaliber-NK), equivalent to the American RGM/UGM-109E Tomahawk [8]. Fired by its fleet in the Caspian Sea – with no military necessity – they reached and destroyed 11 targets situated at 1,500 kilometres distance, in the non-jammed area – so that NATO could appreciate their performance. These missiles crossed Iranian and Iraqi air space at an altitude varying between 50 and 100 metres, depending on the terrain, and flying just four kilometres away from a US drone. None of them were lost, compared to US missiles, which have a margin of error beteen 5 % and 10 %, depending on the models [9]. At the same time, this salvo demonstrated the waste of the incredible sums of money spent on the useless « anti-missile shield » built by the Pentagon around Russia –even though it was officially intended for protection against Iranian launch sites..Taking into account that these missiles can be fired from submarines situated anywhere in the oceans, and that they can transport nuclear warheads, the Russians have clearly made up for their delay as far as launchers are concerned.Finally, in the case of a nuclear confrontation, the Russian Federation would be destroyed by the United States – and vice versa – but would win in the case of a conventional war.Only the Russians and the Syrians are capable of evaluating the situation on the ground. All the other military information from other sources, including the jihadists, are without foundation, since only Russia and Syria have an overall picture of the terrain. Moscow and Damascus intend to profit as far as possible from their advantage, and are therefore keeping their operations secret.From the official communiqués and the confidences of certain officers, we may conclude that at least 5,000 jihadists have been killed, including several leaders of Ahrar el-Sham, al-Qaïda and the Islamic Emirate. At least 10,000 mercenaries have fled to Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. The Syrian Arab Army and Hezbollah have re-captured the area without waiting for the promised Iranian reinforcements.The bombing campaign should end by the Orthodox Christmas. The question which will then have to be answered is whether or not Russia will be authorised to finish its job by pursuing the jihadists who have found refuge in Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Failing this, Syria will have been saved, but the problem will still not have been resolved. The Muslim Brotherhood will not fail to seek revenge, and the United States will not fail to use them again against other targets.Keep in mind

The Russian operation in Syria was designed to deprive the jihadist groups of the support they receive from various states under the cover of aid for the « democratic opposition ».

The operation demanded the use of new weaponry, and transformed itself into a demonstration of Russian force.

Russia now has the capacity for jamming all NATO communications. It has now become the primary power in terms of conventional warfare

This performance has stoked discord in Washington. It is still too soon to say whether this will favour President Obama, or whether it will be used by the « liberal hawks » to justify an increase in the military budget.Thierry MeyssanTranslation Pete Kimberley

[1] “Russian Military Uses Syria as Proving Ground, and West Takes Notice”, Steven Lee Myers & Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, October 14, 2015.[2] “Top NATO general: Russians starting to build air defense bubble over Syria”, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, The Washington Post, September 29, 2015.


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[3] “How America can counter Putin’s moves in Syria”, by Condoleezza Rice, Robert M. Gates, Washington Post (United States), Voltaire Network, 8 October 2015.[4] The only available study is well below reality : Russia’s quiet military revolution and what it means for Europe, Gustav Gressel, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2015.[5] «Russisches Syrien-Abenteuer: Das Ende der alten Weltordnung», Matthias Schepp, Der Spiegel, 10. Oktober 2015.[6] “What frightened the USS Donald Cook so much in the Black Sea?”, Voltaire Network, 8 November 2014.[7] «Cu ce arme ultrasecrete a cîstigat Putin suprematia în razboiul radioelectronic din Siria ?», Valentin Vasilescu, Ziarul de gardã, 12 octobre 2015. Version française : «L’arme ultrasecrète qui permet à Poutine d’assoir sa suprématie dans la guerre radio électronique en Syrie ?», Traduction Avic, Réseau international.[8] “KALIBRating the foe: strategic implications of the Russian cruise missiles’ launch”, by Vladimir Kozin, Oriental Review (Russia), Voltaire Network, 14 October 2015.[9] After having announced the opposite, the United States were obliged to admit the facts : “First on CNN: U.S. officials say Russian missiles heading for Syria landed in Iran”, Barbara Starr & Jeremy Diamond, CNN, October 8, 2015. “Moscow rejects CNN’s report on Russian missile landing in Iran”, IRNA, October 8, 2015. “Daily Press Briefing”, John Kirby, US State Department, October 8, 2015. “Пентагон не комментирует сообщения о якобы упавших в Иране ракетах РФ”, RIA-Novosti, October 8, 2015.

