Statutory Construction Agpalo Notes

8/13/2019 Statutory Construction Agpalo Notes

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CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL

Laws, generally

• A whole body or system of law

• Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory bylegitimate power of the state

• Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of legislati!e

power", Presidential issuances (ordinance power"#urisprudence, ordinances passed by sanggunians of

local go!ernment units$

%tatutes, generally

• An act of legislature (Philippine &ommission, Phil$

Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress"

• PDs of )arcos during the period of martial law *+-

&onstitution

• EO of A.uino re!olutionary period /reedom

&onstitution

Public 0 affects the public at large

• general 0 applies to the whole state andoperates throughout the state ali1e upon all

people or all of a class$

• %pecial 0 relates to particular person or thingsof a class or to a particular community,

indi!idual or thing$

• Local Law 0 operation is confined to a

specific place or locality (e$g municipal

ordinance"

Pri!ate 0 applies only to a specific person or

sub2ect$

Permanent and temporary statutes

• Permanent 3 one whose operation is not limited induration but continues until repealed$

• 4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time

fied in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the

happening of an e!ent$

o E$g$ statute answering to an emergency

Other classes of statutes

• Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application

• Declaratory, curati!e, mandatory, directory,

substanti!e, remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation

• According to form

o Affirmati!e

o 5egati!e

)anner of referring to statutes

• Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil Legislature

*+6*3 *+-7

• &ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98

• Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+:, *+; <

• 'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa

• Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title

ENACTMENT OF STATUTES

Legislati!e power, generally

• Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws

• >ested in congress 0 *+; &onstitution

• President 0 *+- ? /reedom (PD and EO

respecti!ely"

• %angguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod

panlalawigan 0 only within respecti!e 2urisdiction 0ordinances

• Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer

• Delegated power

• Issue rules and regulations to implement a

specific law

&ongress legislati!e power

• 4he determination of the legislati!e policy and its

formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding

rule of conduct$

• Legislati!e power 3 plenary ecept only to such

limitations as are found in the constitution

Procedural re.uirements, generally

• Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA"

• Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws

Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided also

by the &onstitution"

Passage of bill

• Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a member

of congress for enactment into law

• %hall embrace only one sub2ect which shall beepressed in the title

• %inged by authors

• /ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse

• 'ills may originate from either lower or upper @ouse

• Eclusi!e to lower house

Appropriation

Re!enue= tariff bills

'ills authoriing increase of public debt

'ills of local application

Pri!ate bills

• After - readings, appro!al of either house (see Art 8

%ec :8 (*""

• %ecretary reports the bill for first reading

• /irst reading 0 reading the number and title, referral to

the appropriate committee for study andrecommendation

• &ommittee 0 hold public hearings andsubmits report and recommendation for

calendar for second reading

• %econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with amendments

proposed by the committee" 0 unless copies are

distributed and such reading is dispensed with

o 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions and

amendments

o 'ill will be !oted on



o A bill appro!ed shall be included in the

calendar of bills for -rd reading

• 4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on :nd reading will be

submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,

• 'ill appro!ed on the -rd reading will be transmitted to

the BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process asthe first passage"

o If the BOther @ouseC appro!es without

amendment it is passed to the President

o If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments,and disagreement arises, differences will be

settled by the &onference &ommittees of both

houses

o Report and recommendation of the :

&onference &ommittees will ha!e to be

appro!ed by both houses in order to beconsidered pass

• President

o Appro!es and signs

o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt"

o Inaction

• If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where

it originated with recommendation

o :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to

the other house for appro!al

o :=- of the other house appro!es 0 it shall

become a law

o If president did not act on the bill with in -6

days after receipt, bill becomes a law

• %ummary - ways of how a bill becomes a law$

President signs

inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt

!etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of

all its members, each house !oting separately$

Appropriations and re!enue bills

• %ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills

• Only difference is that they can only originate from the

Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with

the amendments

• Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$

: (:"

o congress may not increase the appropriation

recommended by the President

o particular appropriation limited

o procedure for &ongress is the same to all

other department= agencies (procedure for

appro!ing appropriations "o special appropriations 0 national treasurer=

re!enue proposal

o no transfer of appropriations authority to

augment

o discretionary funds 0 for public purposes

o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted

o President my !eto any particular item=s in an

appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$

Authentication of bills

• 'efore passed to the President

• Indispensable

• 'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President

•

Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals

• #ournal of proceedings

• &onclusi!e with respect to other matters that are

re.uired by the &onstitution

• Disputable with respect to all other matters

• 'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws shouldrest upon public memorials of the most permanen

character

• %hould be public

Enrolled bill

• 'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er

and the %enate President and appro!ed by the

President

• Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courts

o It carries on its face a solemn assurance that i

was passed by the assembly by the legislati!eand eecuti!e departments$

• &ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!erwhat really happened

o If only for respect to the legislati!e and

eecuti!e departments

• 4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing o

the bill before it was certified by the officer of the

assembly and appro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the

remedy is by amendment by enacting a curati!e

legislation not by 2udicial decree$

• Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon

the courts

• If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and

2ournal, enrolled bill pre!ails$

Githdrawal of authentication, effect of

• %pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there is

discrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated

and the enrolled bill$

• Effect

o 5ullifies the bill as enrolled

o Losses absolute !erity

o &ourts may consult 2ournals

PARTS OF STATUTES

4itle of statute

• )andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shalembrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in

the title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+; &onstitution"

• : limitations upon legislation

o 4o refrain from conglomeration, under one

statute, of heterogeneous sub2ects

o 4itle of the bill should be couched in a

language sufficient to notify the legislators

and the public and those concerned of the

import of the single sub2ect$



Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect"

• Principal purpose to apprise the legislators of the

ob2ect, nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the bill

and to pre!ent the enactment into law of matters which

ha!e not recei!ed the notice, action and study of the

legislators$

o 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation

• In sum of the purpose

o 4o pre!ent hodgepodge= log3rolling

legislationo 4o pre!ent surprise or fraud upon the

legislature

o 4o fairly apprise the people, through

publication of the sub2ects of the legislation

o Fsed as a guide in ascertaining legislati!e

intent when the language of the act does not

clearly epress its purposeH may clarify doubt

or ambiguity$

@ow re.uirement construed

• Liberally construed

• If there is doubt, it should be resol!ed against the

doubt and in fa!or of the constitutionality of the statute

Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement

• &omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect

• If all parts of the law are related, and are germane to

the sub2ect matter epressed in the title

• 4itle is !alid where it indicates in broad but clear

terms, the nature, scope and conse.uences of the lawand its operations

• 4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill

• Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$

o Enough if it states Ban act to amend a specific

statuteC

• 5eed not state the precise nature of theamendatory act$

• F% Legislators ha!e titles ending with the words Bandfor other purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the same

&onstitutional restriction as that embodied in thePhilippine &onstitution"

Ghen re.uirement not applicable

• Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted

into law

• Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the time

the *+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$

• 5o application to municipal or city ordinances$

Effect of insufficiency of title

• %tatute is null and !oid

• Ghere, the sub2ect matter of a statute is not

sufficiently epressed in its title, only so much of the

sub2ect matter as is not epressed therein is !oid,

lea!ing the rest in force, unless the in!alid pro!isions

are inseparable from the others, in which case the

nullity the former !itiates the latter

Enacting clause

• Gritten immediately after the title

• %tates the authority by which the act is enacted

• * 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the Presidenof the F%, be it enacted by the F% Philippine

&ommissionC

• : 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the F%

be it enacted by the Philippine LegislatureC

• - 3 Ghen : became bicameral B'e it enacted by the

%enate and @ouse of Representati!es of the Philippinesin legislature assembled and by authority of the sameC

• 9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the 5ationa

Assembly of the Philippines

• 7 0 when 9 became bicameral Bbe it enacted by the

%enate and @ouse of Representati!es in congress

assembledC 0 same *+983*+:=*+;3present$

• 8 0 'atasang Pambansa B'e it enacted by the

'atasang Pambansa in session assembledC

• 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ President of

the Philippines, by the powers !ested in me by the&onstitution do hereby decree as followsC

• ; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC

Preamble

• Defined 0 prefatory statement or eplanation or a

finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, o

occasion for ma1ing the law to which it is prefiedC

• /ound after enacting clause and before the body of the

law$

• Fsually not used by legislations because content of the preamble is written in the eplanatory note$

• 'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$

Pur!iew of statute

• that part which tells what the law is about

• body of statute should embrace only one sub2ecshould only one sub2ect matter, e!en there pro!isionsshould be allied and germane to the sub2ect and

purpose of the bill$

• %tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains a

single proposition$

• Parts

o short title

o policy section

o definition section

o administrati!e section

o sections prescribing standards of conduct

o

sections imposing sanctions for !iolation oits pro!isions

o transitory pro!ision

o separability clause

o effecti!ity clause

%eparability clause

• it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared

in!alid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby$

• It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate the

whole statute where what is left, after the !oid part, is

not complete and wor1able

• Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole



• its effect to create in the place of such presumption

the opposite of separability$

PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND

ORDINANCES

Presidential issuances

• are those which the president issues in the eercise of

ordinance power$

•

i$e$ EO, AO (administrati!e orders", proclamations,)O (memorandum orders", )& (memorandum

circulars", and general or special orders$

• @a!e force and effect of laws$

• EO

o acts of the President pro!iding for rules of a

general or permanent character in the

implementation or eecution of

constitutional= statutory powers$o do not ha!e the force and effect of laws

enacted by congress

o different from EO issued by the President in

the e of her legislati!e power during the

re!olution Presidential decree under thefreedom constitution

• AO

o acts of the President which relate to particular

aspects of go!ernmental operations in

pursuance of his duties as administrati!e head

• Proclamations

o acts of the President fiing a date or declaring

a statute or condition of public moment or

interest, upon the eistence of which the

operation of a specific law or regulation is

made to depend

• )O

o acts of the President on matters ofadministrati!e details or of subordinate or

temporary interest which only concern a

particular officer or office of go!ernment

• )&o acts of the president on matters relating to

internal administration which the President

desires to bring to the attention of all or some

of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or

offices of the go!ernment, for information of

compliance

• Keneral or %pecific Order

o Acts and commands of the President in his

capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of the A/P

%upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations

• %ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+; &onstitution

• %ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+; &onstitution

• It has been held that a law which pro!ides that a

decision of a .uasi32udicial body be appealable directly

to the %&, if enacted without the ad!ice and

concurrence of the %&, ineffecti!e

o Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to &A

• Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power ofthe %&

o Power to repeal procedural rules

o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e in

nature (unli1e the legislati!e department"

• %ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away !ested

rightsH right to appeal

• Procedural rules 0 means of implementing eisting

rightH where to file an appeal for transferring the !enue

• Rules and regulations issued by the administrati!e or

eecuti!e officers in accordance with and authoried

by law, ha!e the force and effect of lawo Re.uisites for !alidity

Rules should be germane to the

ob2ects and purposes of the law

Regulations be not in contradiction

with, but conform to, the standards

that the law prescribes

4he be for the sole purpose o

carrying into effect the genera

pro!isions of the lawo Law cannot be restricted or etended

o Law pre!ails o!er regulations, if there are

discrepancies

• Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e agency isa delegated legislati!e power 0 if it enlarges or restricts

such statute is in!alid

• Re.uisites for delegating a statute by legislati!e

branch to another branch of go!ernment to fill in

details, eecution, enforcement, or administration o

law$ the law must beo &omplete in itself

o /i a standard which may be epress o

implied

Eample of BstandardC 0 simplicity

and dignityH public interestH public

welfareH interest of law and order

2ustice and e.uity and substantiamerit of the caseH ade.uate and

efficient instruction

• Eampleo &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid

o &hange of BmayC(permissi!e" to BshallC

(mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego ! &O)ELE&

pp ::"

Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished

• Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect of a

!alid lawH binding on the courts e!en if they are not in

agreement with the policy stated therein or with its

innate wisdom

• Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts tha

finally determine what the law means

• Administrati!e construction is not necessarily binding

upon the courtsH it may be set aside by 2udicia

department (if there is an error of law, or abuse of

power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or KAD 0 gra!e abuse of

discretion"

'arangay ordinance



• %angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e bodyH

may pass an ordinance by ma2ority of all its membersH

sub2ect to re!iew by %angguniang bayan= panglungsod

• %angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action on the

ordinance within -6 days from submissionH if theres

inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the

municipal or city ordinanceH if inconsistency is found,it will remand to the %angguniang barangay

)unicipal ordinance

•

Lodged in the %angguniang bayan• )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed

• Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for appro!al

or !etoH if theres mayors inaction, ordinance is

presumed appro!edH if !etoed and o!erridden by :=- of

all members, ordinance is appro!ed

• Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang

panlalawigan for re!iewo Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or in

part and its action is finalH if theres inaction

within -6 days, it is deemed !alid

&ity ordinance

• >ested in %angguniang panglungsod• )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed

• %ubmitted to )ayor within *6 days

o Appro!e

o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed

o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed

• If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action within

-6 days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid

Pro!incial ordinance

• %angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum

!oting, passage of ordinance

• /orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days fromreceipt shall

o Appro!e

o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed

o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed

VALIDITY

Presumption of constitutionality

• E!ery statute is presumed !alid

o Lies on how a law is enacted

o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed and

eecuti!e who appro!ed

o Responsibility of upholding the constitution

rests not on the courts alone but on the

legislati!e and eecuti!e branches as well

• &ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety of

laws

• 4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of

the law to the constitution must be clear and

une.ui!ocal

• All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of

the constitutionality of lawH to doubt is to sustain

• /inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the

%upreme &ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 par

and !oted thereon"

• 5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to initially

decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in

appropriate cases

Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power

• 4he eistence of an appropriate case

• Interest personal and substantial by the party raisingthe constitutional .uestion

• Plea that the function be eercised at the earlies

opportunity

• 5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be passed

upon in order to decide the case

Appropriate case

• 'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable

contro!ersy

• #udicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest

and !ital contro!ersy

• &ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matte

which is appropriate for court re!iewH pertains toissues which are inherently susceptible of beingdecided on grounds recognied by law

• &ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0 .uestions

which are concerned with issues dependent upon the

wisdom (!$ legality" of a particular act or measure

being assailed

o Bseparation of powersC

o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the concep

of 2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power includes

the duty of the courts of 2ustice to settle actua

contro!ersies in!ol!ing rights which are

legally demandable and enforceable and to

determine whether or not there has been KADamounting to lac1 or ecess of 2urisdiction on

the branch or the part of any branch

instrumentality of the Ko!ernment

%tanding to sue

• Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal= substantia

interest in the case such that the party has sustained or

will sustain direct in2ury as a result of go!ernmentalact that is being challenged

• BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the decree

• &itien 0 ac.uires standing only if he can establish tha

he has suffered some actual or threatened concrete

in2ury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of thego!ernment

o E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that public

funds ha!e been illegally disbursed

• )ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legastanding to .uestion the !alidity of the Presidentia

!eto or a condition imposed on an item in an

appropriations bills

• %& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniance of a suit

which does not satisfy the re.uirement of lega

standing



o E$g$ calling by the President for the

deployment of the Philippine )arines to 2oin

the P5P in !isibility patrols around the metro

Ghen to raise constitutionality

• at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the

pleading

• it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration = new

trial in the lower courtH or

• in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the proceedings oron appeal

• in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a

determination of the .uestion is necessary to a

decision, and in cases where it in!ol!es the 2urisdiction

of the court below

5ecessity of deciding constitutionality

• where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount

public interest and time is of the essence in the

resolution of such .uestion, adherence to the strict

procedural standard may be relaed and the court, inits discretion, may s.uarely decide the case

• where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest and

there is undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong

reasons of public policy may demand that its

constitutionality be resol!ed

4est of constitutionality

• is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to what

can or may be done under the statute, and not by what

it has been done under it$o If not within the legislati!e power to enact

o

If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects >iolates due process

Lea!es law enforcers unbridled

discretion in carrying out its

pro!isions

o Ghere theres a change of circumstances 0

i$e$ emergency laws

• Ordinances (test of !alidity are"

o It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or any

statute

o It must not be unfair or oppressi!e

o It must not be partial or discriminatory

o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade

o It must be general and consistent with public policy

o It must not be unreasonable

Effects of unconstitutionality

• It confers no rights

• Imposes no duties

• Affords no protection

• &reates no office

• In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been passed

• : !iews

o Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is not a

lawH decision affect ALL

o )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in

passing upon the .uestion o

unconstitutionality does not annul or repea

the statute if it finds it in conflict with the

&onstitutionH decisions affects parties O5LM

and no 2udgment against the statuteH opinion

of court may operate as a precedentH it does

not repeal, supersede, re!o1e, or annul thestatute

In!alidity due to change of conditions

• Emergency laws

• It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as an

eercise of police power

• It becomes in!alid only because the change o

conditions ma1es its continued operation !iolati!e ofthe &onstitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its

nullity should only affect the parties in!ol!ed in the

case and its effects applied prospecti!ely

Partial in!alidity• Keneral rule that where part of a statute is !oid as

repugnant to the &onstitution, while another part i

!alid, the !alid portion, if separable from the in!alid

may stand and be enforced

• Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so

mutually dependent and connected, as conditions

considerations, inducements, or compensations fo

each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislatureintended them as a whole, the nullity of one part wil

!itiate the rest 0 such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of

Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC

EFFECT AND OPERATION

Ghen laws ta1e effect

• Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be published

either in the Official Kaette or in a newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the countryC

o 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all statutes

including those local and pri!ate, unless there

are special laws pro!iding a differen

effecti!ity mechanism for particular statutes

• %ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode

• Effecti!ity of laws

o default rule 0 *73day period

o must be published either in the OK onewspaper of general circulation in thecountryH publication must be full

• 4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0 solely

refers to the *73day period and not to the re.uirement

of publication

Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e effect

• 4he Presidents ordinance power includes the authority

to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O, )& and genera

or specific orders



• Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is

merely interpretati!e or internal in nature not

concerning the public

• : types

o 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or

implement eisting law pursuant to a !alid

delegation or to fill in the details of a statuteH

re.uires publication

o 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in

nature or internalH does not re.uire publication

• Re.uirements of filing (*+; Administrati!e &ode"

o E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law

&enter - certified copies of e!ery rule

adopted by it$ Rules in force on the date of

effecti!ity of this &ode which are not filed

within - months from that date shall not

thereafter be the basis of any sanction againstany party= persons

Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect

• Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e effect *6days from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board

at the entrance of the pro!incial capitol or city,

municipality or barangay hall, A5D in at least : other

conspicuous places in the local go!ernment unitconcerned

• 4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall cause

the posting not later than 7 days after appro!alH tet

will be disseminated in English or 4agalogH the

secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall record

such fact in a boo1 1ept for that purpose, stating the

dates of appro!al and posting

• Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be

published in a newspaper of general circulation withinthe respecti!e pro!ince concernedH if 5O newspaper ofgeneral circulation in the pro!ince, PO%4I5K shall be

made in all municipalities and cities of the pro!ince

where the %anggunian of origin is situated

• /or highly urbanied and independent component

cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition to the

posting re.uirement shall be published once in a local

newspaper$ In the absence of local newspaper, in anynewspaper of general circulation

o @ighly urbanied city 0 minimum population

of :66,666 and with latest annual income of

at least 76) Php

%tatutes continue in force until repealed

• Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established continues

until changed by competent legislati!e power$ It is not

changed by the change of so!ereignty, ecept that of

political nature

• 4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and

they terminate upon epiration of the term stated or

upon occurrence of certain e!entsH no repealing statute

is needed

4erritorial and personal effect of statutes

• All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines

)anner of computing time

• %ee Art$ *- &&

• Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act within a

specified number of days, such as ten days from

notice, it means ten calendar days and 5O4 ten

wor1ing days

• E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9

• If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act can stil

be done the following day• Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC DOE%

5O4 APPLM to the computation of the period o

prescription of a crime, in which rule, is that if the las

day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a

%unday or legal holiday, the information concerning

said felony cannot be filed on the net wor1ing day, asthe offense has by then already prescribed

CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on

NATURE AND PURPOSE

&onstruction defined

• &onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering and

epounding the meaning and intention of the authors

of the law, where that intention rendered doubtfully

reason of ambiguity in its language or of the fact tha

the gi!en case is not eplicitly pro!ided for in the law$

• &onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusion

beyond direct epression of the tet epressions which

are in spirit though not within the tet$

• ine!itably, there enters into the construction of

statutes the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 withinthe limits of the rele!ant legislati!e materials

• it in!ol!es the EER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E

#FDI&IARM

&onstruction and interpretation distinguished

• 4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are used

interchangeablyH synonymous$

&onstruction Interpretation

3 process of drawing

warranted conclusions notalways included in direct

epressions, or determiningthe application of words to

facts in litigation

3 art of finding the true

meaning and sense of anyform of words

Rules of construction, generally

• Rules of statutory construction are tools used to

ascertain legislati!e intent$

• 5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience

• In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to

1now the rules of statutory construction, in case of

doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled

principles of interpretation$



• Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory

construction as part of the pro!isions of the statute 3

see eamples page 9+376

• Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of

!ague, broad words= terms

Purpose of ob2ect of construction

• 4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the intentof the law$

• 4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute is todetermine legislati!e intent, either epressly or

impliedly, by the language usedH to determine the

meaning and will of the law ma1ing body and disco!er

its true interpretations of law$

Legislati!e intent, generally

• is the essence of the law

• Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e

enactment$ It must be enforced when ascertained,

although it may not be consistent with the strict letter

of the statute$ It has been held, howe!er, that that the

ascertainment of legislati!e intent depend more on a

determination of the purpose and ob2ect of the law$• Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C

• Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spiritare oftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not

entirely synonymous

Legislati!e purpose

• A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a particular

statute was enacted by legislature$

• Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and go!ernment

which, for the purpose of interpretation means thatlaws ha!e ends to be achie!edC

Legislati!e meaning• Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its language,

means$

• Ghat it comprehendsH

• Ghat it co!ers or embracesH

• Ghat its limits or confines are$

• Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous

• If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute,its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language

and lead to what the legislati!e intent is

Kraphical illustration 0

Federation of Free Farmers v CA.• RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written milling

agreements between the ma2ority of the planters and

the millers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by3 products shall be di!ided between themC

• RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in

participation granted by the planters under this act and

abo!e their present share shall be di!ided between the

planter and his laborer in the proportion of 86N

laborer and 96N planterC

• 4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two section

will defeat the purpose of the Act

• 4he purpose

o &ontinuous production of sugar

o 4o grant the laborers a share in the increased

participation of planters in the sugar produce

• 4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act operati!e

irrespecti!e of whether there eists a milling

agreement between central and the sugar planters$

)atters in.uired into in construing a statute

• BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of thestatuteH it is also necessary to see whether the intention

or meaning has been epressed in such a way as to

gi!e it legal effect or !alidityC

• 4hus 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now wha

the legislature used sufficiently epresses tha

meaning$ 4he legal act is made up of : elements

o internal 0 intention

o eternal3 epression

• /ailure of the latter may defeat the former

Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained• 4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the statute

itself$

• If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislati!e

intent because of ambiguity, the court may loo1

beyond the statute such aso Legislati!e history 0 what was in the

legislati!e mind at the time the statute wasenactedH what the circumstances wereH wha

e!il was meant to be redressed

o Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or cause

which induced the enactment of the law, the

mischief to be suppressed, and the policy

which dictated its passageo when all these means fail, loo1 into the effect

of the law$

If the -rd means (effect of the law" is

first used, it will be 2udicia

legislation

POWER TO CONSTRUE

&onstruction is a 2udicial function

• It is the court that has the final word as to what the law

means$

• It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and

the law in!ol!ed• Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar factua

situation of each case

• &ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and particularly attendant circumstances and action

before, during and after the operati!e fact ha!e ta1en

their totality so that 2ustice can be rationally and fairly

dispensed$

• )oot and academic 0

o Purpose has become stale

o 5o practical relief can be granted

o Relief has no practical effect



• Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the case

o Eception

If capable of repetition, yet e!ading

re!iew

Public interest re.uires its resolution

Rendering decision on the merits

would be of practical !alue

Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction

• It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the statutedifferent interpretation

• Legislati!e 0 enact laws

• Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws

• #udicial3 interpretation and application

• If the legislature may declare what a law means 0 it

will cause confusionit will be !iolati!e of the

fundamental principles of the constitution of

separation powers$

• Legislati!e construction is called resolution or

declaratory act

Endencia v David

• Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme

&ourts decision

Perfecto v. Meer

• Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&s interpretation

Bshall recei!e such compensation as may be fied by

law, which shall not be diminished during their

continuance in officeC 0 eempt from income ta

• Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary

whene!er recei!ed by any public officer of theRepublic shall be considered eempt from the income

ta, payment of which is hereby declared not to be adiminution of his compensation fied by the

&onstitution or by lawC

• %ource of confusion

• >iolati!e of principle on separation of powers

• RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional

• Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8 *+-

&onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of emolument of

any public officer or employee, includingconstitutional officers, shall be eempt from payment

of income taC

• 4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta

anymore

Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside

• BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he interpretation

of a statute or a constitutional pro!ision by the courtsis not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or

nullification$

• 4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate case

change or o!errule its pre!ious construction$

• 4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final word in

the interpretation or construction of a stature merely

means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution,

modify or annul the 2udicial construction without

modifying or repealing the !ery statute which has been

the sub2ect of construction$ It can, and it has done so

by amending or repealing the statute, the conse.uence

of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial construction of

the statute is modified or set aside accordingly$

Ghen court may construe statute

• B4he court may construe or interpret a statute underthe condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR

A)'IKFI4MC

• Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more

meanings$ %usceptible of more than one interpretation$

• Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful o

meaning may the court interpret or construe its intent$

&ourt may not construe where statute is clear

• A statute that is clear and unambiguous is nosusceptible of interpretations$

• /irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the law

• &onstruction 0 !ery last function which the cour

should eercise

• Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only room

for application• &ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and

free from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or onerous

• A meaning that does not appear nor is intended orreflected in the !ery language of the statute cannot be

placed therein by construction

Manikan v. Tanodbayan

• %ec$ PD **83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of EPA

officials may not be construed as an eception to, or

limitation on, the authority of the 4anodbayan toin!estigate complaints for !iolation of the anti3graf

law committed by the EPA officials

• EPAs power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to policeauthority not emplyed to describe other power

Lapid v. CA

• Issue whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman

imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without

pay is immediately eecutory

• Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to

Ombudsman Act

• 4hese three laws are related or deal with public

officers, but are totally different statutes

• An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a

statute may not construe it by epanding its meaningwhere its pro!isions are clear and unambiguous

Land ank v. CA

• DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust accountsC

• %& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and

L'P bonds

Libanan v. !"ET

• Issue whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by the

chairman of the 'oard of Election Inspectors ('EI" arespurious, since it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA *88



• @eld not spuriousH only renders the 'EI accountable

Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system

• Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or

interpreting the laws or the &onstitution shall form part

of the legal system of the PhilippinesC

• Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!e

interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the force

of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its

enactment , since the courts interpretation merelyestablishes the contemporaneous legislati!e intent thatthe statute thus construed intends to effectuate

• Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %& has

once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a

certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle andapply it to all future casese where the facts are

substantially the same

o /or stability and certainty

• %upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent applicable, the

criteria that must control the actuations not only of

those called upon to abide thereby but also of those

duty3bound to enforce obedience thereto$

• %& rulings are binding on inferior courts

#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect

• Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward, not

bac1ward

• Rationale Retroacti!e application of a law usually

di!est rights that ha!e already become !ested or

impairs he obligations of contract and hence is

unconstitutional$

Peo !$ #abinal

• Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted fromissuance of license of firearms 0 included a secret

agent hired by a go!ernor • Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of )acarandang in

*+8

• 4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while the

)acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing, howe!er,

the decision was promulgated when the )apa doctrine

was in place

• 4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using stare

decisis doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrine

Co. v. CA

• On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the &ircular

issuedH ue doctrine, which con!icted ue under 'P

::, was not gi!en retroacti!e application

"oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• Fsed 2us soli (place of birth"

• %& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood"

• @owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us soli

did not di!est the citienship of those who, by !irtue of

the principle before its re2ection, became of were

declared citiens of the Philippines

en'onan v. CA

• Issue when to count the 73year period to repurchase

land granted &A *9*

• )onge ! Angeles (*+7" and 4upas ! Damaso (*+;9"

0 from the date of con!eyance or foreclosure sale

• 'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the

epiration of the *3year period of repurchase

• 4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is tha

which was enunciated in )onge and 4upas because

the transactions in!ol!ed too1 place prior to 'elisario

and not that which was laid down in the latter casewhich should be applied prospecti!ely

&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute

• In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may

tread on sensiti!e areas of constitutional rights, the

court may issue guidelines in applying the statute, no

to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the

law is$

Peo. v. Ferrer

• Ghat acts that may be considered liable under the

Anti3%ub!ersion Act

Mora#es v. Enri#e

•

Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation

"P v. CA( Mo#ina

• Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity o

an erring spouse in a !oid marriage under Art$ -8 /&

LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE

&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes

• &ourts are not authoried to insert into the law whatthey thin1 should be in it or to supply what they the

legislature would ha!e supplied if its intention had

been called to the omission$• 4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the mos

arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite

the law to conform to what they thin1 should be the

law$

• 5either should the courts construe statutes which are

perfectly !ague for it !iolates due process

o /ailure to accord persons fair notice of the

conduct to a!oid

o Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion in

carrying out its pro!isions

• : leading stars on 2udicial construction

o Kood faith

o commonsense• an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified by

either a sa!ing clause or by construction

&ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom

• &ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflictingtheories

• &ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom, 2ustice or

epediency of legislation, for its not within thei

pro!ince to super!ise legislation and 1eep it within the

bounds of common sense$



• 4he court merely interpret regardless of whether or not

they wise or salutary$

CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court

is warranted in a!ailing itself of all illegitimate aids toconstruction in order that it can ascertain the true intent

of the statute$

• 4he aids to construction are those found in the printed

page of the statute itselfH 1now as the intrinsic aids,

and those etraneous facts and circumstances outside

the printed page, called e)trinsic aids$

4itle

• It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to

its construction and to ascertaining legislati!e will$

• If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts mayresort to the title to clear the obscurity$

• 4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to etend orrestrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a

language of doubtful import will be constructed to

conform to the legislati!e intent as disclosed in its title$

• Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the

meaning of the law or as to the intention of the

legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise$

• %er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent

carries more weight in this 2urisdiction because of the

constitutional re.uirement that Be!ery bill shall

embrace only one sub2ect who shall be epressed in

the title thereof$

• 4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an

indispensable part of a statute$

ag%io v. Marcos

• 4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr period

to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings

(to settle and ad2udicate the titles to the !arious lots

embraced in the sur!ey" as authoried by RA +-*

co!ering the lands that ha!e been or about to be

declared land of public domain, by !irtue of 2udicial

proceedings instituted w=in the 96 years net preceding

the appro!al of this act$

• 4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be reopenedoriginally instituted in court April *:, *+*: or

5o!ember :7, *+::, the counted date form which thedecision therein rendered became final$ Petition was

filed on #uly :7, *+8*

• 4itle of the Law BAn Act to authorie the filing in the

proper court under certain conditions of certain claims

of title to parcels of land that ha!e been declared public land, by !irtue of the appro!al of this act$C

• 4here was an apparent inconsistency between the title

and body of the law$

• It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the

date the final decision was rendered$

• It recites that it authories court proceedings of claims

to parcels of land declared public by !irtue of 2udicia

decisions rendered within forty years net preceding

the appro!al of this act$

• 4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress itself

such 1ind of title then is not to be classed with words

or titles used by compilers of statues because it is thelegislature spea1ing$

• Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in the

title of the law stand in e.ual importance to the phrasein %ections * thereof by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings

instituted$

• 4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;9 in detai

was intended to apply to public lands only for the title

of the act, always indicati!e of legislati!e intent$

• 5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect, whichsub2ect shall be epressed in the title of the bill, the

words and for other purposes when found in the title

ha!e been held to be without force or effec

whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogether discarded in

construing the Act$

Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito• 4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$ :89

entitled B Outlining the procedure by which complaintscharging go!ernment officials and employees with

commission of irregularities should be guidedC applie

to criminal actions, to the end that no preliminary

in!estigation thereof can be underta1en or information

file in court unless there is pre!ious compliance with

the eecuti!e order$

• EO only applies to administrati!e and not to crimina

complaints$

• 4he !ery title spea1s of commission of irregularities$

Ghen resort to title not authoried• 4he tet of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is

improper to resort to its title to ma1e it obscure$

• 4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e, but no

to create doubt$

Preamble

• It is a part of the statute written immediately after its

title, which states the purpose, reason for the

enactment of the law$

• Fsually epress in whereas clauses$

• Kenerally omitted in statutes passed by

• Phil$ &ommission

• Phil$ Legislature• 5ational Assembly

• &ongress of the Phil

• 'atasang Pambansa

• 4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory note to

eplain the reasons for the enactment of statutes$

• Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by the

President in the eercise of his legislati!e power$

• Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and

unambiguous, the preamble can neither epand no

restrict its operation, much less pre!ail o!er its tet



5or can be used as basis for gi!ing a statute a

meaning$

• Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be

resorted to clarify the ambiguity$

• Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the minds of

the lawma1ers as to the purpose is achie!ed, the

mischief to be remedied, and the ob2ect to beaccomplished, by the pro!isions of the legislature$

• )ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to the

statute$• )ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad

scope of law$

• It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the law

apply retroacti!ely in which case the law has to be

gi!en retroacti!e effect$

Illustration of rule

Peop#e v. P%risima

• A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which

penalies, among others, the carrying outside of ones

residence any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not

used as a necessary tool or implement for li!elihood,with imprisonment ranging from fi!e to ten years$

• uestion rose whether the carrying of such weapon

should be in relation to sub!ersion, rebellion,insurrection, lawless !iolence, criminality, chaos or

public disorder as a necessary element of the crime$

• 4he mere carrying of such weapon outside ones

residence is sufficient to constitute a !iolation of the

law

• Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the e!ents

that led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent

and spirit of the decree is to re.uire the moti!ationmentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element

of the crime$• 4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the

decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may

only be 2ustified by associating the carrying out of

such bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes

stated in its preamble$

Peo v. Ec*ave'

• Issue whether a person who s.uatted on a pastoral

land could be held criminally liable for the !iolation of

PD : Bany person who, with the use of force,

intimidation or threat, or ta1ing ad!antage of the

absence or tolerance of the land owner, succeeds in

occupying or possessing the property of the latteragainst his will for residential, commercial or anyother purposes$

