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2013 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW Carlo L. Cruz

Article I –The Archipelago Doctrine - teaches that the outermost points of our terrestrial domain are to be connected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as our internal waters. As internal waters, they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. Archipelagic sealanes are to be laid on these waters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open seas. Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). [Magallona v. Ermita - G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Sea - provides for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-

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water mark of the coast. Contiguous Zone - 12 miles from the outer limits of the territorial sea – exercise of “protective jurisdiction” – in a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to Prevent and Punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Economic Zone or Patrimonial Sea - extending 200 miles from the low water mark of the coastal state – all living and non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelf – refers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands. The costal state has the EXCLUSIVE sovereign right to explore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and no one else may do so without its consent. Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. xxx The imposition of these passage rights [right of innocent passage and the

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right of transit passage through international straits] through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. [Magallona v. Ermita - G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011] Petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. [Magallona v. Ermita - G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]

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The Open Seas – res communes but a state may exercise jurisdiction on the open seas over its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right to visit and search and under the doctrine of hot pursuit. Outer space, like the open seas, is res communes and NOT susceptible to discovery and occupation – not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty. A state is responsible for whatever injury or damage any object it sends to outer space may cause. The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity [BJE] xxx is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states. Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it – which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association – runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic. [The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain – GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

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ARTICLE II - generally not a source of enforceable rights EXCEPT the Incorporation Clause and Section 28 on the policy of public disclosure – duty to disclose [which presents a SPLENDID SYMMETRY to Article II, Section 7 on the Right to Information]. Section 16 – on ecology – has been implemented by law. Note that the Constitution now describes the Philippines as, not only a republican but also a, democratic State. NOTE provisions on initiative on national legislation [Article VI (32)] and initiative on amendment of the Constitution. [Article VII (2)]. - Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. These provisions enlarge the people’s right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest. [Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary - G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012] - SEE also – Article II [23] – The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that provide the welfare of the nation. Article X [14] – The President shall provide for regional development councils xxx composed of local

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government officials, xxx and representatives from non-governmental organizations xxx Article X [18] – The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. x x x. Article XII [9] – The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations with the xxx various private sectors xxx Article XIII [15] – The State shall respect the role of independent people’s organizations. Article XIII [16] – The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. Article XVI [12] – The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from the communities. Whatever good is done by the government is attributed to the State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed not to the State but to the government alone. Such injury may justify the replacement of the government by revolution, theoretically at the behest of the State, in a development known as direct State action. Parens Patriae – guardian of the rights of the people – Soriano v. Laguardia [G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009] -

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Offensive language in television may be regulated or even banned for the sake of the children. Justification – parens patriae. A belligerent occupation would have no effect on the continued effectivity of the law on treason. Accordingly, political laws, like the Constitution, were merely suspended, subject to revival under the jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation. Suspension of political laws affects only the civilians, and not the soldiers or “enemies in arms.” [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff] Also does not apply to treason [Laurel v. Misa]. Non-political laws, like the Civil Code, remain effective, unless changed by the belligerent occupant. Judicial decisions, such as a conviction for defamation, are valid during a belligerent occupation except those of a political complexion. Right to Self-Determination – right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. NOTE – Article II [7] – The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest and the right to self-determination. - Internal self-determination – a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. - External self-determination - the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with

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an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people. The people’s right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. Distinguish the Incorporation Clause or Doctrine of Incorporation from the Doctrine of Transformation – accepted rules of international law must first be enacted into legislation. A stipulation in a treaty or executive agreement providing for a state with the option to waive its criminal jurisdiction to prosecute foreigners who commit crimes within its territory is not to be considered as an abdication of its sovereignty. On the rationale that the Philippines has adopted the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. Such waiver does not amount to an unconstitutional diminution or deprivation of jurisdiction of Philippine courts. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo - G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011] Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Authorities are, however, agreed that one is distinct from another for

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accepted reasons apart from the concurrence-requirement aspect. As has been observed by US constitutional scholars, a treaty has greater “dignity” than an executive agreement, because its constitutional efficacy is beyond doubt, a treaty having behind it the authority of the President, the Senate, and the people; a ratified treaty, unlike an executive agreement, takes precedence over any prior statutory enactment. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo - G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011] The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through executive action. [Bayan Muna v. Romulo - G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011] Renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy – should be read with Article VI [23][1] – a declaration of the existence of a state of war may be made upon two-thirds vote of both Houses, in joint session assembled, voting separately. The UNITED NATIONS - Security Council – Yalta Formula – procedural matters are decided by any 9 or more members. Non-procedural matters – those that may require the Council to invoke measures of enforcement - at least 9 members including all the permanent members. No member is allowed to vote on questions concerning the pacific settlement of a dispute to which it is a party. Unlike

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in the General Assembly, the characterization of a question is considered a non-procedural matter in the Security Council. Note: Veto and Double Veto prerogative of a permanent member. International Court of Justice – judicial organ of the UN which functions in accordance with the Statute, of which all the members are considered ipso facto parties. Even non-members may be parties to the Statute on conditions to be determined in each case by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. May decide contentious cases and render advisory opinions, upon request of the General Assembly or the Security Council, as well as other organs of the UN, when authorized by the General Assembly, on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities. Only members may be parties in contentious cases. Jurisdiction of the Court is based on the consent of the parties as manifested under the “optional jurisdiction clause” or the “compromissary clause.” Article II, Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. - See Article VII, Section 18 –Gudani v. Senga - G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006 – gag order against a general prohibiting him from testifying in a legislative inquiry - Valid. Justification – military powers.

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Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Montano - G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 - an unborn child can be considered a dependent. The term child can be understood to include the unborn fetus in the mother’s womb. Article II, Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos. - Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000 - to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has permitted the entry of foreign investors. - First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts, the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-sari stores and such other similar retailing activities. [Espina v. Zamora - G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010, Abad]

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Indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right to internal self-determination. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, and to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State. Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to “internal self-determination.” [The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain – GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008] Article II, Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. - Article XII, Section 21 - Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority. Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the public. - SPLENDID SYMMETRY

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between Section 28 and Article III, Section 7 on the right to information.

ARTICLE VI – Legislative power - appropriation, taxation, expropriation - not exclusive to Congress – initiative and referendum may be exercised directly by the people –RA 6735. The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative – springs from its authority to define and prescribe punishment for crimes. [Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo - G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011, Second Division, Brion] The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: “Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.”] is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, En Banc, Brion] We rule out the first option – holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM

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during the 2008-2011 term – as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution. xxx. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress. xxx. If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view – like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents. xxx. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005] Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011, En Banc, Brion] The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. [Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution]

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Non-legislative powers of Congress – canvass of presidential elections [VII, 5], declaration of existence of a state of war [VII, 23 (2)], confirmation of amnesties [VII, 19], and of presidential appointments [VII, 16], amendment or revision of the Constitution [XVII], and impeachment [XI]. Congress is not a continuing body. [League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008] The Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. Accordingly, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. [Garcillano v. House of Representatives - G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008] BUT NOTE Arnault v. Nazareno – the Senate is a continuing body for purposes of its power of contempt. A law providing for the establishment of a congressional oversight committee which would have the authority to disapprove regulations promulgated by the executive

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Branch in its enforcement of a law is unconstitutional. Legislative Veto - entitles Congress, pursuant to its “oversight functions,” to disapprove [or approve] administrative regulations promulgated by the Executive Branch, pursuant to a validly delegated power, in the course of its enforcement of a duly enacted law. [A LEGISLATIVE VETO IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.] The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny - to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities; investigation – under Section 21; and supervision – which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. xxx. The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment. Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. - The so-called “rule on

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presentment” pertains to the submission of a bill to the President for his appropriate action. [Abakada Guro Party List V. Purisima - G.R. No. 166715 August 14, 2008, Corona] See Macalintal v. COMELEC, G.R. 157013, July 10, 2003 – COMELEC rules implementing RA 9189 subject to approval by Congressional oversight committee – INVALID – constitutes a legislative veto; contradicts the independence of the COMELEC. Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board - G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008 – law [Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165] requiring candidates for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean – unconstitutional – list of constitutional qualifications exclusive, may not be “enlarged” by Congress. Herrera v. COMELEC - The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. Each additional legislative district in a city need not have 250,000 inhabitants provided that the initial or original district formed in said city had, at the time of its establishment, a population of 250,000. [Mariano v. COMELEC] Congress may not authorize the ARMM to create provinces and cities because the power to create them inherently involves the power to create a legislative district,

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which only Congress possesses. The ARMM may, however, be authorized by law to create municipalities and barangays. – Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act – [Sema v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008] A proposed province composed of one or more islands need not comply with the 2,000 square meter contiguous territory requirement under the Local Government Code, as provided for under the exemptions in the IRR of the LGC. [Navarro v. Ermita - G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011] Aquino v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010 - Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a province. The “250,000 inhabitants” requirement does not apply to creation of additional legislative districts for a province. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008 – a law is passed increasing CDO’s legislative district from one to two. No need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section 10, because the territory remains a single unit. Lokin v. COMELEC – G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010, Bersamin – the COMELEC cannot issue implementing rules and regulations that provide an additional ground - when the “nomination is withdrawn by the party” - for the

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substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941. Amores v. HRET – G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010 - a party-list nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009 - for every four district representatives, there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat. The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:

1. Twenty percent of the total number of the

membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts.

