Sandy "Notes" After-Action Report

8/13/2019 Sandy "Notes" After-Action Report

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New York State Division of HomelandSecurity and Emergency Services

Hurricane Sandy Response

After Action ReportNotes

July 1, 2013

Prepared byThe National Center for Security & Preparedness


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NOTE: Blue-bolded and italicized texts contain information intendedonly for the Commissioner of the New York State Division of HomelandSecurity and Emergency Services.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary 4

Areas of Study

Personnel 6

Technology & Facilities 11

Policies & Procedures 15

Concluding Recommendations 22


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hurricane Sandy sorely tested a New York State Division of Homeland Security andEmergency Services Office of Emergency Management (OEM) which was still in the processof implementing changes and improvements prompted by the response to 2011's HurricaneIrene and Tropical Storm Lee. Although a relatively weak storm in terms of wind speeds,

Sandy was extraordinarily large in size and impeccable in her timing, striking the New Yorkand New Jersey coastlines at high tide. The resulting storm surge caused unprecedenteddamage, smashing coastal communities in both states, flooding large areas of New York City,and disrupting transportation, energy and communications for millions of residents.

The storm caused 48 fatalities in New York State, and another 24 in neighboring states.Property damage exceeded $72 billion (second only to Katrina). Despite efforts by city,county, state and federal emergency agency personnel that can only be described as heroic,Hurricane Sandyfor a timesimply overwhelmed every plan and contingency. The scaleof the event was larger and the needs of the victims greater than most communities hadanticipated.

OEM was and continues to be centrally involved in the Hurricane Sandy response andrecovery effort, with the agency's staff working endless hours and days to meet the needs ofthe people of New York State. For the most part, OEM's performance can be consideredsuccessful despite confusion, delays and missteps along the way. In the words of many whowere involved in the process and interviewed for this report, it could have been worse. But isthat outcome acceptable? Moreover, if a Category 2 or 3 hurricane followed the path ofSandy and struck New York and New Jersey coastlines under similar conditions in the future,would even that level of marginally acceptable performance be replicable?

Many of the problems OEM encountered in mounting operations for Sandy were predictable,

echoing gaps and shortfalls called out after the Irene and Lee responses the previous year.Staffing, technology and doctrine were issues in 2011 and they remained issues in 2012although the challenging circumstances of the Sandy response certainly exacerbated thoseproblems. Many of these pre-existing conditions were being addressed, albeit slowly, whenSandy literally appeared on the horizon and forced the question. The answer is still thesame: New York State does not have a world-class emergency management capability.

OEM is extremely understaffed. By comparison, Iowa's emergency managementagency, serving a state with the same area as New York but only a sixth thepopulation, is as large as OEM. The profound demands on an overtaxed staff duringits many activations, as well as underperformance by a vocal and unmotivated

minority have severely degraded morale and compromised effectiveness. Designatingemergency management staff as nonessential personnel to facilitate early retirementsand a subsequent failure to fill empty positions has further eroded OEM's capabilities.


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OEM's underlying technology base is out of step with other states and even otherjurisdictions in New York. The Emergency Operations Center is a Cold War reliclocated in a bunker in Albany, dressed up with updated communications equipmentand computers. It is physically ill-suited to supporting sustained, complex operations,to the point that the Governor chooses NOT to use the facility personally duringemergencies. DLAN, the emergency management support software used by OEM to

collect and fulfill resource requests, is insufficiently understood by many staff,requires substantial on-site contractor support, and is incompatible with systemsused by other jurisdictions and agencies (including, prominently, New York City,Suffolk and Nassau Counties).

Many of OEM's established plans and procedures were inadequate, scarcelyunderstood, or ignored during the Sandy response, and response personnel were nottrained in their content and use. Improvisation during a disaster can be the highestdemonstration of the emergency manager's art, but it needs to be founded on solidfoundational principle. During Sandy, the gaps between policy and practice, whethertracking the deployment of generators and other resources, the application of the

Incident Command System in the management of the EOC, or deployment ofheadquarters staff to a forward location in New York City to support the State'sresponse, resulted in confusion, inefficiencies and disgruntled staff throughout OEM.The sense of confusion was undoubtedly heightened by the downstate deployment ofsenior agency leaders, which may have been logical from a tactical perspective butwas, in all likelihood, a strategic mistake.

