Sandy "Draft" After-Action Report

8/13/2019 Sandy "Draft" After-Action Report

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Hurricane Sandy ResponseAfter Action Report DRAFT

July 1, 2013

Prepared byThe National Center for Security & Preparedness on behalf of

The New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 3

Executive Summary 4

Overview of Hurricane Sandy 5Hurricane Sandy Response & Recovery 7

Methodology 8

Areas of Study

Personnel 9

Technology & Facilities 12

Procedures & Plans 17

Concluding Recommendations 22

Appendix 1 AAR Development Team 23

Appendix 2 Acronyms Used in this Report 24

Appendix 3 Hurricane Sandy Chronology 27

Appendix 4 Executive Orders Issued During Hurricane Sandy 31

Appendix 5 Persons Interviewed for this Report 35




FOREWORD

July 1, 2013

As the recovery operations began following Hurricane Sandy, Commissioner JeromeHauer of the New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services (theDivision) reached out to the National Center for Security & Preparedness (NCSP) to develop The NCSP previously developed a limited scope AAR on the response to Hurricane Irene and

Tropical Storm Lee. Subsequently, the NCSP conducted a confidential functional exercise tohelp the Division assess processes and procedures during a simulated Level 1 activation of

strategic partnership with the Division and provided a strong foundation for the HurricaneSandy AAR process.

AAR development can vary in terms of scope, focus, methodology, and purpose. The

emergency management efforts. He asked that the report be accurate, comprehensive, andclear in its findings and conclusions. It is equally important to note that the Commissioner didnot provide any guidance as to which subject matter experts to use, approach to take, or howto accomplish the mission. In other words, we were not only allowed but entrusted tocomplete the project objectively.

I selected the subject matter experts (SMEs) based on their experience, expertise, andin most cases, my personal knowledge of their capabilities. The AAR Development Teamproduced a report keeping with the guidance provided to us. We have confidence that this

Respectfully submitted,

Rick C. MathewsDirector




EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricane Sandy sorely tested the New York State Division of Homeland Security andEmergency Services Office of Emergency Management (OEM), which was still in the processof implementing changes and improvements prompted by the response to 2011's HurricaneIrene and Tropical Storm Lee. Although a relatively weak storm in terms of wind speed,

Sandy was extraordinarily large in size and impeccable in her timing, striking the New Yorkand New Jersey coastlines at high tide. The resulting storm surge caused unprecedenteddamage: it smashed coastal communities in both states, flooded large areas of New YorkCity, and disrupted transportation, energy, and communications for millions of residents.

The storm killed 48 persons in New York State, and another 24 in neighboring states.Property damage exceeded $72 billion (second only to Katrina). Despite efforts by City,County, State, and Federal emergency agency personnel that can only be described asheroic, Hurricane Sandy for a time simply overwhelmed every plan and contingency. Thescale of the event was larger and the needs of the victims greater than most communitieshad anticipated.

OEM was and continues to be centrally involved in the Hurricane Sandy response andrecovery effort. The agency's staff has worked endless hours and days to meet the needs ofthe people of New York State. For the most part, OEM's performance can be consideredsuccessful despite confusion, delays, and missteps along the way. In the words of many whowere involved in the process and interviewed for this report, it could have been wors e. But isthat outcome acceptable? Moreover, would that level of marginally acceptable performancebe replicable in the face of a Category 2 or 3 hurricane along Sandy's path?

Many of the problems OEM encountered in mounting operations for Sandy were predictable,and echoed gaps and shortfalls called out after the Irene and Lee responses the previousyear. Staffing, technology, and doctrine were issues in 2011 and they remained issues in2012, and the challenging circumstances of the Sandy response certainly exacerbated thoseproblems. Many of these pre-existing conditions were being addressed, albeit slowly, whenSandy appeared on the horizon and forced the question.

The lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy response are clear because many of the

notwithstanding, the State of New York and OEM need to move forward quickly on all frontsto ensure the citizens of the Empire State have the response capability they not only deservebut, based on recent events, need.






