21
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION Agpalo 2009, San Beda College of Law aiza ebina/2012 CHAPTER 9 FOCUS/DOCTRINES 1. Prospective operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect. It looks and applies to the future 2. Retroactive is a law which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past 3. Statutes are to construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to give them a retroactive effect, expressly declare or necessarily implied from the language used. 4. Lex prospicit, non respicit – the law provides for the future, not backward 5. Lex de future, judex de praetirito – the law provides for the future, the judge for the past 6. If law is couched in the past tense, it does not necessarily imply that it should have retroactive effect 7. No substantive statute shall be so construed retroactively as to affect pending litigations 8. Statutes that are retroactive in nature are (a) remedial or curative statutes (b) statutes which create new rights (c) Statutes that expressly provide that it should be applied retroactively (d) where it uses words clearly indicating its intent 9. A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively if it impairs substantive right that has become vested 10. The law has no retroactive effect except in (a) procedural laws (b) curative laws 11. Nova constitutio futuris foram imponere debet non praeteritis – A new statute should affect the future not the past 12. Leges et constitutions futuris certum est dare fornam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatum et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective,

AGPALO CHAPTER 9, 10, 11: Statutory Construction Notes, Cases and Legal Maxims

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Statutory ConstructionAgpalo NotesCasesLegal MaximsCHAPTER 9: Prospective and Retroactive StatutesCHAPTER 10: Amendment, Revision, Codification and RepealCHAPTER 11: Constitutional ConstructionGrego vs. COMELEC;Santos vs. Duata;Bernabe vs. Alejo;Subido vs. Sandiganbayan;Tung Chin Hui vs. Rodriguez;David vs. COMELEC;LLDA vs. CA;Bagatsing vs. Ramirez;DAR vs. Sutton;Drilon vs. Ermita;David vs. Arroyo;Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary;United Pepsi Cola Supervisor Union vs. Laguesma;Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance;Magtoto vs. Manguera;Manila Price Hotel vs. GSIS;IBP vs. Zamora;Macalintal vs. COMELEC

Citation preview

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONAgpalo 2009, San Beda College of Law aiza ebina/2012

CHAPTER 9FOCUS/DOCTRINES1. Prospective operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect. It looks and applies to the future2. Retroactive is a law which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past3. Statutes are to construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to give them a retroactive effect, expressly declare or necessarily implied from the language used.4. Lex prospicit, non respicit the law provides for the future, not backward5. Lex de future, judex de praetirito the law provides for the future, the judge for the past6. If law is couched in the past tense, it does not necessarily imply that it should have retroactive effect7. No substantive statute shall be so construed retroactively as to affect pending litigations8. Statutes that are retroactive in nature are (a) remedial or curative statutes (b) statutes which create new rights (c) Statutes that expressly provide that it should be applied retroactively (d) where it uses words clearly indicating its intent9. A statute may not be construed and applied retroactively if it impairs substantive right that has become vested10. The law has no retroactive effect except in (a) procedural laws (b) curative laws11. Nova constitutio futuris foram imponere debet non praeteritis A new statute should affect the future not the past12. Leges et constitutions futuris certum est dare fornam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatum et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending.CASES:1. GREGO vs COMELEC

One of the respondents was elected as councilor for his 3rd and final term Petitioner questions his qualifications because he questions the fact that petitioner was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff because of serious misconduct in an administrative case on October 1981. Sec 40 of the Local Government Code provides for the disqualification of such and petitioner argues that it must be applied retroactively in this case ISSUE: WON Sec 40 of the Local Government Code should be applied retroactively SC: No. Statutes are not be construed as to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such is expressly declared or clearly implied from the language of the enactment. Sec 40 does not qualify the date of a candidates removal and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the court from applying the law prospectively Nova constitutio futuris foram imponere debet non praeteritis A new statute should affect the future not the past

2. SANTOS vs DUATA

Duata and Aguilar bought a parcel of land. Santos, Gaanan and Aguilar bought the land but for convenience, the title was issued in Santos name The daughter of Duata insituted an action for reconveyance of the lot but Santos refused claiming that the land was sold to her by Aguilar in a private document ISSUE: WON Santos and Aguilar intended a mortgage or sale with pacto de retro in the private document SC: It is a mortgage. Art 1602 of the Civil Code was designed to curtail evils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase The said Article is remedial in nature and can be applied retroactively to cases arising prior to the effectivity of the Civil Code Leges et constitutions futuris certum est dare fornam negotiis, non ad facta praeterita revocari, nisi nominatum et de praeterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit Laws should be construed as prospective, not retrospective, unless they are expressly made applicable to past transactions and to such as are still pending.

