After-Action Recommendations for the Raleigh Police ......2020/11/10 · RPD’s After Action Report.1 Although it appears that the After Action Report does provides a comprehensive

After-Action Recommendations for the Raleigh Police Department,

May 30–31, 2020 Protests November 202021CP Solutions

21CP Solutions | After-Action Recommendations for the Raleigh Police Department, May 30–31, 2020 Protests

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................................. i

About 21CP Solutions .................................................................................................................................................... ii

Scope & Approach ........................................................................................................................................................... 1

Summary of RPD’s Response to the George Floyd Protests ........................................................................... 4

Recommendations ......................................................................................................................................................... 9

I. Operational Planning ....................................................................................................................................... 9 Background ......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 12

II. Use of Force and De-escalation During Protests ................................................................................ 15 Background ....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 21

III. Equipment and Resources ......................................................................................................................... 23 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 23

IV. Communications ........................................................................................................................................... 25 Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 25

V. Mutual Aid ......................................................................................................................................................... 27 Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 27 Findings and Recommendations .......................................................................................................................................................... 31

VI. Body Worn Cameras .................................................................................................................................... 34 Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 34 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 35

VII. After Action Reports ..................................................................................................................................... 38 Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 38 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 43

VIII. Community Engagement ............................................................................................................................ 45 Background ...................................................................................................................................................................................................... 45 Recommendations ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 47


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About 21CP Solutions 21CP Solutions helps cities and communities effectively tackle the challenges of delivering safe, effective, just, and constitutional public safety services in the 21st Century. We empower communities across the country to develop and implement equitable, just, and integrity-driven public safety. 21CP is a collective of national experts, from veteran police chiefs and public officials to leading civil rights lawyers and social scientists – all united behind a common goal of furthering a new, shared vision of public safety that works for everyone. In addition to making recommendations about improvements or reforms to policies, practices or procedures, 21CP actively works with communities across the country to provide ongoing technical assistance and translate broad objectives to on-the-ground realities.


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Scope & Approach Scope of the Assessment The City of Raleigh engaged 21CP in June 2020 to conduct review of policies and procedures implicated by the Raleigh Police Department’s (“RPD”) response to protests that occurred in reaction to the murder of George Floyd. This included a review of a series of incidents that occurred on May 30 and 31, 2020, which involved the use of tear gas during protests. The City directed that the assessment encompass both a review of the tactics utilized during the protests and the police department’s response to violence and criminal activity during the protests. These areas were identified based on conversations with the City, reviews of the documents and the unfolding of events. One can group these categories into pre-protest activities like operational planning; protest activities which include use of force, equipment and resources, communications, mutual aid, and body-worn cameras; and post protest efforts like After-Action Report. Community engagement crosses over all three-time categories. Issues expressly identified as being implicated by this scope include:

• Operational Planning; • Use of Force and De-escalation During Protests; • Equipment and Resources; • Communications; • Mutual Aid Agreements; • Body-Worn Cameras; • After-Action Reports; and • Community Engagement.

In 21CP’s experience, what a department actually does is often very different from what it says it does – which may be different from what its policies say it should do. 21CP’s analysis aimed to consider each of these different realities. It should be noted that 21CP was not charged with conducting any independent investigation, fact-finding, or statistical analysis for the present report. This report is not an independent after-action report, nor does it make specific findings about the particular actions or performance of officers or supervisors. Instead, 21CP considered information and data provided by RPD, RPD personnel in focus groups, and community members during engagement sessions. It then formulated recommendations for addressing issues or improving performance in the future based on the requirements of RPD’s existing policies, national practices, or emerging best practices, with the sources of those practices discussed as relevant throughout the report. Consequently, this report is an assessment of RPD’s practices, policies, procedures, and additional issues that were implicated by the protest activities in May 2020 – and a compendium of specific recommendations for RPD on ways to improve or further enhance its performance.


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Information & Document Review 21CP conducted a comprehensive review of various RPD written materials related to the incident, including reports, memoranda, written policies, general orders, written procedures and training guides/outlines related to use of force and response to mass gatherings/protests. In addition, 21CP reviewed video footage from body worn cameras, social media feeds, and new- media video footage captured. It should be noted that, during the review process, RPD updated its policy manual. Although this report attempts to address these most recent updates, the relatively recent nature of these modifications means that the report also addresses the version of policies in place during the summer of 2020. RPD Interviews and Focus Groups 21CP conducted a number of interviews and focus groups with key stakeholders. In light of the current public health situation, all interviews and focus groups were conducted virtually using video conferencing technology. At the outset of these discussions, all participants were guaranteed confidentiality. 21CP conducted a series of interviews and focus groups with city management and police department personnel. 21CP identified relevant participants based on the review of documentary and video materials. The primary objective of these interviews was to gain an understanding of how the policies, procedures, and plans were actually executed during the protest response. Questions focused on the respondents’ roles prior, during, and after the protest and what they experienced and learned from their encounters. Interviews generally lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. Three officer focus groups were also conducted. Participants volunteered for the focus groups and were RPD members of varying ranks, from lieutenant to officer. The focus of discussion was again on the members’ experience, suggestions for improvements, and the impact of their experiences during the protests. These discussions typically lasted between ninety and one hundred-twenty minutes. We note that, because the focus group participants were self-selected, the opinions expressed may not be representative of the whole of RPD. Engagement with the Raleigh Community 21CP’s process for community engagement began by identifying – through the review of mass media and social media – groups engaged with and involved in issues surrounding the protests and policing in Raleigh. These ten groups were invited to participate in one-on-one or small focus group sessions. Additionally, the City and RPD provided 21CP with an additional set of targeted stakeholders for engagement. This included current partners of the police department, individuals who were active in the protests, and others who have long been engaged in community and police events in Raleigh.


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Like those independently identified by 21CP, outreach was made to the 38 groups/individuals provided by the city with invitations for one-on-one or small focus group interviews. To comply with public health guidelines, community stakeholder discussions were conducted via various technology platforms. In each interview, the 21CP subject matter experts asked the interviewee(s) a series of questions about their experience with the police department, including:

• How present is the police department in one’s community? • What is working at the Raleigh Police Department that could be grown to best

support the communities of need? • What concerns does one have around Raleigh Police Department policies and

practices? • What does an ideal partnership with the Raleigh Police Department around

community policing and problem-solving look like? • How can the broader community be brought further into this dialogue?

At the end of each conversation, 21CP asked participants to refer another organization, individual, or peer group for a 21CP interview in order to hear from as many as possible. Initially, community engagement was not part of the scope of 21CP’s investigation, as the City was addressing internally what may be the best way to engage a full and robust dialogue among the citizens of Raleigh. Following the release of the RPD’s After Action Report and the subsequent community input at the September City Council meeting 21CP strongly recommended purposefully engagement with community and RPD officers and staff be initiated immediately. Upon getting approval to proceed in early October 21CP made every effort to engage with the community as part of our investigation. However, we were delayed in our engagement by a variety of internal factors both from the City and RPD creating an extremely truncated timeline for potential community engagement. Due to these challenges, and a hesitancy from the community to engage in the assessment for a variety of reasons, largely political, at the conclusion of our investigation, 21CP heard from 20 stakeholders from widely diverse backgrounds and experiences.


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Summary of RPD’s Response to the George Floyd Protests

Because 21CP’s role was to evaluate RPD’s policies, procedures, practices, and protocols related to demonstration and crowd control management, and not to conduct an independent investigation into what did or did not occur during the protests, this is a summary of events in Raleigh surrounding the protests following the death of George Floyd and is informed substantially by information available in RPD’s After Action Report. 1 Although it appears that the After Action Report does provides a comprehensive accounting of some factual details, independent verification of all facts and accounts in that report is beyond the scope of the present review. The following account assumes the facts taken from RPD’s After Action Report as true. On May 25, 2020, Mr. George Floyd died as a result of the actions of Minneapolis Police Department officers. Video footage captured of the incident, in which one of the officers pressed his knee to Mr. Floyd’s neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds, shocked and galvanized many across the country in the following days. On May 30, 2020, a protest event in Raleigh called, “A National Day of Action-Justice for George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Ahmaud Arbery, and lives cut short by Raleigh and Durham Police Departments” was organized by a group called Raleigh Demands Justice. Protesters gathered in the afternoon and the crowds grew to an estimated 1000 people by 5:45 PM. The Raleigh Police Department (“RPD”) was unable to gather much intelligence on the protest during the prior few days, but had begun various stages of preparing for a large event by starting their personnel mobilization phases and holding over police personnel already on duty. The RPD deployed traffic control units to block intersections in order to create safe passage for protestors to march safely. The deployment posture for the RPD, who until this point had been deployed in standard RPD uniforms, changed when intelligence was developed in the field, and supported by social media posts, that a large group of protestors were heading toward the Downtown District Police station. The social media post stated, “Direct action at the Raleigh Police Department Downtown Division @ 6:00 p.m. Dress for conflict.” At this point, RPD began the deployment of Mobile Field Force (“MFF”) officers in full protective gear, who were staged out of sight nearby. RPD began seeing groups splintering and gathering at various points near the Wake County Courthouse on Fayetteville Street, a large group also assembled at the corner of McDowell and Davie Streets adjacent to the John H. Baker Public Safety Center. At approximately 6:41 PM, the group near the John H. Baker Public Safety Center began rushing into the sally-port entrance to the detention center. Wake County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”) deputies who had been assigned to protect the sally-port responded by deploying chemical munitions to turn the crowd back and keep them from trying to gain access to the detention center. Protestors responded by throwing rocks, bottles, and large pieces of concrete at the

1 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 (2020).


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deputies, who called for assistance from RPD. RPD officers arrived to provide assistance but came from assignments that were not deployed in full protective gear. Consequently, they ended up being exposed in standard patrol uniforms and trapped near the sally port door due to flying debris and objects being thrown at them. This contingent of officers would later need to be rescued by established RPD rescue teams. Following the initial WCSO deployment of chemical munitions, the crowds dispersed, only to re-group at McDowell and Davies Streets. At this point, and in response to the WCSO request for assistance and the RPD’s own officers that were trapped near the sally port, a larger group of MFF officers in full protective gear, and accompanied by grenadiers equipped with chemical munitions and 44MM foam projectiles, arrived and deployed in formation in an attempt to draw the crowd further away from the detention center and with the hopes of dispersing this violent group. The group of protestors did not disperse and again focused on the law enforcement presence and attacked the RPD officers again with a variety of projectiles. The MFF grenadiers deployed chemical munitions and requested additional support as the crowd grew angrier and more volatile, with MFF squad members being surrounded, and punched, by the crowd. The Incident Commander decided that the Selective Enforcement Unit (“SEU”) should be dispatched to assist in gaining control of the situation. Upon SEU’s arrival the decision to deploy more chemical munitions was made and led to the crowd dispersing, which allowed the RPD officers to retreat and regroup. Some officers received medical attention for their injuries. The MFF squads and the SEU contingent was able to form a line which was held for nearly an hour. In various areas of the city, protestors took to the streets and blocked access, clashed with officers, and were involved in situations in which officer rescues had to be conducted. In one situation, a group of officers became surrounded at Salisbury and Cabarrus Streets. These officers were pinned against the wall of the Sheraton Hotel by a shouting crowd described as angry. As the incident commander was deploying officer rescue squads to handle the rapidly evolving and increasingly violent situation, he ordered all officers that were completing their shifts and who were on secondary employment assignments to report to a designated staging area to be deployed in support of the protests and civil disorder. At approximately 8:00 PM, several hundred protestors made their way to the State Capitol grounds and surrounded two RPD officers who were deployed for traffic control in their police cruisers. The protestors began hitting the police cruisers and jumping on top of them. This prompted a group of State Capitol Police Department officers to immediately respond to help those RPD officers. Upon arriving to the location of the two RPD cruisers, the SCPD officers were immediately assaulted and forced to retreat. This prompted the incident commander to order additional officer rescues conducted by the SEU. A nearby MFF contingent also arrived to assist but were unsuccessful in removing the police cruisers. They were also assaulted and pushed back. Chemical munitions ended up being deployed in the final attempts to rescue the officers in the police cruisers. This action successfully pushed the protestors back, although some protestors began picking up some of the chemical munition canisters and throwing them back at the police.


