Sandy After Action Report

7/30/2019 Sandy After Action Report

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Hurricane SandyAfter Action

Report and Recommendationsto Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg

May 20

Deputy Mayor Linda I. Gibbs, Co-ChairDeputy Mayor Caswell F. Holloway, Co-Chair


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Cover photo: DSNY truck clearing debrisCredit: Michael Anton


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NYC Hurricane Sandy After Action Report - May 2013 1

ForewordOn October 29, 2012 Hurricane Sandy hit New York City with a erocity unequalled by any coastal storm inmodern memory. Forty-three New Yorkers lost their lives and tens o thousands were injured, temporarilydislocated, or entirely displaced by the storms impact.

Knowing the storm was coming, the City activated its Coastal Storm Plan and Mayor Bloomberg ordered themandatory evacuation o low-lying coastal areas in the ve boroughs. Although the storms reach exceededthe evacuated zones, it is clear that the Coastal Storm Plan saved lives and mitigated what could have beensigni cantly greater injuries and damage to the public.

The Citys response to Hurricane Sandy began well be ore the storm and continues today, but we are arenough away rom the immediate events o October and November 2012 to evaluate the Citys per ormanceto understand what went well andas another hurricane season approacheswhat can be improved.

On December 9, 2012 Mayor Bloomberg directed us to conduct that evaluation and report back in a shorttime with recommendations on how the Citys response capacity and per ormance can be strengthened in the

uture. This report and the 59 recommendations in it are intended to advance the achievement o those goals.

This report is not intended to be the nal word on the Citys response to Hurricane Sandy, nor are therecommendations made here intended to exclude consideration o additional measures the City and otherstakeholders could take to be prepared or the next emergency. But these recommendations are based

on several months o intensive and comprehensive e ort by City agencies, and include input rom manystakeholders, including nonpro t partners, New York State agencies, and an extensive set o hearings held bythe New York City Council. We hope you nd this report use ul, and we look orward to working within the Cityand with many other public and private stakeholders to implement these recommendations and any othermeasures that strengthen the Citys ability to meet the needs o New Yorkers when the unexpected happens.

On a nal note, we would like to thank the thousands o City workers and volunteers who worked tirelessly ordays, weeks, and months to help New Yorkers and our City recover a ter the storm. Together, we will ensurethat the City is even better prepared to meet New Yorkers needs going orward.

Linda Gibbs, Deputy Mayor or Health and Human ServicesCas Holloway, Deputy Mayor or Operations


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NYC Hurricane Sandy After Action Report - May 20132

Table o ContentsFOREWORDINTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARYCOMMUNICATIONSGENERAL AND HEALTHCARE FACILITY EVACUATIONS

General EvacuationHealthcare Facility Evacuations

PUBLIC SAFETY911 and Emergency ResponsePublic Sa ety Operations and Equipment

Power Outages, Generators, and BoilersSHELTERINGShelter Logistics and OperationsSpecial Medical Needs Shelters

RESPONSE AND RECOVERY LOGISTICS, UTILITIES, AND INFRASTRUCTUREResidential and Commercial Building Re-occupancy and Public In rastructure RestorationFuel and TransportationDebris Removal Telecommunications

COMMUNITY RECOVERY SERVICESFood, Water, and Goods DistributionVulnerable Populations and Special NeedsAccess to HealthcareRestoration CentersNYC Service Coordination o Volunteers and DonationsBusiness Recovery

ONGOING RECOVERYHousing: Hotel Program and NYC Rapid RepairsNonpro t RecoveryCollaboration with Mayors Fund to Advance New York CityCommunity Development Block Grant-Disaster Recovery Programs

CONCLUSIONAPPENDICES AND RESOURCES

Appendix A: List o New York City agencies and acronymsAppendix B: Post-Sandy Survey o Zone A ResidentsAppendix C: Sample Utility Outage ReportAppendix D: Sample Fuel ReportAppendix E: Sample DOB Structural Assessment ReportAppendix F: Sample Daily NYC Rapid Repairs Reports

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NYC Hurricane Sandy After Action Report - May 2013 3Photo: NYC Department o Transportation / Steph


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Introduction and

Executive Summary This a ter action report is a high-level summary o recommend-ed improvements to the Citys operations be ore, during, andimmediately ollowing Hurricane Sandy and was developed bythe Mayors O ce with input rom the many City agencies thatresponded and continue to participate in the Citys recovery

rom the storm. This report is not an exhaustive list o all les-sons learned; it includes some, but not all, o the many internaloperational adjustments that City agencies will makeand inmany cases have already madeto sta ng, communications,and deployment o resources. Rather, it is a roadmap o the stra-tegic steps the City will take to improve our ability to protect li e

and property in the ace o the increasing risk o severe weather.Organized by crosscutting themes and ocused on addressingthe Citys most immediate needs be ore, during, and a ter a se-vere storm, this report establishes the Citys priorities or howto prepare or the next severe storm. In many cases, the recom-mendations in this report are applicable beyond coastal stormsand will increase the Citys overall preparedness to respond tocatastrophic events.

The current iteration o the Citys ormal preparations or a coast-al storm began in 2000 with the release o the Coastal StormPlan (CSP), a collection o programs to prepare and respond toa storm, including evacuation, sheltering, and logistics plan-ning. A coastal storm presents a known but largely unpredict-able threat: known because large coastal storms orm ar away

rom the northeast coast o the United States and can be trackedor several days be ore they impact the New York City region.

Coastal storms are unpredictable because despite knowingtheir general course, bearing (the direction toward which thestorm is heading), and strength, storm conditions can changerapidly and dramatically right up to the time that impacts are

elt (or not) in the City. The Coastal Storm Plan anticipates the se-ries o decisions the Mayor will make regarding the Citys stormpreparations; its modular ormat allows City agencies to tailoroperations to the conditions o the emergency and to maintainfexibility. The O ce o Emergency Management (OEM) leadsperiodic reviews o the CSP; the last signi cant revision occurredin 2007, and signi cant adjustments were also made ollowingan a ter action review o Hurricane Irene in 2011.

Hurricane Sandy hit New York City on Monday, October 29, 2012.Starting several days be ore the storm, Mayor Bloomberg con-vened daily executive-level brie ngs at City Hall and OEM Head-quarters in Brooklyn to receive detailed brie ngs rom agencycommissioners and senior sta ; the National Weather Service(NWS); agency partners including the Metropolitan Transpor-tation Authority (MTA) and the New York State Department o Health (NYS DOH); and others. These brie ngs, along with wors-ening weather orecasts, led OEM to activate the Emergency Op-erations Center (EOC) on Friday, October 26, which became thenerve center or storm response management. The Mayor held

the rst o many daily press con erences to update New Yorkersthe same day. Based on the storms trajectory and strength onthat date, OEM also opened the Logistics Center (LC) to providesupplies, equipment, and other resources to responding agen-cies. In accordance with the CSP, OEM activated the HealthcareEvacuation Center (HEC) at OEM to prepare or the possibleevacuation o healthcare acilities; and the Emergency Sup-ply Stockpile was activated to provision the Citys emergencyshelter system in the event o an evacuation. A key decisionwhether to issue a mandatory evacuation orderwas made

ollowing updated storm surge predictions rom the NationalWeather Service on the morning o October 28.

Following the storm, the geographic scope and extent o thedamage in the hardest hit areas required neighborhood-leveldecision making to ensure that community needs were beingmet. Mayor Bloomberg appointed senior sta members as bor-ough recovery directors to work in each neighborhood and actas a single point o contact or residents and community groupsin addition to dedicated teams o operations sta rom acrossCity agencies that worked centrally to meet the most criticalneedsgenerator placements, debris removal, shelter opera-tions, ood and water distribution, and many others.

To help understand why people in Coastal Storm Plan EvacuationZone A chose to evacuate (or not), the City conducted a surveyin English and Spanish to ask about New Yorkers overall aware-ness o evacuation zones, how they received in ormation aboutevacuation zones and severe weather, and their con dence inthe Citys guidance to evacuate or shelter in place. The surveyweighed responses by borough, age, and other demographic

actors to develop a survey population that was truly represen-tative o residents in Zone A.


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The recommendations in this report are the product o workingsessions with more than 115 City employees representingmore than 25 agencies, as well as consultation with communitygroups, volunteer organizations, and nonpro t partners aboutthe substantive areas o the Citys preparations and response tothe storm. 1 In addition to the City workers amiliar with the most

critical response operations as part o their everyday jobssuchas debris removal at the Department o Sanitation (DSNY) anddewatering at the Department o Environmental Protection(DEP)thousands o City employees whose primary jobs donot include emergency management provided sta ng andlogistics support in temporary storm-related work assignments. The Mayors O ce conducted an anonymous survey o morethan 330 o these employees to solicit their input about (i) howto improve core response and recovery operations; and (ii) to

1 See Appendix A: List o Participating Agencies and Acronyms.

The a ter action working sessions and discussions with partnersgenerated 59 recommendations in six core areas: (i) communi-cations; (ii) general and healthcare acility evacuations; (iii) pub-lic sa ety; (iv) general and special medical needs sheltering; (v)response and recovery logistics; and (vi) community recoveryservices. A seventh section, Ongoing Recovery, is also briefy ad-dressed at the end o the report; it is necessarily preliminary be-cause the Citys response to Hurricane Sandy remains ongoingand will continue as the neighborhoods most impacted continuethe hard work o recovery.