The National Hurricane Center (NHC) Tropical Cyclone Report estimated the death countfrom Sandy at 147 direct deaths. In the UnitedStates, the storm was associated with 72 directdeaths in eight states: 48 in New York, 12 in NewJersey, 5 in Connecticut, 2 each in Virginia andPennsylvania, and 1 each in New Hampshire,

West Virginia, and Maryland. The storm alsoresulted in at least 75 indirect deaths (i.e., relatedto unsafe or unhealthy conditions that existedduring the evacuation phase, occurrence of thehurricane, or during the post-hurricane/clean-upphase). These numbers make Sandy thedeadliest hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland since Hurricane Katrina in 2005, as well as thedeadliest hurricane/post-tropical cyclone to hit the U.S. East Coast since Hurricane Agnes in1972.

NASA

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HURRICANE SANDY RESPONSE & RECOVERY(Current as of 5/2013)

Hurricane Sandy required the largest emergency response in the NYC area since the 9/11terror attacks with support from more than 4,650 personnel deployed from 42 federalagencies and volunteer organizations andEmergency Management AssistanceCompact (EMAC) support from 29 statesacross the nation. Throughout responseoperations, over 5500 State Police andNational Guard members were deployedand 14 swift water rescue teams executed161 reported missions. Additionally, 9functional branches and personnel fromover 35 state agencies operated in the

SEOC, and 124 shelters were stood up tohouse approximately 8,000 displacedcitizens.

The storm resulted in nearly 400,000 evacuations and extensive flood and wind damage tocritical infrastructure, including 2.1 million power outages and flooding in major NYC tunnelsand subway lines. Furthermore, significant fuel shortages ensued with 2 of 6 major petroleumrefineries shut down and 4 operating at reduced rates. Additionally, over 149.7 million gallonsof water were pumped from NYC infrastructure, the Defense Logistics Agency delivered 2.3million gallons of fuel, and over 5.7 million cubic yards of debris were removed from impactedregions.

In order to facilitate recovery operations, mobile Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) wereopened in Queens, Brooklyn and Staten Island on November 1 st , and a total of 65 FederalEmergency Management Agency (FEMA) DRCs were operational throughout the response.

r)on November 7, 2012, which brought strong winds, storm surge, and freezing temperatures tothe NYC region. Despite the inclement weather, the ports of New York and New Jersey re-opened the same day, with most subways and the Queens-Midtown Tunnel returning tooperations two days later.

The New York State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) began demobilization onNovember 12, 2012. Deactivation of the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) from a Level Ito Level II came on November 16, 2012. Rec assistance. By May of 2013, $6.6 billion in total FEMA assistance was awarded to New YorkState.

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AREAS OF STUDYPERSONNEL

STRENGTHS

An organization succeeds or fails on the quality and commitment of its personnel. While OEMhas a number of significant personnel issues, including staffing, the overall performance of itsstaff prior to, during, and after Sandy was remarkable. OEM staff worked long hourssupporting a mission that was dynamic, challenging, and often frustrating. The dedicationreflected throughout extended operations ultimately made an important difference betweensuccess and failure.

The men and women of OEM were asked to work12-hour shifts under difficult conditions forextended days. For some, due to additional tasks and understaffing, that translated into 16+hour days, which they accepted as a necessary part of getting the job accomplished. Thededication of OEM staff in Albany and in the field was critical to the success of the responseover a series of seemingly never-ending days. The experience of a small number of long-serving professionals in past events helped compensate for too many vacant positions in theorganization, allowing OEM to mount a response that met the majority of the unprecedentedneeds of the citizens of New York State in a timely and effective manner.

Strong sense of commitment by most staff to the mission. Demonstrated expertise delivering emergency management services. Succeeded in the face of unprecedented challenges. Effective collaboration with volunteers from other agencies in EOC

operations.






AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Staffing

Staffing within OEM is down 50% over the past two years, from the 2011 level of 125 toapproximately 65 (post-Sandy). New York State OEM has roughly the same number of staffas agencies in states with 80% fewer residents. During routine operations, OEM staffers arecarrying out a broad range of tasks, including the development of plans, conduct of exercisesand delivery of training. They are also tasked with managing the disbursement and use ofhundreds of millions of dollars of Federal grant funds and payments, including monies forvictims of past disasters. The shortage of trained personnel delays getting funds into thehands of citizens and emergency agencies across New York.

