Statcon by Agpalo

8/11/2019 Statcon by Agpalo

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CHAPTER 1: STATUTES

A. IN GENERALLAWS, GENERALLY

Law in its jural and generic sense refers to the wholebody or system of law, in its jural and concrete sense, it means

a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimateower of the state!t includes" statutes, residential decrees, e#ecuti$e orders,other residential issuances, rulings of the Sureme %ourtconstruing the law, rules and regulations, and ordinances

S&A&ES, GENERALLYA statute is an act of the legislature as an organi'ed

body, e#ressed in the form, and assed according to therocedure, re(uired to constitute it as art of the law of theland) !ncludes those assed by the" *hil) %ommission, *hil)Legislature, +atasang *ambansa, %ongress of the *hil)

*ri$ate Statutes, alies only to a secificersonsubject

*ublic Statutes, affects the ublic at large"-) General law. alies to the whole state uon all the

eole or all of a class /*eole $) *alma01) Secial law. relates to articular ersons or things of

a class or to a articular community, indi$idual orthing

2) Local law 3 oeration is confined to a secific laceor locality e)g) municial ordinance

*ER4ANEN& AN5 &E4*6RARY S&A&7&ES*ermanent. oeration is not limited in duration but continuesuntil reealed&emorary. duration is for a limited eriod of time fi#ed in thestatute itself, ceases uon the haening of an e$ent

6&8ER %LASSES 69 S&A&7&ESAlication" rosecti$e, retroacti$e6eration" declaratory, curati$e, mandatory, directory,substanti$e, remedial, enal9orms" affirmati$e, negati$e

4ANNER 69 RE9ERR!NG &6 S&A&7&ES*hil) %ommission*hil) Legislature /-:;-.-:2=0 3 %ommonwealth Acts%ongress of the *hil) /-:>=.-:?1 and -:@? onwards0 3

Reublic Acts

+atasang *ambansa /-:?2.-:@=0 3 +atas *ambansa

B. ENACTMENT OF STATUTESLEG!SLA&!E *6WER, GENERALLY

Leg) *ower is the ower to maBe, alter and reeal laws)&he sangguniang barangay, sangguniang bayan, sanggunianganlungsod and sangguniang anlalawigan ha$e also legislati$eowers within their jurisdiction, to enact ordinances)

6rdinances are inferior in status and subordinate to thelaws of the state /*rimicias $) 4uniciality of 7rdaneta0)

An admin)e#ec) 6fficer, in the e#ercise of a dulydelegated ower, can liBewise issue rules and regulations to

imlement a secific law, and such rules and regulations ha$ethe force and effect of law)

%6NGRESSC LEG!SLA&!E *6WER&he essential feature of the legislati$e function is the

determination of the legislati$e olicy and its formulation andromulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct) &helegislati$e ower is lenary)

*R6%E57RAL RED7!RE4EN&S, GENERALLYAart from the basic constitutional re(uirements,

congress ro$ides in detail, embodied in the Rules of both8ouses of %ongress, the rocedure by which a bill may beenacted into law)

*ASSAGE 69 A +!LL&he Secretary reorts the bill for first reading, which

consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed byits referral to the aroriate %ommittee for study andrecommendation) 6n second reading, the bill shall be read infull with the amendments roosed by the committee, unlesscoies therof are distributed and such reading is disensedwith) &hen, the bill will be subject to debates, ertinent

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motions, and amendments) After the amendments, the bill willbe $oted on second reading) A bill aro$ed on the secondreading shall be included in the calendar of bills for thirdreading) 6n third reading, the bill as aro$ed on secondreading will be submitted for final $ote)

A**R6*R!A&!6NS AN5 REEN7E +!LLSRead Article =, sec) 1>, 1< of the constitution)

A7&8EN&!%A&!6N 69 +!LLS+efore an aro$ed bill is sent to the resident, the bill

is authenticated by the signing of the SeaBer and the Senate*resident of the rinted coy of the aro$ed bill)

7N!4*EA%8A+!L!&Y 69 LEG!SLA&!E 67RNALS&he journal is regarded as conclusi$e with resect to

matters that are re(uired by the constitution to be recordedtherein) With resect to other matters, in the absence of

e$idence to the contrary, the ournals ha$e also been accordedconclusi$e effect)

ENR6LLE5 +!LL7nder the enrolled bill doctrine, the te#t of the act as

assed and aro$ed is deemed imorting absolute $eracityand is binding on the courts) !t is conclusi$e not only of itsro$isions but also of its due enactment)

!f there has been any mistaBe in the rinting of the billbefore it was certified by the officer of the assembly andaro$ed by the chief e#ecuti$e, the remedy is by amendment

by enacting a curati$e legislation, not by judicial decree /%asco*hil) %hemical %o), !nc) $) Gimene'0Where there is discreancy between the journal and the

enrolled bill, the latter as a rule re$ails o$er the former,articularly with resect to matters not e#ressly re(uired to beentered in the journal)

W!&85RAWAL 69 A7&8EN&!%A&!6N, E99E%& 69&he SeaBer and the Senate *resident may withdraw

their signatures from the signed bill where there is serious andsubstantial discreancy between the te#t of the bill asdeliberated and shown by the journal and that of the enrolled

bill) !t thus, renders the bill without attestation and nullifies itsstatus as an enrolled bill)&he court can declare that the bill has not been duly enactedand did not accordingly become a law /Astorga $) illegas0)

C. PARTS OF STATUTES

&!&LE 69 S&A&7&E6ne subject, one bill ro$ision is mandatory, $iolationthereof is unconstitutional)

*7R*6SES 69 RED7!RE4EN&!t is to rohibit dulicity in legislation, the title of whichcomletely fails to arise the legislators or the ublic of thenature, scoe and conse(uences of the law or its ro$isions/!nchong $) 8ernande'0

-) to re$ent hodgeodge or log.rolling legislation1) to re$ent surrise of fraud uon the legislature2) to fairly arise the eole

>) title of the statute may be used as a guide inascertaining legislati$e intent when the language of theact does not clearly e#ress its urose

86W RED7!RE4EN& %6NS&R7E5&he constitutional re(uirement as to title of a bill should

be liberally construed /*eole $) +uen$iaje0) !t should notbe gi$en a technical interretation) Nor should it be sonarrowly construed as to crile or imede the ower oflegislation /&obias $) Abalos0) Where there is doubt, the(uestion should be resol$ed against the doubt an in fa$or of

the constitutionality of the statute)

W8EN &8ERE !S %64*L!AN%E W!&8 RED7!RE4EN&-) if the title is comrehensi$e enough to reasonably

include the general object which a statute seeBs toeffect, without e#ressing each and e$ery end andmeans necessary of con$enient for accomlishing theobject

1) if all arts are related and germane to the subjectmatter

2) if it indicates in broad but clear terms the nature, scoeand conse(uences of the law and its oerations)

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&he title need not be a catalogue or inde# of the bill /*eole $)9errer0) &hese rinciles aly to titles of amendatory acts) Atitle which states that it is an act to amend a secific statutes isa sufficient comliance with the constitutional re(uirementF itneed not states the recise nature of the amendatory act/4anila &rading Suly %o, $) Reyes0)

Note" Hand for other urosesI amounts to nothing

W8EN RED7!RE4EN& N6& A**L!%A+LE!t does not aly to laws in force e#isting at the time the

-:2< %onstitution tooB effect /*eole $) alensoy0, nor tomunicial or city ordinances)

E99E%& 69 !NS799!%!EN%Y 69 &!&LE!f the subject is not related in any manner to the title it

is null and $oid, but if the subject matter is not sufficientlye#ressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as isnot e#ressed therein is $oid, lea$ing the rest in force, unless

the in$alid ro$isions are insearable from the others)

ENA%&!NG %LA7SE&he enacting clause is that art of a statute written

immediately after the title thereof which states the authority bywhich the act is enacted)

*REA4+LEA reamble is a refatory statement or e#lanation or a

finding of facts, reciting the urose, reason or occasion formaBing the law to which it is refi#ed) !t is usually found in

residential decrees and e#ecuti$e orders)

*7R!EW 69 S&A&7&E&he ur$iew of body of a statute is that art which tells

what the law is all about) A comle# and comrehensi$e ieceof legislation usually contains, in this se(uence, a short title, aolicy section, definition section, administrati$e section,sections rescribing standards of conduct, section imosingsanctions for $iolations or its ro$isions, transitory ro$ision,searability clause, reealing clause and effecti$ity clause)

&he constitutional re(uirement that a bill should ha$eonly one subject matter which should be e#ressed in its title is

comlied with where the ro$isions thereof, no matter howdi$erse they may be, are allied and germane to the subject, ornegati$ely stated, where the ro$isions are not inconsistentwith, but in furtherance of, the single subject matter /*eole $)%arlos0)

SE*ARA+!L!&Y %LA7SEA Searability clause is that art of a statute which

states that if any ro$ision of the act is declared in$alid, theremainder shall not be affected thereby) Such a clause is notcontrolling and the courts, in site of it, may in$alidate thewhole statute where what is left, after the $oid art, is notcomlete and worBable)

D. PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE, RULES AND ORDINANCES*RES!5EN&!AL !SS7AN%ES

&hese are those which the resident issues in thee#ercise of his ordinance ower) &hey ha$e the force and effect

of law)-) E#ecuti$e order 3 acts of resident ro$iding for rules of

a general or ermanent character in the imlementationor e#ecution of constitutional or statutory owers

