2014 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW

2015 REMINDERS for POLITICAL LAW

Carlo L. Cruz

SEPARATION OF POWERS - Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law. Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in "the various operational aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541 and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the doctrine of separation of powers, namely: (a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year without complying with the statutory definition of savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts; and (b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive. The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General Appropriations Acts. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015]

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015]Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner. [Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014]

Checks and Balances The Presidents disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. [Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, 62 Phil. 912, cited in Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]DELEGATION OF POWERS the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

The 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Presidential Pork Barrel - the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government," remains legally effective and subsisting the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used as it should be used only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority infrastructure development projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

The proviso under Section 9 of the RH Law which states that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" is empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

The issuance of a Barangay Protection Order by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay. Not violative of the principle of delegation. [Garcia v. Drilon, G. R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352; Tua v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014]

Article I The Archipelago Doctrine - teaches that the outermost points of our terrestrial domain are to be connected with straight baselines and all waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as our internal waters. As internal waters, they are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Philippines. Archipelagic sealanes are to be laid on these waters over which foreign ships will have the right of passage as if they were open seas.

UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Territorial Sea - provides for a uniform breadth of 12 miles from the low-water mark of the coast. Contiguous Zone - 12 miles from the outer limits of the territorial sea exercise of protective jurisdiction in a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea. Economic Zone or Patrimonial Sea - extending 200 miles from the low water mark of the coastal state all living and non-living resources found therein belong exclusively to the coastal state. The Continental Shelf refers to [a] the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the subjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas, and [b] to the seabed and subsoil of similar areas adjacent to the coasts of the islands. The costal state has the EXCLUSIVE sovereign right to explore the continental shelf and to exploit its natural resources, and no one else may do so without its consent. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath The imposition of these passage rights [right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits] through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]

Petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal: SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. [Magallona v. Ermita, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011]The Open Seas res communes but a state may exercise jurisdiction on the open seas over its vessels, over pirates, in the exercise of the right to visit and search and under the doctrine of hot pursuit. Outer space, like the open seas, is res communes and NOT susceptible to discovery and occupation; it is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty. A state is responsible for whatever injury or damage any object it sends to outer space may cause.

The Bangsamoro Juridical Entity [BJE] is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,ARTICLE II - generally not a source of enforceable rights EXCEPT the Incorporation Clause and Section 28 on the policy of public disclosure duty to disclose [which presents a SPLENDID SYMMETRY to Article III, Section 7 on the Right to Information].The Constitution now describes the Philippines as not only a republican but also a democratic State. NOTE provisions on initiative on national legislation [Article VI (32)] and initiative on amendment of the Constitution. [Article VII (2)]. - Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to information on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of health of their President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpusor declaration of martial law. These provisions enlarge the peoples right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to prejudice their interest. [Petitioner Organizations v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147036-37, April 10, 2012] - SEE also Article II [23] The State shall encourage non-governmental, community based, or sectoral organizations that provide the welfare of the nation. Article X [14] The President shall provide for regional development councils xxx composed of local government officials, and representatives from non-governmental organizations xxx Article X [18] The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. x x x. Article XII [9] The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President, which shall, after consultations with the xxx various private sectors xxx Article XIII [15] The State shall respect the role of independent peoples organizations. Article XIII [16] The right of the people and their organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic decision-making shall not be abridged. Article XVI [12] The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of the members of which shall come from the communities.

Whatever good is done by the government is attributed to the State but every harm inflicted on the people is imputed not to the State but to the government alone. Such injury may justify the replacement of the government by revolution, theoretically at the behest of the State, in a development known as direct State action.

Parens Patriae guardian of the rights of the people Offensive language (low value expressions) in television may be regulated or even banned for the sake of the children. Justification parens patriae. [Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009] A belligerent occupation would have no effect on the continued effectivity of the law on treason. Accordingly, political laws, like the Constitution, were merely suspended, subject to revival under the jus postliminium upon the end of the occupation. Suspension of political laws affects only the civilians, and not the soldiers or enemies in arms. [Ruffy v. Chief of Staff] Also does not apply to treason [Laurel v. Misa]. Non-political laws, like the Civil Code, remain effective, unless changed by the belligerent occupant. Judicial decisions, such as a conviction for defamation, shall remain valid even after a belligerent occupation, except those of a political complexion.