During Sandy, the lack of seasoned personnel forced many OEM employees to work beyondtheir 12 hour shifts for days on end. Many assignments and requests were delayed due tothe lack of knowledgeable personnel positioned to fulfill orders and respond to calls for

information.

The lack of trained staff also adversely impacted the integration into the EOC of untrainedvolunteers from other State agencies. Upon arrival, several representatives had almost noexperience, and received training (EEOC, 300, and 400 classes) from OEM staff.

Loss of Experienced Staff

OEM needs to recruit and retain more qualified staff, preferably with operational experience.In the past, there were opportunities to train and partner with replacements; that cycle is notcurrently working.

There is a need to address differences among positions to ensure both the slot andincumbent match OEM requirements. Cross-training among key staff can help to supportretention of staff and institutional knowledge. Moreover, there is a need for a clearly definedand meaningful professional development/career path for OEM personnel.

Staff Sustainment

The sustainability of OEM staff at all levels does not appear to be a sufficiently highpriority. There is no specific office or individual assigned the broad responsibility for themaintenance of staff well-being. Even prior to landfall, several individuals had been working14-to-16 hour days. Many in the EOC were already tired and underperforming before the fullactivation was ordered. Professional development, staff sustainment, and successionplanning have not received a sustained commitment. The consequence impacts staffknowledge, professionalism, and retention.




TECHNOLOGY & FACILITIES

STRENGTHS

New York State OEM has access to the full range of technology necessary to supportemergency operations across the state. As evidenced throughout the Sandy response, therewere no meaningful barriers to data, voice and visual communications between the EOC in

Albany and personnel operating in County- New York City.

DLAN reflects the requirements of OEM. EOC technology base is first class. GIS is being employed to support EOC operations and decision making.




management support system, it should be noted that OEM personnel familiar with and trainedin the use of DLAN feel it is an effective tool for supporting EOC operations. Over the pastdecade it has been customized to meet the needs of OEM and has a proven track record withmany of the EOC staff. Contractor staff (on-site at the EOC) is highly knowledgeable of OEMoperations and is responsive to requests to prepare reports and provide assistance to new

users.

OEM employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to present information on a wide range

is experienced and eager to employ a wide range of tools in support of the Office and itsmission.

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DLAN

The principal tool used by OEM to obtainand manage requests for assistance from

counties across the State is DisasterLAN. Although the State has investedsubstantially over the past decade inmaking DLAN the electronic backbone forOEM incident management, it is notwidely embraced by emergencymanagers at the local level. Local

jurisdictions in New York have invested inother systems that are unable tocommunicate with DLAN.

Since DLAN is felt to be too hard to use, it is not used on a daily basis by most OEM staff norby local-level responders, which means most personnel are not familiar with its operation.

Tracking the status of specific entered requests is difficult, making management and planningfor those resources and assignments challenging.

DLAN does not readily allow users to generate custom reports the DLAN contractor at theEOC must develop these for users.

DLAN is not compatible with WebEOC and eTeam, the systems in use in most counties andmajor cities in the State, including New York City, which means data must be entered twiceand that the databases downstate and in Albany cannot speak to each other.

AP




Asset Tracking

The volume of material flowing into and out of staging areas, most prominently Citi Field, wasstaggering. A modern asset tracking system, tied to DLAN (or some other incident

streamline the acquisition and delivery of requested resources to the parties that need them,

help assure positive control during the operation, and facilitate recovery and return of rented,purchased and borrowed items.

OEM should conduct both internal and external software requirements reviews to ensure thatwhatever system the state will be using meets the operational and recovery needs of the stateand stakeholders. There are a number of commercial off the shelf systems (COTS) thatprovide the functionality the interviewees described as a need.