The basis and content o all 59 recommendations ollow below;in brie , they can be grouped into seven themes, as ollows:

I. Improved evacuation, including updated evacuation zonesand better, clearer communication to help New Yorkersunderstand how to protect themselves rom the risk o severe weather.

II. Improved accessibility o all coastal storm-related in orma-tion and services to make them available to all New Yorkers,including persons with disabilities or special medical needs,homebound populations, non-English speakers, and un-documented immigrants.

ensure that the processes or getting response resources areuser- riendly and can be easily scaled to the size o an emergencywith support rom a wide range o City personnel.

The recommendations in this report are designed to strength-en the Citys overall preparedness and to put the building

blocks in place or a thorough and organized response to anextended emergency event that impacts thousands o NewYorkers. The recommendations in this report also ocus on theways the City can improve emergency response to help NewYorkers resume their lives and get back to work. The MayorsO ce and City agencies are already working on the plans, legalreviews, strategic purchasing, and other measures necessary toimplement these recommended actions.

III. Better integration o the Citys data across plat orms andagencies to increase situational awareness and allow moretargeted, e cient response and recovery operations.

IV. Additional capacity to respond to large-scale building inun-dation and loss o power, including pre-storm identi cationo the equipment and skilled resources likely to be needed

or building restoration and better coordination with pri-vate building owners.

V. Better coordination o relie to a ected areas and to vulner-able or homebound populations, including more e cientdeployment o volunteers and donations to residents andbusiness owners.

VI. The development o a mid- to long-term housing plan orNew Yorkers displaced by damage rom coastal storms.

VII. Partnership with the ederal and state authorities thatregulate and en orce standards or private companies andutilities that provide essential services to New York City resi-dents.


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The City has a heightened responsibility to communicate clear,

actionable in ormation to the public during emergencies. Fromthe outset o Hurricane Sandy, the Mayors press o ce coordi-nated and acted as a clearinghouse or all storm-related com-munications to ensure that New Yorkers had access to consistentand prioritized communication.

During the storm, the City pushed out in ormation through asmany channels as possible. Major television networks, radiochannels, third-party websites, NYC.gov, and the Mayors O ceand Mike Bloomberg YouTube channels carried live press con er-ences while City Twitter eeds rein orced the most critical mes-sages. The Mayors press o ce issued requent updates on thestorms progress and sent text press releases to their distribution

lists that include more than 100 ethnic and community-basedpress outletsranging rom Russian newspapers to Chinesetelevision stations to Spanish-language radio. To reach the dea and hard o hearing community, sign language interpreters

signed all live press con erences and the City actively encour-aged major networks to provide closed-captioning during may-oral press con erences. In the past year NYC.gov also underwentsubstantial back-end upgrades to improve site stability duringperiods o high demand; between October 29 and October 31,NYC.gov handled 2.3 million visits and 4.8 million page views.Hurricane Evacuation Zone data on the Citys open data plat-

orm allowed third-party sites to map this in ormation or theirviewers and diversi ed the number and type o sites on whichit was available.

In addition to in ormation fowing rom City o cials to the pub-lic, communication rom the public to the City via 311 also in-creased in volume, with a daily average our times greater thanthe 2012 daily average and peaking as high as 274,000 calls in asingle day. Although average wait times to speak with a 311 call-taker increased during Sandy, the automated Interactive VoiceResponse system, or IVR, resolved 74% o all inquiries within twominutes. 311 Online visits were also seven times higher than the2012 daily average.

OEM uses an additional set o tools to broadcast in ormationto the general public, including Noti y NYC, the Citys fagshipemergency update system that sends alerts via landline, mo-bile, text, email, and Twitter to more than 165,000 registered us-ers. Noti y NYCs reach expanded by nearly 15% during Sandy,gaining more than 9,600 direct subscribers and another 12,000to the Noti y NYC Twitter account. The City became the rst lo-cal municipality in the country to use the Commercial MobileAlert System (CMAS), an emergency text message service cre-ated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to sendtext messages to all equipped cell phones in a designated geo-graphical area regardless o phone carrier service or origin. TheCity used CMAS three times during Sandy, starting at noon onOctober 28 a ter the Mayor announced the mandatory Zone Aevacuation and twice on October 29 between 8:30 and 9:30 PMduring the height o the storm. The Citys Advanced WarningSystem also reaches special needs individuals through govern-ment and nonpro t organizations.

Communications Between October 26 and November 9,

NYC.gov received 4 million unique visitors and16 million page views.

Mayor Bloombergs YouTube channel hadnearly 1 million views between October 26and November 9.

OEM sent Noti y NYC alerts via landline,mobile, text, email, and Twitter to more than165,000 residents.

The City sent more than 2,000 tweets andgained more than 175,000 social media

ollowers during the storm, including a 71%increase in ollowers o the NYC Mayors O ce Twitter eed.

By the Numbers


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Recognizing the important role that local elected o cials playin their communities, the Mayors O ce designated a 24-hourhotline in the Emergency Operations Center or elected o cialsto report constituent needs and other issues. The MayorsO ce also sent comprehensive email updates to electedo cials and community partners requently be ore, during,

and immediately a ter the stormsometimes several perdayand periodically through Thanksgiving. In the absence o power and telecommunications, the City used paper fyers todistribute in ormation through neighborhoods about available

ood and water distribution points, mobile charging locations,Restoration Centers, Rapid Repairs, and other programs. The NYClogo identi ed City programs to the public and fyer templatesallowed borough and program sta to adapt the in ormation asquickly as necessary.

While many aspects o the Citys public communications wentwell be ore and a ter the storm, many challenges arose or whichthe City can be better prepared in the uture. For example, 311serves as a li eline to City services and in ormation or residents,businesses, and visitors, and is vitally important to the City agen-cies and employees that provide municipal services to the public. There was no interruption o 311 service during Hurricane Sandy,but remedial actions should be taken to ensure that the technol-ogies supporting 311 retain the necessary fexibility and unc-tionality to most e ectively serve callers be ore, during, and a tercitywide events. 311 has contingency plans in place to ensurecontinuity o service in the event o damage to its in rastructure,which happened during Sandy when Verizons Lower Manhattanhub fooded rom storm surge. 311 activated this contingencyplan on October 29 and remained operational throughout thestorm. However, the 311 plat orm and geographic in ormationsystem (GIS) architecture have limited ability to scale to handleemergency-level call volume, and although 311 has grown to in-clude many customer service interactions rom across City agen-cies since it launched 10 years ago, there are more opportunitiesto grow call center, online, and mobile unctionality through up-grades to the systems underlying architecture.

Recommendations

1. Further expand capacity o 311 call-taking duringemergencies. 2

Implement a redundant call routing solution to ensure

continuity o 311 call-taking. Establish an alternate location or 311 call-takers.

Expand the use o cloud-based mapping solutions tosupport emergency activity.

2. Formalize and expand regular updates to elected o cialsand community partners.

Update and collect the specifc documents (PDFs) thaare most relevant to the emergency or circulation, in-cluding agency documents such as building electricalrecerti cation orms. Develop versions o critical docu-ments or wide distribution that can be read by so t-

ware used by people with visual disabilities.3. Standardize City communications by creating a template

or yers, adaptable logos, standard language, and trans-lations to acilitate aster communications and to ensurethat City programs are clearly identi ed.

2 The City has committed up to $30 million over the next two years to upgradethe in rastructure that supports the 311 call centers operations including butnot limited to the re-architecture o the 311 plat orm, the implementation o cloud-based mapping, and the creation o an alternative location or call centerrepresentatives.


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Mayor Bloomberg issued a mandatory evacuation o CoastalStorm Plan Evacuation Zone A, including neighborhoods added

ollowing Hurricane Irene, on October 28 in response to revisedstorm surge projections rom the National Weather Service. Onlythe second general population evacuation in the Citys history,the evacuation order required 375,000 New Yorkers to leavetheir homes and communities in advance o the storm. Manyresidents o Zone A heeded the evacuation order and le t. How-ever, thousands o people did not leave the evacuation zone;tragically, 43 New Yorkers lost their lives to the storm.

Healthcare acilities are regulated by New York State, andthe State Department o Health and the City Department o Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH) worked side-by-side inthe Healthcare Evacuation Center at OEM in the days be orethe storm to prepare healthcare acilities or anticipated storm

impacts. State regulations require that hospitals and nursinghomes have a backup power source to allow them to shelterin place and continue services in the event o an outage; 3 adultcare acilities are not subject to these requirements. The decisionto order a general evacuation o healthcare acilities to protectagainst the potential risks o an approaching storm (or or anyreason) must be balanced against the inherent risks o the evac-uation itsel to vulnerable populations: regardless o whetherthe storm strikes, the act o evacuating hospital patients and el-derly and in rm populations can exacerbate existing conditionsand increase mortality rates among those evacuated. 4 These

risks were a substantial consideration be ore Mayor Bloombergordered a general hospital evacuation in advance o HurricaneIrene, and while there were no deaths associated with health-care evacuations in connection with that storm, the challengesposed by the evacuation were a ocus o the Citys a ter actionreview o Hurricane Irene storm response.