Right to Self-Determination right to freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. Internal self-determination a peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. External self-determination - the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people. The peoples right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. [The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, October 14, 2008]

Distinguish the Incorporation Clause or Doctrine of Incorporation from the Doctrine of Transformation accepted rules of international law must first be enacted into legislation. [Note both doctrines are applicable in our jurisdiction. There is transformation when the Senate gives its concurrence to treaties.]

Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions." Thus, laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international agreements. [Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 188550, August 19, 2013]

A zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

Thus, the word primarily in Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0I(a and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the principle of no abortion embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

Education - the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves their aims and objectives and how best to attain them. They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis, and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment. [Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, G.R. No. 207412, August 7, 2013]

Political Dynasties Section 26 (of Article II) is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

ARTICLE VI The commencement of the terms and the regular election of legislators may be changed by law. An increase in their salaries shall take effect after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.

Qualifications - Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 requiring candidates for senator to be certified illegal-drug free unconstitutional list of constitutional qualifications exclusive, may not be enlarged by Congress. [Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870, November 3, 2008]

Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions. There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its national. It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at least six times. If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S. passport Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere ceremonial formality. The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a country". On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen. What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. [Macquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, July 2, 2013]

To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of land does not make it ones residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet established actual and physical residence in the barangay xxx A temporary stay in a strangers house cannot amount to residence Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to registration. [Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013] The critical issue, however, pertains to Osmeas bodily presence in Toledo City and the declaration he made in his COC on this point. The petitioners claim that Osmea was only seen in Toledo City in the month of September 2012 to conduct political meetings. They also stress that the dilapidated property in Ibo, Toledo City is not even owned by Osmea, and is not in keeping with the latters stature a former Senator and a member of a political clan The law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal, we ruled that the "fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made the rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially considering that there were witnesses (including petitioner's neighbors in Villa de Toledo) that were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. x x x It may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment or business." Similarly, the fact that Osmea has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence in Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election. It is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. In Perez v. COMELEC, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a candidates domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor Osmeas actual physical presence in Toledo City is established not only by the presence of a place (Ibo, Toledo City, house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in Toledo City. Osmeas substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Toledo City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration and headquarters, but also his participation in the communitys socio-civic and political activities. Osmea has been proclaimed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the mandate of the electorate Before his transfer of residence, Osmea already had intimate knowledge of Toledo City, particularly of the whole 3rd legislative district that he represented for one term. Thus, he manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Moreover, Osmea won the mayoralty position as the choice of the people of Toledo City. [Jalover v. de la Pena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014]

The prescriptive period under the HRET Rules [for the institution of election contests] does not apply to disqualification cases based on citizenship. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the prescriptive period notwithstanding.BUT it is the State, through its representatives designated by statute that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizens descendant. [Limkaichong v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 178831-32, April 1, 2009]

Party-List Representatives - The COMELEC cannot issue implementing rules and regulations that provide an additional ground - when the nomination is withdrawn by the party - for the substitution of a party-list nominee. RA 7941 lists only 3 grounds death, disability and withdrawal by the nominee himself. [Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180443, June 22, 2010]

A party-list nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the elections. [Amores v. HRET, G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010]

For every four district representatives, there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law.Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat.[BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009]

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:[1] Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every four existing legislative districts. [2] Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two percent of the total party-list votes. [3] The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizationsincluding those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. (Two-Step Procedure - The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation.) [4] The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from dominating the party-list system. [BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009]

Parameters for party-list registration: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. [Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013]

There is no arguing that the COMELEC Resolution dated January 5, 2010 granting LPGMAs registration has since become final. Such finality, however, pertains only to the Resolution itself and not to the accreditation of LPGMA as a party-list organization The Resolution did not create in LPGMAs favor a perpetual and indefeasible right to its accreditation as a party-list organization. Neither did it grant finality and indefeasibility to the factual findings of the COMELEC on the qualifications of the group. Both the accreditation and the facts substantiating the same can be reviewed and revoked at any time by the COMELEC, motu propio, or upon the instance of any interested party thru a complaint for cancellation, as set forth in Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941. [Dayao v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193643]