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New York State Emergency Operations Center

Although the communications capabilities of the EOC are completely up to date, the processof communications within the EOC is a challenging one. Modern, functional EOCs around theworld are wide-open and well-lit, with signage and information screens that can be seen fromanywhere in the room. The

from other agencies with the operational environment, including meeting space, to carry outtheir missions. The EOC should be assessed for further updates and improvements;alternate space should be considered.

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PROCEDURES & PLANS

STRENGTHS

Relocating Staff to New York City and the ROC

The unprecedented scope of the storm damage and corresponding response effort -forward, operational posture on

the part of OEM leadership. While still playing its traditional role of supporting resourcerequests from county and city governments, OEM personnel (both staff and consultant) wereengaged in hands-on roles across the region, working in city and county EOCs, staffinglogistics staging areas, performing field inspections and damage assessments, andaugmenting other agency staff.

Relocating key staff to the New York City area was hugely successful fromlocal jurisdiction perspectives.

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) personnel were

invaluable to sustaining EOC operations, but need to be effectively managed. The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provided asolid basis for operations.







Regional Operations Center

Establishing a so-called Regional Operations C ROC at the State offices inMidtown Manhattan was seen by the Commissioner as a straightforward task to ensure theGovernor and his key staff had access to the same information they could receive in the NYState EOC in Albany. To this end, he had OEM personnel go to New York City to assemblethe systems necessary to convert a conference room into a viable Regional OperationsCenter. While the equipment, including video screens and computers, was purchased for thispurpose and much of it was employed in another command and control facility, the ROC wasnever assembled as envisioned. The transfer of senior personnel from Albany also severely

If OEM is going to continue to support a forward leaning posture in major events, including the

utilization of assets in the field in the manner displayed during Sandy, it must: Incorporate the ROC concept into the CEMP; Strengthen its available staff resources, both at the headquarters level and in

the State Regions (see discussion under Personnel, above) and; Clarify and define, train and exercise OEM support roles to Executive

Leadership.

The decision to establish the so-called ROC was not understood norsupported by OEM rank and file.

The OEM leadership team must be bolstered. The change in procurement rules installed for OEM during the Sandy

response is inconsistent with effective emergency operations. OEM must do a better job of building and sustaining its staff. OEM and Executive Leadership expectations need to be better defined and

integrated into planning and operations. Planning needs to be strengthened across the board.






OEM Leadership Team

Due to the retirement or voluntary transfers of key staff over the past two years, OEM enteredthe Sandy response with a seriously depleted leadership cadre.

Effective emergency management is frequently a function of strong hands-on leadership and

pre-existing personal relationships. In this case, the absence of a deep bench of experiencedemergency managers within the office was felt almost immediately. The Commissioner andthen Director clearly recognized this problem and had taken steps to address gaps in theorganization, but this process was in its very early stages when the storm hit in October.

Use of experienced consultants allowed OEM to actively engage on a variety of issues thatwould have probably been outside the range of available State personnel. This should not,however, be seen as a substitute for recruiting, training, and retaining experiencedmanagement staff.

OEM and Executive Leadership Expectations

OEM needs to modify its current organizational structure, procedures, and culture toaccommodate the new model of proactive senior leadership demonstrated by the Governor andhis senior staff. This will require close coordination with executive leadership todefine expectations and evolve standard operating procedures, addressing "breaks" with pre-Sandy processes.

At the same time, the Governor and senior leadership need to better understand how OEM

functions and can support them during a disaster. This will require executive reinforcement ofcabinet and interagency roles and support in preparedness, participation, and response so thatthe overall state response is stronger.

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CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

The New York State Office of Emergency Management was in poor condition on October 28,2012. Too few experienced staff members, a system based in part on tools that the users inthe field , and a leadership that was trying to build a team whilefighting too many fires around the State. All of these vulnerabilities were exposed whenSandy made landfall on October 29.

While the core strength of OEM its staff includes many dedicated professionals, there aretoo many others that l The technology backbone of the State EOC is solid, but undercut by an incident managementsoftware system that is not accepted by the local communities that need to use it and aphysical plant that is not conducive to efficient operations. It is also operating in a dynamicgovernment environment in which its plans and SOPs are being overtaken by new demandsand requirements. These challenges must be seen as an opportunity.

The Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services should initiate a ground upreview of each position and the personnel filling those roles. This bench review should

ole.Personnel should be reassigned to maximize strengths, replaced if necessary. Staffmembers should also be shown a career path and an opportunity for professional growthcommensurate with their efforts and sacrifices.

OEM must review the viability of its continued use of DLAN. If DLAN is to be retained, it mustallow more system flexibility and greater integration with other systems in the State. The

EOC needs to be reconfigured to create more flexible and dedicated space for use byplanners, working groups, and other personnel during activations.

The new paradigm of leading from the front, demonstrated by the Governor during Sandy andlikely to be replayed in future disasters, demands OEM adopt a fresh approach to supporting

leadership while still fulfilling its core responsibilities to the counties,cities, and citizens of the Empire State. To this end, the CEMP needs a thorough review andrevision specifically addressing scenarios. The resulting roadmap for

to its senior officials, ensuring coordination and efficient use of resources.

New York s Office of Emergency Management has been a standard for the world. Itshould be again.




APPENDIX 1: AAR DEVELOPMENT TEAM

The development of this document was led by Rick C. Mathews, Director, National Center forSecurity & Preparedness, University at Albany, State University of New York.

NCSP Staff & Subject Matter Experts

Andrew Vitek, Research Assistant Carlos H. Millan, Project Analyst Jeffrey Knaack, Project Coordinator Derek T. Morrison , Senior Analyst Steve Sin, Senior Research Associate Cyndi Mellen, Senior Project Coordinator Brandon J. Kennedy, Senior Project Coordinator Jayson L. Kratoville, Chief of Staff Rick C. Mathews, Director

The Olson Group, LLC, supported the NCSP staff and subject matter experts in theorganization, layout, and editing of the After Action Report .

Primary Subject Matter Expert Team

Thomas J. Lockwood William Nagle Kyle Olson Dorothy Lowry Adam Montella

Glenn EplerSecondary Subject Matter Expert Team

The development team consulted was a team of secondary subject matter experts embeddedwithin the DHSES during the Hurricane Sandy Response. This team provided directinformation, comments, and recommendations.

Donald Hiett James Ellson Patrick Bahnken Howard Murphy William Savarese Randall Duncan




APPENDIX 2: ACRONYMS USED IN THIS REPORT

ACE: Army Corps of Engineers

AG & MKTS: Department of Agriculture and Markets

APB: Animal Protection Branch

ARC: American Red Cross

CEMP: Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CIKR: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources

COTS: Commercial off the Shelf Systems

DCJS: Division of Criminal Justice Services

DEC: Department of Environmental Conservation

DFS: Department of Financial ServicesDHS: US Department of Homeland Security

DMNA: Division of Military and Naval Affairs

DOCCS: Department of Corrections and Community Services

DOH: Department of Health

DOL: Department of Labor

DOS: Department of State

DOT: Department of Transportation

DPC: Disaster Planning Commission

DRC: Disaster Recovery Center

DSP: Division of State Police

EMAC: Emergency Management Action Compact

EOC/SEOC: New York State Emergency Operations Center

ESB: Emergency Services Branch

ESD: Empire State Development

ESF: Emergency Support Functions

FB: Functional Branch

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency




GP: General Population

HCF: Health Care Facility

HCR: Homes and Community Renewal

HSB: Human Services Branch

IMT: Incident Management TeamIOF: Initial Operating Facility

IOGS: Interstate Oil and Gas Commission

JFO: Joint Field Office

JIC: Joint Information Center

JOC: Joint Operations Center

LESB: Law Enforcement and Security Branch

LIRR: Long Island Rail Railroad

LOC: Logistics Operation Center

MTA: Metropolitan Transit Authority

NCSP: National Center for Security & Preparedness

NLT: No Later Than

NRCC: National Resource Coordinating Center

NRF: National Response Framework

NWS: National Weather Service

NYSDHSES: New York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Services

NYSDOT: New York State Department of Transportation

NYSE: New York Stock Exchange

NYSERDA: New York State Energy Research and Development Authority

NYSOEM: New York State Office of Emergency Management

NYSTWA: New York State Thruway Authority

OCFS: Office of Children and Family Services

OEIC: Office of Interoperable and Emergency Communications

OFA: Office of the Aging

OFPC: Office of Fire Prevention and Control






APPENDIX 3: HURRICANE SANDY CHRONOLOGY

Time/Date Event

1100 22 OCT Tropical Depression Sandy 320 miles SSW of Jamaica; forecastpossible extreme weather in the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast regions.