3. BERNABE vs ALEJO

Late Fiscal Bernabe fathered a son with Carolina Alejo and was named Adrian Bernabe, born in 1981. Bernabe died in 1993. Carolina prayed that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate child RTC dismissed the claim ruling that under the Family Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. ISSUE: WON the Family Code shall have retroactive effect SC: Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate child of Fiscal Bernabe and since the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Article 285 is a substantive law as it gives the child the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining the majority age. The Family Code cannot impair the right because it had already been vested prior to enactment.

4. SUBIDO vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Subido, then Commisioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and Parina, a BID special agent issued a warrant of arrest against Maksimuk even if the decision for his deportation is not not yet final and executor thus leading to his detention of 43 days. Subido and Parina charged of Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by Art 124 of the RPC Sandiganbayan took over the case but petitioners contended that it has no jurisdiction to try the case because when it was filed Subido was no longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 27 ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the case SC: Yes. RA 7975 provides that Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of anti-graft and corrupt practices where one of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the crime (not at the time of the filing of the case as claimed by Subido) Parina, although holding a position lower than salary grade 27, wan prosecuted as a co-conspirator of Subido, the principal accused and the exemption only applies when none of the principal accused occupies positions corresponding to salary grade 27, where jurisdiction is vested on the other courts. They also contend that RA 7975 is likewise curative or remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations RA 7975 as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters is clearly a procedural law (prescribes rules and forms of procedure enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice As a procedural and curative statute, it may be validly given a retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested rightsCHAPTER 10FOCUS/DOCTRINES:1. Amendment the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended form. Power to amend belongs to the legislature.2. Express Amendment vs Amendment by Implication: (1) Express amendment is done by providing in the amendatory act the specific sections or provisions of a statute to be amended as recited therein or as commonly indicated to read as follows (2) Amendment by Implication legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is shown by a statement in the latter act that any provision of law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly3. The amendatory act, complete by itself, will be considered as an original or independent act4. In the absence of a clear inconsistency, every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject5. A part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter in which event, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to the extent of repugnancy.6. Amendment takes effect 15 days following its publication in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after such publication.7. Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act different from that of the original act indicates that the legislative intended a change in the law or in its meaning.8. An amendment will not be construed as having a retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided or the legislative intent to give it a retroactive effect is necessarily implied from the language used and no vested right is impaired9. Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights: the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment. Obligations that were contracted under the prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be governed by the law before its amendment. (no retroactive effect)10. Effect of Amendment on Jurisdiction: Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. It remains with the court until the case is finally decided therein.11. Effect of Nullity of Prior or Amendatory Act: Where a statute which has been amended is invalid, nothing in effect has been amended.12. Revision and Codification: done to restate the existing laws into one statute and simplify complicated provisions, and make laws on the subject easily found13. What is omitted is deemed repealed. All laws and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.14. A codification should be construed as the continuation of the existing statutes.15. The power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact one.16. Repeal: (1) total revoked completely, (2) partial leaves the unaffected portions of the statute in force, (3) expressed a particular or specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed as an express repeal (4) implied all other repeals17. Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exist in terms of the new and old laws, latter situation is an implied repeal.18. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier.19. Legis posteriores priores contraries abrogant. A later law repeals the prior law on the subject which is repugnant thereto.20. Implied Repeal by Revision or Codification: Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded there from shall be discarded.21. Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed.22. All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly Repealing clause.23. The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter whether or not the prior law is a special law.24. A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on the same subject, as the latter is generally regarded as an exception to the former.25. As between two laws, one passed later prevails. The later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. The lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and could not have intended to change what they did not know. The Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, not the other way around.26. A general law does not repeal a special law, generally.27. Generalia specialibus non derogant a general law does not nullify a specific or special law.CASES:1. TUNG CHIN HUI vs RODRIGUEZ