2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in

the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats

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shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes.

3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining

seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution.

[Two-Step Procedure - The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats

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reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.] 4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The

three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines

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and need not represent any particular sector. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, En Banc, Carpio] Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that “the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.” [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, En Banc, Carpio] In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or

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organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and

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overseas workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013, En Banc, Carpio]

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There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMA’s registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization. xxx However, the Resolution did not create in LPGMA’s favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. [Dayao v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 193643, January 29, 2013, En Banc, Reyes] Abayon v. HRET – G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010, Abad – there are two kinds of congressmen – elected from legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system. Once elected, the party-list representative has the same rights, privileges and duties as the district representative. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications

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of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office. Limkaichong v. COMELEC - G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009 - once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. Ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive period notwithstanding. BUT it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen’s descendant. The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power. xxx At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial – exclusive and original

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jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal - G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011] Navarro v. Ermita – G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010, Peralta - “Gerrymandering” is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. xxx The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. The commencement of the terms and the regular election of legislators may be changed by law. An increase in their salaries shall take effect after the expiration of the full term

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of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Instances when vote needs to be recorded – at the request of 1/5 [16, 4], vote on third reading [26, 2], overriding vote in case of veto [27, 1], HR impeachment vote [XI, 3, 3]. REMEMBER the implied – public purpose and amount must be determinate or determinable -and constitutional limitations – Article VI, sections 24, 27 (2) and 29 (1) and (2) of Congress’ power of appropriation, particularly the prohibition against Congress from increasing the budget proposed by the President and on the transfer of appropriations - Nazareth v. Villar - the Supreme Court clarified that the power conferred upon the President to transfer appropriations could well be extended to his Cabinet Secretaries as alter egos under the ‘doctrine of qualified political agency’ “Thus, in the instant case, the authority granted to the DOST by the Executive Secretary, being one of the alter egos of the President, was legal and valid but in so far as the use of agency’s savings for the year 2000 only. Although 2000 budget was reenacted in 2001, the authority granted on the use of savings did not necessarily extend to the succeeding year.” The Commission on Appointments shall rule by a majority of all its Members.

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Pimentel v. Ermita – The President may not be compelled to submit his “acting” appointments to the CA for confirmation. Ad interim appointments shall remain effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next special or regular session of Congress. [Guevarra v. Inocentes] In a special session, the Congress may consider “general legislation or only such subjects as the President may designate.” In a regular session, “the power of the Congress is not circumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic law.” [in Araneta v. Dinglasan] Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective “Members” - the jurisdiction of an Electoral Tribunal begins once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office, for it is only after the occurrence of these events that a candidate can be considered as either a Member of the House of Representatives or a Senator. According to the Supreme Court, to be considered a “Member” of the House of Representatives, “there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of office.” It stressed that a “proper oath” would be one taken before the Speaker of the House of Representatives “in open session,” consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of Rule II

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(Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives. [Reyes v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013] Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers - G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 - Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different. Executive Privilege - Garcillano v. House of Representatives - G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008 - The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. New session, new publication of rules. AKBAYAN v. Aquino - G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 - executive privilege with respect to the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens’ demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations. - De la Paz v. Senate - G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009 - subject of a legislative

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inquiry is a political question. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers - G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, MR – the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. - Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers - G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration – [1] executive privilege - doctrine of “operational proximity” - the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. [2] It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim.

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David v. Arroyo – G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 – The President may not invoke Section 17 of Article XII, which would authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. BUT the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance – presidential certification [economic emergency] does away with the requirements of three readings on separate days and distribution of final copies three days before enactment Note Article VII, Section 10 – simultaneous vacancies in the offices of the President and the Vice-President - The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has established the so-called Conference Committee, composed of representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives, which is a “mechanism for compromising differences” between their respective versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled that

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“it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill” and whatever changes may be agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo another “three readings” in the Senate and the House of Representatives. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]

Partial veto – general rule – approve entirely or disapprove in toto, except with respect to appropriations bills.

Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is exempt. [Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles -G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012, First Division, Villarama]

Any proposal to enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress shall be valid only if ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than forty-five days but not later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

ARTICLE VII – Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Executive Secretary - G.R. No. 180046, April 2, 2009 –The President may not amend RA 7722 through an Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power.

The President is granted Ordinance Powers under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292

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(Administrative Code of 1987) and may issue any of the following: xxx Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

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Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. [Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division - G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012] The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain – GR No. 183591, October 14, 2008 – [1] That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence. [2] While the President does not possess constituent powers – as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum – she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers. It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,

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extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. - G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009 - The provisions of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 3902, authorize the President of the Philippines to exercise considerable infringements on the right of the franchisees to operate their enterprises and the right to free expression. Such authority finds corollary constitutional justification as well under Section 17, Article XII, xxx We do not doubt that the President or the State can exercise such authority through the NTC, which remains an agency within the executive branch of government, but such can be exercised only under limited and rather drastic circumstances. They still do not vest in the NTC the broad authority to cancel licenses and permits. xxx the NTC, in the exercise of its prerogative to grant provisional authorities to operate or certificates of public convenience, may nevertheless not cancel legislative franchises, which only Congress can do. The President’s “executive privilege” covers all presidential communications. [AKBAYAN v. Aquino - G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 - however, the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and

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employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation. Senate v. Ermita – [1] Executive privilege, which includes conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez - G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); and matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002), MAY BE INVOKED against this legislative power. [2] BUT note that executive officials are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on

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whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted, and not merely implied. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is “By order of the President,” which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. [3] That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting. AKBAYAN v. Aquino - G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 – [1] “secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.” [People’s Movement for Press Freedom

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(PMPF) v. Manglapus] “Information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest.” [Chavez v. PCGG] Diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis; however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status. [2] Informer’s Privilege - the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of a person or persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. [3] Privilege accorded to presidential communications, which are presumed privileged without distinguishing between those which involve matters of national security and those which do not, the rationale for the privilege being that a frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. It bears emphasis, however, that the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not

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absolute, one significant qualification being that “the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing.” This qualification applies whether the privilege is being invoked in the context of a judicial trial or a congressional investigation conducted in aid of legislation. [4] Deliberative Process Privilege - covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. Notably, the privileged status of such documents rests, not on the need to protect national security but, on the “obvious realization that officials will not communicate candidly among themselves if each remark is a potential item of discovery and front page news,” the objective of the privilege being to enhance the quality of agency decisions. The so-called “deliberative process privilege” refers to the decision-making of executive officials. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers - G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008 -[1] Presidential Communications Privilege applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the President’s unique constitutional role. The elements of presidential

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communications privilege are - 1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.” 2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. [2] Deliberative Process Privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials; based on common law privilege. [3] Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial of the deliberative process privilege. The commencement of the term of the President may be changed only by constitutional amendment. Note – the commencement of the terms of legislators may be

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changed by law, so long as such change would not alter the length of their terms. Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. [Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, citing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452] In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317] this Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office. Funa v. Ermita – G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010 - The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices,

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as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office. De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council - G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010 – Section 15 does not apply to the Judiciary. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. Sarmiento v. Mison – confirmation is required only for the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. Bautista v. Salonga – Commissioner of Human Rights not subject to confirmation; not included in the first sentence. Quintos-Deles v. Commission on Appointments – sectoral representatives required confirmation; included in the first sentence. Calderon v. Carale – NLRC commissioners do not require confirmation. Constitutional Commissioners require

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confirmation. Members of the Judiciary do not require confirmation, only JBC nomination. Judicial and Bar Council [regular members] require confirmation. Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen – no confirmation, just JBC nomination. Soriano III v. Lista - GR 153881, 24 March 2003 - Now that the Philippine Coast Guard is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA. Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, En Banc, Brion] The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, [Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.] which merely grants the

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President the power of supervision over autonomous regions. This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the President’s power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs. xxx. Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, En Banc, Brion] The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). [Section 35. Filling of vacancy. - Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come from the same province or

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sector of the member being replaced.] [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines - G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012, En Banc, Brion] Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. [Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274] The President’s power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants. [General v. Urro - G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011] Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez - G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008 - the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as

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expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. [Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.] Lopez v. CSC - the authority of the CSC is only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. Luego v. CSC – the CSC may not approve as “temporary” an appointment designated as “permanent” by the appointing authority. The CSC classified the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the Career Executive Service; appointee to the position required to acquire CES eligibility [CES officers, under the Administrative Code, are appointed by the President]. Ombudsman challenges the classification, saying that it impairs his appointment prerogative as guaranteed under the Constitution. SC: classification would result in absurdity – [a] it would vest in the President the power to appoint an employee of the Ombudsman, in violation of the Constitution, or [b] it would include in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. The CSC may not classify a position [Graft Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman] as belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES eligibility, because CES officers are appointed by the President. This derogates the appointing power of the Ombudsman. A CES

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appointment not effected by the President is contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Code. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, 451 SCRA 570] Matibag v. Benipayo - G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002 - An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. [Fetalino v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012, En Banc, Brion] The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General, therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13, Article VII, whose text and spirit were too clear to be differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the

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Constitution has not otherwise so provided. xxx It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. [Funa v. Agra - G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013, En Banc, Bersamin] Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. [Aguirre, Jr. v. De Castro, 378 Phil. 714 (1999)] As a general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. [Cruz, Carlo L., The Law of Public Officers, 154-155 (1992)] The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is, when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. xxx In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman. [Gonzales v. Office of the President - G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe] Power of control - Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et al., [101 Phil. 328 (1957)] - if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such

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power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments. Angeles v. Gaite - G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009 - Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 - no appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. - The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency.