1) Administrati$e order 3 acts of resident which relate toarticular asects of go$ernmental oerations inursuance of his duties as administrati$e head)

2) *roclamations 3 acts resident fi#ing a date or declaringa statute or condition of ublic moment or interest, uonthe e#istence of which the oeration of a secific law orregulation is made to deend

>) 4emorandum orders 3 acts of resident on matters ofadministrati$e detail or of subordinate or temoraryinterest which only concern a articular officer or officeof the go$ernment


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S7*RE4E %67R %!R%7LARSF R7LES AN5 REG7LA&!6NSRead Sec) < /) the necessity that the constitutional (uestion be asseduon in order to decide a case)

A**R6*R!A&E %ASE6ne in which it raises a justiciable contro$ersy, the

resolution of which the court will ha$e to choose between theconstitution and the challenged statute

S&AN5!NG &6 S7ELegal Standing is a ersonal and substantial interest in

the case such that the arty has sustained or will sustain directinjury as a result of the go$ernmental act that is beingchallenged)

%iti'ens legal standing"o 8e has suffered some actual or threatened injury

as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct ofgo$ernment

o !njury is fairly traceable to the challenged action)

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rosecti$ely) A statute of this tye belongs to the class ofemergency laws

*AR&!AL !NAL!5!&Y&he general rule is that where art of a statute is $oid as

reugnant to the %onstitution, while another art is $alid, the$alid ortion, if searable from the in$alid, may stand and beenforcedF e#cet when the arts are so mutually deendentand connected) &he resence of searability clause creates theresumtion that the legislature intended searability, ratherthan comlete nullity of the statute)

F.EFFECT AND OPERATIONW8EN LAWS &AKE E99E%&

Art 1 of the %i$il %ode ro$ides that HLaws shall takeeffect after fifteen days following the completion of theirpublication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwiseproided.!

All laws or statutes, including those of local alicationand ri$ate law shall be ublished as a condition for theireffecti$ity /&aada $) &u$era0, otherwise it would $iolate thedue rocess clause of the constitution)

&he general rule is that where the law is silent as to itseffecti$ity, or where it ro$ides that it shall taBe effectimmediately or uon its aro$al, such law shall taBe effectafter -< days from its ublication in the 6fficial Ga'ette) &hecomletion of ublication, from which date the eriod ofublication will be counted, refers to the date of release of the6)G) or newsaer for circulation and not to its date, unless the

two dates coincide)

W8EN *RES!5EN&!AL !SS7AN%ES, R7LES AN5 REG7LA&!6NS&AKE E99E%&

&he re(uirement of ublication as a condition for theeffecti$ity of statues alies to *residential !ssuances, e#cetthose which are merely interretati$e or internal in nature notconcerning the ublic)

Rules and regulations of administrati$e and e#ecuti$eofficers are of two tyes"

-) Whose urose is to imlement or enforcee#isting law ursuant to a $alid delegation or to

fill in the details of a statuteF whether they areenal or non.enalF this re(uires ublication)

1) Which are merely interretati$e in nature ormerely internal in character not concerning theublic, does not need ublication)

!n addition, the -:@? Administrati$e %ode ro$ides that"-) E$ery agency shall file with the 7)*) Law center three

coies of e$ery rule adoted by it) Rules in force onthe date of effecti$ity of this %ode which are not filedwithin 2 months from that date shall not be the basisof any sanction against any arty or ersons)

1) Each rule shall become effecti$e -< days from thedate of filing as abo$e ro$ided unless a differentdate is fi#ed by law, or secified in the rule in casesof imminent danger to ublic health, safety andwelfare)

*ublication and filing re(uirements are indisensable tothe effecti$ity of rules and regulations, e#cet when the law

authori'ing its issuance disenses the filing re(uirements)

W8EN L6%AL 6R5!NAN%E &AKE E99E%&

1. 7nless otherwise stated, Local ordinance shall taBe

effect after -; days from the date a coy thereof isosted in a bulletin board at the entrance of thero$incial caitol or city, municial, or barangay hall, asthe case may be, and in at least two other consicuouslaces in the local go$ernment unit)

1) the secretary to the sanggunian shall cause the ostingof the ordinance within < days after its aro$al at the

entrance of the ro$incial caitol and the city, municialor barangay hall in at least 1 consicuous laces2) &he gist of all ordinances with enal sanctions shall be

ublished in a newsaer of general circulation, withinthe ro$ince where the local legislati$e body concernedbelongs, in the absence of such newsaers, ostingsshall be made in all municialities and cities of thero$ince where the saggunian of origin is situated)

>) 9or highly urbani'ed city and indeendent comonentcities, in addition to being osted, be ublished once in alocal newsaer of gen) circulation within the city, in the

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absence of which, it shall be ublished in any newsaerof general circulation)

S&A&7&ES %6N&!N7E !N 96R%E 7N&!L RE*EALE57nless a statute is by its ro$isions for a limited eriod

only, it continues in force until changed or reealed by thelegislature) Law once established continues until changed bysome cometent legislati$e ower) !t is not changed by changeof so$ereignty nor of a change in constitution, until the newso$ereign by legislati$e act creates a change)

4ANNER 69 %64*7&!NG &!4EWhere the word HweeBI is used as a measure of time

and without reference to the calendar, it means a eriod ofse$en consecuti$e days without regard to the day of the weeBfrom which it begins /*N+ $) %)A0)

Where a statute re(uires the doing of an act within asecified number of days, such as ten days, from notice, it

means -; calendar days and not worBing days)&he e#clude. the 3first and include the last day rule

go$erns the comutation of a eriod) !f the last day falls on aSunday or legal holiday, the act can still be done the followingday) &he rincile does not aly to the comutation of theeriod of rescrition of a crime, in which the rule is that if thelast days in the eriod of rescrition of a felony falls on aSunday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felonycannot be filed on the ne#t worBing day, as the offense hasbeen by then already rescribed)

CHAPTER 2: CONSTRUCTION ANDINTERPRETATION

A. NATURE AND PURPOSE%6NS&R7%&!6N 5E9!NE5

!t is the art or rocess of disco$ering and e#oundingthe meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where thatintention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in itslanguage or of the fact that the gi$en case is not e#licitlyro$ided in the law

%6NS&R7%&!6N AN5 !N&ER*RE&A&!6N 5!S&!NG7!S8E5

!nterretation is the art of finding the true meaning andsense of any form of word, while construction is the rocess ofdrawing warranted conclusions not always included in directe#ression or determining the alication of words to faces inlitigation) +ut they are used interchangeably in ractice)

R7LES 69 %6NS&R7%&!6N, GENERALLY&he legislature is resumed to Bnow the rules of

statutory construction, it enacts a law with the end in $iew thatit will, in case of doubt, be construed in accordance with thesettled rinciles of interretation) Where there is ambiguity inthe language of a statute, courts emloy canons of statutoryconstruction to ascertain and gi$e effect to its true intent andmeaning)

&he legislature sometimes adots rules of statutoryconstruction as art of the ro$isions of a statute) &helegislature also defines, in certain comlicated statutes, theword and hrases used therein) E#cet as they may ha$e been

embodied as art of a statute, rules of construction ha$e nobinding effect on the courts) Nor are they controlling in theinterretation of laws, they may only be used to clarify, not todefeat, legislati$e intent) E$en those rules of constructionwhich are in the form of statutory ro$isions may be ignored iftheir emloyment may defeat, rather than effectuate,legislati$e intent)

*7R*6SE 6R 6+E%& 69 %6NS&R7%&!6NAll rules of construction of interretation ha$e for their

sole object the ascertainment of the true intent of the

legislature) &he object of all judicial interretation of a statuteis to determine legislati$e intent, what intention is con$eyed,either e#ressly or imliedly, by the language used, so far as itis necessary for ascertaining whether the articular case orstate of facts resented to the court comes within it)

LEG!SLA&!E !N&EN&, GENERALLY%ourts will not follow the letter of the statute when it

leads away from the true intent of the legislature and toconclusions inconsistent with the general urose of the act/&orres $) Limja0) 8ence, where the statute is suscetible ofmore than one construction, that construction should be

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adoted which will most tend to gi$e effect to the manifestintent of the legislature /7)S) $) &oribio0)

LEG!SLA&!E *7R*6SE!t is the reason why a articular statute was enacted by

the legislature) A legislation is an acti$e instrument of thego$ernment which, for uroses of interretation, means thatlaw ha$e ends to be achie$ed and statutes should be soconstrued so as not defeat but to carry out such ends anduroses /Lite# Emloyees Assn $) Edu$ala0)

LEG!SLA&!E 4EAN!NG!t is what the law, by its language, means) !t may be

synonymous to legislati$e intent) !f there is ambiguity in thelanguage, its urose may indicate the meaning of thelanguage and lead to what the legislati$e intent is)

4A&&ERS !ND7!RE5 !N&6 !N %6NS&R7!NG A S&A&7&E

!t is not enough to ascertain the intention of meaning ofthe statuteF it is also necessary to see whether the intention ormeaning of the statute has been e#ressed in such a way as togi$e it legal effect and $alidity) &he legal act is made u of twoelements 3 an internal and an e#ternal oneF it originates inintention and is erfected by e#ression) 9ailure of the lattermay defeat the former)