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By this point in the evening, clear patterns were evident regarding the tactics of the protestors. It remains unknown as to whether protestors had practiced, discussed or otherwise planned the tactics, but the approaches primarily consisted of splintering off into small groups, so as to appear to be disorganized groups with no illegal purpose, before then gathering in a different location and amassing as a large group with a demonstrated will to engage the police in violence vandalism to property. The skirmishes between the RPD MFF, SEU, RRT, WCSO and other assisting law enforcement agencies continued throughout the night at various locations and with different groups of protestors. The primary mutual aid agencies at this point were the Apex Police Department, Clayton Police Department, Garner Police Department, Cary Police Department, Knightdale Police Department, the North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement (“ALE”), Wayne County Sheriff’s Office and the Johnson County Sheriff’s Office. The North Carolina State Highway Patrol (“NCSHP”) and the State Capitol Police Department were primarily deployed to protect the Capitol grounds and the Governor’s mansion. All of the other departments were deployed within squads primarily comprised of RPD officers and under RPD command. At approximately 9:30 PM, just as a second MFF contingent was deployed to support the WCSO in defending the courthouse, reports of looting and fires being set began coming in and required an immediate response. A CVS on Fayetteville Street was reportedly being looted and small fires were lit in front of the store. A team of SEU officers responded to the CVS and actually extinguished the fire and secured the store from looters. The SEU team leader notified the Raleigh Fire Department (“RFD”) to not respond to the CVS due to the volume of the crowd and their demeanor. Another fire was reported at the Dollar General Express store at 131 Davie Street, as the RPD fire apparatus responded the crowd began blocking access and jumping onto the fire truck-this forced a retreat of RFD personnel and equipment. RPD officers from nearby areas responded and secured the area. The earlier mentioned CVS and Dollar Store Express were both set on fire again as the night progressed. SEU units operating in small teams and on small four-wheel-drive off-road vehicles responded and extinguished those and additional fires, as the city of Raleigh Fire Department was not able to respond in light of limited vehicle access and a lack of security. At 2:05 AM, a shooting was reported at Blount and Martin Streets. Initial reports indicate that the protestor who was shot was armed with a pistol and was firing rounds in the air. Another nearby person shot the protestor with the AR-15 type rifle. Ultimately, the protestor survived the gunshot wound, and the shooter was arrested. The civil disorder, looting, fire setting and clashes with RPD continued throughout the night ending at approximately 5:00 AM. On Sunday May 31, 2020, Mayor Baldwin and RPD Chief Deck-Brown held a press conference denouncing violence and imploring the community to exercise their First Amendment rights in a peaceful manner. They praised the large community group that came out to clean up areas of the city


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that were hard hit by vandalism, fires, and other destruction. They indicated that further violence and looting would not be tolerated. On Sunday, May 31, the RPD prepared for another day and night of downtown protests. RPD deployed multiple teams of officers in areas that were anticipated to have protest activities. Protestors began to organize around 4:00 PM and grew to a crowd of approximately 150 people who began to march north of Fayetteville Street toward the State Capitol grounds. RPD initially deployed using their “Layered Approach,” described in greater detail later in this report, with a contingent of officers in patrol uniforms with a traffic control mission to keep protestors safe while marching in the street. Once protestors reached the State Capitol, reports of protestors laying down in the street and blocking cars from moving began being reported. Protestors openly carrying firearms were also being reported. Eventually protestors took over control of the road on Morgan Street, between Salisbury and Fayetteville Street. As this was occurring, a 911 call was received regarding an individual nearby who had overdosed. Traffic backups and protestors taking over some intersections may have likely impeded the EMS 911 response, resulting in an SEU team being deployed to the main blocked intersection. SEU were faced with protestors sitting in the street and refusing to move, but they were not otherwise combative. The SEU team leader gave the protestors three sets of verbal commands to clear the intersection and then he threw out a canister of chemical munitions to clear the intersection. The SEU team leader later learned that the ambulance for the overdose had been cancelled. It is believed that this was the first deployment of chemical munitions on Sunday. The crowd reportedly grew angry at being fired upon with chemical munitions for sitting in the street. The crowd grew larger, and a group of about 300 protestors split off and began marching toward the N.C. Legislative Building. Simultaneously, another group of approximately 250 people moved to the east side of the Capitol Building. The crowd that marched toward the N.C. Legislative Building was angry but marched peacefully to the Governor’s Mansion. Soon after these crowds took their positions, a call for assistance came from the NCSHP stating that rocks were being thrown at the Governor’s Mansion and that their cruisers were being damaged. The NCSHP at this point deployed their MFF. RPD assisted in gaining control of the situation and moved the crowd to the south. Minor confrontations between police and protestors occurred through the evening. At approximately 8:50 PM, the crowds around the Capitol turned their attention to the large confederate monument at Hillsborough and Salisbury Streets, and placed a rope around the top of it and began trying to topple it. The Chief of the State Capitol Police requested immediate assistance from RPD who send MFF and SEU teams to the area. RPD did not deploy any munitions until the crowd began throwing rocks and bottles at the officers, at which time chemical munitions were utilized to disperse that crowd. By 11:00 PM skirmishes between police and protestors were occurring in various neighborhoods, and the environment resembled the previous night, only with smaller crowds, but members of these crowds were more than willing to engage the police violently. Fires were regularly being set by groups of


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protestors and looting was widespread. SEU teams expertly navigated the congested streets and extinguished fires and assisted arrest teams in locating and arresting suspects. MFF squads were deployed to multiple commercial centers to prevent looting and arson, including the Triangle Town Center and the Raleigh Convention Center. After approximately 1:00 AM, there were smaller crowds roaming the streets, and the focus turned to extinguishing fires. The days that followed were busy for the RPD and partner agencies, but the violence had ended and most of the few arrests that were made, were for curfew violations. Ultimately, 14 officers were injured as a result of the protests. It is unknown how many protestors were injured at this time. The incidents during May 30 into May 31 quickly devolved into an unanticipated, chaotic night of property destruction and violence. The evening of May 31 was somewhat better, and by June 1 the protests were peaceful.


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Recommendations Pre- Protest Activities There is a total of thirty-eight recommendations across the eight categories. The recommendations are not listed by any type of priority. One can rank the priorities by the level of impact on the police department, city and community and also by ease of implementation. For example, Recommendation 21 concerning RPD's body-worn camera policy can be considered high impact with easy implementation. While the recommendations concerning mutual aid may be low impact and more difficult to implement. The Raleigh Police Department, City and key stakeholders will need to prioritize the recommendations and develop an implementation plan to actualize the recommendations. I. Operational Planning Background The NIMS/ICS Framework

Government organizations have long struggled with developing effective command and control systems for responding to critical incidents. In the late 1960s and 1970s, fire response resources in Southern California developed the Incident Command System (“ICS”) based on a military critical incident response model.2 In 1993, ICS became a national model for command and control when it was formally used in New York at the first attack at the World Trade Center.3 In response to the 2001 World Trade Center terrorist attack, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) in 2004 formally adopted ICS within the National Incident Management System (“NIMS”), mandating that all government agencies seeking federal funding use the NIMS/ICS model in their local emergency management organizations and policies. RPD indicates that it uses the NIMS framework to manage large and complex events.4 Initial and ongoing training in NIMS/ICS is provided as RPD officers progress through the ranks and are responsible for carrying out assignments in such an environment.5 Jurisdictions across all levels of government – federal, state, and local – as well as nongovernment organizations and the private sector today use NIMS as the framework for managing and controlling a broad spectrum of incidents, “from routine to complex” and those both “naturally[-]occurring and manmade.”6 NIMS incorporates issues

2 Kimberly S. Stambler & Joseph A. Barbera, “Engineering the Incident Command and Multiagency Coordination Systems,” 8 Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 1 (2011). 3 U.S. Homeland Security, The World Trade Center Bombing: Report and Analysis 6 (1993), https://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/tr-076.pdf. 4 Raleigh Police Department, Emergency Action Plan (Jan. 24, 2020). 5 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 40–41 (2020). 6 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Command System 89 (2008), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf.


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and considerations relating to “facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications” – all of those things that bear on responding to and addressing an emerging incident.7 The NIMS approach reflects and accommodates a number of critical realities. First, the approach is flexible. Because it is “adaptable to any situation, from planned special events to routine local incidents to incidents involving interstate mutual aid or Federal assistance,” this “[f]lexibility allows NIMS to be scalable and, therefore, applicable for incidents that vary widely in terms of hazard, geography, demographics, climate, cultural, and organizational authorities.”8 Second, the standardization in terms of approaches that NIMS creates among agencies in terms of approaches, structures, and terminology “allow[s] incident personnel” from different agencies “to work together effectively and foster cohesion among the various organizations involved.9 Third, NIMS allows individual organizations to fulfill their independent missions even as they support others.10 The “strength and efficiency” of the NIMS/ICS system rest on the following foundational characteristics:

• Common Terminology; • Modular Organization; • Management by Objectives; • Incident Action Planning; • Manageable Span of Control; • Incident Facilities and Locations; • Comprehensive Resource Management; • Integrated Communications; • Establishment and Transfer of Command; • Unified Command; • Chain of Command and Unity of Command; • Accountability; • Dispatch/Deployment; and • Information and Intelligence Management.11

As the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) outlines in their National Incident Command System resources, activation of the NIMS/ICS system requires:

7 Id. 8 Id. at 3. 9 Id. 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident command System 3 (3d ed. 2017), https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/is700b/6ho/national_incident_management%20system_third%20edition_october_2017.pdf. 11 Federal Emergency Management Agency, ICS Review Document, Extracted From E/L/G 0300, Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents, ICS 300 5 (2018), https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/ics%20review%20document.pdf.


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• Recognizing and anticipating the requirement that organizational elements be activated and taking the necessary steps to delegate authority, as appropriate;

• Establishing incident facilities as needed, located to support field operations; • Establishing the use of common terminology for organizational elements, position titles,

facilities, and resources; and • Clear objectives that are the foundation of a written Incident Action Plan (IAP).12

RPD states in its Emergency Action Plan (revised January 24, 2020) that it uses the NIMS/ICS approach13, this section considers RPD’s operational planning with respect to the protests in May and June. RPD Training RPD training records and training curricula given to 21CP indicate that it has provided initial and ongoing training to officers on crowd management and incident command consistent with the NIMS framework. Mobile Field Force Training – or instruction on officers acting within the context of a large group of mobilized officers, as opposed to the more typical environment of patrol – for RPD officers begins at the academy during Basic Law Enforcement Training (“BLET”). The curriculum covers crowd management, mass-arrest situations, crowd dynamics, and First Amendment concerns. BLET also includes basic Crisis Intervention Training, Use of Force Training and other inter-personal skills training designed to develop skills beneficial to de-escalating tense or volatile situations. RPD officers also receive additional training from the Center for Domestic Preparedness, operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS) in Aniston, Alabama. The FEMA training, which addresses methods of effective crowd management, focuses on the different roles officers, supervisors, and commanders play in rapidly-evolving crowd management situations. RPD currently has approximately 450 FEMA certified MFF officers. Follow-up crowd management training is delivered frequently through annual in-service training and stand-alone training bulletins to officers. Issues relating to crowd management are reinforced in other trainings, such as the First-Line Supervisor course, which is mandatory for all newly-promoted sergeants. RPD also participates in various exercises with city partners focusing on the response to various critical events which can implicate the NIMS framework. RPD Operational Structure Relating to Crowd Management The RPD organizational structure includes a Special Operations Division (“Special Ops”). Special Ops has the primary responsibility, under the leadership of the Chief of Police and the Major assigned as its commander, to prepare, train and equip Special Ops members who take the lead on responding to particular events, including emergencies, critical incidents, and natural disasters. Special Ops also

12 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Command System 89 (2008), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nims/NIMS_AppendixB.pdf. 13 Raleigh Police Department, Emergency Action Plan (Jan. 24, 2020).


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oversees the Mobile Field Force and Rapid Response Team (“RRT”) officers, many of whom are assigned to various other bureaus and divisions but are called upon when events require supplemental officers. Recommendations

Training Recommendation 1: RPD should develop additional commanders capable of handling large and complex police actions during critical incidents. In interviews with RPD staff, 21CP learned that the majority of RPD incident commanders are lieutenants and captains in the Special Operations Division. To ensure a sufficient number of available incident commanders, RPD should work to expand the pool of commanders to include personnel from units, divisions, and bureaus beyond Special Operations. A greater number and diversity of potential incident commanders will ensure that existing commanders are not stretched too thinly in times of elevated activity. Recommendation 2: RPD should prioritize Mobile Field Force and Crowd Management training. In discussions with 21CP, RPD officers reported that Mobile Field Force and Crowd Management training are intended to be scheduled annually but are often cancelled or replaced with another subject during in-service training. Although officers may not utilize crowd management skills on a day-to-day, shift-to-shift basis, the complexity of policing in the context of crowds makes such training vital. Perishable crowd management and control skills need to be refreshed at defined intervals. RPD’s Use of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS) Recommendation 3: RPD should ensure that Incident Commanders do not leave the command post unless a new one is designated and in command. 21CP learned from RPD personnel that the Incident Commander (IC) left the Incident Command post on both May 30 and 31 numerous times to go out and evaluate protest activity in the field as it was happening. Per the general NIMS approach, the IC should not leave the command post unless there is a new IC designated for the duration of his/her absence. Although this may be necessary, the designation of a new or temporary IC should generally be resisted and avoided, as the transition can complicate communications and decision-making. The task of intelligence-gathering during a critical and violent incident should be designated to the Intelligence Unit and, if needed, a command-level officer sufficiently trained in NIMS.