There are two kinds of congressmen elected from legislative districts and those elected through the party-list system. Once elected, the party-list representative has the same rights, privileges and duties as the district representative. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. The consistent judicial holding is that the HRET has jurisdiction to pass upon the qualifications of party-list nominees after their proclamation and assumption of office. [Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010]

No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already registered in order to ensure the latters continuous adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications and eligibility to participate in party-list elections. The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS vested right. Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS. The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. [Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 206844-45, July 23, 2013]

Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already registered "need not register anew" for purposes of every subsequent election, but only needs to file a manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013]

The fact that COCOFED did not obtain sufficient number of votes in the elections does not affect the issue of the validity of the COMELECs registration. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013]

A party is not allowed to simply refuse to submit a list containing "not less than five nominees" and consider the deficiency as a waiver on its part. [COCOFED v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207026, August 6, 2013; Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy (ANAD) v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206987, September 10, 2013]

Sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector evidence showing a track record in representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors is only required from nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and underrepresented who do not factually belong to the sector represented by their party or organization. [Abang Lingkod Party-List v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013]

Legislative Districts Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power.The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein. [Herrera v. COMELECInhibitions - allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another office of government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Legislative power - appropriation, taxation, expropriation - not exclusive to Congress initiative and referendum may be exercised directly by the people RA 6735 includes the power to amend or repeal laws.The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three categories, namely: scrutiny - to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities; investigation under Section 21; and supervision (or legislative veto) which connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority. xxx. The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on presentment.The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative springs from its authority to define and prescribe punishment for crimes. [Quarto v. the Honorable Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011]

The supermajority vote requirement set forth in Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 provides: Consistent with the provisions of the Constitution, this Organic Act may be re-amended or revised by the Congress of the Philippines upon a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate voting separately.] is unconstitutional for violating the principle that Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]

We rule out the first option holdover for those who were elected in executive and legislative positions in the ARMM during the 2008-2011 term as an option that Congress could have chosen because a holdover violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution the term of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view like the extension of the elective term is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into the constitutional appointment power of the President. [Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005; Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, October 18, 2011]

The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. [Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution]

Non-legislative powers of Congress canvass of presidential elections [VII, 5]; declaration of existence of a state of war [VII, 23 (2)]; resolution of conflicts between the President and a majority of his Cabinet regarding his ability to discharge his functions [VII, 11] confirmation of amnesties [VII, 19], and of presidential appointments [VII, 16]; amendment or revision of the Constitution [XVII]; and impeachment [XI].

Nature of Congress - Congress is not a continuing body.Electoral Tribunals - The resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power At the higher levels city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010 and June 7, 2011]

Electoral Tribunals shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (a) a valid proclamation, (b) a proper oath, and (c) assumption of office. A proper oath is one taken before the Speaker of the House of Representatives in open session, consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives. [Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013]

Considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member of the House of Representatives, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the Court is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the scope of the terms "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRETs sole jurisdiction. [Tanada v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 207199-200, October 22, 2013]

The term "election" refers to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.Commission on Appointments - shall rule by a majority of all its Members The President may not be compelled to submit his acting appointments to the CA for confirmation. [Pimentel v. Ermita] Ad interim appointments, which are permanent appointments [Matibag v. Benipayo], shall remain effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the adjournment of the next special or regular session of Congress. [Guevarra v. Inocentes] In a special session, the Congress may consider general legislation or only such subjects as the President may designate. In a regular session, the power of the Congress is not circumscribed except by limitations imposed by organic law. [Araneta v. Dinglasan]

Legislative Inquiries - Section21relatesto the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure. New session requires a new publication of rule, unless said rules would provide that they shall continue to be effective unless changed by a subsequent Congress. [Garcillano v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008]

Executive privilege with respect to the privilege for diplomatic negotiations may be invoked not only against citizens demands for information, but also in the context of legislative investigations.[AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] The subject of a legislative inquiry is a political question. [De la Paz v. Senate, G.R. No. 184849, February 13, 2009]

Appropriations - an item of appropriation as "an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose." An "item" is indivisible because the amount cannot be divided for any purpose other than the specific purpose stated in the item. [Footnote 211, Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013] An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill.