But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet. xxx Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo]

The Philippine Truth Commission [PTC] - The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of

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the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. [Section 17, Article VII] [Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 - G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]

Santos v. Go - G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005 - Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution

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through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. [Fortun v. Arroyo - G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012]

Culanag v. Director of Prisons – criminal and administrative remedies for violation of conditional pardon are not mutually exclusive and may be successively availed of by the President for the punishment of the conditional pardon. – recommitment/criminal prosecution for violation of conditional pardon/criminal prosecution for new offense if violation of the condition constitutes a separate criminal offense.

Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol – conditional pardonee committed usurpation of public functions. New case dismissed for lack of witnesses. President ordered his commitment. SC sustained saying mere commission, not conviction required for recommitment. [Affirmed in Sumulong v. Gonzales]

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the

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person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. x x x Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x” [Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago - G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012, En Banc, Sereno]

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary - the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.

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The Contract Agreement xxx between Northrail and CNMEG does not partake of the nature of an executive agreement. It is merely an ordinary commercial contract that can be questioned before the local courts. [China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria - G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, En Banc, Sereno] Rubrico v. Arroyo - G.R. No. 183871, February 18, 2010 - the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines [89 Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts.

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The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary - G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, Third Division, Peralta] The power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary - G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012, Third Division, Peralta] Liberal Party v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010 - A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. xxx With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the

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writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court’s orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. [MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay - G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011] People v. Sesbreno - The Supreme Court as guardian of the legal profession has ultimate powers over attorneys. Its authority to discipline lawyers stems from its constitutional prerogative to regulate the practice of law and the admission of the persons to engage therein (Section 5(5), Article X, The 1973 Philippine Constitution; In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 1954). Apart from the constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over attorneys is an inherent power incidental to its proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of its judicial functions (Tejan v. Cusi, 57 SCRA 154; In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 573; In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Edillon, G.R. No. AC-1928 [IBP Adm. Case No. DD-1] August 3, 1978). Furthermore, attorneys are the court's constituency - to aid in the administration of justice (Doge S. State, 39 NE 745). A lawyer occupies what may be termed a quasi-judicial office since he is in fact an officer of the court, and like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice (Kerlin v. Culkin, 60 ALR 851)

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David v. Arroyo – PP1021 recalled PP1017. SC – not moot and academic - The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The expiration of the term generally renders an election protest moot and academic [Sales v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 174668] BUT said case may still be resolved for purposes of formulating controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public [Atienza v. Villarosa], or in the case of determining a question involving the one-year residency requirement for those running for public office, which is one capable of repetition, under the doctrine of repetition yet evading review. [Gayo v. Verceles]; or notwithstanding the election and proclamation of a new set of municipal officers, to prevent a repetition of the acts complained of [Albaña v. Commission on Elections]; or despite the approval by the Civil Service Commission of the questioned appointments, to avoid a repetition [Altres v. Empleo - G.R. No. 180986, December 10, 2008]; or the demise of one of the accused, to prevent a miscarriage of justice against a co-accused [Constantino v. People - G.R.

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No. 140656, September 13, 2007]; or even the separation of the petitioner from government service, because other penalties may be imposed upon her [Pagano v. Nazarro - G.R. No. 149072, September 21, 2007]. Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre - by the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Earliest Opportunity – if not raised in pleadings, cannot be considered at trial and, if not considered at trial, cannot be considered on appeal. In criminal cases, constitutional question can be raised any time in the discretion of the court. In civil cases, question can be raised at any stage if it is necessary to the determination of the case itself. In every case, except where there is estoppel or laches [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy], constitutional question may be raised at any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions – justification -separation of powers [trias politica principle] Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation - G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008 - The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play.

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The operative fact doctrine also applies to [executive orders and] executive acts subsequently declared as invalid. [Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council - G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011] Bengzon v. Drilon – fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court’s independence - fiscal autonomy. [Re: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for Payment of Legal Fees,id. at 209 citing Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution, “[t]he Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.”] Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect fees [Id., citing Bengzon v. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150] including legal fees. xxx. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs the Court’s guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. [In the Matter of Clarification of Exemption from Payment of All Court and Sheriff’s Fees - A.M. No. 12-2-03-0, March 13, 2012, En Banc, Perez]

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A vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. A vacancy in the lower courts must be filled within ninety days from the submission of the list of nominees. [Vacancies in the Offices of the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen shall be filled within three months after they occur.] Fortich v. Corona – division decides with a 3-2 vote. MR denied with a 2-2 vote. Petitioner asks that the matter be taken to the court en banc. SC denies request: the word “decided” must refer to “cases.” “Resolved” must refer to “matters.” Planters Products Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation - G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008, Reyes - Regional Trial Courts (RTC) have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of statutes, executive orders, presidential decrees and other issuances. BUT note British American Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, August 20, 2008 – the Court of Tax Appeals cannot pass upon the constitutionality of a statute. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the SC. National Power Corporation [A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC, March 10, 2010] and GSIS [A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010] and the Land Bank of the Philippines [Land

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Bank of the Philippines v. Rivera - G.R. No. 182431, November 17, 2001] are not exempt from paying filing fees. Ampong v CSC - G.R. No. 167916, August 26, 2008 - administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after employment in the judiciary. With respect to the power of the Court, Section 5 (6), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the “Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.” This provision empowers the Court to oversee all matters relating to the effective supervision and management of all courts and personnel under it. Recognizing this mandate, Memorandum Circular No. 26 of the Office of the President, dated July 31, 1986, considers the Supreme Court exempt and with authority to promulgate its own rules and regulations on foreign travels. Thus, the Court came out with OCA Circular No. 49-2003 (B). [Leave Division v. Heusdens - A.M. No. P-11-2927, December 13, 2011] The regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council have staggered terms.

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Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC. [Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council - G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012] Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman - The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna - G.R. No. 166051, April 8, 2008 – Section 14 does not apply to decisions in administrative proceedings, like those rendered by the Office of the President. BUT note the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR. ARTICLE IX-A - Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava – rules of procedure should not encroach upon the constitutional prerogatives of other bodies, like the SC. Marcoleta v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 181377, April 24, 2009 - Section 5 (a) of Rule 3 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure and Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution require that a majority vote of all the members of the Comelec, and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations, is necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling.

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Final decisions, orders or rulings of Constitutional Commissions may be appealed to the Supreme Court - by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, with respect to the COMELEC and The COA, and Rule 43 with respect to the CSC. Guevara v. COMELEC – the COMELEC’s contempt power can be exercised only in connection with its power of adjudication, and may not be invoked in connection with its exercise of purely administrative functions. Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008 – The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC, only final orders, rulings or decisions of the COMELEC en banc, unless the Resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity. Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer – only orders or rulings issued in connection with the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial power can be the subject of certiorari proceedings under section 7. Resolutions awarding contracts should be the subject of ordinary civil actions before trial courts. To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz:

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1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution. 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). 3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of

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Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that “reappointment” found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. [Funa v. The Chairman, Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012]

ARTICLE IX-B – THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION But while the grant of the CSC’s rule-making power is untouchable by Congress, the laws that the CSC interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. As an

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administrative agency, the CSC’s quasi-legislative power is subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies. The rules that the CSC formulates must not override, but must be in harmony with, the law it seeks to apply and implement. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission - G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013] Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Pasay - G.R. No. 163072, April 2, 2009 – The MIAA is a government “instrumentality” that does not qualify as a “government-owned or controlled corporation.” The term government “instrumentality” is broader than the term “government-owned or controlled corporation.” The fact that two terms have separate definitions means that while a government “instrumentality” may include a “government-owned or controlled corporation,” there may be a government “instrumentality” that will not qualify as a “government-owned or controlled corporation.” UP ranks with MIAA, a government instrumentality exercising corporate powers but not organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. While said corporations are government instrumentalities, they are loosely called government corporate entities but not government-owned and controlled corporations in the strict sense. [Lockheed Detective and Watchman Agency, Inc. v. University of the Philippines - G.R. No. 185918, April 18, 2012]