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Recommendation 4: Incident Action Plans should be a priority planning activity for each operational period of 12 hours and should be developed as soon as the possibility of a protest becomes known. NIMS requires the creation of an IAP for each critical incident.14 It does not appear that RPD drafted an Incident Action Plan (“IAP”) for the May 30 protest. An IAP was created for May 31, and all subsequent days of protest were governed by “Contingency Plan for George Floyd Protests.” 21CP acknowledges that the incidents during May 30th into the 31st quickly devolved into an unanticipated, chaotic night of property destruction and violence. Nonetheless, this was five days after the killing of George Floyd and nights of protests in other cities. RPD did not plan for the worse. The purpose of an IAP document is to have all of the necessary information to effectively manage a critical incident in one place. IAPs contain names and contact information for police personnel deployed in key response roles, logistics, deployed resources, and other important information necessary to lessen confusion and serve as the location for information that will help to scale incident resources up or down as needed. Any IAP created to address protests which could involve civil disorder should provide clear direction regarding when arrests should be made and who may authorize such arrests. By placing a variety of information in a centralized location and format, Incident Commanders can reduce their cognitive loads by relying on IAPs.15 The contingency plans that RPD designed during the protests appeared highly detailed. 21CP could not definitively determine the scope or method of distribution to RPD officers across relevant ranks. However, to the extent that RDP intends to adhere to NIMS/ICS protocols, the contingency plans do not replace the designated IAPs if the RDP intended to follow NIMS/ICS protocols. Recommendation 5: The Intelligence Function/Unit should monitor protest and crowd management events occurring across the country and region. It should assist the Incident Commander in developing the IAP. Based on interviews with RPD personnel, 21CP learned that prior to the protests on May 30, RPD began assigning personnel to develop information to get a sense of the possibility for protest activity in Raleigh surrounding the George Floyd incident. RPD even contacted the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department for information about what they faced with regard to protests.

14 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Incident Action Planning Process, “The Planning P,” Extracted From E/L/G 0300, Intermediate Incident Command System for Expanding Incidents, ICS 300 (2018), https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icsresource/assets/incident%20action%20planning%20process.pdf. 15 See, e.g., John E. Ziewacz, “Crisis Checklists for the Operating Room: Development and Pilot Testing,” 213 Journal of the American College of Surgeons 212, 213 (2011) (describing checklists to ease operating surgeons’ “cognitive aids”); “Cockpit Checklists: Concepts, Designs, and Use,” 35 Human Factors 28 (1993) (describing role of checklists to aviation safety).


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Although RPD staff reported that very little information was available with regard to size and scale of the possible events in Raleigh, at the same time potential crowd events and protest activity became the source of information-gathering efforts within the Department, it would have been useful for an IAP to have been developed. In particular, the volatile situations in Minneapolis and elsewhere in the days immediately following the murder of George Floyd should have prompted greater, more formalized preparation, communication with operational commands, notifications to MFF members to inspect and prepare their gear, and the building out of an ICS structure – all documented and at the ready in an IAP. The more formalized, structured involvement of intelligence personnel in the creation of an IAP is an effective mechanism for ensuring efficient and timely development of IAPs going forward. Recommendation 6. If an Incident Commander does not staff the Safety Officer position, the Incident command should be required to articulate why staffing the position was not necessary. The RPD Emergency Action Plan (Rev 1-24-20) 16 specifically addresses “safety” with regard to the planning for critical incident responses, requiring that the Incident commander “designate a Safety Officer to develop and recommend measures for assuring personnel safety, and to monitor and/or anticipate hazardous and unsafe situations”: The Safety Officer is responsible for identifying hazardous situations associated with the incident; continuously monitor workers for exposure to safety or health hazardous conditions; altering, suspending, evacuating or terminating activities that may pose imminent safety or health danger to the workers, and providing training and safety and health information.17 During the review of protest related documents provided by the RPD, the Incident Action Plan prepared to manage the events of June 1, 2020 did not designate a “Safety Officer”. In light of the events during the previous two nights of protests and all of the potential for additional injuries, staffing a Safety Officer may have helped with some decision making in the Incident Command Post. Recommendation 7: RPD and the City of Raleigh should explore the potential benefits of more rigorously enforcing the ordinances relevant to the permitting of First Amendment-protected activity. The City of Raleigh has a picket or protest permitting ordinance that states that no picketing shall be conducted unless an application has been received and approved by the Chief of Police or her designee.18 The process of obtaining and completing the “Permit to Picket” straightforward. The application is one page and comprised mostly of logistical information of where the protest will occur and number of expected participants.

16 RPD’s Emergency Action Plan (revised Jan. 24, 2020) is the guiding document for RPD’s response to critical incidents. 17 Raleigh Police Department, Emergency Action Plan (Jan. 24, 2020). 18 City of Raleigh Code of Ordinances Nos. 12-1055, 12-1056, 12-1057, and 12-1058.


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During 21CP ‘s review, we learned from stakeholders that the City of Raleigh does not appear to consistently enforce the permitting process, with groups wishing to gather and protest not necessarily being required to obtain a “Permit to Picket” before engaging in protest activity. We learned from interviews that this change evolved over the years primarily because Raleigh experiences daily protests, at and around the capital building, that are typically peaceful and orderly. Spontaneous and/or unpermitted marches and protests can pose special operational challenges. RPD personnel indicated that it would be beneficial, from an operational perspective, to have greater time to prepare for protests – with some notification being better than no notification, and advance notification being best of all. The development of an IAP and staffing preparations can all be dynamically planned in light of known events, and the enforcement of the permitting process can facilitate RPD’s appropriate and methodical preparation in order to keep the community and protestors safe. Recommendation 8: RPD should develop a standalone Mass Detention and Arrest policy. The First Amendment, and its freedoms of speech and assembly, are core rights of all citizens. Protests, large and small, are part of American history, and they will continue to occur, especially in a state-capital city like Raleigh. Consequently, RPD should develop clear policy guidance as to when officers managing crowd and protest situations, can make mass arrests. The policy should, among other things, detail how arrest teams will engage with protesters subject to arrest and how those arrested will be booked. (Due to COVID restrictions booking options at the Wake County Justice Center may not be available, temporary field booking locations may to be created, which RPD policy should describe.) Given the scope of legal and logistical implications surrounding mass arrests in a protest situation, RPD would be well-suited to craft a detailed policy addressing these issues. Activities During the Protests II. Use of Force and De-escalation During Protests Background Most typically, the use of force, and issues surrounding it, surface in the context of an individual officer, or a limited number of officers, using force against an individual. Although in crowd contexts this serves as a particular challenges, the broad legal requirements – and a police department’s overriding policies and expectations regarding force – are the same regardless of whether or not an individual happens to be located in the midst of a large group of other people.


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In particular, the requirement that an officer’s actions be “‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them” applies to all force.19 This means that the lawfulness of force depends not on the situation and circumstances as subjectively perceived or understood by the involved officer but, instead, on what a reasonable officer, under the circumstances that the involved officer encountered, would have perceived and understood. The involved officer’s “underlying intent or motivation” is not relevant because the legal standard is an “objective” one.20 This legal standard “outlines broad principles regarding what police officers can legally do in possible use-of-force situations, but it does not provide specific guidance on what officers should do and should not do in the field.” 21 Consequently, police departments must provide, in their policies and attendant training, a much more particular and practical rules of the road for officers on when force may be used. The following sections consider the Raleigh Police Department’s policies on use of force that were in effect on May 30 and 31. Then, the report describes what occurred on those days from both the perspective of the officers and crowd members. This description is based on stakeholder interviews and the review of video footage of incidents captured during those two nights. Recommendations flow from this analysis in turn. Use of Force Policies RPD’s Directive 1108-01, Use of Force and Weapons, is the guiding policy for the use of force by members of the Raleigh Police Department. The version that 21CP was provided by RPD for purposes of this review was updated on March 26, 2020. In finalizing the present report in late October 2020, 21CP became aware that a revised or updated version of Directive 1108-01 became effective on October 2, 2020. Given the recency of the update and the need to consider how the policies and procedures that RPD had in place in May 2020 shaped or influenced the Department’s performance during the period of the protests in question, this report addresses the March 26, 2020 version. With respect to force, RPD policy provides that:

Force should be used only when all other means of resolving a situation have been exhausted or are clearly inapplicable. Force will be used only to the degree reasonably necessary to control the situation. The extent of force in terms of degree and level will vary according to the situation. The nature of the offense, the physical make-up of the parties involved, actions of third parties who may be present, potential for injury to officers, citizens or suspects, the risk of escape, the availability of alternatives and other exigent circumstances are factors to be considered.

19 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). 20 Id. 21 Police Executive Research Forum, Guiding Principles on Use of Force 15 (2016).


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Officers are required to make split second decisions in quickly evolving circumstances. Officers must continuously evaluate the need for force and be prepared to respond to changing circumstances which could include the need to escalate the force used, de-escalate the force used or to disengage from the use of force. It must be stressed that the use of force is not left to the unfettered discretion of the involved officer. This is not a subjective determination. The use of force must be objectively reasonable. The officer must only use that force which a reasonably prudent officer would use under the same or similar circumstances . . . .

In determining the necessity for force and the appropriate level of force, officers shall evaluate each situation in light of the known circumstances, including, but not limited to, the seriousness of the crime, the level of threat or resistance presented by the subject, and the danger to the community.22

Emerging best practices are pointing police departments toward use of force policies that permit the use of force only when necessary, proportional to the threat, objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and safe and feasible de-escalation efforts have been tried and exhausted or are not available under the circumstances. RPD’s policies could be clearer in some sections of its policy by expressly calling the concept of “the extent of force in terms of degree and level . . . vary[ing] according to the situation” proportionality or proportional force. However, among agency policies that 21CP has recently reviewed, RPD’s general use of force policies are forward-thinking in prominently addressing the fundamental concepts of necessity, proportionality, reasonableness, and de-escalation. The directive goes on to indicate that using non-deadly force is permitted:

• In self-defense, or defense of another against unlawful violence, or to prevent suicide or self- inflicted injury; or,

• In overcoming resistance to a lawful arrest or search, or to prevent an escape from custody.23

The March 2020 version of the policy – and it appears the current, October 2020 version of the policy – uses what RPD calls a “linear” use of force continuum.24 The general concept is that officers have an array of potential force responses, ranging from the relatively less serious or significant, through more serious force applications, up to and including deadly force. In the context of this “continuum,” the directive defines when specialty impact munitions, specifically the Exact Impact 1006, a foam projectile may be used:

The Exact Impact 1006 may be used when there is active resistance to legal custody, to prevent imminent injury to an officer or third person, or to stop serious self-injury from occurring. Active

22 Raleigh Police Department, Directive 1108-01, Use of Force and Weapons 2 (Mar. 26, 2020) (emphases added). 23 Id. 24 Id. at 4.


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resistance is defined as the use of personal weapons (i.e. hands, feet, or other body parts) or other weapons in order to assault or gain a positional advantage from which an assault is or would be likely.25

Crowd control encounters where there is an imminent threat to officer safety is provided as a specific example of when this weapon may be justified. Guidelines for the use of pepper gas are also provided in this directive. Specifically, pepper gas is authorized when:

• There is non-compliance to a lawful command and the suspect has begun to make aggressive actions toward or against the officer or a third person; or

• When the suspect continues his/her refusal to comply with the officer’s lawful efforts to affect an arrest and the continued physical resistance presents an increased threat.26

The directive specifically states that pepper gas should not be used:

• On protestors or involuntary mental commitments when the only non-compliance displayed is passive and there is no immediate threat to officer(s) or others;

• For crowd dispersal unless authorized by the Chief of Police or designee.27 In addition to current directives, 21CP also examined the Raleigh Police Department’s Emergency Action Plan, dated January 24, 2020. A section of this plan addresses crowd control and the use of chemical agents:

All action in which launching of chemical agents is necessary shall be done on command only. There shall not be an indiscriminate use of chemical agents. Use of baton and other riot equipment, changes in formations, and use of firearms (except for protection of self or others) shall occur only upon direction of command personnel.28

To the best of 21CP’s knowledge, this is the extent of governance over the use of force and chemical agents by RPD officers. Use of Force on the May 30 and May 31, 2020 Through interviews and focus groups of members of RPD; discussions with community members – including some who were present during the events of May 30 and 31; RPD’s After Action Report; and

25 Id. 26 Raleigh Police Department, Directive 1108-01, Use of Force and Weapons 4 (Mar. 26, 2020). 27 Id. at 5. 28 Raleigh Police Department, Emergency Action Plan 8 (Jan. 24, 2020).