• 4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the s.uatting

problem which according to its preamble is still a

ma2or problem in urban communities all o!er the

country and because many persons and entities found

to ha!e been unlawfully occupying public and pri!ate

lands belong to the affluent class$

• 4he court said that crime may only be committed in

urban communities and not in agricultural and pastural

lands because the preamble of the decree shows that it

was intended to apply for s.uatting in urban lands

more particularly to illegal constructions$

&ontet of whole tet

• 4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself ta1en

as a whole and in relation to one another considering

the whole contet of the statute and not from an

isolated part of the pro!ision$

• 4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$

•

E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute must be epounded by reference to each other in order to

arri!e at the effect contemplated by the legislature$

Punctuation mar1s

• %emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the

relation of the thought, what follows must ha!e a

relation to the same matter it precedes it$

• &omma and semi3 colon are use for the same purpose

to di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon ma1es the

di!ision a little more pronounce$ 'oth are not used to

introduce a new idea$

• Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and can

ne!er control against the intelligible meaning owritten words$

• An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or

wholly sol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may beconsidered in the construction of a statute$

• 4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be

confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated

by a comma from the other antecedents$

• An argument based on punctuation is not persuasi!e$

Illustrati!e eamples

F#orentino v. P+

• Bwho may be willing to accept the same for suchsettlementC 0 this implies discretion

• %& held only the last antecedent 0 Bany citien of the

Philippines or any association or corporation organied

under the laws of the PhilippinesC

• pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders can

compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said

certificates for payment of their obligations subsistingat the time of the amendatory act was appro!ed

+era v. ,arcia

• Bif the charge against such subordinate or employee

in!ol!es dishonesty, oppression, or gra!e misconduc

or neglect in the performance of his dutyC

• BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not becommitted in the course of the performance of duty by

the person charges

Peo. v. S%bido

• %ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency

.ualifies both non3payment of indemnity and non

payment of fine

&apitaliation of letters

• An aid of low degree in the construction of statute$



@eadnotes or epigraphs

• %econdary aids

• 4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a statute

for ready reference or classification$

• 5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn

there from are of little !alue and they can ne!er control

the plain terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not

part of the law$

• 4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon the

sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule forsettling such .uestions as are embraced therein$

• Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and unambiguous,

there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the

headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of

the tet, especially when they are mere reference aids

indicating the general nature of the tet that follows$

Lingual tet

• Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is

promulgated in English and %panish, English shall

go!ern but in case of ambiguity, %panish may be

consulted to eplain the English tet$

• A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or inEnglish, or in /ilipino

• BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!eissuance promulgated in all the official languages, the

English tet shall control, unless otherwise pro!ided$

Intent or spirit of law

• It is the law itself$

• &ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in the

application and interpretation of a statute$

• A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$

• 4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way

epressed and then construe the statute to accomplishthe supposed intentionH otherwise they would pass

beyond the bounds of 2udicial power to usurp

legislati!e power$

Policy of law

• %hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$

• One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e astatute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will

promote public policy$

Tinio v. Francis

• Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the

homesteader • not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation from the

date of the appro!al of the application and for a termof 7 years from and after the date of the issuance of the

patent or grant

o from the ORDER for the issuance of patent

o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy

will be defeated

Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay

• policy 0 against double pensions for the same ser!ices

• a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity

Bin addition to other benefits which they are entitled

under eisting lawsC &A55O4 be construed as to

authorie the grant of double gratuity

• Bother benefitsC may be

o Refund of contributions

o Payment of the money !alue of accumulated

!acation and sic1 lea!es

Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed

• Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the causes

which induced the enactment of the law are importanfactors to be considered in this construction$

o Purpose or ob2ect of the law

o )ischief intended to be remo!ed

o &auses which induced the enactment of the

law

• )ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to the

purpose pro2ected in the statute$

• 4he purpose of the general rule is not determinati!e of

the proper construction to be gi!en to the eceptions$

• Purpose of statute is more important than the rules ogrammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning

Dictionaries

• A statute does not define word or phrases used$

• Kenerally define words in their natural plain and

ordinary acceptance and significance$

&onse.uences of !arious constructions

• In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$

• A construction of a statute should be re2ected that will

cause in2ustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeatlegislati!e intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment o

legislati!e purpose or ob2ect, render certain words or

phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any o

its pro!isions nugatory$

Presumptions

• 'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense, and inthe absence of compelling reasons to the contrary

doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a

statute will be resol!ed in fa!or of that construction

which is in accord with the presumption on the matter$

o &onstitutionality of a statute

o &ompleteness

o Prospecti!e operation

o Right and 2ustice

o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable

operation as a whole

o Against inconsistency and implied repeal

unnecessary changes in law

impossibility

absurdity

in2ustice and hardship

incon!enience

ineffecti!eness$



LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Kenerally

• A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations or

where there is ambiguity in the language, there is no

better means of ascertaining the will and intention of

the legislature than that which is afforded by the

history of the statute$

Ghat constitutes legislati!e history

• @istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its

inception until its enactment into law$

• Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps done

from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally

passed by the legislature$

• Ghat it includes

o Presidents message if the bill is enacted in

response thereto,

o 4he eplanatory note accompanying the bill

o &ommittee reports of legislati!e

in!estigations

o Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill

o %ponsorship speecho Debates and deliberations concerning the bill

o Amendments and changes in phraseology in

which it undergoes before final appro!al

thereof$

o If the statute is based from a re!ision, a prior

statute, the latters practical application and

2udicial construction,

o >arious amendments it underwent

o &ontemporary e!ents at the

Presidents message to legislature

• 4he president shall address the congress at the opening

of its regular session or appear before it at any othertime$

• Fsually contains proposed legal measures$

• Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation,

when enacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing on

the matter$

Eplanatory note

• A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a

proposed legislation by its author or proponent$

• Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute

is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts

may resort to the eplanatory note to clarify the

ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of thestatute$

• Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent asdisclosed in its eplanatory note$

• A statute affected or changed an eisting law and the

eplanatory note to the bill which has e!entually

enacted into a law states that the purpose is too simply

to secure the prompt action on a certain matter by the

officer concerned and not to change the eisting lawH

the statute should be construed to carry out such

purpose$

• It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning

that is inconsistent with what is epressed in the tet o

the statute$

Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations

• &ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual proceedings

of the legislati!e body to assist in determining theconstruction of a statute of doubtful meaning$

• 4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute means

that meaning which was put to the pro!ision during thelegislati!e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be

adopted$

• >iews epressed are as to the bills purpose, meaning

or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the

law$

• It is impossible to determine with authority whaconstruction was put upon an act by the members o

the legislati!e body that passed the bill$

• 4he opinions epressed by legislators in the course of

debates concerning the application of eisting laws are

not also gi!en decisi!e weight, especially where the

legislator was not a member of the assembly tha

enacted the said laws$• Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts

will not in.uire into the moti!es which influence the

legislature or indi!idual members, in !oting for its passageH no indeed as to the intention of the draftsman

or the legislators, so far as it has not been epressed

into the act$

Reports of commissions

• &ommissions are usually formed to compile and

collate all laws on a particular sub2ect and to preparethe draft of the proposed code$

Prior laws from which statute is based• &ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same sub2ect

and to in!estigate the antecedents of the statute

in!ol!ed$

• 4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes

re!ised or compiled statutes, for the prior law which

ha!e been codified, compiled or re!ised will show the

legislati!e history that will clarify the intent of the lawor shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified

or re!ised statute$

Peo. v. Manantan

• Issue whether or not 2ustice of peace is included

• &ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of peace, isthat the omission of B2ustice of peaceC re!ealed the

intention of the legislature to eclude such from itsoperation

• @eld contention denied$ In holding that the word

B2udgeC includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said that

Ba re!iew of the history of the Re!ised Election &ode

will help 2ustify and clarify the abo!e conclusionC

Director of Lands v. Abaya

• Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the datethe decision was rendered or from the date 2udicia

proceedings instituted in cadastral cases



• @eld court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9 older

laws which ha!e in common that counting of the

period starts from the date of the institution of the

2udicial proceeding and not from the date the 2udgment

is rendered

Sa#aysay v. Castro

• BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC

•

4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not included inthe pro!ision

&hange in phraseology by amendments

• Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$

• A statute has undergone se!eral amendments, each

amendment using different phraseology, the deliberateselection of language differing from that of the earlier

act on the sub2ect indicates that a change in meaning of

the law was intended and courts should so construe

that statute as to reflect such change in meaning$

Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA

•

Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany portC(old law"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a surplusage

Amendment by deletion

• Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute

indicates that the legislature intended to change the

meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the

legislation would not ha!e made the deletion had the

intention been not effect a change in its meaning$

• A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the doing

of a certain thing is amended by deleting such pro!ision$

,#oria v. CA• Issue whether a public officer or employee, who has

been pre!enti!ely suspended pending in!estigation of

the administrati!e charges against him, is entitled to

his salary and other benefits during such pre!enti!e

suspension

• @eld &ourt answered in the negati!e because such

pro!ision with regard to payment of salaries duringsuspension was deleted in the new law

%enaseda v. F#avier

• Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely

suspend respondents in administrati!e cases who are

employed in his office, and not those who areemployees in other department or offices of thego!ernment

Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion"

• An amendment of the statue indicates a change in

meaning from that which the statute originally had

applies only when the intention is clear to change the

pre!ious meaning of the old law$

• Rules dont apply when the intent is clear that the

amendment is precisely to plainly epress the

construction of the act prior to its amendment because

its language is not sufficiently epressi!e of such

construction$

• /re.uently, words do not materially affect the sense

will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the

code or re!ised statute, or that some general idea wil

be epressed in brief phrases$

Adopted statutes

• /oreign statutes are adopted in this country or from

local laws are patterned form parts of the legislati!ehistory of the latter$

• Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those

of another country, the decision of the courts in such

country construing those laws are entitled to grea

weight in the interpretation of such local statutes$

Limitations of rule

• A statute which has been adopted from that of a

foreign country should be construed in accordance

with the construction gi!en it in the country of origin

is not without limitations$

Principles of common law

• Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is noin force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it is

founded on sound principles applicable to locaconditions and is not in conflict with eisting law

ne!ertheless, many of the principles of the common

law ha!e been imported into this 2urisdiction as a resul

of the enactment of laws and establishment o

institutions similar to those of the F%$

&onditions at time of enactment

• In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to

ha!e ta1en into account the eisting conditions o

things at the time of its enactment$

• In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physica

conditions of the country and the circumstances then

obtain understanding as to the intent of the legislatureor as to the meaning of the statute$

@istory of the times

• A court may loo1 to the history of the times

eamining the state of things eisting when the statute

was enacted$

• A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it

were a protoplasm floating around in space$

• In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of alaw or constitutional pro!ision, the history of the times

of which I grew and to which it may be rationally

supposed to bear some direct relationship, the e!il

intended to be remedied and the good to be

accomplished are proper sub2ects of in.uiry$

• Law being a manifestation of social culture and

progress must be interpreted ta1ing into consideration

the stage of such culture and progress including all the

concomitant circumstances$



• Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off

from the contact with the drama of life which unfolds

before our eyes$

CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION

Kenerally

• Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time

of, or after their enactment by the eecuti!e, legislati!e

or 2udicial authorities, as well as by those who in!ol!ein the process of legislation are 1nowledgeable of the

intent and purpose of the law$

• &ontemporary construction is strongest in law$

Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of

• Is the construction placed upon the statute by an

eecuti!e or administrati!e officer$

• 4hree types of interpretation

o &onstruction by an eecuti!e or

administrati!e officer directly called to

implement the law$

o &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in his

capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of thego!ernment$

o @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding in

the form of a ruling by an eecuti!e officer

eercising .uasi32udicial power$

Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction

• Ghere there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of

a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by

the eecuti!e or administrati!e officer charged with its

enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resol!e the

doubt$

• 4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose, especially if

the construction is followed for a considerable periodof time$

+est#e P*i#ippines /nc. v. CA

• Reasons for why interpretation of an administrati!e

agency is generally accorded great respect

o Emergence of multifarious needs of a

moderniing society

o Also relates to eperience and growth of

specialied capabilities by the administrati!e

agency

o 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness,

eperience and informed 2udgment, and the

fact that they fre.uently are the drafters of thelaw they interpret

P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• Issue whether the go!ernment can legally collect

duties Bas a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a statute

upon all articles eported through pri!ately3owned

whar!es

• @eld the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by sayingBthe language of the Act could ha!e been made more

specific and certain, but in !iew of its history, its long

continuous construction, and what has been done and

accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the

opinion that the go!ernment is entitled to ha!e and

recei!e the money in .uestion, e!en though the sugar

was shipped from a pri!ate wharf

Geight accorded to usage and practice

• &ommon usage and practice under the statute, or a

course of conduct indicating a particular underta1ing

of it, especially where the usage has been ac.uiescedin by all the parties concerned and has etended o!er a

long period of time$

• Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best interpretation

of the law is usage$

&onstruction of rules and regulations

• 4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the

principle that the interpretation by those charged with

their enforcement is entitled to great weight by thecourt in the latters construction of such rules and

regulations$

Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en muchweight

• It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the

particular branch of go!ernment called upon to

implement the law thus construed$

• Are presumed to ha!e familiaried themsel!es with al

the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to ha!e formed an

independent, conscientious and competent eper

opinion thereon

Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded• Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$

• If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared

null and !oid$

Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude

correction nor create rightsH eceptions

• 4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction

of the erroneous construction by the officer himself by

his successor or by the court in an appropriate case$

• An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates

no !ested right on the part of those relied upon, andfollowed such construction$

Legislati!e interpretation

• 4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or appro!a

of, an eecuti!e or 2udicial construction of a statute$

• 4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the powe

granted to the courts by the constitution$

Legislati!e appro!al

• Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of a

contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute

by an administrati!e or eecuti!e officer charged with

its enforcement$



• 4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such

contemporaneous construction$

• )ay also be showmen by the legislature appropriating

money for the officer designated to perform a tas1

pursuant to interpretation of a statute$

• Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$

Reenactment

• )ost common act of appro!al$

• 4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en acontemporaneous construction is persuasi!e indication

of the adoption by the legislature of the prior

construction$

• Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and respect

than the contemporaneous construction of the statute

before its ratification$

%tare decisis

• #udicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater

weight than that of an eecuti!e or administrati!e

officer in the construction of other statutes of similar

import$

• It is an in!aluable aid in the construction orinterpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning$

• %tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should follow

past precedents and should not disturb what has beensettled$

• %upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not only of

interpreting and applying the law in accordance with

prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the

impro!idence and wantonness wrought by needless

uphea!als in such interpretations and applications

• In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare

decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue

epressly raised by the partiesH it must be a direct

ruling, not merely an obiter dictum• Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court upon

some .uestion of law which is not necessary to thedecision of the case before itH not binding as a

precedent

• 4he principle presupposes that the facts of the

precedent and the case to which it is applied are

substantially the same$

• Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of

stare decisis does not apply$

• 4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does not

apply when there is a conflict between the precedent

and the law$

• 4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon anydoctrine or rule found to be in !iolation of law in force

• Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot

abandon a precedent enunciated by the %& ecept by

way of repeal or amendment of the law itself

CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&,

'an(ua(e o% statute

LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule

• Keneral rule if statute is clear, plain and free from

ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and

applied without attempted interpretation

o >erba legis

o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde of

intention

o Gords employed by the legislature in a

statute correctly epress its intent or will

o >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from the

words of a statute there should be nodeparture

o 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the law

cannot be etended to those matters outside

its scope

• #udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon legislati!e

prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the law

o &ourts must administer the law as they find it

without regard to conse.uences

+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C

• Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis

of Art$ :;- Labor &ode which states that Bemployer

)AM also terminate the employment of an employeeCfor reasons therein by ser!ing notice thereof and

paying separation pay to affected employees

• 4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the go!ernmen

of the employers land (Patalon &oconut Estate" for

purposes of agrarian reform which forced the employer

to cease his operation

• Issue whether or not employer is liable for separation pay

• @eld 5O, employer is not liable for separation payS

o It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the

employer if he wants to gi!e separation pay

o 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in

the statuteo B)AMC denotes that it is directory in nature

and generally permissi!e only

o Plain3meaning rule is applicable

o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapo

magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation

payS Ang daya3dayaS Lugi na nga s

employer, 1i1ita pa si employeeS Fnfair&annot beS 5oS 5oS

o 4o depart from the meaning epressed by the

words is to alter the statute, to legislate and

not interpret

o )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpi

tetum 0 dangerous construction which iagainst the tet

Dura le sed le

• Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is still

the law

• Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0 when thelanguage of the law is clear, no eplanation of it is

re.uired

• Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible o

interpretation$ It must be applied regardless of who

may be affected, e!en if it may be harsh or onerous



• @oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e scripta est

0 it is eceedingly hard but so the law is written

• A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit the

court from engaging in 2udicial legislation to change

what it thin1s are unrealistic statutes that do not

conform with ordinary eperience or practice (respeto

nalang sa ating mga mambabatasS Ghate!erS @aha 2o1e only"

• If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it,

remedy may be done through a legislati!e process, not by 2udicial decree

• Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and e.uity as

2ustification to construe it differently are una!ailing 0

Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL LAG or PO%I4I>E

LAG, not common law

• E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and notits replacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang e.uity

e.uityS Pero pag walang law, pwedeng mag3e.uity,

getsS$$$ important toS"

• Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity ne!er

acts in contra!ention of the law

DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperati!e

• If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its meaning,the court is not at liberty to supply nor to ma1e one

Santiago v. COMELEC

• In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning thus,

concluded that RA 8-7 is inade.uate to implement

the power of the people to amend the &onstitution

(initiati!e on amendments" for the following reasonso Does not suggest an initiati!e on amendments

on to the &onstitution because it is silent as to

amendments on the &onstitution and the wordB&onstitutionC is neither germane nor rele!ant

to said section

o Does not pro!ide for the contents of a petition

for initiati!e on the &onstitution

o Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e on

the &onstitution

o RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a

sufficient standard

• #ustice Puno (anoS #ustice 4reeS" dissents

o Legislati!e intent is also shown by the

deliberations on the bill that became RA

8-7 (there are 9 more reasons 0 see page

*-63*-*, which are not so important"• Interpretation of RA 8-7 was not in 1eeping with the

maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis !aleat

.uam pereat 0 that interpretation as will gi!e the thing

efficacy is to be adopted

Ghat is within the spirit is within the law

• Dont literally construe the law if it will render itmeaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or

contradiction

• 4he spirit of the law controls its letter

• Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit or

reason of the law

• %pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter

• A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in

accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the

law

• Presumption undesirable conse.uences were ne!erintended by a legislati!e measure

Literal import must yield to intent• >erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0

words ought to be more subser!ient to the intent and

not the intent to the words (ahhh parang intent is to

woman as word is to man 0 so man is subser!ient to

woman logicalS"

• Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and e.uity

• %o it is possible that a statute may be etended to cases

not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as

they come within its spirit or intent

Limitation of rule

• &onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is ambiguityS

&onstruction to accomplish purpose

• PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the enactmen

of the statute 0 1ey to open the brain of the legislaturelegislati!e intentS

• %tatutes should be construed in the light of the ob2ec

to be achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to be

suppressed

• As between two statutory interpretations, that which

better ser!es the purpose of the law should pre!ail

Sarcos v. Casti##o

• 4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to

determine legislati!e intent• /ran1furter

o Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed

!itality from the ob!ious purposes at which

they are aimed

o Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument o

go!ernment and not merely as a collection of

English words

• 'en2amin 5atham &ardoo

o Legislation is more than a composition

o It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernmen

which means that laws ha!e ends to be

achie!ed

• @olmeso Gords are fleible

o 4he general purpose is a more important aid

to the meaning than any rule which grammar

or formal logic may lay down

o &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too closely to

the words of law where those words import a

policy that goes beyond them

Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp

• A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would be

un2ust or lead to absurd results




0ing v. !ernande'

• Issue whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA and

%erge" may be employed in a non3control position in a

retail establishment, a wholly nationalied business

under RA **;6 Retail 4rade Law (btw, wala na tong

law na Tto$ It has been repealed by the Retail 4rade

Liberaliation Act 0 my thesisS "• @eld 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S #o1e

onlyS" the law has to be construed with the Anti3

Dummy Law 0 prohibiting an alien from inter!ening

in the management, operation, administration or

control thereof

• Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien, you

cannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous alien may

resort to flout the law or defeat its purposeS

(maggulang daw mga intsi1 ultimo tubig sa pasig

ri!er, which is supposed to be free, bottles it and thensells itS @uwatS"

• It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a manner

that would sta!e off any attempt at circum!ention ofthe legislati!e purpose

%stamante v. +L"C

• Issue how to compute for bac1wages to which an

illegally dismissed employee would be entitled untilhis actual reinstatement (ta1e note of this case$$ its a

labor case 1iliti ni Kolangco"

• - ways

o *st 0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted from

the amount of bac1wages is the earnings

elsewhere during the period of illegal

dismissal

o :nd 0 Labor &ode Art$ :+ 0 the amount of bac1wages is fied without deductions or

.ualifications but limited to not more than -

years

o -rd 0 amended Art$ :+ 0 full bac1wages or

without deductions from the time the

laborers compensation was withheld until his

actual reinstatement

• 4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in RA

8*7 (Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to wor1ers

than was pre!iously gi!en them under the )ercuryDrug rule or the *st way

1S v. Toribio

• 4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human

consumption so long as these animals are fit for

agricultural wor1= draft purposes was a Breasonable

necessary limitationC on pri!ate ownership

• Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large cattle

against theft and to ma1e easy reco!ery and return of

such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen

• Issue whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the

municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by themunicipal treasurer is prohibited

• @eld ME%S Outside or inside without permit i

prohibited

ocobo v. Estanis#ao

• Issue whether the &/I and a municipal court in the

capital of a pro!ince ha!e concurrent 2urisdiction o!er

the crime of libel

• RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I

• #udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipa

court in the capital of a pro!ince in offenses where the penalty is not more than prission correctional or fine

not eceeding 8,666Php (penalty for libel"

• %o ano naS

,odines v. CA

• Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e right to

ma1e, use, and sell his patented machine, article or product

• Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice appropriates a

prior in!ention by incorporating its inno!ati!e concept

and albeit with some modification and change

performs substantially the same function in

substantially the same way to achie!e substantially thesame result (ano ba TtoS Puro substantially"

P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros /nc. v. Ponferrada

• : apparently conflicting pro!isions should be

construed as to realie the purpose of the law

• 4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the wor1ers

benefits

• 'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to the

benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:*

• B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation

Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases

• 4he reason which induced the legislature to enact alaw is the heart of the law

• &essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when the

reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases

• Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its soul

Peo v. A#m%ete

• Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the

Agricultural Land Reform &ode

• Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping or

prethreshing of palay on a date other than tha

pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the

landlord and tenant

o %hare tenancy relationship• Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share

tenancy relationship, thus does not punish prereaping

or prethreshing of palay on a date other than tha pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the

landlord and tenant anymore

o Leasehold system

Commendador v. De 2i##a

• Issue whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to

peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal



had been rendered inoperati!e by PD :697

proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law

• @eld ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and the

dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the

reason for the eistence of PD -+ ceased automatically

and the decree itself ceased

2as$%e' v. ,iap

• Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute

has already been remo!ed in a gi!en situation, thestatute may no longer apply in such case

• 4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning lands,

the purpose is to preser!e the nations lands for future

generations of /ilipinos

• A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of the

said law, no longer be .uestioned after the alien

becomes a /ilipino citien%upplying legislati!e omission

• if it is clearly ascertainable from the &O54E4S

• )ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the statute

conform to ob!ious intent of the legislature or to

pre!ent the act from being absurd

• 5ote differentiate from 2udicial legislation

&orrecting clerical errors

• As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the

face of the whole enactment and no specific pro!ision

is abrogated

• 4his is not 2udicial legislation

Illustration rule

"%fino Lope' 3 Sons /nc. v. CTA

• &ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC to

Bcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!iousmista1e in law

• %ec 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the &4A

2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the &ommissioner

of &ustoms

• %ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the decision

of the &ollector of &ustoms that may be appealed to

the ta court

• B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of &ustoms

has super!ision and control o!er &ollectors of

&ustoms and the decisions of the latter are re!iewable

by the &ommissioner of &ustoms

Lamp v. P*ipps• BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E of

lawC

Farinas v. arba

• Issue who is the appointing power to fill a !acancy

created by the sanggunian member who did not belong

to any political party, under the pro!ision of the Local

Ko!ernment &ode

• Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer

• It should be Bauthorities concernedC

• 'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief eecuti!eC

but under %ec$ 76 of the Local Ko!ernment &ode, the

BPresident, Ko!ernor, )ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power

to appoint in order to fill !acancies in local councils or

to suspend local officials

ualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors"

• Only those which are clearly clerical errors or ob!ious

mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH otherwise, is to

rewrite the law and in!ade the domain of thelegislature, it is 2udicial legislation in the guise o

interpretation

&onstruction to a!oid absurdity

• Reason it is always presumed that the legislature

intended eceptions to its language which would a!oidconse.uences of this character

• 4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases no

within the literal meaning of the terms if their eact

and literal import would lead to absurd or mischie!ous

results

• Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut

e!itetur incon!eniens et absurdum 0 where there isambiguity, such interpretation as will a!oidincon!enience and absurdity is to be adopted

• &ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears to be

arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in sla!ish

disobedience to its language

• &ourts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not

to defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render compliance with its

pro!isions impossible to perform

Peo v. D%$%e

• %urplusageSSS

• %ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses

o

Prescription shall begin to run from 4he day of the commission of the

!iolation

/rom the time of disco!ery A5D

institution of 2udicial proceedings for

in!estigation and punishment

• 'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is

tolled upon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0 anact of grace by the %tate

• &ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicia

proceedings for its in!estigation and punishmentC may

be either disregarded as surplusage or should be

deemed preceded by the word BuntilC

O#iveros v. 2i##a#%'

• Issue whether or not the suspension order against anelecti!e official following an information for !iolation

of the Anti3Kraft law filed against him, applies not

only to the current term of office but also to another

term if the accused run for reelection and won

• %ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unles

ac.uitted, reinstatedS

• @eld only refers to the current term of the suspended

officer (and not to a future un1nown and uncertain new

term unless supplemented by a new suspension order



in the e!ent of reelection" for if his term shall ha!e

epired at the time of ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be

no longer entitled to reinstatementH otherwise it will

lead to absurdities

Peo v. 4% !ai

• Issue when does a crime punishable by arresto menor

prescribe

• %tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP&o

Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine of:66Php 0 correctional penalty 0 prescribes in

*6 years (Art$ +6"

• &ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS

o Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than :66Php

0 light felonies 0 : months

o *Php ma1es a difference of + years and *6

monthsS (huwatS"

o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty"

prescribes in 7 years

o Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter

o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be

ascertained not until the court decides which

of the alternati!e penalties should be imposed 0 imprisonment ba or fine lang yun lang

poS

Peo v. "eyes

• Dangerous Drugs Act

• RA 87+

o U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion

perpetua

o V :66 grams 0 min penalty is reclusion

perpetua

• &ourt ruled that

o U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from prision

correctional to reclusion temporal *-93*++grams 0 reclusion temporal

883*-- 0 prison mayor

Less than 88 grams 0 prisioncorrecional

• %tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmonie conflicting

pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole lawH to effectuate

the intention of legislature

Ma#on'o v. 5amora

• &ontention the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot

!alidly pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental

budget for the purpose of epropriating a certain parcelof land, without first adopting or updating its house

rules of procedure within the first +6 days following

the election of its members, as re.uired by %ecs$ 76

and 7: of the LK&

• &ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedS

o Adoption or updating of house rules would

necessarily entail wor1 local councils

hands were tied and could not act on any

other matter if we hold the absurd contentionSo %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this

could not ha!e been intended by the law

&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice

• Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a

hardship or an oppressi!e result, a possible abuse of

authority or act of oppression, arming one person with

a weapon to impose hardship on the other

• Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0 thainterpretation is to be adopted which is free from e!i

or in2ustice

Amatan v. A%-ero

• Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide

• Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure, he

entered into a plea bargaining agreement, which the

2udge appro!ed of, downgrading the offense charge of

homicide to attempted homicide to which Fmpad

pleaded guilty thereto$

• @elloS 5amatay na nga tapos attempted langS

)ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you areSSS

• /iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done

though the hea!ens fall (ano dawS"

• %tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is silen

or ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a solutionresponsi!e to the !ehement urge of conscience(ahhh ano daw ulitS"

Peo v. P%risima

• It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum

prohibitumH thus intent to use such prohibited weapons

is immaterial by reason of public policy

• &ourt said that use the preamble to construe such act

whether penalied or not

• )oreo!er the court said that legislature did not intendin2ustice, absurdity and contradiction

• &ourt ga!e an eample

o %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this tomy lender, then in the course or my 2ourney

Im caught, Im penalied under the Decree

for 73*6 years imprisonmentS (ang labo

namanS"

1rs%a v. CA

• Issue whether or not the isolated use, at one instanceof a name other than a persons true name to secure a

copy of a document from a go!ernment agency

constitutes !iolation of &A *9: 0 Anti3alias Law

• @eld 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe 2o1e

langS"

o 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to pre!ent confusion and fraud in busines

transactions

o %uch isolated use of a different name is no

prohibited by the lawH otherwise, in2ustice

absurdity and contradiction will result

&onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest

Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*

• %a &onsti Tto ahS La lang hehe (yihee, %ergeS"



• BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws

regulations and processesC of the so3called RP during

the #apanese occupation of the country Bare null and

!oid and without legal effectC )AM 5O4 be

construed to embrace #FDI&IAL PRO&E%%E% as this

would lead to great incon!enience and public hardship

and public interest would be endangered

o &riminals freed

o >ested right, impaired

&onstruction in fa!or of right and 2ustice

• Art$ *6 && In case of doubt in the interpretation or

application of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma1ing

body intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail

• Art$ + && 4he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or

insufficient with respect to a .uestion before the court

will not 2ustify the latter from declining to render

2udgment thereon

• In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is

percei!ed to tip the scales which the court belie!es will

best promote the public welfare is its probable

operation as a general rule or principle

Sa#vacion v. SP

• Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and

detained her in his apartment for 9 days

• &ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than *)Php

• '%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec **-

of the &entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86 (applicable to

transient foreigners"

• Issue whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a Philippine

ban1 of a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the

moral damages awarded in fa!or of the latters *:3

year3old rape !ictim

• '%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to

RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits shall beeempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other

order or process of any court, legislati!e body,

go!ernment agency or any administrati!e bodywhatsoe!erC

• &ourt held that A5O 'AS 5a3rape na nga ayaw

pang magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang

silly lawS (hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ Im so bored na ehS"

o &ourt applied the principles of right and

2ustice to pre!ail o!er the strict and literal

words of the statute

o 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such

assets from attachment at the time the said

law was enacted, the countrys economy wasin a shambles$ 'ut in the present time it isstill in shambles$$$ hehe 2o1e lang but in the

present time, the country has reco!ered

economically$ 5o reason why such assets

cannot be attached especially if it would

satisfy a 2udgment to award moral damages to

a *:3year3old rape !ictimS

%urplusage and superfluity disregarded

• Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is de!oidof meaning in relation to the contet or intent of the

statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies

the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase

or clause may be re2ected as surplusage and entirely

ignored

• %urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not !itiate

a statute

• Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful !itated by the non3useful

Demafi#es v. COMELEC • Issue whether a pre3proclamation election case has

become moot because the proclaimed winner had

immediately ta1en his oath pursuant to %ec : RA 9;6

which pro!ides that the Bfirst mayor, !ice3mayor and

councilors of the municipality of %ebaste shall be

elected in the net general elections for local officialsand shall ha!e .ualifiedC

• It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC begin

immediately after their proclamationS

• &ourt held that this is wrongS

o 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does no

warrant the respondents reading that the term

of office of the first municipal officials o%ebaste begins immediately after their

proclamation

o 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland if there is

no meaning in it, that sa!es a world o

trouble, you 1now, as we need not try to find

any

o Apply the general rule when such term begin

0 the term of municipal officials shall begin

on the *st day of #anuary following thei

election

Redundant words may be re2ected

• %elf3eplanatory, ano buS

Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude

construction

• /alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore consta

0 false description does not preclude construction nor

!itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise

clear

Eemption from rigid application of law

• Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is no

without an eception

• Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2u

bas.ue 0 where anything is granted generally, thiseception is implied

• &ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an eception

to a rule e!en where the latter does not pro!ide anyotherwise the rigor of the law would become the

highest in2ustice 0 summum 2us, summa in2uria

Law does not re.uire the impossible

• 5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no one

to perform an impossibility

• Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation to

do an impossible thing



• Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial compliance

(as re.uired by law"

Lim co C*%i v Posadas

• Publication in the Official Kaette wee1ly, for three

times and consecuti!ely, to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er

naturaliation case

• It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement asthe OK was not, at the time, published wee1ly

• 4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other :re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to ac.uire

2urisdiction o!er the naturaliation case

Akbayan v. COMELEC

• 4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by

power to the &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$ :;RA ;9-8

• Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to eercise such

power so as to accommodate potential !oters who

were not able to register for the upcoming election

• &O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the

impossibility of late registration to accommodate

potential !oters• &ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en such

interpretation that is in accordance with logic, commonsense, reasonableness and practicality

• Ghere time constraint and the surrounding

circumstances ma1e it impossible or the &O)ELE& to

conduct special registration of !oters, the &O)ELE&

cannot be faulted for refusing to do so, for the law

does not re.uire the impossible to be doneH there is no

obligation to ho the impossible thing

• &O)ELE&s decision is sustained

5umber and gender of words

• Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words in plural include the singular, and !ice !ersa$

• A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular

person or thing, 2ust as a singular word may embrace

two or more persons or things

• Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article also

applies to a situation where there is only one child because BchildrenC includes BchildC

• Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends Bsome

candidatesC or Ball candidatesC

• On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine,

includes all genders, unless the contet in which the

word is used in the statute indicates otherwise

IMPLICATIONS

Doctrine of necessary implication

• %o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is

enforced

• %tat&on rule to fill in the gap is the doctrine of

necessary implication

• Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as

much a part thereof as that which is epressed

• E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the law

• E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is

deemed to include all incidental power, right o

pri!ilege

• In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0 greater

includes the lesser

• 5ecessity 0

o includes such inferences as may be logically

be drawn from the purpose or ob2ect of thestatute, from what the legislature must be

presumed to ha!e intended, and from thenecessity of ma1ing the statute effecti!e and

operati!e

o ecludes what is merely plausible, beneficial

or desirable

• must be consistent with the &onstitution or to eisting

laws

• an implication which is !iolati!e of the law i

un2ustified or unwarranted

C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission

• Issue whether a coterminous employee, or one whose

appointment is co3eistent with the duration of a

go!ernment pro2ect, who has been employed as suchfor more than : years, is entitled to early retiremen

benefits under %ec : RA 88;-

• &ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledSo A coterminous employee is no different from

a casual or temporary employee, and bynecessary implication, the inclusion of the

latter in the class of go!ernment employees

entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily

implies that the former should also be entitled

to such benefits

o Grong application of the maim Bepresio

uniusest eclusion alteriusC

Remedy implied from a right

• Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right, there is

a remedy for !iolation thereof

• Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy

• 4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does

not preclude him from !indicating his right, for such

remedy is implied from such right

• Once a right is established, the way must be cleared fo

its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure

2udicial as well as administrati!e, must gi!e way

• Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation of aright" there is a remedy

• If theres no right, principle does not apply

at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co

• Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from office

which pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not only of the

Administrati!e &ode but of the &onstitution itself

• &ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong

committed, there should be reinstatement and payment

of bac1wages, among other things

• @owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his

reinstatement, for when he was suspended and



e!entually dismissed, somebody was appointed to his

position

• Issue whether remedy is denied petitioner

• @eld position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is no

!acancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed

permanently$ 4he incumbent is only holding a

temporary position$ )oreo!er, the incumbents beingmade to lea!e the post to gi!e way to the employees

superior right may be considered as remo!al for cause

Krant of 2urisdiction

• &onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute

• &annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt

• &annot be implied from the language of a statute, in

the absence of clear legislati!e intent to that effect

Pimente# v. COMELEC

• &O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election

cases filed with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing

municipal electi!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the

grant of authority upon the &O)ELE& to issue writs

of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus concerning said

election cases

Peo v. Pa#ana

• %tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er criminalcases in!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the time of the

filing of the action, a subse.uent statute defining a

youthful offender as one who is o!er + but below :*

years of age may not be so construed as to confer by

implication upon said special court the authority to try

cases in!ol!ing offenders *8 but below :* years of age

Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction

• 4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with it

all necessary and incidental powers to employ allwrits, processes and other means essential to ma1e its

2urisdiction effecti!e

• Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main cause of

action, it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, e!en if

they would otherwise be outside its 2urisdiction

o E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is cogniable

in )4& )4& can order payment of rentals

e!en though the amount eceeds the 2urisdictional amount cogniable by them, the

same merely incidental to the principal action

• %tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an administrati!e

agency must be liberally construed to enable the

agency to discharge its assigned duties in accordancewith the legislati!e purpose

o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear and

decide claims in!ol!ing refund and any other

claims filed , include attorneys fees andother damages

Krant of power includes incidental power

• Ghere a general power is conferred or duty en2oined,

e!ery particular power necessary for the eercise of

one or the performance of the other is also conferred

• 4he incidental powers are those which are necessarily

included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the

power granted

o Eamples

Power to establish an office includes

authority to abolish it, unless

Garrant issued shall be made upon

probable cause determined by the 2udge implies the grant of powe

to the 2udge to conduct preliminaryin!estigations

Power to appro!e a license includes

by implication the power to re!o1e it

• Power to re!o1e is limited

by the authority to gran

license, from which it i

deri!ed

Power to deport includes the power

to arrest undesirable aliens afte

in!estigation

Power to appoint !ested in the

President includes the power to

ma1e temporary appointments unless

Power to appropriate moneyincludes power to withdraw

unepended money already

appropriated

Etc see page **3*:

Krant of power ecludes greater power

• 4he principle that the grant of power includes al

incidental powers necessary to ma1e the eercise

thereof effecti!e implies the eclusion of those which

are greater than that conferred

o Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE power to suspend or remo!al

o Power to reorganie DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE

the authority to depri!e the courts certain

2urisdiction and to transfer it to a .uasi

2udicial tribunal

o Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4

I5&LFDE power to prohibit

Ghat is implied should not be against the law

• Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remo!e 0

o &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL %ER>I&E

E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a cause pro!ided for by law precludes such

implication (unless the appointment was

made outside the ci!il ser!ice law

• Power to appoint a public officer by the Presiden

includes power to remo!e

o Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with 2ust

cause

o Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term of

office to be at the pleasure of the appointing

officer, power to appoint carries with it power

to remo!e anytime



• Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE

the power to delegate the authority to ta1e testimony of

witnesses whose appearance may be re.uired by the

compulsory process of subpoena$ 5or does such

power to in!estigate include the power to delegate the

authority to administer oath

Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied

• It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so

authories, no claim against public funds may beallowed

o %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to

APPOI54I>E officials, this cannot be

construed to include ELE&4I>E officials

o BemployerC to pay *-th month pay, does not

imply that it includes Bgo!ernment

Illegality of act implied from prohibition

• In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3 where a

statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in

!iolation thereof is by implication null and !oid

• Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a cause ofaction for relief

• E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be allowedto found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or ine.uity

• 5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua propria

0 no man should be allowed to ta1e ad!antage of his

own wrong

• Public policy re.uires that parties to an act prohibited

by statute be left where they are, to ma1e the statute

effecti!e and to accomplish its ob2ect

o Party to an illegal contract cannot come to

court of law and as1 that his illegal ob2ect be

carried out

o A citien who sold his land to an alien in!iolation of the constitutional restriction

cannot annul the same and reco!er the land,

for both seller and buyer are guilty of ha!ing

!iolated the &onstitution

4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule

• Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its

enforcement or application will !iolate an a!owed

%un"a&enta' #o'!) or #u*'! !nterest

De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc*

• @omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the

homesteader and his family a piece of land for hishouse and culti!ation

• 4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within

7 years following the issuance of the patent and

pro!ides that any contract of a con!eyance in

contra!ention thereof shall be null and !oid

• 4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may

reco!er the land sub2ect of such illegal sale

arsobia v. C%enco

• Another eception is that when the transat!on !s not

!''e(a' #er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the

prohibition by law is designed for protection of one

party, the court may grant relief in fa!or of the latter

Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

• uando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur et pe

obli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done directly

cannot be done indirectly

Peo v. Concepcion

•

Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an actthe prohibition etends to the board of directors and to

each director separately and indi!idually

• Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from

granting loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of

which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the

prohibition

Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+

• Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the principa

obligation during a fied period, the interest thereon

during the eistence of the restriction is no

demandable

Cr%' v. Tant%ico

• Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or

employee from attachment, garnishment etc

• Earlier law authories the go!ernment to withhold an

amount due such officer or employee to pay his

indebtedness to the go!ernment %@OFLD 5O4 'E

&O5%4RFED to withhold so much of his retirement

benefits as this amount to attachment garnishment etc$

Tant%ico 6r. v Domingo

• Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer oremployee from attachment, garnishment etc

•

Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of retiremen benefits of a public officer until his accountabilities

with the go!ernment shall ha!e been cleared, as such

action is doing indirectly what the go!ernment i

prohibited from doing directly

4here should be no penalty from compliance with law

• A person who complies with what a statute re.uires

cannot, by implication, be penalied thereby

• /or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason canno

countenance an eaction or a penalty for an ac

faithfully done in compliance with the lawC

CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases

IN GENERAL

Kenerally



• A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an

ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal,

commercial or trading meaning

• )ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use such

definition because this is what the legislature intended

• 4as1

o ascertain intent from statute

o ascertain intent from etraneous ? rele!ant

circumstance

o construe word or phrase to effectuate suchintent

• Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a

term used in the law

o Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as well

as the I54E5D)E54 of law (not of an

isolated part or a particular pro!ision alone"

%tatutory definition

• Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e

definition controls the meaning of statutory word,irrespecti!e of any other meaning word ha!e in

ordinary usual sense$

• Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or phrase, should not by construction, be gi!en a different

meaning$

• Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific

definition, thus, this should be used

• 4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular law,

definition must be adopted$

• 5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but it

merely legislates what should form part of the law

itself

2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission

7compensation8 RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V

• 9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations e)ceptbon%ses a##o;ances 3 overtime pay

• Definition was amended deleted BeceptionsC

• Legislati!e Intent the amendment shows legislati!e

intent that bonuses ? o!ertime pay now included in

employees renumeration$

• Principle by !irtue of epress substantial change in

phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or eecuti!e

construction should gi!e way to mandate of new law$

Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic<

• Issue Ghether person who practiced chiropractic

without ha!ing been duly licensed, may be criminally

liable for !iolation of medical law$• @eld 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C

chiropractic may in ordinary sense fall within its

meaningH statutorily defined 3 includes manipulations

employed in chiropracticH thus, one who practices

chiropractic without license is criminally liable$

C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien<

• Issue whether alien who comes into country as

temporary !isitor is an BimmigrantC

• @eld while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban

alien who comes to the Philippines for permanen

residenceCH 4he Immigration Act ma1es own

definition of term, which is Bany alien departing from

any place outside the Philippines destined for the

Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$

• (so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non

immigrantC$" 3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more importantly

the definition emphasies an immigrant, who is an

alien, who comes to the Philippines either to reside4E)PORARILM or PER)A5E54LM 0 no

distinction

• definition of terms gi!en weight in construction

• terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole statute

gi!en effect in their E54IR4M, as harmonious

coordinated, and integrated unit

• words ? phrases construed in light of contet o

G@OLE statute$

ualification of rule

• %tatutory definition of word or term controlling only a

used in the ActH• not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or term

in other statutes

• Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to

enactment of act$

• %tatutory definition controlling statutory words does

not apply when

o application creates incongruities

o destroy its ma2or purposes

o becomes illogical as result of change in it

factual basis$

Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V• Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner of

sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill district

who has been allocated eport and=or domestic ?

reser!e sugar .uotas$

• %tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3.uota

non3district and accommodation planters, they ha!ing

no sugar .uota$ @owe!er, in *+77, .uota system

abolished

• Gith change in situation, illogical to continue adhering

to pre!ious definition that had lost their legal effect$

Amadora v. CA

• @owe!er, where statute remains unchangedinterpreted according to its clear and original mandate

until legislature ta1ing into account changes sub2ected

to be regulated, sees fit to enact necessary amendment$

Gords construed in their ordinary sense

• Keneral rule In the absence of legislati!e intent, word

and phrases should be gi!en their plain, ordinary, and

common usage meaning$

• %hould be read and considered in their natural

ordinary, commonly accepted, and most ob!ious

signification, according to good and appro!ed usageand without resulting to forced or subtle construction$



Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank

• A statute Beempts certain importations from ta and

foreign echange, which are actually used in the

manufacture or preparation of local products, forming

part thereof$C

• B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the imported products ha!e to be mied mechanically, chemically,

materially into the local product ? lose its identity$

•

)eans that the imported article is needed toaccomplish the locally manufactured product for

eport$

C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>?

• BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statute plain and

ordinary meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair where

profit is the purpose ? li!elihood is the moti!e$

• In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at its

clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members,

without intention to obtain profit

• 5ot engaged in business$

P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S 7 9present va#%e:<

• %tatute Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age, lump

sum payment of present !alue of annuity for the first 7

years, and future annuity to be paid monthly$ Provided

*o;ever that there shall be no discount from annuity

for the first 7 yrs$ of those who are 87 yrs or o!er, onthe day the law too1 effect$C

• >ocabulary

o lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in single

payment

o annuity 3 amount of money paid to somebody

yearly or at some other regular inter!al

• %hould there be discount from the present !alue of hisannuity

• 5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to theretired employee substantial sum for his sustenance

considering his age$ Any doubt in this law should beruled in his fa!or$

Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA

• Ghether transferee of a forest concession is liable for

obligations arising from transferors illegal

encroachment into another forest concessionaire,

which was committed prior to the transfer

• %ec$ 8* of PD 67 Bthe transferee shall assume all the

obligations of the transferor$C• &ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and

eplained BObligationsC construed to mean

obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary

course of business$ 5ot those as a result of

transgressions of the law, as these are personal

obligations of transferor$

• Principle &onstrue using ordinary meaning ? a!oidabsurdity$

M%stang L%mber /nc. v CA

• %tatute %ec$ 8; PD 67 3 penalies the cutting

gathering ? or collecting timber or other fores

products without a license$

• Is BlumberC included in BtimberC

• Re!ersing *st ruling, %& says lumber is included in

timber$

• B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no definition of

timber or lumber$ 4imber is included in definition o

forestry prod%cts par (." %ec$-$ Lumber 3 same

definitions as Bprocessing plantsC

• Processing plant is any mechanical set3up, machine or

combination of machine used for processing of logs ?

other forest raw materials into #%mber !eneer, plywood

etc p$ *;-$

• %imply means, #%mber is a processed log or forest raw

material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in ordinary common

usage$ In *++- ed$ of Gebsters Internationa

Dictionary, #%mber is defined as timber or logs after

being prepared for the mar1et$ 4herefore, lumber is a

processed log or timber$ %ec 8; of PD 67 ma1es no

distinction between raw ? processed timber$

Keneral words construed generally

• ,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda what is

generally spo1en shall be generally understoodgeneral words shall be understood in a general sense$

• ,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m a

general statement is understood in a general sense

• In case word in statute has both restricted and genera

meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless nature o

the sub2ect matter ? contet in which it is employed

clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended$

•Keneral words should not be gi!en a restricted

meaning when no restriction is indicated$

• Rationale if the legislature intended to limit themeaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it

to ha!e done so$

Application of rule

,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC

• BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting anyforeigner from contributing campaign funds includes

2uridical person

• BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person

• BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in law,C

an artificial or natural person

2argas v. "i##aro'a

• B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase

accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense tocomprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior courts o

2ustices of %&$

C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA

• Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be

understood in implied or generic sense including

KO&&s$



Centra# ank v. CA

• B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central

go!ernment, consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e and

2udiciary, as well as constitutional bodies ( as

distinguished from local go!ernment ? other

go!ernmental entities" 2ers%s<

• 94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the PhilippinesC

or BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0 including central

go!ernments as well as local go!ernment ? KO&&s$

"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms

• Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product produced in

the country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard (dara1" producedfrom wheat imported into the country are Bproducts of

the PhilippinesC

Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter

• Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general

signification employed in a statute, in absence of

legislati!e intent, to comprehend not only peculiar

conditions obtaining at its time of enactment but those

that may normally arise after its appro!al as well• Progressi!e interpretation etends to the application of

statute to all sub2ects or conditions within its general

purpose or scope that come into eistence subse.uent

from its passage

• Rationale to 1eep statute from becoming ephemeral(short3li!ed" and transitory (not permanent or lasting"$

• %tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases

and sub2ects that arise$

• Keneral rule in %tat&on Legislati!e enactments in

general comprehensi!e operation, apply to persons,

sub2ects and businesses within their general pur!iew

and scope coming into eistence subse.uent to their

passage$

,eotina v. CA

• Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff and

&ustoms &ode embrace not only those declared

prohibited at time of adoption, but also goods and

articles sub2ect of acti!ities underta1en in subse.uent

laws$

,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC

• Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by law

at that time, but also to future elections including

election of delegates to &onstitutional &on!ention

Gords with commercial or trade meaning

•Gords or phrases common among merchants and traders,

ac.uire commercial meanings$

•Ghen any of words used in statute, should be gi!en such

trade or commercial meaning as has been generallyunderstood among merchants$

•Fsed in the following tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws

for the go!ernment of the importer$

•4he law to be applicable to his class, should be construed

as uni!ersally understood by importer or trader$

Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/"

• 5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before its

ta1ing effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed of C

•Lay parting away w= something

•)erchant to sell (this must be used"

San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e

•Bgross !alue of moneyC

•)erchant Bgross selling priceC which is the total amounof money or its e.ui!alent which purchaser pays to the!endor to recei!e the goods$

Gords with technical or legal meaning

•Keneral rule words that ha!e, or ha!e been used in, a

technical sense or those that ha!e been 2udicially

construed to ha!e a certain meaning should be

interpreted according to the sense in which they ha!e

been PRE>IOF%LM used, although the sense may

!ary from the strict or literal meaning of the words

•Presumption language used in a statute, which has atechnical or well31nown meaning, is used in that sense

by the legislature

Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos

•%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which prescribes the

steps to be ta1en when property attached is claimed by

a person other than the defendant or his agent

• %tatute Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent such

third person from !indicating his claim to the property

by any proper action.C

• Issue Bproper actionC limits the - rd partys remedy to

inter!ene in the action in which the writ of attachmen

is issued

•@eld BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined meaning as anBordinary suit in a court of 2ustice by which one party

prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection o

a right or pre!ent redress or wrong

Ghile

•%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement o

ActionC

•%tatute B&i!il action may be commenced by filing a

complaint with the proper courtC

•Gord commencement 3 indicates the origination of entire

proceeding

• It was appropriate to use proper action (in *st statute

than inter!ention, since asserted right of -rd

partyclaimant necessarily flows out of pending suitH if the

word Tinter!ention is used, it becomes strange$

Ma#anyaon v. Lising

• %ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law

• %tatute B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall be

entitled to reinstatement and to his salaries and

benefits which he failed to recei!e during thesuspensionC

• Issue Gill a public officer whose case has been

dismissed not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits in

%ec$ *-



• @eld 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaning finding of not

guilty based on the merit$

• Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept when,

the dismissal comes after the prosecution has

presented all its e!idence and is based on

insufficiency of such e!idence$

"%ra v. Lopena

•Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation those Bwho

ha!e been pre!iously con!icted by final 2udgment ofan offense punished by imprisonment of not less than *month ? a fine of no less than Php :66$C

•Issue Bpre!iously con!ictedC

•@eld it refers to date of con!iction, not date of

commission of crimeH thus a person con!icted on same

date of se!eral offenses committed in different dates is

not dis.ualified$

@ow identical terms in the statute construed

• Keneral rule a word or phrase repeatedly used in a

statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statuteHunless a different intention is clearly epressed$

• Rationale word used in statute in a gi!en sense

presumed to be used in same sense throughout the law$

4hough rigid and peremptory, this is applicable where in

the statute the words appear so near each other physically,

particularly where the word has a technical meaning andthat meaning has been defined in the statute$

De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV

• share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for the -

agricultural years net preceding the current har!est

• leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est of the

- preceding yrs• BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year

• BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in * calendar

yr : crops are raised thats : agricultural years$

0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds

• %tatute In %ec$* , Art$ III of *+-7 &onstitution 3

Bpublic agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC

ecept in fa!or of /ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno

pri!ate agricultural land shall be transferred orassigned$C

• both ha!e same meaning being based on same policy

of nationaliation and ha!ing same sub2ect$

)eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute

• Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word, phrase,

ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or epansi!e

meaning$

• In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of statuteH e!en

disregard technical or legal meaning in fa!or of

construction which will effectuate intent or purpose$

Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions

• Keneral rule word, phrase, pro!ision, should not be

construed in isolation but must be interpreted in

relation to other pro!isions of the law$

• 4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its pro!ision mus

be gi!en effect$

C#a%dio v. COMELEC

• %tatute (LK&" B5o recall shall ta1e place within * yr

from the date of the officials assumption of office or *

year immediately preceding a regular electionC

• Issue Does the *st limitation embraces the entire recal

proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall assemblies" o

only the recall election

• @eld the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to %ec$8+

which states that, Bthe power of recall shall beeercised by the registered !oters of an LKF to which

the local electi!e official belongs$C

• @ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power

!ested in electorate is power to elect an official tooffice and not power to initiate recall proceedings$

• Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in isolation

form but should be interpreted in relation to othe

pro!isions of a statute, or other statutes dealing on

same sub2ect in order to effectuate what has beenintended$

,arcia v. COMELEC

• @istory of statute

o In the &onstitution, it re.uires that legislature

shall pro!ide a system of initiati!e and

referendum whereby people can directlyappro!e or re2ect any act or law or par

thereof passed by &ongress or localegislati!e body$

o Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines #oca

initiative as Bprocess whereby registered

!oters of an LKF may directly propose

enact, or amend any ordinance$C

It is claimed by respondents tha

since resolution is not included in

this definition, then the same canno be sub2ect of an initiati!e$

• Issue whether a local resolution of a municipa

council can be sub2ect to an initiati!e and referendum• @eld Ge re2ect respondents narrow and litera

reading of abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with the

&onstitution and will sub!ert the intent of the

lawma1ers in enacting the pro!isions of the Loca

Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* on initiati!e ?referendum

• 4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not change

the scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of the same

code$ It states (b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend on#y to s%b-ects or matters ;*ic* are ;it*in t*e #ega# po;ers

of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:



• 4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the application of

local initiati!e to ordinances, but to all Bsub2ects or

matters which are within the legal powers of theSangg%nians to enact, which undoubtedly includes

resolutions$C

,e#ano v. C.A.

• In &orporation Law, authories a dissol!ed corporation

to continue as a body corporate for - yrs$ for the

purpose of defending and prosecuting suits by oragainst it, and during said period to con!ey all its

properties to a BtrusteeC for benefits of its members,stoc1holders, creditors and other interested persons,

the transfer of the properties to the trustee being for the

protection of its creditors and stoc1holders$

• Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or

technical sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which

would include a lawyer to whom was entrusted the

prosecution of the cases for reco!ery of sums ofmoney against corporations debtors$

"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion

• Issue Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular courtwithin the meaning of R$A$ 8+7

• %tatute RA 8+7 which ma1es criminal actions

in!ol!ing members of the P5P come Bwithin the

eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the reg%#ar co%rts.

• Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC interchangeably

• &ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine

#udicial %ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e

department and simply instrumentalities of the

eecuti!e power$

• Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial department

of the go!ernment namely the %& and lower courts

which includes the Sandiganbayan.

• @eld &ourts considered the purpose of the law which

is to remo!e from the court martial, the 2urisdiction

o!er criminal cases in!ol!ing members of the P5P and

to !est it in the courts within the 2udicial system$

Mo#ina v. "afferty

• Issue Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes

domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$

• %tatute Phrase used in ta statute which eempts such

products from payment of taes, purpose is to

encourage the de!elopment of such resources$

• @eld phrase not only includes !egetable substances

but also domestic and domesticated animals, animal

products, and fish or bangus grown in ponds$ &ourtga!e epansi!e meaning to promote ob2ect of law$

M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord

• Issue B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning

• %tatute word is used in statute which pro!ides that

Becept as herein specifically eempted, there shall be

paid by each merchant and manufacturer a ta at the

rate of *=- of *N on gross !alue of money in all goods,wares and merchandise sold, bartered, or echanged

for domestic consumption$

• @eld &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is to

ta all merchants ecept those epressly eempted, i

is reasonable and fair to conclude that legislature used

in commercial use and not in limited sense of tota

destruction of thing sold$

Mottom%# v. de #a Pa'

• Issue Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the &ourt of

Appeals or the trial court

• %tatute RA 7-9- Effect of Appea# Appeal shall nostay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgmenunless the officer or body rendering the same or t*e

co%rt , on motion, after hearing ? on such terms as it

may deem 2ust should pro!ide otherwise$

• @eld It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the ad!erse

party intends to appeal from a decision of the %E& and

pending appeal desires to stay the eecution of the

decision, then the motion must be filed with and be

heard by the %E& before the ad!erse party perfects its

appeal to the &ourt of Appeals$

• Purpose of the law the need for immediacy oeecution of decisions arri!ed at by said bodies was

imperati!e$

)eaning of term dictated by contet

• 4he contet in which the word or term is employed

may dictate a different sense

• 2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiam a word is

to be understood in the contet in which it is used$

Peop#e v. C*ave'

• %tatute /amily home etra2udicially formed shall be

eempt from eecution, forced sale or attachmentecept for Bnon payment of debtsC

• Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$

0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds

• %tatute lands were classified into timber, mineral and

agricultural

• Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to includeall lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such

being the contet in which the term is used$

Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary.

• %tatute A riparian owner of the property ad2oining

foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered with

water bordering upon shores of ban1s of na!igable

la1es shall ha!e preference to apply for such lands

ad2oining his property$• /act Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on the

ban1s of ri!er$

• @eld Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a

property ha!ing a water frontage, when it mentioned

Bforeshore lands,C Bmarshy lands,C or Blands co!ered

with water$C

Peo. v. Ferrer

• Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaning

• Gord BO!erthrowC



• %tatute Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully

and by o!ert acts$C

• Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ? limits its

meaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or !iolence$

Peo. v. +a'ario

• %tatute )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany owner

or manager of fishpondsC shall pay an annual ta of afied amount per hectare and it appears that the owner

of the fishponds is the go!ernment which leased them

to a pri!ate person who operates them

• Gord BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as the

ancient principle that go!ernment is immune from

taes$

Ghere the law does not distinguish

• 1bi #e) non disting%it nec nos disting%ere debem%s

where the law does not distinguish, courts should not

distinguish$

• &orollary principle Keneral words or phrases in a

statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural andgeneral significance

• Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced into

parts and one part distinguished from the other to

2ustify its eclusion from operation$

• &orollary principle where the law does not ma1e anyeception, courts may not ecept something therefrom,

unless there a compelling reason to 2ustify it$

• Application when legislature laid down a rule for one

class, no difference to other class$

Presumption that the legislature made no .ualification in

the general use of a term$

"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co.• %tatute grants a person against whom the possession

of Bany landC is unlawfully withheld the right to bringan action for unlawful detainer$

• @eld any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not

eclusi!ely to publicH hence, includes all 1inds of land$

Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es

• %tatute authories the director of lands to file petitions

for cancellation of patents co!ering public lands on the

ground therein pro!ided$

• @eld not distinguished whether lands belong tonational or local go!ernment

SSS v. City of aco#od

• Issue eempts the payment of realty taes to

Bproperties owned by RPC

• @eld no distinction between properties held in

so!ereign, go!ernmental, or political capacity and

those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial character$

2e#asco v. Lope'

• %tatute certain BformalitiesC be followed in order that

act may be considered !alid$

• @eld no distinction between essential or non3essentia

formalities

Co#gatePa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene'

• %tatute does not distinguish between Bstabilier and

fla!orsC used in the preparation of food and those used

in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream

O#iva v. Lamadrid • %tatute allows the redemption or repurchase of a

homestead property w=in 7 years from its con!eyance

• @eld Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary or

in!oluntary$

Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc.

• %tatute grants employee Blea!es of absence with payC

• @eld Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or

less than full payH to all lea!es of absence and not

merely to sic1 or !acation lea!es$

O#fato v. COMELEC

• %tatute ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball pre3 proclamation contro!ersiesC

• @eld BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city omunicipal

P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt

• %tatute A counterbond is to secure the payment of

Bany 2udgment,C when eecution is returned

unsatisfied

• @eld Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and

eecutory but also 2udgment pending appeal whoseeecution ordered is returned unsatisfied$

"amire' v. CA• %tatute BAct to Prohibit ? Penalie Gire 4apping and

Other related >iolations of Pri!ate &ommunication

and Other PurposesC

• BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoried by all the

parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en word

to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other de!ice

or arrangementC

• Issue Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the taping o

a communication ot*er t*an a participant to thecommunication or e!en to the taping by a participan

who did not secure the consent of the party to thecon!ersations$

• @eld Law did not distinguish whether the party soughtto be penalied ought to be party other than o

different from those in!ol!ed in the pri!ate

communication$ 4he intent is to penalie all persons

unauthoried to ma1e any such recording, underscored

by BanyC

Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/"

• %tatute imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarette

containing >irginia tobacco $ Pro!ided that of the

length eceeds * millimeters or the weight pe



thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, the ta shall be increased

by *66N$

• Issue whether measuring length or weight of cigars,

filters should be ecluded therefrom, so that ta would

come under the general pro!ision and not under the

pro!iso

• @eld 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and non3filter cigars, court should not distinguish$

Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic

• Issue whether the con!iction of an applicant for

naturaliation for !iolation of a municipal ordinance

would dis.ualify him from ta1ing his oath as a citien$

• %tatute An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his oath

as a citien after : years from the promulgation of thedecision granting his petition for naturaliation if he

can show that during the inter!ening period Bhe has

not been con!icted of any offense or !iolation of

go!ernment rulesC

• @eld law did not ma1e any distinction between ma#a

in se and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the applicantfrom !iolation of municipal ordinance is

comprehended within the statute and precludes

applicant from ta1ing his oath$

Pera#ta v. CSC

• Issue whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that go!ernment

employees are entitled to *7 days !acation lea!es of

absence with full pay and *7 days sic1 lea!es with full

pay, eclusi!es of %aturday, %undays or holidays in

both cases, applies only to those who ha!e lea!e

credits and not to those who ha!e none$

• @eld Law spea1s of granting of a right and does not

distinguish between those who ha!e accumulated andthose who ha!e none$

Pi#ar v. COMELEC

• %tatute RA *88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate shall,

within -6 days after the day of the election file

true and itemied statement of all contributions and

ependitures in connection with the election$

• @eld Law did not distinguish between a candidate

who pushed through and one who withdrew it$

• BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and e!ento those who withdrew his candidacy$

Sanciagco v. "ono• B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te t*e

co%rts s*o%#d make t*e distinction

• %tatute %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+ which pro!ides that

9Any person holding public appointi!e or position

shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the

time he filed his certificate of candidacyC

• Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious sangg%nians

or barangay officia#s shall upon the filing of

candidacy, be considered on forced lea!e of absence

from office

• /acts an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected

President of Association of 'arangay &ouncils and

pursuant thereto appointed by the President as membeof the Sangg%nian Pan#%ngsod. @e ran for &ongress

but lost$

• Issue @e then wants to resume his duties as member

of sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was merely forcedon lea!e when he ran for &ongress$

• @eld the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied his

re.uestH being an appointi!e sangg%nian member, hewas deemed automatically resigned when he filed his

certificate of candidacy$

,arvida v. Sa#es 6r.

• Issue whether petitioner who was o!er :* but below

:: was .ualified to be an electi!e %Q member

• %tatute %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a member of

the 0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not be :* yrs old$

• %ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides tha

electi!e official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must no

be more than :* yrs$ Bon the day of electionC

• @eld the distinction is apparent the member may bemore than :* years of age on election day or on the

day he registers as member of 0atip%nan ng

0abataan. 'ut the electi!e official, must not be more

than :* years of age on the day of election$

Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words

• Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifyingdisassociation and independence of one thing from

each other$

Peo v. Martin

• %tatute %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*, punishes

Bany indi!idual who shall bring into or land in thePhilippines or conceals or harbors any alien not duly

admitted by any immigration officer

• does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e meaning

since the words Bbring intoC BlandC, BconcealsC and

BharborsC being four separate acts each possessing its

distincti!e, different and disparate meaning$

C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b

• %tatute imposes amusement taes on gross receipts of

Bproprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement placeC

• @eld BorC implies that ta should be paid by either

proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be

single ? not by all at the same time$

• Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that either

phrase ser!es as .ualifying phrase$

• BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR

&O54E4 O/ 4@E LAG %O GARRA54%

Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC"

• %tatute %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt authoriing

municipal 2udges to conduct Bpreliminary eamination

or in!estigationC



• BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC

SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of

Bthat is to sayC"

• Ordinance imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta

• Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual mar1et

!alueC of articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et !alueC

intended to eplain Bgross !alue in money$C

• BorC means successi!ely• %tatute Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe

offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of

lasci!iousness, shall not be prosecuted ecept upon a

complaint by the offended party or her parents,

grandparents or guardian$C

• Although these persons are mentioned dis2uncti!ely,

pro!ision must be construed as meaning that the rightto institute a criminal proceeding is eclusi!ely and

successi!ely reposed in said persons in the order

mentioned, no one shall proceed if there is any person

pre!iously mentioned therein with legal capacity to

institute the action$

• BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as meaningBtogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong with,C Badded to

or lin1ed toCo 5e!er to mean BorC

o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union

• Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both

con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e term

o term used to a!oid construction which by use

of dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude the

combination of se!eral of the alternati!es or

by the use of con2uncti!e BandC will eclude

the efficacy of any one of the alternati!es

standing alone$

ASSOCIATED WORDS

5oscitur a sociis

• where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in

itself or e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings, its

correct construction may be made clear and specific by

considering the company of words in which it is found

or with which it is associated$

• to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of associated or

companion words

%enaseda v. F#avier • %tatute %ec$ *-(-", Art I of the &onstitution grants

Ombudsman power to BDirect the officer concerned to

ta1e appropriate action against a public official or

employee at fault, and recommend his remo!al,

suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution$

• BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure not

pre!enti!e

Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.

• %tat %ec$ 97; of LK& authoried local go!ernment

units to pre!ent or suppress BKambling ? othe

prohibited games of chance$C

• BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e

other prohibited games of chance, must be pre!ented

or suppressed ? not to gambling authoried by

specific statutes$

Carandang v. Santiago

•

Issue Ghether an offended party can file a separateand independent ci!il action for damages arising from

physical in2uries during pendency of criminal action

for frustrated homicide$

• %tatute Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of defamation

fraud, ? physical in2uriesC

• @eld &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as onedefined in RP&, but to mean bodily harm or in2ury

such as physical in2uries, frustrate homicide, or e!en

death$

Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*

• Issue Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases pending in

court under the so called Republic of the Philippinesestablished during the #apanese military occupation

are affected by the proclamation of Ken$ )cArthurissued on October :-, *+99 that Ball laws, regulations

and processes of any other go!ernment in the

Philippines than that of the said &ommonwealth are

null and !oid and without legal effect$C

• BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes but to

the eecuti!e orders of the &hairman of the

Philippine Eecuti!e &ommittee, ordinance

promulgated by the President of so3called RP, and

others that are of the same class as the laws andregulations with which the word BprocessesC i

associated$

Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.