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Based on all of the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the CSC may take cognizance of an administrative case filed directly with it against an official or employee of a chartered state college or university. This is regardless of whether the complainant is a private citizen or a member of the civil service and such original jurisdiction is shared with the Board of Regents of the school. [Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals- G.R. No. 176162, October 9, 2012] Which quasi-judicial agency has jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints for illegal dismissal against an adjunct government agency engaged in proprietary function? The Armed Forces of the Philippines Commissary and Exchange Services (AFPCES) is a unit/facility of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) organized pursuant to Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 31, which was issued on November 20, 1972 by then President Ferdinand Marcos. Since it cannot be denied that petitioners are government employees, the proper body that has jurisdiction to hear the case is the CSC. [Hidalgo v. Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 179793, July 5, 2010] In Garcia v. Molina [G.R. Nos. 157383 & 174137, August 10, 2010, 627 SCRA 540], we declared the formal charges issued by petitioner Government Service Insurance System President without prior conduct of a preliminary investigation as null and void. [Salva v. Valle – G. R. No. 193773, April 2, 2013]

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Amores v. CSC - G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009 - the mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. Tolentino v. de Jesus – acceptance of a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of constitutional security of tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service eligible. Romualdez v. CSC – a person’s acceptance of a temporary appointment results in the termination of official relations with his former permanent position, to which he may not demand reinstatement if his temporary appointment is not renewed. Maturan v. Maglana – where a temporary employee acquires civil service eligibility during his tenure as such, his temporary appointment does not thereby automatically become permanent. Ambas v. Buenaseda – even if appointment is temporary, appointee may not be removed at will if appointment is for a fixed period. A government employee holding a casual or temporary employment cannot be terminated within the period of his employment except for cause. Thus, they may be laid-off

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anytime before the expiration of the employment period provided any of the following occurs: (1) when their services are no longer needed; (2) funds are no longer available; (3) the project has already been completed/finished; or (4) their performance are below par. Equally important, they are entitled to due process especially if they are to be removed for more serious causes or for causes other than the reasons mentioned in CSC Form No. 001. This is pursuant to Section 2, Article IX(B) of the Constitution and Section 46 of the Civil Service Law. The reason for this is that their termination from the service could carry a penalty affecting their rights and future employment in the government. [PCSO v. Lapid - G.R. No. 191940, April 12, 2011] RA 6850 – temporary employees – 7 years – may be granted civil service eligibility that will qualify them for permanent appointment to their positions. Daza v. Lugo – G.R No. 168999, April 30, 2008 - a probationary employee may only be terminated for a just cause, that is, unsatisfactory conduct or want of capacity. Primarily confidential – one which denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state [De los Santos v. Mallare]; or

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one declared to be so upon recommendation of the CSC [Salazar v. Mathay] BUT see PAGCOR v. Angara [involving token attendants at the PAGCOR, whose positions are, by law, classified, as primarily confidential], citing PAGCOR v. Rilloraza, CSC v. Salas and Pinero v. Hechanova – an executive or legislative declaration that a position is primarily confidential, highly technical or policy-determining is not conclusive upon the courts, the true test being the nature of the position. These employees still have security of tenure, and are exempt only from the requirement of competitive examinations. Examples – private secretaries [Corpus v. Cuaderno] – bodyguards [Borres v. CA] – city legal officer [Cadiente v. Santos] and provincial attorney [Grino v. CSC] Civil Service Commission v. Salas - a driver is not a confidential employee. [See Re: Vehicular Accident - A.M. No. 2008-13-SC, November 19, 2008] Corpus v. Cuaderno – the three classes exempted from competitive exams; enjoy security of tenure. Nepotism – appointment or designation of relatives within the 3rd degree of consanguinity of affinity prohibited except – [1] persons appointed in a confidential capacity [2] teachers [3] members of the AFP [4] physicians – applies even to designations.

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In the local government career service, the prohibition against nepotism extends to the relatives of the appointing or recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.) [Galeos v. People - G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011] The principal distinctions between a detail [movement from one agency to another -[Executive Order 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (6)] and reassignment [reassignment from one organizational unit to another in the same agency -E.O. 292, Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 5, Section 26 (7)] lie in the place where the employee is to be moved and in its effectivity pending appeal with the CSC. Based on the definition, a detail requires a movement from one agency to another while a reassignment requires a movement within the same agency. Moreover, pending appeal with the CSC, an order to detail is immediately executory, whereas a reassignment order does not become immediately effective. [Republic of the Philippines v. Pacheco – G.R. No. 178021, January 25, 2012] University of the Philippines v. Regino –As a component of the Civil Service, UP is therefore governed by PD 807 and administrative cases involving the discipline of its

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employees come under the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. All members of the civil service are under the jurisdiction of the CSC, unless otherwise provided by law. RA 4670 – under Magna Carta for Public School Teachers – schools have exclusive jurisdiction over public school teachers. But SC has declared CSC and Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction. Period of preventive suspension pending investigation cannot be deducted from the penalty, because preventive suspension is not a penalty. [Quimbo v. Gervacio] Preventive suspension pending appeal is actually punitive; so, if exonerated, respondent is entitled to be reinstated with full pay for the period of suspension [pending appeal]. However, if penalty or conviction is affirmed, the period of preventive suspension pending appeal becomes part of the penalty of suspension or dismissal. [Gloria v. CA] The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 – “(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.” This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries since it does not expressly provide for

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back salaries during this period; our established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period of preventive suspension [Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999)] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its legality is beyond question. To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an employee may be entitled to back salaries: a) the employee must be found innocent of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified. [Bangalisan v. CA, 342 Phil. 586 (1997)] The reasoning behind these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated. [Civil Service Commission v. Cruz - G.R. No. 187858, August 9, 2011, En Banc, Brion] Periods – CSC – 90 days - Public officers with pending criminal cases – 90 days - Local elective officials – Local Government Code – 60 days - Anti-Graft Law – suspension pendente lite – 90 days - Ombudsman – six months An illegally terminated civil service employee is entitled to back salaries limited only to a maximum period of five years, and not full back salaries from his illegal termination up to his reinstatement. [Yenko v. Gungon, G.R. Nos. 165450 & 165452, August 13, 2009, 595 SCRA 562, 580]

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The illegally dismissed government employee shall be paid back salaries at the rate he was receiving when he was terminated unqualified by salary increases and without deduction from earnings received elsewhere during the period of his illegal dismissal. [Balquidra v. CFI of Capiz, Branch II. No. L-40490, October 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 123] Being an incumbent at the time, Galang would have continued to receive RATA, Meal Allowance and Rice Subsidy, separate from his salary, had he not been illegally dismissed from service. [Galang v. Land Bank of the Philippines - G.R. No. 175276, May 31, 2011] CSC v. Dacoycoy - the government party that can appeal the decision in administrative cases must be the party prosecuting the case and not the disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Liggayu - G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012] Quinto v. COMELEC – G.R. No. 189698, December 1, 2009, Nachura/[MR] February 22, 2010, Puno - Under Section 13 of RA 9369, which reiterates Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Upon the other hand, an elected official is not deemed to

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have resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elected office or position. In fine, an elected official may run for another position without forfeiting his seat. Elective officials can be appointed to civilian posts during their term, but they shall be considered as having forfeited their elective seats upon acceptance of said civilian posts. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. Not applicable to President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, who can hold other offices only if allowed under the Constitution. [Article VII, Section 13] – Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary ARTICLE IX-C – THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Marcoleta v. Borra - A.C. No. 7732, March 30, 2009 - complaint for disbarment against COMELEC Commissioners - an impeachable officer who is a member of the Bar cannot be disbarred without first being impeached [Jarque v. Ombudsman, In Re: Raul M. Gonzales and Cuenco v. Fernan] It bears emphasis that the provision that majority of Comelec members should be

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lawyers pertains to the desired composition of the Comelec. While the appointing authority may follow such constitutional mandate, the appointment of a full complement of lawyers in the Comelec membership is not precluded. Power to enforce and administer election laws Includes the power to annul an illegal registry of voters; cancel a proclamation made by a board of canvassers; oust a candidate already proclaimed; reject nuisance candidates [BUT Comelec may not refuse to give due course to a certificate of candidacy duly accomplished and filed – its duty is ministerial]; postpone or continue elections [Ocampo v. COMELEC]; declare a failure of elections [Omnibus Election Code/Sanchez v. COMELEC] Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC [244 SCRA272]– a COMELEC resolution required newspapers to provide it with free space of not less than ½ page for the common use of political parties and candidates. SC: Unconstitutional – constituted “Taking” of private property without payment of just compensation. Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337] – BP 881, Section 92 requires radio and TV stations to give free air time to the COMELEC to be used as the COMELEC hour for broadcasting information regarding candidates. Challenged on the ground of being unconstitutional for