As Sandy approached, the City used the best available orecastdata and instructed hospitals in Zone A to discharge those pa-tients who could sa ely be discharged and to reschedule electivesurgeries. New York Downtown Hospital, which is not in Zone Abut was at a high risk o losing power, voluntarily evacuated be-

ore the storm. Patients at other hospitals in Zone A who couldnot be sa ely discharged were instructed to shelter in place, aswere those in residential healthcare acilities. Sandys unprec-edented storm surge caused widespread power outages andfooding that ultimately compromised the ability o ve hospi-tals and approximately 30 residential acilities to shelter in placethroughout the storm and its a termath. Those acilities wereevacuated and patients and residents were taken to alternatelocations, in some cases or extended periods. Although theselarge-scale evacuations were completed without patient atali-ties, several improvements can be made to this component o storm response operations.

General and HealthcareFacility Evacuations

3 See 10 NYCRR 711.3(e)(3) (providing that i a health acility is located in afood plain, the State health commissioner may require the acility to complywith various requirements, including that the health acility is designed andcapable o providing services necessary to maintain the li e and sa ety o pa-tients and sta i foodwaters reach the one-hundred year food crest level, andthat the acility include [e]lectrical service, emergency power supply, heating,ventilating and sterilizers). See also id. 713-1.10(c) (generator requirements);713-2.22(h) (requirements or emergency electric services); and 405.24(g) (emer-gency and disaster preparedness requirements or hospitals).4 NYC Health Commissioner Dr. Thomas A. Farley explained this issue urther ata recent City Council hearing:

In advance o Irene, all o the hospitals and most o the chronic care acilitiesin Zone A were evacuated, as instructed by mysel [Commissioner Farley] andthe State Health Commissioner [Nirav Shah, M.D., M.P.H.] In total, at least 7,000

people were evacuated rom these acilities. While these evacuations wereconducted sa ely, it was clear rom our conversations with acility operatorsthat they believed the evacuations put their patients at risk.

Emergency Planning and Management During and A ter the Storm: EmergencyPreparedness and Response at the Citys Healthcare Facilities: Oversight HearingBe ore the New York City Council Comms. on Health, Aging, and Mental Health,Developmental Disabilities, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse, & Disability Services (Jan.24, 2013) (testimony o Thomas A. Farley, MD, MPH, Commissioner, New York CityDepartment o Health and Mental Hygiene) (hereina ter Farley Testimony). Seealso Dosa D, Hyer K, Thomas K, et al. To Evacuate or Shelter in Place: Implicationso Universal Hurricane Evacuation Policies on Nursing Home Residents, 13(2) JAm Med Dir Assoc. 190.e1 (February 2012).

There are approximately 99,000 buildingsin the Hurricane Sandy surge zone housing405,000 residential units and more than 1million people.

26 NYCHA developments home to more than45,000 residents are in Hurricane EvacuationZone A.

There are 6 acute-care hospitals, 1 psychiatrichospital, 22 nursing homes, and 18 adult care

acilities in Zone A.

By the Numbers


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General Evacuation

The Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) delineates three evacuation zones,A, B, and C. Zone A includes the Citys coastline and low-lyingareas most vulnerable to a coastal storm. Under the CSP, ZoneA is to be evacuated in the event o a Category 1 hurricane; the

Mayor ordered an evacuation o Zone A in advance o HurricanesIrene and Sandy. Zones B and C cover additional low-lying areasthat are vulnerable to more extreme storms (a Category 2 hur-ricane and above). The zone system in the CSP was developedusing Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges rom Hurricanes (SLOSH)maps generated by the U.S. Army Corps o Engineers (USACE),and are primarily based on (i) coastal food risk resulting romstorm surgethe dome o ocean water propelled by the windsand low barometric pressure o a hurricane; (ii) the geography o the Citys low-lying neighborhoods; and (iii) the accessibility o these neighborhoods by bridges and roads. Amended to includeCity Island, the Rockaways, and Hamilton Beach a ter HurricaneIrene, Zone A includes 375,000 people and 26 public housing de-velopments. 5 Sandys track, including the le tward hook it took that put the City in the direct path o the storms most dangerousonshore winds and record storm surge, caused inundation thatsigni cantly exceeded the boundaries o Zone A.

Be ore Sandy, the National Weather Service updated its stormsurge model to account or bigger and slower moving storms, aswell as improved elevation and high tide data; OEM was in theprocess o reviewing and updating the Citys evacuation zoneswhen this storm hit. Based on this updated model and the rec-ommended interpretation o hurricane category, storm bearing,the size o the storm, and other in ormation the City receives

rom the National Hurricane Center and the National WeatherService be ore a coastal storm, the City is revising its hurricaneevacuation zones or the 2013 hurricane season. The new zones1 through 6which will replace Zones A, B, and Cinclude anadditional 640,000 New Yorkers not included within the bound-aries o the ormer zones. The increased number o zones willgives the City more fexibility in targeting areas to evacuate inadvance o a predicted storm. The map above illustrates theprojected new evacuation zones 1 through 6; the City plans torelease detailed in ormation about the new evacuation zones inJune 2013 and will make this in ormation available to residentson NYC.gov and 311, as well as through additional outreach.

The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) has a particularresponsibility to provide sa e shelter or its residents and to pro-tect its buildings and in rastructure. A recommendation o theIrene a ter action review was to strengthen NYCHAs communi-cations with the resident population and develop NYCHA-spe-ci c evacuation plans to incorporate into the Coastal Storm Plan.In advance o the storm, NYCHA made 33,000 calls to 19,000

amilies, posted fyers in multiple languages, and worked withthe NYPD to make announcements with bullhorns rom markedvehicles with fashing lights in order to encourage residentsto evacuate be ore elevators and other building systems werepowered down. NYCHA and the NYPD also provided 200 busesto help residents evacuate and continued to transport residentsoutside o Zone A until it was no longer sa e or rst respondersto be on the roads.

Despite extensive communications be ore the storm, many resi-dents o Zone A chose not to leave their homes. To gain some un-

derstanding o residents decisions to evacuate or remain in theirhomes, the City conducted a survey o Zone A residents. 6 Amongthe key ndings are that prior to the storm, 88% o Zone A resi-dents surveyed knew that they lived in a hurricane evacuationzone, and 78% knew that they lived in Zone A. In addition, 71% o Zone A residents reported hearing an announcement to evacuate

rom a public o cial. Yet those who knew they lived in a vulnera-ble area and received an o cial instruction to evacuate were onlyslightly more likely to evacuate than a resident who reported thatthey did not receive such an instruction (78% vs. 68%).

5 Press Release, New York City O ce o the Mayor, Mayor Bloomberg Issues Orderor Mandatory Evacuation o Low-Lying Areas as Hurricane Sandy Approaches (Oc-

tober 28, 2012), available at http://on.nyc.gov/QXldWv.6 The Citys polling rm purchased a sample list o all adults identi ed as residing inthe census blocks that compose Zone A. It set quotas by borough and paid care ulattention to eld the survey evenly and weight by borough, gender, age, and raceto resemble the Census 2010 adult population o Zone A. The survey is reliable orunderstanding the views and opinions o the adult population o Zone A and mak-ing decisions based on those opinions. The entire survey is attached as Appendix B.

Projected New Hurricane Evacuation Zones

Note: The exact borders o the new Hurricane Evacuation Zones are still beingnalized. This graphic represents the proposed Evacuation Zones, which are

currently under review. The new zones will be nalized and released in June 2013.


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This suggests that the decision to evacuate is based on moreactors than a mayoral order. 7 The most signi cant actors con-

tributing to a decision not to evacuate include a belie that thestorm would not be strong enough to pose a danger (22%); a be-lie that the residents home was su ciently elevated to prevent

fooding (11%); and a general belie that the residents homewas well built (8%). O those surveyed, 29% reported evacuatinga ter the storm. Among residents who evacuated be ore or a terthe storm, 67% evacuated or more than 48 hours, 78% stayedwith riends, and 2% stayed at a City evacuation shelter. Thissurvey will become an important tool or re ning how the Citycommunicates with residents in evacuation zones not only priorto coastal storms, but year-round.

7 The survey ound that 44% o these residents had initially remained in placeand evacuated a ter the storm.

Recommendations4. Implement the new Coastal Storm Plan evacuation zones

and review the Citys evacuation procedures.

Develop a building- or development-speci c evacua-tion zone determination or NYCHA properties withinthe new evacuation zones.

Review pre- and post-storm evacuation routes that ac-count or the possibility o road and bridge closures orfooding.

5. Increase and re ne pre-storm communications and edu-cation to vulnerable areas, including NYCHA develop-ments, to maximize evacuation in uture storms throughOEMs Ready New York program and other outlets.