A General Appropriations Act contains an estimate of revenues and funding sources, which are usually (1) taxes, (2) capital revenues (like proceeds from the sales of assets), (3) grants, (4) extraordinary income (like dividends of government corporations) and (5) borrowings. Unprogrammed funds arise or exist when the estimated revenues are exceeded by actual receipts, e.g., unexpected large dividends from government institutions like the Social Security System and Government Service Insurance System. Savings occur when estimated expenditures are not spent, e.g. (a) the PAPs (projects, activities or programs) for which the appropriation had been authorized was completed, finally discontinued, or abandoned; or (b) there were vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; or (c) the required or planned targets, programs and services were realized at a lesser cost because of the implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies. The act or practice of transferring funds prior to the end of the fiscal year, which did not meet any of those three instances, is unconstitutional. [Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014]

An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. .. the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Enrolled Bills - That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill does not detract from its validityThis Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses. [Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004]

Log-rolling legislation - refers to the process in which several provisions supported by an individual legislator or minority of legislators are combined into a single piece of legislation supported by a majority of legislators on a quid pro quo basis: no one provision may command majority support, but the total package will. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Instances when vote needs to be recorded at the request of 1/5 [16, 4], vote on third reading [26, 2], overriding vote in case of veto [27, 1], HR impeachment vote [XI, 3, 3].

Presidential certification [economic emergency] does away with the requirements of three readings on separate days and distribution of final copies three days before enactment. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]

Note Article VII, Section 10 simultaneous vacancies in the offices of the President and the Vice-President - The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation. [Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014]

Although not provided for in the Constitution, Congress has established the so-called Conference Committee, composed of representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives, which is a mechanism for compromising differences between their respective versions of a bill or joint resolution. It has been ruled that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill and whatever changes may be agreed upon by the Conference Committee need not undergo another three readings in the Senate and the House of Representatives. [Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance]

Partial veto general rule approve entirely or disapprove in toto, except with respect to appropriations bills.In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already indicates a "specific appropriation of money and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a "line-item." [Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013]

Power of Taxation - Since building permit fees are not charges on property, they are not impositions from which petitioner is exempt. [Angeles University Foundation v. City of Angeles, G.R. No. 189999, June 27, 2012]

Double taxation - petitioner should not have been subjected to taxes under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code for the fourth quarter of 2001, considering that it had already been paying local business tax under Section 14 of the same ordinance. [Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of the City of Manila, G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013]

Inititatives Any proposal to enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress shall be valid only if ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than forty-five days but not later than ninety days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

ARTICLE VII The President is granted Ordinance Powers under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) and may issue any of the following: xxx Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders. Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders. Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order. Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or office of the Government shall be embodied in memorandum orders. Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. Acts of the President on matters relating to internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in memorandum circulars. Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. Acts and commands of the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or special orders.

The President may not invoke Section 17 of Article XII, which would authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress. BUT the President alone can declare a state of national emergency; however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. [David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]

A verbal pronouncement to the effect that E.O. No. 304 is suspended should not have been given weight. An executive order is valid when it is not contrary to the law or Constitution.We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law.Executive Power - Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. [Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, G.R. No. 196425, July 24, 2012]

As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence Executive Privilege - The Presidents executive privilege covers all presidential communications. [AKBAYAN v. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008] However, the privilege accorded to presidential communications is not absolute, one significant qualification being that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. Executive privilege, which includes conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9. 002); military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998); and matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002), MAY BE INVOKED against this legislative power. BUT note that executive officials are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted, and not merely implied.In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is By order of the President, which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. [3] That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.[1] Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.[Peoples Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. ManglapusPresidential Communications Privilege applies to decision-making of the President; rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique constitutional role. The elements of presidential communications privilege are - 1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessentialand non-delegable presidential power. 2)The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.Deliberative Process Privilege applies to decision-making of executive officials; based on common law privilege.

Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative onesPower of Appointment - In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, [G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317] this Court explained that the prohibition contained in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary function of said official's office.

The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To hold an office means to possess or occupy the same, or to be in possession and administration,The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other. [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013]A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned. In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of Justice, assuming that was his later designation, were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for the office. This clarification is necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State. Agras official actions covered by this clarification extend to but are not limited to the promulgation of resolutions on petitions for review filed in the Department of Justice, and the issuance of department orders, memoranda and circulars relative to the prosecution of criminal cases. [Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013]Assuming that Gaite was a de facto officer of the Office of the President after his appointment to the Securities and Exchange Commission, any decision he renders during this time is presumed to be valid, binding, and effective. [Espiritu v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 204964, October 15, 2014]Section 15 [of Article VII, on prohibited or midnight appointments] does not apply to the Judiciary. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. [De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, G. R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010]

Confirmation is required only for the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. [Sarmiento v. Mison] Commissioner of Human Rights not subject to confirmation; not included in the first sentence. [Bautista v. Salonga] NLRC commissioners do not require confirmation. [Calderon v. Carale] Constitutional Commissioners require confirmation. Members of the Judiciary do not require confirmation, only JBC nomination. Judicial and Bar Council [regular members] require confirmation. Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsmen do not require confirmation, just JBC nomination. The Vice-President, when appointed to the Cabinet, requires no confirmation.

Now that the Philippine Coast Guard is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. [Soriano III v. Lista, G.R. 153881, March 24, 2003]Given that the President derives his power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the Presidents appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]

The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, which merely grants the President the power of supervision over autonomous regions There is no incompatibility between the Presidents power of supervision over local governments and autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs Once the President has appointed the OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners fears in this regard are more apparent than real. [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]

The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook). [Section 35. Filling of vacancy. - Pending an election to fill a vacancy arising from any cause in the Sangguniang Pampook, the vacancy shall be filled by the President, upon recommendation of the Sangguniang Pampook: Provided, That the appointee shall come from the same province or sector of the member being replaced.] [Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196271, February 28, 2012]

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. [Cabiling v. Pabualan, G.R. Nos. L-21764 and L-21765, May 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 274]

Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authoritys opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants. [General v. Urro, G.R. No. 191560, March 29, 2011]

The President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. [Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.]; Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos v. Martinez, G.R. No. 170626, March 3, 2008]The authority of the CSC is only to determine whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications and the appropriate eligibility, nothing else. [Lopez v. Civil Service Commission]

The CSC may not approve as temporary an appointment designated as permanent by the appointing authority. [Luego v. Civil Service Commission]

The CSC classified the position of Graft Investigation Officer III as belonging to the Career Executive Service; appointee to the position required to acquire CES eligibility [CES officers, under the Administrative Code, are appointed by the President]. Ombudsman challenges the classification, saying that it impairs his appointment prerogative as guaranteed under the Constitution. SC: classification would result in absurdity [a] it would vest in the President the power to appoint an employee of the Ombudsman, in violation of the Constitution, or [b] it would include in the CES a position not occupied by a presidential appointee, contrary to the Administrative Code. The CSC may not classify a position [Graft Investigation Officer III of the Office of the Ombudsman] as belonging to the Career Executive Service and require an appointee thereto to acquire CES eligibility, because CES officers are appointed by the President. This derogates the appointing power of the Ombudsman. A CES appointment not effected by the President is contrary to the provisions of the Administrative Code. [Office of the Ombudsman v. Civil Service Commission, 451 SCRA 570]

An ad interim appointment that has lapsed by inaction of the Commission on Appointments does not constitute a term of office. The period from the time the ad interim appointment is made to the time it lapses is neither a fixed term nor an unexpired term. [Fetalino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191890, December 04, 2012]