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constituting taking without just compensation, the SC said the law was a valid regulation by the State of the use of the State’s air waves. Valid exercise of the police power. Presbiterio v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 178884, June 30, 2008 - a failure of election may be declared only in the three instances stated in Section 6 of the OEC: the election has not been held; the election has been suspended before the hour fixed by law; and the preparation and the transmission of the election returns have given rise to the consequent failure to elect, meaning nobody emerged as the winner. Furthermore, the reason for such failure of election should be force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes. Finally, before the COMELEC can grant a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be established, namely: (1) no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes cast would affect the result of the election. Sangcopan v. COMELEC – G. R. No. 170216 , March 12, 2008 – the annulment of election can only be done when the COMELEC finds that an election was vitiated by widespread and pervasive terrorism and election frauds, which resulted in the submission at gunpoint of falsified and tampered election returns, and it is impossible to purge the illegal from the valid returns, so that there are no

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returns worthy of faith and credit and from which would be gauged a fair and true expression of the popular will. [Sanchez v. COMELEC] Flauta v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 184586, July 22, 2009 - In Duremdes v. Commission on Elections, this Court sustained the power of the COMELEC en banc to order a correction of the Statement of Votes to make it conform to the election returns. Bedol v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 179830, December 3, 2009 - The COMELEC has quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative powers. CONTEMPT power sustained because it was exercised in connection with its quasi-judicial power, i.e., an investigation into alleged massive electoral fraud. Abainza v. Arellano –GR No. 181644, December 8, 2008 - Under Section 5, Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, correction of manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of results during the canvassing may be filed directly with the Commission, even after a proclamation of the winning candidates. Despite the proclamation of the winning candidates, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to correct manifest errors in the election returns for the Sangguniang Bayan candidates. A “manifest error” is one that is visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding; that which is open, palpable, incontrovertible, needing no evidence to make it more clear.

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Duremdes v. Commission on Elections - a pre-proclamation controversy is not proper after a proclamation has been made, only if there had been a valid proclamation. Flores v. COMELEC – SC declared as unconstitutional a law providing that decisions of the municipal or metropolitan trial courts in barangay elections may be appealed to regional trial courts. Pacificador v. COMELEC – G.R. No. 178259, March 13, 2009 –The COMELEC sitting en banc, however, does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance, as the COMELEC in division has such authority. The COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of the resolution or decision of the COMELEC in division. Pursuant to Rule 18 of the Omnibus Election Code, decisions and resolutions of any division of the COMELEC in special cases become final and executory after the lapse of five days, unless a timely motion for reconsideration is lodged with the COMELEC en banc. Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raised before the COMELEC en banc. Clearly, the assailed status quo ante Order, being interlocutory, should first be resolved by the COMELEC First Division via a

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motion for reconsideration. [Cayetano v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 193846, April 12, 2011] Fernandez v. COMELEC – G.R. No. 176296, June 30, 2008 - trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over election protests involving barangay officials, which include the SK chairman. Ugdoracion v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 179851, April 18, 2008 – the certificate of candidacy of a green card holder who states therein that he is a resident may be denied due course or cancelled on the ground of material misrepresentation. Justimbaste v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 179413, November 28, 2008 – [1] the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as “material misrepresentation” under the earlier-quoted Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to “qualifications for elective office.” [2] a petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. Omnibus Election Code - Section 68 – petition for disqualification – based on commission of prohibited acts [e.g., vote-buying, terrorism, overspending, unlawful

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electioneering] and the possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country – may be filed anytime after the deadline for filing of CoCs but before proclamation – person disqualified is prohibited from continuing as a candidate. Section 78 – petition to deny due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy [CoC] – based on false material misrepresentations [on material matters - statements regarding age, residence, citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status , eligibility, as when one, although precluded from running for a fourth term because of the three-term limit rule, claims to be nonetheless qualified, or when one claims to be eligible despite his disqualification on the basis of an accessory penalty imposed upon him in connection with his conviction in a criminal case - the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualification for public office. ] in the CoC - must be filed within five days from the deadline for filing of CoCs, or not later than 25 days from the filing of the questioned CoC – person disqualified is not treated as a candidate at all – has been likened to a petition for quo warranto, but is filed before, and not after, proclamation.

A candidate may be substituted if he dies, is disqualified or withdraws. Substitutions in cases of death

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or disqualification may usually be made until midday of election day. An earlier deadline is usually prescribed for substitutions by reason of withdrawal. Under Section 12 of R.A. No. 9006, in order to obviate confusion, the name of the substitute candidate should, as much as possible, bear the same surname as that of the substituted candidate. [Federico v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013] Thus, in Federico v. Commission on Elections, the Court invalidated the substitution of a candidate for mayor who withdrew her candidacy for purposes of substituting her husband as candidate for governor because of the latter’s death. It said that, while her substitution of her husband because of his death may have been valid because said substitution may be done until midday of election day, her substitution as a candidate for mayor was invalid because the deadline for the same had long prescribed. The Court stressed that her substitution as a mayoralty candidate was not by reason of her death or disqualification. A candidate whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due course may likewise not be substituted. [Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012; Tagolino v. HRET and Lucy Torres, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013; see Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617] “A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.” [Aratea v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012]

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In Aratea v. COMELEC, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there may be instances when the grounds for both sections 68 and 78 may overlap, as when a candidate who represents that he is a resident of the place where he seeks election but is actually a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country, in which case, he would clearly also not be a resident of the place where he seeks election for at least one year immediately preceding the day of the election. In such cases, the Court clarified that one who would like to assail the candidacy of that person may avail himself of either remedy.

Nuisance candidates – stray votes - “We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.” [De la Cruz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012]

Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 122258 - vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing. However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character. Blanco v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180164, June 17, 2008 –

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petitioner was earlier found administratively, and not criminally, liable for vote-buying, and disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. In G.R. No. 122258, petitioner was disqualified from continuing as a candidate only in the May 8, 1995 elections. Abayon v. COMELEC and Raul Daza- GR No. 181295, April 2, 2009 - abduction of a voter, the killing of a political leader, the threats which prevented the holding of the campaign sorties, and the intimidation of voters, or of terrorism [also massive vote-buying and bribery] are proper grounds for an election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy - illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers, canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof; election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. In fact, had Abayon timely filed an election protest, bearing the same allegations and raising identical issues, it would have been given due course. The ten-day period for filing an election contest or a petition for quo warranto cannot be considered suspended with the filing thereof.

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Ocampo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal - a subsequent disqualification of a winning candidate will not entitle his opponent, the candidate who received the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. NOTE - in subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court, it made clear that its earlier rulings holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes for such non-candidate should therefore be considered as stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. [Cayat v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163776, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23] If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. This, according to the Supreme Court, is the

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more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position. [Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012] Atienza v. COMELEC – G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010, Abad - the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register political parties. Liberal Party v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010 - political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 177508, August 7, 2009 - It is clear that the grant of the “exclusive power” to investigate and prosecute election offenses to the COMELEC was not by virtue of the Constitution but by BP 881, a legislative enactment. Dino v. Olivarez – G.R. No. 170447, December 4, 2009 - It is clear that the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints

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involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that successful prosecution of the case can be done by the COMELEC. Eriguel v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 190526, February 26, 2010 - The Special Second Division of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Division of COMELEC, should have instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Division, not only to fill in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may be attained. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition. In this

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case, the COMELEC En Banc cannot be compelled to resolve Layug’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 that was filed on July 28, 2010 after said Resolution had already attained finality. In fact, the COMELEC Second Division denied the same Motion in its Order dated August 4, 2010 precisely for the reason that it was filed out of time. [Layug v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 192984, February 28, 2012] Since it is the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Clearly, petitioner erred in invoking this Court's power to issue said extraordinary writ. [Galang v. Geronimo - G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011; see also Bulilis v. Nuez - G. R. No. 195953, August 9, 2011] There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits xxx Otherwise stated, the Court has no power

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to review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC. [Ambil v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 143398, October 25, 2000, 344 SCRA 358, 365-366; Cagas v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012] Under the exception, therefore, the [Supreme] Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed. [Kho v. Commission on Elections -G.R. No. 124033, September 25, 1997, 279 SCRA 463, 471-473; Cagas v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012] Not all criminal offenses committed during the election period are election offenses.

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The election period may be changed by resolution of the Commission on Elections. The election period may, under the Constitution, commence earlier than ninety days before the day of election. - Special case – Article VII, Section 10 – special election, to be called within 7 days after vacancy, and must be held not earlier than 45 days nor later than 60 days from such call. Penera v. COMELEC - G. R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009 - “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.” ARTICLE IX-D – THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT Riel v. Wright – Insular Auditor denied a claim for payment of his salary for services as a temporary clerk of the Senate on the ground that his services were unnecessary. SC: invalid/this is a matter within the peculiar province of the Legislature and for which its members are responsible to their constituents. Insular Auditor cannot question the necessity of an appropriation BUT in Matute v. Hernandez – Insular Auditor refused to authorize payment under a contract, which was novated without a second public bidding. SC: valid because the Insular Auditor can reject an account that is demonstrably unlawful.