W8ERE LEG!SLA&!E !N&EN& !S AS%ER&A!NE5&he rimary source of the intent is the statute itself and

has to be disco$ered from the four corners of the law /4anila

Lodge No) ?=- $) %) A0) !t has to be e#tracted from the statuteas a whole and not from an isolated art of articular ro$isionthereof) Where the words and hrases of a statute are notobscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of thelegislature must be determined from the language emloyed/eroy $) Layague0) &he court may also looB to the urose ofthe statute to be subser$ed, the reason or cause which inducedthe enactment of the law, the mischief to be suressed, andthe olicy which dictated its assage /Yu %ong Eng $) &rinidad0)

B. POWER TO CONSTRUE%6NS&R7%&!6N !S A 75!%!AL 97N%&!6N

!t is emhatically the ro$ince and duty of the judicialdeartment to say what the law is and it has the final word asto what the law means) &he court does not interret the law ina $acuum) !t does not gi$e legal oinion on hyothetical casesor in cases which ha$e become moot or academic

LEG!SLA&7RE %ANN6& 6ERR7LE 75!%!AL 5E%!S!6NS&he legislature has no ower to o$errule the

interretation or construction of a statute of the %onstitution bythe Sureme court and while it may indicate its construction ofa statute in a resolution or declaratory act, it cannot recludethe courts from gi$ing the statute a different interretation)

W8EN 75!%!AL !N&ER*RE&A&!6N 4AY +E SE& AS!5E&he Sureme %ourt may change or o$errule its re$ious

construction) %onstitutional amendments may modify or nullifya judicial interretation of a ro$ision thereof) &he rule that theSureme %ourt has the final word in the interretation of a

statute merely means that the legislature cannot, by law orresolution, modify or annul the judicial construction withoutmodifying or reealing the $ery statute which has been thesubject of construction, but when it enacts a reeal, there$ious judicial construction of the statute is modified or setaside)

W8EN %67R& 4AY %6NS&R7E S&A&7&EA condition sine (ua non, before the court may construe

or interret, is that there be doubt or ambiguity in its language)6nly statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be

the subject of statutory construction /5aong $) 4unicialudge0) A statute is ambiguous if it is suscetible of more thanone interretation)

%67R&S 4AY N6& %6NS&R7E W8ERE S&A&7&E !S %LEAR%onstruction comes only after it has been demonstrated

that the alication is imossible or inade(uate without it) !t isthe $ery last function which the court should e#ercise, for itthere is more alication and less construction, there would bemore stability in the law /Li'arraga 8ermanos $) Ya &ico0) !thas been reeatedly declared that where the law seaBs inclear and categorical language, there is no room for

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interretation and there is only room for alication /%ebu*ortland %ement %o) $) 4uniciality of Naga0)

9or nothing is better settled than that the first andfundamental duty of courts is to aly the law as they find it,not as they liBe it to be) 9idelity to such a tasB recludesconstruction unless alication is imossible or inade(uatewithout it /Resins, !nc) $) Auditor General0)

Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must betaBen to mean e#actly what it says and the court has no choicebut to see to it that its mandate is obeyed /Lu'on Surety %o) $)5e Garcia0)

Where the law is free from ambiguity, the court may notintroduce e#cetions where none is ro$ided fromconsiderations of con$enience, ublic welfare, or for anylaudable urose, nor may it engraft into the law (ualificationsnot contemlated /Ramos $) %)A0, nor construe ro$isions bytaBing into account (uestions of e#ediency, good faith,ractical utility and other similar reasons so as to rela# non

comliance therewith)Administrati$e agencies tasBed to imlement a stature

may not construe it by e#anding its meaning where ro$isionsare clear and unambiguous)

R7L!NGS 69 S7*RE4E %67R& *AR& 69 LEGAL SYS&E4Legis interpretato legis im obtinet, the authoritati$e

interretation of the Sureme %ourt of a statute ac(uires theforce of law by becoming a art thereof as of the date of itsenactment, since the courtCs interretation merely establishesthe contemoratneous legislati$e intent that the statute thus

construed intends to effectuate /Seno$ila $) 8ermosisimo0)"tare decisis et non #uieta moere, when the Sureme%ourt has once laid down a rincile of law as alicable to acertain state of facts, it will adhere to that rincile and aly itto all future cases where the facts are substantially the same)&his assures certainty and stability in the legal system)

As art of the legal system and until re$ersed by theSureme %ourt itself, rulings of the highest tribunal are bindinguon inferior courts)

75!%!AL R7L!NGS 8AE N6 RE&R6A%&!E E99E%&

Lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looBs forward notbacBward) &he interretation of a statute by the Sureme%ourt remains to be art of the legal system until the lattero$errules it and the new doctrine o$erruling the old is aliedrosecti$ely in fa$or of ersons who ha$e relied thereon ingood faith)

%67R&S 4AY !SS7E G7!5EL!NE !N %6NS&R7!NG S&A&7&E!n construing a statute, the enforcement of which may

tread on sensiti$e areas of constitutional rights, the court mayissue guidelines in alying the statute, not to enlarge orrestrict it but to clearly delineate what the law re(uires) &his isnot judicial legislation but an act to define what the law is)

C. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE%67R&S 4AY N6& ENLARGE 6R RES&R!%& S&A&7&ES

-) While statutory constructions in$ol$es choice, the courtshould resist the temtation to roam at will and rely on

its redilection as to what olicy should re$ail)1) &hey may not, in the guise of interretation, enlarge the

scoe of a statute and include therein situations notro$ided nor intended by lawmaBers)

2) &hey are not authori'e to insert into the law what theythinB should be in it or to suly what they thinB thelegislature would ha$e sulied if its attention had beencalled to the omission)

>) &hey should not re$ise e$en the most arbitrary andunfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law toconform with what they thinB should be the law


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aly them regardless of whether or not they are wise orsalutary)

CHAPTER 3: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. IN GENERAL

GENERALLYAid to construction are those found in the rinted age

of the statute itself, Bnown as intrinsic aids, and thosee#traneous facts and circumstances outside the rinted age,called e#trinsic aids)

&!&LE&he title may indicate the legislati$e intent to e#tend or

restrict the scoe of the law, and a statute couched in alanguage of doubtful imort will be construed to conform to thelegislati$e intent as disclosed in its title) &he rule that the titlemay ser$e as a guide carries more weight in this jurisdictionbecause of the constitutional re(uirement that e$ery bill shallha$e one subject as e#ressed in the title thereof)

W8EN RES6R& &6 &!&LE N6& A7&86R!ME5When the te#t is clear it is imroer to resort to its title

to maBe it obscure) &he title may be resorted in order toremo$e, but not to create doubt or uncertainty

*REA4+LE!t is that art of the stature written immediately after its

title which states the urose, reason or justification for the

enactment of the law and usually e#ressed in the form ofHwhereasI clauses) &hough it is not, strictly seaBing, a art ofa statute, it is the Bey to the statute for its sets out theintention of the legislature) !t may restrict what otherwiseaears to be a broad scoe of a law, or re(uire, in thecommission of a crime, an element not clearly e#ressed in itste#t) !t may e#ress the legislati$e intent to maBe the lawaly retroacti$ely, in which case the law has to be gi$enretroacti$e effect, so as to carry out such intent /*N+ $) 6fficeof the *resident0)

%6N&EJ& 69 W86LE &EJ&

Legislati$e intent should accordingly be ascertained froma consideration of the whole conte#t of the stature and notfrom an isolated art of articular ro$ision /Aboiti' Shiing%or) $) %ity of %ebu0) &he conte#t may circumscribe themeaning of a statute, it may gi$e to a word or hrase ameaning different from its usual or ordinary signification) !nsuch a case, the meaning dictated by the conte#t re$ails)

E$ery section, ro$ision or clause of the statute must bee#ounded by reference to each other in order to arri$e at theeffect contemlated by the legislature) &he intention of thelegislature must be ascertained from the whole te#t of the lawand e$ery art of the act is taBen into $iew /%ommissioner of!nternal Re$eneu $) &4J Sales0)

*7N%&7A&!6N 4ARKSA semi.colon is used to indicate a searation in the

relation of the thought, a degree greater than that e#ressedby a commaF and what follows a semi.colon must ha$e a

relation to the same matter which recedes it) &he comma andthe semi.colon are both used for the same urose 3 to di$idesentences and arts of sentences, the only difference is thatsemi.colon maBes the di$ision a little more ronounced) &heyare not used to introduce a new idea)

*unctuation marBs are aids of low degree and can ne$ercontrol against the intelligible meaning of written word) &hereason is that unctuation marBs are not art of a statureF norare they art of the English language /9eliciano $) A(uino0)

%aitali'ation of Letters

LiBe unctuation marBs, caitali'ation is an aid of lowdegree in the construction of statute) E#amle" in a statutewhich ro$ides that H a will made within the *hiliine !slandsby a citi'en or subject of another state or country, which ise#ecuted in accordance with the law of the state or countryofwhich he is a citi'en or subject, and whichI , in force at a timewhen the *hiliines was still a territory of the 7S, the fact thatthe words Hstate and countryI are not caitali'ed does notmean that the 7nited States is e#cluded form the hraseHanother state or country)I

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!f the statute is based on, or is a re$ision of, a riorstatute, the latterCs ractical alication and judicialconstruction, the $arious amendments it underwent, and thecontemorary e$ents at the time of its enactment form art ofits legislati$e history) !f the statute is borrowed from, ormodeled uon, Anglo.American recedents or other foreignsources, its history includes the history of such recedents, andfor a roer construction of the statue sought to be construed,it is oftentimes essential to re$iew such legislati$e history andfind authoritati$e guide for its interretation from suchrecedents, their ractical alication , and the decisions of thecourts construing and alying such recedents in the countryof origin)