2300 24 OCT NWS Advisory 11: Hurricane Sandy 85 miles SW of GuantanamoBay, Cuba.

0800 25 OCT SITREP 10-25:New York City (NYC) Office of Emergency Management (OEM)Situation Room Activated.

1030 25 OCT Principals: Downstate Conference Call.

1130 25 OCT Principals: Conference Call NWS.

1300 25 OCT .

1400 25 OCT Principals Meeting.

2300 25 OCT NWS Advisory 15: Hurricane Sandy 15 miles NNE of EleutheraIsland, Bahamas.

0800 26 OCT SITREP 10-25:NYS Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) Level 3 Activation.

26 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-26:Gov. Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New York State.

26 OCT (DAY) FEMA Liaisons Arrive at the New York State Emergency OperationsCenter.

26 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-26:NYC OEM Begins 24 Hour Operations.

26 OCT (DAY) -1700.

1200 26 OCT NYC OEM Coastal Storm Steering Committee Conference Call.

2300 26 OCT NWS Advisory 19: Hurricane Sandy 395 mile SSE of Charleston SC.

0800 27 OCT SITREP 10-26:DMNA Joint Operations Center Level 3 Activation.

0800 27 OCT SITREP 10-27:SEOC Level 1 Activation with 9 Functional Branches operational.




0700 28 OCT SITREP 10-28:JOC Level 1 Activation.

28 OCT (DAY)SITREP 10-28 #2President Obama (POTUS) Issues Presidential EmergencyDeclaration #3351 for New York State.

28 OCT (DAY) New Jersey Evacuations in Atlantic City, Sandy Hook South to CapeMay, and the Barrier Islands.

28 OCT (EVE) SITREP 10-28 #2:Select medical facilities/nursing homes in zone A/B begin voluntaryevacuation.

28 OCT (EVE) SITREP 10-28 #2:Nassau and Suffolk .

1400 28 OCT NYC Zone A evacuation as well as the Rockaways, City Island and

Hamilton Beach.

1500 28 OCT SITREP 10-27:New York State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid Plan Activated.

1900 28 OCT Suspension of Subway Service.

2100 28 OCT All NYC Mass-Transit Suspended.

29 OCT (EVE) ***Hurricane Sandy Impact NY***

29 OCT (EVE)

SITREP 10-29 #2: New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) reports

numerous closures throughout the Hudson Valley, NYC and LongIsland.

Major closures include: Tappan Zee Bridge, Holland Tunnel, andthe Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. There are travel restrictions on anumber of other bridges due to high wind. NYSDOT has bannedoversized and overweight travel on and south of I-84.

2030 29 OCT Queens Breezy Point Fire.

30 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-30:Major Federal Disaster Declaration for Public Assistance andIndividual Assistance.

30 OCT (DAY)

SITREP 10-30 #2:Of the six refiners located in the Mid-Atlantic area that supplypetroleum fuels to the New York market, two are shut down and theremaining four are operating at reduced rates.




30 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-30 #2:Human Services Branch Tasked with Establishing Disaster RecoveryCenters(DRCs) Starting 1 Nov.

31 OCT (DAY) SITREP 10-31:NYSE Reopens.

1 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-1:Mobile DRC For the City of New York opened in Queens, Brooklynand Staten Island.

2 NOV NYC Marathon Cancelled.

0800 2 NOV SITREP 11-2:Emergency Services Functional Branch Demobilized.

3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3:Significant Fuel Shortages Acknowledged.

3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3:New York State Regional Operation Center Begins Operations.

3 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-3 #2:EMAC IMT Assistance Arrived to Support NYC OEM operations.