• %tatute %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta

pro!ided for in %ec$ * of this Act shall not be imposed

against the importation into the Philippines o

machinery or raw materials to be used by new andnecessary industry H machinery e.uipment, spare

parts, for use of industriesC

• Issue Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary

generic sense, which means enterprises employing

relati!ely large amounts of capital and=or labor

• @eld %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the :n

time Bis classified togetherC with the terms miners

mining industries, planters and farmers, ob!ious

legislati!e intent is to confine the meaning of the term

to acti!ities that tend to produce or create o

manufacture such as those miners, mining enterprises planters and farmers$

• If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and

illogical

Peo. v. Santiago



• Issue Ghether defamatory statements through the

medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or

libel

• Libel committed by means of Bwriting, printing,

lithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic

ehibiton$C

• It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio

• @eld 5o$ Radio should be considered as same terms

with writing and printing whose common

characteristic is the Bpermanent means of publication$C

San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C

• Issue Ghether claim of an employee against his

employer for cash reward or submitting process to

eliminate defects in .uality ? taste of %an )iguel product falls within 2urisdiction of the labor arbiter of

5LR&

• @eld 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary that

entire uni!erse of money claims under 2urisdiction of

labor arbiter but only those to *$" unfair labor

practices, :$" claims concerning terms ? conditions of

employment 9$" claims relating to household ser!ices7$" acti!ities prohibited to employers ? employees$

• %tatute B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the

5LR&, as last amended by 'P 'lg$ :: including paragraph - Ball money claims of wor1ers, including

hose based on nonpayment or underpayment of

wages, o!ertime compensation, separation pay, and

other benefits pro!ided by law or appropriate

agreement, ecept claims for employees

compensation, social security, medicare and

maternity benefits$C

Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito

•

%tatute EO :87 outlines the procedure whichcomplainants charging go!ernment officials and

employees with commission of irregularities should be

guided, applies to criminal actions or complaints$

• EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and

employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed

of by the officials or authorities concerned inaccordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that

the erring officials and employees can be soonest

remo!ed or otherwise disciplines and the innocent,

eonerated or !indicated in li1e manner, and to the end

also that other remedies, including court action, may

be pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after

administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been ehaustedC

• @eld eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal

actions$ 4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the

.ualification 3 9After administrative remedies s*a##

*ave been e)*a%sted: which suggest ci!il suits

sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!e actions$

Mottom%# v. de#a Pa'

• Issue Ghether the word Tcourt in %ec 7, Art 79-9

Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling,

decision or 2udgment unless the officer or body

rendering the same or the court, on motion after

hearing, and on such terms as it may deem 2ust should

pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a stay granted by

the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling

decision or 2udgment may be raised only by motion in

the main case,C refers to the &A or to the &ourt of

Agrarian Relations

• @eld &orrect construction made clear with reference

to %ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court, officers or

bodies whose decision, award are appealable to the&ourt of Appeals, enumerated as follows &ourt o

Agrarian Relations, %ec$ of Labor, %ocial %ecurity

&ommission etcH /rom grouping, the enumeration

in %ec$ 7 means &ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$

E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species"

• Keneral rule where a general word or phrase follows

an enumeration of particular and specific words of the

same class or where the latter follow the former, thegeneral word or phrase is to be construed to include

or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases a1in to

resembling, or of the same 1ind or class as those

specifically mentioned$

• Purpose gi!e effect to both particular or genera

words, by treating the particular words as indicating

the class and the general words as indicating all thais embraced in said class, although not specifically

named by the particular words$

• Principle based on proposition that had the

legislature intended the general words to be used in

their generic and unrestricted sense, it would ha!e not

enumerated the specific words$

• Presumption legislators addressed specifically to the

particulariation

Illustration

M%t%c v. COMELEC

• %tatute Act ma1es unlawful the distribution o

electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fansflashlights, athletic goods, materials and t*e #ike:

• @eld and the li1e, does not embrace taped 2ingles for

campaign purposes

M%rp*y Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms

• %tatute Dynamos, generators, eciters, and othe

machinery for the generation of electricity for lighting

or for powerH

• @eld phrase Bother machineryC would not includesteam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same

1ind of machinery with dynamos, generators andeciters$

2era v. C%evas

• %tatute all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1 in

whate!er form shall be clearly and legibly mar1ed onits immediate containers with words B4his mil1 is no

suitable for nourishment for infants less than * year of

ageC

• @eld restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er form,C

ecluded filled mil1$

,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara



• %tatute the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to assume the

office of the mayor during the absence, suspension or

other temporary disability

• @eld anything which disables the mayor from

eercising the power and prerogati!es of his office,

since Btheir temporary disabilityC follows the words

BabsenceC and BsuspensionC Peo. v. Maga##anes

• Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction to

hear and decide Boffenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their

office,C the phrase BI5 RELA4IO5 4O 4@EIR

O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts the offense to one

which cannot eist without the office, or the office is a

constituent element of the crime defined in the statute

or one perpetuated in the performance, thoughimproper or irregular, of his official functions

C% 1n-ieng Sons /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s

• Issue whether losses due to the war were to be

deductible from gross income of *+97 when they were

sustained, or in *+76 when Philippine Gar Damage

&ommission ad!ised that no payment would be made

for said losses

• %tatute BIn the case of a corporation, all lossesactually sustained and not charged off within the

taable year and not compensated for by insurance or

otherwise$C

• &ontention the assurances of responsible public

officials before the end of *+97 that property owners

would be compensated for their losses as a result of the

war sufficed to place the losses within the phraseBcompensated otherwiseC than by insurance

• @eld Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause

9compensated for by ins%rance or ot*er;ise: refers tocompensation due under a title analogous or similar toinsurance$ Inasmuch as the latter is a contract

establishing a legal obligation, it follows that in order

to be deemed Bcompensated for Totherwise, the

losses sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a

2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of the

2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract,

.uasi3contract, torts, or crimes,C and not mere

pronouncement of public officials

Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e

• Issue Ghether teachers hired on contract basis are

entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as againstthe claim that they are not so

• %tatute Rule > of IRR of Labor &ode B4his rule (on

ser!ice incenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all employees,

ecept Bfiled personnel and other employees whose

performance is unsuper!ised by the employer

including those who are engaged on tas1 or contract basis$C

• @eld Bthose who were employed on tas1 or contract

basisC should be related with Bfield personnel,C apply

the principle, clearly teachers are not field personnel

and therefore entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e

benefits$

Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA

• Issue whether the phrase Bother lawful be!eragesC

which gi!es protection to manufacturer with the Phil

Patent Office its duly stamped or mar1ed bottles used

for Bsoda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1

cream or other lawful be!erages,C includes hard

li.uor

• %tatute title BAn Act to regulate the use of stamped or

mar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs, barrels, ? othersimilar containers$C

• @eld 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e protection

to all mar1ed bottles of all lawful be!erages regardless

of nature of contents$

+ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas

• Issue whether the term 2udgment, refers to any 2udgment directing the payment of legal interest$

• %tatute &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 0 Bby !irtue of

the authority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act 5umber

:877, as amended, otherwise 1nown as Fsury Law, the

)onetary 'oard in a resolution prescribed that the rate

of interest for loan or forbearance of any money, goodor credit ? the rate allowed in 2udgment in the absenceof epress contract shall be *:N per annum$

• @eld #udgments should mean only 2udgments

in!ol!ing loans or forbearance money, goods or credit

these later specific terms ha!ing restricted the meaning

B2udgmentsC to those same class or the same nature as

those specifically enumerated$

"ep%b#ic v. Migrino

• /acts retired military officer was in!estigated by the

P&KK for !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation to EO * ? : authoriing the P&KK to reco!er ill3gotten

wealth from the former Presidents Bsubordinates andclose associatesC

• Issue Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate

such military officer for being in ser!ice during the

administration of the former President

• @eld B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who en2oys

close association or relation to the former Presidenand his wifeH term Bclose associatesC restricted the

meaning of BsubordinatesC

Limitations of e2usdem generis

• Re.uisites

o %tatute contains an enumeration of particular

? specific words, followed by general wordor phrase

o Particular and specific words constitute a

class or are the same 1ind

o Enumeration of the particular ? specific

words is not ehausti!e or is not merely by

eampleso 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent to

gi!e the general words or phrases a broader

meaning



• Rule of e-%sdem generis is not of uni!ersal

applicationH it should use to carry out, not defeat the

intent of the law$

1S v. Santo +ino

• %tatute It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger,1ris or other deadly weapon$ Provided prohibition

shall not apply to firearms who ha!e secured a license

or who are entitled to carry the same under the pro!isions of this Act$C

• Issue does Bthe deadly weaponC include an unlicensed

re!ol!er

• @eld MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of

statute$ 'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention toinclude in the prohibition weapons other than armas

blancas therein specified$

Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises /nc. v. CA & previo%s page sa

1abilang column

"oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity

Commission• Issue a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem generi

whether TemployerC be limited to underta1ing an

acti!ity which has an element of profit or gain

• %tatute Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic orforeign, who carried in the Philippines any trade,

business, industry$ and uses the ser!ices of another

person, who under his orders as regard the

employment, ecept the Ko!ernment, and any of its

political subdi!isions branches or instrumentalities and

KO&&sC$

• @eld 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies only

when there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is sufficiently

comprehensi!e to include charitable institutions and

charities not for profitH it contained eceptions which

said institutions and entities are not included$

Epressio unius est eclusion alterius

• 4he epress mention of one person, thing or

conse.uence implies the eclusion of all others$

• Rule may be epressed in a number of ways

o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m what is

epressed puts an end to that which is implied

where a statute, by its terms, is epressly

limited to certain matters, it may not, by

interpretation or construction, be etended toother matters$

o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non

e)ceptis 3 A thing not being ecepted must be

regarded as coming within the pur!iew of the

general rule

o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3 4he

epression of one or more things of a class

implies the eclusion of all not epressed,

e!en though all would ha!e been implied had

none been epressedH opposite the doctrine of

necessary implication

5egati!e3opposite doctrine

• Arg%ment%m a contrario what is epressed puts an

end to what is implied$

C*%ng Fook v. @*ite

• %tatute case eempts the wife of a naturalied

American from detention, for treatment in a hospital

who is afflicted with a contagious disease$

• @eld &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas corpus

(filed by the nati!e3born American citien on behalf ofwife detained in hospital", court resorted to negati!e3opposite doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to

wife of a naturalied citien ? cannot interpolate

Bnati!e3bornC citien$

• Analysis courts application results to in2ustice (as

should not discriminate against nati!e3born citiens"

which is not intent of law, should ha!e used doctrine

of necessary implication$

Application of e)pression %ni%s rule

• Kenerally used in construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting

common rights, imposing rights ? forfeitures, as wellas statutes strictly construed$

Acosta v. F#or

• %tatute specifically designates the persons who may

bring actions for $%o ;arranto ecludes others from

bringing such actions$

Escribano v. Avi#a

• %tatute for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations ocriminal actions for written defamation shall be

conducted by the city fiscal of pro!ince or city or by

municipal court of city or capital of the pro!ince where

such actions may be instituted precludes all othemunicipal courts from conducting such preliminary

in!estigations

Peo. v. Lantin

• %tatute crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio

namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts

of lasci!iousnessH crimes such as slander can be

prosecuted de oficio.

)ore short eamples on p$ ::7

Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA

Santos v. CA Ler%m v. Cr%'

Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao

2era v. Fernande'

• %tatute All claims for money against the decedent

arising from contracts, epress or implied, whether the

same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for

funeral epenses and epenses for the last sic1ness of

the decedent, and 2udgment for money agains

decedent, must be filled within the time limit of the

notice, otherwise barred fore!er$



• @eld 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being

mentioned in the rule are ecluded from the operation

of the rule$

Mendeni##a v. Omandia

• %tatute changed the form of go!ernment of a

municipality into a city pro!ides that the incumbentmayor, !ice3mayor and members of the municipal

board shall continue in office until the epiration of

their terms$• @eld all other municipal offices are abolished$

%tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons /nc.

• %tatute Legislature deliberately selected a particular

method of gi!ing notice, as when a co3owner is gi!en

the right of legal redemption within -6 days from

notice in writing by the !endor in case the other co3owner sells his share is the co3owned property,

• @eld the method of gi!ing notice must be deemed

ecusi!e ? a notice sent by !endee is ineffecti!e$

2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o

• %tatute Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments are

gi!en broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept those

which are specifically mentioned therein$ If a sub2ectmatter does not come within the eceptions, an

ordinance imposing a ta on such sub2ect matter is

deemed to come within the broad taing power,

e)ception firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis.

Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s

• Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the

go!ernment belong to the competiti!e ser!ice, eceptthose declared by law to be in the noncompetiti!eser!ice and those which are policy3determining,

primarily confidential or highly technical in nature and

enumerates those in the noncompetiti!e as including

%E&RE4ARIE% O/ KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%,

the clear intent is that assistant secretaries of go!ernors

and mayors fall under the competiti!e ser!ice, for by

ma1ing an enumeration, the legislature is presumed to

ha!e intended to eclude those not enumerated, forotherwise it would ha!e included them in the

enumeration

Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA

• 4he insurance company disclaimed liability since

death resulting from murder was impliedly ecluded in

the insurance policy as the cause of death is not

accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act,

ecluded by the !ery nature of a personal accident

insurance$

• @eld the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio 3 the

mention of one thing implies the eclusion of the other

thing 3 not ha!ing been epressly included in theenumeration of circumstances that would negate

liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered

by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance

company to include death resulting from murder or

assault among the prohibited ris1s lead ine!itably to

the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or eempt

itself from liability for such death

• Insurance company still liable for the in2ury, disability

and loss suffered by the insured$ (sobra Tto, I swearS

)inurder na nga, ayaw pang bayaranS %obraS @ind

daw accidental eh di mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayarandahil murderS %usS %usS"

Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os

• Issue whether the solicitation for religious purposes

i$e$, reno!ation of church without securing permit fro

Department of %ocial %er!ices, is a !iolation of PD

*789, ma1ing it a criminal offense for a person to

solicit or recei!e contributions for charitable or public

welfare purposes$

• @eld 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically

enumerated only goes to show that the framers of the

law in .uestion ne!er intended to include solicitations

for religious purposes within its co!erage$

Limitations of the rule*$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory

construction

2. E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s no more than

auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where

other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was

not intended to be eclusi!e$

-$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way oeample or to remo!e doubts only$

,ome' v. 2ent%ra

• Issue whether the prescription by a physician o

opium for a patient whose physical condition did no

re.uire the use of such drug constitutes

Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustify re!ocation o

physicians license to practice

• @eld %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s no

applicable

• &ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside

from the fi!e eamples specified, there can be no otherconduct of a physician deemed Tunprofessional$ 5or

can it be con!incingly argued that the legislature

intended to wipe out all other forms o

Tunprofessional conduct therefore deemed grounds forre!ocation of licenses

9$ Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon it

face to limit the operation of its pro!ision to particular

persons or things enumerating them, but no reason

eists why other persons or things not so enumeratedshould not ha!e been included and manifest in2ustice

will follow by not including them$

7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the

e.ual protection clause of the &onstitution$

8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience

hardship and in2ury to the public interest$



Doctrine of casus omissus

• A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an enumeration

must be held to ha!e been omitted intentionally$

• 4he maim operates only if and when the omission has

been clearly established, and in such a case what is

omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein$

• Eception where legislature did not intend to eclude

the person, thing or ob2ect from the enumeration$ Ifsuch legislati!e intent is clearly indicated, the court

may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the

clear intent of the legislature and will not do !iolence

to its language

Doctrine of last antecedent

• ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not

those which are distantly or remotely located$

• Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi impediat%r

sententia & relati!e words refer to the nearestantecedents, unless the contet otherwise re.uires

• Rule use of a comma to separate an antecedent fromthe rest eerts a dominant influence in the application

of the doctrine of last antecedent$


Pangi#inan v. A#vendia

• )embers of the family of the tenant includes the

tenants son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en though

they are not dependent upon him for support and li!ing

separately from him 'E&AF%E the .ualifying phrase

Bwho are dependent upon him for supportC refers

solely to its last antecedent, namely, Bsuch other

person or persons, whether related to the tenant or notC

F#orentino v. P+

• Issue whether holders of bac1pay certificates can

compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said

certificates in payment of the holders obligations to

the ban1$

• %tatute Bobligations subsisting at the time of the

appro!al of this amendatory act for which the

applicant may directly be liable to the go!ernment or

to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to

corporations owned or controlled by the go!ernment,

or to any citiens of the Philippines or to any

association or corporation organied under the laws ofthe Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the samefor such settlementC

• @eld the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last

antecedent, ruled that the phrase .ualify only to its last

antecedent namely Bany citien of the Philippines or

association or corporation organied under the laws of

the PhilippinesC

• 4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders can

compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept saidcertificates for payment of their obligations with the

ban1$

ualifications of the doctrine$

*$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention of the

law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced

in the pro!ision, the same should be made etensi!e to

the whole$

:$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to

.ualify the antecedent at all$

Reddendo singular singuilis

• >ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent

• Referring each to eachH

• Referring each phrase or epression to its appropriate

ob2ect, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the

word should be ta1en distributi!ely$

Peo. v Tamani

• Issue when to count the *73day period within which toappeal a 2udgment of con!iction of criminal actionX

date of promulgation of 2udgment or date of receipt o

notice of 2udgment$

• %tatute %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt

• @eld %hould be from Tpromulgation should be

referring to T2udgment, while notice refer to order$

0ing v. !ernande'

• Issue Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontro position in a retail establishment, comes within the

prohibition against aliens inter!ening Bin the

management, operation, administration or controlC

followed by the phrase Bwhether as an officer

employee or laborer

• @eld /ollowing the principle, the entire scope o

personnel acti!ity, including that of laborers, isco!ered by the prohibition against the employment of

aliens$

Amadora v. CA

• Issue whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which states

that Blastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts

and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their

pupils and students or apprentices so long as they

remain in their custodyC applies to all schoolsacademic as well as non3academic

• @eld teachers pupils and studentsH heads o

establishments of arts and trades to apprentices

• Keneral rule responsibility for the tort committed bythe student will attach to the teacher in charge of such

student (where school is academic"

• Eception responsibility for the tort committed by thestudent will attach to the head, and only he, (who"

shall be held liable (in case of the establishments of

arts and tradesH technical or !ocational in nature"

PROVISOS, ECEPTIONS AND CLAUSES

Pro!isos, generally

• to limit the application of the enacting clause, section

or pro!ision of a statute, or ecept something, or to

.ualify or restrain its generality, or eclude some

possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as etending



to cases not intended by legislature to be brought

within its pur!iew$

• Rule restrain or .ualify the generality of the enacting

clause or section which it refers$

• Purpose limit or restrict the general language or

operation of the statute, not to enlarge it$

• Location commonly found at the end of a statute, or

pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the wordBPro!idedC$

• Determined by Ghat determines whether a clause is a pro!iso is its substance rather than its form$ If it

performs any of the functions of a pro!iso, then it will

be regarded as such, irrespecti!e of what word or

phrase is used to introduce it$

Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law

• It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the

legislati!e intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$

• 4hus it may enlarge, than restrict

1.S. v. Santo +ino

• %tatute it shall be unlawful for any person to carry

concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger,1ris or any other deadly weapon Provided that this

pro!ision shall not apply to firearms in the possession

of persons who ha!e secured a license therefore or

who are entitled to same under pro!isions of this Act$

• @eld through the Pro!iso it manifested the intention to

include in the prohibition weapons other than armas

b#ancas as specified$

Pro!iso as additional legislation

• Epressed in the opening statement of a section of a

statute

• Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is necessarily

implied when read in connection with the limitation• Purpose

o 4o limit generalities

o Eclude from the scope of the statute that

which otherwise would be within its terms

Ghat pro!iso .ualifies

• Keneral rule .ualifies or modifies only the phraseimmediately preceding itH or restrains or limits the

generality of the clause that it immediately follows$

• Eception unless it clearly appears that the legislature

intended to ha!e a wider scope

C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard

• %tatute %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law, eecuti!e

order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no

go!ernment agency ecept the Import &ontrol

&ommission shall allocate the import .uota among the

!arious importers$ Provided 4hat the PhilippineRehabilitation and 4rade Administration shall ha!e

eclusi!e power and authority to determine andregulate the allocation of wheat flour among

importers$C

• Issue whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat flour

from the scope of act itself$

• @eld 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause immediately

preceding it and can ha!e no other meaning than tha

the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of

assigning to Import &ontrol &ommission was assigned

to PR4A$

• If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of the

Act, the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in the sectioncontaining the repealing clause

Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es• Ghen an earlier section of statute contains pro!iso, no

embodied in later section, the pro!iso, not embodied in

a later section thereof, in the absence of legislati!e

intent, be confined to .ualify only the section to which

it has been appended$

F#ores v. Miranda

• Issue Petitioner that appro!al of the Public %er!ice

&ommission of the sale of public ser!ice !ehicle was

not necessary because of pro!iso in %ec$ :6 o

&ommonwealth Act 5o$ *98

• %tatute It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice

!ehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator thereofwithout the pre!ious appro!al and authority of the

&ommission pre!iously had to sell, alienate

its property, franchiseH Provided *o;ever that nothing

herein contained shall be construed to pre!ent the

transaction from being negotiated or completed before

its appro!al or to pre!ent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public ser!ice of any of its property in the

ordinary course of businessC

• @eld

o the pro!iso means only that the sale

without the re.uired appro!al is still !alid and

binding between the partiesH also

o the phrase Bin the ordinary course of business could not ha!e been intended to include

sale of !ehicle itself, but at most may referonly to such property that may be concei!ably

disposed of by the carrier in the ordinarycourse of its business, li1e 2un1ed e.uipment$

Mercado Sr. v. +L"C

• @eld the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only to

casual employeesH not to pro2ect employees$

• Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with

reference to immediately preceding part of the

pro!ision which it is attached and not to other sections

thereof, unless legislati!e intent was to restrict o.ualify$

Eception to the rule

• Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately

preceding part of the section to which it is attachedH if

no contrary legislati!e intent is indicated$

• Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase preceding it or the earlier pro!isions of the statute or

e!en the statute itself as a whole, then the pro!iso wil

be construed in that manner, in order that the intent o

the law may be carried out



Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision

• Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and the

main pro!ision, that which is located in a later portion

of the statute pre!ails, unless there is legislati!e intent

to the contrary$

• Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en

preference for it is the latest epression of the intent ofthe legislation$

Eceptions, generally• Eception consists of that which would otherwise be

included in the pro!ision from which it is ecepted$

• It is a clause which eempts something from the

operation of a statute by epress words$

• Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC

• )ay not be introduced by words mentioned abo!e, as

long as if such remo!es something from the operationof a pro!ision of law$

• /unction to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the

words or phrases constituting the general rule$

• E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A thing

not being ecepted, must be regarded as coming within

the pur!iew of the general rule$• Doubts resol!ed in fa!or of general rule

Eception and Pro!iso distinguished

Eception

• Eempts something absolutely from the operation of

statute

• 4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise

would be a part of the sub2ect matter of it$

• Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding from

its operation some sub2ect or thing that would

otherwise fall within the scope$Pro!iso

• Defeats its operation conditionally$

• A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse

• If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a

new pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding

conditionally for a new case3 this is the nature of

pro!iso$

%imilar in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is toecept something from an enacting clause$

Illustration of eception

ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyees Association

• %tatute 5o person, firm, or corporation, business

establishment or place shall compel an employee or

laborer to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays, unless

paid an additional sum of at least :7N of his

renumeration Provided that this prohibition shall not

apply to public utilities performing public ser!ice, e$g$

supplying gas, electricity, power, water etc

• Issue Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N foremployees who wor1 during holidays and %undays

• @eld 5egati!e$ :nd part is an eception although

introduced by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public

utility that supplies electricity ? pro!ides means oftransportation, it is e!ident that appellant is eempt

from .ualified prohibition established in the enactmen

clause$

To#entino v. Secretary of Finance

• %tatute 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse shal

become a law unless it has passed - readings onseparate days, ? printed copies thereof in its final form

ha!e been distributed to its )embers - days before its

passage, e)cept when the President certifies to the

necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public

calamity or emergency$

• @eld it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is

the distribution of the printed bill in its final form -

days from its final passage$? not the - readings on

separate days$

Pendon v. Diasnes

• Issue whether a person con!icted of a crime agains

property, who was granted absolute pardon by thePresident, is entitled to !ote

• %tatute A person shall not be .ualified to !ote Bwho

has been sentenced by final 2udgment to suffer one

year or more from imprisonment, such disability not

ha!ing been remo!ed any plenary pardonC or Bwho has

been declared by final 2udgment guilty of any crime

against property$C

• *st clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penalied by less

than * yr$H and (:" Person granted an absolute pardon

• :nd clause 3 creates eception to *st but not to :nd that a

person con!icted of crime against property cannot !ote

unless theres pardon$

• @eld absolute pardon for any crime for which one

year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores

the prisoner to his political rights$

• If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply, ecept

when against property3 needs pardon$

• 4he :nd clause creates the eception to the *st

,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by 9e)cept:

or 9%n#ess:

• %tatute Rule : of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by

registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the

addresseeH but if fail to claim his mail from the post

office within 7 days from ate of first notice of the postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effect at the epiration o

such time$C

• Issue Ghether actual receipt the date of a registered

mail after 7 day period, is the date from which to counthe prescripti!e period to comply with certain

re.uirements$

• @eld %er!ice is completed on the 7th day after the *s

notice, e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail monthslater$

• :nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with

Tbut which indicates eception$



%a!ing clause

• Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from the

effect of the law what the clause pro!ides, or sa!e

something which would otherwise be lost$

• Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of statute

• Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e in the

form of a sa!ing clause, the right of the state to prosecute and punish offenses committed in !iolation

of the repealed law$• Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted by

another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the old law

at the time the new law ta1es effect, by means of

sa!ing clause

• &onstrued in light of intent by legislature

• Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of

statute$

CHAPTER SI: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n

Re'at!on to ot$er Statutes

STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE

Kenerally

• %tatute is passed as a whole

o It should ha!e one purpose and one intent

o &onstrue its parts and section in connection

with other partso Ghy 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole

• 5e!er

o Di!ide by process of etymological

dissertation (why 'ecause there are

instances when the intention of the legislati!e

body is different from that of the definition in

its original sense"o %eparate the words (remember that the whole

point of this chapter is to construe it as a

whole"o %eparate contet

o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is a

leicographer A person who studies

leicography$ Ghat is leicography then

Analyes semantic relationships between

leicon and language 0 not important$ 5e!er

mind" 0 ang 1ulitS

• 4he whole point of this part is to construe the whole

statute and its part together (actually 1ahit ito nalang

tandaan hanggang matapos 1asi ito lang yung sinasabing boo1"

Intent ascertained from statute as whole

• Legislati!e meaning and intent should be

etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence

the title"o Ghy 'ecause the law is the best epositor of

itself

• Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum 3 the

best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

o Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e ma)im

Optima at %tatuti /rutti where interpreting as

to why when coc1roaches(IPI%" when added

results to %F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z

0 sorry bloc1mates, weird si cherryS

• Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es whichinfluenced the legislati!e body unless the moti!e is

stated or disclosed in the statute themsel!es$

Aisporna v. CA• pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be

studied as detached=isolated epressions

o &onsider e!ery part in understanding the

meaning of its part to produce a harmonious

whole

o )eaning of the law is borne in mind and no

to be etracted from a single wordo )ost important E!ery part of the statute mus

be interpreted with reference to the contet

Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb%

• Described that if the words or phrases of statute be

ta1en indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning differenform the one intended by the author$

• Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the

etent of the application of the pro!ision

,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt

• &ase of wire tapping

• 4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be

unlawful for any person, not being authoried by all

the parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en

word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other

de!ice or arrangement, to secretly o!erhear, intercept

or record such communication or spo1en word by

using such de!ice commonly 1nown as dictagraphC• Issue whether the phrase de!ice or arrangemen

includes party line and etension

• %tatcon it should not be construed in isolation$ Rather

it should be interpreted in relation to the other words

(tap, to o!erhear" thus party line or telephone

etension is not included because the words in the

pro!ision limit it to those that ha!e a physicainterruption through a wiretap or the deliberate

installation of de!ice to o!erhear$ (Remember themaim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied

an association with other words in construing the

intention or limitation of the statute"

+ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA

• Issue whether educational assistance gi!en to

indi!iduals prior to the enactment of RA 87; should be continued to be recei!ed

• @eld Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA 87;

depends on the combination of first and second

paragraph

• /irst sentence states that Bsuch other additiona

compensation not otherwise specified as may be

determined by the D') shall be deemed included in

the standardied salary rates herein prescribed$C 4he



second sentence states Bsuch other additional

compensation, whether in cash or in 1ind, being

recei!ed by incumbents only as of #uly *, *+;+ not

integrated into the standard shall continue to be

authoried$C (you can as1 cheery na lang to eplain it,

ang haba ng nasa boo1 "

• statcon do not isolate or detach the parts$ &onstruing astatute as a whole includes reconciling and

harmoniing conflicting pro!isions

Purpose or contet as controlling guide

• construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of

the words or phrases base on its contet, the nature of

the sub2ect, and purpose or intention of the legislati!e

body who enacted the statute

• gi!e it a reasonable construction

• Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction,

letters of the statutes, rhetorical framewor1 if it can

pro!ide a clear and definite purpose of the whole

statute ( as long as it can produce a clear and definite

statutes, it is sometimes affected to be la on the

construction of grammar"

•

@armonie the parts of each other and it should beconsistent with its scope and ob2ect

Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole

• Ghy construe a statute as a whole 3 'ecause it

implies that one part is as important as the other

• Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itself 3

One can ma1e it clear by reading and construing it in

relation to the whole statute

• @ow do you properly and intelligently construe a

pro!ision=statute 3 - ways (*" Fnderstand its

meaning and scopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH (-"courts should consider the whole act itself

• Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en effect 3'ecause it is enacted as an integrated measure not a

hodgepodge of conflicting pro!isions

• Gays on how the courts should construe a statute

(according to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes"

o Interpret the thought con!eyed by the statute

as whole

o &onstrue constituent parts together

o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole part

o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in light of

the general purpose

o )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious and

sensible (adopt a construction which would

gi!e effect to e!ery part of the of the statute" Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 the

construction is to be sought which

gi!es effect to the whole of the

statute 3 of its e!ery word$

Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled

• included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is

the reconciling and harmoniing conflicting pro!isions

because it is by this that the statute will be gi!en effect

as a whole$

• Ghy is it a must for courts to harmonie conflicting

pro!ision 3 'ecause they are e.ually the handiwor1 o

the same legislature

"P v. CA

• Issue whether or not an appeal of cases in!ol!ing 2ust

compensation should be made first by DARA' beforeR4& under %ec$ 7

• @eld %& said that the contention of the Republic and

the Land 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no merit because although DARA' is granted a 2urisdiction

o!er agrarian reform matters, it does not ha!e

2urisdiction o!er criminal cases$

Sa-onas v. CA

• Issue what period an ad!erse claim annotated at the

bac1 of a transfer certificate effecti!e

• @eld In construing the law %ec$ 6 of PD *7:+

(ad!erse claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6

days from the date of the registration" care should be

ta1en to ma1e e!ery part effecti!e

%pecial and general pro!isions in same statute• special would o!errule the general

• special must be operati!eH general affect only those i

applies

• ecept to general pro!ision

&onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory

• another conse.uence of the rule pro!ision of a statute

should not be construed as to nullify or render another

nugatory in the same statute

• Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam perea3 a law should be interpreted with a !iew to upholding

rather than destroying

o Do not construe a statute wherein one portionwill destroy the other

o A!oid a construction which will render to

pro!ision inoperati!e

Reason for the rule

• because of the presumption that the legislature has

enacted a statute whose pro!isions are in harmony and

consistent with each other and that conflictingintentions is the same statute are ne!er supported or

regarded


• Ghat if the parts cannot be harmonied or reconciledwithout nullifying the other 3 Rule is for the court to

re2ect the one which is least in accord with the genera

plan of the whole statute

• Ghat if there is no choice 3 the latter pro!ision mus

!acate the formerH last in order is fre.uently held to

pre!ail unless intent is otherwise

• Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmonied and made to

stand together 3 one must in.uire into the

circumstances of their passage

&onstruction as to gi!e life to law



• pro!ide sensible interpretation to promote the ends of

which they were enacted

• construct them in a reasonable and practical way to

gi!e life to them

• Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat

3 interpretation will gi!e the efficacy that is to be

adopted$

&onstruction to a!oid surplusage

• construe the statute to ma1e no part or pro!isionthereof as surplasage

• each and e!ery part should be gi!en due effect and

meaning

• do not construe a legal pro!ision to be a useless

surplusage and meaningless

• eert all efforts to pro!ide the meaning$ Ghy 'ecauseof the presumption that the legislature used the word or

phrase for a purpose

Application of rule

Me-ia v.a#a#ong

• Issue how to constru Bnet general electionC in %ec$;; of the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ity

• @eld the phrase refers to the net general election

after the city came into being and not the one after its

organiation by Presidential Proclamation$

+iere v. CF/ of +egros Occidenta#

• Issue does the city mayor ha!e the power to appoint a

city engineer pursuant to %ec$ * of the &ity &harter of

La &arlote

• @eld no, the city mayor does not ha!e such power$

4he phrase Band other heads and other employees of

such departments as may be createdC whom the mayor

can appoint, refers to the heads of city departmentsthat may be created after the law too1 effect, and doesnot embrace the city engineer$ 4o rule otherwise is to

render the first con2unction BandC before the words

Bfire departmentC a superfluity and without meaning at

all

1ytengs% v "ep%b#ic

• Issue whether the re.uirement the re.uirement for

naturaliation that the applicant Bwill reside

continuously in the Philippines from the date of thefiling of the petition up to the time of his admission to

Philippine citienshipC refers to actual residence or

merely to legal residence or domicile• @eld such re.uirement refers to actual or physical

residence because to construe it otherwise is to render

the clause a surplusage$

• An applicant for naturaliation must be actually

residing in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturaliation to its determination by the

court

Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA

• Issue whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or

public dominion

• @eld to say that the land is patrimonial will render

nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the

effect that the &ity of )anila Bis hereby authoried to

lease or sellC

• A sale of public dominion needs a legislati!e

authoriation, while a patrimonial land does not$

%tatute and its amendments construed together

• rule applies to the construction and its amendments

• Ghate!er changes the legislature made it should begi!en effect together with the other parts$