Ensure that communications clearly explain theimportance o ollowing an evacuation order or othero cial instructions.

Provide direction on what to bring, such as medicationsand important documents, and rein orce that peoplemay have to leave home or more than three to ve days.

Publicize the homebound evacuation system to NewYorkers who cannot evacuate without assistance,clients o the Citys paratransit services, and peoplewith disabilities.

Coordinate with advertising companies or use o digitalbillboards to display evacuation and other in ormation.

NYCHA made 33,000 calls to 19,000 units,

posted fyers in multiple languages, andworked with the NYPD to make announce-ments with bullhorns rom marked vehicleswith fashing lights.

NYCHA employees knocked on 3,436 doors o residents who are mobility impaired or whorequire li e-sustaining equipment as well asthe doors o 7,680 seniors in Zone A duringthe weekend preceding the storm.

NYCHA and the NYPD provided 200 buses to

help residents in zone A evacuate.

NYCHA Numbers


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Healthcare Facility Evacuations

Many o New York Citys medical acilities are concentrated closeto the water ront. From Hospital Row on Manhattans East Sideto the adult care acilities in the Rockaways, coastal storms pres-ent a disproportionate risk to an already vulnerable population. 8

Although hospitals and nursing homes are required by Stateregulation to have evacuation plans and redundant power ca-pabilities to allow sheltering in place, 9 the impact o HurricaneSandy and the duration o the widespread power outage wasmore than some acilities could bear. Five hospitals and approxi-mately 30 nursing homes and adult residential acilities evacu-ated during and a ter the storm, either to other acilities or toSpecial Medical Needs Shelters (SMNS), a last- resort optionwhen placements at other residential care acilities identi edin evacuation planswhich requently operate near ull capac-ityare not available. The number o evacuations also stressedpatient transportation options and created competition or bedplacements in the absence o a regional evacuation plan to co-ordinate these scarce resources. In total, City and State o cialshelped sa ely evacuate approximately 6,300 patients rom 37di erent healthcare acilities without a single atality. 10

Following the storm, the City sourced as many generators aspossible to protect li e and sa ety and to prevent additionalhealthcare acility evacuations. However, communications withmany acilities was di cult due to power and telecommunica-tions outages and uneven overall situational awareness, whichlimited the Citys ability to address the needs o particular loca-tions quickly. Facilities were repatriated as they came back on-line, but this process was not as orderly as it should have been

because there are no guidelines or healthcare acilities to re-open a ter an evacuation, such as a structural certi cation romthe Department o Buildings (DOB), letters rom certi ed con-tractors to veri y essential utility connections, and inspection

rom the relevant healthcare oversight entity. Overall, there issubstantial room or improvement or acilities to harden theirin rastructure, improve their plans to shelter in place, and de-velop plans to sa ely move patients and their medical charts toappropriate alternative acilities be ore, during, or a ter a severeweather event.

Recommendations

6. Work with the New York State Department o Health todevelop and en orce current and new regulations orlicensed residential acilities including hospitals, nursinghomes, and adult care acilities that require comprehensiveevacuation planning and backup power capacity.

Establish protocols that leverage other acilities in theregion to avoid reliance on Special Medical Needs Shel-ters or acility evacuations.

Develop a patient tracking system to track evacuees.

7. Ensure healthcare acilities are equipped with and knowhow to use alternate means o communication (e.g. satel-lite phones or radios) that remain unctional in the eventthat power outages and downed landlines make otherchannels unusable.

8. Develop guidelines or healthcare acility repatriationthat include all necessary inspections and certi cations.

8 According to research undertaken by the NYC Special Initiative or Rebuildingand Resiliency (SIRR), 20% o hospitals citywide, 34% o adult care acilities; 19%o nursing homes, and 11% o other residential acilities are in the 1-in-100 yearfood zone or the 1-in-500 year food zone.9 See supra note 2.10 Farley Testimony, supra note 5.


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911 and Emergency Response

The Citys 911 emergency call-taking system reached its highesthourly call volume ever20,000 calls per hourduring Huuri-cane Sandy and received more calls during one 24-hour periodbetween 3:00 PM on October 29 and 3:00 PM on October 30 thanon September 11, 2001 or during the 2003 blackout, the twohighest call periods prior to Sandy. Although this unprecedentedcall volume resulted in average wait times as high as 5 minutesand 30 seconds at the height o the storm, the recently upgraded911 system unctioned as designed and did not ail or drop anycalls. Nonetheless, some callers may have received busy signalsdue to limited capacity o outside phone carriers.

Hurricane Sandy did result in an increase o high-priority calls,including a 37-time increase o water rescues over normal; butthe majority o calls were or downed trees and other non-li e-threatening emergencies. Mayor Bloomberg gave a press brie -ing during the night o the storm to remind New Yorkers that911 should be used only or serious emergencies, and that 311should be used or all other types o assistance. To assist in recov-ery and clean-up operations ollowing the storm, the O ce o Data Analytics was able to establish a data link between 311 and911 or calls about downed trees, which acilitated more e cientdeployment o resources than in previous storm responses.

Public Sa ety Recommendations119. Launch a public awareness campaign that 911 is or emer-

gencies only.

10. Improve and strengthen pre-storm messaging about theproper use o 911 and 311 and other resources availableto New Yorkers or non-li e threatening situations.

11. Formalize a protocol to push in ormation about downedtrees rom 911 and 311 to the Department o Parks andRecreation (DPR) or removal a ter the initial emergencyresponse.

Public Sa ety Operations and Equipment

Days be ore Hurricane Sandy made land all, NYPD and FDNYmade crucial changes in sta ng levels that proved invaluableduring and a ter the storm: NYPD implemented 12-hour tours tomaintain sta ng levels and FDNY brought in more than 600 ad-ditional Fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel.Be ore the storm, NYPD deployed extra sta to food-prone loca-tions in Evacuation Zone A to conduct home visits, advise resi-dents o the Citys evacuation order, noti y residents o the avail-ability o various shelters, and distribute pre-packaged ood andsupply kits. FDNY activated its Incident Management Team (IMT),a team o 50-60 FDNY sta trained in logistics, nance, planning,and command to manage large-scale, complex incidents in NewYork City and around the country to coordinate the evacuationo homebound and elderly residents that requested assistancethrough 311 and arranged or transport and relocation o indi-viduals who could not evacuate without this assistance.

During and a ter the storm, the NYPD Special Operations divisionand FDNY water rescue teams used prepositioned personneland equipment in Staten Island, Brooklyn, and Queens torescue more than 2,200 people. Both departments estimate thathundreds o additional rescues were likely conducted but werenot reported. FDNY EMS, along with mutual aid ambulanceresources, coordinated evacuations o several hundred patients

rom Coney Island Hospital, Bellevue Hospital, and NYU Hospital,including patients in critical condition and more than 15 in antsin neo-natal intensive care. Once the storm subsided, FDNY andNYPD conducted grid searches o more than 31,000 homes andbusinesses to locate and assist people in severely a ected areas.

11 In addition to these recommendations, the City will shortly release a reviewo the 911 emergency response system that will make additional proposals tostrengthen 911 operations during large, extended emergency events.

911 received more than 20,000 calls per hourduring the peak o the storm.

Approximately 2 million New Yorkers werewithout power immediately a ter the storm.

The City deployed approximately 230 genera-tors a ter the storm to hospitals, healthcare

acilities, and public and private residentialbuildings.

More than 3,500 tra c signals were down ordamaged ollowing the storm.

By the Numbers


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While NYPD was able to carry out its li e-sa ety mission, someo cers reported that their equipment was not well-suited orfood rescue operations. For example, NYPD patrol commandsused fat-bottomed jon boats to conduct many rescues; becausethese boats do not have motors and require manual rowing ortowing, they limit mobility and maneuverability in swi t currents.

Because these boats are metal, o cers had to use extremecaution to avoid downed power lines. The FDNY and NYPDsspecialized units more success ully used infatable boats, whichhave outboard motors that can operate with only 18 inches o dra t and are made o nephron galvanized rubber that is easilydecontaminated and patched. Infatable boats are generally moremaneuverable than jon boats, old up or storage on a vehicle, andcan be easily deployed.

Power outages that began on October 29 posed unique publicsa ety challenges. Immediately ollowing the storm nearly630,000 Con Edison and Long Island Power Authority (LIPA) cus-tomer accountsmore than 1.5 million peoplewere without

power. The storm surge took out Con Edisons electric substationson the Lower East Side o Manhattan, knocking out power romapproximately 34th Street south to the World Trade Center. Fallentrees brought outages to approximately 70% o customers servedby overhead power lines in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, andStaten Island. Power in the Rockaways was completely knockedout, as was all o Coney Island, and broad swathes o StatenIslands Mid and South shores, Gerritsen Beach, Howard Beach,and other coastal neighborhoods.