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video footage from body worn cameras, social media, and news media; 21CP was able to formulate a working understanding of the scope of use of force deployment during the protest activity. It is not surprising that there are differing perceptions and opinions about who did what, when, and how. Our intent is not to adjudicate who is right but to understand enough so our recommendations are grounded in facts. The general consensus appears to be that, on Saturday, May 30, a group of protestors were in front of the Wake County Sherriff’s Office on McDowell Street. The Sherriff Department requested assistance from RPD. A group of RPD officers in soft uniforms responded. According to officer interviews, some in the crowd began throwing rocks, frozen water bottles and other projectiles down the sally-port ramp. At some point the protestors began moving down the ramp at which time the Sherriff Department used tear gas. Both RPD and community members agreed that the use of tear gas started the escalation of the confrontation between protestors and police. RPD reports that, after 8:00 PM on May 30, there was “an increase in lawless behavior.”29 According to Raleigh’s After Action Report, there were multiple groups at various locations throughout downtown Raleigh which became volatile. There were damages to businesses, fires, and looting. Throughout the night and into the early hours of Sunday, the confrontation between protestors and officers continued. With officers being pelted by objects and/or threatened, RPD sent units to rescue officers and used tear gas to disperse the crowd.30 The crowd appeared to grow angrier, more frustrated, and resistant, and it appeared that the scope of property damage increased, as well. As one command member stated, “neither side was able to de-escalate that night.” The evening of May 31 proceeded in a similar fashion. Protestors were blocking Morgan Street. There were 911 calls requesting an ambulance to respond to Wilmington Street near Morgan Street:

The RPD incident commander called for an SEU team to mobilize and stand by at Salisbury Street and Morgan Street. With the safety of the patient being a concern, the incident commander was aware that he may need to clear the street of protesters to get the ambulance through the area. Although the road was blocked at this time, the protesters were not doing any more than sitting in the street. The SEU team responded as directed, and the team leader gave protesters three verbal commands, which were captured on body- worn camera, to clear the street. An individual did question the team leader about peaceful protests, yet the team leader, still operating under the assumption that an ambulance needed to get to a patient, deployed tear gas cannisters towards the middle of the intersection. One individual kicked a tear gas cannister back at the officers, and he was struck with a foam baton and subsequently arrested. The gas deployment was successful in clearing the intersection.31

29 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 1 (2020). 30 Id. 31 Id. at 9–10.


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It was later learned that the ambulance was cancelled. The deployment of tear gas appeared to start another night of property damage. 21CP heard from community voices the overriding sentiment that the deployment of tear gas was unprovoked. As one of the respondents said, “I really think if they (police) hadn’t gassed the crowd at that moment things would not have turned out the way it did.” Some described the early parts of the afternoon into evening of May 30 as “like a street party.” By the second night, the description changed: “It felt so much like a war zone,” said one community member. Both from police community interviews, it appears that the use or presence of “gas became constant.” There were also reports by community members and volunteer medics being hit by rubber bullets. The perception that a good deal of munitions were deployed during the May protests is supported by RPD’s report on the type and amount of munitions used over this two-day period, outlined in Figure 1. Figure 1: RPD Munitions Deployment, May 30 and May 31, 2020

Munition Deployed 5/30/2020

Deployed 5/31/202

Total Deployed

CS-Hand Thrown (CTS-5230) 174 44 218 CS-Launchable (CTS-4230) 17 0 17 CS-Blast Dispersion (CTS-4630) 17 0 17 40 mm Foam Baton (CTS-4557) 211 46 257 OC Blast Dispersion (CTS-4640) 9 0 9 OC MK-9 Spray 4 0 4 Flash Bang-Hand Thrown (CTS-290M) 2 1 3 40 mm Aerial Flash Bang (CTS-4090-1) 3 2 5 Red Smoke (CTS-5210) 2 0 2 White Smoke (CTS-5210) 0 2 2

Source: Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 2 (2020). Separately, there were 230 property-related crimes reported during the protests. Burglary accounted for 153, damage to property totaled 71, and six arsons were reported.32 Over the five-day period, 51 people were charged with 95 criminal charges. The most frequent charges were for felony trespassing (23), resisting or obstructing (14), and burglary (13).33 Listening to the stories of officers and community members about what they experienced on May 30 and 31, and watching some of the captured video of the events ourselves, it is evident that many individuals experienced physical and emotional trauma during the nights of May 30 and May 31.

32 Id. 33Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 24 (2020).


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Recommendations Recommendation 9: RPD should develop more specific policy guidance on the use of force in crowd contexts. RPD should clarify and re-train commanders on when and how to authorize deployment of special munitions. Again, as Figure 1 summarizes, over the two-day period of May 30 and 31, there were 252 deployments of tear gas and 257 uses of a foam batons/projectile over a two-day period. The deployment of tear gas is, as cited in RPD Policy Response to Disasters- 1107-234, is to be done by command only. 21CP understands that RPD personnel understood that the authority to use gas and other munitions was functionally passed down from the Chief to the Incident Commander to Mobile Field Force teams. One command officer told us that the rules for engagement, with authority, came from him down the chain. It was “If you are being threatened, need to rescue officers, control the crowd from damaging property or people you are granted the authority to deploy chemical ammunition.” The final decision was left to the squad leader and the grenadier. The use of CS (tear) gas continues to be the source of controversy and debate. Opponents note that the United Nation’s 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention generally “outlawed the use of riot control agents” like CS gas “in warfare,” though it did make an exception “for law enforcement use” in domestic order situations. 35 However, even among those jurisdictions where police maintain the ability to use CS munitions, a number are defining specific limits on the types of circumstances in which they can be used and express requirements as to whom – typically senior police leaders – must authorized their use.36 Additionally, 21CP viewed some video footage of what appeared to be pepper spray that, rather than being aimed specifically at particular protestors, appeared to be applied more indiscriminately to crowds of people. Protestors also told us they believed they were targeted and shot with rubber (foam projectiles) without provocation. Given the nature of our review and the number of individual applications of force in the crowd context, this report cannot independently evaluate the legality and propriety of each use of force application or deployment. What we can conclude, however, is that RPD must develop clearer protocols for when force, especially the munitions discussed above, may and may not be used within the context of crowd management or protest activities. In so doing, RPD should ensure that decisions about the deployment of significant force are made, whenever possible, by senior command. Simply the notion that RPD understood that the authorization for using force functionally devolved from the Chief to individual officers to make their own, standalone judgments as events unfolded underscores the need for more

34 Raleigh Police Department, Policy 1107-2, Response to Disasters, Protest Response 3 (Aug. 5, 2020). 35 McKenzie Sadeghi, “Fact Check: It’s True Tear Gas is a Chemical Weapon Banned in War,” USA Today (Jun. 6, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/06/06/fact-check-its-true-tear-gas-chemical-weapon-banned-war/3156448001/. 36 Lindsey Van Ness, “Tear Gas Bans: A Policing Change Not Gaining Traction,” PewTrusts.org (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/08/04/tear-gas-bans-a-policing-change-not-gaining-traction.


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specific protocols and policy guidance on the use of force in crowd contexts and the specific deployment, if RPD continues to use them in the future, of all of the types of munitions deployed in May 2020. Recommendation 10: RPD, the City, and community representatives should work together to determine whether – and if, so, under what circumstances – RPD should deploy tear gas. As noted above, the use of tear gas on protestors has become an issue across the country.37 On the one hand, the use of tear gas causes significant physical effects. It is also a type of force that by its nature cannot be narrowly targeted to particular individuals or modulated in terms of extent or severity after deployment. That is, the effects of a tear gas deployment are broad to the extent that they cannot be readily contained or controlled by an officer. However, at the same time, some contend that the elimination of CS gas as a tool in crowd management situations would require police to more readily go “hands-on” with protestors who are engaged in criminal disorder or violent activity. This is an important policy discussion that requires a thoughtful, open, inclusive debate. Police using tear gas on protestors is an issue across the country. Some jurisdictions are trying to decide this question through legislation. However, police executives ask, “What is the alternative if did not have gas?” “What would the alternative be?”38 As with most technology, the issue is not the technology but how it is used. Tear gas used indiscriminately without accountability is wrong. Tear gas should be the last alternative. Thinking through a use of force continuum for crowd management will help put the use of tear gas and other munitions in context. The RPD was placed in a situation in which officers were threatened and property was being damaged. If tear gas was not an option, the alternatives could have been even more disastrous. This is an important policy decision that should be based on a reasoned analysis and discussion involving all voices. Recommendation 11: To enhance command and control capabilities and accountability, RPD should establish a means of documenting the use of tear gas, foam baton or projectiles, and other munitions used during protests and mass disturbances. RPD’s policy is that use of force reports shall be completed by the involved officer for any force greater than restraining techniques: “Generally, Use of Force/Complaint of Injury Reports should be completed whenever there is a greater than normal amount of force required in subduing a subject.”39 Such use of force reporting requires that deploying officers provide an accounting of the circumstances in which force was employed, including descriptions of the threat posed by subjects at deployment, the officer and subject actions, and the specifics of each type of force used.

37 Id. 38 Lindsey Van Ness, Tear Gas Bans: A Policing Change Not Gotten Traction, Stateline Article, PEW, August 4, 2020. https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2020/08/04/tear-gas-bans-a-policing-change-not-gaining-traction 39 Raleigh Police Department, Directive 1108-01, Use of Force and Weapons 11 (Mar. 26, 2020).


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The data presented in Figure 1 on the scope of munitions deployment during the May 30 and May 31 protests appear based exclusively on RPD’s accounting of equipment stocks. That is, by inventorying what RPD officers did and did not have available in terms of equipment at the conclusion of each day, the Department could determine what officers used in the field. However, auditing force based on equipment expenditures is different from RPD personnel providing affirmatively accounts of when, how, and under what circumstances they used force. Based on interviews with officers, we understand that use of force reporting was not generally done on either May 30 or May 31. Additionally, because of body-worn camera issues discussed elsewhere in this report, limited BWC footage of events is available – making retrospective, formalized use of force reporting difficult. Ultimately, there was just a single use of force report for the actions staring on Saturday through Sunday. Starting on Monday, June 1, the lieutenant of the Mobile Field Force (MFF) would document the use of force by that squad. However, by this point, both protest and force activity substantially subsided. It is understandable that typical processes and procedures can be placed under great strain in fast-evolving and chaotic circumstances. However, it is incumbent on the Department to develop and activate a process that rigorously documents the circumstances in which force is used against a group of people – even under such challenging circumstances. RPD should establish processes for rigorously documenting all force in these crowd control contexts. III. Equipment and Resources Recommendations Recommendation 12: An inventory and assessment of helmets and gas masks should be conducted, and a replacement schedule be established to ensure officers have safe and functioning personal equipment. Interviews with RPD personnel revealed that many of the CS gas canisters in their possession were beyond their expiration dates. Expired CS gas canisters do not pose health concerns for those exposed to it, but retaining those canisters beyond their expiration dates lessens the effectiveness of the gas. For CS gas contemplated for deployment, it is recommended to deploy gas that is not expired so that the expected outcome of crowd dispersal occurs and the oversaturation of crowds with minimally effective gas is avoided. Recommendation 13: As long as the RPD continues the use of chemical munitions, it is recommended that the RPD maintain a sufficient supply that has been vetted for quality and usability.


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During the protests, RPD realized that their CS munitions were running low and requested chemical munitions from other jurisdictions. The request was fulfilled; however, there was an inconsistency as to the type, quality, and expiration dates of those munitions. It took time to discern as to what was actually usable by the RPD grenadiers creating delayed response times based on feedback from the Mobile Field Force and Special Operations Division. Going forward, RPD should implement working procedures to ensure that supply sources and chains are clear. Recommendation 14: RPD may want to explore the effectiveness and use of “soft” protective gear for Mobile Field Force personnel. The availability of “soft” protective gear is increasing and could be useful as an alternative to the current protective gear used by many MFF units in the country. Soft protective gear is designed to be worn under the regular police uniform, but offers similar protection provided by the full protective gear worn by the current MFF squads, only without the “militarized” look. A few American police departments that have tested such soft gear and are beginning to implement it. The use of soft gear may be particularly useful in the context of the “Layered Approach” to crowd management that RPD currently adopts with respect to officer equipment. The “Layered Approach” refers to the three stages of officer deployment in the context of a crowd management situation: a first stage in which officers are in regular patrol uniforms, a second stage with officers in uniform and wearing helmets and other protective equipment, and a final stage in which MFF officers wear full protective gear (also known as a “turtle” gear ). Given that soft gear is as effective as turtle gear but looks less like militarized equipment, RPD should consider adopting it. Recommendation 15: RPD should explore, with city leaders and community members, supplementary means of CCTV cameras, aerial support and intelligence. Situational awareness was reported to have been difficult to attain at certain times during the unrest due to time of day, landscape, and other factors. The use of air support units, like North Carolina Highway Patrol helicopters, could have assisted greatly in determining RPD priorities and deployment of resources. Because such technologies do implicate concerns about privacy and the potential appearance of “over-policing,” the recommendation here is for RPD to explore potential mechanisms for ensuring better information about crowd situations in manner consistent with community values. Recommendation 16: RPD should explore, with city leaders and community members, the availability of additional small utility vehicles (i.e. Gators). The availability of additional small utility vehicles (IE gators) should also be considered. During the May protests, available utility vehicles helped with transporting RPD units to areas not accessible by police cruisers, vans, or buses. The utility vehicles were also extremely useful for the Special Operations Division units, which began responding to fires and extinguishing them when crowd activity prevented fire trucks from reaching the scene of in-progress fires. The safe use of these vehicles should be governed by emergency vehicle operations policies.