*residentCs message to legislature&he residentCs message indicates his thinBing on the

roosed legislation which , when enacted into law, follows hisline of thinBing on the matter)

E#lanatory NoteWhere there is ambiguity in a statue or where a statute

is suscetible of more than one interretation, courts mayresort to the e#lanatory note to clarify the ambiguity andascertain the urose or intent of the statute) &he statue maythen be so construed as to gi$e effect to the urose or intentas disclosed in its e#lanatory note)

Legislati$e 5ebates, $iews and deliberations%ourts may resort to the legislati$e deliberations in the

legislature on a bill which e$entually was enacted into law toascertain the meaning of its ro$isions) &hus, where there isdoubt as to what a ro$ision of a statute means, that meaningwhich was ut to the ro$ision during the legislati$edeliberation or discussion on the bill may be adoted)

8owe$er the $iews e#ressed by the legislators duringthe deliberation of a bill as to the billCs urose, meaning, oreffect are not controlling in the interretation of the law)

&he oinions e#ressed by legislators in the course ofdebates concerning the alication of e#isting laws are not alsogi$en decisi$e weight, esecially where the legislator was not amember of the assembly that enacted said laws)

Reorts of commissions!n the codification of laws, commissions are usually

formed to comile and collate all laws on articular subject andto reare the draft of the roosed code

*rior law from which statute is based!n ascertaining the intention of the lawmaBer, courts are

ermitted to looB to rior laws on the same subject and toin$estigate the antecedents of the statute in$ol$ed)%hange in hraseology by amendments

&he change in hraseology by amendment of a ro$isionof law indicates a legislati$e intent to change the meaning ofthe ro$ision from that it originally had) !n construing theamended ro$ision, courts may in$estigate the history of thero$ision to ascertain legislati$e intent as to the meaning orscoe of the amended law)

Amendment by deletionAs a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words

or hrases in a statute indicate that the legislature intended tochange the meaning of the statute, for the resumtion is thatthe legislature would not ha$e made the deletion had theintention been not to effect a change in its meaning) &heamended statute should accordingly be gi$en a constructiondifferent from that re$ious to its amendment)

E#cetions to the rule&he rule that an amendment of a statute indicates a

change in meaning from that which the statute originally hadalies only when the deleted words or hrases are notsurlusage or when the intention is clear to change there$ious meaning of the old law) &he rule does not aly wherethe intent, as shown by history of the enactment, is clear thatthe amendment is recisely to lainly e#ress that constructionof the act rior to its amendment because its language is notsufficiently e#ressi$e of such construction)

Adoted statute

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&he general rule is that where local statutes areatterned after or coied from those of another country, thedecisions of the courts in such country construing those lawsare entitled to great weight in the interretation of such localstatutes) &he reason is that the legislature, in adoting fromanother country a statute which has re$iously recei$ed judicialconstruction in that country, is deemed to ha$e adoted thestatute with such construction and ractical alication in thecountry of origin)

&he adoted statutes are thus generally construed inaccordance with the construction gi$en similar statutes in the7S, unless secial reasons, local customs, and ractice re(uireotherwise)

Limitations to the rule&he general rule that a statute which has been adoted

from that of a foreign country should be construed in

accordance with the construction gi$en it in the country oforigin is not without limitations)

*rinciles of common lawWhile common law as Bnown in Anglo.American

jurisrudence is not in force in this country, sa$e only insofaras it is founded on sound rinciles alicable to localconditions and is not in conflict with e#isting laws, ne$erthelessmany of the rinciles of the common law ha$e been imortedinto this jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws andestablishment of institutions similar those of the 7nited States)%ourts may thus roerly resort to common law rinciles inconstruing doubtful ro$isions of a statute, articularly wheresuch statute is modeled uon Anglo.American recedents)8owe$er there is a conflict between a common law rincileand a statutory ro$ision, the latter re$ails)

%onditions at time of enactment!n enacting a statute, the legislature is resumed to

ha$e taBen into account the e#isting conditions of things at thetime of its enactment) 9or this reason, it is roer, in theinterretation of a statute to consider the hysical conditions ofthe country and the circumstances then obtaining which must

of necessity affect its oeration in order to reach anunderstanding as to the intent of the legislature, or as to themeaning of the statute)

8istory of times&he court may looB to the history of the times, e#amine

the state of things e#isting when the statue was enacted, andinterret it in the light of the conditions obtaining) Generally, itmay be said that in determining the meaning, intent andurose of a law or constitutional ro$ision, the history of thetimes out of which it grew and to which it may be rationallysuosed to bear some direct relationshi, the e$ils intended tobe remedied, and the good to be accomlished are roersubjects of in(uiry)

%) %ontemoraneous %onstruction

Generally

%ontemorary or ractical constructions are theconstructions laced uon statutes at the time of, or after, theirenactment by the e#ecuti$e, legislature, or judicial authorities,as well as those who, because of their in$ol$ement in therocess of legislation, are Bnowledgeable of the intent andurose of the law, such as draftsmen and bill sonsors)$ontemporanea exposition est optima et fortissima in lege...the contemorary construction is strongest in law)

E#ecuti$e construction, generallyF Binds of

What is commonly Bnown as contemoraneousconstruction is the construction laced uon the statute by ane#ecuti$e or administrati$e officer called uon to e#ecute oradminister such statute) Accordingly, e#ecuti$e and theadministrati$e officers are generally the $ery first officials tointerret the law, rearatory to its enforcement) &hree tye ofe#ecuti$e interretations" /-0 construction by an e#ecuti$e oradministrati$e officer directly called to imlement the law,e#ressed or imlied, e#ressed such as circular, directi$e, orregulationF /10 by the Secretary of ustice in his caacity as thechief legal ad$iser of the go$ernment, in the form of oinionsissued uon the re(uest of the e#ecuti$e /20 interretation

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handed down in an ad$ersary roceeding in the form of a rulingby an e#ecuti$e officer e#ercising (uasi.judicial ower)

Weight accorded to contemoraneous constructionGenerally seaBing, where there is doubt as to the

roer interretation of a statute, the uniform constructionlaced uon it by the e#ecuti$e or administrati$e officercharged with its enforcement will be adoted, if necessary toresol$e the doubt) !n the absence of error or abuse of ower orlacB of jurisdiction or gra$e abuse of discretion clearlyconflicting with either the letter or the sirit of the legislati$eenactment creating or charging a go$ernmental agency, theaction of the agency would not be disturbed by the courts) Asatly said in a case" Hthe rincile that the contemoraneousconstruction of a statute by the e#ecuti$e officers of thego$ernment, whose duty it is to e#ecute it, is entitled to greatresect, and should ordinarily control the construction of thestatute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction

that no authorities need be cited to suort it)I

Weight accorded to usage and ractice. ac(uiesced in by all the arties concerned and has

e#tended o$er a long eriod of time%Optimus interpres rerum usus. the best interreter of

the law is usage

%onstruction of rules and regulationsAn administrati$e agency has the ower to interret its

own rules and such interretation becomes art of the rules)

Reasons why contemoraneous construction is gi$en muchweight

%ontemoraneous construction is entitled to greatweight" because /-0it comes from the articular branch ofgo$ernment called uon to imlement the law thus construed)/10 e#ecuti$e officials are resumed to ha$e familiari'edthemsel$es with all the considerations ertinent to the meaningand urose of the law, and to ha$e formed an indeendent,conscientious and cometent e#ert oinion thereon) /20 thereare fre(uently the drafters of the law they interret) !n short,

due to their cometence, e#ertness, e#erience, and informedjudgment) And there is a need for certainty and redictability inthe law)

When contemoraneous construction disregarded!t is neither controlling nor binding uon the court) &he

court may disregard the law %%, where there is no ambiguity,where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strongreason to the contrary e#ists, and where the court hasre$iously gi$en the statue a different interretation) !f it iserroneous then should be declared null and $oid)

Erroneous contemoraneous construction does not recludecorrection nor create rightsF e#cetions

&he error may be corrected when the true constructionis ascertained) As a rule, an erroneous %% creates no $estedright on the art of those who relied uon, and followed suchconstruction) A $ested right may not arise from a wrong

interretation of a law by an administrati$e or e#ecuti$e officerwhose rimary duty is to enforce, and not to construe, the law)And the go$ernment is ne$er estoed by the mistaBe or erroron the art of its agents)

&he rule is not absolute, but admits e#cetions in theinterest of justice and fair lay) /true in ta# cases0

Legislati$e interretation&he fact that the interretation of a statue is rimarily a

judicial function does not reclude the legislature formindicating its construction of a statute it enacts into law) !t maythus ro$ide in the statute itself an interretati$e or declaratoryclause rescribing rules of construction or indicating how itsro$isions should be construed) !t may also define the termsused in a statute, enact a declaratory act construing a re$iouslaw or ass a resolution indicating its sense or intention as togi$en statute) 8owe$er the legislature cannot limit or restrictthe ower granted to the courts to interret the law) While theirinterretation is not controlling, the courts may resort to it toclarify ambiguity in the language thereof) !t is entitled ofresectful consideration)