The lessons learned from the Hurricane Sandy response are clear because many of the notwithstanding, the State of New York and OEM need to move forward quickly on all frontsto ensure the citizens of the Empire State have the response capability they not only deserve

but, based on recent events, need.


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AREAS OF STUDYPERSONNEL

STRENGTHS

An organization succeeds or fails on the quality and commitment of its personnel. While OEMhas a number of significant personnel issues, including staffing, the overall performance of itsstaff during the run-up to, during and after Sandy was remarkable. OEM staff worked long

hours supporting a mission that was dynamic, challenging and often frustrating. Thededication reflected throughout extended operations ultimately made an important differencebetween success and failure.

The men and women of OEM were asked to work 12-hour shifts under difficult conditions forextended days. For some, due to additional tasks and understaffing, that translated into 16+hour days, which they accepted as a necessary part of accomplishing the mission. Thededication of OEM staff in Albany and in the field was critical to the success of the responseover a series of seemingly never-ending days. The experience of a small number of long-serving professionals in past events helped compensate for too many vacant positions in theorganization, allowing OEM to mount a response that met the majority of the unprecedented

needs of the citizens of New York State in a timely and effective manner.

A number of OEM personnel forfeited vacation time to stay at their posts. Others labored tothe point of exhaustion, staying at their position despite the physical and emotional stressborn of a long-term round-the-clock activation. Moreover, OEM staff members wereleveraged to provide needed expertise and leadership to EOC volunteers from other Stateagencies.

OEM personnel deserve recognition for their contributions to public safety during and after it is a testimonial to these public employees that they have largely found ways to succeed in

that pursuit.

Strong sense of commitment by most staff to the mission. Demonstrated expertise delivering emergency management services. Succeeded in the face of unprecedented challenges. Effective collaboration with volunteers from other agencies in EOC

operations.


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AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

StaffingStaffing within OEM has been reduced 50% over the past two years, from the 2011 level of125 to approximately 65 (post-Sandy). Force reductions, including the budget-drivendecision to leave open positions vacant means New York State OEM has roughly thesame number of staff as agencies in states with 80% fewer residents. This translates into ahard crunch for OEM during both routine and emergency operations.

During routine operations, OEM staff is carrying out a broad range of tasks, including thedevelopment of plans, conduct of exercises and delivery of training. They are also taskedwith managing the disbursement and use of hundreds of millions of dollars of Federal grantfunds and payments, including monies for victims of past disasters. This process is laborintensive; the shortage of trained personnel delays getting funds into the hands of citizensand emergency agencies across New York.

The situation is exacerbated during emergencies such asSandy,where the lack of personnel (both experienced senior staff and

junior ranks) forced many OEM employees to work beyond their 12

hour shifts for days on end. Some staff were pressed intopositions for which they had not been trained, and manyassignments and requests were delayed due to the lack ofknowledgeable personnel being positioned to fulfill orders andrespond to calls for information. As one consequence, applications for disaster recovery staff labored on the new disaster.

The lack of trained staff also adversely impacted the integration into the EOC of untrainedvolunteers from other State agencies. Upon arrival, several representatives had almost noexperience, receiving training (EEOC, 300, and 400 classes) from OEM staff. The lack of

experience impacted the use and assignments of individual volunteers (leading totensions). Additionally, there were several conflicts regarding time commitments andresponsibilities of those new to the EOC environment.

Profoundly understaffed for both routine and emergency operations. Loss of experienced and knowledgeable senior staff through early retirements

and interagency transfers.