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Recommendation 17: RPD should consider investing in sound amplification devices (gas mask-mounted devices) to ensure that critical communication addressing tactics is not misunderstood or unheard in loud, chaotic crowd contexts. MFF squad leaders reported that during critical times in the protests, their squads could not hear them due to extremely loud conditions. The squad leaders had to remove their gas masks exposing them to CS and pepper spray in order to be heard by their squad members. The Department should consider equipping sound amplification devices in Department-issued gas masks to better facilitate officer communication. IV. Communications Background When planning for a large-scale event or a critical incident response, communicating with staff early and often is important to establish a high level of confidence that planning is occurring, and higher attendance and availability of personnel. Priority must be given to providing relevant and accurate information to staff as soon as it becomes known and prior to any deployment for a critical incident response. Recommendations Recommendation 18: RPD should develop a strategy to clearly communicate what they expect from MFF, patrol operations and any other support unit during a protest that has the potential to turn violent. With regard to the protests that occurred between May 30 and June 1, interviews with RPD stakeholders suggested that there was no effective communication strategy in place at the time to keep patrol officers informed in real-time, or near real-time, as to what was occurring with respect to the protest activity. Specifically, most of the patrol officers interviewed said that they received information about the unfolding events through text message. Officers that reported for duty were provided what they referred to as “Operational Plans,” which appear to be a reference to the daily contingency plans produced by SPECIAL OPS commanders. As noted elsewhere in this report, these contingency plans were well-written and contained detailed information about available intelligence. However, several officers reported not receiving any information at roll call or prior to reporting for protest duty, this may indicate that how the information is disseminated may be ineffective during chaotic times and police staff may not have access to the information. Consideration should be given to providing a verbal briefing as well any written reference documents during all pre-deployment meetings, briefings or roll calls. In addition to communicating basic information about what is happening, RPD should ensure clear communication mechanisms in order to disseminate instructions and messaging about what the


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Department expects from MFF, patrol operations, and any other supporting personnel during a protest or crowd management situation. In any situation, officers perform their best when they know what the department wants them to do, have clarity what equipment they should have, and have a common understanding of the Department’s mission, strategy, any special contingencies or protocols, and other rules of engagement. The developed communication strategy should be layered to ensure that commanders and supervisors are aware of their duties and responsibilities, with an additional focus on ensuring that the officers in the MFF, Rapid Response Team (“RRT”), and other operational squads are keenly aware of the goals and how to execute them. Based on 21CP’s experience, it is very difficult to effectively communicate exactly what to do once a protest turns violent. Instead, detailed information-sharing and messaging must be done and in advance of critical incidents/ a rise in violent behavior. The thoroughness of the pre-deployment briefing will also provide front-line officers with greater confidence that they understand expectations regarding performance. Recommendation 19: During periods of protest, crowd management, and critical incident management activity, there should be a debrief after the end of shifts. Officers reported that, during the May protest activity, there were no official debriefs after their shifts deployed at the protests beyond being called in, relieved, and sent home. Supervisors should attend Protest/Crowd Management briefings an hour ahead of all others scheduled. Supervisors should be reminded of their mission and responsibilities with regard to supervision as well as particular mission details to share with their officers. Recommendation 20: RPD should fill the Internal Communications Specialist position. During critical incidents, the use of an Internal Communications Specialist could keep relevant and accurate information flowing throughout the organization. This position remains vacant within RPD. Filling it may help alleviate the key concern about relevant and accurate information dissemination to RPD staff. Recommendation 21: RPD should ensure that its Police Attorney be included in command staff alerts in connection critical incidents, and that he/she advises command staff on key matters of consideration during protests – such as dispersal orders, mass arrests, and other legal matters typical during civil disorder events. The role of the RPD’s Police Attorney is essential during critical incidents. Seeking the advice of the Attorney prior to or during civil disorder events and subsequent RPD response can help to prevent missteps and allow the Department to thoughtfully navigate legal issues raised by critical events.


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V. Mutual Aid Background The events of May 30 and 31 raises issues related to Raleigh’s mutual aid relationships with surrounding jurisdictions. Law enforcement has long understood that multiagency cooperation can benefit efforts to address activities which cross jurisdictional boundaries. It is also widely acknowledged that a single police department cannot staff, prepare for, or respond to large-scale major natural or manmade emergencies which may occur in their jurisdiction. For these reasons, public safety agencies enter into mutual aid agreements with other agencies to obtain support and resources when such emergencies occur. This idea is straightforward, but many agencies have learned – through some difficulties – that successful mutual aid requires careful, advance attention to the details of management, command and control, planning and joint training.40 A Mutual Aid Agreement is the first step in a successful mutual aid arrangement. The Agreement should govern the nature of the support, conditions under which the support is provided and roles and responsibilities of agencies and their personnel. The purpose for Mutual Aid agreements is to:

• Coordinate planning; • Multiply the response resources available to any one jurisdiction; • Ensure timely arrival of aid; • Arrange for specialized resources; and • Minimize administrative conflict and litigation post-response.41

Many jurisdictions have Mutual Aid arrangements at several levels. There are Automatic Aid Agreements which allows for units and personnel from neighboring jurisdictions to be dispatched without approvals. “These agreements are usually basic contracts between or among neighboring local entities and are used under conditions when time is of the essence to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage following an incident.”42 Mutual Aid Agreements are formal agreements that require a formal request for assistance. Such agreements generally cover a larger geographic area than automatic aid agreements. These may be with neighboring jurisdictions, regional, statewide or even inter-state. Regardless of the level, the best practice is all arrangements are codified in a written document signed by all participating parties. State law must authorize regional agreements between law enforcement agencies and often a city or county law is required to permit an agency to enter into an agreement.

40 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Mutual Aid: Concepts and Issues Paper (2008). 41 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Best Practices: Mutual Aid Agreements – Types of Agreements, Lessons Learned Information Sharing, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=765559 (last accessed Oct. 26, 2020). 42 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Guideline for Mutual Aid 2 (2017).


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The most recent national guidance is a mutual aid agreement should be supported by a Mutual Aid Operational Plan that covers the specific resources, tasks, personnel, asset allocations, roles, responsibilities, integration, and actions that mutual aid participants execute respective to their assignments.43 Agreements and Operational Plans should be routinely reviewed and updated by participants. Joint training and exercises should also be conducted to ensure personnel understand the rules of engagement and the command and control structure outlined in the Agreements and Operational Plan. Raleigh’s Policies and Practices The primary authority for the Raleigh Police Department to enter into a mutual aid agreement is derived from N.C.G.S § 160-A-288, entitled “Cooperation between law enforcement agencies.” This section allows the “head of any law enforcement agency to temporarily provide assistance to another agency if so, requested in writing by the requesting agency.”44 However, the law allows a city or county to specifically prohibit or limit, by an ordinance, the head of the law enforcement agency ability to enter into such an agreement. Section 5-1004 of Raleigh’s City Ordinances provides that: The Chief of Police is authorized to enter into agreement with other law enforcement agencies as permitted by law for the purposes of enforcement of laws and for the preservation of peace and order. The North Carolina Department of Justice released a reference guide for jurisdictions in October 201445 for understanding the statutory authority, how to enter into an agreement, and limitations of an agreement. In Raleigh, the City of Raleigh Emergency Plan set the guidelines by which the RPD may request mutual aid assistance. Raleigh Police Department’s Policies. RPD’s Directives 1100-03, Jurisdiction/Mutual Aid, 1107-01, Emergency Mobilizations, and 1107-02, Response to Disaster outline the procedures and protocols for providing and obtaining assistance from another law enforcement agency. Specifically, Directive 1100-03 implements N.C.G.S. § 160-A-288 and Raleigh’s City Ordinance, Section 5-1004 by delineating how the RPD requests and provides mutual aid to other law enforcement agencies. This directive authorizes the Chief of Police or her designee to determine how to respond and what resources to include personnel, vehicles and equipment to provide based on a request for mutual aid. The Chief of Police or her designee also has the authority to request mutual aid assistance from other law enforcement agencies. This includes requests for federal law enforcement assistance. The directive provides that the “Police Attorney will maintain a current file of all Assistance Agreements.” “Each

43 Id. 44 N.C.G.S § 160-A-288. 45 North Carolina Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Liaison Section, Mutual Aid Agreements Between Law Enforcement Agencies in North Carolina (Rev. Ed. Oct. 2014).


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Agreement will be reviewed and revised by the Chief of Police and Police Attorney prior to implementation.” According to this directive, only the Mayor or the next in line of succession can request assistance from the State Highway Patrol or the National Guard. Directive 1100-03 also contains language about the supervision and control of officers. Officers are subject to lawful commands of supervisors of the requesting agency and have the same powers, jurisdiction, rights and immunities as an officer of that agency. Directive 1107-01 contains procedures for emergency mobilizations. This directive states:

The Chief of Police, or designee, will determine, in collaboration with the Mayor and the City Manager, the necessity of requesting assistance from outside agencies. Requests for assistance from the State Highway Patrol or the National Guard must be initiated by the Mayor of Raleigh or the next in line of succession. It also specifies how personnel from outside agencies should be used, specifically for critical security or traffic control locations whenever possible.

Response to disasters is covered in 1107-02 and also references mutual aid agreements. Here the instructions are “To the extent possible, the integrity of working units should be maintained and instructions to outside units should be relayed from a Raleigh supervisor to a supervisor of the other agency.” This directive also addresses civil disorder and references the “Riots and Civil Disorders” article of the North Carolina General Statutes G.S. 14-228.1 to G.S. 14-228.20). RPD’s Emergency Operations Plan (January 24, 2020), Section F, references Mutual Aid Agreements. It requires upon the activation of the Incident Command System the Incident Commander will designate a Liaison Officer (LO). It is the responsibility of the LO to maintain a list of assisting and cooperating agencies and agency representatives; monitor check-in sheets daily to ensure that all agency representatives are identified; assist in establishing and coordinating interagency contacts; and keep agencies supporting the incident aware of incident status. 21CP reviewed the Mutual Assistance Agreements between the Raleigh Police Department and the Wake County Sheriff’s Office, Clayton Police Department, Cary Police Department, and the Apex Police Department. RPD does not have existing mutual aid agreements with Johnston County or Wayne County. It is also the understanding of RPD that agreements are not necessary with state agencies like the State Police and Capitol Police and others that have concurrent jurisdiction within the city limits of Raleigh. Raleigh Police Department’s Use of Mutual Aid Assistance on May 30 – June 7, 2020 By state statute, all that is necessary to obtain assistance from another law enforcement agency is a written request for such assistance. It is the opinion of the N.C. Attorney General’s Office that the statute specifies that the request for assistance must be "in writing" but does not specify, nor restrict, the


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mechanism for transmitting the written request. Therefore, in addition to a letter sent by traditional means, the request may be sent electronically by FAX, the DCI network, or by e-mail.46 The Chief made her request for outside assistance through the DCI network. “Officers from agencies without jurisdiction in Raleigh were paired up and deployed with Raleigh officers.”47 Based on interviews and a review of the After Action Report on the George Floyd Protests, 21CP understands that a Liaison Officer was not appointed. It was suggested that an Assistant Chief in the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) acted in that capacity. On Saturday, May 30, 2020, the Chief of RPD requested mutual aid assistance from surrounding jurisdictions using the DCI network. The DCI request was sent to Wayne County Sheriff’s Office at 23:42 and to Johnston County Sheriff’s Office at 23:43. A DCI was sent on May 31st at 00:30 hours for assistance. The After Action Report stated that assistance was provided by Apex PD, Clayton PD, Garner PD, Knightdale PD North Carolina Alcohol Law Enforcement, Wayne County Sheriff’s Office, and Johnston County Sheriff ‘s Office.48 21CP was provided the following information from RPD about the number and use of outside law enforcement officers: Figure 2: Mutual Aid Provided to RPD, May 30 and May 31, 2020

Mutual Aid for Saturday, May 30, 2020 Jurisdiction Number of

Officers Type of Assistance

Johnston County Sheriff 10 Tactical Team Wayne County Sheriff 10 Civil Unrest Team Clayton Police Department 17 Mobile Field Force Knightdale Police Department 4 Mobile Field Force Cary Police Department 17 Mobile Field Force Fuquay Police Department 7 Mobile Field Force Apex Police Department 6 Mobile Field Force Garner Police Department 9 Mobile Field Force NC Alcohol Law Enforcement 7 Tactical Team Total Outside LE Officers 76 Mutual Aid for Sunday, May 31, 2020 NC State Highway Patrol 85 Mobile Field Force NC Alcohol Law Enforcement 7 Tactical Team Total Outside LE Officers 92

Source: Raleigh Police Department

46 North Carolina Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Liaison Section, Mutual Aid Agreements Between Law Enforcement Agencies in North Carolina 5 (Rev. Ed. Oct. 2014); Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 7 (2020). 47 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 7 (2020). 48 This information was obtained from interviews and RPD’s After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 at 7.