Moldovan Political Leader Filat Arrested in Intra-Coalition Coup Moldova is theoretically a parliamentary republic, but its parliament was in recess for two and a half months, hiding away from the economy’s collapse, uncontrollable corruption, loss of the political system’s legitimacy, and regime-change movements competing against each other. Western embassies in Chisinau also seem to have run out of solutions for the erstwhile democratic model-student Moldova (see accompanying article). Moldova’s coalition government, nominally pro-Europe but deeply factionalized, holds slightly more than half of the seats in parliament, and has lost the support of Chisinau’s pro-Western circles. The government had convened a national roundtable consultation on the eve of the parliament’s reopening, only to be rebuked by civil society representatives. The legislature convened at last on October 15, heavily guarded by riot police and surrounded by thousands of pro-Russia demonstrators (for whom the pro-Western protesters had cleared the way). Rather than addressing the country’s multiple crises, the re-convened parliament became the scene of an intra-coalition coup instigated by Vlad Plahotniuc, Moldova’s richest businessman and informal leader of the Democratic Party in the coalition government. With no advance notice, the Parliament was asked to approve the arrest of Plahotniuc’s long-time rival, Liberal-Democrat leader Vlad Filat, chairman of the main pro-Western party in the governing coalition. Stunned at first, the parliament then quickly approved the arrest by a large majority. Plahotniuc’s team had pre-planned these proceedings. The parliament’s chairman, Andrian Candu, who is Plahotniuc’s godson, unexpectedly changed the session’s agenda and read aloud a criminal indictment of Filat by the Prosecutor’s Office. Prosecutor-General Corneliu Gurin and Anti-Corruption Center chief Viorel Chetraru—two Plahotniuc loyalists, both appointed under Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party’s quota—then stepped in. Gurin took the floor to quote businessman Ilan Shor—implicated in the recent “billion-dollar” bank fraud—as incriminating Filat in that and one other alleged fraud. Chetraru led his masked officers into the parliament’s hall and escorted Filat to a


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detention center for pre-trial investigation. Except for Filat’s party, all the other parties voted unanimously to lift his parliamentary immunity: whether from partisan motives, fear of being targeted themselves by Plahotniuc-controlled prosecutors, or simply in response to a popular clamor for heads to roll (Unimedia, Jurnal.Md, Ziarul National, Infotag, October 15–19). The events just seen inside and outside the national legislature illustrate the extent to which rule of law and institutional processes have collapsed in Moldova. Outside the parliament’s building, aggressive pro-Russia demonstrators were illegally searching cars with official license plates, hunting for Filat, while the intimidated Moldovan police stood by. The charges against Filat carry 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment. A fair trial is unlikely, as Plahotniuc controls key positions in Moldova’s court system. Earlier this year, the same general prosecutor and anti-corruption chief arrested three of Filat’s relatives and are still holding them for possible trial. In his farewell speech to the parliament, Filat characterized the charges against him as fabricated. He described Plahotniuc as the mastermind of Moldova’s hidden financial flows, controller of the law-enforcement and judicial systems, and undeclared owner of Moldova’s dominant media holding. That Plahotniuc holds so much informal, networked personal power, is seen as an indisputable fact by civil society, independent media, and Western embassies in Chisinau. Up to a point, the drama in the parliament on October 15 replayed the Filat-Plahotniuc confrontations of June 2011 and January–April 2013. As prime minister of the same coalition government in those years, Filat denounced Plahotniuc as the “master puppeteer” of Moldova’s financial-banking system, law enforcement apparatus, and of a gamut of politicians. In those confrontations, Filat was attempting to dislodge Plahotniuc from the pinnacle of informal power. But Filat lost both fights, retreating each time under threats from Plahotniuc-controlled prosecutors. Moreover, European embassies and Brussels demanded each time of Filat to prioritize the coalition’s “stability.” Filat alluded to this fact in his farewell speech, but only the well-informed would have understood those allusions. Since then, Filat had been biding his time, avoiding open conflict with Plahotniuc in the governing coalition. This time, however, it was Plahotniuc who initiated the confrontation; and he went even farther by having Filat arrested and criminally charged. Capitalizing on the widespread anti-system odium, Plahotniuc used this same system to channel the odium selectively against his rival, eliminating the latter from the arena. Moreover, Plahotniuc’s group has gained a respite to reshuffle the political cards within the system and outside it. It is this group that has become the main target of anti-“oligarchic” sentiment in recent months. To deflect the main thrust of that sentiment, Plahotniuc orchestrated a controlled investigation against Shor (see above) and the arrest of Filat, as anti-“oligarchic” actions for public consumption. This is also intended to defuse the clamor for Gurin’s, Chetraru’s, and other Plahotniuc loyalists’ removal from their posts. These officials now claim to be busy “combating crime and corruption” in Filat’s and Shor’s guises and cannot resign until they “resolve” these cases. First and foremost, letting Filat’s head roll is supposed to pacify the public (if not necessarily the protest leaders), at least temporarily (see EDM, September 9, October 6). Shor, meanwhile, has the status of a “protected witness” in the anti-Filat investigation handled by Plahotniuc’s men. Shor is free, and might even claim immunity from prosecution in his capacity as an


