Agpalo Chapters 6-11

7/31/2019 Agpalo Chapters 6-11

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CHAPTER VI

STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE AND IN RELATION TO OTHER STATUTES

A. STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE

6.01. Generally

A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. The whole and every part of a statute shouldbe construed together.

It is always an unsafe way of construing a statute to divide it by process of etymological dissertation, into separate words, and then apply to each, thusseparated from its context, some particular definitions given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the statute upon the basis of these definitions. It is as wella dangerous practice to base construction upon only a part of a section since one portion may be qualified by the other portion.

6.02. Intent ascertained from statute as whole

The legislative meaning is to be extracted and ascertained from the statute as a whole. Its clauses are not to be segregated, but every part of a statute is to

be construed with reference to every other part and every word and phrase in connection with its context. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase mighteasily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it isassociatedand the details of one part may contain regulations restricting the extent of the general expression used in another part of the same act.

REASON The best interpreter of a statue is the statute itself. (Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum)

In the proper interpretation of statutes, it is not permissible to inquire into motives which influenced the legislative body, except insofar as such motivesare disclosed by the statute itself.

The rule that the statute must be construed as a whole requires that apparently conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized, if possible, astwo seemingly irreconcilable propositions are susceptible to perfect harmony. The intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of thesubject statute.

6.03. Purpose or context as controlling guide

Statutes must receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to all their provisions, force and effect being given notnarrowly to isolated and disjoined clauses, but to their spirit, broadly taking all their provisions together in one rational view. Neither grammatical constructionnot the letter of the statute not its rhetorical framework should be permitted to defeat its clear and definite purpose to be gathered from the whole act,comparing part with part. If possible, parts must be harmonized with each other and rendered consistent with its scope and object.

6.04. Giving effect to statute as a whole.


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A statute is enacted in whole so one part of it is as important as the other. A provision or section which is unclear by itself is made clear by reading andconstruing it in relation to the whole statute. Every part of a statute should be given effect as a statute is enacted as an integrated measure, not a hodgepodge of

conflicting provisions.

In construing, courts have to take the thought conveyed by the statute as a whole; construe the constituent parts together; ascertain the legislative intent

from the whole act; consider each and every provision thereof in the light of the general purpose of the statute; and endeavor to make every part effective,harmonious, and sensible. Ut res magis quam pereat. The construction which is to be sought is that which gives effect to the whole of the statute its every

word.

ADOPT construction that will give effect to every part of the statute

AVOID construction that will render a provision inoperative

Apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.

6.05. Apparently conflicting provisions reconciled.

The various provisions should be read together so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect, without repugnancy or inconsistency. All the

provisions, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them. The courts shall endeavor to reconcile theminstead of declaring outright the invalidity of one against the other.

6.06. Special and general provisions in the same statute.

The particular or special provision is construed as an exception to the general provision.

6.07 6.09. Construction as not to render provision nugatory. Reason. Qualification.

A provision of a statute should be so construed as not to nullify or render nugatory another provision. This principle is expressed in the maxim,interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereator a law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it. One portion of a

statute should not be construed to destroy the other. This rule is based on the presumption that the legislature has enacted a statute whose provisions are inharmony and consistent with each other and that conflicting intentions in the same statute are never supposed or regarded. For consistency in statutes is of

prime importanceall laws are presumed to be consistent with each other.

However, where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is demonstrably not possible, the court must reject that one which is least in accord with the

general plan of the whole statute. However if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious provisions or sections, it has been held, the last inorder of position is frequently held to prevail, unless it clearly appears that the intent of the legislature is otherwise.

6.10. Construction as to give life to law.


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Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they are enacted, without doing violence to reason. A law should not be soconstrued as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law nor so interpreted as to afford an opportunity to defeat compliance with its terms, create an

inconsistency, or contravene the plain words of the law.Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat, or that interpretation as will give the thingefficacy is to be adopted.

It is presumed that the law enacted by the legislature is complete by itself, that the legislature did perform its function well, and that it intended to impart toits enactment such a meaning as will render it operative and effective. It is a general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so without

violence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret a statute as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole as expressed in the maxim, ut res magis

valeat quam pereat. In case of doubt or obscurity, that construction as will avoid any of such results (nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explainedaway, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory) and as will instead make it fully operative and effective will be given the statute.

6.11 6.12. Construction to avoid surplusage.

Surplusage unnecessary, extraneous matter

Whenever possible, a legal provision must not be so construed as to be a useless surplusage, and, accordingly, meaningless in the sense of adding nothingto the law or having no effect whatsoever therein. Nor should a word be so construed as to render other words or phrases associated with it serve no purpose.All efforts should be exerted to give some meaning to every word or phrase used in a statute. The legislature is presumed to have used the word or phrase for a

purpose and is supposed not to insert a provision which is unnecessary and a surplusage.

APPLICATION.

Niere v. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

Law involved: RA 4585 or the Charter of the City of La Carlota

Section 1: the Mayor shall appoint the city treasurer, the city health officer, the chief of police and fire department, and other heads and otheremployees of such city department as may be created.

Question raised: Does the city mayor have the power to appoint a city engineer pursuant to such law?

Courts answer: and other heads and other employees of such departments as may be created, whom the mayor can appoint, refers to the heads of citydepartments that may be created after the law took effect, and does not embrace the city engineer. To rule otherwise is to render the first conjunctionand before the word fire department a superfluity and without meaning at all.

Manila Lodge No. 761 v CA

Law involved: Public Act 1360, which authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay, to form part of the Luneta extension andstipulated that the reclaimed land shall be property of the City of Manila. The City of Manila is hereby authorized to set aside a portion thereof atthe north end for a hotel site and either to lease or sell the same.


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Question raised: Whether said reclaimed land is patrimonial land or of public dominion intended for public use.

Courts answer: If the land is patrimonial, it can be disposed of without statutory authorization. The Act uses the phrase is hereby authorized. To

authorize means to empower, to give a right act and hereby means by means of this statute or action. To hold that the reclaimed land ispatrimonial property, which can be disposed of without statutory authorization, is to render the provision of the law to the effect that the City of

Manila is hereby authorized to lease or sell a portion thereof superfluous. And to construe the statute as to render the phrase superfluous wouldviolate the elementary rule of legal hermeneutics that effect must be given to every word, clause, and sentence of the statute and that a statute must be

so interpreted that no part thereof becomes inoperative.