Regional personnel must be bolstered. Poor morale and sense of purpose.

texists has a lot

of ability butvery little


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Loss of Experienced StaffThe reduction in staffing levels noted above was in part achieved by designatingmanagement-level personnel within OEM as nonessential and therefore eligible forearly retirement. The resulting departure of decades of institutional memory andexperience has left the agency with middle and senior managers possessing

response experience. The only professional experience for the majority of Operationsstaff has been with OEM Ops. The loss of senior personnel and the gross staffingnumbers mean that a number of key positions are, at times at least, filled by employeeslacking practical experience and the appropriate training for their responsibilities.OEMneeds to recruit and retain more qualified staff, preferably with operational experience. In thepast, there were opportunities to train and partner with replacements; that cycle is notcurrently working.

There is a need to address differences among positions to ensure both the slot andincumbent match OEM requirements. Cross-training among key staff can help to supportretention of staff and institutional knowledge. Moreover, there is a need for a clearly definedand meaningful professional development/career path for OEM personnel. EMAC staff canaddress some of the gaps, as they did during Sandy. It is critical, however, that theyappreciate the NY State and OEM environments and that they be engaged in a moretimely manner, if possible. EMAC supported key shortfalls; which, if provided sooner,would have helped mitigate some issues that occurred.

Staff SustainmentThe sustainability of OEM staff at all levels does not appear to be a sufficiently highpriority. A strong, extended over time. There is no specific office or individual assigned the broad responsibility for themaintenance of staff well-being. Even prior to landfall, several individuals had been working

14-to-16 hour days. Many in the EOC were already tired and underperforming before the fullactivation was ordered.

Currently, professional development, staff sustainment, and succession planning havenot received sustained commitment. This hinders a sense ofprofessionalism and personnel retention, as well as the reputation of the EOC withpublic and private sector communities.

There were some promising efforts made to address quality of life in the EOC (e.g.,wellness/stress management, counseling, massage therapy, etc.). However, the lack ofoverall investment in the well-being of the regular OEM staffers and the volunteers

from outside agencies, combined with the extremely high pressure associated with theSandy response and a strong sense of being underappreciated (see Poor Morale,below) vastly outweighed those measures.


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Poor MoraleMorale within OEM in general, and among EOC staff in particular, was low beforeSandy made landfall, went downhill during Sandy-related operations, and remains thatway in the post-Sandy environment. Unity of purpose was eroded by inadequatelycommunicated decisions to go outside standard operating procedures (e.g., actions -leaning and forward presence),

unavailability of senior and middle leadership at key moments, and slipshodcommunication and change management relating to the as of yet incomplete merger.

The current culture within the EOC allows unhealthy, unprofessional, and negativepractices and influences to go unchecked. This is due to a number of factors includingfrequent changes in leadership, the physical properties of the EOC itself, deficientprofessional development strategies, and weak internal communications at virtuallyevery organizational level. Many office personnel primarily identify with sub-unitswithin OEM, perceiving themselves to be in competition or conflict with other teams ofco-workers. Throughout Hurricane Sandy, there were several examples whereindividuals specifically withheld or failed to share information with other OEM staff.

Sandy had a strong negative impact on OEM personnel, reflected in the decision ofseveral senior managers to leave government and/or DHSES service following theactivation. Several people more than should be reasonably expected rose to theoccasion and filled multiple positions. But there were instances of "act out: get out"by staff both within OEM and from outside agencies who wanted to be relieved of EOCduties during the operation.

The consequences of poor morale can be seen in the dramatic negative reaction withinthe EOC ranks to the deployment of key OEM staff to establish a New York City-based decision, early in the Sandy response, was

made to better provide supporting information to the Governor and other key decision- MidtownManhattan.

While logical in an abstract sense one of the primary functions of OEM is, of course,to provide the Governor and his staff with the information needed to make decisions dividing an already understaffed agency placed a heavy burden on personnel in bothNYC and Albany. Openly referring (as one senior official did) to the ROC designees as - - EOC was being denigrated and abandoned. Moving so many senior personsdownstate (including the Director) meant the EOC was functioning without the benefit

of its most experienced managers. It also meant that virtually no one was available toeffectively communicate the reasoning behind the ROC to the Albany staff.


