SANIDAD vs COMELEC G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 FACTS:

Petitioners filed the petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.

Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.

The Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 was a justiciable one

HELD:

Yes. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the

power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.

AQUINO vs ENRILE G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974 FACTS:

The petitioners having been arrested and held pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force ...", filed the petitions for habeas corpus.

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law. ISSUE:

Whether or not the validity of Proclamation No. 1081 is subject to

judicial inquiry HELD:

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino held that the question is political and should not be determined by court. Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the Court's jurisdiction, the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of policy implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation, dealing as it does with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone.

Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of the grounds for the declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. Justice Antonio, finds that there is no dispute as to the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his responsibility being directly to the people.

The question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been

foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973 Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution ..." Thus, this provision validates all acts made by the President. YNOT vs IAC G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 FACTS:

Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No 626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court. He then petition to the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation without giving the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the improper exercise of legislative power by the former President under Amendment 6 of the 1973 Constitution wherein Marcos was given emergency powers to issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that had the force of law. ISSUE:

Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional HELD:

Yes. While it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may be rebutted. The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for

the purpose of taking care that the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.

Case no. 4 (Requisites of Judicial Review/Inquiry) Actual Case

Mariano vs Comelec G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995

Facts:

Two (2) petitions assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 entitled “"An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati” as unconstitutional.

They contend that section 51 collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution where elective local officials, including Members of the House of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.

Issue:

Whether petitioners’ arguments are tenable for litigation

Held:

No. The court dismissed the petitions.

The court cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

Case #5 (Requisites of Judicial Review/Inquiry) Actual Case

SALONGA vs PAÑO G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985 Facts:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4 January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues:

1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme Court

Held:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under the questioned resolution.

The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.

Case #6 (Requisites of Judicial Review/Inquiry) Actual Case

Perez vs Provincial Board G.R. No. L-35474 March 29, 1982 Facts:

This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to annul Resolution No. 228 (ordering respondent Provincial Treasurer to stop payment of petitioner's salaries as acting provincial fiscal) of the respondent Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, dated August 21, 1972; to enjoin respondents from enforcing and implementing said Resolution; and to compel respondents to recognize petitioner Honorato Perez as acting provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

Whether the aforementioned petition constitutes an actual case and therefore subject for judicial review

Held:

No. The SC deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the issues raised, this petition having become moot and academic. The court took cognizance of the fact that petitioner Perez filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor of Cabanatuan City in the local elections of January 30, 1980. The mere filing of a certificate of candidacy constitutes forfeiture of his right to the controverted office under Section 29 of the Election Code of 1978 which provides:

SEC. 29. Candidates holding appointive office or position.— Every person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall ipso facto cease in his office or position on the date he files his certificate of candidacy. Members of the Cabinet shall continue in the offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of certificate of candidacy, subject to the pleasure of the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied).

A petition instituted to establish petitioner's right to an appointive office is rendered moot and academic where his right to said office has been forfeited by his filing of a certificate of candidacy to an elective office.

PHILCONSA VS. VILLAREAL G.R. No. L-33517 March 29, 1974 FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Constitution Association, joined by other petitioners, all delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, suing in

their capacity as such as well as citizens and taxpayers, filed this mandamus proceeding on May 15, 1971 praying that a writ be issued ordering respondents Cornelio T. Villareal, in his capacity as Speaker of the then House of Representatives, the Chief Accountant thereof, as well as its Auditor, to inspect and examine the books, records, vouchers and other supporting papers of the House of Representatives that have relevance to the alleged transfer of P26.2 million from various executive offices to the House of Representatives as well as its books, records, vouchers and other supporting papers dealing with the original outlay of the P39 million as appropriated for the 1969-1970 fiscal year. ISSUE:

Whether or not The petition is moot and academic.

HELD:

Yes, the petition is already moot and academic.

The Supreme Court held that there is no need to pass on the merits of the various legal issues raised as in accordance with the ruling in Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. v. Gimenez, promulgated on February 28, 1974, a suit of this character has become moot and academic with the effectivity of the 1971 Constitution and the consequent abolition of the House of Representatives.