6.13. Statute and its amendments construed together.

The amendment should be harmonized and construed with the earlier provision of the charter to the end that said provision and the amendment are both

given effect.

The legislature, in making such amendments or changes, must have some purpose in making them, which should be ascertained and given effect.

B. STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES

6.14. Statute construed in harmony with the Constitution.

The statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation of, the fundamental law. The legislature is presumed to have adhered to theconstitutional limitations. Courts should also presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and one which operatesno further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law.

It is a well-settled rulethat a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that will avoid conflict with the Constitution. Theconstitutionality of a statute should not be prejudiced by applying the statute in a manner that will render it unconstitutional. Every intendment of the lawshould lean towards its validity, and the court should favor that construction which gives it the greater chance of surviving the test of constitutionality.

6.15 6.18. Statutes in pari materia. Construction. Reason. Where harmonization is impossible.

Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, or have the same purpose or object, or cover the same specific or particularsubject matter. The later statute may specifically refer to the prior stature. However, in case no reference is made, it is also sufficient that the two or morestatutes relate to the same specific subject matter to be considered in pari materia.

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as toform a uniform system of jurisprudence.

All laws are presumed to be consistent with each other. To interpret and do it in such a way as to harmonize laws with laws is the best method ofinterpretation.


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Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an express national policy. The assumption is that whenever the legislatureenacts a law, it has in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, and in the absence of any express repeal or amendment, the new statute is

deemed enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relative to the samesubject matter will be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose.

Interpretation should be in accordance with the circumstances or conditions peculiar to each, in order that the statutes may be harmonized or betterunderstood. This rule is based on the old legal maxim, distingue tempora et concordabis jura, or distinguish times and you will harmonize laws.

In case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against implied amendment or repeal and in favor of harmonization of all laws on the subject. When there isimplied amendment, the latter statute should be so construed as to modify the prior law on the subject no further than may be necessary to effect the specific

purpose of the latter enactment.

REASON. The legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and have taken into account, prior laws on the subject of legislation.

Later statutes are supplementary or complimentary to the earlier enactments. Whenever the legislature enacts a new law, it is deemed to have enacted thenew provision in accordance with the legislative policy embodied in prior statutes and, unless there is an express repeal of the old laws, they all should beconstrued together.

Where harmonization is impossible, one has to give way in favor of the other. Either the two laws are reconciled and harmonized or, if they cannot, theearlier one must yield to the later one, it being the later expression of the legislative will.

6.19. Illustration of the rule.

Dialdas v Perdices

Facts: An alien who operated a retail store in Cebu pursuant to law decided to close his store and transfer it to Dumaguete. The retail trade law authorizesan alien, who on 15 May 1954 is actually engaged in retail, to continue engage therein until his voluntary retirement from such business, but not toestablish or open additional stores or branches for retail business. Section 199 of Tax Code, however, provides that any business for which the

privilege tax has been paid may be removed and continued in any other place without payment of additional tax.

Issue: Whether the transfer by the alien of his retail store from Cebu to Dumaguete can be considered as a voluntary retirement from business.

Held: The SC ruled that the retail trade law and Sect. 199 of the Tax Code are in pari materia. It stated that the trial court overlooked entirely, however,the clear provision of Sect. 199 of the Internal Revenue Code x x x which has not been repealed either expressly or impliedly by RA 1180. The legalityof such transfer, therefore, can in no wise be questioned and consequently petitioners business in Dumaguete should not be considered as a new onein contemplation of the aforesaid RA 1180.

6.20 6.22. General and special statutes. Reason. Qualification

General statute applies to all of the people of the state or to all of a particular class of persons in the state with equal force; does not omit any subject orplace naturally belonging to class; it is one of universal application


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Special statute relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a particular portion or section of the statute only.

A general and special law on the same subject matter are in pari materia. Where there are two acts, one is special and particular and the other is general, if

standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act, the special must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearlythan that of a general statute and must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act. The circumstance that the special law is passed before

or after the general act does not change the principle.

Special law passed later regarded as an exception to or a qualification of the prior general act

General law passed later special statute is still construed as an exception, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.

Where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.

REASON. The legislature in passing a law of special character has its attention directed to the special facts and circumstances which the special act isintended to meet. It will not be considered that the legislature, by adopting a general act containing provisions repugnant to the provisions of the special act

and without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify the special act, intended to amend, repeal or modify said act.

EXCEPTIONS. 1. Where the legislature clearly intended the later general enactment to cover the whole subject and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent

therewith, the general law prevails (there is a repeal of the special law).

2. where the special law merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a specific and special rule. General law prevails

6.23. Reference statutes.

Reference statute statutes which refers to other statutes and makes them applicable to the subject of the legislation; frequently used to avoid encumberingthe statute books of unnecessary repetition.

This adoption of a statute by reference makes it as much a part of the adopting statute as if it had been incorporated therein in full. This have beenrecognized as an approved method of legislation, in the absence of constitutional restrictions. The adoption by reference of a statute that was preciously

repealed revives the statute; the adoption takes the adopted statute as it exists at the time of adoption, unless it does so expressly.

A reference statute should be so construed as t harmonize with, and give effect to, the adopted statute.

6.24. Supplemental statutes.

Supplemental act intended to supply deficiencies in an existing statute and to add, to complete, or extend the statute without changing or modifying itsoriginal text; read and construed with the original to make an intelligible whole

6.25. Reenacted statutes.


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Reenacted statute one which reenacts a previous statute or the provisions thereof

Reenactment one in which the provisions of an earlier statute are reproduced in the same or substantially the same words; may also be made by

reference; a legislative expression of intention to adopt the construction as well as the language of a prior act

Where a statute provides that all laws not inconsistent with the provisions thereof are deemed incorporated and made integral parts thereof by reference,

such previous laws on the same subject matter are deemed reenacted. RULE: When a statute or a provision thereof has been construed by the court of lastresort and the same is substantially reenacted, the legislature may be regarded as adopting such construction, and the construction becomes as integral part of

the reenacted statute with the force and effect of a legislative command. Thus, in the interpretation of reenacted statute, the courts will follow the constructionwhich the adopted statute previously received.