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elected official, having recently paid his way to election as mayor of the city of Orhei. During the prime-ministership of Iurie Leanca (May 2013–February 2015), the government turned over the controlling stock package in the Banca de Economii (Moldova’s largest bank) and the concession of Chisinau International Airport to obscure Russian companies, and Shor became the board chairman of both companies. The politically-tainted proceedings against Filat seem also designed for stalling the investigations into those twin scandals, or diverting the investigations onto false tracks (see accompanying article). --Vladimir Socor Moldovan Billionaire Plahotniuc Gaining More Political Power In a country as bereft of leadership talent as Moldova turned out to be, Liberal-Democrat Party leader Vlad Filat’s resignation over corruption charges and his arrest leaves a vacuum in its wake. The charges against Filat, in the form in which they were proffered, have been met with skepticism among pro-Western observers in Chisinau thus far, while local pro-Russia politicians exult in these developments (see accompanying article). As prime minister of the coalition government (2009–2013) and leader of the coalition’s largest party (2013–2015), Filat was unquestionably Moldova’s most effective pro-Western politician, team builder of the government that achieved Moldova’s Association Agreement with the European Union, and overtly a pro-US and pro–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) politician. For inspiration, he looked to former Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili’s model of modernization from above through the use of executive power—a model, however, that Moldova’s parliamentary system fatally precludes. Filat’s Liberal-Democrat Party, organized like all Moldovan parties around the leader’s personality and funding, was the only consistent pro-reform governing party, as well as the largest. This party was a factor of stability and policy continuity in an otherwise dysfunctional system, which ultimately hobbled both the party and its leader. Filat’s political exit, amid attacks on the Liberal-Democrat Party from multiple directions (from billionaire Vlad Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party inside the governing coalition, as well as from the Red Left parliamentary and extra-parliamentary oppositions), regime-change movements, the rise of pro-Russia parties, the European Union’s declining attractiveness to Moldova while Romania’s attractiveness grows, are trends potentially transforming Moldova in as yet unpredictable ways (see EDM, September 9, October 6). Filat announced his resignation as party leader in his valedictory speech in parliament, minutes before being taken to the detention center. The Liberal-Democrat Party characterized the charges as “obviously fabricated”; it “condemn[ed] the cynical scenario to denigrate the party and its leader,” and noted that this is the latest in a series of attacks “from a variety of political camps” (see above). Filat’s right-hand man, Valeriu Strelet, holds the post of prime minister since July 31 this year, and he has also taken over as party leader since Filat’s exit (Strelet had earlier headed this party’s parliamentary caucus). The party has decided to remain in the governing coalition, despite Plahotniuc’s intra-coalition coup. Strelet has declared that he would continue heading the government “without fear of blackmail,” without accepting instructions from “Nobil Club” (Plahotniuc’s hotel residence), and without heeding “the legion of bloggers and trolls” (coded reference to Plahotniuc-controlled media in Moldova) (Unimedia, Jurnal.md, Ziarul National, Infotag, October 15–19). The power balance in the 101-seat parliament, however, is changing in Plahotniuc’s favor.