Legislati$e aro$al

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&he legislature may by action or inaction, aro$e orratify such contemoraneous construction) !t may bemanifested in many ways" as when it reenacts a statutere$iously gi$en a %%, uses words similar in their imort to thelanguage of an earlier law which has recei$ed a racticalalication or amend a rior statute without, in the amendingact, ro$iding anything which would restrict, change or nullifythe recious %% laced uon the rior law) !t may be alsoshown by the legislature aroriating money for the officerdesignated to erform a tasB ursuant to an interretation of astatute) Where the legislature has notice or Bnowledge of aconstruction laced uon a statue by an e#ecuti$e officercharged with its imlementation, without reudiating it, itssilence is ac(uiescence e(ui$alent to consent to continueractice) &here is an imlied aro$al by its failure to change alongstanding administrati$e construction)

&atihabitio mandato ae#uiparatur. legislati$e ratificationis e(ui$alent to a mandate

Reenactment&he most common act of legislati$e aro$al of %% of a

state is by reenactment) &he rincile is the reenactment of astatute, re$iously gi$en %%, is a ersuasi$e indication of theadotion by the legislature of the rior construction) !t must bereenacted and not merely amended and the %% thereof must bein the form of regulation to imlement the law and dulyublished and not merely administrati$e ruling embodied in aletter to a secified indi$idual and not ublished) !t is accordedwith greater weight and resect than the %% of the statutebefore its ratification) &he reason for such is" there is anagreement between two deartments 3 the legislati$e ande#ecuti$eO to the meaning of the law, and it de$ol$es uon thejudiciary to gi$e it deferential treatment)

Stare decisis&he decision of the S% alying or interreting a statute

is controlling with resect to the interretation of that statuteand is of greater weight than that of an e#ecuti$e oradministrati$e officer in the construction of other statutes ofsimilar imort) &he reason" the S%Cs interretation forms art ofthe statue itself and of the legal system and comes form that

branch of go$ernment entrusted with the duty to construe orinterret the law)

"tare decisis et non #uieta moere. one should followast recedents and should not be disturbed what has beensettled) &he rule rests on the desirability of ha$ing stability inthe law) 'nterest republicae ut sit finis litiumOthe interest ofthe state demands that there be an end to litigation)

9or a ruling of S% be under the doctrine of stare decisis,it must be a direct ruling and not through sub silencio andobiter dictum)

&he facts of the recedent and the case to which it isalied should be the same for stare decisis to be alied)

&he rule of stare decisis is not absolute) &he rinciledoes not blind adherence to recedents) !f it is found contraryto law, must be abandoned) &he rincile should not alywhen there is conflict between the recedent and the law)8owe$er only the S% itself can change or abandon a recedentenunciated by it, neither by inferior court, nor by legislature

unless they reeal or amend the law itself) !f the inferior courtsfeel that the recedent is against their way of reasoning, theymay state their ersonal oinion but still they are bound tofollow it)

CHAPTER IV : ADHERENCE TO, ORDEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OFSTATUTE

A. LITERAL INTERPRETATION

Lite!" Me!#i#$ % &"!i#'(e!#i#$ )"e- As a general rule, the intent of legislature to be

ascertained and thereafter gi$en effect is the intente#ressed in the language of the statute)

- *lain meaning rule" erba legis

- 'ndex animi sermo(seech is the inde# of intention)

- Verba Legis non est recedendum(from the words of a

statute there should be no dearture)- What is not clearly ro$ided in the law cannot be

e#tended to those matters outside its scoe)

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- Where what is not clearly ro$ided in the law is readinto law by construction because it is more logical andwise, it would be to encroach uon legislati$ererogati$e to define the wisdom of the law, which isjudicial legislation)

- &o deart from the meaning e#ressed by words is toalter the statute, to legislate and not to interret)

-Maledicta est expositio#uae corrumpit textum" or it is

dangerous construction which is against the te#t)

Dura Lex Sed Lex

- )bsoluta sentential expositore non indigent( When the

language of the law is clear, no e#lanation of it isre(uired)

- When the law is clear, it is not suscetible ofinterretation) !t must be alied regardless who maybe affected, e$en if it may be harsh or onerous)

- *ura lex sed lex( &he law may be harsh, but it is still

the law)

- +oc #uidem per#uam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est,

or it is e#ceedingly hard but so the law is written)- &he court should aly the law e$en if it would be harsh

or unwise)- &he duty of court in interreting a statute which is

ambiguous is not to disute its wisdomF the duty of thecourt is limited to in(uiring into the legislati$e intentand, once this is determined, to maBing said intenteffecti$e)

- When the law is clear, aeal to justice and e(uity as

justification to construe it differently are una$ailing)E(uity ! described as justice outside legality, whichsimly means that it cannot sulant although it maysulement the law)

- )e#uitas nun#uam contraenit legis(E(uity ne$er acts

in contra$ention of the law)

B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL MEANINGSt!t)te ()*t +e !&!+"e %- i#te&et!ti%#, %te/i*e

i#%&e!ti0e.

- %ourt must use e$ery authori'ed means to ascertain theintent of the statute and gi$e it an intelligible meaning)!f effort is imossible to sol$e the doubt and disel theobscurity of a statute, if no judicial certainty can be hadas to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to sulynor to maBe one)

- !f statute fails to e#ress a meaning, judicial modestyforbids court from assuming and from sulying ameaning thereto)

- 'nterpretatio fienda est ut res magis aleat#uam pereat"

that interretation as will gi$e the thing efficacy is to beadoted) A law should be interreted with a $iew touholding rather than destroying it)

W!t i* /iti# te *&iit i* /iti# te "!/.- &he intent or sirit of the law is the law itself)- As a general rule of statutory construction, the sirit or

intention of a statute re$ails o$er the letter thereof,

and what is within the sirit of a statute is within thestatute although it is not within the letter thereof, whilethat which is within the letter but not within the sirit ofthe statute is not within the statute)

- &he intent is the $ital art, the essence of the law, andthe rimary rule of construction is to ascertain and gi$eeffect to that intent)

- A law should accordingly be so construed as to be inaccordance with, and not reugnant to, the sirit of thelaw)

- &he court may consider the sirit and reason of statute

where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clearurose of the lawmaBers)

Lite!" i(&%t ()*t ie" t% i#te#t.- &he intention controls the literal interretation of a

articular language of statute)

- Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inserire(wordsought to be more subser$ient to the intent and not theintent to the words)

- !f thereCs two conflicting theories, courts choose whichbest accords with the sirit or intent of the law)

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- %onscience and e(uity should always be considered inthe construction of a statute)

- &he sirit and intendment of the law must re$ail o$erits letter)

- A statute may therefore be e#tended to cases not withinthe literal meaning of its terms, so long as they comewithin its sirit or intent)

Li(it!ti%# %- )"e- What is within the sirit of a statute e$en if not within

the letter is alicable only if there is ambiguity in thelanguage of the law)

C%#*t)ti%# t% !%(&"i* &)&%*e- Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to

be achie$ed and the e$il or mischief to be suressed,and they should be gi$en such construction as willad$ance the object, suress the mischief, and secure

the benefits intended)- %ourts should not follow the letter of a statute when to

do so would deart from the true intent of thelegislature or would otherwise yield conclusionsinconsistent with the urose of the act)

- As between two statutory interretations, that which

better ser$es the urose of the law should re$ail) whyP &he general urose is a more imortant aid to themeaning than any rule which grammar or formal logicmay lay down) /8olmes0)

- A literal interretation is to be rejected if it would be

unjust or lead to absurd results)

We# e!*%# %- "!/ e!*e*, te "!/ it*e"- e!*e*.- cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex

- raton legis est anima" the reason of the law is its soul)- &he reason behind the law is the heart of the law)

Reason of the law lays a decisi$e role in itsconstruction)

- A statute may render a rior law de$oid of reason)- Where a later law has a urose in conflict with that of a

rior statute on the same subject, the latter has lost allmeaning and function and has ceased to e#ist)

- &his may haen when the urose of the statutesought to be achie$ed by it is accomlished, or themischief sought to be reressed is re$ented, by an actor e$ent indeendent of the statute itself)

S)&&"i#$ "e$i*"!ti0e %(i**i%#- Where a literal imort of the language of a statute

shows that words ha$e been omitted that should ha$ebeen in the statute in order to carry out its intent andsirit, clearly ascertainable from the conte#t, the courtmay suly the omission to maBe the statute conform tothe ob$ious intent of the legislature or to re$ent the actfrom being absurd)

- Rule is corollary with the rule that what is within thesirit of the law is within the law)

C%eti#$ C"ei!" e%*- &he court, in order to carry out the ob$ious intent of the

legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistaBes ormisrints which, if uncorrected would render the statutemeaningless, emty or nonsensical or would defeat orimair its intended oeration, so long as the meaningintended is aarent on the face of the whole enactmentand no secific ro$ision is abrogated)

- !t is the duty of the court to arri$e at the legislati$eintent)

- &he court is not indulging judicial legislation, it is merelyendea$oring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error)

)!"i-i!ti%# %- )"e

- What the courts may correct to reflect intention oflegislature are those which are clearly clerical errors orob$ious mistaBes, omissions, misrints)

- &o correct a clear statute would be rewriting the law anddo judicial legislation in the disguise of interretation)

C%#*t)ti%# t% !0%i !+*)it- General terms of a statute should be so limited in their

alication as not to lead to absurdities) !t is resumedthat the legislature intended e#cetions to its languagewhich would a$oid absurd conse(uences)

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- 'nterpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut

eitetur inconeniens et absurdum( Where there isambiguity, such interretation as will a$oidincon$enience and absurdity is to be adoted)