6.26 6.27. Adoption of contemporaneous construction. Qualification.

The reenactment of a statute which has received a practical or contemporaneous constructionis a persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislatureof the prior practical or executive construction, the legislature being presumed to know the existence of such construction when it made the reenactment. In

construing, the court should take into account such prior contemporaneous construction and give due weight and respect to it, as the joint construction placedupon the statute by the legislature that enacted it and the executive that implements it.

QUALIFICATION. The rule above (adoption of construction) applies only when the statute is capable of the construction given to it and when thatconstruction has become a settled rule of conduct.

6.28. Adopted statutes.

Adopted statute statute patterned after, or copied from a statute of a foreign country.

In construing, it is proper for the court to take into consideration the construction of the law by the courts of the country from which it is taken, as well as

the law itself and the practices under it, for the legislature is presumed to have adopted such construction and practices with the adoption of the law. Thepresumption does not, however, apply to construction given the statute subsequent to its adoption, although it has persuasive effect on the interpretation of the

adopted statute.

MAXIMS at a glance

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura distinguish times and you will harmonize laws

Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat that interpretation as will give the thing efficacy is to be adopted

Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a

uniform system of jurisprudence

Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum - the best interpreter of a statue is the statute itself


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Ut res magis quam pereat the construction which is to be sought is that which gives effect to the whole of the statute

Chapter 7: Strict or Liberal Interpretation

A. IN GENERAL

7.01 Generally

-strict or liberal interpretation: depends on the nature of the statute-the purpose to be subserved and mischief to be remedied-that will best accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislative intent

7.02 Strict c in its exact construction, generallyStrict Construction- is that construction according to the letter of a statute, which recognizes nothing that is not expressed, takes the language used in its exactmeaning, and admits no equitable consideration.

-it is the antithesis of liberal construction

7.03 Liberal construction definedLiberal Construction- such equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote justice.

-that construction which expands the meaning of a statute to meet cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason thereof or within the evil which thestatute was designed to remedy, or which gives a statute its generally accepted meaning to the end that the most comprehensive application thereof may beaccorded, without being inconsistent with its language or doing violence to any of its terms.

7.04 Liberal construction applied, generally-where a statute is ambiguous and capable of more than one construction, the literal meaning of the words may be rejected, instead the statute will be given liberalinterpretation so as to save the statute from obliteration-expressed in ut res magis valeat quam pereat-this should, however, be distinguished from that act of the court in engrafting upon a law, something which it believes ought to have embraced therein (judiciallegislation)-a statue may not be liberally construed to read into it something which its clear and plain language rejects.

7.05 Construction to promote social justice


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-The principles of social justice as enshrined in the Constitution should be taken into account in the interpretation and application of laws.-All the laws which on the great historic event when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was born, were susceptible of two interpretationsstrict or liberal,

against or in favor of social justicenow have to be construed broadly in order to promote and achieve social justice.

7.06 Construction taking into consideration general welfare or growth of civilizationBased on the maximsalus populi est suprema lexStatuta pro public commodo late interpretantur- statute enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally.-Statutes and judicial decisions alike come into being and growing out of the same common roots, the supreme good of society. It is a consecrated legal axiom that

the reason of the law is the life of the law.-If the judge limits himself to the printed pages of the statute, and does not go out into the open spaces of actuality and dig down deep into his common soil, hefails in his noble calling, and becomes subservient to formalism

B. STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

7.07 Penal statutes, generallyPenal statutes- those laws by which punishments are imposed for violation or transgression of their provisions.

-are those acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature andprovide for their punishmentCase: Yu Oh v. CA

-RA No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and its punishment. It is not a penallaw, and therefore, Art 22 of the RPC does not apply in the case.

7.08 Penal statutes strictly construed-Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.-penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable consideration; nor exclude cases from it that are obviously within its

provision

-only those persons, offenses, and penalties clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the operation of the statute. Any reasonabledoubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.

-Statutes, being penal, must be construed must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant and at the same time preservethe obvious intention of the legislature.Case: Laurel v. Abrogar

-Issue: whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Card through the telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in

short, PLDTs business of providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of of theft under article 308 of the RPC.-Held: No. take personal property in the said provision would not include PLDTs business. It must be construed in favor of the accused.

7.09 Reason why penal statutes are strictly construed-the law is tender in favor of the rights of an individual; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretionof the court, limited. This is not enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of a forbidden acts.

7.10 Acts mala in se and mala prohibitaGeneral Rule: a penal statute will not be construed to make t5he commission of certain prohibited acts criminal without regard to the intent of the doer, unless

there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.


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Mala in Se- such as those penalized under the RPC, criminal intent, apart from the act itself, is requiredMala Prohibita- the only inquiry is, has the law been violated

7.11 Application of the ruleCase: Azarcon v Sandiganbayan

-Issue: whather a private person can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depository ofdistrained property, so as to make the conversion thereof the crime of malversation falling within the jurisdiction of sandiganbayan. The prosecution argues thatArt 222 of the RPC defines the individuals covered by the term officers under Art 217 of the same code.

-Held: No. Art 22 of the RPC is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of theacts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public officers.

Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said Art 222 is to be deemed a public officer.7.12 Limitation of RuleWhere a penal statute is capable of two interpretations, one which will operate to exempt an accused from liability for violation thereof and another which willgive effect to the manifest intent of the statute and promote its object, the latter interpretation should be adopted.Ex: The law which punishes the display of flags used during the insurrection against the United States may not be so construed as to exempt from criminalliability a person who displays a replica of said flag because said replica is not the one used during the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the statutealtogether.

7.13 Statutes in derogation of rights

Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the exercise of its police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting their enjoyment.They are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope or purpose.Example: Statutes authorizing the expropriation of private land and property, allowing the taking of deposition, fixing the ceiling price of commodities, limitingthe exercise of proprietary rights by the citizens, and suspending period of prescription of actions are construed strictly.

7.14 Statutes authorizing appropriationsRule: strictly construed against the expropriating authority and liberally in favor of property owners.

Reason for the rule: the exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether by state or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and therule is that the authority must be strictly construed.