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TECHNOLOGY & FACILITIES

STRENGTHS

New York State OEM has access to the full range of technology necessary to supportemergency operations across the state. As evidenced throughout the Sandy response, therewere no meaningful barriers to data, voice and visual communications between the EOC in

Albany and personnel operating in County- New York City.

management support system, it should be noted that OEM personnel familiar with and trained

in the use of DLAN feel it is an effective tool for supporting EOC operations. Over the pastdecade it has been customized to meet the needs of OEM and has a proven track record withmany of the EOC staff. Contractor staff (on-site at the EOC) is highly knowledgeable of OEMoperations and is responsive to requests to prepare reports and provide assistance to newusers.

The most frequent source of frustration expressed by those who have used DLAN on aregular basis is that personnel from other agencies as well as county emergencymanagement agencies have not been adequately trained to use the system. Personnelthat use DLAN every day (e.g., Ops and the Watch Center staff) felt it worked very well.

OEM employs GIS to present information on a wide range of subjects of importance to employ a wide range of tools in support of the Office and its mission.

DLAN reflects the requirements of OEM.

EOC technology base is first class. GIS is being employed to support EOC operations and decision making.


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DLANThe principal tool used by OEM to obtain and manage requests for assistance from countiesacross the State is DisasterLAN. Although the State has invested substantially over thepast decade in making DLAN the electronic backbone for OEM incident management, itis widely viewed by emergency managers at the local level (as well as by other Stateagencies) as cumbersome, inefficient, and inflexible. In addition, other jurisdictions inNew York have invested in other technologies that are unable to communicate withDLAN. As a consequence, many officials across the State view DLAN as animpediment to effective incident management.

Criticisms of DLAN were heard at every level of government and centered aroundproblems of usability and compatibility. Specific objections include:

Preparing a mission request form/ticket is time consuming and non-intuitive; Since DLAN is felt to be too hard to use, it is not used on a daily basis by most OEM

staff nor by local-level responders, which means most personnel are not familiar withits operation;

Tracking the status of specific entered requests is difficult, making management andplanning for those resources and assignments challenging;

DLAN does not readily allow users to generate custom reportsthe DLAN contractorat the EOC must develop these for users;

DLAN is not compatible with WebEOC and eTeam, the systems in use in most countiesand major cities in the State, including New York City, which means data must beentered twice and that the databases downstate and in Albany cannot speak to eachother.

Additional complaints speak to gaps between what DLAN provides and what is neededto support logistics and procurement, particularly during a crisis. DLAN was neverdesigned to be a resource management tool, but has the capability to do so withcustomization. However, unless the state and local jurisdictions are using the same management will continue to be an issue.

DLAN is viewed by non-OEM users as inadequate. Asset tracking is a major area for investment. The EOC as configured is not conducive to effective operations.


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DLAN crashed during Sandy operations (though other incident management softwarepackages used in other jurisdictions also crashed under the workload) requiringcontractor assistance to reboot. Some feel that being forced to have DLAN contractorsin the EOC to support the software reflects the limitations of the product, is expensive,and constitutes a misuse/waste of limited floor space. Finally, observers felt that EOCstaff was engaged in working with the DLAN system to the exclusion of communicating

with other emergency operations center personnel. This compromised their ability toshare information (this is, to be fair, another criticism that has been leveled againstother software packages).

It is not an indictment of DLAN to note that only one other state uses the software, northat OEM is the only major emergency management agency at any level in New Yorkthat employs it. Nor is it necessarily a criticism to observe that many urgent or highlevel requests were pushed through not using DLAN, and that the forms for many suchtickets were completed after the fact. It is important, however, to recognize that the

it is viewed by many The system has few

to do anything better than other, more widely accepted, competing systems.

Asset TrackingThe volume of material flowing into and out of staging areas, most prominently Citi Field, wasstaggering. The lack of an up-to-date system to tag and track those resources must beaddressed, not only from a resource management perspective during an emergencybut also from a resource recovery point-of-view during demobilization. The tens ofthousands of items, from generators to pallets of water to light towers to vehicles,requested and deployed in the recovery operations in New York were tracked usingpaper and pen. There is no system in place for advanced bar coding of items, let alone

RFID (radio frequency identification) tagging that would allow tracking across theregion. recover the majority of the non-perishable items (such as generators) in this chaoticenvironment is a testimonial to the dedication of the men and women that drove theSandy response at the grassroots level. It was also an inefficient and cumbersomeprocess that led to losses and waste. OEM staff spent hundreds of hours on the phoneduring the emergency trying to track down resources that could have been readilyaccounted for with a modern system. While no system can completely prevent suchincidents, OEM can and should anticipate future requirements.