- Where literal adherence to the language would result toabsurdity, the court has the ower to suly or omit thewords from a statute in order to re$ent an absurdresult)

- %ourts test the law by its result) &here are laws whichare generally $alid but may seem arbitrary when aliedin a articular case because of its eculiar circumstance)%ourts are not bound to aly them in sla$ish obedienceto their language)

- A law should not be interreted so as not to causeinjustice)

- Where a term is defined in a statute, the court may notconstrue it to e#clude what is included therein as torestrict its scoe)

C%#*t)ti%# t% !0%i i#4)*tie- &he resumtion is that the legislature in enacting a

law, did not intent to worB a hardshi or an oressi$eresult, a ossible abuse of authority or act oforession, arming one erson with a weaon to imosehardshi on another)

- a est accipienda interpretatio #uae itio caret" that

interretation is to be adoted which is free from e$il orinjustice)

C%#*t)ti%# t% !0%i !#$e t% &)+"i i#tee*t- !t is a well established rule of statutory construction that

where great incon$enience will result, or great ublicinterest will be endangered or sacrificed, or greatmischief done, from a articular construction of astatute, such construction is to be a$oided)

- %ourts should resume that such construction was notintended by the legislature)

C%#*t)ti%# i# -!0% %- i$t !# 4)*tie- Any doubt in the construction of a statute should be

resol$ed in fa$or of right and justice)

- &he fact that a statute is silent, obscure or insufficientwith resect to a (uestion before the court will notjustify the latter from declining to render judgmentthereon)

- -ure naturae ae#uum est neminem cum alterius

detrimento et inuria fieri locupletiorem, which wasrestated with ninguno non deue enri#uecersetortizeramente con da/o de otro. %ourts in$oBe theserinciles when the statutes are silent or obscure inorder to arri$e at a solution that would resond to the$ehement /assionate0 urge of conscience)

- !n balancing conflicting solutions, that one is ercei$edto ti the scales which the court belie$es will bestromote the ublic welfare in its robable oeration as ageneral rule or rincile)

S)&")*!$e !# *)&e-")it i*e$!e

- surplusagium non noceat(surlusage does not $itiate a

statute)- 0tile per inutile non itiatur( the useful is not itiated

by the non%useful.- Where a word, hrase or clause in a statute is de$oid of

meaning in relation to the conte#t or intent of thestatute or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies thestatute or renders it without sense, the word, hrase, orclause may be rejected as a surlusage and entirelyignored)

Re)#!#t /%* (! +e e4ete

-General rule is that e$ery effort should be made to gi$esome meaning to e$ery art of a statute) &his rule doesnot imose uon the courts an imerati$e obligation togi$e e$ery redundant word or hrase a secialsignificance, contrary to the manifest intention of thelegislature)

- A ossible interretation which would defeat the wholeurose of the law is to be rejected)

- When the use of word is merely to reiterate or reeat, itcarries out the intention of the legislature)

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O+*)e % (i**i#$ /% % -!"*e e*i&ti%# (! #%t&e")e %#*t)ti%#

- %ourt should not and cannot always be bound by thehraseology or literal meaning of a statute)

- &hat some words may be missing due to clerical errorsor false descrition does not reclude construction nor$itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise

clear)

- 1alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat(

9alse descrition does not reclude construction nor$itiate the meaning of the statute)

E5e(&ti%# -%( i$i !&&"i!ti%# %- "!/

- E$ery rule is not without e#cetion

- 'bi #uid generaliter conceditur2 inest haec exception, si

non ali#uid sit contras us bas#ue, which means thatwhere anything is granted generally, this e#cetion isimliedF that nothing shall be contrary to law and right)

-E(uity and other comelling reasons may justify ane#cetion to a rule e$en when the rule does not ro$ideany)

- !f the alication of law will re$ent a fair and imartialin(uiry into the actual facts of a case, justice demandsthat the general rule should yield to occasionale#cetions)

- "ummum us, summa inuria" the rigor of the law would

become the highest injustice)- Where rigid and strict alication of law would worB

injustice, an e#emtion therefrom to re$ent such result

on humanitarian and e(uitable grounds is warranted,although the literal imort of the law suggests no suche#emtion)

L!/ %e* #%t e6)ie te i(&%**i+"e

- The law obliges no one to erform an imossibility,

e#ressed in the ma#im, nemo tenetur ad impossibile.!n other words, there is no obligation to do animossible thing) 'mpossibilium nulla obligation est.

- Statutes should not be construed as to re(uirecomliance with what it rescribes, which is imossibleF

but in such a way that substantial comliance with whatthe law re(uires is sufficient)

N)(+e !# $e#e %- /%*- it is a ma#im of statutory construction that when the

conte#t if a statute so indicates in lural include thesingular, and $ice $ersa)

-A lural word in a statute may thus aly to a singularerson or thing, just as a singular word may embracetwo or more ersons or things)

- !t is also a rule of statutory construction that inconstruing a statute, the masculine, but not thefeminine, includes all genders, unless the conte#t inwhich the word is used in the statute indicatesotherwise)

C. IMPLICATIONSD%ti#e %- #ee**! i(&"i!ti%#

-What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all.embracing legislation may be inade(uate to ro$ide forfuture e$ents, thereby creating gas in the law) 6ne ofthe rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gais the doctrine of necessary imlication)

- 5octrine states that what is imlied in a statute is asmuch a art thereof as that which is e#ressed)

- E$ery statute is understood by imlication to contain allsuch ro$isions that are needed to effectuate itsurose)

- x necessitate legisor from the necessity of the law)

-

E$ery statutory grant of ower, right or ri$ilege isdeemed to include all incidental ower, right orri$ilege) &his is because in eo #uod plus sit, semperinest et minus.

- Hnecessary imlicationI" it is one which under thecircumstances, is comelled by a reasonable $iew of thestatute, and the contrary of which would be imrobableand absurd)

- HNecessityI" defines what may roerly and logically beinferred from and read into the statute)

- &his doctrine may not be used to justify the inclusion ina statute of what to the court aears to be wise and

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just, unless it is at the same time necessarily andlogically within its terms)

- What may be necessarily imlied from a statute should,in any e$ent, be consistent with, and not contrary to,the constitution or to e#isting laws) An imlication whichis $iolati$e of the law is unjustified or unwarranted)

Re(e !&&"ie -%( ! i$t

- Where there is a right, there is a remedy) 0bi us, ibi

remedium- &he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does

not reclude him from $indicating his right, for suchremedy is imlied from such right)

- Such right enforces itself by its own inherent otencyand uissance, and from which all legislation must taBetheir bearings)

- HwrongI means deri$ation or $iolation of a right, and isnot e(ui$alent to Herror)I

G!#t %- 4)i*iti%#- Settled is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide

cases is conferred only by the %onstitution or by theStatute)

- urisdiction cannot be imlied from the language of astatute, in the absence of a clear legislati$e intent tothat effect)

W!t (! +e i(&"ie -%( $!#t %- 4)i*iti%#- to emloy all writs, rocesses and other means essential

to maBe its jurisdiction effecti$e)- *ower to do all things which are reasonably necessary

for the administration of justice within the scoe of itsjurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgmentsand mandates, e$en though the court may be called todecide matters which would not be within its cogni'anceas original caused of action)

- !t can grant reliefs incidental to the main cause ofaction)

G!#t %- &%/e i#")e* i#ie#t!" &%/e

- As a rule, where a general ower is conferred or dutyenjoined, e$ery articular ower necessary for thee#ercise of one or the erformance of the other is alsoconferred) &he incidental owers are those which arenecessarily included in, and are therefore of lesserdegree than the ower granted) !t cannot e#tend toother matters not embraced therein, nor are not

incidental thereto)- *ower conferred by law uon an administrati$e officer to

issue rules and regulations to carry out the uroses ofa statute he is called uon to e#ecute includes theauthority to delegate to a subordinate officer theerformance of a articular function, absent any e#ressor imlied ro$ision to the contrary)

G!#t %- &%/e e5")e* $e!te &%/e- the rincile that the grant of ower includes all

incidental owers necessary to maBe the e#ercise

thereof effecti$e imlies the e#clusion of those which aregreater than that conferred)

W!t i* i(&"ie *%)" #%t +e !$!i#*t te "!/.

- The statutory grant of ower does not include such

incidental ower which cannot be e#ercised without$iolating the %onstitution, the statute conferring theower, or other laws on the same subject)

A)t%it t% !$e !$!i#*t &)+"i -)#* (! #%t +ei(&"ie

-

7nless a statute e#ressly so authori'es, no claimagainst ublic funds may be allowed) Accordingly, astatute may not be so construed as to authori'e, byimlication, a charge against ublic funds)

I""e$!"it %- !t i(&"ie -%( &%i+iti%#- Where a statute rohibits the doing of an act, the act

done in $iolation thereof is by imlication null and $oid)- &he rohibited act cannot ser$e as a foundation of a

cause of action for relief)

- x dolo malo non oritur(no man can be allowed to

found a claim uon his own wrongdoing or ine(uity

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- 3ullus commodum capere potest de inuria sua propria(

no man should be allowed to taBe ad$antage of his ownwrong)

- !t is oularly Bnown by the ma#im" 'n pari delicto

potior est condition defendentis

E5e&ti%#* t% te )"e

- the rincile ofpari delictorecogni'es certain

e#cetions)- !t will not aly when its enforcement or alication will

$iolate an a$owed fundamental olicy or ublic interest)- Another e#emtion is that when the transaction is not

illegal er se but merely rohibited and the rohibitionby law is designed for the rotection of one arty, thecourt may grant relief in fa$or of the latter)

W!t !##%t +e %#e iet" !##%t +e %#e i#iet"

-4uando ali#uid prohibetur ex directo, prohibeturet perobli#uum

- What the law rohibits cannot, in some other way, belegally accomlished)

Tee *%)" +e #% &e#!"t -% %(&"i!#e %- "!/.9or simle logic, fairness and reason cannot countenance ane#action or a enalty for an act faithfully done in comliancewith the law

CHAPTER 7: INTERPRETATION OF

WORDS AND PHRASESGe#e!""