Immediately ollowing the storm, light towers or tra c andgeneral neighborhood sa ety were in short supply, thoughwith assistance rom FEMA and the New York State EmergencyManagement O ce, the City eventually sourced approximately500 light towers that were deployed to a ected communities.Light towers not only deterred crime and assisted rst respondersin rescue operations a ter the sun set, they also became centrallocations or communities to exchange in ormation and chargeelectronic devices.

The NYPD provided tra c management and intersection controlin areas without unctioning tra c signals or weeks a ter thestorm, though the number o intersections with signals withoutpower immediately a ter the stormmore than 3,500exceededthe number o available tra c en orcement agents. The NYPDquickly mobilized 1,200 Police Academy recruits to augment

tra c control measures at key intersections. Tra c issues wereexacerbated by the uel shortage that abated as o November 9,when Mayor Bloomberg implemented uel rationing measuresthroughout the City. 12 Tra c in severely a ected neighborhoodswas impacted or weeks ollowing the storm as residents returnedand recovery resources and volunteers fowed into those areas.

FDNY per ormed extensive work to dewater more than 2,700fooded homes and businesses, remove more than 3,250 trees

rom roadways, and wash more than 250 streets to remove beachsand and debris. These operations were critical to allowing rstresponders to maintain li e-sa ety operations and provide accessto a ected areas or additional relie e orts.

A ter the storm, NYPD o cers were used beyond their crimecontrol capabilities or tasks such as distribution o ood andsupplies and wellness checks or vulnerable or homeboundresidents. NYPD o cers and School Sa ety Agents also sta edevacuation shelters to ensure public sa ety and assist evacuees inobtaining donated ood and supplies, ling or FEMA assistance,and addressing other basic needs. In addition to assisting with thedistribution o ood and other personal items, the IMT distributednearly 80,000 re sa ety pamphlets to address the increase in

res ollowing the storm to tens o thousands homes in Queens,Brooklyn, and Staten Island (see Vulnerable Populations andSpecial Needs on page 27).

Recommendations

12. Identi y and expedite the purchase o public sa etyequipment, including additional light towers andin atable boats.

13. Consider alternative power options or tra c and streetlights to keep the roadway network unctioning to themaximum possible extent during power outages.

12 Recommendations regarding the uel shortage are discussed on pages 18-19.


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Power Outages, Generators, and Boilers

As noted above, storm surge and high winds le t millions o NewYorkers without power; the inundation o critical in rastructureincluding the 13th Street Con Edison substation and our LIPAsubstations, led to an outage greater in extent and longer induration than what could have been predicted based on theNational Weather Services orecast and surge modeling and ex-periences in previous severe weather events. 13

A ter large portions o the city lost power at approximately 8:00PM on Monday, October 29, the City deployed as many gener-ators as it could source to meet a demand that exceeded thenumber o requests rom any other incident. 14 In addition toCity acilities, including hospitals and public housing, private a-cilities that did not have generators or where generators ailedturned to the City or assistance. The City established an inter-governmental generator and boiler task orce comprised o theMayors O ce o Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, OEM,FEMA, and the Army Corps o Engineers to prioritize placementto locations that needed power or immediate li e-sa ety needs.In total, the City deployed approximately 230 generators to hos-pitals, nursing homes, large multi- amily buildings, and NYCHAdevelopments in the days ollowing the storm. The City workedclosely with Con Edison and LIPA to monitor and prioritize pow-er restoration throughout the inundation zone.

Although all evacuation shelters are located outside o Zone A,they remain susceptible to systems outagesincluding poweroutagesthat extend beyond the borders o the evacuationzone. Seward Park High School in the Lower East Side lost power

or several hours on October 29 or this reason. In anticipation o this possibility, schools that are selected as emergency sheltersare assessed or generators so that temporary power can be re-stored as quickly as possible.

A ter the generator and boiler task orce met the demand orgenerators to protect li e and sa ety, the next highest priority orbuilding systems restoration was NYCHA: approximately 80,000residents in 423 buildings were a ected by lost power, heat,and/or hot water. NYCHA sta worked to restore at least tem-porary services as quickly as possible, though many buildings

subjected to saltwater and sand required a signi cant amounto work to bring them even to this standard.

To expedite power restoration in public housing acilities, NYCHAentered into emergency contracts with electrical contractors tobuild temporary switch boxes and restore connections to theCon Edison and LIPA power grids. In the 15 days immediately

ollowing the storm more than 150 electricians and other skilledtrades restored power to approximately 400 NYCHA buildingshousing more than 79,000 residents. As a result o these e -

orts, heat, power, and hot water were completely restored to allNYCHA buildings impacted by the storm by November 18.

Although essential services were ultimately restored, this reviewconcluded that signi cant steps can be taken to strengthen theCitys capacity to more quickly respond to the massive poweroutages that residents and businesses aced ollowing the storm.As part o its internal post-storm review, NYCHA will research thebest practices and work with residents to clearly outline its re-sponsibilities to residents who remain in their homes during amandatory evacuation and in the event o prolonged power out-ages in areas that are not evacuated. The City also used contactin ormation rom tax records and water accounts to reach out toowners o buildings in the Department o Housing Preservationand Development (HPD) port olio to hold them accountable torestore buildings to habitability, and where possible, assist themin doing so. 15

13 Prior to Sandy, Con Edison made preparations or the 11 to 12 oot surge atthe Battery orecast by the NWS by erecting temporary barriers around installa-tions, including those in the East 13th Street complex. The actual storm surgecame into the Battery at 14 eet, exceeding all o cial orecasts and overwhelm-ing the barriers erected at the East 13th Street complex. The unpredicted surgelevel fooded ve Con Edison substations and our LIPA substations. The network outages caused by the unprecedented substation fooding numbered almost350,000 customers.

The most common cause o weather-related power outages is damage to over-head lines outside Manhattan (up to approximately 600,000 customer accounts).During Sandy, Con Edison made preparations or power outages in certain ar-eas by de-energizing certain networks, particularly in Lower Manhattan, andportions o the steam system in response to rising storm surge. Sandys stormsurge exceeded the areas where Con Edison took preemptive action, causing ad-ditional outages in Manhattan and Staten Island; the LIPA network experiencedmassive inundation in the Rockaways, which was essentially completely withoutpower ollowing the storm.14 The City works with the U.S. Army Corps o Engineers outside o hurricane

season to survey building-speci c needs or backup generation at critical acili-ties based on the type and use o the building; the Army Corps keeps detailedspeci cations or each assessment, including in ormation about generator sizing,placement, and connections, on record in case o an event that requires a genera-tor to be deployed to that location. Following Sandy the need or generators arexceeded the available supply, and in a number o cases, the generator speci ca-

tions on record or a particular acility were incorrect based on building use orwere out o date. The Army Corps mission limits its generator assessments tobuildings that house services essential to victim survival or public health, publicsa ety and disaster recovery operations, shelters, and in rastructure operations.15 The NYC Department o Housing Preservation and Development (HPD) is re-sponsible or en orcing the New York State Multiple Dwelling Law and the NewYork City Housing Maintenance Code. These laws outline the rights and respon-sibilities o renters and property owners regarding the maintenance o property,including heat and hot water, lead-based paint, window guards, carbon monox-ide detectors, bedbugs, basements and cellars, and Certi cates o No Harassment

or certain types o housing. See NYC HPD, Residential Building Owners, http://www.nyc.gov/html/hpd/html/owners/owners.shtml (last visited April 18, 2013).


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Recommendations

14. Develop a comprehensive plan to expedite power resto-ration to multi- amily public and private housing.

Work with building owners to conduct a power needsassessment o mid- and high-rise residential buildings inlow-lying areas in the event o a sustained power outage.

Set standards or power and essential service restora-tion and require plans rom building owners to meetthose needs as part o their obligation to provide habit-able dwellings.

Develop power needs assessments or NYCHA develop-ments and set standards or essential service restora-tion in the event o a sustained power outage and de-velop a plan to meet those standards.

15. Improve and expand of-season site generator assess-ments or public acilities.

Work with the Army Corps to develop criteria and as-sessment processes appropriate to New York City.

Expand the list o acilities that receive power assess-ments to private buildings with City agency tenants.

Develop a process or acilities, including private resi-dential buildings, to conduct sel -assessments ollow-ing Army Corps methodology.

16 The New York State Department o Environmental Contamination regulates ahazardous waste management program on behal o the ederal EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA), including the State Pollutant Discharge EliminationSystem (SPDES) that controls point source discharges to public wastewater andstormwater systems. Inundation o building basements may damage building

uel tanks or cause them to leak, introducing the possibility o environmentalcontamination i the building discharges to the Citys sewer system duringdewatering.

16. Establish a Dewatering and Generator Task Force and Ac-tion Plan to activate in advance o an approaching stormthat will collect and use detailed in ormation about build-ings in ood-prone areas to expedite recovery.

Develop a plan to address environmental contamina-tion in dewatering and debris removal. 16

Develop street siting and permitting criteria or largetemporary generators and boilers.

Identi y goods or a strategic stockpile and/or establishemergency contracts or additional critical resourcessuch as generators, boilers, and electrical switchgear.

