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Ageing Management of Civil
Structures:
Some Aspects of eDF's In-
Service Inspection Program and
Risk Informed Approach
Alexis COURTOIS ([email protected]), Frederic
COPPEL ([email protected]), Etienne
GALLITRE, Frederic TAILLADE
4th International Conference on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management
Lyon, France
23-27 October 2017
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CONTENT
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
1. OVERVIEW OF THE EDF’S AGEING MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
2. LONG TERM BEHAVIOR MONITORING OF CONTAINMENTS
FEATURES OF PWR FRENCH CONTAINMENTS
SURVEILLANCE PRINCIPLES
MONITORING SYSTEM
DATA MANAGEMENT : FROM IN-SITU MEASUREMENT TO DIAGNOSIS
3. APPREHENSION OF RISKS OF INTERNAL EXPANSION OF THE CONCRETE ON EDF OPERATING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
RISK OF INTERNAL EXPANSION DUE TO DEF OR AAR
METHODOLOGY USED BY EDF
APPLICATION
4. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
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AGEING MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR CIVIL
STRUCTURES AT EDF
� Ageing management has been implemented on civil
structures at eDF since the 1990’
� Comparison with IAEA NS-G-2.12:
� “Régles Nationales de Maintenance” is close to what is called
“Ageing Management Program” (AMP) by IAEA standards
� “Fiche d’Analyse du Vieillissement” is equivalent to “Ageing
Management Review”. 66 mechanisms related to 11 generic
systems (containment, pools, anchoragesD) are addressed.
� “Dossier d’Aptitude à la Poursuite d’Exploitation” is close to
Time Limited Ageing Analysis “TLAA”
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
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AGEING MECHANISMS ANALYSIS
The analysis consists in answering to the questions:
� What is the design life time hypothesis?
� Is it a potential threat or a phenomenon already observed?
� Did we encounter difficulties that could affect a safety function?
� Is the maintenance program adapted?
� Is a possible repair easy to implement?
� Is there any risk of obsolescence of the system?
Additional questions for Long Term Operation:
� Is there any regulation or qualification requirements that could affect operation time?
� Is there any additional inspection or maintenance to perform for LTO?
� What is the expected life time of the items and what is the assessment basis?
Two ageing mechanisms that have to be followed-up:
� Concrete creep of prestressed containment vessel
� Internal expansion reactions in concrete structures (AAR and DEF)
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
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PHENOMENON:
CREEP OF CONCRETE CONTAINMENT
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
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WHY A CONTAINMENT MONITORING SYSTEM IN
OPERATION?� eDF made the choice of PWR with prestressed concrete containment
� French containment prestressing systems are cement grouted
(bonded tendons):
• effective protection against corrosion
• additional strength for overdesign situation
• no direct inspection
• no re-tensioning
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
Grouting with special grout Anchorage systemTendons ducts
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SURVEILLANCE PRINCIPLES
� “Allowable” creep concrete strains and displacement are assessed by
design (consistent with acceptable prestressing lossess)
� Monitoring of concrete strains/displacement to assess prestressing
losses over time
� Monitoring the actual structural behavior under pressure
� Use of specific instrumentation
� Periodic monitoring reports (2 or 5 year period)
Monitoring data
Pressure
Strain
In operation
In pressure test
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STANDARD MONITORING SYSTEM
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
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VWSG AND PENDULUM
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
Embedded VWSG layout, vertical cross section of
containment
Vibrating Wire Strain Gages (VWSG, embedded within concrete wall)
Elongation of the wire is linked to wire Eigen frequency
Temperature probe
(Pt100)
Pendulum for horizontal displacement
measurement
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IN CASE OF VWSG FAILURE, MIND THE
SURFACE EXTENSOMETERS!
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
7 years for designing and testing the system on operation conditionsD
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COMPARISON EMBEDDED / SURFACE
EXTENSOMETERS
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
Surface sensor
Embedded sensor
Strain
Time
Pressure
Strain
Surface sensor
Embedded sensor
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DATA GENERATION AND MANAGEMENT WITH
KOALA SOFTWARE
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
Raw dataPerioddicity
depends upon
operation
rules
Operatorof measurements
of structural behaviour
Storageof data (temperature effect)
Corrected data
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PHENOMENON:
CONCRETE INTERNAL EXPANSION
PLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
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Environmental effects and various others phenomena can cause
ageing of NPP structures.