- A word or hrase used in a statute may ha$e anordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercialor trade meaning)

- Which meaning should be gi$en deends uon what thelegislature intended) As a general rule in interreting themeaning and scoe of a term used in the law, a carefulre$iew of the whole law in$ol$ed, as well as theintendment of law, ascertained from a consideration ofthe statute as a whole and not of an isolated art or a

articular ro$ision alone, must be made to determinethe real intent of the law)

St!t)t% De-i#iti%#

- &he legislati$e definition controls the meaning of astatutory word, irresecti$e of any other meaning theword or hrase may ha$e in its ordinary or usual sense)

- 9or the legislature, in adoting a secific definition isdeemed to ha$e restricted the meaning of the wordwithin the terms of the definition)

- When the legislature defines a word, it does not usurthe courtCs function to interret the laws but it merelylegislates what should form art of the law itself)

- While the definition of terms in a statute must be gi$enall the weight due to them in the construction of thero$ision in which they are used, the terms or hrasesbeing art and arcel of the whole statute must be gi$eneffect in their entirety as a harmonious, coordinated and

integrated unit, not as a mass of heterogeneous andunrelated if not incongruous terms, clauses andsentences)

)!"i-i!ti%# %- )"e- &he statutory definition of a word or term Has used in

this ActI is controlling only in so far as said act isconcerned)

- &he general rule that the statutory definitions controlthe meaning of statutory words does not aly where itsalication creates ob$ious incongruities in the languageof the statute, destroys one of its major uroses, orbecomes illogical as a result of a change in its factualbasis)

- 8owe$er, in a subse(uent case, it was held that of astatute remains unchanged, it must be interretedaccording to its clear, original mandate until thelegislature amends it)

W%* %#*t)e i# tei %i#! *e#*e- !n construing words and hrases, the general rule is that

in the absence of legislati$e intent to the contrary, they

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should be gi$en their lain, ordinary, and commonusage meaning)

- 9or words are resumed to ha$e been emloyed by thelawmaBer in their ordinary and common use andaccetation)

- &he grammatical and ordinary reading of a statute mustbe resumed to yield its correct sense)

- 0bi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus

Ge#e!" W%* %#*t)e $e#e!""

- Generalia erba sunt generaliter intelligenda or what is

generally soBen shall be generally understood orgeneral words shall be understood in a general sense)

- Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A

general statement is understood in a general sense)- Where a word used in a statute has both a restricted

and general meaning, the general must re$ail o$er the

restricted unless the nature of the subject matter or theconte#t in which it is emloyed clearly indicates that thelimited sense is intended)

- A general word should not be gi$en a restricted meaningwhere no restriction is indicated)

Ge#ei te( i#")e* ti#$* t!t !i*e tee!-te- rogressi$e interretation" e#tends by construction the

alication of a statute to all subjects or conditionswithin its general urose or scoe that come intoe#istence subse(uent to its assage and thus Bees

legislation from becoming ehemeral and transitoryunless there is a legislati$e intent to the contrary)- !t is a rule of statutory construction that legislati$e

enactments in general and comrehensi$e terms,rosecti$e in oeration, aly aliBe to all ersons,subjects and business within their general ur$iew andscoe coming into e#istence subse(uent to theirassage)

W%* /it %((ei!" % t!e (e!#i#$- Words and *hrases, which are in common use among

merchants and traders, ac(uire trade or commercial

meanings which are generally acceted in thecommunity in which they ha$e been in common use)

- Settled is the rule that in the absence of legislati$eintent to the contrary, trade or commercial terms, whenused in a statute are resumed to ha$e been used intheir trade or commercial sense)

W%* /it te#i!" % "e$!" (e!#i#$- As a general rule, words that ha$e or ha$e been used in,

a technical sense or those that ha$e been judiciallyconstrued to ha$e a certain meaning should beinterreted according to the sense in which they ha$ebeen re$iously used, although the sense may $ary fromthe strict or literal meaning of the words)

- &he technical or legal, not the ordinary or generalmeaning of a word used in a statute should be adotedin the construction of the statute, in the absence of nay(ualification or intention to the contrary)

H%/ ie#ti!" te(* i# *!(e *t!t)te %#*t)e- &he general rule is that a word or hrase reeatedly

used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughoutthe statute)

- &he same word or substantially the same hraseaearing in different arts of a statute will be accordeda generally acceted and consistent meaning, unless adifferent intention aears or is clearly e#ressed)

- &he reason for the rule is that a word used in a statutein a gi$en sense is resumed to be used in the samesense throughout the law)

- !t is articularly alicable where in the statute thewords aear so near each other hysically andarticularly where the word has a technical meaning andthat meaning has been defined in the statute)

Me!#i#$ %- /% 6)!"i-ie + &)&%*e %- *t!t)te

- &he meaning of a words or hrase used in a statute maybe (ualified by the urose which induced the legislatureto enact the statute)

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- !n construing a word or hrase, the court should adotthat interretation that accords best with the manifesturose of the statute or romotes or reali'es its object)

- !t is generally recogni'ed that if a statute is ambiguousand caable of more than one construction, the literalmeaning of the word or hrase used therein may berejected if the result of adoting such meaning will be to

defeat the urose which the legislature had in mind)

W% % &!*e %#*t)e i# e"!ti%# t% %te &%0i*i%#*- &he general rule is that a word, hrase or ro$ision

should not be construed in isolation but must beinterreted in relation to other ro$isions of the law)&his rule is a $ariation of the rule that a statute shouldbe construed as a whole, and each of its ro$isions mustbe gi$en effect)

- A word or ro$ision should not be construed in isolationfrom, but should be interreted in relation to, the other

ro$isions of a statute or other statutes dealing on thesame subject)

- &he word or ro$ision should not be gi$en a meaningthat will restrict or defeat, but should instead beconstrued to effectuate, what has been intended in anenacting law)

Me!#i#$ %- te( it!te + %#te5t

- While ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will begi$en its usual and commonly understood meaning, theconte#t in which the word or term is emloyed maydictate a different sense)

- &he conte#t in which the word is used oftentimesdetermines its meaning)

- A word is understood in the conte#t in which it is used)

Verba accipienda sunt secundum materiam- &he conte#t may liBewise gi$e a broad sense to a word

of otherwise ordinarily limited meaning)- &he conte#t may also limit the meaning of what

otherwise is a word of broad signification)

Wee te "!/ %e* #%t i*ti#$)i*

- Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not

distinguish) 0bi lex non distinguit, nec nos distingueredebemus.

- &he rule founded on logic, is a corollary of the rincilethat general words and hrases in a statute shouldordinarily be accorded their natural and generalsignificance

- &he rule re(uires that a general term or hrase shouldnot be reduced into arts and one art distinguishedfrom the other so as to justify its e#clusion from theoeration of the law)

- A corollary of the rincile is the rule that where the lawdoes not maBe any e#cetion, court may not e#cetsomething therefrom, unless there is comelling reasonaarent in the law to justify it)

- 0bi lex non distinguit, nec non distinguere debemus,

alies not only in the construction of general words ande#ressions used in a statute but also in the

interretation of a rule laid down therein)- &his rincile assumes that the legislature made no

(ualification in the use of a general word or e#ression)- &he courts may distinguish when there are facts or

circumstances showing that the legislature intended adistinction or (ualification, for in such a case, the courtsmerely gi$e effect to the legislati$e intent)

Di*4)#ti0e !# %#4)#ti0e /%*- &he word HorI is a disjuncti$e term signifying

disassociation and indeendence of one thing from each

of the other things enumerated) !t should be construedin the sense in which it ordinarily imlies, as adisjuncti$e word)

- &he use of the disjuncti$e word HorI between twohrases connotes that either hrase ser$es as (ualifyinghrase)

- &he term HorI has sometimes been held to mean HandI,when the sirit or conte#t of the law so warrants)

- &he word HorI may also be used as the e(ui$alent ofHthat is to sayI gi$ing that which it receded it the samesignificance as that which follows it) !t is not always

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disjuncti$e and is sometimes interretati$e or e#ositoryof the receding word)

- &he word HorI may also mean successi$ely)- &he word HandI is a conjunction ertinently defined as

meaning Htogether withI, Hjoined withI, Halong ortogether withI, Hadded to or linBed toI, used to conjoinword with word, hrase with hrase, clause with clause)

- &he word HandI does not mean HorIF it is a conjunctionused to denote a joinder or union, Hbinding togetherI,Hrelating the one to the otherI)

- 8owe$er, HandI may mean HorI as an e#cetion to therule) &he e#cetion is resorted to only when a literalinterretation would er$ert the lain intention of thelegislature as gleaned from the conte#t of the statute orfrom e#ternal factors)

Noscitur a sociis- Where a articular word or hrase is ambiguous in itself

or is e(ually suscetible of $arious meanings, its correctconstruction may be made clear and secific byconsidering the comany of words in which it is found orwith which it is associated)