DAVID VS. ARROYO G.R. No. 17396 May 3, 2006 FACTS:

Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a “sequence” of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” But the President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the limitations.

On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, in a move to suppress alleged plans to overthrow the government, issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017), declaring a state of national emergency. She cited as factual bases for the said issuance the escape of the Magdalo Group and their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day; the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines; and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. On the same day, she issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) setting the standards which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) should follow in the suppression and prevention of acts of lawless violence. The following were considered as additional factual bases for the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5: the bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan; the raid of an army outpost in Benguet resulting in the death of three soldiers; and the directive of the Communist Party of the Philippines ordering its front organizations to join5,000 Metro Manila radicals and 25,000 more from the provinces in mass protests. Immediately, the Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th People Power I anniversary celebration. It revoked permits to hold rallies. Members of the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) and the National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), who marched from various parts of Metro Manila to converge at the EDSA Shrine, were violently dispersed by anti-riot police. Professor Randolf David, Akbayan party-list president Ronald Llamas, and members of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU were arrested without a warrant. In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and confiscated news stories, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen were stationed inside the editorial and business offices, as well as outside the building. A few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. The PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the government during the state of national emergency.”

On March 3, 2006, exactly one week from the declaration of a

state of national emergency and after all the present petitions had been filed, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1021 (PP 1021), declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist and lifting PP1017. These consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. It is contended that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 rendered the present

petitions moot and academic; 2.) Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing; 3.) Whether or not there were factual bases for the issuance of PP

1017; 4.) Whether or not PP 1017 is a declaration of Martial Law; 5.) Whether or not PP 1017 arrogates unto the President the

power to legislate; 6.) Whether or not PP 1017 authorizes the President to take over

privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest; and 7.) Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are constitutional

HELD: The Petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. The issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot

and academic because all the exceptions to the “moot and academic” principle are present.

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

(1)there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2)the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount

public interest is involved; (3)the constitutional issue raised requires formulation

of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4)the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All these

exceptions are present here. It is alleged that the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public interest, involving as they do the people’s basic rights to the freedoms of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. Lastly, the contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the present petitions are subject to judicial review.

All the petitioners have legal standing in view of the

transcendental importance of the issue involved. It has been held that the person who impugns the validity of a

statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met: (a)the cases

involve constitutional issues; (b)for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (c)for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (d)for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and (e)for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

Being a mere procedural technicality, however, the requirement

of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. The question of locus standi is but corollary to the bigger question of proper exercise of judicial power. Undoubtedly, the validity of PP No. 1017 and G.O.

The illegal implementation of PP 1017, through G.O. No. 5, does

not render these issuances unconstitutional. The criterion by which the validity of a statute or ordinance is to

be measured is the essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental result arising from its exertion. PP 1017 is limited to the calling out by the President of the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. It had accomplished the end desired which prompted President Arroyo to issue PP 1021. But there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police, expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights. But when in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

David, et al. were arrested without a warrant while they were

exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present danger that warranted the limitation of that right. Likewise, the dispersal and arrest of members of KMU, et al. were unwarranted. Apparently, their dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all permits to hold rallies. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.” Furthermore, the search of the Daily Tribune offices is illegal. Not only that, the search violated petitioners’ freedom of the press. It cannot be denied that the CIDG operatives exceeded their enforcement duties. The search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of the offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media, are plain censorship.

The “acts of terrorism” portion of G.O. No. 5 is, however, unconstitutional. G.O. No. 5 mandates the AFP and the PNP to immediately carry out the “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.” The phrase “acts of terrorism” is stillan amorphous and vague concept. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this aspect is absolute, without restrictions. Consequently, there can be indiscriminate arrest without warrants, breaking into offices and residences, taking over the media enterprises, prohibition and dispersal of all assemblies and gatherings unfriendly to the administration. All these can be effected in the name of G.O. No. 5. These acts go far beyond the calling-out power of the President. Certainly, they violate the due process clause of the Constitution. OPOSA VS. FACTORAN G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 FACTS:

The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on rainforest.