7.15 Statutes granting privileges

Statutes granting special privileges are viewed with suspicion and are strictly construed.Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis- privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

Strict construction requires that those who invoke a special privilege granted by a statute must comply strictly with its provisions.EX: legislative franchise to operate electric light and power

7.16 Legislative grants to local government unitsRule: Legislative grants in favor of local government units are grants of a public nature, and hence, should be strictly construed against the grantee.Reason: There is in such a grant a gratuitous donation of public money or property which results in an unfair advantage to the grantee and for that reason, the grantshould be narrowly restricted in favor of the public.

7.17 Statutory grounds for removal of officials

-strictly construed.


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Rule: Removal is to be confined within the limits prescribed for it; the causes, manner and conditions fixed must be must be pursued with strictness; where thecause of removal is specified, the specification amounts to a prohibition to move for a different cause, which is a paraphrase of the maxim expression unius est

exclusio alterius.Reason: the remedy is a drastic one and penal in nature.

Example: A statutes which provides that a public official may be removed for neglect in office, the phrase in office should be construed to qualify theenumerated grounds, in that the grounds must be such as affect the officers performance of his duties as an officer and not such as affect only his character as a

private person.

7.18 Naturalization lawsRule: Naturalization laws are strictly construed against an applicant for citizenship and rigidly followed and enforced.Reason: The right of an alien to become a citizen by naturalization is a statutory rather than a natural one.

7.19 Statutes imposing taxes and customs dutiesTaxation- is a destructive power which interfered with the personal and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the supportof the government.Rule: Tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer.

7.20 Statutes granting tax exemptionsRule: Laws granting tax exemptions are construedstrictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Taxation is the rule and

exemption is the exception. The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is in fact covered by the exemption so claimed.Basis: To minimize the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness and equality of treatment among taxpayers.Case: Commissioner of Internal Revenue v CA

-Facts: The BIR claimed that there should be no tax credit pursuant toThe proviso of Sec. 168 of the tax code which reads xxx Provided, finally, That credit for any sales, millers or excise taxes and raw materials or supplies used inthe milling process shall not be allowed against the millers tax due, except in the case of a proprietor or operator of a refined sugar factory as provided hereunder.-Issue: whether containers and packaging materials can be credited against the millers deficiency tax.

-Held: The proviso should be strictly construed to apply only to raw materials and not to containers and packing materials which are not raw materials; hence themiller is entitled to tax credit.

Tax exemptions cannot be created by mere implication but must be clearly provided by law. In case of doubt, non-exemption is favored.Example: Where PD No. 1955 withdrew all tax exemptions, except those embodied in the Real Property Code, a law which grants certain industries real estate tax

exemptions under the Real Estate Code, the intention to limit the exemption to only those provided in the Code and to exclude those prescribed in other laws isclear.Case: PLDT v Province of Laguna

-Facts: PLDT is a holder of a legislative franchise, pursuant to which it is exempt from the payment of franchise tax. However, the LGC of 1991 withdrew existing

tax exemptions, which included that of PLDT. Consequently, the province of Laguna, in the exercise of its taxing power under the LGC imposed franchise taxeson PLDT. Thereafter, RA 7925 was enacted, Sec. 23 of which grants Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications Industry. Invoking Sec. 23, PLDT filed aclaim for refund of taxes, contending that Sec.23 grants it tax exemptions.-Issue: Whether PLDT is exempted-Held: Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporationsinterpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, it was ruled that Sec. 23 of RA 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioners franchiseso as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Tax exemptions are highly disfavored.


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7.21 Qualification of ruleFor where the law provides no qualification for the granting of tax exemption, the court is not at liberty to supply one.

The rule of strict construction of a statute granting tax exemptions in favor of the government itself or its agencies.Example: The statute granting the NAPOCOR, which is a government instrumentality, exemption from all forms of taxes embraces exemption not only from

direct but also from indirect taxes.

7.22 Statutes concerning the sovereignRule: Restrictive statutes which impose burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights are strictly construed so no matter how broad their terms are, they

still do not embrace the sovereign, unless the sovereign is specifically mentioned.Example: PD No. 851 which requires employers to pay a thirteenth month salary to their employees receiving a basic compensation of not more than 1k a monthdoes not embrace the Republic of the Philippines.

7.23 Statutes authorizing suits against the governmentDoctrine of non-suability- State may not be sued without its consent.

Nullum tempus occurit regi- there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.Rule: A statute by whereby the state gives its consent to be sued is strictly construed, and the waiver of immunity from suit, being in derogation of sovereignty,will not be lightly inferred.The States immunity may be validly invoked against the action as long as it can be shown that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the stateand not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant.

7.24 Statutes prescribing formalities of willRule: Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are strictly construed. This means that a will must be executed in accordance with thestatutory requirements, otherwise it is entirely void.

7.25 Exceptions and provisosRule: Exceptions should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of

the general provision rather than the exceptions.An exception excludes all others.

The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed, being an exception to the general rule.A preference is an exception to the general rule and it is what its name implies. The law as to preference should be strictly construed.

A proviso should be strictly construed because the purpose set forth in the general enactment expresses the legislative policy and only those expressly exempted bythe proviso should be freed from the operation of the statute.

C. STATUTES LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

7.26 General social legislationGeneral welfare legislations- statutes which have been enacted to implement the social justice and protection-to-labor provisions of the constitutionRule: General welfare legislations which include labor laws, tenancy laws, land reform laws and social security laws are construed liberally. However, this holdstrue only when there is doubt or ambiguity in the law and not when the law itself is clear and free from doubt.Case: Asian Transmission Corp v CA-Issue: When two holidays fall on the same date, will the worker be entitled to only one holiday pay?


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-Held: No, applying the liberal interpretation of labor laws. Holiday pay is a legislated benefit enacted as part of the Constitutional imperative that the State shallafford protection to labor.

7.27 General welfare clause

General welfare clause on the power of local government has two branches:1. One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect

and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon local legislative bodies by law.2. Second branch is much more independent of the specific functions enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to

provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the LGU and the inhabitantsthereof, and for the protection of property therein.

Rule: The general welfare clause should be construed liberally in favor of the LGUs. It should be interpreted, in case of doubt, as to give more powers to localgovernments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and material progress of the people in the community. It is elastic and must be responsive tovarious social conditions.