A modern asset tracking system, tied to DLAN (or some other incident management support

and delivery of requested resources to the parties that need them, help assure positivecontrol during the operation, and facilitate recovery and return of rented, purchased andborrowed items. OEM should conduct both internal and external software requirementsreviews to ensure that whatever system the state will be using meets the operational andrecovery needs of the state and stakeholders. There are a number of commercial off the shelfsystems (COTS) that provide the functionality the interviewees described as a need.


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New York Emergency Operations Center not conducive to efficient operations. The New York State EOC is aCold War relic, lacking the space and flow required in modern emergency operations.The main floor is a cramped warren of cubicles rather than the modern operations , with an arrangement of functional groups that is inflexible and limitedin seating. The lack of available conference rooms forced EOC staff to scrounge for

space for critical meetings, often in areas not equipped to support GIS or othertechnologies. The low ceilings contribute to the acute (and accurate) sense of workingin a bomb shelter; the depression, anxiety and anger expressed by a number ofpersonnel during the 12-hour, round-the-clock shifts of the Sandy activation seemunderstandable. It is not surprising that the Governor is an infrequent user of theoffice suite reserved for him there.

Although the communications capabilities of the EOC are completely up to date, the processof communications within the EOC is a challenging one. ues.For years, emergency managers have recognized that getting out of one's seat and

talking to others who have even small roles in an operation enhances the likelihood ofsuccessful outcomes. During Sandy, this did not take place as it should have. Toomuch time was spent on sitting in front of a computer screen in a cubicle, interruptedby meandering "pass the mic" sessions during which verbal updates were provided mic substitute for an EOC environment in which technology promotes communications,shares knowledge, and facilitates tasking and management.

FunctionalEOCs around the world are wide-open and well-lit, with signage and informationscreens that can be seen from anywhere in the room. The facility, including the main floorbut also dedicated conference space and break areas, must facilitate the ability of EOC

staffwhether OEM, other agency representatives, private sector or NGO personnel to interact to solve problems and get desired outcomes. The New York EOC fails tomeet this test, and actually contributes to a deterioration of staff capabilities over along-term activation.


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PROCEDURES & PLANS

STRENGTHS

Relocating Staff to New York City and the ROCThe decision to move OEM personnel from Albany to New York City was driven byseveral factors:

The Governor and his key staff established early on that they were going to be

directly involved in response operations and that they would act offices in Midtown Manhattan. The Commissioner determined that it was OEMresponsibility to provide the Executive Leadership with situational awarenessand operational support of their decisions and commitments, which led to thedecision to establish a Regional Operations Center.

During the early hours and days following landfall, New York City and nearbycounties including Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester were overwhelmed by thecombination of the devastation and the disruptions to power, communications,transportation, etc. Effective support of the local emergency service agenciesrequired close coordination that could not be achieved from Albany usingroutine channels.

The unprecedented scope of the storm damage and corresponding response effort lean-forward, operational posture on the part of OEMleadership. While still playing its traditional role ofsupporting resource requests from county and citygovernments, OEM personnel (both staff andconsultant) were engaged in hands-on roles acrossthe region, working in city and county EOCs, staffinglogistics staging areas, performing field inspections and damage assessments, andaugmenting other agency staff.

The decision to put personnel on the scene was characterized by local officials in New YorkCity and other affected communities as a new, best practice for OEM. It allowed OEM toeffectively follow- requestswhich were frequently made outside routine procedureswith the EOC staffin Albany. Reflecting the political realities of the response, the presence of senior staff NYC Office of Emergency Management.

Relocating key staff to the New York City area was hugely successful from

local jurisdiction perspectives. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) personnel were

invaluable to sustaining EOC operations, but need to be effectively managed.