A#meda v. F#orentino

• Law 0 Bthe municipal board shall ha!e a secretary who

shall be appointed by it to ser!e during the term o

office of the members thereofC

• Amendment 0 Bthe !ice3mayor shall appoint alemployees of the board who may be suspended or

remo!ed in accordance with lawC

• &onstruction of both Law and Amendment 0 the

power of the !ice3mayor to ma1e appointmen

pursuant to the amendatory act is limited to the

appointment of all employees of the board other thanthe board secretary who is to be appointed by the

board itself

STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO

CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES

%tatute construed in harmony with the &onstitution

• &onstitution3 the fundamental law to which all laws

are subser!ient

• Keneral Rule Do not interpret a statute independent

from the constitution

• &onstrue the statute in harmony with the fundamenta

law Ghy 'ecause it is always presumed that thelegislature adhered to the constitutional limitations

when they enacted the statute

• It is also important to understand a statute in light of

the constitution and to a!oid interpreting the former in

conflict with the latter

• Ghat if the statute is susceptible to two constructions

one is constitutional and the other is unconstitutionalA 4he construction that should be adopted should be

the one that is constitutional and the one that wil

render it in!alid should be re2ected$

• 4he &ourt should fa!or the construction that gi!es a

statute of sur!i!ing the test of constitutionality

• 4he &ourt cannot in order to bring a statute within thefundamental law, amend it by construction

Taada v. T%vera

• this is the case regarding Art$ : of the &i!il &ode

especially the phrase Bunless otherwise pro!idedC$

• %tatcon one should understand that if the phrase refers

to the publication itself it would !iolate the

constitution (since all laws should be made public" Yif

malabo, !ague, eh huh 0 cherry will eplain it na

langZ



%tatutes in Pari Materia

• pari materia 3 refers to any the following

o same person or thing

o same purpose of ob2ect

o same specific sub2ect matter

• Later statutes may refer to prior laws$

• Ghat if the later law ha!e no reference to the prior

law, does that mean they are not in pari materia 3 5o$

It is sufficient that they ha!e the same sub2ect matter$

• Ghen is a statute not in pari materia 3 4he conditionsabo!e are the determinants of ascertaining if a statuteis in pari materia, thus e!en if two statutes are under

the same broad sub2ect as along as their specific

sub2ects are not the same, they are 5O4 in pari

material

@ow statutes in Pari Materia construed

• Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimusinterpretandi modus 0 e!ery statute must be so

construed and harmonied with other statutes as toform a uniform system of 2urisprudence (parang ganun

din nung first part, construe it as a whole$ 'ut also bear

in mind that it should also be in harmony with othereisting laws"

• &onstrue statutes in pari materia together to attain the

purpose of an epress national policy

• Ghy should they be construed together 3 'ecause of

the assumption that when the legislature enacted thestatutes they were thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior

statutes relating to the same sub2ect matter are to be

compared with the new pro!isions$

• Again it is important to harmonie the statutes$ &ourts

should not render them in!alid without ta1ing the

necessary steps in reconciling them

2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S

• there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that it was

in this case that in pari materia was eplained well$

4he eplanation are the same in the aforementioned

• Other things to consider in constructing statutes which

are in pari materia

o @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect

o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the

legislatureo Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect

matter has been changed or modifiedo &onsider acts passed at prior sessions e!en

those that ha!e been repealed

• Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0 distinguish

times and you will harmonie laws

• In cases of two or more laws with the same sub2ect

matter

o uestion is usually whether the later act

impliedly repealed the prior act$

o Rule the only time a later act will be repealed

or amended is when the act itself states so(that it supersedes all the prior acts" or when

there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between

the two$

o In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be

resol!ed against the repeal or amendment and

in fa!or of the harmoniation of the laws on

the sub2ect (later will ser!e as a modification"

Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled

• : main reasons

o

4he presumption that the legislature too1 intoaccount prior laws when they enacted the new

one$

Borbiter dict%m ni c*erry t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t t*a

t*e #egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a; b%t / ;onder *o;

t*e actors fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o; did Lito Lapid

Loi E-ercito etc kne; t*e prior #a;sG / *eard t*ey *ave

researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em. @*y dont ;e vote t*oseresearc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. / *ave been reading t*e ;*o#e

pres%mption t*at t*e #egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e. Madaming

namamatay sa aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a "

o 'ecause enactments of the same legislature

on the same sub2ect are supposed to form par

of one uniform system (Ghy 'ecause later

statutes are supplementary to the earlier

enactments"

If possible construe the two statuteswherein the pro!isions of both are

gi!en effect

Ghere harmoniation is impossible

• Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law because i

is the BcurrentC or later epression of the legislati!e

will

Illustration of the rule (in pari materia"

Lacson v. "o$%e

• Issue the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a statute

that states Bthe mayor shall hold office for four yearunless sooner remo!edC

• statcon the court held that the phrase should be

construed in relation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus the

phrase meant that although the mayor cannot be

remo!ed during his term of office, once he !iolates

those that are stated in remo!al statutes$

C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion

• criminal case Article *:(*" eempting circumstance

(imbecile or insane"

• %tatcon the phrase Bshall not be permitted to lea!e

without first obtaining permission of the same courtC

should be reconciled with another statute that states

Bany patient confined in a mental institution may bereleased by the Director of @ealth once he is cured

4he Director shall inform the 2udge that appro!ed the

confinementC$ 4hese two statutes refers to a person



who was criminally charged but was pro!en to be an

imbecile or insane, thus they should be construed

together$ 4heir construction would mean that in order

for the patient to be release there should be an

appro!al of both the court and the Director of @ealth$

0ing v. !ernae'

• %tatcon relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade 5ationaliation Act" to &ommonwealth Act *6; (Anti

Dummy Law"

Dia#das v. Percides

• /acts a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu

decided to close his &ebu store and transfer it to

Dumaguete$ R4L (retail trade law" and 4a &ode %ec$

*++ were the statutes ta1en into consideration in this

case$ 4he former authories any alien who on )ay *7,*+79 is actually engaged in retail, to continue to

engage therein until his !oluntary retirement from such

business, but not to establish or open additional stores

for retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any

business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid may

be remo!ed and continued in any other place without

payment of additional ta$

• Issue whether the transfer by the alien from &ebu to

Dumaguete can be considered as a !oluntaryretirement from business$

• @eld 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the

.uestion, the %& ruled otherwise stating that R4&

o!erloo1ed the clear pro!ision of %ec$ *++$

C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and

Se;erage A%t*ority

• /acts R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or repairwor1 underta1en by the Ko!ernment, Philippine made

materials and products, whene!er a!ailable shall be

used in construction or repair wor1$

• /lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e

products preference in the purchase of articles by

Ko!ernment, including go!ernment owned or

controlled corporations$

• Issue interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that preference be made in the purchase and use of Phil$

)ade materials and products

• @eld 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari materia

and they should be construed to attain the same

ob2ecti!e that is to gi!e preference to locally produced

materials$

Cabada v. A#%nan ///

• Issue whether or not an appeal lies from the decision

of regional appellate board (RA'" imposingdisciplinary action against a member of the P5P under

%ec$ 97 of RA 8+7 regarding finality of disciplinary

action

• 4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is silent

on filing appeals from decisions of the RA' rendered

within the reglementary period should be construed

and harmonied with other statutes, i$e$ %ec :(*",Article I3' of the *+; &onstitution because the P5P

is part, as a bureau, of the reorganied DILK, as to

form a unified system of 2urisprudence

• %tatcon if RA' fails to decide an appealed case within

86 days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the

appealed decision is deemed final and eecutory, and

the aggrie!ed party may forthwith appeal therefrom to

the %ecretary of DILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has

decided the appeal within 863day reglementary periodits decision may still be appealed to the %ecretary of

DILK

Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA

• Issue who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N di!idend o

winning horse race tic1ets"

• %tatcon 4here are two statutes that should be

considered$ RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" issilent on the matter but the practice is to use brea1ages

for anti boo1ie dri!e and other sale promotions$ E$O

;; ? ;+ which allocated brea1ages therein specified

4hese two should be construed in pari materia, thus al

brea1ages deri!ed from all races should be distributed

and allocated in accordance with Eecuti!e Orders

because no law should be !iewed in isolation

(supplementary"

Keneral and special statutes

• Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of the

state or to a particular class of persons in the state with

e.ual force$

o Fni!ersal in application

• %pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or things

of a class or to particular portion or section of the state

only

• &onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they should

be read together and harmonied (and gi!en effect"

•

Ghat if there are two acts which contain one generaland one special

o If it produces conflict, the special shal

pre!ail since the legislati!e intent is more

clear thus it must be ta1en as intended to

constitute an eception$

o 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land

while the other applies only to a particular

case

• Ghat if the special law is passed before the generalaw It doesnt matter because the special law will stil

be considered as an eception unless epressly

repealed$

So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a#

• /irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing Authority

shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide

cases in!ol!ing unsound real estate (P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$

• %econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction o!er

such cases$

• Issue Ghich one will pre!ail

• @eld 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a

special law, as compared to the latter which is genera

law, thus it is an eception to the Bgeneral 2urisdictionC

of the R4&



Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp

• /acts P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoried PAK&OR to

centralie and regulate all games of chance$

• LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all go!ernment

units to enact ordinances to pre!ent and suppress

gambling and other games of chance$

• %tacon 4hese two should be harmonied rather than

annulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt said thatthe solution to this problem is for the go!ernment units

to suppress and pre!ent all 1inds of gambling eceptthose that are allowed under the pre!ious law

Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt

• RA 8 empowers the general manager of the &i!il

Aeronautics Administration to lease real property

under its administration$

• Administrati!e &ode authories the President to

eecute a lease contract relating to real property

belonging to the republic

• @ow do you apply the rule 3 In this case, the prior

(special" law should pre!ail

Reason for the rule• the special law is considered an eception to the

general law (as long as same sub2ect"

ualification of the rule

• 4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$

• Eceptions

o If the legislature clearly intended the general

enactment to co!er the whole sub2ect and to

repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith

o Ghen the principle is that the special law

merely establishes a general rule while the

general law creates a specific and special rule

Reference statutes

• a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es them

applicable to the sub2ect of legislation

• used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of

unnecessary repetition

• should be construed to harmonie and gi!e effect to

the adopted statute$

%upplemental statutes

• Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting statutes

• %upplemental statutes should be read with the original

statute and construed together

Reenacted statutes

• statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or pro!ision$

• Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or

substantially the same words$

Monte#ibano v. Ferrer

• Issue application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of

)anila is !alid in the criminal complaint directly file

by an offended party in the city court of 'acolod

• @eld 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint filed

directly by the offended party is in!alid and it ordered

the city court to dismiss it$

• 4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila 'acolod

on the same sub2ect are identically worded, hence they

should recei!e the same construction$

• RFLE two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose andterminology should each in its own field, ha!e a li1e

interpretation

Adoption of contemporaneous construction

• in construing the reenacted statute, the court should

ta1e into account prior contemporaneous construction

and gi!e due weight and respect to it$

ualification of the rule

• rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when the

statute is capable of the construction gi!en to it and

when that construction has become a settled rule of

conduct

Adopted statutes• a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country$

• &ourt should ta1e into consideration how the courts o

other country construe the law and its practices

CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberal

construction will depend upon the following

4he nature of the statute

4he purpose to be subser!ed

4he mischief to be remedied

• Purpose to gi!e the statute the interpretation that wil

best accomplish the end desired and effectuate

legislati!e intent

%trict construction, generally

• &onstruction according to the letter of the statute

which recognies nothing that is not epressed, ta1es

the language used in its eact meaning, and admits no

e.uitable consideration

• 5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowes

meaning• It simply means that the scope of the statute shall no

be etended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or

e.uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning oits terms

• It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the literal or

tetual interpretation

• 4he antithesis of liberal construction

Liberal construction, defined



• E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a

statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its

intent, or promote 2ustice

• 5ot to mean enlargement of a pro!ision which is clear,

unambiguous and free from doubt

• It simply means that the words should recei!e a fair

and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent,

spirit and purpose of the law

Liberal construction applied, generally• Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of

the words used may be re2ected if the result of

adopting said meaning would be to defeat the purpose

of the law

• 1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that construction is

to be sought which gi!es effect to the whole of the

statute 0 its e!ery word

Liberal &onstruction #udicial Interpretation

E.uitable construction as

will enlarge the letter of a

statute to accomplish its

intended purpose, carry outits intent, or promote 2ustice

Act of the court in

engrafting upon a law

something which it belie!es

ought to ha!e beenembraced therein

Legitimate eercise of

2udicial power

/orbidden by the tripartite

di!ision of powers among

the - departments of

go!ernment

• A statute may not be liberally construed to read into it

something which its clear and plain language re2ects

&onstruction to promote social 2ustice

• %ocial 2ustice must be ta1en into account in the

interpretation and application of laws

• %ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for the

three departments the legislati!e, eecuti!e, and the 2udicial

• %ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was meant

to be a !ital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy

• It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not only of

future legislations, but also of laws already eisting on

5o!ember *7, *+-7$

• It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present

and future$

&onstruction ta1ing into consideration general welfare or

growth ci!iliation

• &onstrue to attain the general welfare

• Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the people

is the supreme law

• Stat%ta pro p%b#ico commodo #ate interpretant%r &

statutes enacted for the public good are to be construed

liberally

• 4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the reasonlies in the soil of the common welfare

• 4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of actuality

and dig down deep into his common soil, if not, he

becomes subser!ient to formalism

• &onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliation and

!arying conditions

o 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too long

for the bed, his head should be chopped off

rather than enlarge the old bed or purchase a

new oneC should 5O4 be gi!en to statutes

STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED

Penal statutes, generally• Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat of

their nature and pro!ide for their punishment

o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts

and establish penalties for their !iolation

• 4hose which impose punishment for an offense

committed against the state, and which the chie

eecuti!e has the power to pardon

• A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of the

state of uneplained wealth ac.uired by a publicofficial while in office is criminal in nature

Penal statutes, strictly construed• Penal statutes are strictly construed against the %tate

and liberally construed in fa!or of the accused

o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or etended

by intendment, implication, or any e.uitable

considerationo 5o person should be brought within its term

if he is not clearly made so by the statuteo 5o act should be pronounces criminal which

is not clearly made so

Peo v. Atop

• %ec$ ** of RA 87+, which amended Art$ --7 of the

RP&, pro!ides that the death penalty for rape may beimposed if the Boffender is a parent, ascendant, step3

parent, guardian, relati!e by consanguinity or affinity

within the -rd ci!il degree, or the common3law spouse

of the parent of the !ictimC

• Is the common3law husband of the girls grandmotherincluded

• 5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the pro!ision

of the law which are not clearly embraced by it$

o 5o act can be pronounced criminal which is

not clearly within the terms of a statute can be

brought within them$

o Any reasonable doubt must be resol!ed in

fa!or of the accused

• %trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy the

ob!ious purpose of the legislature

o If penal statute is !ague, it must be construed

with such strictness as to carefully

%A/EKFARD the RIK@4% of the defendan

and at the same time preser!e the ob!ious

intention of the legislature

o &ourts must endea!or to effect substantia

2ustice



Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os

• PD *789, which punishes a person who solicits or

recei!es contribution for Bcharitable or public welfare

purposesC without any permit first secured from the

Department of %ocial %er!ices, DID 5O4 include

Breligious purposesCC in the acts punishable, the law

&A55O4 be construed to punish the solicitation of

contributions for religious purposes, such as repair orreno!ation of the church

Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg

• 4he law is tender in fa!or of the rights of the

indi!idualH

• 4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by conformity

to which man1ind would be safe, and the discretion of

the court limited

• Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through technicality but

to pro!ide a precise definition of forbidden acts

Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita

• Keneral rule to constitute a crime, e!il intent must

combine with an act• Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act itself

does not ma1e a man guilty unless his intention were

so

• Act%s me invite fact%s non est me%s act%s & an act done

by me against my will is not my act

)ala in se )ala prohibita

&riminal intent, apart from

the act itself is re.uired

4he only in.uiry is, has the

law been !iolated

RP& %pecial penal laws

• @owe!er, if special penal laws use such words as

Bwillfully, !oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must be pro!edH thus good faith or bad faith is essential before

con!iction

Application of rule

Peo v. 4adao

• A statute which penalies a Bperson assisting a

claimantC in connection with the latters claim for!eterans benefit, does not penalie Bone who O//ER%

to assistC

S%y v. Peop#e• Ghere a statute penalies a store owner who sells

commodities beyond the retail ceiling price fied bylaw, the ambiguity in the EO classifying the same

commodity into : classes and fiing different ceiling

prices for each class, should be resol!ed in fa!or of the

accused

Peo v. Terreda

• %horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to the

accused

Peo v. Manantan

• 4he rule that penal statutes are gi!en a stric

construction is not the only factor controlling the

interpretation of such laws

• Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional single

factor to be considered as an aid in detrmining the

meaning of penal laws

Peo v. P%risima

•

4he language of the a statute which penalies the merecarrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i$e$, a

1nife or bolo, not in connection with ones wor1 or

occupation, with a !ery hea!y penalty ranging from 73

*6 years of imprisonment, has been narrowed and

strictly construed as to include, as an additiona

element of the crime, the carrying of the weapon infurtherance of rebellion, insurrection or sub!ersion

such being the e!il sought to be remedied or pre!ented

by the statute as disclosed in its preamble

A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan

• Issue whether a pri!ate person can be considered a

public officer by reason if his being designated by the

'IR as a depository of distrained property, so as to

ma1e the con!ersion thereof the crime of mal!ersation

• @eld 5OS the 'IRs power authoriing a pri!ateindi!idual to act as a depository cannot include the

power to appoint him as public officer

• A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of the

public funds or property enumerated in Art ::: RP&

and commits any of the acts defined in any of the

pro!isions of &hapter 9, 4itle of the RP&, should

li1ewise be penalied with the same penalty meted toerring public officers$ 5owhere in this pro!ision is i

epressed or implied that a pri!ate indi!idual falling

under said Art ::: is to be deemed a public officer

Limitation of rule

• Limitation * 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable of :

interpretations, one which will operate to eempt an

accused from liability for !iolation thereof and another

which will gi!e effect to the manifest intent of thestatute and promote its ob2ect, the latter interpretation

should be adopted

1S v. ,o C*ico

• A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC the

insurrection against the F% may not be so construed as

to eempt from criminal liability a person who

displays a replica of said flag because said replica is

not the one BusedC during the rebellion, for to soconstrue it is to nullify the statute together

• Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were 2ust

replica of the flags Bused duringC insurrection agains

F%

• Limitation : 0 strict construction of penal laws

applies only where the law is ambiguous and there is

doubt as to its meaning



Peo v. ,atc*a#ian

• A statute re.uires that an employer shall pay a

minimum wage of not less than a specified amount and

punishes any person who willfully !iolates any of its

pro!isions

• 4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is

not specifically declared unlawful, does not mean thatan employer who pays his employees less than the

prescribed minimum wage is not criminally liable, for

the nonpayment of minimum wage is the !ery actsought to be en2oined by the law

%tatutes in derogation of rights

• Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the eercise of

police power, may enact legislations curtailing or

restricting their en2oyment

• As these statutes are in derogation of common orgeneral rights, they are generally strictly construed and

rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope and

purpose

• Eamples

o %tatutes authoriing the epropriation of

pri!ate land or propertyo Allowing the ta1ing of deposition

o /iing the ceiling of the price of commodities

o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights by

indi!idual citiens

o %uspending the period of prescription of

actions

• Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one which

would diminish or restrict fundamental right of the

people and the other if which would not do so, the

latter construction must be adopted so as to allow full

en2oyment of such fundamental right

%tatutes authoriing epropriations• Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e in

nature

• )ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or publicutility company

• Epropriation plus 2ust compensation

• A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict construction

is applied

• %tatutes epropriating or authoriing the epropriation

of property are strictly construed against the

epropriating authority and liberally in fa!or of property owners

%tatutes granting pri!ileges

• %tatutes granting ad!antages to pri!ate persons or

entities ha!e in many instances created special

pri!ileges or monopolies for the grantees and ha!e

thus been !iewed with suspicion and strictly construed

• Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem vo#%ntati

consonam concedentis & pri!ileges are to be

interpreted in accordance with the will of him who

grants them

• And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the

grantor loses such pri!ileges

%t%an Sa;mi## /nc. v. ayvie; T*eater /nc

• Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise to

operate electric light and power, on condition that it

should start operation within a specified period, it

failure to start operation within the period resulted in

the forfeiture of the franchise

Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units

•

Krants of power to local go!ernment are to beconstrued strictly, and doubts in the interpretation

should be resol!ed in fa!or of the national go!ernmen

and against the political subdi!isions concerned

• Reason there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation

of public money or property which results in an unfair

ad!antage to the grantee and for that reason, the granshould be narrowly restricted in fa!or of the public

%tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials

• %tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of public

officials are strictly construed

• Reason the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one and

penal in nature$ In2ustice and harm to the publicinterest would li1ely emerge should such laws be nostrictly interpreted against the power of suspension or

remo!al

Oc*ate v. De#ing

• Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty, oppression

corruption or other forms of maladministration in

officeC

o Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$

o )ust be in relation to the official as an office

and not as a pri!ate person

!ebron v "eyes• Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be strictly

construed

• %tatute local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed or

suspended, after in!estigation, by the pro!incial board

sub2ect to appeal to the President

• President has no authority on his own to conduct the

in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e official

5aturaliation laws

• 5aturaliation laws are strictly construed against the

applicant and rigidly followed and enforced

• 5aturaliation is statutory than a natural right

%tatutes imposing taes and customs duties• 4a statutes must be construed strictly against the

go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer

• Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy

• 4aing act are not to be etended by implication

• 4a statutes should be clearly, epressly, and

unambiguously imposed

• Reason for strict construction taation is a destructi!e

power which interferes with the personal property

rights of the people and ta1es from them a portion of

their property for the support of the go!ernment



%tatutes granting ta eemptions

• Law frowns against eemption from taation because

taes are the lifeblood of the nation

• Laws granting ta eemptions are thus construed

strictissimi -%ris against the tapayer and liberally in

fa!or of the taing authority

• 'urden of proof 0 on the tapayer claiming to be

eempted

• 'asis for strict construction 0 to minimie the different

treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and e.ualityof treatment among tapayers

• 4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are they

presumed$

C/" v. CA

• Issue whether containers and pac1aging materials can

be credited against the millers deficiency ta

• 'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit

• @eld pro!iso should be strictly construed to apply

only to raw materials and not to containers and pac1ing materials which are not raw materialsH hence,

the miller is entitled to ta credit

• Restriction in the pro!iso is limited only to sales,millers ecise taes paid Ton raw materials used in the

milling process

eng%et Corporation v. Cenrtra# oard of Assessment Appea#s

• PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept thoseembodied in the Real Property &ode, a law which

grants certain industries real estate ta eemptions

under the Real Estate &ode

• &ourts cannot epand eemptiom

Esso Standard Eastern /nc. v Acting Commissioner of C%stoms• Ghere a statute eempts from special import ta,

e.uipment Bfor use of industries,C the eemption does

not etend to those used in dispensing gasoline at retailin gasoline stations

C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc.

• %tatute Bracing club holding these races shall be

eempt from the payment of any municipal or national

taC

• &annot be construed to eempt the racing club from

paying income ta on rentals paid to it for use of therace trac1s and other paraphernalia, for what the law

eempts refers only to those to be paid in connectionwith said races

L#adoc v. C/"

• %tatute eemption from taation charitable

institutions, churches, parsonages or co!enants

appurtenant thereto, mos.ues, and non3profit

cemeteries, and all lands buildings, and impro!ementsactually, directly, and eclusi!ely used for religious or

charitable purposes

• Eemption only refer to property taes and not from

all 1inds of taes

La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene'

• %tatute ta pro!ided shall not be collected on foreign

echange used for the payment of Bfertiliers when

imported by planters or farmers directly or through

their cooperati!esC

• 4he importation of fertiliers by an entity which isneither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of

planters or farmers is not eempt from payment of the

ta, e!en though said entity merely acted as agent of planter or farmer as a sort of accommodation withou

ma1ing any profit from the transaction, for the law

uses the word BdirectlyC which means without anyone

inter!ening in the importation and the phrase Bthrough

their cooperati!esC as the only eemption

C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.

• %ee page -67

• Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of so!ereignty

its relin.uishment is ne!er presumed and any reduction

or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its

rate must be strictly construed

P*i#. Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. v. COA

• On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC

• : franchisee are not competitors

• 4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced rate o

ta on gross receipts


• %trict construction does not apply in the case of ta

eemptions in fa!or of the go!ernment itself or itagencies

• Pro!isions granting eemptions to go!ernmen

agencies may be construed liberally in fa!or of non3taliability of such agencies

• 4he epress eemption should not be construed with

the same degree of strictness that applies to

eemptions contrary to policy of the state, since as to

such property eemption is the rule and the taation is

the eemption

• E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0 whether

direct or indirect taes, eempted

%tatutes concerning the so!ereign

• Restricti!e statutes which impose burdens on the

public treasury or which diminish rights and interest

are strictly construed$• Fnless so specified, the go!ernment does not fal

within the terms of any legislation

A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and

Emp#oyment

• PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *- th month

pay to their employees

• BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law not

ha!ing epressly included it within its scope

%tatutes authoriing suits against the go!ernment



• Art$ >I, %ec$ -, *+; &onstitution 0 B4he %tate may

not be sued without its consentC

o Keneral rule so!ereign is eempt from suit

o Eception in the form of statute, state may

gi!e its consent to be sued

%tatute is to be strictly construed and

wai!er from immunity from suit will

not be lightly inferred

• +%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no legal

right as against the authority that ma1es the law onwhich the right depends

• Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state to

incon!enience and loss of go!ernmental efficiency

Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services

• 4he law authoriing the 'ureau of &ustoms to lease

arrastre operations, a proprietary function necessarily

incident to its go!ernmental function, may 5O4 be

construed to mean that the state has consented to be

sued, when it underta1es to conduct arrastre ser!icesitself, for damage to cargo

• %tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by directingthe action against the officer of the state instead of the

state itself

o 4he states immunity may be !alidly in!o1ed

against the action A% LO5K A% I4 &A5 'E

%@OG5 that the suit really affects the

property, rights, or interests of the state andnot merely those of the officer nominally

made party defendant

• E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be

interpreted to authorie garnishment of public funds to

satisfy a 2udgment against go!ernment property

o Reason

Public policy forbids it Disbursement of public funds must

be co!ered by a correspondingappropriation as re.uired by law

/unctions and ser!ice cannot be

allowed to be paralyed or disrupted

by the di!ersion of public funds

from their legitimate and specific

ob2ects, as appropriated by law

%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will

• %trictly construed, which means, wills must be

eecuted in accordance with the statutory

re.uirements, otherwise, it is entirely !oid• 4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the intent

of the legislators and not that of the testator, and the

latters intention is fre.uently defeated by the non3

obser!ance of what the statute re.uires

Eceptions and pro!isos

• %hould be strictly but reasonably construed

• All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the general pro!ision rather than the eceptions

o @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of

legislators if it will accord reason and 2ustice

not to apply the rule that Ban epress

eception ecludes all othersC

• 4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be strictly

construed being an eception to the general rule

• %ituations which allows eceptions to the re.uiremen

of warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly

construedH to do so would infringe upon personaliberty and set bac1 a basic right

• A preference is an eception to the general rule

• A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with thelegislati!e intent

o %hould be strictly construed

o Only those epressly eempted by the pro!iso

should be freed from the operation of the

statute

STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED

Keneral social legislation

• Keneral welfare legislations

o 4o implement the social 2ustice and

protection3to3labor pro!isions of the

&onstitutiono &onstrued liberally

o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons

whom the law intended to benefit

o Includes the following 0 labor laws, tenancy

laws, land reform laws, and social security

laws

Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote#

• Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay

ecept those therein enumerated

• %tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or not

who are not among those ecepted are entitled to the

holiday pay

• Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingmans welfare

should be the primordial and paramount considerationo Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in the

implementation and interpretation of the pro!isions of the Labor &ode including its

implementing rules and regulations shall be

resol!ed in fa!or of laborC

• Liberal construction applies only if statute is !ague

otherwise, apply the law as it is stated

Keneral welfare clause

• : brancheso One branch attaches to the main trun1 of

municipal authority 0 relates to such

ordinances and regulations as may be

necessary to carry into effect and discharge

the powers and duties conferred upon local

legislati!e bodies by law

o Other branch is much more independent o

the specific functions enumerated by law 0

authories such ordinances as shall seem

necessary and proper to pro!ide for the healthand safety, promote the prosperity, impro!e



the morals, peace, good order of the LKF

and the inhabitants thereof, and for the

protection of the property therein

• &onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs

• 4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in

promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and

material progress of the people in the community

• &onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise wouldcripple LKFs

• )ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious socialconditions

• )ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of life

Krant of power to local go!ernments

• Old rule municipal corporations, being mere creatures

of law, ha!e only such powers as are epressly granted

to them and those which are necessarily implied orincidental to the eercise thereof

• 5ew rule RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC

o %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a city,

or a municipality shall be liberally construed

in its fa!or$ Any fair and reasonable doubt as

to the eistence of the power should beinterpreted in fa!or of the local go!ernment

and it shall be presumed to eistC

%tatutes granting taing power (on municipal corporations"

• 'efore *+- &onstitution 0 inferences, implications,

and deductions ha!e no place in the interpretation of

the taing power of a municipal corporation

• 5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ , %ec 7 *+; &onstitution 0

Beach local go!ernment unit shall ha!e the power to

create its own sources of re!enue and to le!y taes,

fees, and charges sub2ect to such guidelines andlimitations as the &ongress may pro!ide, consistent

with the basic policy of local autonomyCo %tatutes prescribing limitations on the taing

power of LKFs must be strictly construed

against the national go!ernment and liberally

in fa!or of the LKFs, and any doubt as to the

eistence of the taing power will be resol!ed

in fa!or of the local go!ernment

%tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes

• 'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer o 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are obliged

to act promptly in the ma1ing of the

assessments

o 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling ofsecurity against unscrupulous ta agents who

will always find an ecuse to inspect the

boo1s of tapayers

• Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0 interpreted

liberally affording protection to the tapayers

%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta

• liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and strictly

construed against the tapayer

• intention to hasten ta payments or to punish e!asions

or neglect of duty in respect thereto

• liberal construction would render penalties for

delin.uents nugatory

Election laws

• Election laws should be reasonably and liberally

construed to achie!e their purpose

• Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of the

electorate in the choice of their representati!es• - parts

o Pro!isions for the conduct of elections which

election officials are re.uired to follow

o Pro!isions which candidates for office are

re.uired to perform

o Procedural rules which are designed to

ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winne

in the elections

Different rules and canons or statutory construction go!ern

such pro!isions of the election law

• Part *o Rules and regulations for the conduct o

elections

'efore election 0 mandatory (part *"

After election 0 directory (part -"

o Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as to

the manner of conducting the details of an

election are 5O4 mandatoryH andirregularities in conducting an election and

counting the !otes, not preceding from any

wrongful intent and which depri!es no lega

!oter of his !otes, will not !itiate an election

or 2ustify the re2ection of the entire !otes of a

precinct Against disenfranchisement

Remedy against election officiawho did not do his duty 0 crimina

action against them

• Part :

o Pro!isions which candidates for office are

re.uired to perform are mandatory

o 5on3compliance is fatal

• Part -

o Procedural rules which are designed to

ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winne

in the elections are liberally construed

o 4echnical and procedural barriers should no

be allowed to stand if they constitute anobstacle in the choice of their electi!e

officials

• /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate

o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible

doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates

eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will o

the electorate

Amnesty proclamations



• Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed

as to carry out their purpose

• Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the law

of those who ha!e !eered from the law

• E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain persons

come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt

should be resol!ed in their fa!or and against the state

• %ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty

is synonymous

%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes

• Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused

• Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence

• %ame as amnesty and pardon

Peo v. "eyes

• Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall commenceto run from the day the crime is disco!ered by the

offended, authorities, C

• Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day of

disco!ery or registration in the Register of Deeds

• @eld /rom the time of registration

• 5otice need not be actual for prescription to runHconstructi!e notice is enough

• )ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e period iscounted from the time of registration

Adoption statutes

• Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or of

the child to be adopted

• Paramount consideration 0 child and not the adopters

>eteran and pension laws

• >eteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate aclass of men who suffered in the ser!ice for the

hardships they endured and the dangers theyencountered in line of duty

o Epression of gratitude to and recognition of

those who rendered ser!ice to the country by

etending to them regular monetary benefit

• >eteran and pension laws are liberally construed in

fa!or of grantee

De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin

• Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war

!eterans, ecept those who are actually recei!ing a

similar pension from other go!ernment funds

• %tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of thesame go!ernment and does not preclude war !eterans

recei!ing similar pensions from the F% Ko!ernmentfrom en2oying the benefits therein pro!ided

oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista

• >eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity of

pension awards, it shall be construed to ta1e effect

from the date it becomes due and 5O4 from the date

the application for pension is appro!ed, so as to grant

the pensioner more benefits and to discourage inaction

on the part of the officials who administer the laws

C*ave' v. Mat*ay

• Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be construed

liberally, they should be so construed as to pre!ent a

person from recei!ing double pension or

compensation, unless the law pro!ides otherwise

Santiago v. COA

• Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws

• Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and hopefully

e!en comfort when he no longer has the stamina to

continue earning his li!elihood

• @e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful go!ernmen

at best concretely epressed in a generous retiremen

gratuity commensurate with the !alue and length of hisser!ice

Orti' v. COMELEC

• Issue whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& i

deemed to ha!e completed his term and entitled to ful

retirement benefits under the law which grants him 73year lump3sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pensionwho Bretires from the ser!ice after ha!ing completed

his term of office,C when his courtesy resignationsubmitted in response to the call of the Presiden

following ED%A Re!olution is accepted

• @eld MesS Entitled to gratuity

• Liberal construction

• &ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere

manifestation of submission to the will of the politica

authority and appointing power

/n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate 6%stice

Efren / P#ana• Issue whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity and

retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy

resignation was accepted following ED%A Re!olution

and establishment of a re!olutionary go!ernmen

under the /reedom &onstitution, he lac1ed a few

months to meet the age re.uirement for retiremenunder the law but had accumulated a number of lea!e

of credits which, if added to his age at the time, would

eceed the age re.uirement

• @eld yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction

applied

/n "e Pineda• Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case

• 4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up forlac1 of re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not done

discriminately

• only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was

mar1ed by competence, integrity, and dedication to the

public ser!ice

/n "e Martin

• Issue whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of the

disability retirement benefits pursuant to the pro!isionthat Bif the reason for the retirement be any permanen

disability contracted during his incumbency in office



and prior to the date of retirement he shall recei!e only

a gratuity e.ui!alent to *6 years salary and allowances

aforementioned with no further annuity payable

monthly during the rest of the retirees natural lifeC is

entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the *63year

period

• @eld MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended to

assist the stric1en retiree meeting his hospital anddoctors bills and epenses for his support