7.28 Grant of power to local governmentsOld rule: Construed strictly and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the national government and against the political subdivision concerned.

New Rule: Following the constitutional mandate of local autonomy, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the LGC, which provides in Sec 4 thereof that any powerof a barangay, municipality, city or province shall be liberally construed in its favor. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the exercise of power shall beinterpreted in favor of the LGU concerned.

7. 29 Statutes granting taxing powerOld rule: Construed strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting that power must be resolved against the LGU becauseLGUs, unlike the sovereign state, are allocated with no inherent power to tax.

New Rule: Since the policy of local autonomy is advanced by the new constitution, statutes prescribing limitations on the taxing power of LGUs must bestrictly against the national government and liberally in favor of the LGUs, and any doubt as to the existence of the taxing power will be resolved in favor ofthe local government.

7.30 Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes

Rule: The laws on prescription being a remedial measure should be interpreted liberally in a way conducive to bringing about the beneficial purpose ofaffording protection to the taxpayers.

7.31 Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of tax

Rule: Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes within the period required are liberally construed in favor of the government and strictly construedin favor of the government and strictly observed and interpreted against the taxpayer. Provided, however, that such construction will not result to injustice to

the taxpayer.Reason: By reason of public policy. Such laws are intended to hasten tax payments or to punish evasions or neglect of duty in respect thereto.

7.32 Election lawsRule: Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purpose to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choiceof their representatives for the application of the election laws involves public interest and imposes upon the COMELEC and the courts the imperative dutyto ascertain by all means within their command who is the real candidate elected by the people.

Three parts of election laws for purposes of applying the rules of statutory construction:


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1. The provisions for the conduct of elections which election officials are required to follow.-mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only.

-If not complied with by the election officials, the law provides a remedy against them. They should be prosecuted, and the will of the honest voter, asexpressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld.

2. The provisions which candidates for office are required to perform.-generally regarded as mandatory. Thus, the provisions prescribing the qualifications of candidate requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy, definingelection offenses, and limiting the period within which to file election contests, are mandatory and failure to comply is fatal.

3. The procedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections.

-liberally construed.-example: laws governing election protests. Technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of theelectorate in the choice of the public officials.

7.33 Amnesty proclamationsRule: Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as to carry out their purpose, which is to encourage the return to the fold of the law of those who haveveered from the law. Hence, in case of doubt as to whether certain persons come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be resolved in their favor andagainst the state.

7.34 Statutes prescribing prescription of crimesRule: Statutes of limitations are liberally construed in favor of the accused

Reason: It is not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a recognitionand notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which itdestroys proofs of guilt.

7.35 Adoption statutesRule: Adoption statutes are liberally in favor of the child to be adopted.Reason: Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide

homes, parental care and education for the unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter.

7.36 Veteran and pension lawsVeteran and pension laws- are enacted to compensate a class of men who suffered in the service for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered

in line of duty.Rule: Veteran and pension laws, being remedial in character must be construed liberally to the end that their noble purpose is best accomplished.

Cases:Ortiz v COMELEC

-Issue: whether a commissioner of the COMELEC is deemed to have completed his term and entitled to full retirement benefits under the law which grants himfive-year lump sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who retires from the service after having completed his term of office, when the acceptance of hiscourtesy resignation submitted in response to the call of the President following the EDSA Revolution is accepted.-Held: The acceptance of of his courtesy resignation is not resignation in contemplation of law because it was not voluntary. He is entitled to retirement benefits.

In Re Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana


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-Issue: whether Justice Plana is entitled to gratuity and retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignation was accepted following the EDSA Revolutionand establishment of a revolutionary government under the Freedom Constitution, he lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement under the

law but had accumulated a number of leave credits which, if added to his age at the time, would exceed the age requirement.-Held: Applying the liberal approach, he is entitled. Failure to serve the required length of service is beyond his control.

In Re Martin

-Issue: whether a justice of the SC, who availed of the disability retirement benefits pursuant to the provision that if the reason for the retirement be anypermanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office and prior to the date of retirement he shall receive only a gratuity equivalent to ten years salary

and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retirees natural life, is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension afterthe ten-year period.-Held: if at the time of retirement he was already entitled to retire under Sec 1 of RA 910 and to receive his 5-year lump sum plus a lifetime pension after 5 years,his having applied for disability retirement under Sec 3 of the law in order that he may receive the 10-year lump sum gratuity, should not result, should not resultin the forfeiture of his right to a lifetime pension if he should still be alive after ten years from his retirement. The law is not intended to deprive him of his lifetime

pension if he is also alive after 10 years. The retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age, not to punish him for having survived.

Cena v CSC

-Issue: whether or not a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days ofgovernment service, may be allowed to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an old-age

pension under Sec 11 par. (b) of PD No. 1146.

-Held: There is no justifiable reason to avail such. There is no indication that Sec 11, par. (b) of PD No. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where acompulsory retiree on his 65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service, i.e., only a few months short short of the age-oldrequirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.

7.37 Rules of CourtRule: The Rules of Court, being procedural, are to be construed liberally with the end in view of realizing their purposethe proper and just determination of alitigation. Technicalities, when they are not an aid to justice, deserve scant consideration from the courts.

However, where a decision of a court is satisfactorily supported by the records and is in strict accordance with the rules, a liberal construction of such rules so as tojustify setting aside the decision is not warranted.

The literal strictures of the rules have been relaxed in favor of liberal construction in the following cases:1. Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice;

2. Where the interest of substantial justice will be served;3. Where the resolution of the emotion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court; and

4. Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.

7.38 Other statutesCurative statutes- are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certainlegal requirements. They are retroactive.Redemption laws- being procedural in nature, are to be construed liberally to carry out their purpose, which is to enable the debtor to have his property applied to

pay as many debtors liabilities as possible.-similarly, statutes providing exemptions from executions are interpreted liberally in order to give effect to their beneficent and humane purpose; and to

this end, any reasonable doubt should be construed in favor of the exemption from execution.


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Warehouse receipts- as instruments of credit, warehouse receipts play a very important role in modern commerce, and accordingly, warehouse receipt laws aregiven liberal construction in favor ofbona fide holders of such receipts.

Probation- gives second chance to first-hand offenders to maintain his place in society through the process of reformation-probation law is liberally construed by extending the benefits thereof to any one not specifically disqualified.

Statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution- liberally construed for the advancement of purposes and objectives for which it was created.

MAXIMS

Statuta pro public commodo late interpretantur- statute enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally.

Privilegia recipient largam interpretationem voluntati consonam concedentis- privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them.

Nullum tempus occurit regi- there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

Chapter VIII

MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

A. In General

8.01. Generally.

Statutes may be classified either as madatory or directory. The classification is important in resolving the question of what effect should be given to themandate of the statute.

8.02. Mandatory and directory statutes generally.

Mandatory statute- commands either positively that something be done, or performed in a particular way, or negatively that something be not done,leaving the person concerned no choice on the matter except to obey.


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-contains words of command or prohibition, the omission to follow which renders the proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, or the violation ofwhich makes the decision therein rendered invalid.

Directory statute- permissive or discretionary in nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no injury can result from ignoring it or

that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtained. The nonperformance of what it prescribeswill not vitiate the proceedings therein taken.

8.03. When statute is mandatory or directory.

There is no absolute test for determining whether a statutory direction is to be considered mandatory or directory. The primary object is to ascertain

legislative intent.

When a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than

substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, ordely and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as

directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory where no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can resultfrom ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result.

A provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance is mandatory.

8.05. language used.

Mandatory

-words of command and prohibition

-shall, must, ought, should, cannot, shall not, ought not

Directory

-permissive words

-may


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8.06. Use of shall or must.

As a general rule, the use of the word shall in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory. The presumption is that the word shall in a statute is used inan imperative, and not in a directory, sense. If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon something in the character of the legislation or in the context

which will justify a different meaning.

Like the word shall, the term must or ought is a word of command. It connotes compulsion or mandatoriness. The word must and shall in a statute are notalways imperative. It may be consistent with discretion. If the language of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals thatthe legislature intended to use the word must to be directory, it should be given that meaning.

One test used to determine whether the word shall is mandatory is whether non-compliance with what is required will result in the nullity of the act. If itresults in the nullity of the act, the word is used as a command.

Illustration.

InDirector of Lands vs. CA, the law requires in petitions for land registration that upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,

the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published in the Official Gazette and once in a nespaper of general circulationin the Philippines. The Court held that the law expressly requires that the initial hearing be published not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation because due process demands it and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as other newspapers. These make

the use of the word shall imperative, so that the decision in the land registration case which was tried without the initial hearing being published in a newspaper ofgenral circulation is a nullity.

8.07. Use of may.

The word shows opportunity or possibility. Under ordinary circumstances, the phrase may be implies the possible existence of something. Generallyspeaking, the use of the word may in a statute denotes that it is directory in nature. The word may is generally permissive only and operate to confer discretion.

Illustration.

The word may in Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code to the effect that shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by delivery of

the certificate or certificates endorsed by the owner is merely permissive and indicates that transfer of the shares may be effected in a manner different from thatprovided for in law.


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8.08. When shall is construed as may and vice versa.

The word may will, as a rule, be construed as shall where a statute provides for the doing of some act which is required by justice or public duty, or whereit vests a public body or officer with power and authority to take such action which concerns the public interest or rights of individuals. On the other hand, theword shall may be construed as may when so required by context or the intention of the legislature. It shall be construed merely as permissive when no public

benefit or private right requires that it be given an imperative meaning.

Illustration.

Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides that an appeal from an adverse decision against a local executive electiveofficial to the President shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. It has been held that the word shall in the provision is not mandatory

because there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision and there is nothing to

infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order.

8.09. Use of negative, prohibitory or exclusive terms.

A negative statute is mandatory. A negative statute is one expressed in negative words or in the form of an affirmative proposition qualified by the word

only, said word having the force of an exclusionary negation.

B. MANDATORY STATUTES

8.10. Statutes conferring power.

Statutes which confer upon a public body or officer power to perform acts which concern the public interests or rights of individuals, are generallyregarded as mandatory although the language used is permissive only since such statutes are construed as imposing rather than conferring privileges. It is placed

with the depository to meet the demands of rights, and to prevent a failure of justice. It is given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke its aid, and who could

otherwise be remediless.


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8.11. Statutes granting benefits.

Statutes which require certain steps to be taken or certain conditions to be met before persons concerned can avail of the benefits conferred by law are,

with respect to such requirements, considered mandatory. For this reason, failure of a person to take the required steps or to meet the conditions will ordinarilypreclude him from availing of the statutory benefits. The rule is based on the maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt, or the laws aid the vigilant,

not those who slumber on their rights. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure he who is first in time is preferred in right.

8.12. Statutes prescribing jurisdictional requirements.

Statutes prescribing the various steps and methods to be taken for acquisition for jurisdiction by the courts or tribunals over certain matters are consideredmandatory.

8.13. Statutes prescribing time to take action or to appeal.

Statutes or rules prescribing the time for litigants to take certain actions or to appeal from an adverse decision are generally mandatory.

8.14. Statutes prescribing procedural requirements.

In statutes relating to procedure, every act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of thepart affected, is mandatory. A statute which requires a court to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular manner, follow a particular procedure, or subject to certainlimitations, is mandatory, and an act beyond those limits is void as an excess of jurisdiction.

8.15. Election laws on conduct of election


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The provisions of election laws governing the conduct of election and prescribing the steps election officials are required to do in connection therewith aremandatory before the elections, however, when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially

where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.

8.16. Election laws on qualification and disqualification.

The rule that election laws are mandatory before but not after the election applies only to those provisions which are procedural in nature. The rule doesnot apply to provisions of the election laws prescribing the time limit to file certificates of candidacy and the qualifications and disqualifications to elective office.

These provisions are mandatory even after the elections.

8.17. Statutes prescribing qualifications for office.

Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and must exist at the commencement of the term and during the occupancy of the office. This meansthat if a person is not qualified at the time he assumed office, or if he loses such eligibility or qualifgications during the continuance of his incumbency, he may be

ousted from office.

8.18. Statutes relating to assessment of taxes

It is a general rule that the provisions of a statute relating to the assessment of taxes, which are intended for the security of the citizens, or to insure theequality of taxation, or for certainty as to the nature and amount of each others tax, are mandatory; but those designed merely for the information or direction of

officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of proceedings are merely directory.