3 NOV (DAY)

SITREP 11-3 #2: FEMA Footprint in the NYC EOC triples in size to support Disaster

Resolution 4805. FEMA Initial Operating Facility (IOF) established in the NYC OEM

EOC. FEMA Branch II Includes the Five Boroughs of New York City. FEMA Joint Field Office (JFO) was established in Queens.

4 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-4:NYC OEM Establishes Two Command Posts in Impacted areas; onein Staten Island and one in the Rockaways.

5 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-4 #2:FEMA requests a List of Facilities that can Accept a Delivery of 24million Gallons of Gasoline Being Brought Into Regions 1 & 2.

5 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-5:Branch Members Begin Staffing Fuel Task Force to prioritize FederalFuel.

6 NOV (DAY) Presidential Election.




7 NOV (DAY)

SITREP 11-7 #2:

New York.Forecast: Storm Surges of 3-5 feet, Strong Winds with Gusts up to 60mph, Snow with 3-6" of Accumulation in the Catskills and HudsonValley,1-3" in the New York City Metro area, Temperatures Cold withwind chills in the 20s possible in areas affected by Sandy.

7 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-7 #2:Port of New York and New Jersey is open to all Traffic.

8 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-8 #2:New York City Subways Operating Normally on Most Lines with SomeWeather Related Delays.

9 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-8 #2:NYC, Suffolk, and Nassau County Gas Rationing Begins.

9 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-9:The Queens Midtown Tunnel reopened.

2000 12 NOV SITREP 11-12 #2:SEOC begins demobilizing several state agencies from being presentin the EOC overnight from the hours of 8:00 p.m. 8:00 a.m.

2000 12 NOV

SITREP 11-12 #2:Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS), Department of FinancialServices (DFS), Office for Technology (OFT), Air Operations Branch,

Animal Protection Branch and Emergency Services Branch DullyDemobilized.

15 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-15Power Restored to All Areas Other than those that Cannot beRestored Due to Flooding.

16 NOV (DAY)

SITREP 11-16 #2:The Division of Military and Naval Affairs (DMNA) reduces activationlevel and operating hours of the Joint Force Headquarters JointOperations Center to Level II (no night shift).

16 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-17:

EOC Reduced to Level II Activation.

18 NOV (DAY) SITREP 11-18:State Fire Mobilization and Mutual Aid plan deactivated.

10 DEC (DAY) SITREP 12-7:Brooklyn Battery Tunnel fully reopened.

14 DEC (DAY) LAST SITREP




APPENDIX 4: EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED DURINGHURRICANE SANDY

Number Executive Order

47 Governor Cuomo Declares A Disaster In The Following Counties

48 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Authority Of PoliceOfficers Employed By New York State Agencies

49Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For TheState Disaster Emergency

50 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Transportation For TheState Disaster Emergency

51 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Residences AndBusinesses Affected By The State Disaster Emergency

52Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory ProvisionsEstablishing Time Limitations On Actions And Time In Which To Take An

Appeal

53Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory ProvisionsEstablishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody PendingDisposition Of A Felony Complaint

54 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Motor Fuel Distribution And Transportation For The State Disaster Emergency

55 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Repair Of State FacilitiesFor The State Disaster Emergency




56 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory Provisions Of TheState Office For The Aging During The State Disaster Emergency

57 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Education Law ProvisionsRegarding Dialysis Services During The State Disaster Emergency

58 Temporary Suspension Regarding The Certification Of Donated WaterDuring The State Disaster Emergency

59 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Limitations On Motor AndHome Heating Fuel

60 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions RelatingTo The Powers Of Certain Security Guards

61Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory ProvisionsEstablishing Time Limitations For Holding A Defendant In Custody PendingDisposition Of A Felony Complaint

62 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To The Election Law

63Declaring Certain Conditions Caused By Hurricane Sandy In And AroundFederally Declared Counties To Be Public Nuisances Impacting PublicHealth And Ordering The Removal Of Those Conditions

64 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulatory ProvisionsRegarding Home Health Care During The State Disaster Emergency