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Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party holds 19 seats; his long-time ally Mihai Ghimpu’s Liberal Party, has 13 seats; Plahotniuc has poached 4 deputies under former prime minister Iurie Leanca from the Liberal-Democrats; and former president Vladimir Voronin’s Communist Party, holding 20 seats, is discussing a possible alliance or even merger with Plahotniuc’s party. That kind of combination, if achieved, would enable Plahotniuc to become de facto leader of a government-forming parliamentary majority. It would isolate the Liberal-Democrats under Strelet on the center-right, now holding 19 seats (down from 23) and the Moscow-oriented Socialists under Igor Dodon with their 24 seats, currently the largest parliamentary group. Meanwhile, even if the existing coalition is maintained in its present form (Liberal-Democrat Party, Democratic Party, Liberal Party), poaching just one more deputy would lift Plahotniuc’s party above Strelet’s party in the coalition, thus transferring the right to designate the prime minister to Plahotniuc’s party. All parliamentary parties except the Socialists want to avoid pre-term elections. The Socialists and their extra-parliamentary ally, Renato Usatii’s Our Party, however, are pressing for pre-term elections, confident of winning on their common pro-Russia platform. If pre-term elections bring Our Party into the parliament, this post-ideological party is considered likely to join an alliance under Plahotniuc’s informal control. (The traditional, ideology-driven Socialists would not be likely to do so.) In recent months, Plahotniuc and Usatii have coordinated their actions in plain sight. Leading up to Filat’s arrest, Usatii had spearheaded a campaign to de-legitimize Filat, while Plahotniuc’s media holding amplified those attacks. A kind of division of labor seemed to operate between them. Usatii and Plahotniuc had similarly combined against Filat’s party during the November 2014 parliamentary elections and June 2015 local elections. On October 15, Usatii’s supporters were clamoring in front of the parliament building for Filat to be arrested. As Filat was being arrested, Usatii made a triumphant announcement to his assembled supporters and for Russian television channels from the scene (Interfax, October 15). Plahotniuc is the main winner of the latest power shifts, in the short-term at least. He is moving closer to replicating Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian model in Moldova—i.e., unofficial supreme power without official responsibilities. Unlike Ivanishvili in Georgia, however, Plahotniuc must soon contend one way or another with Moldova’s surging pro-Russia parties. At this stage, he has joined forces with Usatii with the aim of destroying Moldova’s main pro-Western party—the Liberal Democrats, hitherto under Filat and henceforth under Strelet (see accompanying article).

Prepare to be Terminated: Russia readies first robot tank, shows off Armata at arms expoPublished time: 10 Sep, 2015 Russia’s military says it is ready to start producing a fully autonomous armored combat system to operate on the battlefield with only remote control and support from personnel. This system is Russia’s T-14 Armata tank.“The future belongs to unmanned [battle] vehicles. To ensure transition to fully robotic machines, we must achieve new levels of automatization, and secure the principles of remote control,” Andrey Terlikov, the chief designer of the T-14 Armata tank, told RT.“This vehicle has everything necessary to take the decisive step towards remotely controlled autonomous combat vehicles," he added.


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So, is Armata going to fight by itself? Not just yet, the designer says, but soon. "Armata is a manned tank, but its ability to operate without crew is a matter of the immediate future,” Terlikov said.Russia’s military has shown off the Armata tank for the Zvezda military TV channel. Christopher Foss, Editor at Jane's Defense weekly, said it was very impressive to see the Armata tank and the T-50 5G fighter jet at the ongoing Russia Arms Expo 2015 in Nizhny Tagil.

There are many other defense exhibitions around the world, yet few of them have a firepower and mobility demonstration, so to see vehicles performing was of particular interest, Foss said. “For an hour and a half your potential customers see the vehicles being put through their paces and firing their weapons… in that respect it’s unique,” Foss told RT.

Russian ‘Skynet’ to lead military robots on the battlefieldPublished time: 19 Oct, 2015 In a step towards creating independent artificial intelligence comparable to Skynet from the 'Terminator' franchise, a Russian company has successfully tested software capable of undertaking decisions and carrying them out without any human intervention.The United Instrument Manufacturing Corporation (OPK), an integral part of the Rostec arms corporation, says it has developed the Unicum (Latin for 'the only one') software package that gives military or civilian robots enough artificial intelligence to perform complicated tasks completely on their own. Powering a group of up to 10 robotic complexes, the Unicum artificial intelligence (AI) communicates and distributes ‘roles’ among the robots, chooses the ‘commander’ of the robotic task force and assigns combat mission to each individual machine.or It can locate targets, choose dominating positions on a battlefield, request target elimination validation from human operators and eliminate the targets. It is also capable of automatically requesting replacements for disabled machines. “This is the first [AI] system of that quality that has successfully completed the tests and has been passed on to the client. The technology is being readied for installation on real life robotic systems, both civilian and in the military, including unmanned aerial vehicles,” OPK Deputy Director Sergey Skokov said.“The software system has passed all the [governmental] commissions,” Skokov stressed.The Unicum AI could be installed on any robotic system, no matter where it is used: on the ground, in the air or out at sea. It has the ability to act independently or in groups.The developers claim their AI could exclude humans from taking part in the actions of robots altogether. “With Unicum, the robots will be capable of executing tasks independently, to see and evaluate the situation, plotting new courses as well as communicating with other machines. In fact, this is yet another step to the creation of fully-fledged artificial intelligence, enabling mechanisms with nearly human capabilities,” Skokov said.


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