Petitioner is a Taiwanese citizen with a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese authorities. Bureau of Immigration and Deportation then ordered his summary deportation. Petitioner then filed petition for habeas corpus on the ground that his detention was illegal. RTC of Manila then granted his petition and ordered his release from custody but BID filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, thereafter filing a notice of appeal from RTCs judgment. Petitioner filed opposition claiming that the notice was filed beyond the 48-hour reglementary period for filing appeals in habeas corpus cases as prescribed by the pre-1997 Rules of Court. RTC rejected his claim and granted due course to notice of appeal. ISSUE: WON the pre-1997 Rules of Court is applicable in this case? SC: No. Sec. 18 Rule 41 of the pre-1997 Rules of Court which prescribes a 48-hour period was omitted and thereby repealed by the 1997 Rules of Court, which completely replaced Rules 1-71. Provisions of an old law that were not reproduced in the revision thereof covering the same subject are deemed replaced and discarded. The omission showed SCs intention to abrogate those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in the revised statute or code. Reglementary period for filing an appeal in a habeas corpus case is now similar to ordinary civil action as governed by Sec 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Court which is 15 days from notice of the judgment or order. What is omitted is deemed repealed. Revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded there from shall be discarded.

2. DAVID vs COMELEC

There are two petitions in the case beginning with Alex David, barangay chairman of Bgy. 77, Zone 7, Kaloookan and followed by Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter President Bonifacio M. Rillon. The Court resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Contending that their term is five years, petitioners ask to order the cancellation of the scheduled barangay election this coming May 12, 1997 and to reset it to the second Monday of May, 1999, further questioning, how long is the term of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices on the second Monday of May 1994? RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) provides that it is three years while RA 6679 states that is five years. ISSUE: Which should prevail? The Local Government Code (RA 7160) or RA 6679? SC: A later law repeals an earlier one, therefore RA 6679 is repealed by RA 7160. The Local Government Code was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores contraries abrogant. A later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. RA 7160: the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at three (3) years while RA 6679 states that such "term shall be for five years." The provisions are clearly inconsistent and repugnant with each other. In its repealing clause, RA 7160 states that "all general and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand together. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. As between two laws, one passed later prevails. The later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. The lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and could not have intended to change what they did not know. The Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, not the other way around.

3. LLDA vs CA

The Laguna Lake Development Authority was created by RA 4850 as a government agency for the Laguna Lakes environmental protection and development. PD 813 was later on created granting the LLDA special powers which include exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of the lake waters including navigation, construction, and operation of fish pens, and the like plus the power to collect fees for such activities. RA 7160 (Local Government Code) was created thereafter and the municipalities around the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the Code as granting them jurisdiction over issuing permits for fish pen privileges within their jurisdiction and started issuing permits to big fish pen operators. The LLDA issued a notice declaring these fish pens as illegal because they were not registered with the LLDA further imposing fines and threatening demolition of the said projects. The private respondents contended that the LLDA has no jurisdiction because it is the Local Government Code, a later law, that shall prevail over the case. ISSUE: WON the LLDA can exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake Region as provided in RA 4850 and PD 813 Yes. The LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheries is concerned. RA 7160 did not repeal the laws creating the LLDA therefore the latter maintains exclusive authority over issuances of permits. The charter of the LLDA is a special law while RA 7160 is a general law. Even if RA 7160 was enacted later, it is still a general law and cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. Special law prevails over general law because it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent law by mere implications. Generalia specialibus non derogant a general law does not nullify a specific or special law.

4. BAGATSING vs RAMIREZ

Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation thereof and for other Purposes. Respondents seeks to nullify the ordinance ISSUE: WON the Revised City Charter should govern over the Local Tax Code on publication of tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila SC: The Local Tax Code prevails. Although the Revised City Charter is a special law, may be impliedly modified by a later statute, and where the statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its provisions. A special law is considered to be an exception to the general. The Revised Charter of Manila speaks of ordinance in general whereas the Local Tax Code relates to ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. A charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state.