8.19. Statutes concerning public auction sale.

Statutes authorizing public auction sale of properties and prescribing the procedure to be followed are in derogation of property rights and due process, andare construed, with respect to the prescribed procedure, to be mandatory.

C. DIRECTORY STATUTES


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8.20. Statutes prescribing guidance for officers

There are statutory requisitions intended for guidance of officers in the conduct of business devolved upon them which do not limit their power or render

its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineffectual. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as mandatory, unless accompanied by negative wordsimporting that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.

8.21. Statutes prescribing manner of judicial action

Statutes prescribing the requirements as to the manner of judicial action that judges should follow in the discharge of their functions are, as a rule, merely

directory. Non-compliance therewith is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings.

8.22. Statutes requiring rendition of decision within prescribed period

The question as to whether time provision is mandatory or directory is one of legislative intent. If by the terms of the statute or by necessary implicationthe judge or public official loses jurisdiction to resolve the case after the prescribed period and any judgment thus rendered is null and void for want of jurisdiction,

then the statute is mandatory. The better rule is that where a construction of a time provision as mandatory will cause great injury to persons not at fault or result ina miscarriage of justice, such consequence should be avoided by construing the statute as directory, for reasons of fairness, justice and fair play require such

construction.

8.23. Constitutional time provision directory

Is a decision rendered beyond the period prescribed in the Constitutio twenty four months for the Supreme Court, 12 months for lower collegiate courts,and 3 months for other lower courts null and void? Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or verdict, have been held

by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had intended suchresult it would clearly have indicated it. Additionally, constitutional provisions are directory and not mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.

Chapter 9 - Prospective and Retroactive Statutes


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A. IN GENERAL

9.01. Prospective and Retroactive statutes.

Prospective statutes one which operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statutes take effect, one that looks and applies to the future.

Retroactive law law which creates a new obligation imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past.

Statute is not made retroactive because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words, part of the requirements for its action andapplication is drawn a time antedating its passage.

A retroactive law, in legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposesnew duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transaction or consideration already past.

9.02. Laws operate prospectively, generally.

Statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature to give tem a retroactive effect is expressly

declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.

A statute ought not to receive a construction making it retroactive unless the words are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be

annexed to them. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so.

Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward, not backward

Les de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past.

A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage.

Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis a new statute should affect the future, not the past.

9.03. Presumption against retroactivity.

It depends upon legislative intent.

The presumption is that all laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly, and unequivocally expressed or necessarilyimplied.

Presumption applies whether the statute is in the form of an original enactment, an amendment, or a repeal.

9.04. Words or phrases indicating prospectivity.

hereafter or thereafter to take effect immediately or at affixed future date

from and after the passing of this Act, shall have been made, from and after indicates that the statute is prospective in operation only

shall implies that the lawmakers intend the enactment to be effective only in future.


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9.05. Retroactive statutes, generally.

Constitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroactive statutes which do not impair the obligations of contract, deprive persons of property withoutdue process of law, or divest rights that have become vested, or which are not in the nature of ex post facto laws.

Retroactive laws: remedial or curative statutes as well as statutes which create new rights

Statutes applied retroactively must not violate any of the constitutional restrictions

B. STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

9.06. Penal statutes.

Penal laws operate prospectively

No act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, except by virtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed

Based on the maxim: nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.

9.07. Ex post facto law.

It is any of the following:1.) A law which makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act.

2.) A law which aggravates a crime, or make it greater than it was, when committed

3.) A law which changes the punishment and inflict s a greater punishment than that annexed to the crime when committed

4.) A law which alters the legal rule of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time f thecommission of the offense

5.) A law which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done

was lawful

6.) A law which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty

The prohibition against ex post facto law is limited in scope and applies only to penal matters and criminal proceedings, which impose punishment orproceedings, which affect private rights retroactively.

Retroactive laws, which are not criminal in nature, do not violate prohibition against ex post facto laws

9.08. Bill of attainder.

A legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial

It is doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features


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If a statute is a bill of attainder, it is an ex post facto law

If a statute is an ex post facto law, it does not provide that it is a bill of attainder

9.09. When penal laws applied retroactively.

Penal laws cannot be given retroactive unless they are favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual criminal, although at the time of the application ofsuch laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same (favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda)

2 laws affecting the liability of the accused: (1) in force at the time of the commission of the crime (2) enacted during or after the trial of the criminalaction

If during the pendency of a criminal action and a statute is passed reducing the penalty and it is favorable to the accused, it will be applied retroactively.

If there is already a final judgment and the accused is already serving sentence, the remedy of the accused is to file a petition for habeas corpus, allegingthat his continued imprisonment is illegal

Exceptions: (1) accused is habitual delinquent (2) the later statute expressly provides that it shall not apply to existing actions or pending cases (3) the

accused disregards the later law and invokes the prior statute where he was prosecuted

9.10. Statutes substantive in nature.

A law which creates, defines, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for the administration of public affairs Substantive right one which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them

Procedural rule if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right (i.e. where to prosecute an appeal or transferring the venue of appeal)

Substantive rule if the rule creates right such as the right to appeal

9.11. Effects on pending actions.

A statute which affects substantive rights and not merely procedural matters may not be given retroactive operation so as to govern pending proceedings,in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary.

Example: In Cang vs. CA, RA No. 7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the trial court. It took effect only during thependency of the appeal before the CA. Therefore, petitioners claim that RA No. 7691 should be retroactively applied was not given merit. The court heldthat, a law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be given retroactive effect.

9.12. Qualification of rule.

A substantive law will be construed as applicable to pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law.

Or if the statutes purpose is to promote social justice

A case must be decided in the light of the law as it exists at the time of the decision by the appellate court.

Example, in the caseMunicipality of Sta. Fe v. Municipality of Aritao, petitioner contends that, provisions of the 1987 constitution and the LGC of 1991

on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. When the court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over


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a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the case is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedingsin another tribunal. The court held that a law may be given retroactive effect if it so provided expressly or retroactivity is necessarily implied there from.

No vested right is impaired and it does not deprive the person of property without due process of law. Provisions of 1987 Constitution are intended toapply to all existing political subsidiaries.