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Philippine Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 169752, September 25, 2007 - Petitioner is DECLARED a private domestic corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Boy Scouts of the Philippines is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction. [Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011] Local water districts, such as the LMWD, are GOCCs with special charter. P.D. No. 198 constitutes the special charter by virtue of which local water districts exist. [Feliciano v. Aranez - G.R. No. 165641, August 25, 2010] LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA. [Veloso v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011, En Banc, Peralta] Sanchez v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 127545, April 23, 2008 - The Court had therefore previously upheld the authority of the COA to disapprove payments which it finds excessive and disadvantageous to the Government; to determine the meaning of “public bidding” and when there is “failure” in the bidding; to disallow expenditures which it finds unnecessary according to its rules even if disallowance will mean discontinuance of foreign aid;

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to disallow a contract even after it has been executed and goods have been delivered. Likewise, we sustained the findings of the COA disallowing the disbursements of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation for failure to submit certain documentary requirements and for being irregular and excessive. We have also ruled that the final determination of the Department of Finance and the BIR as to a person’s entitlement to an informer’s reward is conclusive only upon the executive agencies concerned and not on the COA, the latter being an independent constitutional commission. The COA is traditionally given free rein in the exercise of its constitutional duty to examine and audit expenditures of public funds especially those which are palpably beyond what is allowed by law. [Barbo v Commission on Audit – G.R. No. 157542, October 10, 2008] - in Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan Water District] v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the disbursement of government funds by a water district and declared that such power does not conflict with the jurisdiction of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. Section 2[2] – the critical function of the COA authorizes it to VETO disbursements. Pacete v. Acting Chairman of the COA – monetary claims must be acted upon by the COA within 60 days. Failure to do so within said period would not result in the automatic approval of the claim pursuant to section1 of CA 327. SC:

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NO, claimant can file petition for mandamus to compel COA to render a decision. Civil Service Commission v. Pobre, 438 SCRA 334 - While the determination of leave benefits is within the functions of the Civil Service Commission as the central personnel agency of the government, the duty to examine accounts and expenditures relating to such benefits properly pertains to the Commission on Audit. Even as the Supreme Court recognizes the Civil Service Commission’s jurisdiction in this case, it is not exclusive as it is shared with the Commission on Audit. NHMFC v. Abayari – G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009 - Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that execution by garnishment could proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it must bear stress that the latter is a government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of its own. Its juridical personality is separate and distinct from the government and it can sue and be sued in its name. As such, while indeed it cannot evade the effects of the execution of an adverse judgment and may not ordinarily place its funds beyond an order of garnishment issued in ordinary cases, it is imperative in order for execution to ensue that a claim for the payment of the judgment award be first filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).

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An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa. The criminal case filed before the Office of the Ombudsman is distinct and separate from the proceedings on the disallowance before the COA. So also, the dismissal by Margarito P. Gervacio, Jr., Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao, of the criminal charges against petitioners does not necessarily foreclose the matter of their possible liability as warranted by the findings of the COA. [Soria v. Commission on Audit - G.R. No. 167219, February 8, 2011] With respect to the liability of petitioner, we likewise affirm the COA’s ruling that he is personally and solidarily liable for the disallowed amount. The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application because CDA is not a private entity but a government agency created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939 in compliance with the provisions of Section 15, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, respondents satisfactorily established that petitioner acted in bad faith when he prevailed upon the DAP-TEC to modify the initial result of the technical evaluation of the computers by imposing an irrelevant grading system that was intended to favor one of the bidders, after the bids had been opened. [Versoza v. Carague - G.R. No. 157838, March 8, 2011] ARTICLE X – LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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RECALL - Section 70 of the Local Government Code – Percentage requirements – at least 25% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of not more than 20,000/At least 20% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 5,000/At least 15% in the case of LGUs with a voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than 300,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 15,000/At least 10% in case the voting population exceeds 300,000, provided petitioners shall not be less than 45,000 Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals - the LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATV system because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under EO Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205 mandated the NTC to grant certificates of authority to CATV operators while EO 436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate and supervise the CATV industry. Social Justice Society v. Atienza - G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008 - Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body. It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the subordinate. Here, what the DOE

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seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local officials, a power that not even its principal, the President, has. Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Governors do not have emergency military powers. - Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1, subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 [of the Local Government Code], as the said provision expressly refers to calamities and disasters, whether man-made or natural. The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during these occurrences. But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster. Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under this provision to justify their actions. Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons. First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a “national law enforcement agency,” to which the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the

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Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend the Republic against all enemies, foreign and domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of the national territory. Second, there was no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the assistance of national law enforcement agencies. [[Jamar M. Kulayan, et al. vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan etc., et al. - G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc, Sereno] Three-Term Limit 1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr. [G.R. No. 133495, September 3, 1998, 295 SCRA 157 (1998)]). If the official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon v.

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Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008, 551 SCRA 50 (2008)). 2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 147927, February 4, 2002, 376 SCRA 90 (2002)] and Socrates v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457]). 3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official’s continuity of service (Latasa v. Commission on Elections. - G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601 (2003). 4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009, 609 SCRA 234).

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5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602 (1999)and Dizon v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 182088, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 589 (2009)). The break or interruption need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002, 391 SCRA 457], citing Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602 (1999)). 6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. Nos. 163295 & 163354, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 473 (2006)and Rivera III v. Commission on

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Elections [G.R. Nos. 167591 & 170577, May 9, 2007, 523 SCRA 41 (2007)). There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month. Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled. [Abundo v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013, En Banc, Velasco] Laceda v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008 – punong barangay of municipality of Sorsogon for 1st two terms. By the time he was elected for his 3rd term, the municipality had been merged with another municipality to form the City of Sorsogon. Territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants the same. Latasa v. COMELEC affirmed. Disqualified for a fourth term. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official merely served the balance of the latter’s term of office; it is not a full three-year term. It also goes without saying that an incumbent elective local official against whom a recall election is initiated and who nevertheless wins in a recall election must be viewed as

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being a continuing term of office and not as a break in reckoning three consecutive terms. - A recall election term then, not being a full three-year term, is not to be counted or used as a basis for disqualification whether it is held prior or subsequent to the nine-year full three-term limit. [Mendoza v. COMELEC – NOT MENTIONED in Abundo v. Commission on Elections - G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013]

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ARTICLE XI – ACOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS People v. Benipayo - G.R. No. 154473, April 24, 2009 – a COMELEC Commissioner may not be charged with libel without first being impeached. [The RTC, not the Ombudsman, or the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over libel charges leveled against public officers.] BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST - "acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers." In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as the other grounds for impeachment. [Gonzales v. Office of the President - G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe] Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special

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Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope. Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other grounds for impeachment. [Gonzales v. Office of the President - G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe] The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives - G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011] Francisco v. HR - G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003 - “…initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint AND referral to the House of Committee on Justice…” Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted matchsticks [sic] light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives - G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011]

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No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment “proceedings.” Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment.” It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense. [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives - G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011] A person no longer in office may still be impeached – penalty: disqualification from public office. Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives - G.R. No. 193459, February 15, 2011] To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word

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“promulgate,” it does not necessarily mean to publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of “to make known” as it should be generally understood. [Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives - G.R. No. 193459, March 8, 2011] Sandiganbayan -Original Jurisdiction – [a] violations of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, where the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity – Official of the Executive Branch with the position of regional director or higher or with a salary grade level 27, including provincial governors, vice-governors, board members, provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads/city mayors, vice-mayors, city councilors, city treasurers, assessors, engineers and other city department heads/officials of the diplomatic service from consuls or higher/PA-PAF colonels or PN captains and all officers of higher rank/officers of the PNP while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher/city or provincial prosecutors and their assistants and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor/presidents, directors, trustees or managers of GOCCs, state universities or educational institutions or foundations / Members of Congress and officials with SG27 and up / Members of the judiciary

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without prejudice to the Constitution / Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions without prejudice to the Constitution / All other national and local officials with SG27 or higher. / [b] other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by public officials and employees mentioned above in relation to their office [where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years or a fine of P6,000.00 [Madarang v. Sandiganbayan] / [c] civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A issued in 1986 – sequestration cases. Original Jurisdiction over petitions for writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, provided that jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the SC. Appellate Jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or their appellate jurisdiction. Caballero v. Sandiganbayan - G.R. Nos. 137355-58, September 25, 2007 - violations of RA No. 3019 by a municipal mayor come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because under RA No. 6758, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, municipal mayors are local

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officials classified as Grade “27.” [Binay v. Sandiganbayan] - The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. [People v. Sandiganbayan - G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010] Carandang was correct in insisting that being a private individual he was not subject to the administrative authority of the Ombudsman and to the criminal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because Radio Philippines Network, Inc. (RPN), was not a government-owned or -controlled corporation, although sequestered by the PCGG; hence, he was not a public official or employee. [Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 116033, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 747] [Carandang v. Desierto - G.R. No. 148076, January 11, 2011] People v. Sandiganbayan – Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors, trustees or managers of all GOCCs, whether or not with original charters Orap v. Sandiganbayan – judges may be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan even if they come under the administrative supervision of the SC. Administrative charges shall defer filing of criminal charges based on the same offense by the Special Prosecutor before the Sandiganbayan. BUT - Balsamo v. Suan [citing Rallos v.