•

4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his oldage, not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed

Cena v. CSC

• Issue whether or not a go!ernment employee who has

reached the compulsory retirement age of 87 years, but

who has rendered less than *7 years of go!ernmentser!ice, may be allowed to continue in the ser!ice to

complete the *73year ser!ice re.uirement to enable

him to retire with benefits of an old3age pension under

%ec **(b" PD **98

• @owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o : pro!ides

that Bany re.uest for etension of compulsory retirees

to complete the *73years ser!ice re.uirement for

retirement shall be allowed only to permanent

appointees in the career ser!ice who are regularmembers of the K%I% and shall be granted for a period

not eceeding * year

• @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :

unconstitutionalS It is an administrati!e regulation

which should be in harmony with the lawH liberal

construction of retirement benefits

Rules of &ourt

• R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally

• Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust determination of a

litigation• Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they

are adopted not as ends in themsel!es but as means

conduci!e to the realiation of the administration of

law and 2ustice

• R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial

rights at the epense of technicalities

Case v. 6%go

• Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of procedure

will be o!erloo1ed when they do not in!ol!e public

policyH when they arose from an honest mista1e or

unforeseen accidentH when they ha!e not pre2udiced

the ad!erse party and ha!e not depri!ed the court of itsauthority

• Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of liberal

constructiono Ghere a rigid application will result in

manifest failure or miscarriage of 2ustice

o Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice will

be ser!ed

o Ghere the resolution of the emotion is

addressed solely to the sound and 2udicious

discretion of the court

o Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party is not

commensurate with the degree of his

thoughtlessness in not complying with the

prescribed procedure

• Liberal construction of R& does not mean they may be

ignoredH they are re.uired to be followed ecept only

for the most persuasi!e reasons

Other statutes

• &urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or to

!alidate legal proceedings which would otherwise be

!oid for want of conformity with certain legare.uirementsH retroacti!e

• Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0 construed

liberally to carry out purpose, which is to enable the

debtor to ha!e his property applied to pay as many

debtors liability as possible

• %tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are

interpreted liberally in order to gi!e effect to thei beneficial and humane purpose

• Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to promote

their ob2ects and assist the parties obtaining speedy

2ustice

• Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0 liberally

construed in fa!or of a bona fide holders of suchreceipts

• Probation laws 0 liberally construed

o Purpose to gi!e first3hand offenders a second

chance to maintain his place in society

through the process of reformation

• %tatute granting powers to an agency created by the

&onstitution should be liberally construed for the

ad!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es for which

it was created

CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes

IN GENERAL

Kenerally

• )andatory and directory classification of statutes 0

importance what effect should be gi!en to the

mandate of a statute

)andatory and directory statutes, generally

• )andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely tha

something be done in a particular way, or negati!ely

that something be not doneH it re.uires O'EDIE5&E

otherwise !oid

• Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in

nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such away that no in2ury can result from ignoring it or that its

purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than

that prescribed and substantially the same resulobtainedH confer direction upon a personH non

performance of what it prescribes will not !itiate the

proceedings therein ta1en

Ghen statute is mandatory or directory

• 5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is

directory or mandatory

• /inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent



• Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of the

statuteH must be gi!en to the entire statute, its ob2ect,

purpose, legislati!e history, and to other related

statutes

• )andatory in form but directory in nature 0 possible

• Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory depends

on whether the thing directed to be done is of the

essence of the thing re.uired, or is a mere matter ofform, what is a matter of essence can often be

determined only by 2udicial constructiono &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a matter

of con!enienceH where the directions of a

statute are gi!en merely with a !iew to the

proper, orderly and prompt conduct of

businessH no substantial rights depend on it

o &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision relating

to the essence of the thing to be done, that is,

to matters of substanceH interpretation showsthat the legislature intended a compliance

with such pro!ision to be essential to the

!alidity of the act or proceeding, or when

some antecedent and prere.uisite conditions

must eist prior to the eercise of the power,or must be performed before certain other

powers can be eercised

4est to determine nature of statute

• 4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will follow in

case what the statute re.uires is not done or what it

forbids is performed

• Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choice 0 if

yes, then it is mandatory

• Depends on the effects of compliance

o If substantial rights depend on it and in2ury

can result from ignoring itH intended for the

protection of the citiens and by a disregardof which their rights are in2uriously affected 0 mandatory

o Purpose is accomplished in a manner other

than that prescribed and substantially the

same results obtained 3 directory

• %tatutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is

merely directory in nature

o If strict compliance will cause hardship or

in2ustice on the part of the public who is not

at faulto If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or

mischie!ous conse.uences

If an officer is re.uired to do a positi!e act but fails because such

actions will lead to the

aforementioned, he will only be

sub2ect to administrati!e sanction for

his failure to do what the law

re.uires

Language used

• Kenerally mandatory 0 command words

o %hall or %hall not

o )ust or )ust not

o Ought or Ought not

o %hould or %hould not

o &an or &annot

• Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words

o )ay or )ay not

Fse of BshallC or BmustC

• Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in nature

• If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest uponsomething in the character of the legislation or in the

contet which will 2ustify a different meaning

• 4he import of the word ultimately depends upon aconsideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature, ob2ec

and the conse.uences that would follow from

construing it one way or the other

Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t* Assn. /nc. v. CA

• BmustC construed as directory

• &orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery corporation

formed under this &ode )F%4 within one month afterreceipt of official notice of the issuance of its

certification of incorporation with the %E&, adopt acode of by3laws for its go!ernment not inconsistent

with this &odeC

• PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the

&orporation &ode states that the non3filing of the by3

laws does not imply the BdemiseC of the corporation

that there should be a notice and hearing before the

certificate of registration may be cancelled by the

failure to file the by3laws

• One test whether mandatory or directory compliance

must be made 0 whether non3compliance with what isre.uired will result in the nullity of the actH if it results

in the nullity, it is mandatory

Director of Land v. CA

• Law re.uires in petitions for land registration tha

Bupon receipt of the order of the court setting the time

for initial hearing to be published in the OK and once

in a newspaper of general circulation in the

PhilippinesC

• Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be published in the OK A5D in the newspaper of genera

circulation 0 reason OK is not as widely read of the

newspaper of general circulation

• BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory

• Githout initial hearing being published in a newspaperof general circulation is a nullity

Fse of BmayC

• An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or possibility

• Kenerally, directory in nature

• Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally

construed

• Eample %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0 Bshares of

stoc1 so issued are personal property and )AM be

transferred by deli!ery of the certificate or certificated

endorsed by the owner



o BmayC is merely directory and that the

transfer of the shares may be effected in a

manner different from that pro!ided for in

law

Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa

• Rule BmayC should be read BshallC

o where such construction is necessary to gi!e

effect to the apparent intention of the

legislatureo where a statute pro!ides for the doing os

some act which is re.uired by 2ustice r public

duty

o where it !ests a public body or officer with

power and authority to ta1e such action which

concerns for the public interest or rights of

indi!iduals

• Rule BshallC should be read BmayC

o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by the

intention of the legislature

o Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right

re.uires that it be gi!en an imperati!e

meaning

Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp

• %ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial

institutions owned or controlled by the Ko!ernment

%@ALL, sub2ect to a!ailability of funds accept at a

discount at not more than :6N for *6 years of such

bac1pay certificateC

• B%hallC implies discretion because of the phraseBsub2ect to a!ailability of fundsC

,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino

• &orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such

!iolation being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o ;arranto proceedingsC

• B%hallC construed as BmayC

erces Sr. v. ,%ingona

• %ec$ 8; Ra *86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal from

an ad!erse decision against a local electi!e official to

the President B%@ALL not pre!ent a decision from becoming final and eecutorC

• B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to

construe said pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the

re!iewing officials to stay the eecution of the

appealed decision

Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms

• A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in negati!ewords or in a form of an affirmati!e proposition

.ualified by the word BonlyC

• BonlyC eclusionary negation

• Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er, be

discretionary

MANDATORY STATUTES

%tatutes conferring power

• Kenerally regarded as mandatory although couched in

a permissi!e form

• %hould construe as imposing absolute and positi!e

duty rather than conferring pri!ileges

• Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not for

the public official

• Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to pre!ent

a failure of 2ustice• Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its aid

%tatutes granting benefits

• &onsidered mandatory

• /ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or to

meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude him froma!ailing of the statutory benefits

• 2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt & the

laws aid the !igilant, not those who slumber on their

rights

• Potior est in tempoe potior est in -%re 0 he who is firs

in time is preferred in right

%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements

• &onsidered mandatory

• Eamples

o Re.uirement of publication

o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect tha

before an action for refund of ta is filed in

court, a written claim therefore shall be

presented with the &IR within the prescribed

period is mandatory and failure to comply

with such re.uirement is fatal to the action

%tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal

• Kenerally mandatory

• @eld as absolutely indispensable to the pre!ention of

needless delays and to the orderly and speedy

discharge or business, and are necessary incident to the

proper, efficient, and orderly discharge of 2udicia

functions

• %trict not substantial compliance

• 5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect o

agreements or stipulation of litigants

"eyes v. COA

• %ec$ *; RA *86 0 process of appeal of dissatisfied

tapayer on the legality of ta ordinanceo Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6 days of

effecti!ity of the ta ordinance

o If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a period

of -6 days is allowed for an aggrie!ed party

to go to courto If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon, after

the lapse of 86 days, a party could already proceed to see1 relief in court

• Purpose of mandatory compliance to pre!ent delays

and enhance the speedy and orderly discharge o

2udicial functions



• Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with, the

decision of the lower court will become final and

preclude the appellate court from ac.uiring 2urisdiction

to re!iew it

• /nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest

re.uires that by the !ery nature of things there must be

an end to a legal contro!ersy

,ac*on v. Devera 6r

• Issue whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummaryProcedure, which reads B should the defendant fail to

answer the complaint within the period abo!e

pro!ided, the &ourt, mot% proprio, or on motion of the

plaintiff, %@ALL render 2udgment as may bewarranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and

limited to what is prayed for therein,C is mandatory or

directory, such that an answer filed out of time may be

accepted

• @eld mandatory

o )ust file the answer within the reglementary

period

o Reglementary period shall be Tnon3

etendibleo Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e of

epediting the ad2udication of suits

%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements

• &onstrued mandatory

• Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the essence

of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection

or benefit of the party affected

• Ghere failure to comply with certain procedural

re.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the act

done in connection therewith !oid, the statute prescribing such re.uirements is regarded as

mandatory e!en though the language is used therein is permissi!e in nature

De Mesa v. Mencias

• %ec *, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the claim is

not thereby etinguished, the court shall order, upon

proper notice, the legal representati!e of the deceased

to appear and to be substituted $ If legal

representati!e fails to appear , the court )AM

order the opposing party to produce the appointment of

a legal representati!e C

• Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory

• Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery 2urisdiction ofthe court, for Bunless and until a legal representati!e is

for him is duly named and within the 2urisdiction of

the trial court, no ad2udication in the cause could ha!e

been accorded any !alidity or the binding effect upon

any party, in representation of the deceased, without

trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court

which is the !ery essence of the constitutionally

enshrined guarantee of due process

Election laws on conduct of election

• &onstrued as mandatory

• 'efore election 0 mandatory

• After election 0 directory, in support of the resul

unless of a character to affect an obstruction to the free

and intelligent casting of the !otes, or to the

ascertainment of the result, or unless it is epressly

declared by the statute that the particular act i

essential to the !alidity of an election, or that its

omission shall render it !oid (whew, and habaS"

• Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots, the

same should not be nullified simply because the

officers appointed under the law to direct the electionsand guard the purity of the ballot ha!e not done their

duty

• /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate

o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible

doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates

eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will othe electorate

De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e'

• 4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the number

of the ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is

!oted, as re.uired by law, does not 2ustify the court in

re2ecting the ballot

Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification

• 4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC inelection laws only applies to procedural statutesH

• 5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws

prescribing the time limit to file certificate o

candidacy and the .ualifications and dis.ualifications

of electi!e office 0 considered mandatory e!en after

election

%tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office

• Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature

and must eist at the commencement of the term andduring the occupancy of the office

• %tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications of

persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory

• Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3disbarmen

as lawyer

%tatutes relating to assessment of taes

• Intended for the security of the citiens, or to insurethe e.uality of taation, or for certainty as to the nature

and amount of each others ta 0 )A5DA4ORM

o E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to notify

the tapayer of the assessment of his property

within a prescribed period

• 4hose designed merely for the information or directionof officers or to secure methodical and systematic

modes of proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM

%tatutes concerning public auction sale

• &onstrued mandatory

• Procedural steps must be strictly followed

• Otherwise, !oid



DIRECTORY STATUTES

%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers

• Regulation designed to secure order, system, and

dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which

the rights of parties interested may not be in2uriously

affected 0 directory

o Eception 0 unless accompanied by negati!e

words importing that the acts re.uired shall

not be done in any other manner or time thanthat designated

%tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action

• &onstrued directory

• Procedure is secondary in importance to substanti!e

right

• Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not necessaryto the !alidity of the proceedings

%tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed period

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum

period within which a case or matter shall be decided

or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall beo :9 months 0 %&

o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts

o - months 0 all other lower courts

• %ec Art$ I3A, *+; &onstitution 0

o 86 days from the date of its submission for

resolution 0 for all &onstitutional&ommissions

• 'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes re.uiring

rendition of decision within prescribed period 0

Directory

o Ecept

intention to the contrary is manifest

time is of the essence of the thing to be done

language of the statute contains

negati!e words

designation of the time was intendedas a limitation of power, authority or

right

• always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e the

statute a mandatory or directory construction

o basis EPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results to

the general public by disregarding than

enforcing the little of the law and that 2udges

would otherwise abstain from rendering

decisions after the period to render them hadlapsed because they lac1ed 2urisdiction tot do

so

H%er%bin v. CA

• %tatute appeals in election cases Bshall be decided

within - months after the filing of the case in the office

of the cler1 of courtC

• Issue whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in decidingthe election case although the re.uired period to

resol!e it has epired

• @eld yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration o

2ustice upon factors beyond the control of the parties

would defeat the purpose of due processH dismissa

will constitute miscarriage of 2usticeH speedy tria

would be turned into denial of 2ustice

o /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the said

period merely depri!es him of their right to

collect their salaries or to apply for lea!es, budoes not depri!e them of the 2urisdiction to

act on the cases pending before them

&onstitutional time pro!ision directory

Marce#ino v. Cr%'

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum

period within which a case or matter shall be decided

or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall beo :9 months 0 %&

o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts

o - months 0 all other lower courts

• %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 directory

• Reasons

o %tatutory pro!isions which may be thudeparted from with impunity, withou

affecting the !alidity of statutory proceedings

are usually those which relate to the mode or

time of doing that which is essential to effect

the aim and purpose of the legislature or some

incident of the essential act 0 thus directoryo Liberal construction 0 departure from stric

compliance would result in less in2ury to thegeneral public than would its stric

application

o &ourts are not di!ested of their 2urisdiction

for failure to decide a case within the +63day

periodo Only for the guidance of the 2udges manning

our courts

o /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a

ground for administrati!e sanction against the

defaulting 2udge

A certification to this effect ire.uired before 2udges are allowed to

draw their salaries

CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e Statutes

IN GENERAL

Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined

• Prospecti!e 0o operates upon facts or transactions that occur

after the statute ta1es effect

o loo1s and applies to the future$

• Retroacti!e 0

o Law which creates a new obligation, imposes

a new duty or attaches a new disability in

respect to a transaction already past$

o A statute is not made retroacti!e because it

draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or



part of the re.uirements for its action and

application is drawn from a time antedating

its passage$

1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao

• A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that

occurred prior to the effecti!ity of such law without

being retroacti!e$

• %tatute RA *83 granting increased personal

eemptions from income ta to be a!ailablethenceforth, that is, after said Act became effecti!e and

on or before the deadline for filing income ta returns,

with respect to compensation income earned or

recei!ed during the calendar year prior to the date the

law too1 effect$

Castro v. Saga#es

• A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense"

o one which ta1es away or impairs !ested rights

ac.uired under eisting laws

o creates a new obligation and imposes a new

duty

o

attaches a new disability in respect oftransactions or considerations already past

Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally

• It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutesare to be construed as ha!ing only prospecti!e

operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to

gi!e them a retroacti!e effect, epressly declare or

necessarily implied from the language used$

• 5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when the

legislature has not said so$

• Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws

shall ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is

pro!ided$C• Le) prospicit non respicit & the law loo1s forward, not

bac1ward

• Le) de f%t%re -%de) de praeterito & the law pro!ides

for the future, the 2udge for the past$

• If the law is silent as to the date of its application and

that it is couched in the past tense does not necessarily

imply that it should ha!e retroacti!e effect$

,rego v. Come#ec

• A statute despite the generality of its language, must

not be so construed as to o!erreach acts, e!ents, or

matters which transpired before its passage

• %tatute %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying thoseremo!ed from office as a result of an administrati!e

case from running for local electi!e positions cannot

be applied retroacti!ely$

• @eld It cannot dis.ualify a person who wasadministrati!ely remo!ed from his position prior to the

effecti!ity of said &ode from running for an electi!e

position$

• Rationale a law is a rule established to guide actions

with no binding effect until it is enacted$

• +ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet non

praeteretis & A new statute should affect the future

not the past$

• Prospecti!ity applies to

o %tatutes

o Administrati!e rulings and circularso #udicial decisions

• 4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original or

amendatory, has been applied in many cases$ 4hese

include

%yco v. P+

• %tatute RA *78 which di!ested the P5' of authority

to accept bac1 pay certificates in payment of loans

• @eld does not apply to an offer of payment made

before effecti!ity of the act$

Lagardo v. Masaganda• @eld RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5 #une

*++*, granting inferior courts 2urisdiction o!eguardianship cases, could not be gi!en retroacti!e

effect in the absence of a sa!ing clause$

Larga v. "anada 6r.

• @eld %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of P$D

*7: could ha!e no retroacti!e application$

Peo v. H%e Po Lay

• @eld a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating

&ircular :6 of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged

!iolation occurred before publication of the &ircularon the Official Kaette$

a#ta'ar v. CA

• @eld It denied retroacti!e application to PD :

decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the

bondage of the soil, ? PD -*8, prohibiting e2ectmenof tenants from rice ? corn farmholdings pending

promulgation of rules ? regulations implementing PD

:

+i#o v CA

• @eld remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation as the ground for

e2ectment of a tenant cant be gi!en retroacti!e effecin absence of statutory statement for retroacti!ity$

• Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circulars

ASC+ roadcasting v. CTA

• @eld a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be gi!en

retroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$

Sanc*e' v. COMELEC

• @eld the holding of recall proceedings had no

retroacti!e application



"om%a#de' v. CSC

• @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot be

gi!en retrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to permanent

appointment an employee whose temporary

appointment had epired before the &ircular was

issued$

• Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not laws,

are e!idence of what the laws mean and is the basis of

Art$; of the &i!il &ode wherein laws of the&onstitution shall form part of the legal system of the

Philippines$

Presumption against retroacti!ity

• Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely,

unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainlyand une.ui!ocally epressed or necessarily implied$

• In case of doubt resol!ed against the retroacti!e

operation of laws

• If statute is susceptible of construction other than that

of retroacti!ity or will render it unconstitutional3 the

statute will be gi!en prospecti!e effect and operation$

•

Presumption is strong against substanti!e lawsaffecting pending actions or proceedings$ 5o

substanti!e statute shall be so construed retroacti!elyas to affect pending litigations$

Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity

• Indicating prospecti!e operation

o A statute is to apply BhereafterC or

BthereafterC

o Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC

o Bshall ha!e been madeC

o Bfrom and afterC a designated date

• B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the

enactment to be effecti!e only in f%t%re.• %tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e effect

o BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC

o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President

shall ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$, as

pro!ided in the statute

Retroacti!e statutes, generally

• 4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment of

retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the obligation

of contract, depri!e persons of property without due

process of law, or di!est rights which ha!e become!ested, or which are not in the nature of e) post facto

laws$

• %tatutes by nature which are retroacti!e

o Remedial or curati!e statutes

o %tatutes which create new rights

o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall apply

retroacti!ely

o Ghere it uses words which clearly indicate its

intent

• Problem in construction is when it is applied

retroacti!ely, to a!oid frontal clash with the

&onstitution and sa!e the law from being declaredunconstitutional$

STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT

Penal statutes, generally

• Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$

• Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall be

punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law priorto its commission$

• Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally accepted

principle that no penal law can ha!e a retroacti!eeffect, no act or omission shall be held to be a crime

nor its author punished, ecept by !irtue of a law in

force at the time the act was committed$

• +%##%m crimen sine poena n%##a poena sine #egis &

there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty

without a law$

E) post facto law

• &onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law shall be

enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e application of

penal laws which are in the nature of e) post facto

laws$

• E) post facto laws are any of the followingo Law ma1es criminal an act done before the

passage of the law and which was innocen

when done, and punishes such act

o Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es i

greater than it was, when committed

o Law which changes the punishment ? inflicts

a greater punishment than that anneed to the

crime when committed

o Law which alters the legal rules of e!idence

authories con!iction upon less or different

testimony than the law re.uired at the time of

the commission of the offense

o Law which assumes to regulate ci!il rights

and remedies only, but in effect imposes

penalty or depri!ation of a right fo

something which when done was lawfulo Law which depri!es a person accused of a

crime of some lawful protection to which he

has become entitled, such as protection of a

former con!iction or ac.uittal, o

proclamation of amnesty$

• 4est if e) post facto clause is !iolated Does the law

sought to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from an accused

any right !ital for protection of life and liberty

• %cope applies only to criminal or penal matters• It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!i

proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate ci!i

or pri!ate rights or political pri!ilege

A#via v. Sandiganbayan

• Law as of the date of the effecti!ity of this decree, any

case cogniable by the Sandiganbayan is not an e) post facto law because it is not a penal statute nor

dilutes the right of appeal of the accused$

'ill of attainder



• &onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall be

enacted$

• 'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts

punishment without 2udicial trial

• Essence substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicial

determination of guilt

• %er!es to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing ?

thereby forestalling legislati!e usurpation of 2udicial

functions$• @istory 'ill of Attainder was employed to suppress

unpopular causes ? political minorities, and this is the

e!il sought to be suppressed by the &onstitution$

• @ow to spot a 'ill of Attainder

o %ingling out of a definite minority

o Imposition of a burden on it

o A legislati!e intent

o retroacti!e application to past conduct suffice

to stigmatie

• 'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e) post

facto features$

• Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is also

an e) post facto law$

Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely

• Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect, ecept

when they are fa!orable to the accused$

• Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e

effect insofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a

felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is

defined in Rule 7 Art 8: of the &ode , although at the

time of the application of such laws a final sentence

has been pronounced and the con!ict is ser!ing the

same$

• 4his is not an e) post facto law$• Eception to the general rule that all laws operate

prospecti!ely$

• Rule is founded on the principle that the right of the

state to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of 2ustice$

• Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda adiiosa restrigenda &

&onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$

• Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and

accepted by science$

• : laws affecting the liability of accused

o In force at the time of the commission of the

crime 0 during the pendency of the criminal

action, a statute is passed reducing the degree of penalty

eliminating the offense itself

remo!ing subsidiary imprisonment

in case of insol!ency to pay the ci!illiability

prescription of the offense

• such statute will be applied

retroacti!ely and the trial

court before the finality of

2udgment or the appellate

court on appeal from such

2udgment should ta1e such

statute in consideration$

o Enacted during or after the trial of the

criminal action

Director v. Director of Prisons

• Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused is

ser!ing sentence, remedy is to file petition of *abeas

corp%s alleging that his continued imprisonment is

illegal pursuant to said statute ? praying that he beforthwith released$

• Eceptions to the rule

o Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent

o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not apply

to eisting actions or pending cases

o Ghere accused disregards the later law ?

in!o1es the prior statute under which he was

prosecuted$

• Keneral rule An amendatory statute rendering an

illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is

gi!en retroacti!e effect does not apply when

amendatory act specifically pro!ides that it shall onlyapply prospecti!ely$

%tatutes substanti!e in nature

• %ubstanti!e law

o creates, defines or regulates rights concerning

life, liberty or property, or the powers o

agencies or instrumentalities fo

administration of public affairs$

o that part of law which creates, defines ?

regulates rights, or which regulates rights or

duties which gi!e rise to a cause of actiono that part of law which courts are established

to administer o when applied to criminal law that which

declares which acts are crimes and prescribe

the punishment for committing them

o &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it might

affect pre!ious or past rights or obligations

• %ubstanti!e rights

o One which includes those rights which one

en2oys under the legal system prior to the

disturbance of normal relations$

• &ases with substanti!e statutes

To#entino v. A'a#te

• In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which laysdown certain re.uirements to be complied with be fore

a case can be brought to court$

Espirit% v. Cipriano

• /reees the amount of monthly rentals for residentiahouses during a fied period

Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o

• Law &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law granting

complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant

to which they filed actions to assert rights which



subse.uently amended to eempt fishponds from

co!erage of statute

• @eld Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as it

eempts fishponds from its co!erage$

• 4est for procedural laws

o if rule really regulates procedure, the 2udicial

process for enforcing rights and duties

recognied by substanti!e law ? for 2ustly

administering remedy and redress for adisregard or infraction of them

o If it operates as a means of implementing an

eisting right

• 4est for substanti!e laws

o If it ta1es away a !ested right

o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal

Fabian v. Desierto

• Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the !enueof appeal is procedural

• Eample

o Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the

Ombudsman in administrati!e actions bemade to the &ourt of Appeals

o Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of the

5LR& be filed with the &ourt of Appeals

• Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and are

applicable to actions pending and undermined at the

time of the passage of the procedural law, while

substanti!e laws are prospecti!e

Effects on pending actions

• %tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be gi!en

retroacti!e operation so as to go!ern pending

proceedings$

/b%ran v. Labes

• Ghere court originally obtains and eercises

2urisdiction, a later statute restricting such 2urisdictionor transferring it to another tribunal will not affect

pending action, unless statute pro!ides ? unless

prohibitory words are used$

Lagardo v. Masagana

• Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain case but

ne!ertheless decides it, from which appeal is ta1en, a

statute enacted during the pendency of the appeal

!esting 2urisdiction upon such trial court o!er the

sub2ect matter or such case may not be gi!enretroacti!e effect so as to !alidate the 2udgment of the

court a $%o, in the absence of a sa!ing clause$

"ep%b#ic v. Prieto

• Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e

because it did not allege sufficient action, it may not be

!alidated by a subse.uent law which affects

substanti!e rights and not merely procedural matters$

• Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes ingeneral applies more strongly with respect to

substanti!e laws that affect pending actions o

proceedings$


• A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable to

pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law$

• 4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of police power, is intended to apply to pending actions

• As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law

as it eists at the time of the decision of the appellatecourt, where the statute changing the law is intended to

be retroacti!e and to apply to pending litigations or is

retroacti!e in effect

• 4his rule is true though it may result in the re!ersal of

a 2udgment which as correct at the time it was rendered

by the trial court$ 4he rule is sub2ect to the limitation

concerning constitutional restrictions againsimpairment of !ested rights

%tatutes affecting !ested rights

• A !ested right or interest may be said to mean some

right or interest in property that has become fied or

established and is no longer open to doubt ocontro!ersy

• Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment, presentor prospecti!e, has become the property of some

particular person or persons, as a present interest

• 4he right must be absolute, complete and

unconditional, independent of a contingency

• A mere epectancy of future benefit or a contingen

interest in property founded on anticipated continuance

of eisting laws does not constitute a !ested right

• Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are no

!ested

• A statute may not be construed and applied

retroacti!ely under the following circumstances

o if it impairs substanti!e right that has become

!estedH

o as disturbing or destroying eisting righ

embodied in a 2udgmentH

o creating new substanti!e right to fundamenta

cause of action where none eisted before andma1ing such right retroacti!eH

o by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability

already etinguished by operation of law

• Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of personsmay not be so applied if the new right collides with or

impairs any !ested right ac.uired before the

establishment of the new right nor, by the terms of

which is retroacti!e, be so applied if

o it ad!ersely affects !ested rights

o unsettles matter already done as re.uired by

eisting lawo wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby

eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda



• Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of law

entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged

for his benefit, nor has he a !ested right in the

continued eistence of a statute which precludes its

change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a

particular matter, a subse.uent statute cannot be so

applied retroacti!ely as to impair his right that accrued

under the old law$

• %tatutes must be so construed as to sustain its

constitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be presumed where a retroacti!e application will produce

in!alidity$

Peo v. Pata#in

• 4he abolition of the death penalty and its subse.uent

re3imposition$ 4hose accused of crimes prior to the re3

imposition of the death penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested

rights under the law abolishing it$

• &ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction to

pre!ent their retroacti!e operation in order that the

statutes would not impair or interfere with !ested or

eisting rights$ Accused3appellant Ts rights to be

benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accruedor attached by !irtue of Article :: of the Re!ised Penal

&ode$ 4his benefit cannot be ta1en away from them$

%tatutes affecting obligations of contract

• Any contract entered into must be in accordance with,

and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of

eecution$ %uch law forms part of, and is read into, the

contract e!en without the parties epressly saying so$

• Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of contracts

are the ones applicable to such transactions and not

later statutes, unless the latter pro!ide that they shall

ha!e retroacti!e effect$

• Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en retroacti!e

effect if to do so will impair the obligation of

contracts, for the &onstitution prohibits the enactment

of a law impairing the obligations of contracts$

• Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner

changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairsthe contract itself

• A statute which authories any de!iation from the

terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating the

period of performance which it prescribes, imposing

conditions not epressed in the contract, or dispensing

with those which are howe!er minute or apparently

immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs theobligation, and such statute should not therefore be

applied retroacti!ely$

• As between two feasible interpretations of a statute,

the court should adopt that which will a!oid the

impairment of the contract$

• If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be

rendered illegal by a subse.uent legislation$

• A law by the terms of which a transaction or

agreement would be illegal cannot be gi!en retroacti!eeffect so as to nullify such transactions or agreement

eecuted before said law too1 effect$

1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina

• 4he importation of certain goods without impor

license which was legal under the law eisting at the

time of shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact tha

when the goods arri!ed there was already another law

prohibiting importation without import license$ 4o rule

otherwise in any of these instances is to impair theobligations of contract$


Peop#e v. 5eta

• Eisting law authoriing a lawyer to charge not more

than 7N of the amount in!ol!ed as attorneys fees in

the prosecution of certain !eterans claim$

• /acts A lawyer entered into a contract fo

professional ser!ices on contingent basis and actually

rendered ser!ice to its successful conclusion$ 'eforethe claim was collected, a statute was enacted$

• 5ew statute Prohibiting the collection of attorney

fees for ser!ices rendered in prosecuting !eteran

claims$

• Issue /or collecting his fees pursuant to the contrac

for professional ser!ices, the lawyer was prosecuted

for !iolation of the statute$

• @eld In eonerating the lawyer, the court said the

statute prohibiting the collection of attorneys feecannot be applied retroacti!ely so as to ad!ersely

affect the contract for professional ser!ices and the

fees themsel!es$

• 4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become

absolute and unconditional until the !eterans claim

had been collected by the claimant when the statute

was already in force did no alter the situation$

• /or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute rights

is not helpful and a better !iew to handle the problem

is to declare those statutes attempting to affect rightswhich the courts find to be unalterable, in!alid a

arbitrary and unreasonable, thus lac1ing in due

process$C

• 4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bno

unreasonable$ %er!ices were rendered thereunder to

claimants benefits$ 4he right to fees accrued upon

such rendition$ Only the payment of the fee wascontingent upon the appro!al of the claimH therefore

the right was contingent$ /or a right to accrue is onethingH enforcement thereof by actual payment i

another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the

rendition of the ser!ices should not as a matter of

simple 2ustice affect the agreement, which was entered

into !oluntarily by the parties as epressly directed in

the pre!ious law$ 4o apply the new law to the case of

defendant3appellant s as to depri!e him of the agreed

fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructi!eof the in!iolability of contracts, and therefore in!alid



as lac1ing in due processH to penalie him for

collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of 2ustice$C

Repealing and amendatory acts

• %tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate

prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e them

retroacti!e effect clearly appears$

• Although a repealing state is intended to be retroacti!e,

it will not be so construed if it will impair !ested rights

or the obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters thathad been legally done under the old law$

• Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are

generally applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the

accused, unless the contrary appears or the accused is

otherwise not entitled to the benefits of the repealing

act$

• Ghile an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always

been contained therein , it may not be gi!en a

retroacti!e effect unless it is so pro!ided epressly or

by necessary implication and no !ested right or

obligations of contract are thereby impaired$

•

4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation ofstatutes also applies to amendatory acts

San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp

• RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war debts

from #anuary *, *+9: to December -*, *+97 amended by RA 8* on #une *8, *+7* by !irtually reenacting

the old law and pro!iding that 9if t*e debtor *o;ever

makes vo#%ntary payment of t*e entire pre;ar %npaid

principa# ob#igation on or before December I? ?JK

t*e interest on s%c* principa# ob#igation

corresponding from 6an%ary ? ?J> to day of

payment are #ike;ise condoned C

• @eld a debtor who paid his pre3war obligationtogether with the interests on )arch *9, *+7* or beforethe amendment was appro!ed into law, is not entitled

to a refund of the interest paid from #anuary *, *+98 to

)arch *9, *+7* the date the debtor paid the obligation$

• Reason

o Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a

present or future actH thereby not retroacti!ely

o Bunpaid principal obligationC and BcondoneC

0 imply that amendment does not co!er

refund of interests paid after its appro!al$

C/" v. La Tondena

• %tatute imposes ta on certain business acti!ities isamended by eliminating the clause pro!iding a ta on

some of such acti!ities, and the amended act is further

amended, after the lapse of length of time, by restoring

the clause pre!iously eliminated, which re.uires that

the last amendment should not be gi!en retroacti!e

effect so as to co!er the whole period$

/mperia# v. C/"