The State Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) provided asolid basis for operations.

Extremely beneficialinterface with the

other elected officials.


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New York City emergency management officials went so far as to describe the forwarddeployment of OEM personnel as a game changer and a 180-degree shift from theirexperience with the State in past disasters. In their opinion, the presence of OEM staff on thescene after Sandy resulted in better communication and coordination, more prompt fulfillmentof requests and a stronger sense of collaboration.

EMAC staff didn EOC until . EMAC personnel wereused to augment logistics and finance, and assisted in planning and operations, while OEMstaff filled most of the core ICS positions. Even though the EMAC deployed staff were not management, and most were willing and able to adap By oneestimate, 29 staff positions were filled by EMAC.

OEM would benefit from refining their EMAC request procedure to insure that therequirements for detailees are specified in greater detail. In addition, the request

should be initiated earlier in the activation to help ensure personnel are in place whenneeded and most helpful. To make their integration into the EOC operations easier, theCEMP (see below) should be updated with quick reference guides, job action sheetsand the forms and other tools to perform each function in the EOC. This will helpgreatly when augmenting staff with EMAC and other personnel who are unfamiliar withNew York State EOC operations.

This will also help address problems with EMAC personnel that either lack the skills orsufficient experience to contribute to EOC operations. There needs to be clarificationof credentialing (i.e., professional accreditation, certification, and professionalaccomplishment), roles, and duties to be assumed. During the Sandy response, one

detailee assigned to a management position on the generator task force was notprofessionally or emotionally prepared to handle that responsibility. Another EMACassigned individual acted in an erratic fashion, caused significant disruption andadversely impacted coordination and response, eventually leading to his expulsionfrom the EOC. He subsequently made several accusations of impropriety andwrongdoing at OEM, prompting questioning of State government purchasingprocesses and triggering an inquiry and changes to procurement processes thathampered the fulfillment of critical resource requests.


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CEMP many years of OEM work,analysis, and institutional lessons-learned. Although a number of staff indicated that theCEMP was not employed during the move of personnel to New York and theestablishment of the ROC, those decisions reflected circumstances not necessarily

clearly needs to be revised to reflect changes in the operational and decision-making ce). While the plansand procedures embodied within the CEMP were the basis for actions taken in the fieldand at the EOC throughout the activation, modifications are needed to addressinsights gathered throughout the Sandy response. In addition, greater familiarity withthe CEMP should be encouraged at all levels of the response structure. For example,some hurricane pre-landfall actions spelled out in the CEMP were not triggered. As aconsequence, there was uncertainty over what steps were to be taken in the run up tothe activation and response.

Existing processes and systems worked as designed when they were allowed to play

out. Based on decisions that were made by the Governor and his staff during theincident, there is a need to promote greater understanding of the CEMP and supportingprocedures among senior officials in the State, delineate their roles and resonsibilitiesduring a disaster, and establish the working rules of engagement between theExecutive Leadership and the agencies charged with coordinating emergencyresponse. effectiveness of those decisions within context of the larger response.


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Regional Operations CenterEstablishing a so-called ROCat the State offices in MidtownManhattan was seen by the Commissioner as a straightforward task to ensure the Governor

and his key staff had access to the same information they could receive in the NY State EOCin Albany. To this end, he had OEM personnel go to New York City to assemble the systemsnecessary to convert a conference room into a viable Regional Operations Center. While theequipment, including video screens and computers, was purchased for this purpose andmuch of it was employed in another command and control facility, the ROC was neverassembled as envisioned outlay was unnecessary. (Interestingly, concerns were voiced frequently during theoperation that Executive Leadership did not have a high altitudeperspective on the status of response and recovery efforts by individual, high profile issues.)

The decision to send so many senior OEM staff (including the Director) to establish aROC in New York City was perceived by personnel in Albany as a de factoabandonment of the State EOC. Compounding the perception that State EOC parently voiced The accompanying shift of responsibilities to managers in Albany with less (orin some instances no) experience in their assignments within the EOC furthercompounded staff concerns.