To the extent necessary, contract or emergency on-callelectricians or generator installation and post-disasterassessments, and or on-call plumbers to install boilers.

Add generator operations and maintenance and GPSlocators to the standard scope o work or generatorcontracting to help track location and placement in

areas with poor communications connectivity.


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The Citys evacuation shelter system provides a sa e place outsidethe evacuated area designed to meet evacuees basic health andsa ety needs during a coastal storm or other emergency. I ully ac-tivated or all evacuation zones, the system can accommodate upto 600,000 people. Eighteen City agencies provide sta to operateshelters, and since 2007, more than 34,000 City employees havebeen trained to operate or sta shelters. Evacuees who require ad-ditional medical care but who do not require hospitalization arere erred to specially designated Special Medical Needs Shelters(SMNS.)

During Sandy the City opened the rst tier o sheltersenough toaccommodate the maximum projected 71,000 people who couldpotentially seek shelter during an evacuation o Zone A. 17 Shelterswere ready to accept evacuees as o the morning o Sunday, Octo-ber 28, more than a ull day prior to Sandys arrivalenough timeto allow people to collect their belongings and travel inland whileit was sa e to do so and be ore the MTA shut down the subway andbus system. From the opening on October 28 until the City openedother temporary housing options on November 12, approximately6,800 people sought shelter or some period o time rom a dayor two to several weeks. The majority o people seeking shelterarrived by October 30, immediately a ter the storm passed. OnNovember 2 the City began to consolidate shelter acilities andtransitioned the remaining shelter population to other temporaryhousing options, including hotels, starting November 12. 18

Sheltering Shelter Logistics and Operations The Emergency Supply Stockpile, which consists o 5,700 pallets o medical supplies, personal care items, in ant supplies, cots, blan-kets, ood, water, and pet supplies, supports the basic needs o people who require a sa e place to go during an emergency. TheCity deployed the stockpile on Thursday, October 26 in anticipationo opening shelters. Following Hurricane Irene the City contracted

or additional labor to enable aster deployment o the stockpileand to assist school sta with unloading pallets and bringing thesupplies into the shelters. The vast majority o the Citys sheltersare located in public school buildings that were selected based ongeography, accessibility, and general suitability. Although this ispotentially disruptive to schools, the Citys ability to control sheltersites is an important actor in ensuring shelters are available when-ever they are needed. 19 Accessibility accommodations at generalevacuation shelters and Special Medical Needs Shelters includeinterpreters upon request and ramps, and the City continues to re-view its sheltering plan to ensure that we can provide sa e accom-modations to any person or amily who needs them.

The Citys communal shelters are designed as temporary places orpeople to seek sa ety and are not intended to provide ood and ac-

commodations or longer than three daysa ar shorter durationthan the time that many people could not return to their homesdue to food damage and the extended power outages caused bySandys storm surge. This le t many people without access to resh

ood because shelters are stocked with Meals Ready to Eat (MREs)and shel stable ood that is intended to be consumed or only a

ew days. Evacuation Centers also lack resources such as show-ers and laundry acilities; when possible, the City opened nearbyrecreational acilities with showers, including the East 54th StreetRecreation Center in Turtle Bay, the Sunset Park Recreation Center,and the St. Johns Recreation Center, to ll this need. For peoplewho were unable to return to their homes within a ew days a terthe storm, the City consolidated shelters across each borough to

larger acilities to enable schools to make necessary repairs, cleanthe acilities, and prepare to reopen or students.17 See Emergency Planning and Management Be ore and A ter the Storm: ShelterManagement: Hearing Be ore the New York City Council Comms. on General Wel-

are, Aging, Health, Oversight & Investigations, and Mental Health, DevelopmentalDisability, Alcoholism, Drug Abuse & Disability Services (Feb. 5, 2013) (testimonyo Seth Diamond, Commissioner, New York City Department o Homeless Ser-vices) (hereina ter Diamond Testimony). The projections or each tier o sheltersare based on a Hurricane Evacuation Study conducted by the USACE and FEMA,including a behavioral analysis to determine the likelihood that people complywith a mandatory evacuation order. While the shelters activated or a Zone Aevacuation can accommodate up to 71,000 people, the numbers o residents whoactually sought shelter at one o the Citys emergency shelters during HurricanesIrene and Sandy were much lowerapproximately 9,500 and 6,800 respectively.

New York Citys shelter system housedapproximately 6,800 evacuees in 73 shelters.

1,200 medical pro essional volunteers workedmore than 1,500 shi ts, serving more than18,000 hours.

By the Numbers

18 Diamond Testimony, supra note 21.19 64 schools were used as part o the Citys evacuation shelter stystem: 10 asEvacuation Centers or evacuee intake and 54 as both Evacuation Centers andshelters. Following Sandy, 43 schools were unable to open when school re-sumed on November 5 because o extensive structural damage and studentswere reassigned to temporary class locations while buildings underwent resto-ration. The storm impacted another 22 schools that either lost power or wereused as emergency evacuation sites.


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Recommendations

17. Update and expand the Coastal Storm Plan shelter planto operate at ull capacity or longer than three to vedays and develop a plan or rapid transition to sheltersor other accommodations suitable or medium-term oc-

cupancy by residents whose homes are not habitable andare awaiting repairs or housing placement.

Explore space that is suitable or interim shelteringplacements longer than three to ve days.

Expand ood options beyond shel stable items andMeals Ready to Eat (MREs) to meet diverse dietary needs.

Review and amend the Emergency Supply Stockpile asneeded with additional supplies.

Develop a plan or shower and laundry acilities, includingaccessible showers, or people who remain in shelters.

18. Improve shelter accessibility or all New Yorkers.

Improve shelter sta training about disabilities, includ-ing training about how to obtain items or services (suchas special medical needs cots, sign language interpre-tation, and large print signage or entrances and rest-rooms) that may be needed to accommodate peoplewith disabilities.

Improve physical accessibility o shelters and providein ormation to the public regarding the accessibility o Evacuation Centers in multiple ormats.

Make charging stations or wheelchairs and scootersavailable to people with disabilities.

19. Develop or improve an application to simply and more e -ectively track the shelter population, including medical

needs, relocations, and other signi cant issues.

Special Needs Medical Shelters

New York State has oversight responsibility or residential acili-ties, including nursing homes and adult care acilities, and haspromulgated requirements or storm preparations at these a-cilities.20 Despite these requirements, many acilities were notadequately prepared or the storm and its a termath. These a-cilities need to be better prepared to shelter in place or have

adequate, orderly evacuation plans in the event o a storm orother emergency. The City opened eight Special Medical NeedsShelters (SMNS) sta ed with medical pro essionals and adminis-tration rom the Health and Hospitals Corporation (HHC), mental

health pro essionals rom the Department o Health and MentalHygiene (DOHMH), medical volunteers rom the Citys MedicalReserve Corps, and ederal Disaster Medical Assistance Teams(DMATs) comprised o 25 doctors, nurses, mental health pro es-sionals, and clinical personnel. The Citys Medical Reserve Corps,a group o medical pro essional volunteers organized and man-aged by DOHMH also worked more than 18,000 hours over thecourse o the storm.

From October 28 to November 19, the eight Special MedicalNeeds Shelters served a total o 2,236 evacuees. Among thoseserved were approximately 1,800 residents o chronic care a-cilities who were unable to shelter in place due to inadequatebackup power to maintain a sa e environment or residents orother damage to their acilities, and who could not be placed atother nursing homes or adult care acilities. 21

Some o the most challenging issues during and a ter the stormarose in connection with providing care to evacuees with special

medical needs. The presence o these high-needs individuals,many o whom required prescription medication, had specialdietary needs, or required electricity-dependent care, such asoxygen or ventilators, required specialized care and equipment. This included patients trans erred rom nursing homes and oth-er institutional care settings as well as people in the communitymany without necessary medical records or medications. Someo the operational challenges included the disposal o medicalwaste and providing ood that met the diverse dietary needs o this population.

Recommendations

20. Create a comprehensive management and clinical staf-ing plan or Special Medical Needs Shelters.

21. Although Special Medical Needs Shelters are a last-resortoption or evacuating residential healthcare acilities thatcannot place their patients into other residential acilitiesand should be prepared to accept adult care patients romthese acilities in the event that alternative accommoda-tions cannot be made, residential healthcare acilitiesshould be required to develop evacuation and placementplans that can be activated in the event o an emergency.The City should work with the state to develop criteria toauthorize out-o -county or out-o -state placements asnecessary. Only in the event that a acility emergency plancannot be implemented should these patients be taken to aSpecial Medical Needs Shelter.