• An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain

business which the statute prior to its amendment does

not ta, may not be applied retroacti!ely so as to

re.uire payment of the ta on such business for the

period prior to the amendment

%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank

• Issue can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his

bac1pay certificate in payment of his indebtedness to

the ban1

• April :9, *+783 RA ;+ ga!e 'uyco the right to ha!e

said certificate applied in payment of is obligation thus

at that time he offered to pay with his bac1paycertificate$

• #une *8, *+78, RA *78 was enacted amending the

charter of the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1 shal

ha!e no authority to accept bac1pay certificate in

payment of indebtedness to the ban1$

• @eld 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are

construed as ha!ing prospecti!e operation, unless the purpose of the legislature is to gi!e them retroacti!e

effect$

• 4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA *78

does not contain any pro!ision regarding its retroacti!e

effect$ It simply states its effecti!ity upon appro!al

4he amendment therefore, has no retroacti!e effectand the present case should be go!erned by the law athe time the offer in .uestion was made

• 4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the

original act continues to be in force with regard to al

rights that had accrued prior to such amendment$

/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank

• Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the

basis of the law then pre!ailing, the amendment of said

law will not affect the terms of said contract$

• 4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting parties

is the go!ernment

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

Procedural laws

• 4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e

effect$

• Eceptions

o procedural laws

o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e

operation

• Procedural laws

o ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and

forms of procedure of enforcing rights o

obtaining redress for their in!asiono they refer to rules of procedure by which

courts applying laws of all 1inds can properly

administer in2ustice

o they include rules of pleadings, practice and

e!idence

o Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide o

regulate the steps by which one who commitsa crime is to be punished$

o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to

modes of procedure3 which do not create new

or ta1e away !ested rights, but only operate in



furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of

the rights already eisting, do not come

within the legal conception of a retroacti!e

law, or the general rule against the retroacti!e

operation of statutes$

o A new statute which deals with procedure

only is presumpti!ely applicable to all actions

0 those which ha!e accrued or are pending$

o %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts

will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their

passage$

• 4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is not

o !iolati!e of any right of a person who may

feel that he is ad!ersely affectedH

o nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$

• "ationa#e no !ested right may attach to, nor arise

from, procedural laws$

• A person has no !ested right in any particular remedy,

and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the

trial of his case, whether ci!il or criminal, of any other

than the eisting rules of procedure

A#day v. Cami##on

• Pro!ision 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be

re.uired to ta1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature and

should be applied retroacti!ely"

• Issue Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment

should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a

record on appeal within -6 days as re.uired under the

old rules$

• %uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time the 'P'lg too1 effect, became academic upon effecti!ity of

said law because the law no longer re.uires the filing a

of a record on appeal and its retroacti!e application

remo!ed the legal obstacle to gi!ing due course to theappeal$

Castro v. Saga#es

• A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try certain

cases from a court to a .uasi32udicial tribunal is aremedial statute that is applicable to claims that

accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed

after it too1 effect$

• @eld 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim at the

time it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim where at the

time the claim is formulated and filed, the 2urisdiction

to try it has been transferred by law to a .uasi32udicial

tribunal$• "ationa#e for e!en actions pending in one court may

be !alidly be ta1en away and transferred to another

and no litigant can ac.uire a !ested right to be heard

by one particular court$

• An administrati!e rule which is interpretati!e of a pre3

eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain rightswith obligations thereunder is gi!en retroacti!e effect

as of the date of the effecti!ity of the statute$

At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA

• Issue whether a trial court has been di!ested o

2urisdiction to hear and decide a pending case

in!ol!ing a mining contro!ersy upon the promulgation

of PD *:;* which !ests upon the 'ureau of )ines

Original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide

mining contro!ersies$

• @eld Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$

• It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights thaare already !ested$ It only operates in furtherance of a

remedy or confirmation of rights already in eistence$• It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a

prospecti!e law$ As such, it can be gi!en retrospecti!e

application of statutes$

• 'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions

pending at the time of its enactment ecept only with

respect to those cases which had already attained hcharacter of a final and eecutor 2udgment$

• Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to

facilitate the immediate resolution of mining

contro!ersies by granting 2urisdiction to a body o

agency more adept to the technical compleities of

mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered

meaningless$• Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be permitted

to choose a forum of con!enience$

• #urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the

parties to such proceedings$

• /urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under a

well3accepted principle in stat con, the special law wil

pre!ail o!er a stature or law of general application$

S%bido 6r. v. Sandiganbayan

• &ourt ruled that RA +7, in further amending PD

*868 as regards the %andiganbayans 2urisdiction

mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, i

clearly a procedural law, i.e. one which prescribesrules and forms of procedure enforcing rights o

obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those whichrefer to rules of procedure by which courts applying

laws of all 1inds can properly administer 2ustice$

• 4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e or

remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the

means of enforcing eisting obligations$

• As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA +7 may

!alidly be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there being no

impairment of contractual or !ested rights$

Martine' v. Peop#e

• %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will beconstrued as applicable to actions pending and

undermined at the time of their passage$

• Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules of

&ourt Ba petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper

shall not be entertained by the appellate courtC

• 4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting thesentence implies that the appellate court is no longer

prohibited from entertaining petitions to appear as

pauper litigants, and may grant the petition then

pending action, so long as its re.uirements are

complied with$



Eceptions to the rule

• 4he rule does not apply where

o the statute itself epressly or by necessary

implication pro!ides that pending actions are

ecepted from it operation, or where to apply

it to pending proceedings would impair

!ested rightso &ourts may deny the retroacti!e application

of procedural laws in the e!ent that to do sowould not be feasible or would wor1

in2ustice$

o 5or may procedural laws be applied

retroacti!ely to pending actions if to do so

would in!ol!e intricate problems of due

process or impair the independence of the

courts$

Tayag v. CA

• Issue whether an action for recognition filed by an

illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent

when Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in effect and

has remained pending Art *7 of the /amily &ode too1effect can still be prosecuted considering that Art *7,

which is claimed to be procedural in nature and

retroacti!e in application, does not allow filing of the

action after the death of the alleged parent$

• @eld 4he rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings,

unless the language of the act ecludes them from its

operation, is not so per!asi!e that it may be used to

!alidate or in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes

into effect, since procedure must be go!erned by the

law regulating it at the time the .uestion of procedure

arises especially where !ested rights maybe

pre2udiced$

• Accordingly, Art *7 of the /amily &ode finds no proper application to the instant case since it will

ineluctably affect ad!ersely a right of pri!ate

respondent and, conse.uentially, of the minor child she

represents, both of which ha!e been !ested with the

filing of the complaint in court$ 4he trial court is,

therefore, correct in applying the pro!isions of Art :;7

of the &i!il &ode and in holding that pri!ate

respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed$C

&urati!e statutes

• curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts

• they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the

means of enforcing eisting obligations

• the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing omitted

or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect

sought to be remo!ed or made harmless, is something

which the legislature might ha!e dispensed with by a pre!ious statute, it may do so by a subse.uent one

• curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects,

abridge superfluities in eisting laws, and curb certain

e!ils$ 4hey are designed and intended, but has failed

of epected legal conse.uence by reason of some

statutory disability or irregularity in their own action$

4hey ma1e !alid that which, before the enactment of

the statute, was in!alid$

• 4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done tha

would ha!e been in!alid under eisting laws, as i

eisting laws ha!e been complied with

Friva#do v. COMELEC

• (rested the definition of curati!e statutes"

•

4olentinoo those which underta1e to cure errors?

irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicia

2udicial or administrati!e proceedings, acts of

public officers, or pri!ate deeds or contract

which otherwise would not produce thei

intended conse.uences by reason of some

statutory disability or failure to comply with

some technical re.uirement

• Agpalo

o curati!e statutes are healing acts curing

defects and adding to the means of enforcing

eisting obligationso and are intended to supply defects abridge

superfluities in eisting laws? curb certain

e!ils

o by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are

retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past e!ents

to correct errors or irregularities ? to render!alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would

be otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the

parties intended

• &urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e legislations

which reach bac1 on past e!ents to correct errors or

irregularities ? to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted

acts which would be otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended$

Erectors /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner"

• %tatute EO ***, amended Art :* of the Labor &ode

to widen the wor1ers, access to the go!ernment for

redress of grie!ances by gi!ing the Regional Directors

? the Labor Arbiters concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases

in!ol!ing money claims

• Issue Amendment created a situation where the

2urisdiction of the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$

• Remedy RA 8*7further amended Art :* by

delineating their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder RA8*7, the RD has eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er cases

in!ol!ing claims, pro!idedo the claim is presented by an employer o

person employed in domestic or household

ser!ices or household help under the &ode$

o the claimant no longer being employed doe

not see1 reinstatement

o the aggregate money claim of the employee

or househelper doesnt eceed P7,666$

All other cases are within the eclusi!e 2urisdiction ofthe Labor Arbiter$

• @eld EO *** ? RA 8*7 are therefore curati!e

statutes$



• A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior

law or to !alidate legal proceedings, instruments or

acts of public authorities which would otherwise be

!oid for want of conformity with certain eisting legal

re.uirements

Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee

• %tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid or

in!alid marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en

retroacti!e effect$

Santos v. D%ata

• %tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall presumed

an e.uitable mortgage in any of the cases therein

enumerated, and designed primarily to curtail e!ils

brought about by contracts of sale with right ofrepurchase, is remedial in nature ? will be applied

retroacti!ely to cases arising prior to the effecti!ity of

the statute$

•

Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc.

•

Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter hasno 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a subse.uent

statute clothes it with 2urisdiction before the matter is

decided$

• 4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with

retroacti!e operation to pending proceedings and cures

the defect of lac1 of 2urisdiction of the court at thecommencement of the action$

Legarda v. Masaganda

• Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court has

rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is naturally !oid

as the court has at the time no 2urisdiction o!er the

sub2ect of the action, the enactment of the statute

conferring 2urisdiction to the court does not !alidatethe !oid 2udgment for the legislature has no power to

ma1e a 2udgment rendered without 2urisdiction of a

!alid 2udgment$

Friva#do v. COMELEC

• (an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as well as

one which creates new rights ? new remedies,

generally held to e retroacti!e in nature3 PD :7,

which liberalies the procedure of repatriation"

• @eld PD :7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino

citienship by administrati!e repatriation pursuant to

said decree is retroacti!e$

De Castro v. Tan

• @eld what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in

Friva#do is not only the law itself but also Phil$

&itienship re3ac.uired pursuant to said law to the date

of application for repatriation, which meant that his

lac1 of /ilipino citienship at the time he registered as

a !oter, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor, or atthe time he filed his certificate of candidacy for

go!ernorship, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor,

was cured by the retroacti!e application of his

repatriation$

"ep%b#ic v. Atencio

• &urati!e statute one which confirms, refines and

!alidate the sale or transfer of a public land awarded to

a grantee, which a prior law prohibits its sale within a

certain period ? otherwise in!alid transaction underthe old law$

M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso H%e'on v. Mende'

• %tatute %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment &ode of

*++*, pro!ides that municipal districts organied

pursuant to presidential issuances or eecuti!e order

? which ha!e their respecti!e sets of electi!e

municipal officials holding at the time of the

effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth be consideredas a regular municipalities

• 4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the creation o

municipalities by EO which had been held to be an

in!alid usurpation of legislati!e power$

Tatad v. ,arcia 6r.

• Issue Ghere there is doubt as to whether go!ernmen

agency under the then eisting law, has the authority toenter intoa negotiated contract for the construction of a

go!ernment pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfer

scheme

• @eld 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute which

recognies direct negotiation of contracts under such

arrangement is a curati!e statute$

• As all doubts and procedural lapses that might ha!e

attended the negotiated contract ha!e been cured bythe subse.uent statute

Limitations of rule

• remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e effect if

to do so would impair the obligations of contract or

disturb !ested rights

• only administrati!e or curati!e features of the statute

as will not ad!ersely affect eisting rights will be

gi!en retroacti!e operation

• the eception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is

a remedial or curati!e statute which is enacted as a

police power measure

• %tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e effec

e!en though they impair !ested rights or the

obligations of contract, if the legislati!e intent is to

gi!e them retrospecti!e operation• "ationa#e 4he constitutional restriction agains

impairment against obligations of contract or !ested

rights does not preclude the legislature from enacting

statutes in the eercise of its police power

Police power legislations

• as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the eercise of

police power to regulate certain acti!ities, are

applicable not only to those acti!ities or transactions

coming into being after their passage, but also to those

already in eistence



• "ationa#e the non3impairment of the obligations of

contract or of !ested rights must yield to the legitimate

eercise of power, by the legislature, to prescriberegulations to promote the health, morals, peace,

education, good order, safety and general welfare of

the people

• Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a contract

is sub2ect to the condition that it may be impaired by

the state in the legitimate eercise of its police power,

since the reser!ation of the essential attributes ofso!ereign power is deemed read into e!ery statute or

contract as a postulate of the legal order

%tatutes relating to prescription

• Keneral rule a statute relating to prescription of

action, being procedural in nature, applies to all

actions filed after its effecti!ity$ In other words, such a

statute is both

o prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to

causes that accrued and will accrue after it

too1 effect, ando retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to

causes that accrued before its passage• @owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!en

retroacti!e operation to causes of action that accrued

prior to its enactment if to do so will remo!e a bar of

limitation which has become complete or disturb

eisting claims without allowing a reasonable time to

bring actions thereon

+agrampa v. +agrampa

• %tatute Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &ode Bprescription

already running before the effecti!ity of this &ode

shall be go!erned by laws pre!iously in forceH but if

since the time this &ode too1 effect the entire period

herein re.uired for prescription should elapse, the present &ode shall be applicable e!en though by the

former laws a longer period might be re.uired$C

• @eld 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied to a

cause that accrued prior to its effecti!ity which whenfiled has prescribed under the new &i!il &ode e!en

though the period of prescription prescribed under the

old law has not ended at the time the action is filed in

court

• 4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the

statute relating to prescription should be gi!en

retroacti!e effect will not warrant gi!ing it if it willimpair !ested rights

• %tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period to filean action than that specified under the law may not be

construed as ha!ing retroacti!e application if it will

re!i!e the cause that already prescribed under the old

statute for it will impair !ested rights against whom the

cause is asserted$

• %tatute which shorten the period of prescription ?

re.uires that causes which accrued prior to its

effecti!ity be prosecuted or filed not later than aspecific date may not be construed to apply to eisting

causes which pursuant to the old law under which they

accrued, will not prescribe until a much longer period

than that specified in the later enactment because the

right to bring an action is founded on law which has

become !ested before the passage of the new statute o

limitations

Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription

i##ones v. C/"

• Issue whether %ec$ A of &ommon wealth Act *99

amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany action to

enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of ;ages orovertime compensation under this Act shall becommenced within - years after such cause of action

accrued, otherwise it shall be fore!er barred$ Provided

*o;ever that actions already commenced before the

effecti!e day of this Act shall not be affected by the

period herein prescribed$

• As statute shortened the period of prescription from 8

to - yrs$ from the date the cause of action accrued, i

was contended that to gi!e retroacti!e effect would

impair !ested rights since it would operate to precludethe prosecution of claims that accrued more than - bu

less than 8 yrs$

•

@eld a statute of limitations is procedural in natureand no !ested right can attach thereto or arise

therefrom$

• Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions already

commenced before the effecti!ity of this Act shall no

be affected by the period herein prescribed,C iintended to apply the statute to all eisting actions filed

after the effecti!ity of the law$

• 'ecause the statute shortened the period within which

to bring an action ? in order to !iolate the

constitutional mandate, claimants are in2uriously

affected should ha!e a reasonable period of * yr$ from

time new statute too1 effect within which to sue on

such claims$

Cora#es v. Emp#oyees Compensation Commission

• %ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a differen

conclusion$

• Issue Ghether a claim for wor1mens compensation

which accrued under the old Gor1mens

&ompensation Act (G&A" but filed under after )arch

-*, *+7 is barred by the pro!ision of the 5ew Labor

&ode which repealed the G&A$

• G&A re.uires that Bwor1mens compensation claimsaccruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be

filed with the appropriate regional offices of the

Department of Labor not later than )arch -*, *+7otherwise shall be barred fore!er$C

• @eld Pro!ision doesnt apply to wor1mens

compensation that accrued before Labor &ode too1

effect, e!en if claims were not filed not later than

)arch -*, *+7$

• "ationa#e prescripti!e period for claims which

accrued under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is Ba

right found on statuteC ? hence a !ested right, that

cannot be impaired by the retroacti!e application of

the Labor &ode$



&omparison of 'illones and &orales

'illones

Ghile &ourt said that such

right to bring an action

accrued under the old law is

not !ested right, it did not say

that the right is one protected

by the due process clause of

the &onstitution$

/or 'O4@ cases In sol!ing

how to safeguard the right to

bring action whose

prescripti!e period to institute

it has been shortened by law

Ka!e the claimants whose

rights ha!e been affected, oneyear from the date the law

too1 effect within which to

sue their claims$

&orales

&ourt considered the right to

prosecute the action that

accrued under the old law as

one founded on law ? a

!ested right$

&ourt construed the statute of

limitations as inapplicable to

the action that accrued before

the law too1 effect$

(It is generally held that the

court has no power to read

into the law something whichthe law itself did not pro!ide

epressly or impliedly$

Cora#es case seems to be on

firmer grounds$

Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases

• Keneral rule laws on prescription of actions apply as

well to crimes committed before the enactment as

afterwards$ 4here is, howe!er, a distinction between a

statute of limitations in criminal actions and that of

limitations in ci!il suits, as regards their construction$

• In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the legislature as

an impartial arbiter, between two contending parties$In the construction of such statute, there is no

intendment to be made in fa!or of either party$ 5either

grants right to the otherH there is therefore no grantor

against whom no ordinary presumptions of

construction are to be made$

• &RI)I5AL &A%E% the state is the grantor,surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute or

declare that the offense is no longer sub2ect of

prosecution after the prescripti!e period$ %uch statutesare not only liberally construed but are applied

retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$

%tatutes relating to appeals

• 4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment, other

than that which the &onstitution grants, is statutory and

may be restricted or ta1en away

• A statute relating to appeals is remedial or proceduralin nature and applies to pending actions in which no

2udgment has yet been promulgated at the time thestatute too1 effect$

• %uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er be

construed retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested rights$

@ence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal

and considers the 2udgment rendered in a case final

and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a

decision rendered after the statute went into effect, but 5O4 the right to prosecute an appeal that has been

perfected before the passage of the law, for in the latter

case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become

!ested under the old law and may not therefore be

impaired$

• %tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is to be

gi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be applies to

pending proceedings in which 2udgment has already

been rendered at the time of its enactment ecept i

theres clear legislati!e intent$

er#iner v. "oberts

•

Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing appealsform thirty days to fifteen days from notice o

2udgment, an appeal ta1en within thirty days bu

beyond fifteen days from notice of 2udgmen

promulgated before the statute too1 effect is deemed

seasonably perfected$

CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on an"

Re#ea'

AMENDMENT

♥ Power to Amend

4he legislature has the authority to amend, sub2ect to

constitutional re.uirements, any eisting law$

Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power to

enact, alter and repeal laws$

4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power or of

its power to interpret the law, has no authority to

amend or change the law, such authority being the

eclusi!e to the legislature$

♥ @ow amendment effected

Amendment 0 the change or modification, by deletionalteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in its amended

form$

4he amendment of a statute is effected by theenactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering

some pro!isions of a statute either epressly o

impliedly$

Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the

amendatory act that specific sections or pro!isions of a

statute be amended as recited therein or as common

indicated, Bto read as follows$C

♥ Amendment by implication

E!ery statute should be harmonied with other laws on

the same sub2ect, in the absence of a clea

inconsistency$

Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the samesub2ect is shown by a statement in the later act that any

pro!ision of law that is inconsistent therewith is

modified accordingly$

Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior statute

embracing the same sub2ect as the later may not be

enforced without nullifying the pertinent pro!ision o

the latter in which e!ent, the prior act is deemed

amended or modified to the etent of repugnancy$

H%impo v. Mendo'a

Ghere a statute which re.uires that the annuarealty ta on lands or buildings be paid on or



before the specified date, sub2ect to penalty of a

percentage of the whole amount of ta in case of

delayed payment, is amended by authoriing

payment of the ta in four e.ual installments to

become due on or before specified dates$

4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is

modified by implication that the penalty for late

payment of an installment under the later law will be collected and computed only on the installment

that became due and unpaid, and not on the whole

amount of annual ta as pro!ided in the old

statute$

Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear when

the later law allowed payment in four installments$

Peop#e v. Macatanda

A statute punishing an act which is also a crime

under the RP& pro!ides a penalty as prescribed in

the said &ode, such statute is not a special law but

an amendment by implication$

♥ Ghen amendment ta1es effect

*7 days following its publication in the OfficialKaette or newspaper of general circulation, unless adate is specified therein after such publication$

♥ @ow amendment is construed, generally

%tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole

Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the

original statute has been repealed and a new

independent act in the amended form had been

adopted$

Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been

originally enacted in it amended form$

Read in a connection with other sections as if all had

been enacted in the same statute$ Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of an act

unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with

the same meaning and effect they ha!e before the

amendment$

Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an eisting

statute shall be amended to read as recited in the

amendatory act, such portions of the eisting law asare retained either literally or substantially

Estrada v. Caseda

Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall be in

force for a period of four years after its appro!al,

the four years is to be counted from the date theoriginal statute was appro!ed and not from thedate the amendatory act was amended$

♥ )eaning of law changed by amendment

An amended act should be gi!en a construction

different from the law prior to its amendment, for its is

presumed that the legislature would not ha!e amended

it had not it not wanted to change its meaning$

Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute

had a different meaning which the amendmentchanged in all the particulars touching which a

material change in the language of the later act eists$

Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act

different from that of the original act indicates that the

legislature intended a change in the law or in it

meaning$

2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS

A statutory definition of term containing a generarule and an eception thereto is amended by

eliminating the eception, the legislati!e intent is

clear that the term should now include theeception within the scope of the general rule$

Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions

%ection of a statute re.uiring the eact payment of

publication fees in land registration proceedings

ecept in cases where the !alue of the land doesnot eceed P76,666 is amended by deleting the

ecepting clause, it means that the statute as

amended now re.uires payment of the publication

fees regardless of the !alue of the land in!ol!ed

%uppression of the ecepting clause amount to the

withdrawal of the eemption allowed under the

original act$

♥ Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely

An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a

retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided or the

legislati!e intent to gi!e it a retroacti!e effect i

necessarily implied from the language used and only if

no !ested right is impaired$

/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e

A statute amending a ta law is silent as towhether it operates retroacti!ely, the amendmen

will not be gi!ing retroacti!e effect so as to

sub2ect to ta past transactions not sub2ect to ta

under the original act$

Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s

%tatutes relating to procedure in courts areapplicable to actions pending and undetermined a

the time of their passage$

♥ Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights

After a statute is amended, the original act continues to

be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were

contracted under the prior act and such rights andobligations will continue to be go!erned by the law

before its amendment$

5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such rights$

♥ Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction

#urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the

law in force at the time the action is instituted$

#urisdiction remains with the court until the case isfinally decided therein$



"i##aro'a v. Arciaga

Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the

contrary, a subse.uent statute amending a prior act

with the effect of di!esting the court of

2urisdiction may not be construed to operate but to

oust 2urisdiction that has already attached under

the prior law$

/b%raan v. Labes

Ghere a court originally obtains and eercises 2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting law, such

2urisdiction will not be o!erturned and impaired

by the subse.uent amendment of the law, unless

epress prohibitory words or words of similar

import are used$

Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies

Erectors /nc v. +L"C

PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with

original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases

in!ol!ing employer3employee relations, including

money claims arising out of any law or contract

in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for o!erseas

employment

/acts An o!erseas wor1er filed a money claimagainst his recruiter, and while the case is

pending, EO + was enacted, which !ested

POEA with original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction

o!er all cases, including money claims, arising out

of law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for

o!erseas employment$

Issue whether the decision of the labor arbiter infa!or of the o!erseas wor1er was in!alid

@eld the court sustained the !alidity of the

decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still hadthe authority to decide the cease because EO +b

did not di!est the labor arbiter his authority to

hear and decide the case filed by the o!erseas

wor1er prior to its effecti!ity$

#urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is determined

by the law in force at the time of the

commencement of the actionH laws should only beapplied prospecti!ely unless the legislati!e intent

to gi!e them retroacti!e effect is epressly

declared or is necessarily implied from the

language used$

♥ Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act

Ghere a statute which has been amended is in!alid,

nothing in effect has been amended

4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will beconsidered as an original or independent act$

,overnment v. Agonci##o

Ghere the amendatory act is declared

unconstitutional, it is as if the amendment did not

eist, and the original statute before the attempted

amend remains unaffected and in force$

REVISION AND CODIFICATION

♥ Kenerally

Purpose to restate the eisting laws into one statute

and simply complicated pro!isions, and ma1e the laws

on the sub2ect easily found$

♥ &onstruction to harmonie different pro!isions

Presumption author has maintained a consisted philosophy or position$

4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or code

should be read and construed together$ Rule a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e

statute, and is to be considered as such and not as a

series of disconnected articles or pro!isions$

Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto#

A irreconcilable conflict between parts of are!ised statute or a code, that which is best in

accord with the general plan or, in the absence of

circumstances upon which to base a choice, that

which is later in physical position, being the lates

epression of legislati!e will, will pre!ail$

♥ Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are omitted

in the re!ised statute or code are deemed repealed

unless the statute or code pro!ides otherwise

Reason re!ision or codification is, by its !ery nature

and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on

the sub2ect and an epression of the whole law

thereon, which thereby indicates intent on the part o

the legislature to abrogate those pro!isions of the old

laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute or

code$

Possible only if the re!ised statute or code wasintended to co!er the whole sub2ect to is a complete

and perfect system in itself$ Rule a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a prior

law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of

the former statute$

Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of

a repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of the prior ac

that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemedrepealed$

Mecano v. Commission on A%dit

&laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment officia

of medical and hospitaliation epenses pursuan

to %ection 8++ of the Re!ised Administration

&ode of *+*, which authories the head of officeto case a reimbursement of payment of medica

and hospital epenses of a go!ernment official incase of sic1ness or in2ury caused by or connected

directly with the performance of his official duty$

&oA denied the claim on the ground that A& of

*+; which re!ised the old A&, repealed %ec$ 8++

because it was omitted the re!ised code$

%& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in

enacting the new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of the

old code$



BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or

portions thereof, inconsistent with this &ode are

hereby repealed or modified accordingly$C

5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as the

new &ode fails to identify or designate the act to

be repealed$

4wo categories of repeal by implication

Pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect

matter that are in irreconcilable conflict$

[ Later act to the etent of the conflictconstitutes an implied repeal of the earlier

If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the

earlier one and is clearly intended as a statute, it

will operate to repeal the earlier law$

4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two

codes on the matter of sic1ness benefits because the

pro!ision has not been restated in the 5ew &ode$

4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only those

aspects of go!ernment that pertain to administration,

organiation and procedure, and understandably

because of the many changes that transpired in the

go!ernment structure since the enactment of the old

code$

♥ &hange in phraseology

It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision orcodification of statutes, neither an alteration in

phraseology nor the admission or addition of words in

the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the

construction of the former acts$

Gords which do not materially affect the sense will be

omitted from the statute as incorporated in the re!ise

statute or code, or that some general idea will beepressed in brief phrases$

If there has been a material change or omission, which

clearly indicates an intent to depart from the pre!iousconstruction of the old laws, then such construction as

will effectuate such intent will be adopted$

♥ &ontinuation of eisting laws$

A codification should be construed as the continuation

of the eisting statutes$

4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as itformerly eisted$

4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or

the placing of portions of what formerly was a single

section in seprate sections, does not operate to change

the operation, effect of meaning of the statute, unless

the changes are of such nature as to manifest clearlyand unmista1ably a legislati!e intent to change theformer laws$

REPEAL

♥ Power to repeal

Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to

enact one$

4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact

irrepealable laws or limit its future legislati!e acts$

♥ Repeal, generally

Repeal total or partial, epress or implied

4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely

Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of the

statute in force$

A particular or specific law, identified by its number o

title, is repealed is an epress repeal$

All other repeals are implied repeals$

/ailure to add a specific repealing clause indicates tha

the intent was not to repeal any eisting law, unless anirreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy eist in

the terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls

under the category of an implied repeal$

Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent laws$

4he change in the condition and circumstances after

the passage of a law which is necessitated theenactment of a statute to o!ercome the difficultie

brought about by such change does not operate to

repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the later statute so

inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it$

♥ Repeal by implication

Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals anintention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a

prior act on the sub2ect, that intention must be gi!en

effect$

4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the legislati!e

intent to repeal$

Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest

Keneral rule the latter act is to be construed as a

continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as

the two acts are the same, from the time of the firs

enactment$

4wo categories of repeals by implication

Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same

sub2ect matter are in an irreconcilable conflict andthe later act to the etent of the conflict constitute

an implied repeal of the earlier$

If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the

earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute

it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier

act$

♥ Irreconcilable inconsistency

Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable

repugnancy between two laws ta1es place when the

two statutes co!er the same sub2ect matterH they are so

clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other

that they cannot be reconciled or harmonied and bothcannot be gi!en effect, once cannot be enforcedwithout nullifying the other$

Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should

embrace the same sub2ect and ha!e the same ob2ect$

In order to effect a repeal by implication, the late

statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and

repugnant with the eisting law that they cannot be

made to reconcile and stand together$

It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to eist

that is be shown that the statutes or statutory



pro!isions deal with the same sub2ect matter and that

the latter be inconsistent with the former$

the fact that the terms of an earlier and later pro!isions

of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to

constitute the later an implied repeal of the former$

Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s

/act that %ec :; of RA *88 pertaining tocan!assing by boards of can!assers is silent as to

how the board of can!assers shall prepare the

certificate of can!ass and as to what will be its basis, w=c details are pro!ided in the second

paragraph of %ec:-* of the Omnibus Election

&ode, an earlier statute, Brespecti!e boards of

can!assers shall prepare a certificate of can!ass

duly signed and affied with the imprint of the

thumb of the right hand of each member,

supported by a statement of the !otes and recei!ed by each candidate in each polling place and on the

basis thereof shall proclaim as elected the

candidates who obtained the highest number of

!otes coast in the pro!inces, city, municipality or

barangay, and failure to comply with this

re.uirement shall constitute an election offenseC

Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of%ec :-* of OE& and render the failure to comply

with the re.uirement no longer an electionoffense$

Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws

embracing the same sub2ect may also eist when the

later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier

act, so that the latter law loses all meaning and

function$

Smit* e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a

A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act

where the reason for the earlier act is beyond

perad!enture remo!ed$

Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule that

in the science of 2urisprudence, two inconsistent laws

on the same sub2ect cannot co3eist in one 2urisdiction$

4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same

sub2ect$ Either reconciled or later repeals prior law$

Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later

law repeals the prior law on the sub2ect which isrepugnant thereto"

Mecano v. Commission on A%dit Issue whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised

Administrati!e &ode has been repealed by the

*+; Administrati!e &ode$

*+; Administration &ode pro!ides that BAll

laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this code are

hereby repealed or modified accordingly

&ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal %ec

8++

[ Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency

ta1es place when two statutes co!er the same

sub2ect matter, they are so clearly inconsistent

and incompatible with each other that they

cannot be reconciled or harmonied, and both

cannot be gi!en effect, that one law cannot be

enforced without nullifying the other$

[ 4he new &ode does not co!er not attempt to

the co!er the entire sub2ect matter of the old

&ode$[ 4here are se!eral matters treated in the old

&ode that are not found in the new &ode

(pro!isions on notary publicH lea!e law

public bonding law, military reser!ations

claims for sic1ness benefits under section 8++

and others"

[ &oA failed to demonstrate that the pro!isions

of the two &odes on the matter of the sub2ect

claim are in an irreconcilable conflict$

[ 4here can no conflict because the pro!isionon sic1ness benefits of the nature being

claimed by petitioner has not been restated in

old &ode$

[ 4he contention is untenable$

[ 4he fact that a later enactment may relate to

the same sub2ect matter as that of an earlier

statute is not of itself sufficient to cause animplied repeal of the prior act new statutemay merely be cumulati!e or a continuation

of the old one$

[ %econd &ategory possible only if the re!ised

statute or code was intended to co!er the

whole sub2ect to be a complete and perfec

system in itself$

♦ Rule a subse.uent is deemed to repeal a

prior law if the former re!ises the whole

sub2ect matter of the former statute$[ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the

idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro!isions

of the prior act that are omitted from there!ised act are deemed repealed$

[ 'efore there can be an implied repeal under

this category, it must be the clear intent of the

legislature that later act be the substitute of

the prior act$[ Opinion - s$*++* of the %ecretary of #ustice

what appears clear is the intent to co!er only

those aspects of go!ernment that pertain to

administration, organiation and procedure

understandably because of the many changes

that transpired in the go!ernment structure

since the enactment of RA&$

[ Repeals of statutes by implication are nofa!ored$ Presumption is against the

inconsistency and repugnancy for thelegislature is presumed to 1now the eisting

laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted

inconsistent or conflicting statutes$

Ty v. Trampe

Issue whether PD +:* on real estate taes has

been repealed impliedly by RA *86, otherwise1now as the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++* on

the same sub2ect$

@eld that there has been no implied repeal



&ourt it is clear that the two law are not

coetensi!e and mutually inclusi!e in their scope

and purpose$

[ RA *86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental

functions delegated to local go!ernment units

all o!er the country$

[ PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan )anila

Area and is limited to the administration offinancial ser!ices therein$

[ %ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule of

!alues of real properties in the )etropolitan

)anila Area shall be prepared 2ointly by the

city assessors states that the schedules shall

be prepared by the pro!incial, city and

municipal assessors of the municipalities

within )etropolitan )anila Area for thedifferent classes of real property situated in

their respecti!e local go!ernment units for

enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian

concerned$

!agad v. ,o'oDado#e

%ec$*+ RA 886, the Ombudsman Act grants

disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to

discipline electi!e and appointi!e officials, eceptthose impeachable officers, has been repealed, RA

*86, the Local Ko!ernment &ode, insofar as

local electi!e officials in the !arious officials

therein named$

@eld both laws should be gi!en effect because

there is nothing in the Local Ko!ernment &ode to

indicate that it has repealed, whether epressly or

impliedly$

[ 4he two statutes on the specific matter in.uestion are not so inconsistent, let alone

irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold one

and stri1e down the other$[ 4wo laws must be incompatible, and a clear

finding thereof must surface, before the

inference of implied repeal may be drawn$

[ /nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s est

optim%s interpretandi mod%s i. e (e!ery

statute must be so construed and harmonied

with other statutes as to form uniform system

of 2urisprudence$[ the legislature should be presumed to ha!e

1nown the eisting laws on the sub2ect andnot to ha!e enacted conflicting statutes$