They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the

generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology. Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi. Held:

Locus standi means the right of the litigant to act or to be heard.

The SC decided in the affirmative.

Under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 constitution, it states that: The state shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. Petitioners, minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generation yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding

generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”. Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters fisheries, wildlife, off- shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. This landmark case has been ruled as a class suit because the subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest, not just for several but for ALL CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES. Bottom line:

These minors have fought for our rights up to the highest level of

legal remedy. These minors thought of our interest and right. These minors battled for our sons and daughters and those yet to come. These minors were concern for us to live in a balanced and healthful ecology. Sadly, we, who are learned and with discernment, are oblivious. Until when do we learn our lesson? Remember, we have an "INTERGENERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY" to our future generations. SANIDAD vs. COMELEC G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976 FACTS: On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 991 calling for a national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

On September 22, 1976, the President issued PD No. 1031, amending PD No. 991, by declaring the provisions of PD No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, PD No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991.

The President issued PD No. 1033, stating the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16

The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite.

On September 27, 1976, petitioners filed for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis

On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for COMELEC maintaining that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners have a locus standi

HELD:

Yes. Petitioners possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers,

laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos (P5M) for the effective implementation of its purposes. Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos (P8M) to carry out its provisions. The interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said funds. For the present case, Court deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994

FACTS: On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Presidential Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioners are suing in their capacity as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. The Berjaya Group Berhad, "a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC), which "was intended to be the medium through which the technical and management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO." PGMC submitted its bid which was given a go-signal by the Office of the President in October 1993. Kilosbayan opposed such on-line lottery. On December 1993, a "Contract of Lease" was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC, which was approved by the Office of the President. Petitioner claims that the respondents gravely abused their discretion tantamount to a lack of authority by entering into the contract because:

a) Section 1 of the Charter of the PCSO prohibits holding and conducting lotteries "in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity";

b) Under Act No. 3846 and established jurisprudence, a Congressional franchise is required before any person may be allowed to establish and operate said telecommunications system;

c) Under Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, a less than 60% Filipino-owned and/or controlled corporation, like the PGMC, is disqualified from operating a public service, like the said telecommunications system; and

d) PGMC is not authorized by its charter and under the Foreign Investment Act (R.A. No. 7042) to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and telecommunications systems,

Petitioner emphasized that the terms and conditions of Contract shows that PGMC is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO. The respondents, on the other hand, contends that

a) PGMC is merely an independent contractor, whose role is limited to that of a lessor of the facilities b) There is no shared franchise c) The establishment of the telecommunications system does not require a congressional franchise because PGMC will not operate a public utility since it is not for business purposes but for its own use, which is indispensable in on-line lottery system. d) The contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws e) The petitioner's interpretation of the phrase "in collaboration, association or joint venture" in Section 1 is "much too narrow, strained and utterly devoid of logic" for it "ignores the reality that PCSO is vested with the basic and essential prerogative to enter into all kinds of transactions or contracts as may be necessary for the attainment of its purposes and objectives f) The issue on the "morality" of the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial g) The petitioners do not appear to have the legal standing or real interest in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought

ISSUES:

1. W/N the petitioners have the legal standing to file the instant petition

2. Whether or not the contract of lease is legal and valid

HELD:

1. Yes. The Court resolved to set aside the procedural technicality in view of the importance of the issues raised. The Court adopted the liberal policy on locus standi to allow the ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations to initiate and prosecute actions to question the validity or constitutionality of laws, acts, decisions, or rulings of various government agencies or instrumentalities.

The Court finds the petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of.

2. No. The Contract is illegal. The language of section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42 is indisputably clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege "to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities," the PCSO cannot exercise it "in collaboration, association or joint venture" with any other party. This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase "except for the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraph (A)," namely, "charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities." The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise.

Also, a careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the

contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration or association, in the least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties. That is, Animus homini est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the soul of the instrument.