5. DAR vs SUTTON

Petitioners own a land in Masbate devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the agrarian reform of the government, respondents voluntarily offered to sell (VOS) their landholdings to DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law such as cash incentives and other tax exemptions. RA 6656 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) then took effect, including in its coverage farms used for livestock, poultry and swine. But certain provisions of the CARL were declared unconstitutional because livestock farms should not be included in the coverage of agrarian reform as mandated and exempted by the Constitution. Lands such as these are classified as industrial, not agricultural. Congress then enacted RA 7881, which amended these certain unconstitutional provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. Petitioners then requested DAR to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. DAR ignored the request. ISSUE: WON the landholding was exempt from the coverage of the CARL SC: It is exempted. The reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.CHAPTER 11FOCUS/DOCTRINES:1. Constitution fundamental law which sets up a form of government and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its officers, reserving to the people themselves plenary sovereignty2. The constitution is a written charter enacted and adopted by the people by which a government for them is established3. The constitution is permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to existing conditions but also to future needs. It is absolute and unalterable except by amendment.4. Constitutional Construction to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as expressed in its language5. The Constitution must be adaptable to various crisis of human affairs but it must also be solid permanent and substantial. It should not change with emergencies or conditions. It should not be inflexible. It should not be interpreted narrowly.6. The primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the language itself.7. Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its meaning would change.8. If the words used have both general and restricted meaning, the general prevails over the restricted unless the contrary is indicated.9. Aids to Construction: (1) History (2) Proceedings of the Convention (3) Prior laws and judicial decisions (4) Contemporaneous constructions (5) Consequences of alternative interpretations10. History basically helps in making one understand as to how and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution. In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because there are certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment at the time of its adoption.11. If the language of the constitutional provision is plain, it is not necessary to resort to extrinsic aids. Except when the intent of the framer doesnt appear in the text or it has more than one construction. The proceedings of the convention are usually inquired into because it sheds light upon what the framers had in mind that time.12. Constitution is construed as a whole. Provisions should not be construed separately from the rest, it should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonized with conflicting provisions so as to give them all force and effect.13. Sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the constitution.14. Constitution operated prospectively only unless the words employed are clear that it applies retroactively.15. Constitutional provisions are self-executing, generally. Except when the provisions themselves expressly require legislations to implement them.16. Self-executing provisions provisions which are complete by themselves and become operative without the aid of supplementary legislation17. In case of doubt, construe such provision as self-executing rather that non self-executingCASES:1. DRILON vs ERMITA

EO 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes issued by the President GMA Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on several issues concerning the President (i.e. election fraud, wiretapping, railway project, etc.), in the exercise of its legislative power (legislative inquiries in aid of legislation) Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by EO 464, Sec 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Sec 2 to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is EO 464 constitutional? SC: No. Congress has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected. The enumeration in Section 2 of EO 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

2. DAVID vs ARROYO

President GMA declared PP 1017 to be implemented by GO 5 due to the Magdalo siege and discovery of plans to assassinate her. PP 1017 was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organizations. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest without warrant. A week after PP 1017, GMA issued PP 1021 lifting the state of national emergency. Petitioner averred that PP1017 and GO 5 are unconstitutional for they have no factual basis and they cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. ISSUE: WON PP 1017 and GO 5 were unconstitutional SC: Petition was partly granted. The Court ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees, taking into consideration that legislative power is vested only in congress. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it allows the President to call the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence are declared unconstitutional. The following acts of the government were held unconstitutional: warrantless arrest of the petitioner, dispersal and warrantless arrests of rallyists in the absence of proof that said petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, or violating BP 800; imposition of media standards and any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as warrantless search of the Tribune Offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials.

3. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

An EO allowing members of the Cabinet, their secretaries and undersecretaries hold other offices or positions in addition to their primary positions was assailed in this case. EO 284 runs counter with Art 7 Sec 3 of the Constitution which provides that the President, the VP, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. ISSUE: Is EO 284 constitutional? SC: No. It is null and void. In constitutional construction, the intention underlying the provision must be recognized. The practice of holding multiple offices in the government would lead to abuses by unscrupulous public officials who took the scheme for purposes of self-enrichment, particularly during Marcos era. The court examined the history of the times, the conditions under which the constitutional provisions was framed and its object. Before the adoption of the constitutional provision, there was a proliferation of newly-created agencies created by PDs and other modes of presidential issuances during Marcos time where Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with corresponding salaries, emoluments, allowances, per diems, and other prerequisites of office The evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, VP, Cabinet members, etc with respect to holding multiple government offices. The language of the provision is prohibitory. The qualifying phrase unless otherwise provided cannot refer to the broad exceptions made for appointive officials under Art 9-B Sec 7 of the Constitution. The former is meant to lay down the general rule of holding multiple offices applicable to all elective public officials and employees while the latter is meant for the exception of the President, VP, members of the Cabinet, etc. To construe otherwise would render the meaningless the manifest intent of the framers of the Constitution. History basically helps in making one understand as to how and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution. In construing constitutional law, the history must be taken into consideration because there are certain considerations rooted in the historical background of the environment at the time of its adoption.