/nitia 6r v. CoA implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is

an irreconcilable inconsistency between two

pro!isions or laws is RA -79 in relation to PD

*7+$[ RA -79 0 in part of the Postmaster Keneral,

sub2ect to the appro!al of the 'oard of

Directors of the Philippines Postal

&orporation, shall ha!e the power to

Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the

number of personnel, define their duties and

responsibilities, and fi their salaries and

emoluments in accordance with the appro!ed

compensation structure of the &orporation$C

[ %ec$8 PD *7+ 0 B eemptions

notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the

President, through the 'udget &ommission

on their position classification and

compensation plans, policies, rates and otherrelated details following such specifications

as may be prescribed by the President$C

Issue whether %ec8 of PD*7+, the two law

being reconcilable$

Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation i

allowed to fi its own personnel compensation

structure through its board of directors, the latter

is re.uired to follow certain standards in

formulating said compensation system, and the

role of D') is merely to ensure that the actionta1en by the board of directors complies the

re.uirements of the law$

Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e

%ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: illustrates

repeal by implication$

[ %ec -(a" pro!ides Bno increase in tuition oother school fees or charges shall be appro!ed

unless 86N of the proceed is allocated toincrease in salaries or wages of the member

of the faculty$C

[ 'P :-: Beach pri!ate school shall determine

its rate of tuition and other school fees or

charges$ 4he rates or charges adopted by

schools pursuant to this pro!ision shall be

collectible, and their application or use

authoried, sub2ect to rules and regulations promulgated by the )inistry of Education

&ulture and %ports$C

Issue whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedlyrepealed %ec$ -(a" of PD 97*

@eld there was implied repeal because there are

irreconcilable differences between the two laws$

♥ Implied repeal by re!ision or codification

Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e declaration tha

whate!er is embraced in the new statute shall pre!ai

and whate!er is ecluded there from shall be

discarded$

)ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a

complete and perfect system in itself in order that the

prior statutes or part thereof which are not repeated in

the new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed$

Peop#e v. en%ya

Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of legislati!e

acts on the same sub2ect are re!ised o

consolidated into one, co!ering the entire field o

sub2ect matter, all parts and pro!isions of the

former act or acts

[ that are omitted from the re!ised act are

deemed repealed$

6oa$%in v. +avarro



Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the

eclusi!e rule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals by

implication the old law on the same sub2ect,

Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole sub2ect

matter of an old law and adds new pro!isions and

ma1es changes, and where such law, whether it be

in the form of an amendment or otherwise, ise!idently intended to be a re!ision of the old act,

it repeals the old act by implication$

Peop#e v. A#m%ete

Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by the

Agricultural Land Reform &ode$

%ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful

for either the tenant or landlord without mutual

consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at

any time pre!ious to the date set, for itsthreshing$C

An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision is

pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform

&ode superseded the Agricultural 4enancy Act,

abolished share tenancy, was not reproduced in

the Agricultural Land Reform &ode$ 4he effect of such non3reenactment is a repeal of

%ection -+$

It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to

contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted

which was contained in the old act and not

included in the act as re!ised$

A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as the

substitute for it, operates to repeal the former

statute$

T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e' Issue whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3*66

Rules of &ourt, which pro!ided the appeal in

habeas corpus cases to be ta1en within 9; hours

from notice of 2udgment, has been replaced by the

*++ Rules of &i!il Procedure, which pro!ides in

%ec$ - Rule 9* thereof, that appeal from 2udgmentor final order shall be ta1en within *7 days from

receipt thereof, in !iew of the fact that the %ec$ *;

was repealed, in accordance with the well3settled

rule of statutory construction that pro!isions of an

old law that were not reproduced in the re!ision

thereof co!ering the same sub2ect are deemed

repealed and discarded

@eld %& in this case to abrogate those pro!isions

of the old laws that are not reproduced in there!ised statute or &ode$

♥ Repeal by reenactment

Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole sub2ect

in substitution of the pre!ious laws on the matter, the

latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the

reenacted law is deemed repealed$

Parras v. Land "egistration Commission

Ghere a law amends a specific section of a prior

act by pro!iding that the same is amended so as to

read as follows, which then .uotes the amended

pro!ision, what is not included in the reenactmen

is deemed repealed$

4he new statute is a substitute for the original

section and all matters in the section that areomitted in the amendment are considered

repealed$

♥ Other forms of implied repeal

4he most powerful implication of repeal is that which

arises when the later of two laws is epressed in the

form of a uni!ersal negati!e$

4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e and

negati!e statutes in regard to their repealing effectupon prior legislation$

Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal the

prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is

manifest,

A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting

pro!isions unless the contrary intention is

disclosed$ Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where i

enacts something in general term and afterwards i passes another on the same sub2ect, which though

epressed in affirmati!e language introduces specia

conditions or restrictions

4he subse.uent statute will usually be considered

as repealing by implication the former regarding

the matter co!ered by the subse.uent act$

4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from which

an eecuti!e official deri!es his authority to enforceanother pro!ision of the same law operates to repeal by

implication the latter and to depri!e the official of the

authority to enforce it$ 4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose purpose

or ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier

law on the same sub2ect which thereby depri!es it of

its reason for being, operates to repeal by implication

the prior law, e!en though the pro!isions of both laws

are not inconsistent$

♥ BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this

Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C

construed$

5ature of repealing clause

5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails to

identify or designate the act or acts that areintended to be repealed$

A clause, which predicates the intended repea

upon the condition that a substantial conflict mus be found on eisting and prior acts of the same

sub2ect matter$

4he presumption against implied repeal and the

rule on strict construction regarding implied repea

apply e proprio !igore$

Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting law

so that if repeal of particular or specific law or

laws is intended, the proper step is to so epress it



2a#de' v. T%ason

Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not be

e.ually repealed without it$

Either with or without it, the real .uestion to be

determined is whether the new statute is in

fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the prior statute on the sub2ect$

%ignificance of the repealing clause the presence of

such general repealing clause in a later statute clearlyindicates the legislati!e intent to repeal all prior

inconsistent laws on the sub2ect matter whether or not

the prior law is a special law$

A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a

prior special law on the same sub2ect, as the latter

is generally regarded as an eception to the

former$

Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent

general law, the prior special law will be deemed

repealed, as the clause is a clear legislati!e intent

to bring about that result$

♥

Repeal by implication not fa!ored Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy

and, accordingly, against implied repeal

Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on

the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or

conflicting statutes$

A construction which in effect will repeal a statute

altogether should, if possible, be re2ected$

In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has

impliedly repealed a prior law on the same sub2ect, the

doubt should be resol!ed against implied repeal$

1S v. Pa#acio

Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and willnot be decreed unless it is manifest that the

legislature so intended$

As laws are presumed to be passed with

deliberation and with full 1nowledge of all

eisting ones on the sub2ect

It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing astatute it was not intended to interfere with or

abrogate any former law relating to some matter

Fnless the repugnancy between the two is not

only irreconcilable, but also clear and con!incing,

and flowing necessarily form the language used,

the later act fully embraces the sub2ect matter of

the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier actis beyond perad!enture remo!ed$

E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts stand

and if, by any reasonable construction, they can bereconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal

of the earlier$

+APOCO" v. Angas

Illustrates the application of the principle that

repeal or amendment by implication is not

fa!ored$

Issue whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 ha

impliedly repealed or amended Art ::6+ of the

&i!il &ode

@eld in answering the issue in the negati!e, the

court ruled that repeals or e!en amendments by

implication are not fa!ored if two laws can be

fairly reconciled$ 4he statutes contemplatedifferent situations and apply to differen

transactions in!ol!ing loan or forbearance o

money, goods or credits, as well as 2udgmentrelating to such load or forbearance of money

goods, or credits, the &entral 'an1 &ircula

applies$

In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities as

damages, in connection with any delay in the

performance of an obligation other than thosein!ol!ing loan or forbearance of money, goods or

credits, Art ::6+ of the && applies

&ourts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed

another by implication and they will not ma1e such

ad2udication if they can refrain from doing so, or if

they can arri!e at another result by any construction

which is 2ust and reasonable$

&ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in orderto decide that is repeals another by implication, nor

will they adopt an interpretation leading to anad2udication of repeal by implication unless it is

ine!itable and a clear and eplicit reason thereof can

be adduced$

♥ As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails

Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (late

statute repeals prior ones which are not repugnan

thereto$"

Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e effect

ahead of the earlier law$ As between two acts, the one passed later and going

into effect earlier will pre!ail o!er one passed earlier

and going into effect later$

Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion

an act passed April *8th and in force April :*st was

held to pre!ail o!er an act passed April + th and in

effect #uly 9th of the same year$

And an act going into effect immediately has been

held to pre!ail o!er an act passed before but going

into effect later$

Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and ocontrary tenor are of e.ual theoretical application to a

particular case, the statute of later date must pre!ail

being a later epression of legislati!e will$

P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%'

As between the order of preference of credit set

forth in Articles ::9* to ::97 of the && and tha

of Article **6 of the Labor &ode, gi!ing firs

preference to unpaid wages and other monetaryclaims of labor, the former must yield to the

latter, being the law of the later enactment$



4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is the

later legislati!e will$

Presumption the lawma1ers 1new the older law

and intended to change it$

In enacting the older law, the legislators could not

ha!e 1nown the newer one and could not ha!e

intended to change what they did not 1now$

&& laws are repealed only by subse.uent ones,

not the other way around$

David v. COMELEC

%ec$ * of RA 88+ pro!ides that the term of

barangay officials who were to be elected on the

second )onday of )ay *++9 is 7 years

4he later act RA *86 %ec 9- (c" states that the

term of office of barangay officials who were to

be elected also on the :nd )onday of )ay *++9 is

- years$

4here being a clear inconsistency between the twolaws, the later law fiing the term barangay

officials at - years shall pre!ail$

♥ Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to repeal a

prior special law on the same sub2ect, unless it clearly

appears that the legislature has intended by the later

general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law$

Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when oftwo laws, one is special and the other general and this

applies e!en though the terms of the general act are

broad enough to include the matter co!ered by the

special statute$

,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general law

does not nullify a specific or special law

4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all

the circumstances of the particular case$

Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general law

the legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all

the circumstances of the particular case$

Keneral and special laws are read and construed

together, and that repugnancy between them isreconciled by constituting the special law as an

eception to the general law$

Keneral law yields to the special law in the specific

law in the specific and particular sub2ect embraced in

the latter$

Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the

special law$

♥ Application of rule

Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es

4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law is

not impliedly repealed and constitutes an

eception to the general law whene!er the

legislature failed to indicate in unmista1able terms

its intent to repeal or modify the prior special act$

+APOCO" v. Arca

Issue whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6 creating

the 5APO&OR, a go!ernment3owned corporation

and empowering it Bto sell electric power and to

fi the rates and pro!ide for the collection of the

charges for any ser!ices rendered Pro!ided, the

rates of charges shall not be sub2ect to re!ision by

the Public %er!ice Act has been repealed by RA:8 amending the Public %er!ice Act and

granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the

2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public

utilities owned or operated by the go!ernment or

go!ernment3owned corporations$

@eld a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6, pro!iding

for a particular case or class of cases, is no

repealed by a subse.uent statute, general in it

terms, li1e RA :8, although the general statuteare broad enough to include the cases embraced in

the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to

repeal$

4here appears no such legislati!e intent to repea

or abrogate the pro!isions of the earlier law$

4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the later

became RA :8, it was eplicit that the

2urisdiction conferred upon the Republic %er!ice&ommission o!er the public utilities operated by

go!ernment3owned or controlled corporations i

to be confined to the fiing of rates of such public

ser!ices

4he harnessing and then distribution and sale o

electric power to the consuming public, the

contingency intended to be met by the lega

pro!ision under consideration would not eist$

4he authority of the Public %er!ice &ommission

under RA :8 o!er the fiing of rate of charges

of public utilities owned or operated by KO&&s

can only be eercised where the charter of the

go!ernment corporation concerned does no

contain any pro!ision to the contrary$

P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e

PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to operatea railway line pursuant to Act 5o$ *9+ %ec$ *-

which read BIn consideration of the premises and

of the operation of this concession or franchise

there shall be paid by the grantee to the Philippine

Ko!ernment, annually, an amount e.ual to

one3half of one per centum of the gross earnings

of the grantee $C

%ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as amended by

RA -+, pro!ides that Bthere shall be collected inrespect to all eisting and future franchises, upon

the gross earnings or receipts from the business

co!ered by the law granting a franchise ta of 7N

of such taes, charges, and percentages as are

specified in the special charters of the corporation

upon whom suc franchises are conferred

whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isions hereof

preclude the imposition of a higher ta $



Issue whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode has

repealed %ection *- of Act *9+, stand upon a

different footing from general laws$

Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate contract

and cannot be altered nor amended ecept by

consent of all concerned, unless the right to alter

or repeal is epressly reser!ed$

Reason the legislature, in passing a specialcharter, has its attention directed to the special

facts and circumstances in the particular case ingranting a special charter, for it will not be

considered that the legislature, by adopting a

general law containing the pro!isions repugnant to

the pro!isions of the charter, and without any

mention of its intention to amend or modify the

charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify thespecial act$

4he purpose of respecting the ta rates

incorporated in the charters, as shown by the

clause$

LLDA v. CA

Issue which agency of the go!ernment, LLDA orthe towns and municipalities compromising theregion should eercise 2urisdiction o!er the

Laguna La1e and its en!irons insofar as theissuance of permits for fishery pri!ileges is

concerned$

4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that the

LLDA shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to issue

permits for the use of all surface water for any

pro2ects in or affecting the said region, including

the operation of fish pens$

RA *86 the LK& of *++* grants themunicipalities the eclusi!e authority to grant

fishery pri!ileges in municipal waters$ @eld two laws should be harmonied, and that the

LLA statute, being a special law, must be ta1en as

an eception to RA *86 a general law,

,arcia v. Pasc%a#

&ler1s of courts municipal courts shall beappointed by the municipal 2udge at the epense

of the municipality and where a later law was

enacted pro!iding that employees whose salaries

are paid out of the municipal funds shall be

appointed by the municipal mayor, the later law

cannot be said to ha!e repealed the prior law as to

!est in the municipal mayor the power to appoint

municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent lawshould be construed to comprehend only

subordinate officials of the municipality and notthose of the 2udiciary$

,ordon v. CA

A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a period of

one year within which to redeem a property sold

by the city for nonpayment of realty ta from the

date of such auction sale, being a special law, pre!ails o!er a general law granting landowners a

period of two years to ma1e the redemption$

Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es

4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for the

suspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice employees

does not apply with respect to the suspension or

remo!al of members of the local police force$

♥ Ghen special or general law repeals the other$

4here is always a partial repeal where the later act is a

special law$

2a#era v. T%ason

A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has

repealed or amended a prior special act on the

same sub2ect by implication is a .uestion o

legislati!e intent$

Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the

eplanatory note to the bill before its passage into

law, the discussions on the floor of the legislature,

Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the late

general act pro!ides that all laws or parts thereo

which are inconsistent therewith are repealed omodified accordingly

If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then

the rule that the special law will be considered as aneception to the general law does not applyH wha

applies is the rule that the special law is deemed

impliedly repealed$

A general law cannot be construed to ha!e repealed a

special law by mere implication admits of eception$

City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes

%ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of lawor local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise

ta payable by all grantees of franchise togenerate, distribute, and sell electric current for

light, heat, and power shall be :7 of their gross

receipts$

%ec$ *- of the LK& states 5otwithstanding any

eemption granted by any law or other specia

law, the pro!ince may impose a ta on business

en2oying a franchise at a rate not eceeding 76Nof *N of the gross annul receipts$

@eld the phrase is all3encompassing and clea

that the legislature intended to withdraw all ta

eemptions en2oyed by franchise holders and this

intent is made more manifest by %ec$ *+- of the

&ode, when it pro!ides that unless otherwise pro!ided in this code ta eemptions or incenti!egranted to or presently en2oyed by all persons

ecept local water districts, cooperati!es, and non3stoc1 and non3profit hospitals and educationa

institutions, are withdrawn upon the effecti!ity of

the &ode$

,aer#an v. Cat%big

Issue whether %ec$ *: of RA *6 as amended, the

&ity &harter of Dagupan &ity, which fied theminimum age .ualification for members of the



city council at :- years has been repealed by %ec$8

of RA ::7+

@eld there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *: of the

charter of Dagupan &ity because the legislati!e

intent to repeal the charter pro!ision is clear from

the fact that Dagupan &ity, unli1e some cities, is

not one of those cities epressly ecluded by the

law from its operation and from the circumstancethat it pro!ides that all acts or parts thereof which

are inconsistent therewith are repealed$

4he last statute is so broad in its terms and so

clear and eplicit in its words so as to show that it

was intended to co!er the whole sub2ect and

therefore to displace the prior statute$

agatsing v. "amire'

A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be

impliedly modified or superseded by a later

statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must

be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its

particular pro!isions$

A subse.uent general law similarly applicable to

all cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting charter

pro!ision, for the reason that a charter must not be

inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state$

%tatute remains supreme in all matters not purely

local$

A charter must yield to the constitution and

general laws of the state$

P*i#ippine /nternationa# Trading Corp v. CoA

&oA contended that the PI4& charter had beenimpliedly repealed by the %ec$ *8 RA 87;

@eld that there was implied repeal, the legislati!eintent to do so being manifest$

PI4& should now be considered as co!ered by

laws prescribing a compensation and position

classification system in the go!ernment including

RA 87;$

♥ Effects of repeal, generally

Appeal of a statute renders it inoperati!e as of the date

the repealing act ta1es effect$

Repeal is by no means e.ui!alent to a declaration that

the repealed statute is in!alid from the date of its

enactment$

4he repeal of a law does not undo the conse.uences ofthe operation of the statute while in force, unless suchresult is directed by epress language or by necessary

implication, ecept as it may affect rights which become !ested when the repealed act was in force$

"amos v. M%nicipa#ity of Daet

'P -- 1nown as the LK& was repealed by RA

*86 1nown as LK& of *++*, which too1 effect

on #anuary *, *++:$

%ec$ 7 (d" of the new code pro!ides that rights and

obligations eisting on the date of the effecti!ityof the new code and arising out of contracts or any

other source of prestation in!ol!ing a loca

go!ernment unit shall be go!erned by the origina

terms and conditions of said contracts or the law

in force at the time such rights were !ested$

♥ On 2urisdiction, generally

5either the repeal nor the eplanation of the lawdepri!es the court or administrati!e tribunal of the

authority to act on the pending action and to finally

decide it$ Keneral rule where a court or tribunal has already

ac.uired and is eercising 2urisdiction o!er a

contro!ersy, its 2urisdiction to proceed to fina

determination of the cause is not affected by the new

legislation repealing the statute which originally

conferred 2urisidiction$

Rule once the court ac.uires 2urisdiction o!er acontro!ersy, it shall continue to eercise such

2urisdiction until the final determination of the case

and it is not affected by subse.uent legislation !esting

2urisdiction o!er such proceedings in another tribuna

admits of eceptions$

Repeal or epiration of a statute under which a court ortribunal originally ac.uired 2urisdiction to try anddecide a case, does not ma1e its decision subse.uently

rendered thereon null and !oid for want of authorityunless otherwise pro!ided$

In the absence of a legislati!e intent to the contrary

the epiration or repeal of a statute does not render

legal what, under the old law, is an illegal transaction

so as to depri!e the court or tribunal the court o

tribunal of the authority to act on a case in!ol!ing such

illegal transaction$

Ghere a law declares certain importations to be illegalsub2ect to forfeiture by the &ommissioner of &ustoms

pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the epiration of the law during the

pendency of the proceedings does not di!est the

&ommissioner of &ustoms of the 2urisdiction to

continue to resol!e the case, nor does it ha!e the effec

of ma1ing the illegal importation legal or of setting

aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter$

♥ On 2urisdiction to try criminal case

Once a 2urisdiction to try a criminal case is ac.uired

that 2urisdiction remains with the court until the case is

finally determined$

A subse.uent statute amending or repealing a prior act

under which the court ac.uired 2urisdiction o!er thecase with the effect of remo!ing the courts

2urisdiction may not operate to oust 2urisdiction thahas already attached$

♥ On actions, pending or otherwise

Rule repeal of a statute defeats all actions and

proceedings, including those, which are still pending

which arose out of or are based on said statute$

4he court must conform its decision to the law then

eisting and may, therefore, re!erse a 2udgment which

was correct when pronounced in the subordinatetribunal, if it appears that pending appeal a statute



which was necessary to support the 2udgment of the

lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal$

♥ On !ested rights

repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that

accrued and became !ested under the statute before its

repeal$

4he statute should not be construed so as to affect therights which ha!e !ested under the old law then in

force, or as re.uiring the abatement of actionsinstituted for the enforcement of such rights$

Rights accrued and !ested while a statute is in force

ordinarily sur!i!e its repeal$

4he constitution forbids the state from impairing, by

enactment or repeal of a law, !ested rights or the

obligations of contract, ecept in the legitimateeercise of police power$

%yco v. P+

Ghere a statute gi!es holders of bac1pay

certificates the right to use said certificates to pay

their obligations to go!ernment financial

institutions, the repeal of the law disallowing such payment will not depri!e holders thereof whose

rights become !ested under the old law of theright to use the certificates to pay their obligations

to such financial institutions$

1n Pak Le%ng v. +igorra

A statute gi!es an appellant the right to appeal

from an ad!erse decision, the repeal of such

statute after an appellant has already perfected his

appeal will not destroy his right to prosecute the

appeal not depri!e the appellate court of theauthority to decide the appealed case$

"ep%b#ic v. Migrino

Issue whether prosecution for uneplained wealth

under RA *-+ has already prescribed$

@eld Bin his pleadings, pri!ate respondent

contends that he may no longer be prosecuted

because of the prescription$

It must be pointed out that %ec$ : RA *-+ should be deemed amended or repealed by Art$ I, %ec$

*7 of the *+; &onstitution$

♥ On contracts

Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the

basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal oramendment of said law will not affect the terms of the

contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder$

♥ Effect of repeal of ta laws

Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of statutes is

applicable to statutes which repeal ta laws$

%uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta assessed

before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to

the law in force when the assessment or le!y was

made$

♥ Effect of repeal and reenactment

%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does

not affect the rights and liabilities which ha!e accrued

under the original statute, since the reenactmen

neutralies the repeal and continues the law in force

without interruption$

4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person is

charged with !iolation thereof and its simultaneoureenactment penaliing the same act done by him

under the old law, will not preclude the accuseds

prosecution, nor depri!e the court of the 2urisdiction totry and con!ict him$

Peop#e v. A#m%ete

Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is not

simultaneous such that the continuity of the

obligation and the sanction for its !iolation formthe repealed law to the reenacted law is bro1en

the repeal carries with it the depri!ation of the

court of its authority to try, con!ict, and sentence

the person charged with !iolation of the old law to

its repeal$

♥ Effect of repeal of penal laws

Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime nolonger eists, prosecution of the person charged under

the old law cannot be had and the action should bedismissed$

Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute

and the act which was penalied by a prior law ceases

to be criminal under the new law, the pre!ious offense

is obliterated$

4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of 2urisdiction to

try, con!ict, and sentence, persons, charged with

!iolations of the old law prior to the repeal$

Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an indispensable

element in the commission of a crime as defined in theRP& li1ewise operates to depri!e the court of the

authority to decide the case, rule rests on the same

principle as that concerning the effect of a repeal of a

penal law without .ualification$

Reason the repeal of a penal law withou

dis.ualification is a legislati!e act of rendering legawhat is pre!iously decreed as illegal, so that the person

who committed it is as if he ne!er committed an

offence

Eception

where the repealing act reenacts the statute and

penalies the same act pre!iously penalied under

the repealed law, the act committed beforereenactment continues to be a crime, and pendingcases are not thereby affected$

Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing clause

pro!iding that pending actions shall not be

affected, the latter will continue to be prosecuted

in accordance with the old law$

♥ Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law

In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the

stigma of con!iction of an accused for !iolation of the penal law before its repeal is erased$



♥ Effect of repeal of municipal charter

4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and

puts an end to the functions of the incumbents$

4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by the

passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has the

effect of abolishing all municipal offices then eisting

under the old municipality offices then the eisting

under the old municipality, sa!e those ecepted in thecharter itself$

♥ Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of

Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is

itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby

re!i!ed unless epressly so pro!ided

Ghere a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional,

it will ha!e no effect of repealing the former statute,

the former or old statute continues to remain in force$

CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on

&onstitution defined

• fundamental law which sets up a form of go!ernment

and defines and delimits the powers thereof and thoseof its officers, reser!ing to the people themsel!es

plenary so!ereignty

• written charter enacted and adopted by the people by

which a go!ernment for them is established

• permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to

eisting conditions but also to future needs

• basically it is the fundamental laws for the go!ernance

and administration of a nation

• absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments

• all other laws are epected to conform to it

Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions

• *+-7 &onstitution

Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this &onstitution

came about

• 4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to adopt

a constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions prescribed

in the Act$

o Re.uired - steps

drafting and appro!al of theconstitution must be authoried

it must be certified by the President

of the F%

it must be ratified by the people of

the Philippines at a plebiscite• *+- &onstitution

o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat

the problems of the country

o )arch *8, *+8 &ongress passed Resolution

5o$:, which was amended by Resolution 5o$

9, calling a con!ention to propose

amendments to the &onstitution

• *+; &onstitution

o after ED%A Re!olution

o also 1nown as the *+; &harter

Primary purpose of constitutional construction

• primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to

ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the

constitution as epressed in its language

• purpose of our &onstitution to protect and enhance the

peoples interests

&onstitution construed as enduring for ages

• &onstitution is not merely for a few years but it alsoneeds to endure through a long lapse of ages

• WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people notonly at the time of its framing but far into the

indefinite future

• it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human affairs

but it must also be solid permanent and substantial

• Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of

the people (rich or poor"

• It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to

stand for a great length of time to be progressi!e and

not static

• Ghat it is 5O4o It should 5O4 change with emergencies or

conditionso It should 5O4 be infleibleo It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly

• Gords employed should not be construed to yield

fied and rigid answers because its meaning is applied

to meet new or changed conditions as they arise

• &ourts should construe the constitution so that it would

be consistent with reason, 2ustice and the public

interest

@ow language of constitution construed

• primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is

the LA5KFAKE itself

• 4he words that are used are broad because it aims to

co!er all contingencies

• Gords must be understood in their common o

ordinary meaning ecept when technical terms are

employeeo G@M 'ecause the fundamental law i

essentially a document of the people

• Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its

meaning would change

• Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and

restricted meaning

• Rule general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless the

contrary is indicated$

Ordi##o v. COMELEC

• Issue whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be

!alidly constituted in the &ordillera Autonomous

Region under %ection *7, Article *6

• @eld 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities

municipalities and geographical areas connotes that a

region consists of more than one unit$ In its ordinary

sense region means two or more pro!inces, thus Ifugao

cannot be constituted the &ordillera Autonomous

Region

Marcos v. C*ief of Staff



• Issues

o the meaning or scope of the words any court

in %ection * Article * of the *+-7

&onstitution

o Gho are included under the terms inferior

court in section : Article

• @eld %ection * of Article * prohibits any members

of the &ongress from appearing as counsel in any

criminal case $ 4his is not limited to ci!il but also

to a military court or court martial since the latter isalso a court of law and 2ustice as is any ci!il tribunal$

• Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its

restricted sense and accordingly do not include court

martials or military courts for they are agencies of

eecuti!e character and do not belong to the 2udicial

branch unli1e the term inferior court is$

• Another RFLE words used in one part are to recei!e

the same interpretation when used in other parts unlessthe contrary is applied=specified$

Lo'ada v COMELEC

• the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means theregular national assembly, found in many sections of

the *+- &onstitution refers to the regular, not to the

interim 'atasang Pambansa

• words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning before

they are used in the constitution must be ta1en in that

sense when such words as thus used are construed

Aids to construction, generally

• apart from its language courts may refer to the

following in construing the constitution

o history

o proceedings of the con!entiono prior laws and 2udicial decisions

o contemporaneous constructions

o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3tations

• these aids are called etraneous aids because though

their effect is not in precise rules their influence

describes the essentials of the process (remember

preamble ganito lang din yun"

Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be accomplished

• @istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand as tohow and why certain laws were incorporated into the

constitution$

• In construing constitutional law, the history must be

ta1en into consideration because there are certainconsiderations rooted in the historical bac1ground of

the en!ironment at the time of its adoption (Legaspi !$

)inister of /inance"

A$%ino v. COMELEC

• Issue what does the term Bincumbent president in sec$

- of Article * of the *+- &onstitution refer to

• @eld @istory shows that at that time the term o

President )arcos was to terminate on December -6

*+-, the new constitution was appro!ed on 5o!embe

-6, *+: still during his incumbency and as being the

only incumbent president at the time of the appro!al i

2ust means that the term incumbent president refers to

)r$ )arcos

• #ustice Antonio concurring opinion states the only

rational way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to

read its language in connection with the 1nownconditions of affairs out of which the occasion for its

adoption had arisen and then construe it$

/n re erm%de'

• incumbent president referred to in section 7 of Article

*; of the *+; constitution refers to incumbenPresident A.uino and >P Doy Laurel

Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary

• issue whether EO :;9, which authories a cabine

member, undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold

not more than two positions in the go!ernment and

KO&&s and to recei!e corresponding compensation

therefore, !iolates %ec$ *-, Art$ of the *+;

&onstitution

• court eamined the history of the times, the conditionsunder which the constitutional pro!isions was framed

and its ob2ect

• held before the adoption of the constitutiona

pro!ision, Bthere was a proliferation of newly3created

agencies, instrumentalities and KO&&s created by PD

and other modes of presidential issuances where

&abinet members, their deputies or assistants weredesignated to head or sit as members of the board with

the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems

allowances and other prere.uisites of office

• since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the *+;

&onstitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the

President, >ice President, members of the &abinet

their deputies and assistants with respect to holding

multiple go!ernment offices or employment in the

Ko!ernment during their tenure, the eception to this prohibition must be read with e.ual se!erity

• on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ is prohibitory

so that it must be understood as intended to be a

positi!e and une.ui!ocal negation of the pri!ilege o

holding multiple go!ernment offices or employment

Proceedings of the con!ention

• RFLE If the language of the constitutional pro!isionis plain it is not necessary to resort to etrinsic aids

• E&EP4IO5 when the intent of the framer doesnt

appear in the tet or it has more than one construction$

• Intent of a constitutional con!ention member doesn

necessarily mean it is also the peoples intent

• 4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually in.uired

into because it sheds light into what the framers of the

constitution had in mind at that time$ (refers to the

debates, interpretations and opinions concerning particular pro!isions"



L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA"

• Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the

&onstitution embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry and

swine

• 4ranscript of the deliberations of the &onstitutional

&ommission of *+;8 on the meaning of BagricultureC

clearly shows that it was ne!er the intention of theframers of the &onstitution to include li!estoc1 and

poultry industry in the co!erage of the constitutionally3

mandated agrarian reform program of the Ko!ernment• Agricultural lands do not include commercial

industrial, and residential lands

• @eld it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that %ec

: of RA 887 which includes Bpri!ate agricultural

lands de!oted to commercial li!estoc1, poultry and

swine raisingC in the definition of Bcommercial farmsC

is I5>ALID, to the etent of the aforecited agro3industrial acti!ities are made to be co!ered by the

agrarian reform program of the %tate

Monte-o v. COMELEC

• Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to transfer, by

resolution, one or more municipalities from onecongressional district to another district within a pro!ince, pursuant to %ec : of the Ordinance appended

to the *+; &onstitution

• 4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the

&onstitutional &ommission on Bminor ad2ustmentsC

which refers only to the instance where a municipality

which has been forgotten (ano ba Tto1inalimutan ang

municipality" is included in the enumeration of the

composition of the congressional district and not to the

transfer of one municipality from one district toanother, which has been considered a substanti!e or

ma2or ad2ustment

&ontemporaneous construction and writings

• may be used to resol!e but not to create ambiguities

• In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction

are entitled to great weight howe!er when it comes to

the constitution it has no weight and will not be

allowed to change in any way its meaning$

• Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it

depends on two things

o if opinions are based on fact 1nown to them

and not established it is immaterial

o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may

not be a shade better in the eyes of the law$

Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings

• framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of

pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning the sub2ect of

constitutional pro!isions$ 4@F% when courts adopt principles different from prior decisions it is presumed

that they did so to o!errule said principle

&hanges in phraseology

• 'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of

re!isions and changes in phraseology (e$ deletion of

words" and these changes may be in.uired into to

ascertain the intent or purpose of the pro!ision as

appro!ed

• @OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides, cannot

pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is i

determinati!e of any conclusion$

• &ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7 to

the present" are mere reenactments of prioconstitutions thus these changes may indicate an inten

to modify or change the meaning of the old pro!isions

,a#man v. Pamaran

• the phraseC no person shall be compelled in a

criminal case be a witness against himselfC is changed

in such a way the words criminal cases had been

deleted simply means that it is not limited to criminal

cases only$

&onse.uences of alternati!e constructions

• conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e

construction of doubtful constitutional pro!isions

constitute an important factor to consider in construing

them$

•

if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation, thaconstruction which would lead to absurd, impossibleor mischie!ous conse.uences must be re2ected$

• e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretation Art$ ; %ec

*7(*" re.uires 2udges to render decision within specific

periods from date of submission for decision of cases

(construed as directory because if otherwise it wil

cause greater in2ury to the public"

&onstitution construed as a whole

• pro!ision should not be construed separately from the

rest it should be interpreted as a whole and beharmonied with conflicting pro!isions so as to gi!e

them all force and effect$• sections in the constitution with a particular sub2ect

should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole

purpose of the &onstitution$

To#entino v. Secretary of Finance

• >A4 Law, passage of bill

• in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA *8 (>A4Law"

• contention of the petitioner RA *8 did not originate

eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by the

&onstitution because it is the result of the

consolidation of two distinct bills$

• &ourt re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam niyo nanaman to, that it should originate from @OR but it

could still be modified by the %enate"

)andatory or directory

• RFLE constitutional pro!isions are to be construed as

mandatory unless a different intention is manifested$

• Ghy 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign itself

spea1s and is laying down rules which for the time



Documents

Statutory Construction Agpalo Notes