The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. The true intention of the parties is to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. The PCSO has only its franchise to offer, while the PGMC represents and warrants that it has access to all managerial and technical expertise to promptly and effectively carry out the terms of the contract, and bears all expenses and assumes all risks. The parties are in indivisible community of interest in the conception, birth and growth of the on-line lottery, and, above all, in its profits, with each having a right in

the formulation and implementation of policies related to the business and sharing, as well, in the losses. The actual lessor in this case is the PCSO and the subject matter thereof is its franchise to hold and conduct lotteries since it is, in reality, the PGMC which operates and manages the on-line lottery system for a period of eight years

IBP vs. ZAMORA G.R. No. 141284 August 15, 2000 FACTS:

In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, the President ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. It is aimed to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") was formulated which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Also, it was stated that the services of the Marines are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the "IBP") filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. It alleged that the deployment of the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila violated of the Constitution since there is no emergency situation to warrant the deployment. Also, it claimed that the Administration is unwittingly making military more powerful than what it should really be under the Constitution.

The Solicitor General vigorously defends the constitutionality of

the act of the President contending that petitioner has no legal standing; that the question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols does not violate the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. W/N petitioner has legal standing 2. W/N it violates civilian supremacy over the military and the

civilian character of the PNP

HELD:

1. No. IBP failed to sufficiently show that it is in possession of the requisites of standing to raise the issues in the petition.

"Legal standing" or locus standi is a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. Such "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree.

In this case, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this, there is no other basis presented. The mere invocation by the IBP of such duty is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Also, the IBP has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.

Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. Thus, it behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue at hand.

2. No. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines’ authority. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force.

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 159085 FEBRUARY 3, 2004

FACTS:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. ISSUES: (1) Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional? (2) Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit? HELD:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004 FACTS:

On 7 June 1995, Congress passed Republic Act 8046, which

authorized Comelec to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).

On 22 December 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act 8436

authorizing Comelec to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also mandated the poll body to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials; and to adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. Initially intending to implement the automation during the 11 May 1998 presidential elections, Comelec -- in its Resolution 2985 dated 9 February 1998 -- eventually decided against full national implementation and limited the automation to the ARMM. However, due to the failure of the machines to read correctly some automated ballots in one town, the poll body later ordered their manual count for the entire Province of Sulu. In the May 2001 elections, the counting and canvassing of votes for both national and local positions were also done manually, as no additional ACMs had been acquired for that electoral exercise allegedly because of time constraints.

On 29 October 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a

modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission. On 24 January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 billion to fund the AES for the 10 May 2004 elections. Upon the request of Comelec, she authorized the release of an additional P500 million.

On January 28, 2003, the Commission issued an "Invitation to

Apply for Eligibility and to Bid." On 11 February 2003, Comelec issued Resolution 5929 clarifying certain eligibility criteria for bidders and the schedule of activities for the project bidding. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bidding and Awards Committee (BAC) found the Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC) and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. For technical evaluation, they were referred to the BAC’s Technical Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Technology (DOST). In its Report on the Evaluation of the Technical Proposals on Phase II, DOST said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures, Comelec en banc, on 15 April 2003, promulgated Resolution 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on 16 May 2003. On 29 May 2003, five individuals and entities (including the Information Technology

Foundation of the Philippines, represented by its president, Alfredo M. Torres; and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. They protested the award of the Contract to MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements, they sought a re-bidding. In a letter-reply dated 6 June 2003, the Comelec chairman -- speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, his head executive assistant -- rejected the protest and declared that the award "would stand up to the strictest scrutiny." Hence, the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether ITF, et. al. have the locus standi to file the case

questioning the validity of the election computerization bidding. HELD:

As alleged, Comelec’s flawed bidding and questionable award of the Contract to an unqualified entity would impact directly on the success or the failure of the electoral process. Any taint on the sanctity of the ballot as the expression of the will of the people would inevitably affect their faith in the democratic system of government. Further, the award of any contract for automation involves disbursement of public funds are in gargantuan amounts; therefore, public interest requires that the laws governing the transaction must be followed strictly.

There can be no serious doubt that the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest";18 in other words, it is of "paramount public interest"19 and "transcendental importance."20 This fact alone would justify relaxing the rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of overarching significance to our society."21 Petitioners’ legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.

Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement of public funds,"22 or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose";23 or when petitioners seek to restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law."24 In the instant case, individual petitioners, suing as taxpayers, assert a material interest in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used. In the Petition, they claim that the bidding was defective, the winning bidder not a qualified entity, and the award of the Contract contrary to law and regulation. Accordingly, they seek to restrain respondents from implementing the Contract and, necessarily, from making any

unwarranted expenditure of public funds pursuant thereto. Thus, we hold that petitioners possess locus standi.

Lim vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002

FACTS:

Beginning 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States started arriving in Mindanao, to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1″. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.

On Feb. 2002, Lim filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called “Balikatan 02-1″, and that after due notice and hearing, judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injuction and/or prohibition against the deployment of US troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the “constitutional processes” of each country only in the case of a armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

HELD:

In his Comment, the Solicitor General points to infirmities in the petitions regarding, inter alia, Lim and Ersando's standing to file suit, the prematurity of the action, as well as the impropriety of availing of

certiorari to ascertain a question of fact. Anent their locus standi, the Solicitor General argues that first, they may not file suit in their capacities as, taxpayers inasmuch as it has not been shown that "Balikatan 02-1 " involves the exercise of Congress' taxing or spending powers. Second, their being lawyers does not invest them with sufficient personality to initiate the case, citing our ruling in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora.5 Third, Lim and Ersando have failed to demonstrate the requisite showing of direct personal injury. We agree.

It is all too apparent that the determination thereof involves basically a question of fact. On this point, we must concur with the Solicitor General that the present subject matter is not a fit topic for a special civil action for certiorari. We have held in too many instances that questions of fact are not entertained in such a remedy. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion: The phrase "grave abuse of discretion" has a precise meaning in law, denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility."

DOMINGO v CARAGUE 456 SCRA 450SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ July 18,1991 FACTS:

Petitioners Eufemio C. Domingo, Celso C. Gangan,Pascasio S. Banaria are retired Chairmen, while Sofronio B. Ursal, and Alberto P. Cruz are retired Commissioners of COA.

All claim 'to maintain a deep-seated abiding interest in the affairs of COA, especially in its Organizational Restructuring Plan, as concerned taxpayers.

The other petitioners are incumbent officers or employees of COA. These petitioners claim that they were unceremoniously divested of their designations/ranks upon implementation of the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan without just cause and without due process, in violation of Civil Service Law. Moreover, they were deprived of their respective Representation and Transportation Allowances (RATA), thus causing them undue financial prejudice.

Petitioners now invoke this Court’s judicial power to strike down the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan for being unconstitutional or illegal.

Petitioners contend that the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan is not just a mere reorganization but a revamp or overhaul of the COA, with a 'spillover effect upon its audit performance. This will have an impact upon the rest of the government bodies subject to its audit supervision, thus, should be treated as a matter of transcendental importance. Consequently, petitioners' legal standing should be recognized and upheld. ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to institute the instant petition. HELD:

Judicial power is the power to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue in courts of law and equity. Corollary to this dictum is the principle of locus standi of a litigant. He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of judicial power on his behalf.

Here, petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that 'they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents' and 'are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain.

Clearly, they do not have any legal standing to file the instant suit.

UMALI VS. GUINGONA 305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; MARCH 29, 1999 Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994.

On August 1, 1994, President Ramos received a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.

Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence on record, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the recommendation of the PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law. Issues:

(1) Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.

(2) Whether or Not Petitioner was denied due process of law. (3) Whether or Not the PCAGC is a validly Constituted government

agency and whether the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts decision.

(4) Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still basis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152 Held:

Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed for cause and under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of the legal causes or grounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the ground of loss confidence violated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized. After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure, petitioner was not denied the right to due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and regulations, and he attended

the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus decisively clear that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of any factual or legal basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's claim of CESO eligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal.

As regards the issue of constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.