65 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions Relating

To The Transportation Of School Children In The City Of New York

66 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Emergency Shelter Statutes And Regulations




67 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Regulations Related To TheSupplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

68Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations ToExpand Access To Tetanus Immunizations During The State Disaster

Emergency

69Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutory Provisions RelatingTo Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents And ExtensionOf Expiration Dates

70 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain SchoolDistricts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Orange

71

Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Statutes And Regulations

Regarding Services Provided To Individuals With DevelopmentalDisabilities, Mental Illnesses And Alcohol And Substance Abuse DisordersDuring The State Disaster Emergency

72 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Health Statutes AndRegulations During The State Disaster Emergency

73 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law

74 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain SchoolDistricts Within The Counties Of Nassau And Rockland

75 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To Contracts To ConductSurveys Of Electrical Systems In Residences And Buildings On Long Island

76 Designation Pursuant To Section 6 Of The Executive Law

77 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The InsuranceLaw




78

Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Related To Child And Family Welfare,Child Day Care, Juvenile Justice, Runaway And Homeless Youth, AdultProtective Services, And Residential And Non-Residential Care For VictimsOf Domestic Violence

79 Temporary Suspension Of Provisions Relating To State Contracts And ForThe Repair Of State Facilities For The State Disaster Emergency

80 Extending The Period For Paying School District Taxes In Certain SchoolDistricts Within The County Of Nassau

81 Continuing The Suspension Of Certain Provisions Of Law

82 Temporary Suspension And Modification Of Provisions Of The InsuranceLaw

83 Temporary Modification Of Provisions Related To The New York CityJuvenile Justice Services Close To Home Initiative

85Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Statutory ProvisionsRelating To Payment Of Fees For Duplicate State-Issued Documents AndExtension Of Expiration Dates

86 Temporary Suspension Of Real Property Actions And Proceedings LawDuring The State Disaster Emergency

87 Continuing The Suspension Or Modification Of Certain Provisions Of Law And Regulations




APPENDIX 5: PERSONS INTERVIEWED FOR THIS REPORT

These names and titles reflect those positions held during Hurricane Sandy response asreported to the AAR Development Team.

DHSES Executive Team Jerome Hauer, Commissioner Steven Kuhr, Executive Deputy Commissioner (Through November 4, 2012) James Sherry, Deputy Commissioner for Downstate Operations Andrew Feeney, Deputy Commissioner for Special Projects Jeff Bender, Deputy Commissioner for Administration and Finance Thomas McCarren, Chief Counsel James Clark, Deputy Counsel

New York State Office of Emergency Management

Executive Team

Steven Kuhr, Director (Through November 4, 2012) Gregory Brunelle, First Deputy Director (Through October 15, 2012); Acting Director,(Through 3/2012)

Anthony Sutton, Deputy Director for Field Operations (As of August 13, 2012)

Operations Brian Head, Operations Section Chief (includes NYS Watch Center) Shaun Bertok, Deputy Operations Chief William Campbell, Section Chief IMT William Bowen, Logistics Section Chief (Through November 9, 2012) Dan Connor, Operations Section Vince Fargione, Operations Section Amy Benequista, Watch Center

Regional Directors Gene Lucchese, Region 1 NYC David Zatlin, Region 1 Long Island Jim Soto, Region 2 East of Hudson Shannon Green, Region 3 Capital District Bruce Jordan, Region 3 Northern NY Mike Sprague, Region 4 Central NY

Tom McCartney, Region 4 Southern Tier William Correa, Region 5 Finger Lakes Doug Winner, Region 5 Western NY

Planning and Preparedness David DeMatteo, Section Chief, Planning Theodore Fisch, Section Chief, Radiological Preparation Chief, GIS Richard French, Section Chief, Training and Exercises





New York Hospital Association

Susan Waltman, Senior VP & General Counsel

Others Interviewed Elizabeth Davis & EAD Associates, NCSP SMEs Patrick Bahnken, NCSP SME Randall Duncan, NCSP SME Howard Murphy, NCSP SME Donald Hiett, NCSP SME William Savarese, NCSP SME Ed Beban, NCSP SME