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In an interview, 21CP was told that the outside agencies’ Mobile Field Force deployed with RPD’s MFF teams. Each outside team came with at least a sergeant and some had lieutenant and a captain came with one team. Johnson County also brought their BEAR CAT and RPD special teams partnered up with them. The local and county law enforcement officers where used Saturday into Sunday. In an interview, it was confirmed an outside agency squad did report to ranking officials in the field. One respondent said, “they came with their own equipment and radios”: “They did what I asked them to do but then they just left.” We understand the Chief did provide a verbal report to all the law enforcement agencies that responded to the request for assistance. The North Carolina State Highway Patrol (NCSHP) was deployed on Sunday around the Governor’s Mansion and around the State Capitol. The NCSHP monitored the crowds in these areas and deployed their Mobile Field Force officers to Blount Street at Jones Street. On Sunday, May 31, the Chief of RPD contacted Wake County Emergency Management requesting they ask for assistance from the N.C. National Guard. The Guard was protecting the Supreme Court building at 2 E. Morgan Street.49 A State of Emergency was declared starting on Monday, June 1st, through Sunday, June 7th, which allowed the continuation of the Guard. The National Guard acted as standing security at a variety of locations including North Hills Mall, Triangle Town Center, Crabtree Mall, and Cameron Village.50 The Guard deployed over 100 service members who remained on standing posts and provided perimeter security. Findings and Recommendations As outlined above, the Raleigh Police Department provided 21CP with signed mutual aid agreements from four of the eight law enforcement agencies that provided assistance to RPD. State law does not require a mutual assistance agreement for a jurisdiction to request and provide assistance. N.C.G.S § 160-A-288 establishes some minimal guidance and protection to agencies and officers. This includes:

• An officer shall have the same jurisdiction, powers, rights, privileges and immunities, including those relating to the defense of civil actions and payment of judgments as officers of the requesting agency.

• While on duty with the requesting agency, the officer shall be subject to the lawful operation commands of the officer’s superior officers in the requesting agency.

• The officer shall for personnel and administrative purposes, remain under the control of the officer’s own agency, including for purposes of pay.

49 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 11 (2020). 50 Id. at 13.


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• The officer is entitled to workers’ compensation and the same benefits when acting under this provision as though the officer were functioning in the normal scope of the officer’s duties.

These are the only conditions governing an officer and/or agency when responding to a written request for assistance when a mutual assistance agreement does not exist between the agencies. “The absence of a mutual aid agreement, or a defective but executed mutual aid agreement, leaves an officer acting outside his/her jurisdiction with only those authorities and protections provided by N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-404, -405, and -734.”51 The International Association of Chiefs of Police strongly encourages law enforcement agencies not to rely on verbal agreements. They recommend that written mutual assistance agreements provide:

• Form and structure, setting forth common procedures and expectations; • Awareness of potential problems and concerns such as those related to liability and

insurance; and • Procedures for reimbursement for the costs of all deployed resources where the

parties consent to such an arrangement.52 The N.C. Attorney General’s Office recommends that a signed mutual aid agreement should exist between law enforcement agencies which may reasonably expect to request or provide assistance to sister agencies. They suggest that in addition to the statutory elements listed above an agreement should also include language about liability for acts of the officer while assisting an agency and liability for damage to, or loss of, loaned equipment. The agreements with Wake County Sheriff, Apex PD, Carey PD, and Clayton PD appear to meet the IACP and Attorney General’s requirements. It should be noted that the agreements with Apex PD and Carey PD are a little more extensive than those with Wake County Sheriff and Clayton PD. FEMA produced NIMS guideline for mutual aid in 2017.53 The guidelines suggest having mutual aid agreements and mutual aid operational plans. The agreements should contain key elements like purpose, benefits, authorities, definitions, governance structure and operations oversight, licensure and certifications, interoperable communications, tort liability and indemnification, insurance, worker’s compensation, deployment notification, reciprocity and reimbursement, termination, dispute resolution, modification and amendment management, operational plan and procedures requirements, and supplemental information54 Mutual aid operational plans support the agreements. Supplemental mutual aid agreements, either as an appendix to the agreement or as a separate document:

51 North Carolina Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Liaison Section, Mutual Aid Agreements Between Law Enforcement Agencies in North Carolina 7 (Rev. Ed. Oct. 2014). 52 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Mutual Aid: Concepts and Issues Paper 10 (2008); Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 7 (2020). 53 Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Incident Management System Guideline for Mutual Aid (2017). 54 Id. at 6–10.


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• Identify specific resources, tasks, personnel, asset allocations, roles, responsibilities,

integration, and actions that mutual aid participants execute respective to their assignments; and

• Help requesting or receiving parties manage mutual aid assets during a planned event or following an incident.55

Recommendation 22: RPD should review their existing Mutual Assistance Agreements to determine if they are adequate in specifying the commitment, scope, and general procedures for all parties. It is recognized not all mutual assistance agreements need to be expansive or have supporting operational plans. However, the agreements should be specific enough to address the provisions in the law and also minimize administrative conflict and litigation post-response. Recommendation 23: The Raleigh Police Department should identify all local and county law enforcement agencies with which resources might be requested and shared and establish Mutual Assistance Agreements with them. Mutual assistance agreements can offer protections to officers and agencies above those provide in N.C. law. It is good practice to codify the conditions for sharing resources between law enforcement agencies and to systematically analyze the agencies with whom it would be beneficial to have agreements. Recommendation 24: The Raleigh Police Department should establish an annual review schedule to ensure Mutual Aid Agreements are reflective of evolving laws, policies, and practices. According to the N.C. Attorney General document the state statute does not restrict the duration of the underlying mutual assistance agreement. “However, as stated earlier, this Office has consistently suggested that even mutual aid agreements that are intended to be continuing should be reviewed, and possibly re-executed, annually.”56 The mutual aid agreement with Apex PD and Carey PD were signed in September 2015, Clayton PD was executed in May 2017 and Wake County Sheriff’s Department was dated December 2018. Recommendation 25: The Raleigh Police Department should work with other law enforcement agencies to create a Mutual Aid Agreement Operational Plan to support the Mutual Aid Agreements.

55 Id. at 11. 56 North Carolina Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Liaison Section, Mutual Aid Agreements Between Law Enforcement Agencies in North Carolina 6 (Rev. Ed. Oct. 2014).


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As mentioned, a Mutual Aid Agreement Operational Plan provide greater details and procedures to support and implement a Mutual Aid Agreement. The Plan can help identify capabilities of other agencies in terms personnel, training and equipment. It can detail how to mobilize resources, set the management and coordination structure, address voice and data interoperability, documentation and reporting, and demobilizing resources. The advantage of the Operational Plan is it can be modified without going through the authorization process of an agreement. The development of such a plan should be done in conjunction with local and county law enforcement agencies who have signed an agreement. Once the plan is complete it should become a training document and used in exercises by all signatory agencies. The Police Executive Research Forum’s publication, The Response to Mass Demonstrations,57 provides a list of recommendations on the importance of mutual aid and systems for managing mutual aid. It specifically discusses pre-event preparation and ensuring all agencies are operating under the same guidelines for the use of force. RPD may find this reference helpful in putting together a Mutual Aid Agreement Operational Plan. Recommendation 26: The Raleigh Police Department should review their current policies and plans to ensure they reflect how mutual aid officers are used, tracked, and how home agencies are involved in planning and assessing mutual aid assistance. The events of May 30 and 31, 2020 evolved quickly. However, a primary purpose for written agreements, operational plans and policies, and multi-jurisdictional training using these documents is help ensure a smooth transition of requesting, deploying, monitoring, to post deployment. 21CP was not able to find documentation on appointing a Liaison Officer to manage the mutual aid request, where outside law enforcement teams were used, a tracking of the outside officers’ time and use, or post deployment involvement of outside agencies in the After Action Report. VI. Body Worn Cameras Background The use of body-worn cameras has dramatically accelerated across the policing profession in recent years. By the end of 2018, “about 10,500 agencies, or 58 percent of all law enforcement departments in the U.S., used body cameras.”58 Body-worn cameras have been associated with a number of benefits. First, a number of jurisdictions that deploy them have experienced decreases in officer use of force, officer misconduct, and civilian

57 Police Executive Research Forum, The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned 39–46 (2018). 58 Ben Miller, “Just How Common Are Body Cameras in Police Departments?,” Government Technology (June 28, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/data/Just-How-Common-Are-Body-Cameras-in-Police-Departments.html.


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complaints about officer conduct. 59 Body-worn cameras may result in better transparency and accountability and thus may improve law enforcement legitimacy.”60 Indeed, cameras “may lead to a faster resolution of citizen complaints and lawsuits” by resolving issues and factual disputes effectively and efficiently.61 Of course, “[f]ootage captured may be used as evidence in arrests or prosecutions.”62 At the same time, body-worn camera footage also provides opportunities for the department to better learn from actual officer performance.63 Finally, “[b]ody-worn cameras may also result in higher rates of citizen compliance to officer commands during encounters,” with civilians and police officers alike changing their behavior when they know that they are being recorded.64 These benefits of body-worn cameras do not dissipate in the context of crowd management or protest activity. However, at the same time, the filming of First Amendment-protected activity implicates potentially significant privacy concerns that are distinct from those that more typical law enforcement encounters might. As such, departments must ensure that they have clear policies on when cameras may and may not be used – and that these policies are understood by officers and the community in advance of protest activity. Recommendations Recommendation 27: RPD should review and revise Policy 1109-18 to ensure that its requirements regarding body camera use and activation are clear within the context of situations involving protests, First Amendment-protected activity, and crowd management. In both the camera policy provided to 21CP during its review, and in the version of the policy linked on the Department’s Web Portal, Policy 1109-18, Body Worn Cameras and Mobile Video Recording, effective August 5, 2020, the use of body worn cameras is prohibited during many protest situations. Specifically, the Department’s policy manual provides that “BWCs shall be used only for legitimate law enforcement purposes in accordance with applicable law and departmental policy” and that “[u]se of BWCs is specifically prohibited in certain situations,” including but not limited to, the following:

59 See, e.g., Michael D. White, Office of Justice Programs Diagnostic Center, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Police Officer Body-Worn Cameras: Assessing the Evidence 21 (2014); Brett Chapman, “Body-Worn Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us,” 280 NIJ Journal 3 (Jan. 2019), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252035.pdf. 60 Brett Chapman, “Body-Worn Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us,” 280 NIJ Journal 2 (Jan. 2019), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252035.pdf. 61 Id. 62 Id. 63 Id. 64 Brett Chapman, “Body-Worn Cameras: What the Evidence Tells Us,” 280 NIJ Journal 2 (Jan. 2019), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252035.pdf.


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• Officers shall not use BWCs to record peaceful and lawful assemblies, pickets, parades or protests;

• Officers shall not use BWCs to record individuals attending peaceful and lawful assemblies, pickets, parades or protests, except as specifically required by this policy;

• Officers shall not use BWCs to record activities that are not law enforcement functions.65

The policy does not clearly define what constitutes a “peaceful and lawful” event, “legitimate law enforcement purpose,” or “law enforcement functions.” Definitions of those terms are also absent from N.C.G.S. §132-1.4A, the state statute that regulates body worn camera use and video disclosure in North Carolina. The implications of the lack of specificity with respect to definitions of these terms became readily apparent in the aftermath of the May protests. Many officers, including Mobile Field Force personnel that 21CP interviewed for this assessment, stated that they did not even bring their body worn cameras when reporting for duty. There was a general consensus among the officers and supervisors that we interviewed that the use of BWCs to record people participating in protests was strictly prohibited by department policy. Several officers stated that they were told that doing so would constitute a violation of protest attendees “privacy rights.” Officers issued protective “turtle” gear indicated that there were insufficient mounting options for BWCs which meant that they could not have used them even if they were permitted to do so. At some point either late on the May 30 and early May 31, officers were directed to put their BWC on under their gear and activate it. Consequently, the cameras picked up the officers’ audio activity without video. Based on the interviews conducted by 21CP there was significant confusion among officers regarding the use of BWCs during the events as there were a number of officers who did utilize BWCs.” One officer even reported that they used two cameras, mounted in different positions on their body, to simultaneously record during the protests. A large amount of officer-generated BWC video was disclosed pursuant to a request under N.C.G.S. §132-1.4A. The video was later released to the public by news media outlets. Additionally, several officers received disciplinary action (written reprimands) for conduct or comments recorded on BWCs. The discipline was not related to officer misconduct toward or the treatment of members of the public. Communities in many jurisdictions throughout the nation, have raised issues about the privacy implications of police deploying body camera technology. First, unlike other types of surveillance cameras or in-car video systems, body-worn cameras can “give officers the ability to record inside private

65 Raleigh Police Department, Policy 1109-18, Body Worn Cameras and Mobile Video Recording (Aug. 5, 2020), https://cityofraleigh0drupal.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/drupalprod/COR23/BodyWornCamerasandMobileVideoRecordingPolicy.pdf (emphasis in original).