4. UNITED PEPSI COLA SUPERVISOR UNION vs LAGUESMA

The union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. The petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible forunion membership under the first sentence of Art 245 of the Labor Code. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence ofArt 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form, assist orjoin unions, contravenes Art 3 Sec 8 of the Constitution which provides the right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged ISSUE: WON Art 245 of the Labor Code violates the Constitution (Art 3 Sec 8) SC: No. The Constitutional Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards tobe constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers.Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art 3 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art 3 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organization. This inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the lattermight not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict ofinterests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence ofmanagerial employees in Union membership.

5. TOLENTINO vs SECRETARY OF FINANCE

RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. Its constitutionality was challenged on the ground that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art 6, Sec 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. ISSUE: WON RA 7716 is constitutional SC: Yes. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the HOR. The Senate has the power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the HOR on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. The President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. Sections in the constitution with a particular subject should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the constitution.

6. MAGTOTO vs MANGUERA

Art 4 Sec 20 of 1973 Constitution: ...Any person under investigation... shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right... no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself...Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence... Petitioner was accused of murder in two informations. During trial, his extrajudicial confession dated November 1972 (before 1973 Constitution was promulgated) was admitted in evidence over the objection that it was taken while the accused was in preventive custody of the PC without having been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. ISSUE: WON Art 4 Sec 20 of the 1973 Constitution be applied retroactively SC: It should be given a prospective application. The constitutional guarantee of right to counsel only has prospective effect. Giving such provision a retroactive effect would invite unwarranted hardship on the part of the prosecutor. However, his confession is admissible given that the same had been obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. Why prospective effect for this case? (1) said provision of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right; (2) the history behind this new right shows the intention to give this constitutional guaranty not a retroactive, but a prospective effect, so as to cover only confessions taken after the effectivity of the New Constitution; and (3) to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and to offended parties in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution and in accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. Constitution operated prospectively only unless the words employed are clear that it applies retroactively.

7. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs GSIS

GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation pursuant to the privatization program of the government. Two bidders participated, Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RB). MPHs bid was at P41.58/per share while RBs bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RBs bid and invoked the Filipino First Policy enshrined under Art 12, Sec 10 of the 1987 Constitution but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that Art 12, Sec 10 needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing) and even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony. ISSUE: WON Art 12, Sec 10 needs an implementing law and RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares SC: No. The qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision is self-executing. Art 12, Sec 10 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former. Section 10: The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

8. IBP vs ZAMORA

President Estrada directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence, invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Art 7, Sec 18 of the Constitution The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON the calling out to the AFP and PNP was constitutional SC: Yes. When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Art 7, Sec 18, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any qualification.

9. MACALINTAL vs COMELEC

Petitioner, a lawyer and a taxpayer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking a declaration that certain provisions of RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. ISSUES: (1) WON Sec 5 of RA 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines violate the residency requirement in Art 5 Sec 1 of the Constitution. (2) WON Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates for national offices and party-list representatives including the President and the VP violate Art 7, Sec 4 of the Constitution that winning candidates for President and VP shall be proclaimed by Congress. (3) WON under Sec 25 of RA 9189, the Congress may review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the COMELEC shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Art 9-A, Sec 1 of the Constitution SC: (1) All laws are presumed to be constitutional Sec 5 of RA 9189 allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as h executes an affidavit to show that he has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Art 5, Sec 1 and Sec 2 that all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting, for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. (2) The constitution must be construed as a whole Art 7, Sec 4 of the Constitution gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and VP. The COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the President and the VP. Sec 18.5 of RA 9189 is far too sweeping for including the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency. The provisions of the constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of RA 9189 and hence, the canvassing of votes and proclamation of winners for presidency and vice-presidency must remain in the hands of the Congress. (3) In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be deduced from the discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission Art 9-A, Sec 1 of the Constitution provides that The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. RA 9189 is unconstitutional as it violates the provision, mandating the independence of constitutional commissions. The phrase subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee in the first sentence of Sec 17.1 empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than 3 countries for the May 2004 elections, and the phrase only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the May 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Sec 17.1 of RA 9189. Otherwise Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC. The petition was partly granted. The above-mentioned portions of RA 9189 were declared void and unconstitutional.