9.13. Statutes affecting vested rights.

A vested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in property that has become fixed or established and id no longer open to doubt orcontroversies

Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a present interest

Rights which have not been acted are not vested

A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively if it impairs substantive right that has become vested

While a law creating a new right in favor of a class of persons may be given retroactive operation. It may not be so applied if the new right collides with orimpairs any vested right acquired before the establishment of the new right.

Example, the abolition of death penalty and its imposition. Those accused of crimes prior to the re-imposition of the death penalty have acquired vested

rights under the law abolishing it.

9.14. Statutes affecting obligations of contract.

Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of the execution

Such law forms part of, and is read into, the contract even without the parties expressly saying so

Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself

A statute which authorizes any deviation from the terms of contract should not be applied retroactively

9.15. Illustration of rule.

InPeople v. Zeta, a lawyer entered into a contract for professional services on contingent basis and actually rendered service to its successful conclusion.

This is pursuant to the then existing law authorizing a lawyer to charge not more than 5% of the amount involved as attorneys fees in the prosecution ofcertain veterans claim. A statute was enacted prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees before they were collected. The lawyer in this case was

prosecuted for violating the statute. The court said that the said statute cannot be applied retroactively. The court concluded that the 5% fee allowed by theold law is not unreasonable.

9.16. Repealing and amendatory acts.

Although a repealing act is intended to be retroactive, it will not be so construed if it will impair vested rights or the obligations of contract, or unsettlematters that had been legally done under the old law

While an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had been contained therein, it may not be given a retroactiveeffect unless it is so provided expressly or by necessary implication and no vested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired.


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Example: RA No. 401 was amended by RA No. 671; according to the said amendment, a debtor who paid his pre-war obligation with interests before theamendment was approved into law is not entitled to a refund of the interest paid, because the phrase makes voluntary payment in the said act denotes a

present or future act.

C. STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

9.17. Laws not retroactive; exception.

Procedural laws and curative laws are given retroactive operation

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.

They refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.

They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence.

In criminal law, they provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.

Remedial statutes which do not create new or take away vested rights but only operate in furtherance of the remedy r confirmation of rights alreadyexisting do not come with the legal concept of a retroactive law.

No vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, orwhere to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.

Example: In Tan, Jr. v. CA, the issue is whether or not the redemption of subject property valid under the then existing rule of procedure at the time of

redemption remains valid even if the new rule, if applied retroactively, makes the redemption void. The CA applied the new rule retroactively andvalidated the redemption. The court reversed the appellate court and ruled in favor of the validity of the redemption.

9.19. Procedural laws.

Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion.

They refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.

Include rules of pleadings, practice, and evidence.

9.20. Exceptions to the rule.

The rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation, orwhere to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights.

It may not be also applied to pending actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts.


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9.21. Curative statutes.

These are healing acts.

They are remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.

They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing laws, and curb certain evils.

Their purpose is to give validity to acts that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with.

Example:Frivaldo vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 87193. June 23, 1989.)

Facts: Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January 1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988,the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with theComelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in theUnited States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses thathe had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was merely forced upon himself as a meansof survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge to his title should be dismissed,

being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the OmnibusElection Code.

Issue: Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18 January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and

qualifications of the members of the Congress as well as to the elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos citizenship has alreadybeen made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is assumed

to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval. It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that theSupreme Court may review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,

omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per thecertification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine

Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of themsubject to greater risk than he, who did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. Still, ifhe really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of our

country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, orby repatriation. He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegianceto another country cannot be permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting

public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office butduring the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving asgovernor of Sorsogon.

9.22. Limitations of rule.

Curative statutes are not given retroactive effect if to do so will impair the obligations of contract or disturb vested rights.

Exception is a remedial or curative statute which is enacted as a police power measure.


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9.23. Police power legislations.

Statutes which are enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate certain activities are applicable not only to those activities or transactions cominginto being after their passage, but also to those already in existence.

Reason: non-impairment of the obligations of contract or of vested rights must yield to the legitimate exercise of the power, by the legislature, to prescriberegulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people.

9.24. Statutes relating to prescription.

Being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its effectivity.

Such a statute is both prospective in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it took effect, and retroactive in the sense that it

applies to causes accrued before its passage.

A statute of limitations will not be given retroactive operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will remove a bar oflimitation which has become complete or disturb existing claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon.

9.25. Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription.

Example: In Corales v. Employees Compensation Commission, issue is whether a claim for workmens compensation which ensued under the oldWorkmens Compensation Act is barred by the provisions of New Labor Code which repealed the former act. It says that, workmens compensationclaims accruing prior to the effectivity of the act shall be filed on or before the specified date otherwise, they will be barred. But the court ruled that, the

provisions do not apply on the said claims because the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmens Compensation Act is, asamended is 10 years. This is a right founded on statute, a vested right, that cannot be impaired by the retroactive application of the Labor Code.

9.26. Prescription in criminal and civil cases.

The laws on prescription of actions supply as well to crimes committed before the enactment as afterwards.

The statutes are enacted by the legislatures as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties.

9.27. Statutes relating to appeals.

A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions in which no judgment has yet been promulgated at the timethe statute took effect.

It may not be construed retroactively so as to impair vested rights.


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List of maxims in Chapter 9:

Lex prospicit, non respicit the law looks forward, not backward

Les de futuro, judex de praeterito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past.

Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis a new statute should affect the future, not the past.

Favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda penal laws cannot be given retroactive unless they are favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual criminal,although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same

Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine legis there is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.

CHAPTER 10

Amendment, Revision, Codification and Repeal

I. Amendment

a. Power to Amend

Legislature has the power to amend, subject to constitutional requirement any existing law.

Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the

law.

b. How Amendment Effected

By addition, deletion or alteration of a statute which survives in its amended form.

By enacting amendatory act, modifying or altering some provisions of the statute either expressly or impliedly


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Express Amendment: Done by providing amendatory act that specific sections or provisions of a statute are amended; indicated as toread as follows

c. Amendment by Implication

There is implied amendment where a part of a prior statute embracing the subject as the latter act may not be enforced without

nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, prior act is deemed amended to the extent of the repugnancy.

d. When Amendment Takes Effect

After 15 days following the publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.

e. How Construed

A statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole mea

Documents

Agpalo Chapters 6-11