In the voting held on January 28, 2014, by a vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to reverse its September 4, 2012 Decision insofar as petitioner Gonzales is concerned (G.R. No. 196231). We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence, not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to declare Section 8(2) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. This ruling renders any further ruling on the dismissal of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III unnecessary, but is without prejudice to the power of the Ombudsman to conduct an administrative investigation, if warranted, into the possible administrative liability of Deputy Ombudsman Emilio Gonzales III under pertinent Civil Service laws, rules and regulations. [Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, January 28, 2014, Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration]

Power of control - if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision and control over the departments. [Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328]Memorandum Circular No. 58,But the doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board. [Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Manalang-Demigillo]Such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. All the more in the matter of appellate procedure as in the instant case. Appeals are remedial in nature; hence, constitutionally subject to this Courts rulemaking power. The Rules of Procedure was issued by the Court pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, which expressly empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the procedure in all courts. Parenthetically, Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 18 expressly recognizes an exception to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of executive departments and agencies. Under Section 1 thereof, a decision or order issued by a department or agency need not be appealed to the Office of the President when there is a special law that provides for a different mode of appeal. In the instant case, the enabling law of respondent BOI, E.O. No. 226, explicitly allows for immediate judicial relief from the decision of respondent BOI involving petitioners application for an ITH. E.O. No. 226 is a law of special nature and should prevail over A.O. No. 18. In this case, a special law, RA 7394, likewise expressly provided for immediate judicial relief from decisions of the DTI Secretary by filing a petition for certiorari with the "proper court." Hence, private respondent should have elevated the case directly to the CA through a petition for certiorari. [Moran v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 192957, September 29, 2014]Faithful Execution of Laws - The Presidents discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. [Almario v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 189028, July 16, 2013]

The creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. [Section 17, Article VII] [Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010]

Since the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions, orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43.[Santos v. Go, G.R. No. 156081, October 19, 2005]

Commander-in-Chief - Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP, can be held liable for affront against the petitioners rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the rules. The Court also stresses that rule that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the presidents incumbency. [Rodriguez v. Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 191805, November 15, 2011, citing Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 146738, March 2, 2001, 353 SCRA 452]

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. [Fortun v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012]

In Marcos v. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines [89 Phil, 246 (1951)], this Court ruled that a court-martial case is a criminal case and the General Court Martial is a "court" akin to any other courts. In the case of Ramon Ruffy vs. Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, 43 Off. Gaz., 855, we did not hold that the word "court" in general used in our Constitution does not include a Court-Martial; what we held is that the words "inferior courts" used in connection with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to "review on appeal certiorari or writ of error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments of inferior courts in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment," as provided for in section 2, Article VIII, of the Constitution, do not refer to Courts-Martial or Military Courts. The fact that a judgment of conviction, not of acquittal, rendered by a court-martial must be approved by the reviewing authority before it can be executed (Article of War 46), does not change or affect the character of a court-martial as a court. A judgment of the Court of First Instance imposing death penalty must also be approved by the Supreme Court before it can be executed. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012]

The power to confirm a sentence of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, includes the power to approve or disapprove the entire or any part of the sentence given by the court martial. [Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012]

Pardoning Power - criminal and administrative remedies for violation of conditional pardon are not mutually exclusive and may be successively availed of by the President for the punishment of the conditional pardon. recommitment/criminal prosecution for violation of conditional pardon/criminal prosecution for new offense if violation of the condition constitutes a separate criminal offense. [Culanag v. Director of Prisons]

A conditional pardonee committed usurpation of public functions. New case dismissed for lack of witnesses. President ordered his commitment. SC sustained saying mere commission, not conviction required for recommitment. [Espuelas v. Provincial Warden of Bohol , affirmed in Sumulong v. Gonzales]The Pardon included a preambular clause which read: WHEREAS, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional Contrary to Risos-Vidals declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estradas rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights" as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon. [Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015]

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. x x x Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. x x x [Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012]

Treaties - The power to ratify treaties is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate.The President may not be compelled to submit a treaty to the Senate for concurrence. [Pimentel v. Executive Secretary] Executive Agreements do not require the concurrence of the Senate for their validity. An executive agreement may not amend a treaty. [Adolfo v. CFI of Zambales]

The Contract Agreement xxx between Northrail and CNMEG does not partake of