The charges included in Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and not on the criminal charges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition is dismissable on the ground that the Issue posited by the petitioner do not constitute a valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided to consider the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct and unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue that his office is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as effective and substantive supervening events that cannot be overlooked. FRANCISCO VS. FERNANDO G.R. NO. 166501 NOVEMBER 16, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. (“petitioner”), as member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and taxpayer, filed this original action for the issuance of the writs of Prohibition and Mandamus. Petitioner prays for the Prohibition writ to enjoin respondents Bayani F. Fernando, Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the MMDA (“respondents”) from further implementing its “wet flag scheme” (“Flag Scheme”). The Mandamus writ is to compel respondents to “respect and uphold the x x x rights of pedestrians to due process x x x and equal protection of the laws x x x.”

In their Comment, respondents sought the dismissal of the petition for petitioner’s lack of standing to litigate and for violation of the

doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Alternatively, respondents contended that the Flag Scheme is a valid preventive measure against jaywalking.Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA’s governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates “pedestrian rights” as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. Petitioner filed a Reply, claiming that the Court should take cognizance of the case as it raises issues of “paramount and transcendental importance.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the standing to litigate HELD: No the petitioner has no standing to llitigate A citizen can raise a constitutional question only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) a favorable action will likely redress the injury.1 On the other hand, a party suing as a taxpayer must specifically show that he has a sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute. Petitioner meets none of the requirements under either category

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY G.R. No. L-21603 April 15, 1968 FACTS:

Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.

CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of

interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. ISSUE:

WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal. HELD:

YES. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Other merits on the appeal: The surety insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

STONE VS. SMITH 101 U.S. 814 October 1879 FACTS:

In 1867, the Mississippi legislature granted a charter to a lottery company that was to be valid for 25 years. In 1869, the legislature passed a law that “legislature shall never authorize any lottery; nor shall the sale of lottery-tickets be allowed; nor shall any lottery heretofore authorized be permitted to be drawn, or tickets therein to be sold,” which was ratified by the people. The attorney general of Mississippi filed suit to declare the 25-year charter repealed.

Stone argued that he was exercising his rights under corporation’s charter to operate a lottery and these rights were not extinguished by the passage of the constitutional provision.

Mississippi agreed that Stone was complying with his charter, but argued that the charter was repealed by the passage of the said constitutional provision.

ISSUE:

Does a state legislature have the right to revoke the charter of a lottery company through exercise of its police powers against popular sentiment?

HELD:

The legislation prohibiting lotteries and gambling does not conflict with the contracts clause of the Constitution. The lottery company has nothing more than a license to enjoy the privilege or the time agreed, subject to future legislation or constitutional control.

A legislature may not “bargain away” the ability to provide for public health, safety, and morals or “divest itself of the power to provide for them.” The Court considered lotteries and gambling to be included with and subject to the police powers.

Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000 FACTS:

Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was therefore issued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, examining and/or prescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc.

When it was found that petitioner violated these conditions, its

business permit was cancelled. ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires HELD:

Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

The scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive

as to encompass almost all matters affecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. Power of city mayor to grant business permits

The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and

business permits is beyond cavil. It is provided for by law.

However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.

But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose

special conditions? As aptly discussed by the Solicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewise includes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.

Did the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation

of the business? Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the local

authorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particular profession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or some form of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.

In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent

City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of optometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are duly licensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

CALALANG, vs. A. D. WILLIAMS G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940 FACTS:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of 17 July 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, on 18 July 1940, recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution, in pursuance of the provisions of Commonwealth Act 548, which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.

On 2 August 1940, the Director of Public Works, in his first

endorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street. On 10 August 1940, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, in his second endorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works, approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as indicated, for

a period of 1 year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulations thus adopted.

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a

taxpayer of Manila, brought before the Supreme court the petition for a writ of prohibition against A. D. Williams, as Chairman of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila. ISSUES:

1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the Director

of Public Works infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power?

HELD:

1) The promotion of social justice is to be achieved not through a

mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

2) There is no undue delegation of legislative power.

Commonwealth Act 548 does not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred upon them and under which they

promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines” and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest.”

The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination

of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.