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homes and to film sensitive situations that might emerge during calls for service.”66 Consequently, and similar to Raleigh’s Police Department, the body camera policies of a number of jurisdictions provide specific guidance on the use of cameras in sexual assault cases.67 Separately, some officers also may feel that the cameras, at least in some circumstances, intrude on their personal privacy – potentially capturing mundane or private elements of their time. Additionally, some communities, including immigrant communities, might hesitate to interact with police in the presence of a body camera. Similar privacy concerns have been voiced by advocacy groups with regard to recording protest participants. However, nationally these concerns have recently given way, in light of many protest situations that have resulted in violence and destruction, toward a new priority of recording all public events as much as possible. For instance, on June 9th, 2020 the City of Seattle changed its BWC by Executive Order of the Mayor, “directing SPD officers to record body-worn video during protests. This reverses SPD policy that did not allow recording at peaceful protests unless there was unlawful activity taking place.”68

RPD should explore enhancements to its body camera policy that meaningfully engages with these issues, including providing more specific guidance on when camera activation is required, as well as when recording may be discontinued, in order to be appropriately responsive to privacy concerns. For example, the Salt Lake City Police Department allows officers to suspend recording in particular instances, including “during a conversation with a sensitive victim of a crime, a witness of a crime, or an individual who wishes to report or discuss criminal activity” if certain conditions are met, as well as “during a significant period of inactivity.” 69 When video is discontinued, “[t]he officer shall also document the reason for placing the body cameras into Privacy Mode in a written report.”70 Recommendation 28. RPD should ensure that it adequately addresses outstanding challenges with its body-worn camera system. In discussions with RPD officers over the course of our assessment, 21CP heard a great deal about a few challenges that officers were having with RPD’s body-worn camera system. 21CP understands that at least some officers are skeptical about, or opposed to, the imposition of disciplinary actions that arose out of body-worn camera data that included non-public facing comments or conduct during the protest

66 Police Executive Research Forum/Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice, Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned 11 (2014). 67 See National Sexual Violence Resource Center, SART Toolkit Section 5.6, https://www.nsvrc.org/sarts/toolkit/5-6 (last visited Oct. 26, 2020); Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, The Use of Body-Worn Cameras with Victims of Sexual Violence (2017), https://pcar.org/sites/default/files/resource-pdfs/body_worn_cameras_factsheet.pdf; Mary D. Fan, “Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits,” 68 Alabama L. Rev. 395 (2016), https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1059&context=faculty-articles. 68 Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan, Executive Order 2020-07, Use of Body Cameras at Demonstrations (June 9, 2020), https://www.seattle.gov/police/about-us/body-worn-video. 69 Police Executive Research Forum, Executive Guidebook: Practical Approaches for Strengthening Law Enforcement’s Response to Sexual Assault 69–70 (May 2018). 70 Id. at 70.


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events in May. 21CP also understands from RPD command staff that it has made progress in addressing or eliminating some of the camera mounting and policy definition concerns. Issues that officers identified with respect to the body-worn camera system included:

• Camera Mounting. Some officers could not mount their cameras to the department issued protective gear. The department was able to obtain appropriate mounting hardware options that allows officers to wear and utilize BWCs with all department issued outerwear – including protective “turtle” gear.

• Policy Clarity. There continues to be confusion among rank and file officers and their

direct line supervisors regarding when BWCs can be used in protest and crowd control situations. During multiple focus groups 21CP was informed that the department had actually changed its policy to provide for recording of all protest activity. However, upon further inquiry we were informed that the policy had not in fact been modified in this regard.

Recommendation 29: An ongoing steering committee comprised of legal advisors, IT professionals, command staff, and patrol officers be convened not only to manage policy and training, implementation and maintenance of the body-worn camera system but also to address other technology issues as they arise and address other technology- related initiatives as they become necessary. To ensure that RPD continually responds to emerging issues and new needs with respect to its BWC program, it should establish a steering committee focusing on BWC issues. VII. After Action Reports

Background

An After Action Report (“AAR”) is process in which “following a project or event,” an organization and its “members gather to share insights and identify mistakes and successes.”71 This should be a team-based process that encourages participants to reflect on what happen, offer their observations and perceptions about the event, and identify both promising practices and lessons learned.72 The AAR process is a learning opportunity for the organization and can provide suggestions to leadership, policymakers, and others for change. These reviews and assessments must be more than a perfunctory duty but seen as essential to improving service and increasing performance. This requires that an After Action Report not only objectively

71 Marilyn Darling, et al, “Learning in the Thick of It,” Harvard Business Review (July–Aug. 2005), https://hbr.org/2005/07/learning-in-the-thick-of-it. 72 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services & National Police Foundation, How to Conduct an After Action Review (2020), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0878-pub.pdf.


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gathers and reviews the facts of the event but also contain a corrective action section. FEMA identifies a Critical Incident Response Report (CIRR) and a Critical Incident Response Improvement Plan (CIRIP).73 The CIRR captures the observations and resulting recommendations after a critical event. The Improvement Plan identifies specific issues or problems that emerged from the review, actions needed to address the issues, assignment of responsibility for taking action, and a completion date. These two can be combined into a single document. A police department can learn not only from their own AARs but also from reviewing other departments’ reports. For example, After Action Reports following the demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri 74 ; Minneapolis, Minnesota75; and Charlotte, North Carolina76 are all available for study and consideration. These reports address such issues as the use of Incident Command, use of force during protests, maintaining accountability, and community relations. The reports also “highlight the importance of departmental policies for balancing mobile field force (MFF) equipment, use, and training; identification and officer safety; and use of force with community perceptions.”77 For after-action assessments to be beneficial, the learning loop must be closed by ensuring promising practices and lessons learned are reflected in future plans, procedures, and policies. When appropriate, AARs can be used as case studies, reality-based scenarios, and exercises to help improve organizational performance. It is through learning from experience and teaching these learnings that a police department can improve training, enhance safety measures, and positively impact responses and practices.78 Raleigh Police Department’s Policies and Practices

RPD’s Policy 1109-21 (September 23, 2019), Special Events and Dignitary Security, sets the responsibility for completing and submitting an After Action Report with the Special Operations Division Commander or designee. The policy describes the content of these reports. It is to include a synopsis of the operation, resources and equipment required, strategies and tactics employed, evaluation, officer injuries, personnel hours expended, use of force incidents, evidence, and information released to the media. The report is to be submitted to the Chief of Police.

73 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Glossary,” https://training. fema.gov/programs/emischool/el361toolkit/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2020). 74 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri (2015). 75 Straub, Frank, et al, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department’s Fourth Precinct (2017). 76 Straub, Frank, et al, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Advancing Charlotte: A Police Foundation Assessment of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Response to the September 2016 Demonstrations (2018). 77 Id. at 19. 78 Id. at 2.


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RPD’s Emergency Operations Plan published in January 24, 2020 also references After Action Reports. This document states that the Field Operations Division Commander or designee is responsible for all documentation regarding the incident and submission of all reports to the Chief of Police. According to the Emergency Operations Plan the After Action Report shall include:

• A synopsis; • Resources/equipment required; • Strategies/tactics employed; • An evaluation; • An accounting of injuries/deaths sustained by participating agencies; • A description of roster/hours required; • An index of use of force incidents; • On-scene evidence collected, as applicable; and • An accounting of information released to the news media.

In addition, RPD’s Policy 1101-09, Operations, Management, and Directive Compliance Reviews, authorizes the Office of Professional Standards/Inspections Unit to perform, among other duties, audits and special investigations at the direction of the Chief of Police. The unit may conduct operational units effecting mission capability and special investigations in support of the Department’s overall management strategy and objectives. 21CP reviewed several After Action Reports prepared by the Raleigh Police Department. These included:

• After Action Report EL Pueblo Protest, 2015; • After Action Report on the NAACP Mass Moral Monday March for HKonJ, 2016; • After Action Report July 4, 2019 Fireworks Display (Stadium and PNC Arena

Complex; • After Action Report Tobacco Road Harley Davidson Bike Fest 2019; and • After Action Report First Night Raleigh 2020.

All of these reports followed the basic structure outlined in Policy 1109-21 and were completed by the Special Operations Division. They varied in length from one to five pages. 21CP was also provided a copy of the After Action Report & Corrective Actions: Dreamville Festival April 6, 2019. This report was developed by the Special Events Manager for the City of Raleigh. The Dreamville Festival was a curated, outdoor, music event. This report follows the format outlined by FEMA in that it contained both an After Action Report and a Corrective Action Report.

After Action Report on RPD’s Response to the George Floyd Protests of May 30 – June 7, 2020

Process Used to Produce the Report


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21CP understands that the Chief of Police directed RPD’s Inspections Unit of the Office of Professional Standards to do an internal, administrative review of the events from May 30 – June 7, 2020 and write an after-action report based on their review. The Chief assigned this work to the Office of Professional Standards because (1) all the personnel and resources of Special Operations were involved in responding to the protests and (2) the possibility of identifying problematic behavior by officers existed. The report, per involved staff, became “a hybrid between an AAR and an Administrative Review.” This report was presented to the Raleigh City Council by Chief Cassandra Deck-Brown on September 15, 2020. The report was released to the public on the same day. The report summarizes the sources, information, and data that the Department’s review addressed:

The Inspections Unit utilized WatchGuard body-worn camera video, Raleigh-Wake Emergency Communications Center radio recordings, KOPS online police reports, Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) data, and testimony of on-scene, incident commanders to research these events.79

21CP understands, based on interviews of RPD members, that the work of collecting the data and information started while the protests were still occurring. The RPD staff member assigned the responsibility for doing this administrative review conducted a series of meeting with personnel from Special Operations, Public Information Office, Training, Detective Division, the Regional Intelligence Center, Community Policing Units from Field Operations, and the Police Attorney’s Office.

Content of the After Action Report The Report covered the basic topics of an after-action report. The forty-eight-page document is structured as follows:

• Chronology • Operations Plan / Resource Deployment • Detective Division Response • Intelligence Gathering And Preparation • Public Affairs Office • Community Policing Response • Training Considerations • Incident Costs Areas for Improvement • Areas for Improvement

The present review was neither designed nor intended as a critique or appraisal of the veracity of the specific facts. Instead, the purpose is to assess how the After Action Report compares against best

79 Raleigh Police Department, After Action Report: George Floyd Protests and Response, May 30, 2020 – June 7, 2020 1 (2020).


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practices. The National Police Foundation (NPF) (2020), How to Conduct an After Action Review, identified the most important topic areas to be included in an AAR as background and methodology, incident and response description, key areas of focus, and promising practices, lessons learned, and recommendations80 . Our assessment compares RPD’s After Action Report on Response to George Floyd Protests against the guidance contained in the NPF’s document. In light of the Police Foundation guidelines, RPD did a good job of giving the background of the protest and the purpose of the report along with describing the methodology used to gather information and data81. However, a short discussion on the history of city and police-community relations specifically in reference to protests of police actions and whether similar protests occurred and lessons from those AARs would help the reader put the event(s) into a broader perspective. As mentioned earlier, internal stakeholders and participants were interviewed and involved in providing information for the report. “It is important that AARs not be conducted in a vacuum.”82 Specifically key stakeholders should be engaged throughout the review process. Given the public nature of this event, RPD could have contacted community, nongovernmental organizations, or businesses to get additional insights. It did not appear that personnel responding from outside agencies where contacted for input. It is accepted that bringing different perspectives into the AAR offer challenges but we believe the benefit both in understanding how the event evolved and setting the stage for police and others to work together to improve future responses to similar events is worth the effort. The After Action Report did evaluate the effectiveness of resources used during the days of protest. This review covered everything from the Emergency Operations Center, Mobile Field Force Gear, Body-worn Cameras, Chemical Munitions to Meal Delivery. Based on the review only one resource was found to be least effective – blast dispersion of OC. The Report identified six areas for improvement based on the After Action Review. All were statements without any specific actions associated with them. Certainly, an analysis of data and information coming out of the specific protest response should guide recommendations and improvements. However, best practice suggests a part of the research methodology is to review similar incidents and national standards for insight into promising practices.83 The numerous documents referenced in this section are examples of available reports on police response to protests which could help improve RPD’s response. Recommendations must be actionable and as FEMA outlines a Response Improvement Plan should either be part of the AAR or a separate document. This plan should detail the recommendations and actions necessary to implement the recommendations, responsibility for implementing the recommendations and a time frame. Progress on implementing the recommendations should be reported to the Chief on a regular basis until all recommendations are implemented.

80 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services & National Police Foundation, How to Conduct an After Action Review 45 (2020), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0878-pub.pdf. 81 Id. 82 Id. 83 Id.