20 See supra Note 2.21 Farley testimony, supra note 5.


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The wind and surge rom Hurricane Sandy a ected New York Cityacross the ve boroughs: thousands o homes were fooded inneighborhoods along the coast; widespread power outages le tpeople cut o rom communications and unable to get basic ser-vices; debris blocked roadways and was scattered throughoutthe inundation zone; and thousands o tons o sand were swepto the Citys beaches and into surrounding communities. 22 TheDepartment o Sanitation (DSNY), Department o Parks and Rec-reation (DPR), Department o Transportation (DOT), and Depart-ment o Buildings (DOB) played particularly important roles inclearing debris and inspecting housing to allow people to returnhome, while the Department o Environmental Protection (DEP)worked with the MTA and Army Corps o Engineers to dewaterpublic in rastructure and larger buildings. The Department o City-wide Administrative Services (DCAS) managed the uel operation

Response and Recovery LogisticUtilities, and In rastructure

that kept the Citys public feet and rst responder vehicles goingduring one o the most serious uel shortages in the Citys history.

The ability to collect and synthesize accurate data in storm-bat-tered neighborhoods was critical to understanding and address-ing the most urgent needs ollowing the storm. In addition tothe communications challenges the City aced with respect tonursing and adult care homes (see General and Healthcare Fa-cility Evacuations on page 8), the City did not immediately haveaccess to accurate, timely data rom power utilities, telecom-munications companies, uel providers, gas stations, and other

sectors that provide critical services. As a result, it took a ewdaysand in the case o telecommunications, longerto getan accurate, comprehensive understanding o the magnitude o power and service outages at the household level. For example,in order to pinpoint particular high-rise residential buildings inthe Rockaways that were without power, the City spent severaldays working closely with LIPA to build the capacity to extractdaily outage data and match it with the in ormation in the Citysbuilding database. Using data eeds rom Con Edison and LIPA,the City also established daily reporting on electricity outages;the value o these reports varied with the quality o availabledata and adjustments in reporting conventions the utilities usedas they restored their respective utility networks. 23

Some data was immediately available to guide recovery e orts.For example, water usage data immediately be ore the storm

rom DEPs automated meter readers (AMR) gave an indicationo which households may not have evacuated be ore the storm.Internet-based applications such as GasBuddy supplemented on-the-ground intelligence rom NYPD about uel availability. 24 Over-all, however, the City can signi cantly improve its collection andsynthesis o data on the provision o essential services throughoutthe City, including power, gas, and telecommunications. 25 MayorBloombergs recent appointment o a Chie Data Analytics O cerand the O ce o Data Analytics will greatly assist in this e ort; butthe private and utility sectors must be engaged as well.

22 See generally Emergency Planning and Management During and A ter theStorm: Disaster Management: Oversight Hearing Be ore the New York City Coun-cil Comms. on Public Sa ety, Fire and Criminal Justice Services, Aging, Health,General Wel are, and Mental Health, Developmental Disability, Alcoholism, DrugAbuse and Disability Services (Jan. 16, 2013) (testimony o Caswell F. Holloway,New York City Deputy Mayor or Operations) (hereina ter Holloway Testimony).23 A sample o the daily report, compiled by the Mayors O ce o Long-TermPlanning and Sustainability (OLTPS) is attached as Appendix C.24 OLTPS generated a daily uel report based on data rom GasBuddy.com, acrowdsourcing website and mobile app that primarily reports real-time gas pric-es but that also unctioned as a real-time snapshot o where gas was available orretail purchase. A sample report is attached as Appendix D.

25 During the course o normal operations, City agencies collect and man-age huge amounts o data, rom heat complaints at HPD-a liated residentialproperties to the condition o trees on public property. The recently establishedMayors O ce o Data Analytics is working with agencies to address challeng-ing public sa ety issues through rigorous data analysis. For example, since theCity identi ed the risk actors with the strongest correlation to illegal buildingconversions, DOB inspectors have improved the percentage o inspections that

nd a signi cant code violation rom a historic average o approximately 13% to70-80% today. See Mayors Executive Order No. 306 (April 17, 2013) (establishingthe Mayors O ce o Data Analytics).

An estimated 800,000 New Yorkers lost poweras a result o Hurricane Sandy; thousands o

amilies in the hardest hit areas did not havepower restored or months ollowing the storm.

Hurricane Sandy generated approximately700,000 tons o debris.

80,000 NYCHA residents in 423 buildings wereimpacted by the storm.

More than 25,000 emergency and essential ve-hicles obtained uel at three locations througha partnership with ederal agencies.

37 blocksnearly three mileso boardwalk in the Rockaways su ered severe damage.

By the Numbers


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Recommendations

22. The Mayors O ce o Data Analytics, working withthe Department o In ormation Technology andTelecommunications (DoITT), should develop acomprehensive plan or regular data collection andreporting about essential City services, includingelectricity, uel, and telecommunications. 26

Work with Con Edison, LIPA, and the Citys gas and tele-communications providers to establish continuous, con-sistent, and reliable data exchanges to drive allocation,distribution, and potential need o emergency resources.

Improve agency outreach to a ected populations us-

ing data analytics.23. Bearing in mind the need or cross-agency coordination

and in ormation sharing at the property level, the MayorsO ce o Data Analytics will work with relevant agenciesto ensure that the Citys geosupport system is up-to-dateand re ective o granular building-level detail that drivesagency disaster and recovery response.

24. Resolve inconsistencies in City databases and ensure thatall City agencies have access to and operate rom thesame in ormation.

Develop a template or customer- acing programs and

data collection to acilitate real-time intelligence ande cient data collection and sharing.

25. The Mayors O ce o Data Analytics, the Mayors O ceo Operations, and DoITT should develop a training pro-gram or agency staf and other relevant personnel on theavailability and use o City data sources.

Residential and Commercial Building Re-oand Public In rastructure RestorationHurricane Sandy a ected New Yorkers ability to live and work inthe Citys building stock in two ways: through immediate damage

rom storm surge and wind and through power outages rom dam-age to electricity, liquid uels, and water networks. The restorationo homes and commercial buildings required City agencies, utilitycompanies, and private property owners to work together to as-sess the needs o each property and sequence the work, includ-ing dewatering, structural assessment, and generator installation,to ensure everyones sa ety and to deploy resources as e cientlyas possible. Saltwater inundation o building systems was particu-

larly destructiveNYCHA sourced temporary boilers rom as araway as Texas in order to restore heat and hot water to all occupiedbuildings by November 18.

The Department o Environmental Protection (DEP) and the De-partment o Transportation (DOT) pumped out many o their own

acilities, including wastewater treatment plants, and worked close-ly with the Army Corps o Engineers and the Navy to pump out theBattery Park Underpass and the West Street Underpass. The ArmyCorps also assisted in major tunnel and subway pumping opera-tions or the MTA and Port Authority, and many critical parts o theCitys transportation network came back online in record time. TheCitys and MTAs extensive preparations leading up to the storm,

including shutting down the subway system to move trains andequipment to higher ground and placing sandbags at vulnerable as-sets, allowed the Citys transportation and wastewater systems toendure the storm with ar less damage than would have otherwisebeen the case.

Example AMR data rom Belle Harbor in the Rockaways (October 23 to November 12, 2012)

Changes in water consumption data may be due to actual changes in the total consumption o water or the e ects o power loss and restoratio

26 Consistent with its current practice, the City in collecting, sharing and report-ing any relevant data related to essential City services will abide by any appli-cable privacy or similar restrictions imposed by law.

-

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500


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On Tuesday, October 30, the Department o Buildings (DOB) be-gan conducting structural assessments o residential and com-mercial buildings in inundated areas. The rst round o assess-ments, called windshield assessments, provided a rough overviewo fooding damage and a neighborhood-level baseline romwhich DOB made building-speci c assessments, in the orm o ei-

ther rapid assessments or, i necessary, detailed assessments, tocategorize homes and commercial buildings as green, yellow, orred sa e, use caution, or structurally unsound, respectively. DOBconducted extensive outreach to homeowners, architects, andcontractors, and many homes were reclassi ed rom red or yellowto yellow or green as property owners made repairs. 27 From Oc-tober 30 to November 17, DOB inspectors conducted more than82,000 assessments in the inundation zone. 28

Recommendations

26. Develop a plan to establish inter-agency teams in advanceo a coastal storm or other emergency to conduct build-

ing inspections/assessments and standardize inspectionsurveys to improve data collection and e ciency.

Procure a standing list o engineering consultants to as-sist in disaster evaluation and reoccupation.

Develop mechanisms to noti y owners o multi- amilybuildings o their obligation to maintain habitabilitybe ore a storm and an assistance and en orcementstrategy during the recovery stage.

Identi y the highest occupancy residential buildingsin each type o storm-a ected area, such as within thesurge zone or utility-side power outage area.

Develop a standard survey about building conditionsand services to collect post-storm status in ormationand create a process or building owners to answerthese questions.

Formalize how building inspectors share building sta-tus in ormation with social service providers that re-spond to resident needs.

27. Improve customer service and sel -service options or a -ected residents to sa ely reoccupy their homes.

Create or improve the process or utility customers tosel -report outages.

Improve communication with the public regardingpost-storm re sa ety and reoccupation o dwellings. 29

Provide clear communication and guidance on thegreen/yellow/red placard system and proper steps toremediate a condition and sa ely reoccupy a residenceor business.