- Where the law does not define a word used therein, itwill be construed as ha$ing a meaning similar to that ofwords associated with or accomanied by it)

- A word, hrase should be interreted in relation to, orgi$en the same meaning of, words with which it isassociated)

- Where most of the words in an enumeration of words ina statute are used in their generic and ordinary sense,the rest of the words should similarly be construed)

- Where a word with more than one meaning is associatedwith words ha$ing secific or articular signification, theformer should be gi$en a secific or articularsignification)

Ejusdem generic- While general words or e#ressions in a statute are, as a

rule, accorded their full, natural, and generic sense, theywill not be gi$en such meaning if they are used inassociation with secific words or hrases)

- General rule is that where a general word or hrasefollows an enumeration of articular and secific wordsof the same class or where the latter follow the former,the general word or hrase is to be construed to include,or to be restricted to, ersons, things, or cases aBin to,resembling, or of the same Bind or class as thosesecifically mentioned)

- Where a statute describes things of articular class orBind accomanied by words of a generic character, thegeneric words will usually be limited to things of aBindred nature with those articularly enumerated,unless there be something in the conte#t of the statuteto reel such inference)

- *urose" gi$e effect to both the articular and generalwords, by treating the articular words as indicating theclass and the general words as indicating all that isembraced in said class, although not secifically namedby articular words)

- &his rincile is based on the roosition that had thelegislature intended the general words to be used intheir generic and unrestricted sense, it would not ha$eenumerated the secific words)

- Alication" where secific and generic terms of thesame nature are emloyed in the same act, the latterfollowing the former)

Li(it!ti%#* %- Ejusdem generic- &o be alicable, the following must concur"

o Statute contains an enumeration of articular and

secific words, followed by a general word orhrase)

o &he articular and secific words constitute a

class or are of the same Bindo Enumeration of the articular and secific words

is not e#hausti$e or is not merely by e#amleso No indication of legislati$e intent to gi$e the

general words or hrases a broader meaning

- &he rule of eusdem generic does not re(uire the

rejection of general terms entirely)

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- &he rule is not of uni$ersal alication, it should be usedto carry out, not to defeat, the intent or urose of thelaw)

- !f that intent clearly aears from other arts of the law,

and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary tothe result which will be reached by alying the rule ofeusdem generic, the rule must gi$e way in fa$or of thelegislati$e intent)

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius- E#ress mention of one erson, thing or conse(uence

imlies the e#clusion of all others)- !t is formulated in a number of ways"

o 6ne $ariation of the rules is the rincile that

what is e#ressed uts an end to that which isimlied xpressum facit cessare tacitum

o General e#ression followed by e#cetions

therefrom imlies that those which do not fall

under the e#cetions come within the scoe ofthe general e#ression) xceptio firmat regulamin casibus non exceptis

o E#ression of one or more things of a class

imlies the e#clusion of all not e#ressed, e$enthough all would ha$e been imlies had nonebeen e#ressed)

- &he rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its

$ariations are canons of restricti$e interretation)- +asis" legislature would not ha$e made secified

enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to

restrict its meaning and confine its terms to thosee#ressly mentioned) &hey are oosite the doctrine ofnecessary imlication)

Ne$!ti0e'%&&%*ite %ti#e

- &he rincile that what is e#ressed uts an end to that

which is imlied is also Bnown as negati$e.ositi$edoctrine or argumentum a contrario.

A&&"i!ti%# %- expressio unius )"e

- &he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its

corollary canons are generally used in the constructionof statutes granting owers, creating rights andremedies, restricting common rights, and imosingenalties and forfeitures, as well as those statutes whichare strictly construed)

- Where a statute directs the erformance of certain actsby a articular erson or class or ersons, it imlies thatit shall not be done otherwise or be a different erson orclass of ersons)

- !f a statute enumerates the things uon which it is tooerate, e$erything else must necessarily, and byimlication, be e#cluded)

Li(it!ti%#* %- )"e

- &he rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a

rule of law) !t is a mere tool of statutory construction ora means of ascertaining the legislati$e intent)

- &he rule, not being infle#ible nor a mechanical ortechnical tool, must yield to what is clearly a legislati$eintent)

- !t is no more than an au#iliary rule of interretation tobe ignored where other circumstances indicate that theenumeration was not intended to be e#clusi$e)

- !t should alied only as a means of disco$eringlegislati$e intent and should not be ermitted to defeatthe lainly indicated urose of the legislature)

- !t will not aly where the enumeration is by way ofe#amle or to remo$e doubts only)

-

!t will not aly in case a statute aears uon its faceto limit the oeration of its ro$isions to articularersons or things by enumerating them, but no reasone#ists why other ersons or things not so enumeratedshould not ha$e been included and manifest injusticewill follow by not including them)

- &he rule may be disregarded of it will result toincongruities or a $iolation of the e(ual rotection clauseof the constitution, incon$enience, hardshi and injuryto the ublic interest)

- Where the legislati$e intent shows that the enumerationis not e#clusi$e, the ma#im does not aly)

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D%ti#e %- casus omissus

- &he rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est

states that a erson, object or thing omitted from anenumeration must be held to ha$e been omittedintentionally)

- *rincile roceeds from a reasonable certainty that aarticular erson, object or thing has been omitted froma legislati$e enumeration

- &he rule does not aly where it is shown that thelegislature did not intend to e#clude the erson, thing,object from the enumeration) !f such legislati$e intent isclearly indicated, the court may suly the omission if todo so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature andwill not do $iolence to its language)

D%ti#e %- "!*t !#teee#t

- ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or

hrases to which they are immediately associated) &heydo not (ualify words or hrases which are distantly orremotely located)

- !n the absence of legislati$e intent to the contrary,referential and (ualifying words and hrases must bealied only to their immediate or last antecedent, andnot to the other remote or receding words orassociation of words)

- &he ma#im e#ressi$e of this rule is proximum

antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sententia, orrelati$e words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless

the conte#t otherwise re(uires)- &he use of comma to searate an antecedent from the

rest e#erts a dominant influence in the alication of thedoctrine of last antecedent)

)!"i-i!ti%# %- te %ti#e- 5octrine of last antecedent is subject to the e#cetion

that where the intention of the law is to aly thehrase to all antecedents embraced in the ro$ision, thesame should be made e#tensi$e to the whole)

- Slight indication of legislati$e intent so to e#tend therelati$e term is sufficient) Nor does the doctrine aly

where the intention is not to (ualify the antecedent atall)

Reddendo singular singulis

- &he $ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent is the

rule of reddendo singular singulis) &he ma#im meansreferring each to eachF referring each hrase ore#ression to its aroriate object, or let each be ut inits roer lace, that is, the words should be taBendistributi$ely)

- &eddendo singular singulisre(uires that the antecedents

and conse(uences should be read distributi$ely to theeffect that each word is to be alied to the subject towhich it aears by conte#t most aroriately relatedand to which it is most alicable)

P%0i*%*, $e#e!""- &he office of a ro$iso is either to limit the alication of

the enacting clause, section, or ro$ision of a statute, orto e#cet something therefrom, or to (ualify or restrainits generality , or to e#clude some ossible ground ofmisinterretation of it, as e#tending to cases notintended by the legislature to be brought within itsur$iew)

- !ts rimary urose is to limit or restrict the generallanguage or oeration of the statute, not to enlarge it)

- A ro$iso is commonly found at the end of a section, orro$ision of a statute and is introduced, as a rule by theword H*ro$idedI

-

What determines whether a clause is a ro$iso is itssubstance rather than its form) !f it erforms any of thefunctions of a ro$iso, then it will be regarded as such,irresecti$e of what word or hase is used to introduceit) !t is a (uestion of legislati$e intent)

P%0i*% (! e#"!$e *%&e %- "!/

- It has been held that He$en though the rimary urose

of the ro$iso is to limit or restrain the general languageof a statute, the legislature, unfortunately, does notalways use it with technical correctnessF conse(uently,where its use creates an ambiguity, it is the duty of the

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court to ascertain the legislati$e intention, throughresort to the usual rules of construction alicable tostatutes generally and gi$e it effect e$en though thestatute is thereby enlarged, or the ro$ision made toassume the force of indeendent enactment andalthough a ro$iso as such has no e#istence aart fromwhich it is designed to limit or (ualify)

- A ro$iso may thus enlarge, instead of restrict or limit,what otherwise is a hrase of limited imort has therebeen no ro$iso (ualifying it)

P%0i*% !* !iti%#!" "e$i*"!ti%#

- A ro$iso may also assume the role of an additionallegislation)

- A clear and un(ualified urose e#ressed in theoening statement of a section of a statute comrisingse$eral subdi$isions has been construed as controllingand limiting a ro$iso attached to one of the

subdi$isions, where the ro$iso, if segregatedtherefrom, would mean e#actly the re$erse of what itnecessarily imlied when read in connection with thelimitation)

W!t &%0i*% 6)!"i-ie*

- The general rule is that the office of the ro$iso (ualifies

or modifies only the hrase immediately receding it orrestrains or limits the generality of the clause that itimmediately follows)

- Itshould be confined to that which directly recedes it,

or to the section to which it has been aended, unlessit clearly aears that the legislature intended it to ha$ea wider scoe)

E5e&ti%# t% te )"e

- Where the legislati$e intent is to restrain or (ualify notonly the hrase immediately receding it but also earlier

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