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Gako and Calleja v. Santelices] – an administrative case against a judge must be held in abeyance if the basis for the administrative case is a case pending review by or appeal before the CA. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari, the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the National Bureau of Investigation. [Magno v. People - G.R. No. 171542, April 6, 2011] The OMBUDSMAN is the ACTIVIST WATCHMAN! [Ombudsman v. Racho - G.R. No. 185685, January 31, 2011] The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee applies only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. In cases cognizable by regular courts, the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with other investigative agencies of government. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez - G.R. No. 172700, July 23, 2010] Estandarte v. People – G.R. Nos. 156851-55, February 18, 2008 - when the City Prosecutor is deputized by the Office

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of the Ombudsman, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify the prosecutor’s decision. Aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. xxx Thus, it cannot be rightly said that giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided by law. [Gonzales v. Office of the President - G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe] Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has concurrent

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authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery, both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman. [Gonzales v. Office of the President - G.R. No. 196231, September 4, 2012, En Banc, Perlas-Bernabe] Uy v. Sandiganbayan G.R .No. 105965-70, March 20, 2001 – The Ombudsman can conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute criminal cases involving public officers and employees; not only those within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts as well. The Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon receipt of a complaint. Indeed, we have said in Knecht v. Desierto [353 Phil. 494 (1998)] and later in Mamburao, Inc. v. Office of the Ombudsman [398 Phil. 762 (2000)] and Karaan v. Office of the Ombudsman [476

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Phil. 536 (2004)] that should investigating officers find a complaint utterly devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation should be conducted. The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation in The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. [437 Phil. 702 (2002)] We reiterate that the Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsman’s decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco. [Judge Angeles v. Gutierrez - G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012, Second Division, Sereno] PRIVATE TRANSACTIONS - the Ombudsman can investigate on its own or on complaint by any person any act or omission of any public official or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, or improper It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty. [See Santos v. Rasalan, citing Vasquez v. Hobilla-Alinio, G.R. Nos. 118813-14, April 8, 1997, 271 SCRA 67, 74]

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The Court has repeatedly ruled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the government in relation to the offense charged. [Honasan v. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, G.R. No. 159747, April 13, 2004, 427 SCRA 46] Therefore, with respect to petitioners, the Ombudsman may share its authority to conduct an investigation concerning administrative charges against them with other agencies [like the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission or the Civil Service Commission]. [Lacson v. Executive Secretary - G.R. Nos. 165399 and 165475, May 30, 2011] Office of the Ombudsman v. Medrano - G.R. No. 177580, October 17, 2008 - the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd, which has concurrent jurisdiction under the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Palma v. Fortich – there are 2 kinds of administrative cases against municipal officers – [1] those related to the discharge of the functions of their office [neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of maladministration of office] and [2] those not so connected with said functions. Under the 2nd category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is not linked with the performance

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of official duties, conviction by final judgment is required as a condition precedent to administrative action. Office of the Ombudsman v. de Sahagun – G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008347 - administrative offenses do not prescribe. Melchor v. Gironella - the period [of one year] stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word “may” in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. It is, therefore, discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. The principle of res judicata would not preclude the Ombudsman from ordering another review of a complaint, for he or she may revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of a predecessor in office. [Alvarez v. People - G.R. No. 192591, June 29, 2011] The doctrine in Montemayor v. Bundalian [453 Phil. 158, 169 (2003)] that res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers, has been abandoned in subsequent cases [Borlongan v. Buenaventura; Executive

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Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487 Phil. 490 (2004); Atty. De Vera v. Judge Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000)] which have since applied the principle of res judicata to administrative cases. The decision of the Ombudsman is immediately executory pending appeal and may not be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ. The aforementioned Section 7 is also clear in providing that in case the penalty is removal and the respondent wins his appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the removal. The CA’s issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction, staying the penalty of dismissal imposed by the Ombudsman in this administrative case, is thus an encroachment on the rule-making powers of the Ombudsman under Section 13 (8), Article XI of the Constitution, and Sections 18 and 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Office of the Ombudsman the authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure. The issuance of an injunctive writ renders nugatory the provisions of Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. [Facura v. Court of Appeals - G.R. No. 166495, February 16, 2011] In Soriano v. Cabais, G.R. No. 157175, June 21, 2007, 525 SCRA 261, 265 this Court had the occasion to discuss the appropriate recourse to take from decisions or

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resolutions of the Ombudsman, and said - In Fabian, we ruled that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Here, petitioner’s complaint is criminal in nature. In Estrada v. Desierto, we held that the remedy of aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with this Court, not with the Court of Appeals. In cases when the aggrieved party is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case, there is likewise the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 to be filed with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals. [Belongilot v. Cua - G.R. No. 160933, November 24, 2010] The Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary. [Republic of the Philippines v. Bajao – G.R. No. 160596, March 20, 2009] Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

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ARTICLE XII – NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Republic of the Philippines v. Imperial Credit Corporation - G.R. No. 173088, June 25, 2008 - under the Regalian doctrine, the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. This is premised on the basic doctrine that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap - G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008 - lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber [1935 Constitution] and national parks [1987 Constitution]. Only agricultural lands may be alienated, but a prior positive act of the Government, declaring land as alienable and disposable, by way of proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or certification, is required. Roman Catholic Administrator of Davao Diocese, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission – a religious corporation controlled by non-Filipinos cannot acquire and own lands even for religious purposes. Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties - G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008 The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be

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tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic of the Philippines - G.R. No. 150824, February 4, 2008, Reyes - FOREST lands are outside the commerce of man and unsusceptible of private appropriation in any form. A certificate of title is void when it covers property of public domain classified as forest, timber or mineral lands. Borromeo v. Descallar - G.R. No. 159310, February 24, 2009 - The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. Since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation’s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved. [United Church Board for World Ministries]

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Ho v. Gui - G.R. No. 130115, July 16, 2008 - in Muller v. Muller, [500 SCRA 65] wherein the respondent, a German national, was seeking reimbursement of funds claimed by him to be given in trust to his petitioner wife, a Philippine citizen, for the purchase of a property in Antipolo, the Court, in rejecting the claim, ruled that: Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of the petitioner because of the said prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the said property cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of petitioner's marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondent's disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition. Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc. - G.R. No. 156364, September 25, 2008 - Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, foreign nationals can own Philippine real estate through the purchase of condominium units or townhouses constituted under the Condominium principle with Condominium Certificates of Title. Considering that the rights and liabilities of the

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parties under the Contract to Sell is covered by the Condominium Act wherein petitioner as unit owner was simply a member of the Condominium Corporation and the land remained owned by respondent, then the constitutional proscription against aliens owning real property does not apply to the present case. The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares. [Gamboa v. Finance Secretary - G.R. No. 176579, June 28, 2011] Since the constitutional requirement of at least 60 percent Filipino ownership applies not only to voting control of the corporation but also to the beneficial ownership of the corporation, it is therefore imperative that such requirement apply uniformly and across the board to all classes of shares, regardless of nomenclature and category, comprising the capital of a corporation. xxx The Constitution expressly declares as State policy the development of an economy "effectively controlled" by Filipinos. Consistent with such State policy, the Constitution explicitly reserves the ownership and operation of public utilities to Philippine nationals, who are defined in the Foreign Investments Act of 1991 as Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least 60

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percent of whose capital with voting rights belongs to Filipinos. The FIA’s implementing rules explain that "[f]or stocks to be deemed owned and held by Philippine citizens or Philippine nationals, mere legal title is not enough to meet the required Filipino equity. Full beneficial ownership of the stocks, coupled with appropriate voting rights is essential." In effect, the FIA clarifies, reiterates and confirms the interpretation that the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers to shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial ownership. This is precisely because the right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation. xxx The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have the same 60 percent Filipino ownership and control requirement for public utilities like PLDT. Any deviation from this requirement necessitates an amendment to the Constitution as exemplified by the Parity Amendment. This Court has no power to amend the Constitution for its power and duty is only to faithfully apply and interpret the Constitution. [Heirs of Wilson Gamboa v. Finance Secretary - G.R. No. 176579, October 9, 2012] Section 14. xxx The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. ARTICLE XIII – SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