One of these phenomena is the internal expansion of concrete
which can be caused by alkali aggregate reaction (AAR) and / or
internal sulfate attack (Delayed Ettringite Formation=DEF).
Aggregates
DEF
Cement paste
Sound
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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AAR on EDF Nuclear Power Plants : � ~12 slightly affected by AAR (almost pop
outs and AAR gels only )
Pop out :
cracked coating
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
DEF on EDF Nuclear Power Plants�2 slightly affected structures, discovered around 2008
• Precast concrete columns cast in the early 1980’s
• Mass concrete underground structure , cast in the late 1980
- Very slow swelling (< 10µm/m/year)
- Detected by sensor monitoring only
AAR Gel (silicone and
alkalis – calcium poor)
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No prevention of AAR and DEF was
existing at the time of construction for
power plants built before 1985.
This is why EDF has since defined a
methodology for the AAR and DEF
appraisal on these power plants.
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
The EDF methodology is based
on IFSTTAR recommandations
“Management of structures
affected by internal expansive
reactions of concrete”
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- 6 levels of theoretical risk are defined : MB0 (negligible) , MB1 (low),
MB2 (medium), MB3 (high) and MB4 (very high)
- The parameters required to determine the theoretical risk of AAR are
illustrated below :Alkali content in
concrete
MB risk
Humidity exposure
Aggregate reactivity
Methodology developed by EDF in order to estimate the
theoretical risk of AAR
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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� 5 levels of theoretical risk are defined : OB0, OB1, OB2, OB3, OB4
� The parameters required to determine the theoretical risk of DEF are
illustrated below :
Maximum temperature
reached during hydration
OB risk
Humidity/water exposure
Concrete sensitivity:
-Alkali content in concrete
-Cement or binder composition
Methodology to estimate the theoretical risk of DEF
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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For the reactor building, depending on the availability of data :
o level 1 : building = internal containement of the reactor building
o level 2 : part of the building = dome, raft, containment wall
o level 3 : concrete layer
ex : NPP 2
ex : NPP 1
1
Application to EDF Nuclear Power Plants buildings
NPP Dome Contain. wall Gusset Raft
Max. DEF
risk
OB0 OB0 OB1 OB2
Fiability poor poor poor poor
AAR AND DEF APPRAISAL FOR EXISTING
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
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Precisely defined in a civil works preventive maintenance policy
(made available for safety authorities)
Surveillance strategy based on the MBi / OBi classification of each
building, in application of the general methodology
IN SITU ASSESSMENT
- MB0/OB0 classification: no specific action
- MB1-MB2/OB1-OB2 classification: simplifiedsurveillance
- 3 zones by building
- MB3-MB4/OB3-OB4 classification: complete surveillance
- 6 zones by building
Counting of pop outs
Fluorescence using
uranyl acetate
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
0 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32 36 40 44 48 52
Exp
an
sio
n (µ
m/m
)
Age (semaines)
B1 sain 1017 K4B
B1 fissuré 1017 K8B
B1 très fissuré 1017 K12B
B2 879 K3 sain
B2 879 K5A sain
B2 879 K12 fissuré
B2 879 K14 A fissuré
B2 879 K18 fissuré
B2 879 K20 A très fissuré
B2 879 K27 A très fissuré
B3 sain 1018 K4B
B3 fissuré 1018 K8B
B4 sain 1019 K4B
B4 très fissuré 1019 K9B
Residual
expansion
test
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Step 1: in situ detection
Step 3:
enhanced
surveillance
Step 2: diagnosis
on samples
IN SITU ASSESSMENT
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CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES� As an illustration of eDF’s AMP, two examples have been presented:
� Containment concrete creep monitoring
� AAR and DEF appraisal for existing structures
� Approach fully consistent with NS-G 2.12 IAEA standard
� Collecting useful records (design, construction, inspection and monitoring) is a
key point for an effective AMP:
� Provide appropriate database since the beginning of the projects is highly
recommended.
� Data management in the eDF’s Vercors project may be considered as an example of
good practice.
� New tools and new methods are needed to improve structural health monitoring
for LTO:
� Knowledge on behavior at different scales (materials, specimen, real structures)
� Non Destructive Tests / monitoring devices for cracking, steel rebars or tendons
corrosion, concrete water contentD
� Methods to combine all the records to build a relevant diagnosisPLIM 2017 - Some Aspects of eDF's ISI - ID 087
Thank you for your attention