27 DOB instituted daily reporting or its inspection activity; a sample is attachedas Appendix E.28 See Appendix E, Sample DOB Structural Assessment Report. See also Hollo-way Testimony, supra note 26 (discussing DOB damage assessments).29 The risk o re in storm-inundated areas can be signi cantly increased,particularly i water-damaged power systems are re-energized without properrepairs. These risks should be clearly communicated be ore and ollowing asevere weather event.

NYCHA sta removed 397 elevators romservice in 201 buildings in developments inZone A.

Approximately 80,000 NYCHA residents in 423buildings were a ected by lost power, heat,and/or hot water.

NYCHA entered into emergency contracts withelectrical contractors to install generators and/or build temporary switch boxes and restoreconnections to the grid.

In the 15 days immediately ollowing the stormmore than 150 electricians and other skilledtrades restored power to approximately 400NYCHA buildings housing more than 79,000residents.

NYCHA used 24 temporary boilers andapproximately 100 generators to restore heatand electricity to its acilities.

Heat, power, and hot water were completelyrestored to all NYCHA by November 18.

NYCHA hired approximately 100 cleaningcrews to remove garbage, clean stairwells,and wash and sanitize walls and foors o 202 buildings by November 14. NYCHAalso inspected all 432 rst foor units in theimpacted areas and cleaned all units thatrequired cleaning.

NYCHA knocked on the doors o 24,000 unitsto inspect or mold and cleaned mold rommore than 5,400 o those units.

NYCHA Numbers


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Fuel and Transportation

Sandy triggered one o the most severe uel shortages in the Cityshistory by damaging energy in rastructure along the regional sup-ply chain, including terminals, pipelines, re neries, and the elec-tricity in rastructure that serves these assets. Although some gasstations were damaged by storm surge, the majority o the Citysretail gas stations were not, and with the exception o the Rocka-ways, did not experience extended power outages; retail gas short-ages were a result o not receiving uel shipments due to disrup-tions to the regional supply chain.

City agencies had prepared or potential uel disruptions by u-eling vehicles and generators several days be ore the storm, andthe NYPDs ability to maintain an independent uel supply al-lowed other City agencies to uel vehicles in the days ollowingthe storm. However, other types o critical vehicles were unableto obtain uel. Beginning Sunday November 4, the City workedwith the National Guard, the ederal De ense Logistics Agency, the

ederal Department o Energy, and the National Park Service to setup a ueling operation at Floyd Bennett Field or City vehicles andother critical recovery personnel. Along with two satellite loca-tions at Fort Wadsworth in Staten Island and Orchard Beach in theBronx, more than 25,000 emergency and essential vehicles ob-tained uel through this partnership. First responders, includingprivate ambulances, also had the option to uel at 10 Hess stationsthroughout the City through a partnership managed by the DCASChie Fleet O cer with assistance o the NYPD.

For the general public, the City worked with the State to tempo-rarily waive sul ur content requirements or uel consumption and

to ease uel transportation restrictions into and within the veboroughs. The City also worked with the ederal government tosuspend the Jones Act to allow tankers originating rom oreigncountries to supply uel rom re neries along the Gul o Mexico,and to temporarily waive ederal Environmental Protection Agen-cy requirements that are speci c to dense, urban environments,allowing uel consumed outside o New York to be consumedwithin the city. 30

The lack o subway and bus service caused standstill tra c onthe Citys major roads and highways, leading to gridlock or thegeneral public and inter ering with emergency services andthe Citys recovery operations. To alleviate these conditions, theMayor issued high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) restrictions on theriver crossings into Manhattan on November 1 and November 2.

To alleviate persistent uel lines, on November 9 Mayor Bloom-berg issued an odd/even license plate uel rationing system thatremained in place until November 24, when the Citys uel sup-ply in rastructure had been largely restored. Yellow taxi cabs andother vehicles licensed by the Taxi and Limousine Commissionwere exempt rom uel rationing and HOV restrictions duringcertain hours, and were encouraged to allow ride-sharing whilethe subway system was shutdown. Liveries and black car servic-es were also allowed to accept street-hail passengers betweenOctober 30 and November 5.

Damage to transportation in rastructure continued to limit mo-bility even a ter roads were clear and tunnels dry. The New York

City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) launched atemporary erry service rom the Rockaways to Lower Manhat-tan on November 9; DOT did the same rom Staten Island onNovember 25. At $2 per ride, these services allowed residents o a ected areas with relatively ew public transit connections toa ordably travel to work and access the rest o the City.

This review made clear that while the City adapted well to thesevere challenges posed by the damage Sandy caused to the re-gional uel supply, a uel plan needs to be developed to take thesteps necessary to more quickly alleviate the shortages that a stormor other emergency could cause in the uture. In particular, thelarge number o industry participants and stakeholders, the com-petitive nature o the uels industry, and relatively lax regulationslimited the Citys situational awareness o what caused long linesat the gas pumps and how to nd a solution or City operations andprivate citizens. The Mayors O ce o Long-Term Planning andSustainability (OLTPS) and DCAS relied on pro essional contacts,crowd-sourced data, and phone interviews to slowly piece togetheran accurate picture.

30 Waivers were issued o 40 C.F.R. 80 subparts D & E (EPA rule requiring the useo re ormulated gasoline blendstock or oxygenate blending, known as RBOB, inNew York City and surrounding counties); 40 C.F.R. 80.27 (EPA rule establishingcontrols and prohibitions on gasoline volatility); N.Y. Tax Law Art. 12-A (requiringdi erent tax treatment o uel that is used or transport use versus heating andother o -road uses); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law 19-0323 (requiring the use o only ultra-low sul ur #2 oil or heating in buildings in New York City); New York City Administrative Code 24-168.1(b) (two percent biodiesel requirement orheating oil); and regulations o the Port Authority o New York and New Jerseyrestricting transportation o fammable liquids through tunnels at tunnel and

bridge acilities. Along with uel-related requirements, waivers were also issuedor 49 CFR Parts 385, 386, 390, and 395 ( ederal DOT restrictions on commercial-

driver hours o service); N.Y. Veh. & Tra . Law 385 (restricting vehicles ocertain heights, weights, and lengths on designated roadways and bridges);and 34 R.C.N.Y. 4-13 (NYC DOT Rule restricting reight truck vehicle tra cthrough certain roadways). See also generally, U.S. DOT, Federal Motor CarrierSa ety Administration, Hurricane Sandy Relie E orts - Declarations, Waivers,Exemptions & Permits, http://www. mcsa.dot.gov/about/alerts/hurricane-sandy-2012.aspx (last visited April 25, 2013).


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Recommendations

28. Create a Fuel Task Force, modeled a ter the Downed TreeTask Force (the inter-agency tree removal group), toensure adequate uel or rescue and recovery operations.

Add a uels desk to OEMs Emergency OperationsCenter.

Formalize and expand DCAS/NYPD partnerships withretail gas stations.

Build ederal and state support and create a playbookor regulatory relie during uel shortages.

Protect and standardize eligibility or use o Cityueling sites.

Research options and viability o creating localemergency uel reserves.

29. Develop a Citywide Transportation Plan to ensure the

liquidity o the transportation system, including the timingand triggering conditions o implementing the plan. 31

Outline the conditions to institute uel rationing.

Institute HOV restrictions with clear, industry-speci cpublic messaging.

Ensure that critical responders/critical health andsa ety sta have an emergency transportation plan,including ueling options where practicable andcontingency arrangements in the event o a signi cantdisruption to the uel supply.

30. Upgrade City-owned uel in rastructure, including

mobile uel trucks and real-time reporting rom the Citys414 in-house ueling locations.

31 Elements o the transportation plan may include the MTA subway and bussystems, yellow taxi and black car services, and other public and private feets.32 See Recovery: Post-Storm Cleanup and the E ects on the Citys Health andIn rastructure: Oversight Hearing Be ore the New York City Council Comms. onEnvironmental Protection, Health, Sanitation & Solid Waste Management, andParks & Recreation (Feb. 28, 2013) (testimony o John Doherty, Commissioner,New York City Department o Sanitation).33 The debris temporary storage sites were selected rom a pre-surveyed listcompiled in 2006 by a multi-agency team comprised o OEM, DPR, NYCEDC, and

DEC. Although the selected storage sites had the capacity to manage the debrisrom Sandy, the number o approved storage sites has decreased over time as

undeveloped properties and large parking lots are redeveloped into housing,parks, commercial buildings, or are designated or other uses that are not com-patible with temporary debris storage.34 Although Army Corps contractors provided signi cant assistance throughoutthe debris removal operation, it may be more e cient in uture disasters or theCity to contract directly or these resources.

Debris removal

Debris

Sandy generated an estimated 700,000 tons o storm debris,including construction and demolition debris, sand, concrete,and more than 27,000 tons o woody debris rom nearly 20,000downed trees and limbs. 32 Clearing this debris rom the publicright-o -way and rom homes was critical to maintaining publicsa ety and acilitating recovery operations. On October 30, im-mediately a ter the storm ended, DSNY commenced debris re-moval operations, working ully-sta ed 12-hour shi ts aroundthe clock as part o the Debris Removal Task Force (DRTF), whichcoordi

Documents

Sandy After Action Report