The failure to convincingly communicate the rationale for the ROC along with the beliefof personnel remaining at the EOC that they were held in lower regard by OEMmanagement became an open and lingering wound to agency morale. The lack ofexperience with field operations by previously carried much of this responsibility, though cutbacks have greatlydiminished that toward the downstate deployments on the part of EOC staff. The move downstate wasperceived by those left behind and even some that were working in New York City and point rather than being seen as a necessary part of the OEM mission.

The decision to establish the so-called ROC was not understood norsupported by OEM rank and file.

The OEM leadership team must be bolstered.

The change in procurement rules installed for OEM during the Sandyresponse is inconsistent with effective emergency operations. OEM must do a better job of building and sustaining its staff. OEM and Executive Leadership expectations need to be better defined and

integrated into planning and operations. Planning needs to be strengthened across the board.


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If OEM is going to continue to support a forward leaning posture in major events, including theutilization of assets in the field in the manner displayed during Sandy, it must:

Incorporate the ROC concept into the CEMP; Strengthen its available staff resources, both at the headquarters level and in the State

Regions (see discussion under Personnel, above); and Clarify and define, train and exercise the roles of OEM support to Executive

Leadership in a major emergency.

OEM Leadership TeamDue to the retirement or voluntary transfers of key staff over the past two years, OEM enteredthe Sandy response with a seriously depleted leadership cadre. Effective emergencymanagement is frequently a function of strong hands-on leadership and pre-existing personalrelationships; managers (in Albany and the Regions) with professional and personal ties to city- andcounty-level public safety officials have been allowed to walk out the door in theinterests of reducing costs. The Commissioner and then Director clearly recognized thisproblem and had taken steps to address gaps in the organization, but this process was in its

very early stages when the storm hit in October. The division of OEM staff to supportoperations in both the New York City area and the Albany EOC simply aggravated whatwould have been a serious issue in any event.

operations in New York City and Albany was viewed by some within OEM as an insult.Others questioned how such personnel fit into the organizational structure,complaining about a lack of clear lines of responsibility/accountability. Theintroduction of experienced consultants did, however, allowOEM to actively engage ona variety of issues that would have probably been outside the range of available Statepersonnel. Still, bringing in consultants without more effectively communicating their

roles and responsibilities to OEM staff created perceptions that leadership lacked faithin their ability to deal with the challenges.

What was, in effect, the firing of the Director of Emergency Management in the middleof the Sandy response presented major problems for OEM. While the reasons for thetermination are not within the purview of this report, the timing of that disciplinaryaction essentially decapitated the agency at a critical moment, forcing the lities in addition to his own.This, in turn, resulted in delays on some decisions during the response (despite theCommissioner routinely working 16 hour days), the absence of a senior politicalappointee in the EOC, and a day-to-day leadership vacuum within OEM. The Director,

although not necessarily well-liked by some in the agency, did have the experience andenergy to lead OEM operations; the absence of a deep bench of experiencedemergency managers within the office was felt almost immediately.


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Procurement RulesIn response to allegations of waste and malpractice within OEM in the purchase ofmaterial during the Sandy response, the new State Comptroller made substantialchanges to existing purchasing approval practices, reporting systems, controls andgeneral oversight of purchasing within the agency. Although the charges (made in themedia by an EMAC-assigned volunteer) have not been fully substantiated, a review by

the Comptrollers Office found concerns and systemic issues relating to current OEMaudit and vetting practices. The changes instituted an additional layer of review (and,inevitably, delay) in the processing of requests from county emergency managementagencies and other stakeholders.

The process modifications introduced new requirements designed to provide the for all stages of the procurement process. OEM would process a request from acounty-level emergency management agency or other stakeholder, conduct therequisite research and triage, approve the purchase and forward the package tofinance for final approval. Finance would then conduct the same research and review

of the request, often delaying much needed resources to the jurisdictions. Theimmediate impact of the changes instituted by the Comptroller was to dramaticallyslow down the purchase and delivery of resources and services by OEM.