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Recommendations

Recommendation 30: RPD should ensure that stakeholders inside and outside of RPD are involved in the full After Action Review process. A review of the After Action Reports produced by the Raleigh Police Department show that all were done involving minimal number of staff in most cases and all from the Special Operations Division. The Response to the George Floyd Protest After Action Report did involve input from personnel throughout the RPD. However, data and information gathering for this report did not include outside agencies responding to the mutual aid request, other city public safety departments, witnesses or victims. It is acknowledged that RPD reviewed a good amount of data and information and released a public report in a relatively quick manner. Yet, “identifying a comprehensive list of stakeholders to engage throughout the AAR process is critical.” “The list of stakeholders may include first responders on scene, mutual aid or co-responders, organizational leaders from the department or departments involved in the response, medical staff, elected officials, community or nongovernmental organizations, victims and witnesses (as possible), and subject matter experts.”84 Who and the depth of a review will depend on the number of actors involved in the action and the impact the action had on the community. Those actions only involving Special Operations may be limited in scope, yet it is suggested that personnel from outside of Special Operations be involved in the review process. Certainly, review of actions like the George Floyd Protests would benefit from outside views and opinions. Recommendation 31: After Action Reports prepared by RPD should include a corrective action section that details actions, responsibilities and timeframes. 21CP found that RPD’s After Action Reports would contain a list or discussion on recommended adjustments for future events. The Response to the George Floyd Protest After Action Report provided a list of Areas for Improvement. However, none of the RPD After Action Reports reviewed by 21CP contained a response improvement plan. An example of such a plan is found in the After Action Report & Corrective Actions: Dreamville Festival April 6, 2019 prepared by the Special Events Manager. It is critical that RPD put into action the lessons learned from after action reviews. A Corrective Action Report is the first step of translating learnings into actions. Such a plan identifies the actions necessary to implement the recommendations and assigns each action to a person responsible for taking the action and the time frame in which the action is to be completed.

84 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services & National Police Foundation, How to Conduct an After Action Review 45 (2020), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-w0878-pub.pdf.


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Recommendation 32: The Chief of the RPD should require a regular report on the status of each corrective action identified in an After Action Report until all corrective actions and recommendations are implemented. The Chief must ensure that action is being taken and recommendations are implemented if the department is going to fully benefit from the AAR efforts. This requires a scheduled report back to the Chief on the status of each action until all actions are completed. Without having this accountability mechanism in place, the After Action and Corrective Action report can easily become another document sitting on a shelf. Recommendation 33: Assign an appropriate position the responsibility to obtain and review other police departments and cities’ After Action Reports to improve RPD’s operational plans, preparedness, and response to large scale protests and demonstrations. Certainly, Raleigh, like many other jurisdictions, had not experienced anything in recent history like the type of protests which occurred after the death of George Floyd. However, many cities have had to address anti-police protests since Ferguson in 2016. There were several reports published concerning how these protests were handled and the lessons learned from the police response. As noted, earlier reports from Ferguson, Minneapolis, and Charlotte addressed such issues as the use of Incident Command, Use of Force during protests, maintaining accountability, and community relations. These reports also “highlight the importance of departmental policies for balancing mobile field force (MFF) equipment, use, and training; identification and officer safety; and use of force with community perceptions.”85 A review of these reports’ recommendations and how the Raleigh Police Department’s operational plans could benefit from adopting them might have improved RPD’s response to the protests. Recommendation 34: RPD should review existing policies and procedures and current AARs against best practice for the purpose of improving future After Action Reports and Corrective Action Reports. Recommendation 35: RPD should consider a stand-alone policy defining the types of AARs, assigning responsibility for completion, the level of outside stakeholder participation, creation of Corrective Action Report, and distribution of reports. The policies and procedures governing RPD’s After Action Reports were found in several places – Policy 1101-09, 1109-21, and Emergency Operations Plan. Each defines the responsibility and content of an After Action Report. 21CP did find some contradictory information across these documents. RPD does routinely complete an AAR from smaller-scale events to larger-scale, high-profile or critical events. The

85 Straub, Frank, et al, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Advancing Charlotte: A Police Foundation Assessment of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department Response to the September 2016 Demonstrations 19 (2018).


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scope of an AAR will vary but its purpose of learning and using that learning in planning and preparing for future events remain the same. It would benefit RPD to review recent AARs against some of the best practices documented in this section to determine how their process can be improved. The National Police Foundation publication provides an After Action Review Checklist which could be used as guide in improving RPD’s policies and practices. VIII. Community Engagement Background Protest is a direct action taken by community when other avenues of political influence, negotiation, or dialogue have presumably failed.86 This summer, the public across the country took action in the streets demanding justice, racial equity, and accountability for law enforcement officers who use excessive force. Activists, using the tools of protest, civil disobedience, and grassroots organizing, sought to raise awareness and bring about change. “In the past, most demonstrations were organized by established civil rights organizations or other organized groups, and police agencies could work with those leaders to share information about when and where demonstrations would take place, logistical issues, expectations about how demonstrators and police officers would function, etc.”87 In the summer of 2020, even where protests had strong organizers who may have done the appropriate planning, the sheer scale of the protests often left the back of the protest not knowing what the front was saying or doing. The outcome was the splintering off or clustering of masses of people throughout multiple city blocks and areas with limited direction. This often unorganized and chaotic sprawl created confusion both for organizers and police. The protests in Raleigh in the summer of May 2020 were based on a common distrust of police officers as heard in the national narrative. This lack of trust likely led the participants to a lack of deference regarding police legal authority, and small incidents quickly escalated into violence and subsequent police use of force. 88 However, best practices show that de-escalation tactics can reduce negative opinion about law enforcement through a mutual relationship of trust established both prior to and during active protests.89 A police department with comprehensive community policing strategies that are pervasive across the entire department are the foundation to building community trust. Police departments who regularly engage in non-crisis times with their communities to compare crime analysis data to community

86 Focus St. Louis, Civic Engagement Toolkit, https://www.focus-stl.org/focus-events/civic-engagement-forums/civic-engagement-toolkit/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020). 87 Police Executive Research Forum, The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations: Promising Practices and Lessons Learned (2018). 88 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri (2015). 89 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, Law Enforcement Best Practices: Lessons Learned from the Field (2019).


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concerns and complaints through problem-solving dialogues can develop strong relationships and establish trust and legitimacy.90 RPD’s Practices The Raleigh Police Department regularly engages in protest management as the capital of North Carolina. RPD personnel report having to police over 100 protests a year and historically these have all been done with little to no escalation by activists or police. Trained in tactics for crowd management and de-escalation, RPD’s role is to protect city and state entities, maintain order for the ease and flow of traffic, and to ensure the emergency vehicles can move as swiftly as needed across the city. In order to insure officers are trained on protestor’s first amendment rights and the rules of peaceful protests in the city, RPD has produced a number of Basic Law Enforcement Training documents for new recruits that explain what protestors can expect by way of victims’ support and services when in crisis or injured in public. Additionally, the department staff has been through a number of community policing and implicit bias trainings that seek to address some of the underlying challenges of police and community relationships. Finally, and as discussed elsewhere in this report, by city ordinance, a group is to apply for a protest permit. Completion of this application allows RPD staff to work with the community applicant to develop a plan for their protest that includes a dialogue about safety, best practices, and marshals for the crowd. For seasoned protestors in Raleigh, this is an effective means to planning an engaging and informative event at the Capital. This planning process also gives the RPD an opportunity to demonstrate that they see their role as protecting demonstrators’ First Amendment rights while protecting public safety. Unfortunately, when protests like those on late May 30 and 31 occur, without permitting there is limited pre-planning available and no one organizer to engage with fruitfully to prepare. When interviewed, Raleigh protestors regularly reported that they received no communication from the RPD that they were not to assemble. Rather, the protestors reported being a part of protests during the day with police in soft gear and marginal engagement that suddenly shifted to the presence of the Mobile Field Force in riot gear and soon after the start of regular deployments of CS gas and other less-lethal munitions. This lack of communication from RPD seemed to have left the crowd confused and uninformed as the Department began to escalate their own response protocols. Assessing the events of May 30 and 31, 2020 with respect to community engagement and the RPD’s relationship with the community, it appears, including to stakeholders that we interviewed, that both event organizers and the RPD were caught off guard by the turn of events on the evening of Saturday, May 30 and the size of the protest crowds.

90 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing 43 (2015).


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Initially, as noted previously in this report, RPD did not use chemical munitions or tactical crowd control devices to address the growing crowd. As repeatedly reported by officers during our conversations, RPD’s efforts to control traffic and maintain safety with patrol officers in soft uniforms in their standard protest management approach seemed to fail, with officers becoming overwhelmed by the crowds and some needing to call for rescue support from MFF and the Special Operations Division. Based on our findings, it appears that the Wake County Sheriff’s Department was first to deploy chemical munitions, at the sally port of their jail after a crowd began to overtake it. This pivotal moment seemed to establish a subsequent practice of less-lethal munition deployment to control the crowd by both RPD and other agencies. Volunteer medics and protestors reported during our interviews that, at times, they experienced the deployment of gas more than a dozen times within a two-to-three-hour window. Community members and officers indicated that the use of these crowd controlling mechanisms would at times disperse the crowd briefly, but that it also appeared to inject a new level of anger and agitation to the situation and to escalate the situation over the coming days. Once a protest is underway, substantial opportunities for relationship-building have passed. Intentional engagement with the community prior to any crowd control or protest event is critical to building trusting relationships with the community that may stave off the escalation of violence and destruction during such an event. RPD’s community policing efforts endeavor to devote at least one officer a shift in each district to directly address community needs through attending community meetings, outreach events and youth programs to build relationships in the community. However, leading up to the George Floyd protests, the Department’s engagement was largely tied into intelligence work, as reported by several commanders in the police department, rather than thoughtful listening sessions and community dialogues to hear from the Raleigh citizens about their own concerns with the national narrative. Recommendations Recommendation 35: Following large protests and other critical incidents, the community should be invited to a debrief with command and department leadership so that RPD can hear about the individual experiences and community concerns. Where policies or procedures have significant public impact or interest, a best practice is to include community representatives in the development of training, policy, and the organizational implementation of both. Departments should involve the community across all aspects of its operations and planning. Including but not limited to training on implicit bias and procedural justice and listening session in the wake of this summer’s event that seek to address the harms done to all parties involved through restorative justice practices and thoughtful engagements. There are many mechanisms already in place at the Raleigh police department to do this. For example, I-CARE.


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Raleigh Police Department establish an Interfaith Community Ambassadors for Responsive Engagement (I-CARE) Team. This is a volunteer group for faith-based leaders in October 2020. I-Care members are to:

• Work collaboratively with people of diverse perspectives and experiences; • Build coalitions intended to strengthen the ongoing relationships between the

police and the community; • Act in a capacity that promotes trust and cooperation between the police and the

community; • Act as a conduit for the Chief of Police regarding community needs and concerns; • Apprise the Chief of Police directly of the community’s needs for police services; • Partner with the Raleigh Police Department to nurture procedural justice; and • Assist in educating the faith community at large about the function and services of

the Raleigh Police Department. This is good step of bringing the community into the police department. It is suggested that this group eventually becomes more inclusive and recruit representatives from non-faith-based organizations. The Chief can use this group to assist in the following recommendations. Recommendation 36: RPD should mobilize a third party as marshals or stewards at protests or other types of public order events can to help improve the communication between police and crowds and reduce the likelihood of conflict and violence. Although it may not be possible in every crowd control context, the identification and outreach to individuals who may serve as specific points of contact or liaisons between protestors and police can lead to better outcomes. “Among protest groups, the most effective liaisons are people who are well-known and respected by their peers, including both moderates and radicals. To help preserve their legitimacy (and thus their influence) with their peers, police should work hard to find a middle ground with them during negotiations.”91 Crowd marshals or stewards can serve as both an advocate for the crowd but also a key communicator to the police, encouraging de-escalation and information sharing as the day’s event proceeds. Recommendation 37: Consistent with Recommendation 10, RPD should, in conjunction with city leadership and the community, develop a crowd management philosophy that clearly defines the city’s overall political, strategic, and tactical response framework for protests. In the wake of this summer’s event the City of Raleigh and the Police Department should consider listening session or establishing a working group to address the challenges of the events around May 30

91 E. Maguire & M. Oakley, Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson, & Beyond: A Guide for Police 72 (2020), http://hfg.org/policingprotests.htm.


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and May 31 and what effective practices look like moving forward. This working group of community representatives, business owners, law enforcement and elected leadership should endeavor to inform themselves on best practices in crowd management that both seek to address and balance public safety concerns, the sanctity of life, the protection of business and economic interests in affected neighborhoods, and the practices of law enforcement to insure public safety in Raleigh in the future Recommendation 38: RPD should ensure its capacity to use social media during emerging situations and critical incidents. Communication with the protestors and the broader community is critical. RPD does have a social media presence via their web page, Facebook, and Twitter accounts. Especially in dynamic, fast-evolving situations where the participants themselves are often relying heavily on social media as an organizing tool, departments have found using social media is a way of getting their information and message out to the public.92 Social media communication is effective when committed departmental personnel are trained on how to maximize engagement.

92 Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri 102 (2015).

21CP Solutions

Hassan AdenJessica Drake

Nola JoyceSean Smoot

Project Team

Documents

After-Action Recommendations for the Raleigh Police ......2020/11/10 · RPD’s After Action Report.1 Although it appears that the After Action Report does provides a comprehensive