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Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. - G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009 – the provisions of Article XIII are not judicially enforceable, particularly Section 3 thereof. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or force of its own. The wording of the provision is unequivocal––the farmers and regular farmworkers have a right TO OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law allows two (2) modes of land distribution—direct and indirect ownership. Direct transfer to individual farmers is the most commonly used method by DAR and widely accepted. Indirect transfer through collective ownership of the agricultural land is the alternative to direct ownership of agricultural land by individual farmers. The aforequoted Sec. 4 EXPRESSLY authorizes collective ownership by farmers. No language can be found in the 1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. xxx. Clearly, workers’ cooperatives or associations under Sec. 29 of RA 6657 and corporations or associations under the succeeding Sec. 31, as differentiated from individual farmers, are authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land. Cooperatives can be registered with the Cooperative Development Authority and acquire legal personality of their own, while corporations are juridical persons under the Corporation Code. Thus, Sec. 31 is constitutional as it simply

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implements Sec. 4 of Art. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. xxx. [Hacienda Luisita Incorporated v. Luisita Industrial Park Corporation – GR No. 171101, July 5, 2011,] The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. [The University of the Immaculate Conception v. NLRC - G.R. No. 181146, January 26, 2011] Section 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwelling demolished, except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner. No resettlement of urban or rural dwellers shall be undertaken without adequate consultation with them and the communities where they are to be relocated. Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary - G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007 - Penalty for failure on the part of the government to consult could only be reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify government action. ARTICLE XIV – EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS

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Section 3. - All educational institutions shall include the study of the Constitution as part of the curricula. They shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency. At the option expressed in writing by the parents or guardians, religion shall be allowed to be taught to their children or wards in public elementary and high schools within the regular class hours by instructors designated or approved by the religious authorities of the religion to which the children or wards belong, without additional cost to the Government. Educational institutions, other than those established by religious groups and mission boards, shall be owned solely by citizens of the Philippines or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Congress may, however, require increased Filipino equity participation in all educational institutions. The control and administration of educational institutions shall be vested in citizens of the Philippines. No educational institution shall be established exclusively for aliens and no group of aliens shall comprise more than one-third of the enrollment in any school. The

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provisions of this sub section shall not apply to schools established for foreign diplomatic personnel and their dependents and, unless otherwise provided by law, for other foreign temporary residents. All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. Subject to conditions prescribed by law, all grants, endowments, donations, or contributions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from tax. Institutional academic freedom - consists of four essential freedoms to determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. Note that these four essential freedoms are given to the university as an institution, not to the professors or to the researchers in that institution. [Justice Felix Frankfurter] Camacho vs. Corresis - G.R. No. 134372., August 22, 2002; 387 SCRA 628; 636-637 -"Academic freedom is two-tiered — that of the academic institution and the teacher's.

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Civil Service Commission v. Sojor - G.R. No. 168766, May 22, 2008 - While a school’s academic freedom entitles it to determine “who may teach,” said academic freedom may not be invoked because the administrative charges against the respondent, i.e., nepotism, dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, are classified as grave offenses under civil service rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal. Although Section 4 of R.A. No. 8292 grants to the board [of the school] the power to remove school faculty members, administrative officials, and employees for cause, this power is not exclusive in the matter of disciplining and removing its employees and officials. Being a non-career civil servant does not remove respondent from the ambit of the CSC. Career or non-career, a civil service official or employee, is within the jurisdiction of the CSC. Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements. Section 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. ARTICLE XV – THE FAMILY

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Silverio v. Republic - G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, Corona - sex reassignment – In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Section 3. The State shall defend [1] The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; [2] The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. ARTICLE XVI – GENERAL PROVISIONS The Philippine flag may be changed only by constitutional amendment.

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The national anthem may be changed by law, subject to ratification in a referendum. STATE IMMUNITY - Under the PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EUALITY OF STATES - AVAILABLE to foreign states insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local state. [Syquia v. Almeda Lopez] There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) xxx The restrictive theory came about because of the entry of sovereign states into purely commercial activities remotely connected with the discharge of governmental functions. This is particularly true with respect to the Communist states which took control of nationalized business activities and international trading. [Holy See v. Rosario - G.R. No. 101949, 1 December 1994, 238 SCRA 524, 535, cited in China National Machinery & Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria - G.R. No. 185572, February 7, 2012, En Banc, Sereno]

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Sanders v. Veridiano – suit for damages for defamatory remarks – statements were made by petitioners as officers of the US Government – considered suit against the state. IF A SUIT ASKS FOR affirmative relief on the part of the State, like the passage of a special appropriations law, then it is against it, and the State may invoke its immunity. Otherwise, it is only a suit against its officers, which can act on the relief prayed for in the suit without further State intervention. Garcia v. Chief of Staff – claim for damages for injuries was considered a suit against the State, since the latter would need to appropriate funds to satisfy the claim. - Ruiz v. Cabahug – claim for payment of architectural fees, for which appropriations had already been made was considered a suit against the Secretary of National defense alone, and did not involve the State. - Santiago v. Republic – suit purely for the revocation of a donation on the ground of the failure of the Government to comply with its obligations is not a suit against the State. If a government agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from

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suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued. If it is not incorporated, it is necessary to determine the nature of the functions in which the agency is engaged, so as to hold it suable if they are proprietary and not suable if they are governmental. The test in every case is the nature of the primary functions being discharged. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS may be suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued; BUT they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. [Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte – where the injury occurred in connection with the repair of streets; and Torio v. Fontanilla – where a municipality was held liale for a tort committed in connection with the celebration of a town fiesta, which was considered a proprietary function. In this case, people were injured when the stage for the fiesta collapsed.] CONSENT – EXPRESS – General Law – CA 327, as amended [claims against government to be filed with the COA – Special Law – Merritt v. Government – special law which allowed a person to sue the Philippine Government for injuries he sustained when his motorcycle collided with a government ambulance. [Government eventually found not to be liable, because the ambulance was driven by a

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regular driver, who was not considered to be a special agent of the government.] IMPLIED –when the State institutes a complaint BUT NOTE – Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. – where the government was held to have impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting a claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff, to wit, the recovery of a vessel. Lim v. Brownell – the State is not considered to have impliedly waived its immunity when it files, as successor-in-interest, a complaint in intervention to join the defendant in invoking the doctrine of State immunity to secure the dismissal of the action. Its purpose was merely to resist the claim. Hence. No waiver of state immunity. – implied waiver when the Government enters into a contract, but, as ruled by the Supreme Court in USA v. Ruiz, suability would follow only if the contract is entered into by the state in its proprietary capacity. Governmental contracts [such as for the repair of wharves] do not result in implied waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Note USA v. Guinto, where the Supreme Court said that the operation by the US Government of restaurants in Camp John Hay in Baguio City, and of barber shops in

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Clark Air Base not covered by the doctrine of state immunity. Republic v. Villasor – when the State consents to be sued, it does not thereby also consent to the execution of any judgment against it. Such execution will require another waiver. We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. [Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 212, 231; Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, No. L-31635, Aug. 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464; Santiago v. Republic, No. L-48214, Dec. 19, 1978, 87 SCRA 294] In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, the order of garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that “the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to the processes of the COA.” [See National Electrification Administration v. Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007, 528 SCRA 79, 81.] In fact, we even stated

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there that “it is not for this Court to preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.” [Id., cited in Agra v. Commission on Audit - G. R. No. 167807, December 6, 2011, En Banc, Leonardo-de Castro] No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. Laws on retirement of military officers shall not allow extension of their service. The tour of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces shall not exceed three years. However, in times of war or other national emergency declared by the Congress, the President may extend such tour of duty. Section 6. The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law. Section 11. – [1] The ownership and management of mass media shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to

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corporations, cooperatives or associations, wholly-owned and managed by such citizens. [2] The Congress shall regulate or prohibit monopolies in commercial mass media when the public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition therein shall be allowed. The advertising industry is impressed with public interest, and shall be regulated by law for the protection of consumers and the promotion of the general welfare. Only Filipino citizens or corporations or associations at least seventy per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens shall be allowed to engage in the advertising industry. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of entities in such industry shall be limited to their proportionate share in the capital thereof, and all the executive and managing officers of such entities must be citizens of the Philippines. ARTICLE XVII – AMENDMENT OR REVISION Changes in the Constitution may be effected by a mere modification in its interpretation. People v. Pomar – declared a law granting maternity leave privileges as unconstitutional, for violating the non-impairment clause. Lambino v. COMELEC - G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 - [1] Two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf.

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Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision” of the Constitution. A people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is “so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the ‘substantial entirety’ of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions.”

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The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will “accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision.” Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, “a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan” includes “change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches.” A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that “jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances.” A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution. A shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. Imbong v. COMELEC –Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, may, with the concurrence of two thirds of all its members, call a constitutional convention in general terms only. Thereafter, the same Congress, acting this time as a legislative body, may pass the necessary implementing law providing for the details of the constitutional convention.

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Gonzales v. COMELEC [reiterated in Occena v. COMELEC] – plebiscite may be scheduled on the same day as the regular elections. Note JBL Reyes’ dissent – there must be fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection. Tolentino v. COMELEC – no piecemeal ratification. Whole proposal must be submitted for approval, so the people can have a proper “frame of reference.”