The changes further complicated a process that was already hampered by the DLANpackage. In many instances, DLAN requests did not provide enough detail for theprocurement process to function properly; once a request was entered, keyinformation necessary to execute procurements was often not being provided (forexample: buy a generator for a gas station, no other details). One DLAN procurementfunction is to issue dummy purchase orders to initiate the procurement process. Laterthese dummy orders are replaced with real purchase orders. As a result, the vendor

received paperwork from the state twice. This practice was a concern to theComptroller.

The CAO and staff are working with the new Comptroller and Pricewaterhouse Coopersto leverage recommendations and are making major efforts to restructure disastercontrols and oversight, purchasing, and reporting systems. New processes or not,OEM needs more qualified and trained staff with expertise in logistics andprocurement. It would also be useful to have Finance representatives in the EOC whoare able to work with the Logistics and Operations Sections in order to streamline theprocess.


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OEM and Executive Leadership ExpectationsThe Governor and his senior leadership team assumed an aggressively forwardleaning posture in the response to Sandy, relocating to Midtown Manhattan to be closeto the incident, traveling frequently to impacted sites and actively engaging with localgovernment officials and other citizens. This assertive role in the field challenged existing organizational structure, its procedures, and the overall institutional

culture. his new standard of executive activism byimprovising a number of measures, such as the move of staff to New York City tosupport the Governor, the effort to establish a ROC in the State offices in NYC, andprocedures to attempt to capture and implement resource commitments made outsidethe usual channels by the Governor and his team.

The Governor was making policy and commitments that were, in some instances,contrary to both OEM procedures. It is important to for OEM and EOC staffs, was well-received by both the public and the media. It seems odel in future responses.

OEM needs to modify its current organizational structure, procedures, and culture toaccommodate such forward leaning and proactive senior leadership styles. This willrequire close coordination with executive leadership to define expectations andevolve standard operating procedures, addressing "breaks" with pre-Sandy processes.

At the same time, the Governor and senior leadership need to better understand how OEMfunctions and can support them during a disaster. This will require executive reinforcement ofcabinet and interagency roles and support in preparedness, participation, and response so thatthe overall state response is stronger.


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CONCLUDING RECOMMENDATIONS

The New York State Office of Emergency Management was in poor condition on October 28,2012. Too few experienced staff members, a system based in part on tools that the users inthe field , and a leadership that was trying to build a team whilefighting too many fires around the State. All of these weaknesseswere exposed when Sandy

made landfall on October 29.

While the core strength of OEMits staffincludes many dedicated professionals, there aretoo many others that lack the commitment or theexperience to effectively meet the needs of d, but undercut by anincident management software system that is not accepted by the local communities thatneed to use it and a physical plant that is not conducive to efficient operations. It is alsooperating in a dynamic government environment in which its plans and SOPs are beingovertaken by new demands and challenges, many of which are seen by entrenchedcareerist staff at OEM as being a threat, rather than an opportunity.

The path forward, in a perfect world, would be written on a blank sheet, rebooting OEMto meet a new reality. Given the practical difficulties with such a bold move, theleadership of theNew York State Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Servicesshould initiate a ground up review of each position and the personnel filling those roles. This filling that role. Personnel should be reassigned to maximize strengths, and replaced ifnecessary to obtain the level of commitment to emergency management required forthis role. Personnelshould also be shown a career path and an opportunity for professionalgrowth commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices.

DLANshould be replaced. A competitive process should select a replacement whichis

more flexible, better integrated with other systems in the State, and fully capable ofproviding the functionality and flexibility needed in an evolving emergency. The EOCneeds to be reconfigured to create more flexible and dedicated space for use by planners,working groups, and other personnel during activations.

The new paradigm of leading from the front, demonstrated by the Governor during Sandy andlikely to be replayed in future disasters, demands OEM adopt a fresh approach to supporting cities and citizens of the Empire State. To this end, the CEMP needs a thorough review andrevision, specifically addressing scenarios. The resulting roadmap for

to its senior officials, ensuring coordination and efficient use of resources.

New York s Office of Emergency Management has been a standard for the world. Itshould be again.

Documents

Sandy "Notes" After-Action Report